Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 6. Shooting with Roon

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So, in 09.12, the Albatross threw itself onto the stones. By this time, the German ship was "surrounded" from all sides - to the south of it was the armored cruiser "Bayan", to the north and northeast - "Admiral Makarov" and "Bogatyr" with "Oleg", and to the west - Gotland Island . From that moment until the start of the battle with the second German detachment, led by the Roon cruisers, a little less than an hour passed (according to various sources, the skirmish with the Roon started in 10.00-10.05), but strangely enough, this period is not covered Researchers - a feeling that nothing happened at that time.

So, for example, V.Yu. Gribovsky paid less time to this paragraph:

“On the radio, Bakhirev reported to the komflot:“ After the battle, having been damaged, the enemy cruiser ran ashore on the back side of Gotland behind the Östergarn lighthouse. I consider it useful to send a submarine to the place of the accident. ” The admiral himself, having built a brigade in a somewhat unusual way, in 9 and 50 mines decided to “continue the path to the Gulf of Finland”. Bogatyr was ahead, followed by Oleg in the wake, a little behind the last, Admiral Makarov, followed by Bayan a little east. ”


A.G. Patients in his usual chopped manner reports:

“Russian cruisers after the battle with the Albatross began withdrawing to NNO. Behind the delicate words of the historian “the admiral has built a brigade in a somewhat unusual way” is a rather simple truth. 4 cruisers didn’t have an hour to restore the correct wake ”


But in fact, the period between the two fights is very interesting and eventful - let's try to understand them.

So, after the German minelayer was on Swedish stones at 09.12, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev should have been convinced that the Albatross could not leave the Swedish waters on its own, and then gather its squad together and return home. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account that the Russian ships diverged quite widely - judging by the Russian scheme, the distance between Bayan and Admiral Makarov was at least 10-12 miles, and Oleg with Bogatyr were still further from Bayan to North.



Perhaps this distance was less, but it is obvious that the Russian cruisers really stretched very much. In other words, just to get the Bayan to reach Admiral Makarov, it took about half an hour on the condition that he would start moving immediately after the Albatros landed on the stones - and then it was necessary to catch up with the armored cruisers. In principle, this time could have been shortened if Admiral Makarov had ordered Bogatyr and Oleg and had gone himself to rapprochement with Bayan, but why would he do that? Such an act would make sense in view of the enemy, but he was not on the horizon. "Augsburg" ran, but even if it appeared, it could be regarded as a gift to the gunners of "Bayan". In other words, there was no reason why the Russian commander should urgently run towards Bayan, and not wait for his approach.

Then follows one of the many mysteries of this battle, to which it is unlikely to ever be answered. It is known that in 09.35 "Bogatyr" "discovered" a submarine to the east of itself, as it radioed the rest of the brigade ships. Further colorfully describes the commander of "Bayan" A.K. Weiss in his characteristic humorous manner:

“So, having finished killing the baby, we set off back home, but a submarine felt like some kind of cruiser, Oleg, or Bogatyr, it told him with a signal, and it was enough for an innumerable number of submarines to appear, and with cruisers went such a rapid-firing firing that the sea was boiling from shells. I didn’t immediately succeed in stopping the shooting at the Bayan, the horn huffers were tearing with their horns, I became more and more heated ... ... I saw Makarov shooting at the smoke screen from the smoke screen, semaphore about it at Makarov, but it was aimless ”


It seems that everything is clear, but none of the other domestic or foreign sources mention the “mad shooting” after 09.35. On the other hand, V.Yu. Gribovsky mentions that the cruiser M.K. Bakhirev opened fire on the alleged submarines for a lot after the battle with "Roon":

“Already in 11 h 15 min" Oleg "fired at another imaginary periscope of a submarine. After about half an hour, three other brigade cruisers fired vigorously at another “periscope”. ”


Could it be that AK Weiss summed up the memory, and the shelling, which he described, did not occur in 09.35, and later? Or, on the contrary, it is V. Yu. Gribovsky wrongly referred to this episode at a later time? Or maybe the Russian cruisers “fought” with submarines both before and after the skirmish with the “Roon”? Alas, the answer to this question can not be given. Yet, according to the author, there is one clue that allows to assume that the Russians shot before the fight with “Rooom”. A.K. Weiss mentions a bullet from a smoke bomb on which the fire was fired, and she could only be from those dumped, covering the Augsburg and the Albatross, German torpedo boats. Of course, after 11 hours, Russian cruisers left the place where the smoke screen was set too far away to be able to shell these shells, but in 09.35 they could do it.

Given the above, the actions of the Russian detachment are as follows - a few minutes after the Albatross threw itself on the rocks, that is, approximately in 09.12-09.20, the Bayan went to connect with the brigade cruisers, Admiral Makarov probably approached the wreck of the Albatross, and Bogatyr and Oleg remained north. Then, at Makarov, making sure that the enemy ship was not leaving anywhere, they turned to the 2 second semi-brigade armored cruisers, but did not rush to unite with them, waiting for the Bayan approach. In 09.35, the Bogatyr “discovered” the submarine and opened fire on it, the other cruisers also “supported” it, which obviously prevented them from forming a wake column, and besides, the “Bayan” was still too far away. By 09.50, apparently, the "shooting of submarines" ended, and M.K. Bakhirev ordered his brigade to retreat to the northeast. Almost immediately (shortly after 09.50), six fumes were discovered on the horizon, which were identified as Roon, Lübeck and four destroyers in 10.00 (or 10.00 or 10.01, the time in different sources is different) again rattled the guns.



