Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 6. Shooting with Roon
So, for example, V.Yu. Gribovsky paid less time to this paragraph:
A.G. Patients in his usual chopped manner reports:
But in fact, the period between the two fights is very interesting and eventful - let's try to understand them.
So, after the German minelayer was on Swedish stones at 09.12, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev should have been convinced that the Albatross could not leave the Swedish waters on its own, and then gather its squad together and return home. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account that the Russian ships diverged quite widely - judging by the Russian scheme, the distance between Bayan and Admiral Makarov was at least 10-12 miles, and Oleg with Bogatyr were still further from Bayan to North.
Perhaps this distance was less, but it is obvious that the Russian cruisers really stretched very much. In other words, just to get the Bayan to reach Admiral Makarov, it took about half an hour on the condition that he would start moving immediately after the Albatros landed on the stones - and then it was necessary to catch up with the armored cruisers. In principle, this time could have been shortened if Admiral Makarov had ordered Bogatyr and Oleg and had gone himself to rapprochement with Bayan, but why would he do that? Such an act would make sense in view of the enemy, but he was not on the horizon. "Augsburg" ran, but even if it appeared, it could be regarded as a gift to the gunners of "Bayan". In other words, there was no reason why the Russian commander should urgently run towards Bayan, and not wait for his approach.
Then follows one of the many mysteries of this battle, to which it is unlikely to ever be answered. It is known that in 09.35 "Bogatyr" "discovered" a submarine to the east of itself, as it radioed the rest of the brigade ships. Further colorfully describes the commander of "Bayan" A.K. Weiss in his characteristic humorous manner:
It seems that everything is clear, but none of the other domestic or foreign sources mention the “mad shooting” after 09.35. On the other hand, V.Yu. Gribovsky mentions that the cruiser M.K. Bakhirev opened fire on the alleged submarines for a lot after the battle with "Roon":
Could it be that AK Weiss summed up the memory, and the shelling, which he described, did not occur in 09.35, and later? Or, on the contrary, it is V. Yu. Gribovsky wrongly referred to this episode at a later time? Or maybe the Russian cruisers “fought” with submarines both before and after the skirmish with the “Roon”? Alas, the answer to this question can not be given. Yet, according to the author, there is one clue that allows to assume that the Russians shot before the fight with “Rooom”. A.K. Weiss mentions a bullet from a smoke bomb on which the fire was fired, and she could only be from those dumped, covering the Augsburg and the Albatross, German torpedo boats. Of course, after 11 hours, Russian cruisers left the place where the smoke screen was set too far away to be able to shell these shells, but in 09.35 they could do it.
Given the above, the actions of the Russian detachment are as follows - a few minutes after the Albatross threw itself on the rocks, that is, approximately in 09.12-09.20, the Bayan went to connect with the brigade cruisers, Admiral Makarov probably approached the wreck of the Albatross, and Bogatyr and Oleg remained north. Then, at Makarov, making sure that the enemy ship was not leaving anywhere, they turned to the 2 second semi-brigade armored cruisers, but did not rush to unite with them, waiting for the Bayan approach. In 09.35, the Bogatyr “discovered” the submarine and opened fire on it, the other cruisers also “supported” it, which obviously prevented them from forming a wake column, and besides, the “Bayan” was still too far away. By 09.50, apparently, the "shooting of submarines" ended, and M.K. Bakhirev ordered his brigade to retreat to the northeast. Almost immediately (shortly after 09.50), six fumes were discovered on the horizon, which were identified as Roon, Lübeck and four destroyers in 10.00 (or 10.00 or 10.01, the time in different sources is different) again rattled the guns.
This reconstruction has no contradictions with any well-known author of the description of the battle and perfectly explains why by the time of fire contact with the “Roon” the 1 crew of cruisers was still not built into the wake column: the ships simply stretched too much, cutting off the “Albatross” possible ways to retreat and physically could not quickly get together. Judging by the scheme, in order for “Admiral Makarov” and “Bayan” to “catch up” with the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg” located north, it took at least 40 minutes, and they were probably delayed by firing on submarines. .
