Military Review

Lampas under Prasnyshem. H. 1

15
A series of articles is devoted to the actions of the Russian cavalry in the Second Prasnysh operation February 7 - March March 17 1915 - one of the most brilliant victories of the Russian weapons over the German imperial army in the First World War.


One of the episodes — the actions of the 15 Cavalry Division — we considered earlier (see Polish attack of Ukrainian hussars). Now let us see how the detachment of V. A. Khimets acted — above all, the Cossack units that were part of it.

The overall situation in the theater to the beginning of the Second Prasnyshskoy operation.

By January 1915, west of the Vistula, a positional front had been established, and both sides were beginning to look for opportunities to use the flank maneuver.

Throwing their troops from the left bank of the Vistula and from France to East Prussia, the Germans planned to develop operations:

a) Against the 10 Army - striking Grodno. The correlation of forces - 15 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the Germans against the 12 Russian infantry divisions.

b) Acting on the line Osovec - Lomza. The ratio of forces is approximately equal - one and a half shells.

c) On the front from Torn to Mlava. The army group of M.K.V. Von Galvitsa initially had 3 corps and 2 cavalry divisions against 1 of the Turkestan and 1 of the Equestrian corps. The ratio of 3: 1 forces in favor of the Germans, but, according to E. Ludendorff, additional forces were pulled here - and by the end of the 10 operation, the German divisions were opposed by the Russian 6,5. But ... Galvitz was broken.

The balance of forces clearly tells us where the Germans were actually striking the main blow - and his success would have put the Russian Hungarian armies in a much more difficult position than it happened later - in July 1915, when the Germans succeeded in the same direction. It becomes clear why the French called the Second (Winter) Prasnysh operation “Russian Marna”.

But let's not get ahead.
The Russians also concentrated their forces between Osovets and Novogeorgievsk - but slowly, and by the beginning of the operation the 1 and 2 Siberian army corps and the 15 cavalry division were located as reserves.

Private situation to the beginning of the operation.

The 1 th Turkestan army corps covered the approaches to Novogeorgievsk, having the right flank at Grudusk, and the left flank at Glinojeck. Next to the Vistula stood 1-th Horse Corps. On the contrary, with headquarters in Mlawa, stood the German corps of E. von Tsastrova.


1. Position of the Russian 1 Army in the 2 of January 1915

Both sides covered the future areas of concentration of their troops - and the Russians found out about the concentration of the Germans much later, from intelligence sources. Naturally, the task of the cavalry, which was part of the 1 of the Turkestan Corps (detachment of Lieutenant-General V. A. Himets), was also defensive and was formulated as follows:

“To ensure the right flank of the corps, occupying the Dzerzhgovo-Shumsk area and not allowing the enemy to the Zharkovo-Kitki area. To scout in the directions to Mlawa, Yanov and Khorzhele, including defensive directions Yanov - Prasnysh and Khorzhele - Prasnysh ”.


2. The commander of the 4 th Separate cavalry brigade and Detachment V. A. Chimets.

The order was given when the detachment of V. A. Himets, consisting of the 4 th Separate cavalry brigade with a battalion of riflemen, doubled: the Turkestan Cossack brigade arrived, and it is surprising that it was signed by a cavalryman (commander of the 1 Turkestan general sent a letter S. M. Sheydeman): after all, being in Dzerzhgovo, you cannot defend the directions from Janov and Horzhele to Prasnysh, and you cannot stand in Dzerzhgovo to defend them. The correct decision would be to entrust the protection of the flank of the corps of one, and the rear - another brigade (but apparently affected the magical "principle" of massing cavalry - which was good for the attack on Mlava, but bad for the protection of different directions).

The squad of V.A. Khimets.

The squad of V. A. Khimets, which after the arrival of the Turkestans (January 20) turned into a division, included:

4-I Separate Cavalry Brigade:
The regiment of the officer's cavalry school - 4 squadron;
20 th Dragoon Finnish Regiment - 6 squadrons;
Orenburg separate Cossack division - 2 hundreds;
Mounted battery Officer Artillery School - 6 equestrian guns;

Turkestan Cossack Brigade (Head Major General A. M. Loginov - Commander of the 1 Brigade of the Turkestan Cossack Division):
2 Ural Cossack Regiment - 4 hundreds;
5 th Orenburg Cossack regiment - 4 hundreds;
Horse-rifle team - 8 machine guns.