This reconstruction has no contradictions with any well-known author of the description of the battle and perfectly explains why by the time of fire contact with the “Roon” the 1 crew of cruisers was still not built into the wake column: the ships simply stretched too much, cutting off the “Albatross” possible ways to retreat and physically could not quickly get together. Judging by the scheme, in order for “Admiral Makarov” and “Bayan” to “catch up” with the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg” located north, it took at least 40 minutes, and they were probably delayed by firing on submarines. .

Of course, you can blame the Russian sailors in the "boat fear", but before you do this, you should remember some of the nuances. First, on the Baltic Sea, there have been several occasions when the light forces of the Germans lured Russian ships to the position of submarines, so there was nothing surprising in the fact that the boats were at Gotland. And secondly, the memory of the sailors was still fresh was the death of the same type of “Bayan” and “Admiral Makarov” armored cruiser “Pallada”. On that day, nothing foretold the tragedy: “Pallas” and “Bayan” went on patrol, with “Pallas” walking headline, and in front of her, to the left and right of her course were the destroyers “Slender” and “Powerful”. “Reflection of a mine attack” was struck on the ships, not only the watchmen on the watch, but also watch-free calculations of 75-mm guns and, additionally, specially appointed observers, were struck across the sea. Nevertheless, the torpedo attack came as a complete surprise to the sailors - neither the boat nor the torpedo trail were found on either the destroyers or the Bayan, which was on the cable behind the Pallas in 6-7. Most likely, they did not notice anything on the Pallada: at least, it is precisely known that the ship did not perform any maneuvers before its death, did not signal, and did not open fire. So if the danger was noticed, then at the very last moment, when it was impossible to do anything. And then, as the Bayan's watch officer said:

"From the starboard side of the Pallas, three fires seemed, almost simultaneously three fires from the left side, and then the entire cruiser immediately disappeared into smoke and fire."


When the smoke cleared the surface of the sea was clean - there was not a cruiser left, not a single survivor, not even the bodies of sailors — only isolated fragments of a spar.

"Pallas" died in clear weather, and being in the protection of the destroyers - despite the fact that the observers vigil, no laxity in this matter was not allowed. At the same time, visibility during the battle of Gotland was not good - by the time we are describing it has improved significantly, but still remained far from ideal. At the disposal of M.K. Bakhirev was not a single destroyer. Submarines were scary weaponsand therefore, if something like this was suddenly noticed, the most correct decision was to “outrun than underkill” - no projectiles cost a cruiser with hundreds of crew members on board.

It is worth noting that the "boat fear" also touched the German ships - often they also saw non-existent submarines, I. Karth declined from one of them when he advanced to the area of ​​mining.

Also, all of the above explains the structure of the Russian cruisers, which they had at the time of their contact with the Roon. The “Bogatyr” turned out to be the lead, “Oleg” followed him into the wake, behind them, “Admiral Makarov” followed with some lag, and already “Bayan” followed him slightly east.

But before the battle resumed, another important event occurred: M.K. Bakhirev received a radiogram from which it followed that to the north of him, near the island of Gotska-Sanden, enemy forces were found, including armored ships. Unfortunately, the exact time of receipt of this radiogram is unknown to the author of this article, but it should be noted that Michael Koronatovich (according to his data) found himself in a very difficult situation in 09.50.

When planning the operation, it was assumed that large enemy ships would be in Kiel, and that at sea there should not be anything more substantial than the guard. Then the Baltic Communications Service fleet discovers the light German cruisers in the sea and induces M.K. Bahireva is good, but, on the other hand, it becomes clear that the Germans are conducting some kind of operation that Russian intelligence could not open. While it was only a matter of cruisers, it could be assumed that this was a raid of light forces towards Moonsund or the throat of the Gulf of Finland, which the Germans periodically undertook. But the “Albatross”, retreating, openly “called” submarines for help: the Russian commander did not succumb to this seemingly provocation, and now, at 09.35, his cruisers find submarines in the area where the German ship was trying to retreat. Worse, the enemy’s armored ships were discovered to the north, now another rather big German detachment comes from the east!

A number of researchers (such as D.Yu. Kozlov) rightly draw our attention to the important consequence of the regrettable error of the observers of Russian cruisers, who took the Albatross minelayer for the Undine-type cruiser. Had Rear Admiral M.K. Bakhirev knew that his cruisers had been driven to a high-speed minzag by Swedish stones, he could have guessed that the Germans were actually carrying out the operation. In this case, it was not so difficult to figure out that the German ships conducted another mine production, that the 1 crew of cruisers “dispersed” the direct escort of the mine layer, and somewhere there should be a covering squad, which, by the way, could not be too strong. But Mikhail Koronatovich did not know this and, accordingly, could not understand German intentions: for him everything was such that there were several German detachments in the sea, including armored ships and submarines. Moreover, at least one (and the strongest) German detachment was able to cut off the 1 th brigade of cruisers from the base, and perhaps already cut off. M.K. Bakhirev did not know and could not know that his ships were confronted by only one German armored cruiser, the Roon; on the contrary, he had every reason to believe that numerous German forces were at sea.