Of course, you can blame the Russian sailors in the "boat fear", but before you do this, you should remember some of the nuances. First, on the Baltic Sea, there have been several occasions when the light forces of the Germans lured Russian ships to the position of submarines, so there was nothing surprising in the fact that the boats were at Gotland. And secondly, the memory of the sailors was still fresh was the death of the same type of “Bayan” and “Admiral Makarov” armored cruiser “Pallada”. On that day, nothing foretold the tragedy: “Pallas” and “Bayan” went on patrol, with “Pallas” walking headline, and in front of her, to the left and right of her course were the destroyers “Slender” and “Powerful”. “Reflection of a mine attack” was struck on the ships, not only the watchmen on the watch, but also watch-free calculations of 75-mm guns and, additionally, specially appointed observers, were struck across the sea. Nevertheless, the torpedo attack came as a complete surprise to the sailors - neither the boat nor the torpedo trail were found on either the destroyers or the Bayan, which was on the cable behind the Pallas in 6-7. Most likely, they did not notice anything on the Pallada: at least, it is precisely known that the ship did not perform any maneuvers before its death, did not signal, and did not open fire. So if the danger was noticed, then at the very last moment, when it was impossible to do anything. And then, as the Bayan's watch officer said:
When the smoke cleared the surface of the sea was clean - there was not a cruiser left, not a single survivor, not even the bodies of sailors — only isolated fragments of a spar.
"Pallas" died in clear weather, and being in the protection of the destroyers - despite the fact that the observers vigil, no laxity in this matter was not allowed. At the same time, visibility during the battle of Gotland was not good - by the time we are describing it has improved significantly, but still remained far from ideal. At the disposal of M.K. Bakhirev was not a single destroyer. Submarines were scary weaponsand therefore, if something like this was suddenly noticed, the most correct decision was to “outrun than underkill” - no projectiles cost a cruiser with hundreds of crew members on board.
It is worth noting that the "boat fear" also touched the German ships - often they also saw non-existent submarines, I. Karth declined from one of them when he advanced to the area of mining.
Also, all of the above explains the structure of the Russian cruisers, which they had at the time of their contact with the Roon. The “Bogatyr” turned out to be the lead, “Oleg” followed him into the wake, behind them, “Admiral Makarov” followed with some lag, and already “Bayan” followed him slightly east.
But before the battle resumed, another important event occurred: M.K. Bakhirev received a radiogram from which it followed that to the north of him, near the island of Gotska-Sanden, enemy forces were found, including armored ships. Unfortunately, the exact time of receipt of this radiogram is unknown to the author of this article, but it should be noted that Michael Koronatovich (according to his data) found himself in a very difficult situation in 09.50.
When planning the operation, it was assumed that large enemy ships would be in Kiel, and that at sea there should not be anything more substantial than the guard. Then the Baltic Communications Service fleet discovers the light German cruisers in the sea and induces M.K. Bahireva is good, but, on the other hand, it becomes clear that the Germans are conducting some kind of operation that Russian intelligence could not open. While it was only a matter of cruisers, it could be assumed that this was a raid of light forces towards Moonsund or the throat of the Gulf of Finland, which the Germans periodically undertook. But the “Albatross”, retreating, openly “called” submarines for help: the Russian commander did not succumb to this seemingly provocation, and now, at 09.35, his cruisers find submarines in the area where the German ship was trying to retreat. Worse, the enemy’s armored ships were discovered to the north, now another rather big German detachment comes from the east!
A number of researchers (such as D.Yu. Kozlov) rightly draw our attention to the important consequence of the regrettable error of the observers of Russian cruisers, who took the Albatross minelayer for the Undine-type cruiser. Had Rear Admiral M.K. Bakhirev knew that his cruisers had been driven to a high-speed minzag by Swedish stones, he could have guessed that the Germans were actually carrying out the operation. In this case, it was not so difficult to figure out that the German ships conducted another mine production, that the 1 crew of cruisers “dispersed” the direct escort of the mine layer, and somewhere there should be a covering squad, which, by the way, could not be too strong. But Mikhail Koronatovich did not know this and, accordingly, could not understand German intentions: for him everything was such that there were several German detachments in the sea, including armored ships and submarines. Moreover, at least one (and the strongest) German detachment was able to cut off the 1 th brigade of cruisers from the base, and perhaps already cut off. M.K. Bakhirev did not know and could not know that his ships were confronted by only one German armored cruiser, the Roon; on the contrary, he had every reason to believe that numerous German forces were at sea.
And what did the Germans do at this time? "Roon", "Lübeck" and four destroyers, having received a radiogram of I. Karf, hurried to the rescue, but ...
Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of researchers in the battle of Gotland bypass this episode in silence. Surprisingly, but the fact is that in most descriptions of the battles of the First World, German sailors look perfect without two minutes: they are bold, professional, and their commanders make only the right decisions. If they are wrong somewhere, it is solely due to lack of information. In general, there is a feeling that both the Russian Imperial and Royal Navy opposed some perfect sea war machine in the face of the Kaiserlichmarin. But in fact, in the description of the battle in Gotland, many domestic authors in search of a mote in their own eyes do not notice the log in someone else's.
