Military Review

Break through the wall without breaking a head. H. 3

119
We continue to consider the development of offensive tactics in a positional war (see Break through the wall without breaking a head. H. 1; Break through the wall without breaking a head. H. 2).


The participation of the Russian troops in the Naroch operation in March 1916 in the operation. The strike force of the Russian Western (2-th army) and Northern (part of the 5-th army) fronts included (including reserves and 14 corps of the 1 army) 12 corps. The number of groups - up to 460 thousand (including 375 thousand - in the composition of the main attack of the 2-th army) people.

The forces are large, but the underestimation of the artillery factor in the conduct of an offensive operation in a situation of positional war has seriously affected the effectiveness of the operation. Security artillery was weak - especially for the breakthrough of such a layered defense. The attackers were supported only up to 1000 light and 150 heavy guns - a ratio of no more than 2,5 guns per thousand bayonets. The artillery densities for the Russian front of this period were quite high (12-18, and in some places up to 35 guns per kilometer) on the shock sections of the Naroch operation, but much lower than those used on the French front - where the kilometer was up to 100 guns [Barsukov E. Artillery in providing a breakthrough. March operation of 1916 // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1940. No. 7. P. 26]. While the defensive positions of the Germans were not less, and sometimes stronger than in France.



Three groups of corps were attacking: 1) M. M. Pleshkova (1 th Siberian, 1 th and 27 th army, 7 th Equestrian); 2) L.-O. O. Sireliusa (34 and Army 4 and Siberian); 3) P.S. Balueva (5, 35, Army 36, Siberian 3).

Limited tactical success accompanied only the left-wing group of the 2 Army (thousands of people were captured up to 1,5, a howitzer, 18 machine guns and 36 mortars were captured). The strikes of the 13, 37 and 38 corps of the Northern Front and the 14 Corps of the 1 Army were unsuccessful.



Captured Germans. Baltic-Belarusian theater. Winter-spring 1916

One of the important reasons for the failure is the wrong artillery grouping. For example, at the site of the 1 Siberian Corps (main line), less than half of the heavy artillery of the MM Pleshkov group was used to prepare the attack of the formation. Of course, 76-mm guns could not fill the shortage of heavy artillery - their effectiveness in firing at the trenches was already below average - especially when the ground was not thawed. March 5 was a thick fog - he seriously obstructed the observation [Ibid. C. 33].



As a result, the wire obstacles of the Germans survived - which led to high losses of the Russian infantry. By the end of the operation, enemy barriers and trenches were destroyed in a number of sectors, but the dugouts were largely preserved. The communications flow was overwhelmed with German corpses - which also made it difficult for the Russian infantrymen to take action. Although there were no continuous passages in the wire fences, the infantry coped with the sharp wire. But the gunners of the group of M. M. Pleshkov could not destroy the German machine gun points that were in the forest. It was not possible to suppress the fire of enemy artillery - the latter’s position was not adequately identified due to the lack of aerial reconnaissance and high-quality observation posts. As a result, the Russian infantry could not stay in the captured trenches - it fell under the flank fire of machine-gunners and concentrated artillery fire located around the attacked area. Due to the correct location, the Russian artillery was not detected by the German batteries and did not suffer significant losses, while the losses of the Russian infantry were large [Ibid. C. 35].



The infantry operated in difficult tactical conditions. Thus, Colonel A. O. Grippenberg noted that receiving the order "to dig in the captured areas," parts stood knee-deep in water and ... sat on German corpses. We had to pile up the corpses of the dead Germans - because the trenches were filled with water. And in the evening the trenches began to freeze. The situation was aggravated by the presence of the wounded. But valiant Russian troops fought in such conditions not a day or two - but ten days [Ibid. C. 37].

N. E. Podorozhniy noted in relation to the attack of the 22 Infantry Division, which was rapidly and unceasingly attacking under the deadly crossfire of machine guns and enemy artillery - that the compound courageously sunk into the Germanic barbed obstacles - but could not overcome the barricades. Cut the wire slowly and under enemy fire - especially from the flanking areas (primarily the forest wedge) that caused the greatest losses to the advancing fire. [Podorozhny N. E. Naroch operation in March 1916, M., 1938. C. 78].