3. Commander of the Turkestan Cossack Brigade A. M. Loginov.

There were no communication teams and a sapper in the detachment. For the defense of the Zharkovo-Kitki sector, V. A. Khimetsu was given a battalion of riflemen with a battery.

Describing the part of the squad, it is necessary to note the following.
In the regiment of the officer's cavalry school (OKS) 75% hussars were called up from the reserve. The Finns and the Orenburg Cossack Division in peacetime have never been to large maneuvers. At the same time, the Turkestan Cossack Brigade was a well-trained part with peacetime training (its machine-gun crew at some firing gave up to 96% of hits). In the days of the Lodz operation and later the Turkestan Cossack brigade successfully and repeatedly attacked the German cavalry and infantry.

Numerical strength: 4 brigade 100 - 125 sabers in squadrons, sabers in hundreds of the Turkestan brigade - 95 - 105.

Fighting before the operation.

The location of the detachment is shown in the following diagram.


4. The location of the detachment of V. A. Khimets on the right flank of the 1 of the Turkestan Army Corps is from January 20 to February 7 1915.

In total, 8 of hundreds and 6 of separate platoons — that is, half of the detachment — were sent to reconnaissance, escort, and the duty unit every day, and often the banners of the regiments of the Turkestan brigade were guarded by adjutants, and the staff carrying the guard carried the guard.

Since the 4-I brigade stood in the area for more than two months and the German position did not change, intelligence turned into observation, and the intelligence agencies stood in one place for weeks. Security, separate outposts, consistent with German practice - to move only along the roads. It turned out a double lane outposts.

Until the end of January, there were several minor clashes with German intelligence officers - in which the Turkestans took four prisoners.

Lampas under Prasnyshem. H. 1

5. Cossacks 5-th Orenburg Cossack regiment.

On January 25, V. A. Chimets received an order to support units of the 4 Cavalry Division operating east of the Khorjele-Macov line, without losing sight of the main task - to guard the flank of the corps and conduct active reconnaissance on Neidenburg and Willenberg.

Obtaining such a task is explained by the fact that the 4-division conducted reconnaissance from Ostrolenka to Ortelsburg-Willenberg and was pushed out from the border. It would be easy to support her if one of the detachments of the Detachment, V. A. Khimets, stood north of Prasnysh, and the Germans hinted at the need for such a solution, leaving the Horzhele battalion with artillery and pushing the OChS squadron to the south. A hundred of Orenburg citizens moved from Krzhinovlog to Remebelin - and the German battalion returned to Brzeski Kolaki and began to dig in, wrapped in a continuous curtain of barbed wire.

The corps headquarters became worried: the 12 th Turkestan rifle regiment was advanced to Edorozhets, and V. A. Khimets was ordered: “in view of the beginning of the German offensive on Prasnysh, begin the search for rear and flank of the enemy”. Although there was no “rear and flank” (there were two battalions of infantry in Yanov and Khorzhela), but the 4 I brigade went out in the direction of Khorzhela - Yanov and Roggen. Each time the search ended to no avail. The Turkestans seized four more Germans from the corps of Tsastrov.

In the evening of January 28, V. A. Chimets received an order to reconnoiter Villenberg - where, allegedly, four German corps were concentrated.

Aviation she didn’t fly - neither Russian nor German - and the Turkestans received an order: to speak on Ednorozhets at dawn on the 30th. The chief of staff of the Turkestan brigade intended to go around Jorgele from the east and release a series of patrols - to capture languages. But on the 29th, V. A. Khimets received accusations of inaction from the Commander and ordered a "dashing raid" to break through the German guards and capture Wallenberg.

The case of Horjele. 31 January 1915

On January 30, the detachment of V. A. Khimets under the guise of the 12 of the Turkestan Rifle Regiment spent the night in Edorozhts. In 4 hours of January 31, cavalrymen marched on Olshevka - Rakuyka - Laz, having a platoon of Oksh in the vanguard. The roads were icy and the troopers walked at a speed of 4 miles per hour.

From Rakuyk, V. A. Khimets sent three hundred Orenburg residents on Khorzhele - to cover the detachment on the left, while he himself moved on to Montvitz and went to the edge of the forest stretching along the border.


6. Detachment V. A. Khimets. About 10.30. 31 January 1915

The 4 Brigade was met by fire from the Germans, who were sitting behind barbed wire in front of Montvitz - it was not possible to achieve surprise.