The fact is that Commodore I. Karf released the Roon group only half an hour before he saw the Russian ships, and as soon as he saw them, he immediately called Roon for help. Why, then, did the Roon detachment appear only an hour after it was all over? In fact, Roon could have come earlier and even, most likely, could have taken part in the battle, supporting Augsburg and Albatross I. Karfa. But the banal mistake let him down - the navigator incorrectly plotted a course. As G.Rollman writes about it:
In other words, having rushed to the rescue of his squad, “Roon”, because of the navigator's mistake, did not go where he was called, and was able to “hang on” the Russian squad only in the light of the distant sounds of battle! One can only imagine what epithets the Russian Imperial Navy and M.K. Bakhirev in particular domestic historians and publicists, let his commanders like a blooper. But this mistake was made by the Germans, and for the overwhelming majority of domestic researchers, it immediately ceased to exist: something completely unworthy of the mention.
So, Roon, called to support the ships of I. Karf, got lost. Then, having determined the approximate direction of the Russian detachment from the shooting sounds, he apparently sent “Lübeck” for reconnaissance - this could well explain G. Rollman’s description according to which Люб Lübeck ’was discovered by the Russian cruiser in 09.20 (most likely it was "Bayan"), but did not retreat, but continued observation. Then he saw the others, "who went alone and a couple east and north of Esztergarten-hill" Then the Russians lined up in a wake column and began to depart (G. Rollman believes that the departure was caused by the view of "Lübeck", but this is a clear mistake - the German ships were seen by Russians later). German ships also lined the wake and entered the battle.
Although the battle here is probably too loud, so the clash resulted in a quickly ended firefight. The Germans headed “Lubeck”, followed by “Roon” and then four destroyers - the latter could not take any part in the battle. In 10.05, the distance between the Roon and the Russian Bayan was not more than 62-64 KB and the German armored cruiser first opened fire, Bayan, of course, answered. "Admiral Makarov" did not shoot at the "Roon" (although it is possible that several shells were fired nonetheless - at least G. Rollman claims that both armored cruisers shot at the "Roon"). At the same time, “Bayan”, having fallen under the fire of “Roona”, immediately began to “zigzag” on the course, as a result of which the volleys of “Roona”, “very accurate in the pillar, and exclusively heap”, did not give coverings. A total of the German cruiser made, according to the observations of Russian sailors, 18 or 19 four-gun salvo, hitting the “Bayan” with a single shell. At the same time, the gunners of “Bayan” did not achieve success - they gave 20 two-gun salvoes, but the only damage to the “Roon” was the radio antenna shot down (by a splinter?) That fell near the German ship of the projectile.
Other ships also tried to join the battle: "Lubeck" tried to fire at "Oleg", the Russian armored cruisers immediately responded. But, having made several volleys, both the Russians and the Germans found out that the range of their guns was not enough and had to cease fire.
The shootout lasted no more than twenty minutes - according to German data, the battle began in 10.00, and stopped "around 10.22" (time corrected to Russian). Domestic sources say that the first shot was made at 10.05, and at 10.25, the Germans first bowed to the right (away from the Russian ships), and then turned back, and the battle was over. The Germans repaired their antenna near 10.30 (the “Roon” commander indicates 10.29 in his report). The only hit in the "Bayan" caused the following consequences - 210-mm projectile:
The gases released during the explosion hit the stoker, where they caused four people to be slightly poisoned, but none of them left their post and this incident did not cause any negative health consequences for the stokers.
What can be said about this episode of the battle? By that time, visibility had improved significantly, making it possible to observe the enemy from a distance, at least in the 70 cable, but now the Germans were in more favorable shooting conditions. Visibility to the south-east was worse than to the north-west, so the Germans saw Russian ships better: this is evidenced by the fact that the “Lübeck”, in 09.20, discovered Russian cruisers and watched them, was not noticed. The poor accuracy of the shooting of the Bayan and the Roon is explained by the zigzagging of the Russian cruiser, who thereby knocked down the Roon's sight, but at the same time constant changes of course prevented the shooting of his own gunners. In general, it is possible to speak about the invalidity of the firing of both ships - the only hit of the German cruiser can be safely considered random. At the Bayan, they noted that the roons of the Roon did not cover, but only flights or short flights - to put it simply, the shot was hit by a projectile that received an excessive deviation from the aiming point. True, there is another interesting nuance.