And what did the Germans do at this time? "Roon", "Lübeck" and four destroyers, having received a radiogram of I. Karf, hurried to the rescue, but ...

Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of researchers in the battle of Gotland bypass this episode in silence. Surprisingly, but the fact is that in most descriptions of the battles of the First World, German sailors look perfect without two minutes: they are bold, professional, and their commanders make only the right decisions. If they are wrong somewhere, it is solely due to lack of information. In general, there is a feeling that both the Russian Imperial and Royal Navy opposed some perfect sea war machine in the face of the Kaiserlichmarin. But in fact, in the description of the battle in Gotland, many domestic authors in search of a mote in their own eyes do not notice the log in someone else's.

The fact is that Commodore I. Karf released the Roon group only half an hour before he saw the Russian ships, and as soon as he saw them, he immediately called Roon for help. Why, then, did the Roon detachment appear only an hour after it was all over? In fact, Roon could have come earlier and even, most likely, could have taken part in the battle, supporting Augsburg and Albatross I. Karfa. But the banal mistake let him down - the navigator incorrectly plotted a course. As G.Rollman writes about it:

“The adversary was afraid of the Roon group, which hurried to the 2 flagship radio call full speed, but because of a discrepancy in the gasket, it approached in a roundabout way; the weak cannonade of the battle, which was generally heard only occasionally, brought them to the scene of the battle. ”


In other words, having rushed to the rescue of his squad, “Roon”, because of the navigator's mistake, did not go where he was called, and was able to “hang on” the Russian squad only in the light of the distant sounds of battle! One can only imagine what epithets the Russian Imperial Navy and M.K. Bakhirev in particular domestic historians and publicists, let his commanders like a blooper. But this mistake was made by the Germans, and for the overwhelming majority of domestic researchers, it immediately ceased to exist: something completely unworthy of the mention.

So, Roon, called to support the ships of I. Karf, got lost. Then, having determined the approximate direction of the Russian detachment from the shooting sounds, he apparently sent “Lübeck” for reconnaissance - this could well explain G. Rollman’s description according to which Люб Lübeck ’was discovered by the Russian cruiser in 09.20 (most likely it was "Bayan"), but did not retreat, but continued observation. Then he saw the others, "who went alone and a couple east and north of Esztergarten-hill" Then the Russians lined up in a wake column and began to depart (G. Rollman believes that the departure was caused by the view of "Lübeck", but this is a clear mistake - the German ships were seen by Russians later). German ships also lined the wake and entered the battle.

Although the battle here is probably too loud, so the clash resulted in a quickly ended firefight. The Germans headed “Lubeck”, followed by “Roon” and then four destroyers - the latter could not take any part in the battle. In 10.05, the distance between the Roon and the Russian Bayan was not more than 62-64 KB and the German armored cruiser first opened fire, Bayan, of course, answered. "Admiral Makarov" did not shoot at the "Roon" (although it is possible that several shells were fired nonetheless - at least G. Rollman claims that both armored cruisers shot at the "Roon"). At the same time, “Bayan”, having fallen under the fire of “Roona”, immediately began to “zigzag” on the course, as a result of which the volleys of “Roona”, “very accurate in the pillar, and exclusively heap”, did not give coverings. A total of the German cruiser made, according to the observations of Russian sailors, 18 or 19 four-gun salvo, hitting the “Bayan” with a single shell. At the same time, the gunners of “Bayan” did not achieve success - they gave 20 two-gun salvoes, but the only damage to the “Roon” was the radio antenna shot down (by a splinter?) That fell near the German ship of the projectile.

Other ships also tried to join the battle: "Lubeck" tried to fire at "Oleg", the Russian armored cruisers immediately responded. But, having made several volleys, both the Russians and the Germans found out that the range of their guns was not enough and had to cease fire.


Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"


The shootout lasted no more than twenty minutes - according to German data, the battle began in 10.00, and stopped "around 10.22" (time corrected to Russian). Domestic sources say that the first shot was made at 10.05, and at 10.25, the Germans first bowed to the right (away from the Russian ships), and then turned back, and the battle was over. The Germans repaired their antenna near 10.30 (the “Roon” commander indicates 10.29 in his report). The only hit in the "Bayan" caused the following consequences - 210-mm projectile:

"Broke through the right-side waistboard between 60 and 65 frame and, having broken, broke the bed grid, Yal-four, broke the working and waste steam pipes of the trash winch in the mine shaft No. XXUMX, with fine fragments a few sazha circumferentially punched in many places of the mine stoker # XXUMX, jacketed casing, command galley, second chimney, beams. The main part of the projectile, penetrating the upper deck into the ship, went right along the front bulkhead of 5-dm casemate №5, strongly bulging it, and then penetrated into the coal pit, where it was later discovered. In the battery deck, the 6-mm gun No. 3 was slightly damaged by splinters and dents were obtained on the deck. Despite the abundance of splinters ... none of those who were close ... was either injured or contused. Two people were easily injured in the battery deck. ”


The gases released during the explosion hit the stoker, where they caused four people to be slightly poisoned, but none of them left their post and this incident did not cause any negative health consequences for the stokers.