The 2 squadron OKSH dismounted, but reinforcements from Montvitz approached the Germans. Hurried still 2 squadron Finns. A shootout ensued.

In 9 hours 30 minutes to the Germans came more infantry and artillery. The fight flared up. The horse battery opened fire.

V. A. Chimets advanced three hundred Ural residents with two guns to Laz.

By 8 hours, three hundred Orenburg residents with two machine guns approached the edge of the forest against Horzhele and, sending patrols to observe Opalenets, the Booth and Rakuyka, stood there until the 10 clock.

At 10 hours, the regiment commander, brigade chief of staff, commanders of hundreds and machine-gun platoons saw the following picture: from Khorzhele, two enemy companies moved along the Zaremba highway - a group of 6 horsemen were ahead. The first Russian thought was to attack, but between the edge of the forest and the highway there was a frozen and thawed marsh. We decided to shoot the enemy column.

Two dismounted hundreds and two machine guns were waiting for the riders to approach the fir tree sticking out along the highway. As soon as the Germans came up with this landmark, fire was opened - and the German column remained on the highway. The Germans began to respond, and between the dismounted parts and the grooms began to rise fountains of snow and earth - from explosive bullets.

At that time, reports were received that the Urals had been sent to Laz, German artillery was leaving Hororel, and infantry were moving from there to Srebrnik.

Having lost one Cossack and one horse killed, the Orenburg citizens set off on Laz - Rakuyku - in order to prevent the Germans from attacking the detachment from the rear.

Parts of the brigade moved away.

Losses: V.Khimets squad - 3 man, the Germans - more than 200 man. Of the two people shot by Orenburg, only 20 - 25 people - rose.

But the wire obstacles did not give the detachment the opportunity to break through the guard of the enemy in the equestrian system. The dismounted cavalrymen, even using 1000 rifles, could not compete with the strong German garrisons of Horjele or Montvitsa.

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  1. Streletskos
    Streletskos April 1 2018 06: 25
    +18
    Page of the military glory of the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks
    The light blue and raspberry stripes of the Cossacks of the Turkestan Cossack brigade will be remembered by the Germans at Prasnysh
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator April 1 2018 08: 15
      +17
      A unique combination is the Turkestan Cossack brigade.
      As the author rightly noted,
      In the days of the Lodz operation and later the Turkestan Cossack brigade successfully and repeatedly attacked the German cavalry and infantry.
      .
      In March 1916, the brigade was supplemented by the 1st Astrakhan Cossack Regiment (these are yellow stripes), and the 5th Orenburg Cossack Regiment was increased to 6 hundred.
      In April 1916, the brigade was supplemented by the 52nd Don Cossack Regiment and reorganized into the 2nd Turkestan Cossack Division.
      1. Streletskos
        Streletskos April 1 2018 08: 20
        +16
        Yes, great mix.
        Donets in battle
        1. Streletskos
          Streletskos April 1 2018 08: 20
          +16
          Continuation of the same canvas
          1. Cheburator
            Cheburator April 1 2018 08: 43
            +16
            By the way, the Russian cavalry went through a series of reforms that significantly increased its combat effectiveness. By the way - under the leadership of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich when he was last, the Inspector General of the Cavalry.
            1. Albatroz
              Albatroz April 1 2018 10: 24
              +2
              The ROSSPEN encyclopedia provides the following data on the composition of the Russian cavalry.
              divisions of individual brigades
              Cavalry Cossack Cavalry Cossack

              June 1914 18 6 5 3
              September 1914, 19 12 5 4
              December 1914, 19 16 4 4
              June 1915 20 19 4 6
              December 1915, 22 20 1 6
              June 1916 23 22 3 5
              December 1916, 25 23 2 5
              June 1917 25 23 2 5

              So, some supposedly ineffective cavalry grew

              The ratio of Western and Caucasian cavalry compounds was: 1914 and 90 percent in 10, respectively, 1915 and 83 percent in 17, 1916 and 80 percent in 20, and 1917 and 82 percent in 18. The number of cavalry units in the years of the war varied as follows:
              Western direction Caucasian direction
              December 1914 - 33 divisions and 5 divisions brigades of 3 divisions and 2 div. brigades
              December 1915 - 37 divisions and 5 divisions brigades of 6 divisions and 4 detachments brigades
              December 1916 - 39 divisions and 4 divisions brigades of 8 divisions and 4 div. brigades
              1917 June - 41 divisions and 3 divisions brigades of 7 divisions and 4 div. brigades