According to Russian eyewitnesses, “Roon” fired four-gun salvoes, but, according to German data, he fired volleys from only one gun. On the one hand, of course, it is better for Germans to know exactly how their gunners fired. But on the other hand, information about the one-attack volley of the German cruiser looks like an oxymoron.
Indeed, this form of zeroing existed during the Russian-Japanese war and earlier, when it was assumed that the ships would fight at short distances. But with the increase in the distance of the battle, the advantage of salvo shooting became obvious, when several guns were firing simultaneously - it was much easier to determine flights or short flights and correct fire when shooting volleys, and the German fleet, of course, went everywhere to fire at volleys. And, nevertheless, according to the Germans, “Roon” did only one-gun volleys - and this is at a distance in the 60-70 cable! We can only repeat that we have no reason not to trust this German data, but if they are true, we have every reason to doubt the sanity of the Roon artillery officer's reason.
In the event that Roon fired four-gun salvoes, he used up a 72 or 74 projectile, and his firing accuracy was 1,32-1,39%. If the Germans are correct, then Roon spent only 18 or 19 shells, and the percentage of hits is 5,26-5,55%. But you need to understand that in this case, the more we are talking about randomness - launching one projectile into a ship maneuvering for 6-7 miles, you can only get there by the smile of fortune.
As you know, for this episode of the battle of Gotland, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev was also subjected to the strongest criticism from domestic historians, while in fact his actions are simple and understandable. As we said above, the Russian commander considered himself to be between two German detachments - and this is at least. If so, his task was not to inflict a decisive defeat on the Roon detachment, but a breakthrough to the base, for which he should break away from the Germans who were pursuing him. And because M.K. Bakhirev chose to fight at the departure - his flagship Admiral Makarov was in the center of the system, from where the German ships were clearly visible, and the Bayan under fire - it was clear that the latter did not receive significant damage. The Makarov himself did not shoot, saving shells to fight with the “armored squadron of Gotska-Sanden,” the existence of which he was mistakenly informed. At the same time, an attempt at a decisive rapprochement and a battle with an enemy that was not too inferior to him did not make much sense. “Roon”, no matter how offensive, in its combat power approximately corresponded to “Admiral Makarov” and “Bayan” together - on the side of Russian cruisers there was a slight advantage in side salvo (4-203-mm guns and 8 * 152-mm against 4 * 210-mm and 5 * 150-mm), but it was completely offset by the fact that controlling the fire of one ship is much easier than two. True, some publicists draw attention to the weakness of Roon’s booking - only 100 mm of armor belts against 178 mm of Russian cruisers' armor plates.
This factor seems to be weighing, if only to forget about one "insignificant" nuance. Initially, the 203-mm guns of the Bayan-type cruisers had both armor-piercing and high-explosive shells - alas, only a “Tsushima” sample, that is, lightweight and with a meager amount of explosives. Subsequently, the cruisers received a lightweight (heavier projectiles could not handle the feed mechanisms of the towers) high-explosive projectile of the 1907 model, which had 9,3 kg of trinitrotoluene, that is, in its action, it was somewhere in the middle between a full-scale high-explosive six-inch and eight-inch projectiles. A new armor-piercing projectile was also needed, but the production of new projectiles is a very expensive thing, and obviously decided to save on the outdated cruisers of the project. Instead of creating a full-fledged “armor” for the “Bayans”, we simply took the old Tsushima shells and replaced them with pyroxylin and trinitrotoluene.
But the content of explosives was so miserable that there was little confusion from such a replacement, and therefore closer to the events described by us, the armor-piercing shells were completely removed from the Bayan’s ammunition kits — they only had new high-explosive shells left on the barrel.
In other words, it was very risky for our cruisers to get closer to even a low-armored cruiser like the Roon, because the 210-mm cannon of the latter had armor-piercing shells that could penetrate Russian armor at short distances, but “Admiral Makarov and Bayan were full of holes in the 100 mm armor of the German cruiser. Of course, the 152-mm cannons of all four Russian cruisers had armor-piercing shells, but from them something of the ten-centimeter Roon armored plates defended well at all imaginable combat distances.
In other words, the attempt to "decisively kill the Roon" for the Russian cruisers of the 1 Brigade did not make any sense - even if it succeeded, it was probably only at the cost of heavy damage and the expenditure of ammunition residues. The calculation of the numerical advantage could be justified, and perhaps not: of course, considering the “Roon” is equal to two of our armored cruisers, the Germans had one “Lübeck” against the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg”, but it was necessary to remember that this ratio could change in any the moment - “Augsburg” with its destroyers should have been somewhere nearby, and if they had appeared on the battlefield, the Germans would have two small cruisers and seven destroyers against the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg”. So, the cruiser M.K. Bakhirev was waiting for a hard fight, but the main thing - even if successful, the Russian squad would be easy prey for the German ships at Gotska-Sanden.