Location of the 210-mm shell


What can be said about this episode of the battle? By that time, visibility had improved significantly, making it possible to observe the enemy from a distance, at least in the 70 cable, but now the Germans were in more favorable shooting conditions. Visibility to the south-east was worse than to the north-west, so the Germans saw Russian ships better: this is evidenced by the fact that the “Lübeck”, in 09.20, discovered Russian cruisers and watched them, was not noticed. The poor accuracy of the shooting of the Bayan and the Roon is explained by the zigzagging of the Russian cruiser, who thereby knocked down the Roon's sight, but at the same time constant changes of course prevented the shooting of his own gunners. In general, it is possible to speak about the invalidity of the firing of both ships - the only hit of the German cruiser can be safely considered random. At the Bayan, they noted that the roons of the Roon did not cover, but only flights or short flights - to put it simply, the shot was hit by a projectile that received an excessive deviation from the aiming point. True, there is another interesting nuance.

According to Russian eyewitnesses, “Roon” fired four-gun salvoes, but, according to German data, he fired volleys from only one gun. On the one hand, of course, it is better for Germans to know exactly how their gunners fired. But on the other hand, information about the one-attack volley of the German cruiser looks like an oxymoron.

Indeed, this form of zeroing existed during the Russian-Japanese war and earlier, when it was assumed that the ships would fight at short distances. But with the increase in the distance of the battle, the advantage of salvo shooting became obvious, when several guns were firing simultaneously - it was much easier to determine flights or short flights and correct fire when shooting volleys, and the German fleet, of course, went everywhere to fire at volleys. And, nevertheless, according to the Germans, “Roon” did only one-gun volleys - and this is at a distance in the 60-70 cable! We can only repeat that we have no reason not to trust this German data, but if they are true, we have every reason to doubt the sanity of the Roon artillery officer's reason.

In the event that Roon fired four-gun salvoes, he used up a 72 or 74 projectile, and his firing accuracy was 1,32-1,39%. If the Germans are correct, then Roon spent only 18 or 19 shells, and the percentage of hits is 5,26-5,55%. But you need to understand that in this case, the more we are talking about randomness - launching one projectile into a ship maneuvering for 6-7 miles, you can only get there by the smile of fortune.

As you know, for this episode of the battle of Gotland, Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev was also subjected to the strongest criticism from domestic historians, while in fact his actions are simple and understandable. As we said above, the Russian commander considered himself to be between two German detachments - and this is at least. If so, his task was not to inflict a decisive defeat on the Roon detachment, but a breakthrough to the base, for which he should break away from the Germans who were pursuing him. And because M.K. Bakhirev chose to fight at the departure - his flagship Admiral Makarov was in the center of the system, from where the German ships were clearly visible, and the Bayan under fire - it was clear that the latter did not receive significant damage. The Makarov himself did not shoot, saving shells to fight with the “armored squadron of Gotska-Sanden,” the existence of which he was mistakenly informed. At the same time, an attempt at a decisive rapprochement and a battle with an enemy that was not too inferior to him did not make much sense. “Roon”, no matter how offensive, in its combat power approximately corresponded to “Admiral Makarov” and “Bayan” together - on the side of Russian cruisers there was a slight advantage in side salvo (4-203-mm guns and 8 * 152-mm against 4 * 210-mm and 5 * 150-mm), but it was completely offset by the fact that controlling the fire of one ship is much easier than two. True, some publicists draw attention to the weakness of Roon’s booking - only 100 mm of armor belts against 178 mm of Russian cruisers' armor plates.

This factor seems to be weighing, if only to forget about one "insignificant" nuance. Initially, the 203-mm guns of the Bayan-type cruisers had both armor-piercing and high-explosive shells - alas, only a “Tsushima” sample, that is, lightweight and with a meager amount of explosives. Subsequently, the cruisers received a lightweight (heavier projectiles could not handle the feed mechanisms of the towers) high-explosive projectile of the 1907 model, which had 9,3 kg of trinitrotoluene, that is, in its action, it was somewhere in the middle between a full-scale high-explosive six-inch and eight-inch projectiles. A new armor-piercing projectile was also needed, but the production of new projectiles is a very expensive thing, and obviously decided to save on the outdated cruisers of the project. Instead of creating a full-fledged “armor” for the “Bayans”, we simply took the old Tsushima shells and replaced them with pyroxylin and trinitrotoluene.

But the content of explosives was so miserable that there was little confusion from such a replacement, and therefore closer to the events described by us, the armor-piercing shells were completely removed from the Bayan’s ammunition kits — they only had new high-explosive shells left on the barrel.

In other words, it was very risky for our cruisers to get closer to even a low-armored cruiser like the Roon, because the 210-mm cannon of the latter had armor-piercing shells that could penetrate Russian armor at short distances, but “Admiral Makarov and Bayan were full of holes in the 100 mm armor of the German cruiser. Of course, the 152-mm cannons of all four Russian cruisers had armor-piercing shells, but from them something of the ten-centimeter Roon armored plates defended well at all imaginable combat distances.

In other words, the attempt to "decisively kill the Roon" for the Russian cruisers of the 1 Brigade did not make any sense - even if it succeeded, it was probably only at the cost of heavy damage and the expenditure of ammunition residues. The calculation of the numerical advantage could be justified, and perhaps not: of course, considering the “Roon” is equal to two of our armored cruisers, the Germans had one “Lübeck” against the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg”, but it was necessary to remember that this ratio could change in any the moment - “Augsburg” with its destroyers should have been somewhere nearby, and if they had appeared on the battlefield, the Germans would have two small cruisers and seven destroyers against the “Bogatyr” and “Oleg”. So, the cruiser M.K. Bakhirev was waiting for a hard fight, but the main thing - even if successful, the Russian squad would be easy prey for the German ships at Gotska-Sanden.