              According to the historian A.A. Kersnovsky “the magnificent composition of our cavalry rendered invaluable services to the Russian army, hiding our strategic deployment from the eyes of the enemy. The cavalry gained fame for itself and for Russian weapons whenever its lavas were inspired and controlled by its worthy leaders. She made up to 400 attacks on horseback, in which 170 guns were captured, defeated an entire army (Seventh Austro-Hungarian army on April 27-28, 1915 at Gorodenka and Rzhavantsev), saved our own armies twice (1st at Neradov 3 July 1915 and 11th at Niva Zlochevskaya on June 19, 1916). Recall how the 12th Cav. the division of the 8th army under Ore, which is of great strategic importance for the whole of S.-Z. the front was attacked by Nizhny Novgorod dragoons near Kolyushki, as all Austro-German armies shocked the attack of the Orenburg Cossacks near Koshev and the “Wild Division” near Yezeryan. And how many times are our foot soldiers. divisions and corps were rescued by selfless attacks that were not afraid of anything and swept away hundreds and squadrons of everything ... ”
              1. XII Legion
                XII Legion April 1 2018 10: 27
                +16
                a whole army was defeated (Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army on April 27-28, 1915 at Gorodenka and Rzhavantsev), our own armies were saved twice (1st at Neradov on July 3, 1915

                As I wrote below -
                the actions of the cavalry brigade at Neradovo in July 1915 (when the advancing German 50th reserve division was overturned) or the cavalry group of Count Keller in Dniester in March 1915 (when the cavalry defeated the combined army of the Austrians).

                but I didn’t even write about it
                11th at Niva Zlochevskaya June 19, 1916