All these considerations lay on one side of the scale, and the second was occupied by the monstrous carcass of the armored cruiser Rurik with its palisade of the newest and most powerful 254-mm and 203-mm guns.
The tactical and technical characteristics of the Rurik allowed him, without fear for himself, to engage in battle with the German armored cruiser.
M.K. Bakhirev, as we have said above, made a quite logical and reasonable decision to fight in retreat, but he also gave a radiogram on Rurik, ordering him to attack Roon "in the 408 square". In order "Rurik would not have to wander, Russian the commander also indicated the course of his detachment ("40 hail from the Östergår lighthouse"). At the same time, he ordered "Glory" and "Tsarevich" to go to Glotov's bank. Acting in this way, MK Bakhirev solved several problems at once: he could count on the destruction of "Roon" surpassing his "Rurik", and at the same time, taking into account the two armor The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina received enough strength for a possible battle with the “detachment of Gotska-Sanden”, and also saved ammunition for this fight.
To understand the actions of the commander of the "Roon", the frigate-captain Gigas is much more difficult.
His explanations are very simple - having received a "cry for help", he moved to the area that Commodore I. Karf pointed out to him, but he did not find anyone there (because due to an error in reckoning, it was in 20 miles from the right place - approx. auth.). In 09.20, he received another I. Karf radiogram: “Two armored 4-tube cruisers south of Östergarn”. Then he discovered a Russian detachment, but considered it to be some other detachment, and not the one about which the Commodore informed him. Gigas joined the battle with the Russians, but due to the fact that their ships were heading north, Gigas suspected that the Russian commander wanted to lure the Roon under the blow of superior forces. Accordingly, he turned away and left the battlefield in order to look for those two Russian cruisers, about which the commodore radioed him - well, to the rescue of the Augsburg, of course.
To say that such an explanation is completely illogical is to say nothing. Put yourself in the place of Gigasa. Here he went to the square, which was indicated to him, but there is no one there. Why not try to contact Augsburg? But no, we are not looking for easy ways, but send Lübeck to reconnaissance. The latter discovered the Russian cruisers, (but apparently, it was only the fact of their presence that was reported to the Roon, and not that he sees them in Estergarn). If "Lübeck" had indicated a place, they would have thought about their mistake on "Roon", and so the frigate-captain Gigas decided that he sees a completely different Russian detachment that has nothing to do with the one I.Karf pointed out to him in the radiogram, adopted in 09.20.
And ... the oxymoron begins. From the point of view of Gigas, his ships are somewhere between two strong Russian cruiser detachments. What is its task in this case? Of course, to support the "Augsburg", that is, Gigas should have been turned away from the Russian cruisers (on the "Lübeck" they saw that they were not fighting and generally turned north) and go south, to where, according to Gigas, there were "two Russians four-pipe armored cruisers ”and where, apparently, Commodore I. Karf was waiting for him. Instead, for some reason, Gigas rushes to four Russian cruisers, and after a short firefight, "fearing that Russian cruisers are dragging him northward to superior forces" turns around and leaves the battlefield in order to go in search of the two four-pipe fighter and give support Commodore I. Carf!
That is, instead of assisting his commander who had been bound, Gigas gets involved in a completely unnecessary battle with superior forces that do not threaten him or Commodore I. Carf, and he fights, moving away from the place where his commander called. And after 20 minutes of such a battle, he suddenly regains his sight and rushes back to help out his commodore ?!
The author of this article understands that he will be reproached with bias towards the German commanders, but in his personal opinion (which he does not impose on anyone) was so. The commander of the Roon, the frigate-captain Gigas found himself in an incomprehensible situation, and did not understand what he needed to do. He was not eager to fight, but he could not leave just like that, leaving I. Karfa. Therefore, he marked his presence with a short exchange of fire with the Russian cruisers, after which, “with a sense of accomplishment of duty” he left the battlefield and went “to the winter quarters”, which, in fact, ended the second episode of the battle of Gotland. However, in doing so, he did not know that he was going straight into the hands of “Rurik”.
Продолжение следует ...
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 1
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 2
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 3. Cruisers opened fire
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 4. Carfat Retreat
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 5. How to shoot the Russian commanders
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