All these considerations lay on one side of the scale, and the second was occupied by the monstrous carcass of the armored cruiser Rurik with its palisade of the newest and most powerful 254-mm and 203-mm guns.



The tactical and technical characteristics of the Rurik allowed him, without fear for himself, to engage in battle with the German armored cruiser.

M.K. Bakhirev, as we have said above, made a quite logical and reasonable decision to fight in retreat, but he also gave a radiogram on Rurik, ordering him to attack Roon "in the 408 square". In order "Rurik would not have to wander, Russian the commander also indicated the course of his detachment ("40 hail from the Östergår lighthouse"). At the same time, he ordered "Glory" and "Tsarevich" to go to Glotov's bank. Acting in this way, MK Bakhirev solved several problems at once: he could count on the destruction of "Roon" surpassing his "Rurik", and at the same time, taking into account the two armor The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina received enough strength for a possible battle with the “detachment of Gotska-Sanden”, and also saved ammunition for this fight.

To understand the actions of the commander of the "Roon", the frigate-captain Gigas is much more difficult.

His explanations are very simple - having received a "cry for help", he moved to the area that Commodore I. Karf pointed out to him, but he did not find anyone there (because due to an error in reckoning, it was in 20 miles from the right place - approx. auth.). In 09.20, he received another I. Karf radiogram: “Two armored 4-tube cruisers south of Östergarn”. Then he discovered a Russian detachment, but considered it to be some other detachment, and not the one about which the Commodore informed him. Gigas joined the battle with the Russians, but due to the fact that their ships were heading north, Gigas suspected that the Russian commander wanted to lure the Roon under the blow of superior forces. Accordingly, he turned away and left the battlefield in order to look for those two Russian cruisers, about which the commodore radioed him - well, to the rescue of the Augsburg, of course.



To say that such an explanation is completely illogical is to say nothing. Put yourself in the place of Gigasa. Here he went to the square, which was indicated to him, but there is no one there. Why not try to contact Augsburg? But no, we are not looking for easy ways, but send Lübeck to reconnaissance. The latter discovered the Russian cruisers, (but apparently, it was only the fact of their presence that was reported to the Roon, and not that he sees them in Estergarn). If "Lübeck" had indicated a place, they would have thought about their mistake on "Roon", and so the frigate-captain Gigas decided that he sees a completely different Russian detachment that has nothing to do with the one I.Karf pointed out to him in the radiogram, adopted in 09.20.

And ... the oxymoron begins. From the point of view of Gigas, his ships are somewhere between two strong Russian cruiser detachments. What is its task in this case? Of course, to support the "Augsburg", that is, Gigas should have been turned away from the Russian cruisers (on the "Lübeck" they saw that they were not fighting and generally turned north) and go south, to where, according to Gigas, there were "two Russians four-pipe armored cruisers ”and where, apparently, Commodore I. Karf was waiting for him. Instead, for some reason, Gigas rushes to four Russian cruisers, and after a short firefight, "fearing that Russian cruisers are dragging him northward to superior forces" turns around and leaves the battlefield in order to go in search of the two four-pipe fighter and give support Commodore I. Carf!

That is, instead of assisting his commander who had been bound, Gigas gets involved in a completely unnecessary battle with superior forces that do not threaten him or Commodore I. Carf, and he fights, moving away from the place where his commander called. And after 20 minutes of such a battle, he suddenly regains his sight and rushes back to help out his commodore ?!

The author of this article understands that he will be reproached with bias towards the German commanders, but in his personal opinion (which he does not impose on anyone) was so. The commander of the Roon, the frigate-captain Gigas found himself in an incomprehensible situation, and did not understand what he needed to do. He was not eager to fight, but he could not leave just like that, leaving I. Karfa. Therefore, he marked his presence with a short exchange of fire with the Russian cruisers, after which, “with a sense of accomplishment of duty” he left the battlefield and went “to the winter quarters”, which, in fact, ended the second episode of the battle of Gotland. However, in doing so, he did not know that he was going straight into the hands of “Rurik”.

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  1. +4
    April 17 2018 08: 24
    Another bravo interesting article good drinks hi
    If you look from the side, then after the fact both one side can give the explanations it needs for its actions, and the other. And, say, by organizing a meeting of historians with documents from both sides, so that as a result of reconciliations they would announce one common version for this event unthinkable.
    Therefore, the goal of the author of the cycle to find and explain the contradictions seems quite clear and understandable. And he, in my opinion, is quite successful. To me personally everything described by the author seems quite robust and logical, and once again confirms my vision of the battle at Gotland
    Again good
    1. +1
      April 17 2018 08: 59
      As far as I remember, behind the belt of the German armored cruisers there was a bevel of the armored decks, and in total we get normal protection. The Bayan has a thicker waterline belt, but it is already narrower, and there is no slanting of an armored deck behind it. And the upper belt is wide, but thin - 60mm. When evaluating a reservation, you should not focus on Asamas: the ships are unique. With no high-speed contours, slow-moving, with a low board, overloaded with armor. Right, some kind of cruiser "monitor" type.
      1. +2
        April 17 2018 09: 17
        Quote: ignoto
        When evaluating a reservation, you should not focus on Asamas: the ships are unique. With no high-speed contours, slow-moving, with a low board, overloaded with armor. Right, some kind of cruiser "monitor" type.