                So the contribution of the cavalry is huge, and the action is very impressive.
                Even with all the missed opportunities
            2. Streletskos
              Streletskos April 1 2018 15: 54
              +16
              A few words about the command staff of the parts mentioned in the article.
              The commander of the 4th separate cavalry brigade (and part-time of the entire Detachment) V. A. Khimets.
              Orthodox. Educated in the Oryol Bakhtin military gymnasium. He entered the service on 31.08.1879/1881/08.10.1881. He graduated from Nikolaev Cav. College (11.10.1882). Issued by Warrant Officer (Article 08.08.1885) in l-Guards. Horse Grenadier Regiment. Cornet (Art.06.07.1889). Lieutenant (Art. 30.08.1890). Squadron officer of the Nikolaev cavalry school (from 06.12.1896). Headquarters-Rotmistr (Art. 19.05.1897). He graduated from the Officer Cav. school "successfully." The captain (art. 20.05.1897). Lieutenant Colonel (Article 12.11.1898). Headquarters Officer, Rider Training Officer. school (05.04.1899-01.04.1901). Head of the officer department of the Officer Cav. schools (from 12.04.1902). Colonel (Art. 07.01.1909). Assistant Chief Officer Cav. Schools (1907-31.05.1907). Major General (Project 07.01.1909; Art. 15.08.1914; for distinction). Head of Officer Cav. schools (25.05.1913/1913/31.05.1913 - 15.08.1914/4/10). At the same time, a member of the Council of the Main Directorate of State Horse Breeding (from 09.1914). Lieutenant General (02.03.1915; Art. 04.07.1915; for distinction). Member of the World War. From 10.07.1916/06.12.1916/XNUMX commanded the XNUMXth detachment. Cav. brigade formed after the outbreak of war from the regiment of the Officer Cav. schools, Finnish drag. Regiment and horse battery of the Officer Cav. schools. He participated in the battles as part of the XNUMXth army of the North-Western Front in XNUMX. He was dismissed from his post (VP XNUMX) with the appointment to the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Dvinsky Military District. Head of the army repair department (from XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX). On XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX in the same rank and position. Mobilized in the Red Army. He died in Moscow.
              Awards: Order of St. Anne, 2nd Art. (1902); St. Vladimir 3rd art. (1910); St. Stanislav 1st Art. (1913); St. Anne 1st Art. (December 06.12.1915, 2); St. Vladimir 06.12.1916nd art. (VP XNUMX; for excellent zealous service and special works caused by the circumstances of the current war).
              Commander of the Turkestan Cossack brigade attached to the detachment of V. A. Himets
              A. M. Loginov.
              Orthodox. Received home education. He entered the service on January 23.01.1874, 16.04.1878. He graduated from the Orenburg Cossack Junker School. The Khorunzhim (st. 1877) was issued to the Ural kaz. regiments. Member of the Russian-Turkish war of 78-13.12.1879. Centurion (Art.1880). Member dripping 81-30.08.1884. Podesaul (Art.1896). He graduated from the Officer Cav. school "successfully" (19.01.1897). Yesaul (v. 26.02.1900). Troops foreman (art.7). The commander of the 1900th hundreds of security guards of the CER. Member of the Chinese campaign 01-17.06.1901. He was awarded the Golden Arms (VP ​​1904). Member of the Russian-Japanese war of 05-1. Commander of the 29.09.1904st Argun Regiment ZabKV (04.04.1908-1904). Colonel (Project 06.12.1904; Art. 3; for distinction). Commander of the 12.12.1906rd Ural Kaz. shelf (16.07.1912-1912). Major General (project 16.07.1912; vv. 2; for distinction). Commander of the 1nd Brigade of the 16.07.1912st Turkestan Kaz. divisions (16.03.1914-1). Commander of the 16.03.1914st Brigade of the same division (from 11.1914). Member of the World War. Member of the battles near Lodz in 10.07.1916. On 1916/1918/XNUMX in the same rank and position. Since mid-XNUMX he was also the head of the Khorasan detachment with headquarters in the city of Mashhad (Persia). He returned to Russia in XNUMX. He died in Moscow.
              Awards: Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd Art. (1890); St. Anne 2nd Art. (1894); Golden weapons (VP ​​17.06.1901); St. Vladimir 4th art. with swords and bow (1901); St. Vladimir 3rd art. with swords (1905); St. Stanislav 1st Art. (1913); St. Anne 1st Art. with swords (VP ​​04.06.1915).
              Note: there are references that L. was the head of the 1st Turkestan Kaz. division, however, there is no data on its production in the rank of lieutenant. It is possible that in 1917-18 L., indeed, due to the circumstances of that time, commanded this formation.
  2. andrewkor
    andrewkor April 1 2018 07: 31
    0
    A.V. Ganin “On the eve of the disaster” —Orenburg Cossack army in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (1891-1917). The general conclusion is that with the undoubted advantage of the Russian cavalry over the cavalry of the opponents, having outstanding commanders, the top leadership used it very timidly, success only tactical, although the possibilities reached strategic objectives. Especially, this flaw manifested itself in the REV and inherited by the WWI.
  3. XII Legion
    XII Legion April 1 2018 08: 09
    +16
    The cavalry, the only branch of the army that had operational mobility by the beginning of World War I, was entrusted with a wide range of combat missions.