        Um ... Asama was designed on the basis of O'Higgins, which was intended for Chile. And the waters of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Chile are, by and large, based on meteorological observations, considered quite calm. Therefore, the height of the side was considered quite acceptable.
        Quote: ignoto
        The Bayan has a thicker waterline belt, but it is already narrower, and there is no slanting of an armored deck behind it.

        The sloping of the armored deck is relevant at relatively close combat distances. At large distances, it does not matter - if the projectile falls into this narrow strip of waist armor at the waterline, the angle of the meeting will be indecently large, and the projectile will already lose speed. And if it gets higher, where the second belt (if any) is thinner, then in any case the thickness of the armor deck as a whole is important, but not the bevel. Slanting deck armor plays a role as an addition to waist armor in the waterline area hi
        1. 0
          April 17 2018 16: 04
          The second belt is thicker for the Germans, the same 100 mm. And above it is the armor of the casemate. The same is 100 mm.
      2. 0
        April 17 2018 10: 40
        Quote: ignoto
        As far as I remember, behind the belt of the German armored cruisers there was a bevel of the armored decks, and in total we get normal protection.

        How to say? Within the citadel, the slopes were 40-50 mm. Formally, it’s kind of not bad, but in fact such armor will not hold a heavy shell, but Bayan’s can
        1. 0
          April 17 2018 16: 02
          Where is the heavy shell? They themselves wrote that the shells were light. And what kind of armor? The German Krupp cemented. And what about the Russians? By the way, the first Asam pair had a completely disgusting quality. Plasticine. If Rudnev was still a commander. With a capital letter. In the commander of the cruiser, he moved from the post of chief of port. I wonder how he handled it there. The port facility is not an example anymore.
          1. +2
            April 17 2018 18: 12
            Quote: ignoto
            Where is the heavy shell?

            Both Bayan and the German armored cruisers were created as scouts in squadrons, respectively, situations were possible in which these ships would be hit by 280-305-mm guns of armadillos. About them and speech
            Quote: ignoto
            He transferred to the commander of the cruiser from the post of chief of port.

            and before that - commander of the Skat destroyer, before that - the commander of the gunboat, which had performed the light illumination, and so what?
    2. +4
      April 17 2018 10: 45
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Another bravo interesting article

      Thank you!
      Quote: Rurikovich
      If you look from the side, then after the fact, as one side can give the explanations it needs for its actions, the other.

      That's for sure :))) But I am touched by the tendency of our historians to look for flaws in the actions of our sailors and not to see the "wonderful" mistakes of those who opposed them
      1. +3
        April 17 2018 10: 55
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But I am touched by the tendency of our historians to look for shortcomings in the actions of our sailors and not to see the "wonderful" mistakes of those who opposed them

        I agree with you hi Is this not a consequence of the indecent obscurity of our self-flagellation? what
        As it went from the time of the great "academicians" of Russia, Müller and Schlozer, the imposition of Russian worthlessness continues to this day request
        That's why your articles are impressed not so much with an interesting description, but with an attempt to find sound answers to emerging questions and to get to the bottom on the basis of available materials. Although each one can have her own based on personal qualities and preferences request
        1. +1
          April 17 2018 12: 07
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Although each one can have her own based on personal qualities and preferences

          This is beyond any doubt :)))) But I, with understandable inclinations, still try to be objective. Perhaps this is not always possible, but at least the reader will have the opportunity to draw his own conclusions based on a different view of events, and what they will be for the reader to decide :)
          1. +1
            April 17 2018 13: 42
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But I, with understandable inclinations, still try to be objective. Perhaps this is not always possible, but at least the reader will have the opportunity to draw their own conclusions based on a different view of events, and what they will be for the reader to decide :)

            good
            Golden thought !!! Yes
            You at least understand that you are not the last resort in the interpretation of the event. To many infallible and correct historians to learn from you wink
      2. 0
        April 17 2018 16: 16
        A "proletarian" approach to assessing the actions of the Imperial Navy.
      3. +4
        April 17 2018 16: 54
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That's for sure :))) But I am touched by the tendency of our historians to look for flaws in the actions of our sailors and not to see the "wonderful" mistakes of those who opposed them

        It seems to me that everything is much simpler - if ours did not defeat the enemy on the head, then they acted badly. We are used to and crave only great victories and great achievements. If not, then commander "burdock"
        1. +2
          April 17 2018 17: 00
          Some call it an inferiority complex. laughing In fact, there are enough of them, and this I would even say a very common look. And it applies to absolutely everything - if Russia (or not Russia, any other country is also suitable) is not the birthplace of elephants, then everything is very bad wassat God forbid not to be the first in the smelting of steel, demography, social. community support, etc.! How many times have I met this on the Internet, and still wonder - do some people really think that being the first and the winners in everything is normal and natural, otherwise backwardness, idiocy and generally horror-horror?
          1. +1
            April 17 2018 18: 52
            Quote: arturpraetor
            some call it an inferiority complex

            And what is interesting, if we take specifically us Russians, he was instilled exactly with the collapse of the Union, as an addition to the “democratization" of society with all the consequences (90s)
            In the post-war USSR, the idea of ​​being the first moved both the state as a whole and each individual in particular to improve, which entailed education, science, sports, culture, competition in industry, etc. Another thing is that the idea had a number of shortcomings, but in general it paid off. At least self-flagellation was not observed request
            1. +2
              April 17 2018 19: 15
              Quote: Rurikovich
              In the post-war USSR, the idea of ​​being the first prompted both the state as a whole and each individual in particular to improve, which entailed education, science, sports, culture, competition in industry, etc.