    The most important task is reconnaissance. Excellent veil and good intelligence were organized by Russian cavalry on the left bank of the Vistula during the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation in September 1914, as well as on the left bank of the river. The Vistula River in the battle of Lublin and Lvov in 1914 - well-oriented Russian command, and delayed the progress of the enemy bypassing troops. At the last stage of the Battle of Galicia, the cavalry of the Southwestern Front, having cleared the enemy of the left bank of the Vistula, contributed to the defeat of the left flank of the Austrian 1st Army.
    Cavalry units were supposed to solve the tasks of the so-called "strategic cavalry" - to carry out throws, breakthroughs and bypasses, pursue the enemy, engage in strategic reconnaissance, and provide cover for certain operational directions. For example, the 14th Cavalry Division, operating on the flank of the 4th Army during the Battle of Galicia, fettered the operational maneuver of the 5st Austrian Army for 1 days and allowed to tighten the reserve - the 18th Army Corps. In the Tomashevsky battle of 1914, the cavalry of the 5th army in the most difficult periods of battle quickly concentrated command on the flanks of the army or its corps, which ensured the joints and flanks of combined arms units. In this battle, the Consolidated Horse Corps was formed (one of the first in the Russian army in the First World War), and the actions of the 5th Don Cossack Division and the 2nd brigade of the 1st Don Cossack Division did not allow the complete encirclement of the right flank of the 19th Army corps and provided the central group of the 5th Army out of heavy combat.
    Cavalry raids were successfully carried out. Of great importance for the outcome of the Lodz battle of 1914 was the transfer of the 1st cavalry corps under the command of Lieutenant General A.V. Novikov to the right flank of the 2nd army (Bendkov region) from the left flank of the 5th army (Lask district).
    The Russian cavalry carried out a number of brilliant attacks on horseback, deciding the fate of many battles and battles - influencing the tactical and operational situation (in the Zadnistrovsky, Third Prasnyshsky and other battles).
    The number of equestrian attacks, in comparison with similar attacks of the cavalry of the enemy, is huge (only the Austrian cavalry practiced, and that only at the beginning of the war, equestrian attacks). It is characteristic that Russian cavalry attacked more often infantry and artillery of the enemy than cavalry (attacks on cavalry account for 25% of all horse attacks). In most cases, enemy cavalry evaded combat.
    The Russian cavalry attacked not only the enemy infantry, which is in motion (on a campaign, retreating or advancing), but also in the trenches and even behind the barbed wire. So, on September 29, 1915, at the front of the 11th army corps, the 12th cavalry division in an equestrian attack attacked the Austrians, went through three lines of entrenched infantry chains of the enemy, who fled after a short erratic battle, and on the front of the 33rd army corps four squadrons of the 9th Bugsky Ulansky and a squadron of the 9th Kazan Dragoon Regiments also attacked the enemy infantry, knocked it over and took 40 prisoners.
    A striking illustration is the battle at Balamutovka-Rzhavantsev on April 27, 1915, when two hundred of the 13th Don Cossack Regiment overturned, attacking in an equestrian formation, 4 squadrons of Hungarian hussars, while another hundred also in an equestrian formation in the valley of the stream. Flaccid crushed the infantry company.
    Equestrian attacks of the Russian cavalry took place not only in maneuvering, but also in the positional period of the war - when the cavalry of other armies for the most part was already sitting in the trenches. For example, May 27, 1916 at the village. Zubzhets 9th Cavalry Division, breaking through three lines of the Austrian trenches, seized enemy artillery and up to 1,6 thousand prisoners; On July 23, 1916, in an attack near the village of Kostyukhnovka-Volchetsk, the 16th cavalry division captured 14 enemy guns, etc.
    The war showed that no artillery fire, machine guns and rifles, the actions of airplanes and armored cars are not able to stop the cavalry attack of the Russian cavalry. For example, in the battle of August 7, 1916 near the village The Rudka-Worms hundreds of the 27th and 28th Don Cossack Regiments overcame the barrage of two heavy and one light German battery. And on August 6, 1916, the Cossacks of the 16th and 17th Don Cossack Regiments in the same combat area, under the fire of machine guns and bombs of three German airplanes, broke through wire fences and captured trophies.
    But in conditions of fire combat, cavalry capabilities were nevertheless reduced. In the offensive of combined arms formations, cavalry must attack, first of all, enemy reserves and develop the success achieved by the infantry, and in defense conduct reconnaissance on the flanks and behind enemy lines.
    Importantly, the Russian cavalry during the First World War demonstrated a number of outstanding examples when its actions influenced not only the operational, but also the strategic situation - the actions of the cavalry brigade at Neradovo in July 1915 (when the advancing German 50th reserve division was overturned ) or the horse group of Count Keller in March 1915 on the Dniester (when the cavalry defeated the combined army of the Austrians).
    And one of the episodes when the cavalry influenced the operational-strategic situation - just during the Second Prasnysh operation.
    Thank you!
    We look forward to continuing.
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos April 1 2018 08: 39
      +16
      Thank you!
      We look forward to continuing.