              IMHO, one is connected with the other, in the sense of the current self-flagellation and Soviet aspiration. After all, in the USSR this was put at the forefront - to be the first, in some ways they were the first, in some ways not - but at the general level they tried to put everything as if they were the first in everything. And then the USSR collapsed, many championship points were far-fetched, the 90 started ... And in the minds of people there was a simple, albeit erroneous ratio - either we are the first, or in decline and backwardness. Some moments of Soviet propaganda elegantly formed the basis of these thoughts - for example, stories about how dull, backward and generally bad-bad Tsarist Russia was, since it was not 1 on the list of Great Powers request So finally formed a mass stamp in the mind: either the first, or none, a complete zero. Moreover, at times it takes on very bizarre forms - in the next topic of Andrei’s colleague about democracy, there were curious (from the point of view of clinical studies) examples ... laughing
              1. +1
                April 17 2018 20: 12
                Quote: arturpraetor
                Andrei’s colleagues on democracy in the next topic had interesting (from the point of view of clinical studies) examples ...

                good laughing
  2. +3
    April 17 2018 11: 55
    This is a good article, dear colleague. Most importantly, you point out errors on both sides, although for many, the presence of such errors among gloomy Teutonic people causes crackling patterns wassat Although, in fairness, the very Gigas could not "not be burning with a desire to fight," but simply thoroughly get confused in the situation, which caused some indecision in actions. In the end, mistakes were made in simpler situations, but here it is not clear what, where, and how, and how many of these Russians. Good for those who think soberly and detachedly, and are able to act quickly and decisively, and if a person just thinks too much? request

    PS I did not understand - I 10-th nickname to write to the list of Faces of Madness to them. Passerby or not? laughing
    1. +1
      April 17 2018 12: 13
      Quote: arturpraetor
      I didn’t understand - I should write the 10-th nickname to the list of Faces of Madness named after them. Passerby or not?

      Of course write down. Asama - battleship, coverage of Jessen's head, 17, bonds - separately, there are still possible options, but all together - this is symptomatic :)
      Quote: arturpraetor
      Although, in fairness, the very Gigas could not "not be burning with a desire to fight," but simply thoroughly get confused in the situation, which caused some indecision in actions.

      That's right, that's why I wrote
      The commander of the Roona, frigate Captain Gigas, was in an incomprehensible situation, and did not understand what he needed to do. He was not eager to fight

      That is, where he himself is incomprehensible, where the commander is incomprehensible, the Russians are everywhere, they are surrounded laughing , you need to do something, but here’s what? laughing
      But with all the others, there are two mistakes behind him. He didn’t ask Augsburg on the radio when he couldn’t find him and if you believe that he really believed that he was between two Russian troops, then he had to fight with the south, not the north
  3. +1
    April 17 2018 19: 28
    as always 100500 pluses, reading is a pleasure hi
  4. +1
    April 17 2018 21: 22
    Thank you interesting article. I would like to clarify about the Pallas. As I recall, it is not known why she died, there is no evidence.
    "Pallas" died in clear weather, and being guarded by destroyers

    And about boat fear. Three British cruisers had already sunk by that time or not. For some reason, Abukir, Hog and Kressy remembered.
    1. +1
      April 17 2018 22: 21
      Quote: glory1974
      I would like to clarify about the Pallas. As I recall, it is not known why she died, there is no evidence.

      Well, why? There is a report of the commander of the German submarine, he describes the attack, everything coincides
      Quote: glory1974
      And about boat fear. Three British cruisers had already sunk by that time or not.

      Of course drowned, back in the last 1914th year, September 22
      1. +1
        April 17 2018 22: 34
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Of course drowned, back in the last 1914th year

        Andrew, and the Pallas, and the trinity of Aglitz cruisers were drowned in 1914 hi
    2. 0
      April 17 2018 22: 29
      Quote: glory1974
      As I recall, it is not known why she died, there is no evidence.

      Yes, it seems like U-26 sank what
      Quote: glory1974
      Three British cruisers had already sunk by that time or not. For some reason, Abukir, Hog and Kressy remembered.

      Yes, almost in one month - in September 1914, the Pallas was drowned, and the British trinity were sent to the bottom ...
  5. +2
    April 18 2018 04: 58
    Dear Andrey, and again a good work has come out from under your pen, once again prompting you to think, count and analyze. in a word, creaking brains :-) Thank you for that +!
    With the late, due to an error, arrival of the “Roon”, it turns out curiously and unexpectedly, thank you for drawing attention to this :-)
    Subsequently, the cruisers received a lightweight (heavier shells could not handle the turret feed mechanisms) HE shell of the 1907 sample, which had 9,3 kg of trinitrotoluene

    But 8 "Roon" shells are even smaller, armor-piercing had 3,5 kg of explosive, and high-explosive had 6,9 kg.
    the attempt to “decisively kill the Roon” for the Russian cruisers of the 1th brigade made no sense - even if it succeeded, it was probably only at the cost of heavy damage and expenditure of the remainder of the ammunition. The calculation of a numerical advantage could be justified, but maybe not: of course, considering the Roon to be equal to our two armored cruisers

    Based on the fact that two cruisers had 440 shells of the caliber 8 '', 215-225 of which had already been used up, there was no chance of sinking the Roon. Even if the same 12 shells hit it, as in the Albatross, there would be little sense from this. There is “Albatross,” even the move is not lost.
    In addition, the 8 "ammunition included not only high-explosive, but also shrapnel shells, which were nothing to him. I don’t know how many of them were there, but I think the count went to dozens if you take all four guns.
    The Germans fixed their antenna near 10.30 (the Roon commander indicates 10.29 in his report)

    Staff writes that despite this, the cruiser was left without radio communications.
    1. 0
      April 19 2018 18: 48
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      With the late arrival of the “Roon,” due to a mistake, it turns out curiously and unexpectedly

      Without any doubt:)))
      Quote: Comrade
      But 8 "Roon" shells are even smaller, armor-piercing had 3,5 kg of explosive, and high-explosive had 6,9 kg.

      How to say? High explosive - yes, it was weaker, for some reason the Germans generally had a very modest amount of explosives in high explosives. But the content of explosives in the armor-piercing is just normal, even high
      Quote: Comrade
      In addition, the 8 "ammunition included not only high-explosive, but also shrapnel shells,

      Nope. They have already got rid of them by 1915
      Quote: Comrade
      Staff writes that despite this, the cruiser was left without radio communications.

      Easily. Because restoring the antenna and restoring radio communications are two big differences :))))
      1. +1
        April 20 2018 01: 51
        Dear Andrew,

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Nope. They have already got rid of them by 1915

        Probably not from everyone :-) “Albatross” got from shrapnel.
        Yes, and Vinogradov can read that "in addition to basic warheads"(meaning high-explosive specimen 1907 g. and high-explosive specimen 1915 g. with ballistic / armor-piercing tip)"armed with 8 '' guns there was shrapnel - a shell weighing 116,9 kg".
        1. 0
          April 20 2018 10: 09
          Quote: Comrade
          Probably not from everyone :-) “Albatross” got from shrapnel.

          It is extremely doubtful, dear Valentine.
          In the Bayans it was like this - initially, the ammunition included armor-piercing, high-explosive and segmented shells of model 1905. Then, as high-explosive samples of 1907 appeared, segmented shells were excluded from the ammunition, so that the ammunition consisted of 55 armor-piercing samples of 1905 g (loaded with tol) and 55 high explosive arr. 1907 g, i.e. new sample. And after firing at Chesme, when it turned out that the 203-mm armor-piercing shells were disgusting, they were also removed from the ammunition, leaving only 110 high-explosive
          Quote: Comrade
          And Vinogradov can read that “in addition to the main warheads” (meaning high-explosive models of 1907 and high-explosive samples of 1915 with a ballistic / armor-piercing tip) “armed with 8 '' guns there was shrapnel - a shell weighing 116,9, XNUMX kg. "

          This is a completely different weapon, dear colleague - 203-mm / 50, a newer one, and the Bayans had 203-mm / 45 and their ammunition is completely different
          1. +1
            April 21 2018 01: 22
            Dear Andrey!
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            It is extremely doubtful, dear Valentine.

            Your humble servant took up the injuries sustained in the Gotland battle for quite some time, and the material was collected decently. Therefore, I can’t immediately recall in which particular source I read about it.
            Therefore, I will not insist, it does not matter. Let all the remaining 8 'shells be high-explosive, they are still not enough for a productive fight with the “Roon”.

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            This is a completely different weapon, dear colleague - 203-mm / 50, a newer one, and the Bayans had 203-mm / 45 and their ammunition is completely different

            Then I ask for clarification, dear colleague, or is Vinogradov a mistake?
  6. +1
    April 18 2018 08: 23
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,
    So you have to describe this battle))))
    1. 0
      April 18 2018 18: 40
      Quote: Trapper7
      So you have to describe this battle))))

      Which? :))) With Cressy? :))))
      1. 0
        April 19 2018 08: 14
        With the Vladivostok detachment in 1904
        1. +3
          April 19 2018 18: 49
          Ahhh :)))) Somehow I’ll definitely do it
  7. +1
    April 19 2018 02: 02
    Quote: tyu22
    Read the chronology of the battle in the CP. She is in the internet. Everything is detailed there, every minute.

    I offer you, old friend, a thousand dollars for the fact that you "answer for the bazaar" and put this on this site "timeline"There is only one condition - there really should be, as you yourself said,"per minute", that is, minute by minute (seconds are optional), not a quarter of an hour after half an hour.
    I hope you understand that to such a "chronology"it’s supposed to attach documentary sources from where it came from. In our case, these will be scans of official documents of Russian and Japanese cruisers so that I can check if you are trying to slip me a fake.
  8. +1
    April 19 2018 12: 34
    Many thanks to Andrei for another part of this series!

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