      good good
      during the First World War, the Russian cavalry demonstrated a number of outstanding examples when its actions influenced not only the operational, but also the strategic situation

      You can recall the Transnistrian battle on April 26. - May 2, 1915. when the cavalry of our 9th army did the whole operation.
      As the Quartermaster General of the 9th Army N. N. Golovin wrote:
      three cavalry corps received freedom of action ... On a broad front, a wave of our 160 squadrons rolled from the Dniester to the Prut, sweeping from the flanks and rear of those enemy units that tried to linger on previously fortified positions. "

      By the way, Viktor Littauer, officer of the 1st Sumy Hussar Regiment, in his work “Russian Hussars. Memoirs of an Imperial Cavalry Officer,” analyzed the structure and firepower of the infantry and cavalry divisions and brigades.
      If in the infantry division - about 20000 people (including artillery and auxiliary units), then in the cavalry - only 5000. The firepower of the infantry and cavalry is not comparable.
      That is why, as noted in this article
      Hurried cavalry, even using 1000 rifles, could not compete with the strong German garrisons of Jorgele or Montvitz.

      Accordingly, the chances of overthrowing the infantry increased just when the cavalry did not act on foot, but on horseback — when the sight of the rushing cavalry demoralized the infantry. Of course, it was necessary to choose a tactically competent moment - so as not to incur unnecessary losses.
    2. The centurion
      The centurion April 1 2018 16: 52
      0
      Quote: XII Legion
      The war showed that no fire of artillery, machine guns and rifles, the action of airplanes and armored vehicles could stop the cavalry attack of the Russian cavalry

      Oh? The war surrenders showed that everything is quite the opposite.
      "The ensuing war was very different in character from the previous and next wars. The preceding decades before the war in military affairs were characterized primarily by the fact that defense weapons sharply went ahead in their development compared to the offensive weapons. rifle, fast-firing rifled breech-loading gun and of course a machine gun. All of these weapons were well combined with powerful engineering preparation of defensive positions: solid trenches with the message moves, thousands of kilos barbed wire windmills, minefields, strongholds with dugouts, pillboxes, bunkers, forts, fortified areas, road roads, etc. The appearance on the battlefields of tanks fundamentally changed in future wars the ratio of offensive and defense in operational art. Even at sea, the construction of submarines and aircraft carriers already carried the germ of leaving the gun fleet from the scene.
      Under these conditions, any attempt by the troops to attack turned into a merciless meat grinder, as under Verdun, or ended in a catastrophe, as during the defeat of the 2 of the Russian army near the Masurian Lakes. The nature of the war has changed dramatically, and for many years it became less manoeuvrable, trench, positional. With the increase in firepower and damaging factors of new types of weapons, the centuries-old glorious military fate of cavalry, including Cossack elements, whose element was a raid, raid, bypass, reach, breakthrough, came to an end. The last nail in the coffin of the cavalry scored a machine gun. Even taking into account the solid weight of the first machine guns (the Russian Maxim with the Sokolov machine weighed 65 kg without ammunition), their use from the very beginning provided for finding the machine guns in combat formations. And marching, marching and carts columns of machine guns with ammunition accompanied by special gigs, wagons or carts carts. Such use of machine guns put an end to saber attacks, rounds, reach and raid cavalry.
      ".

      On the march the Russian machine gun gig - grandmother of the legendary cart
      https://topwar.ru/63616-kazaki-i-pervaya-mirovaya
      -voyna-chast-i-dovoennaya.html
      1. XII Legion
        XII Legion April 1 2018 18: 02
        +16
        Well, I gave you specific examples.
        1) in the battle of August 7, 1916 at the village. The Rudka-Worms hundreds of the 27th and 28th Don Cossack Regiments overcame the barrage of two heavy and one light German battery.
        2) On August 6, 1916, Cossacks of the 16th and 17th Don Cossack Regiments there, under machine gun fire and bombs from three German airplanes, broke through wire fences and captured trophies.
        3) May 7, 1916 at the village. Zubzhets 9th Cavalry Division, breaking through three lines of the Austrian trenches, captured enemy artillery and up to 1,6 thousand prisoners.
        4) at the village of Kostyukhnovka-Volchetsk, the 16th cavalry division captured 14 enemy guns. here is also a link https://topwar.ru/118126-volcheckiy-trofey.html

        Of course, everything happened. But if desired and whenever possible, our cavalry did not pass in front of any fire.
        1. Streletskos
          Streletskos April 1 2018 18: 05
          +16
          Yes, and I would also add that this phrase is the centurion
          And marching, marching and convoy convoys, machine guns with ammunition were escorted on special gigs, wagons, or convoy carts. This use of machine guns put an end to saber attacks, bypasses, ranges and cavalry raids.

          also far from absolute.
          Machine guns did not prevent the Russian cavalry from conducting 400 horse attacks in the PMV — with drafts and spades, most of which were successful.
          And the carts in the Civil War also did not reduce the scale of the use of cavalry.
  4. Square
    Square April 1 2018 14: 11
    +2
    On the participation of detachment V.A. Himetsa (4th detachment of the cavalry br. And Turkest. Kaz. Br) did not read in the Second Prasnysh operation. Little-known episode good
    ATP for the beginning of an interesting cycle