The situation was similar in the combat sectors of the Northern Front formations. The commander-5, V.I. Gurko, wrote that the battles of the armies were clearly demonstrated by the fact that an offensive in a positional war, conducted during periods of winter thaw or frost, in conditions of the Russian climate puts the advancing troops in an extremely unfavorable position. Moreover, the preparation of units and headquarters was still insufficient for conducting offensive operations in a situation of positional warfare. [Gurko V.I. War and revolution in Russia. Memoirs of the commander of the Western Front 1914 - 1917. M., 2007. C. 176].

The general recorded negative circumstances affecting the effectiveness of the operation — weak artillery (first of all, severe), the absence of surprise, and an area detrimental to an infantry attack. Heavy artillery arrived gradually and only in the amount of no more than 100 guns (and even then no more than the caliber of 152-mm). The preparation for the operation could be completed no earlier than at the end of March - it was believed that there would not be a thaw by that moment. The training was fixed by the enemy, who concentrated powerful artillery, supplied with ammunition in abundance (whereas the Russians saved every shell). Accordingly, artillery preparation was planned only for one day - with the expectation that before dark the infantry should capture the first line of enemy fortifications. Initially successful, the offensive was not developed - due to the lack of material resources and due to the difficulties of conducting an offensive operation in a winter period positional war. Thus, the land was frozen and, accordingly, the work of creating trenches during the offensive (under enemy fire) was almost impossible. Huge efforts were also demanded by the alteration of the captured German fortifications - for defense. The daytime frost gave way to a thaw (the nights were still frosty) - and the soldiers lying in the snow got wet through, while the clothes froze at night. This led to numerous frostbite of the limbs. [Ibid. C. 174-175].



A secret note on the implementation of operations on Strypa and Narochi (as applied to the 5 Army) and the fact that the shells arrived in small batches - and the troops, for fear of being left without shells, saved them. The most acutely lacking high-explosive shells for 76-mm field guns [Note on the execution of operations. C. 14]. Fixed this document and the fact that one of the reasons for the disruption of the operation on the Northern Front was frozen ground. [Ibid. C. 21].

To break through the deeply erected German defense in an environment of insufficient fire support and turn tactical success (where it was achieved) into operational, Russian troops failed: the broken through units, not supported in time, were met with counterattacks and a hail of hand grenades - and in most cases were forced to retreat. The passive stubbornness of the units under the disastrous fire of the German machine guns brought only great losses. It was very difficult to fasten on the frozen ground of the captured areas - although they built trenches of snow, and at night they brought sandbags from the rear [Ibid. C. 35]. The case was complicated by a lack of communications.



It should be noted that the success of the groups of M. M. Pleshkov (the positions of the 21-th army corps of the enemy were broken) and P. S. Baluev (the front of the enemy was also broken and the positions taken. Postavy) could not be developed due to the unsatisfactory maneuvering by the existing reserves - partly This was due to the ensuing thaw.

The German command, noting the stubbornness of the Russian troops in the fighting of the armies, reports on the critical position of its troops.

E. von Ludendorff noted that from 5 to 18 in March the position of the German 10 Army was critical - in March the Russians managed to win a very painful success for the Germans in the lake gorge, the strike west of Posta was only hard to reflect. The position of the German 8 Army and the Scholz Army Group was no less difficult. [Ludendorff E. My Memories of the War 1914 — 1918. M. - Mn., 2005. C. 209]. E. von Falkenhain noted the fact of a transfer to reinforce the attacked front of one division from the general reserve of the German Eastern Front - the latter was transferred from Baranavichy [E. Falkengain. High Command 1914 — 1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923. C. 220].

If the Russian army could concentrate at the lake. Naroch same technical resources, which had the French in Champagne, and to carry out a simultaneous strike by them, then she could ensure a serious success.

The rate established the following main reasons for the failure of the Naroch operation:

1. Lack of thorough, extensively and comprehensively prepared preparation of the operation. The troops did not receive specific instructions about the tasks and methods of the field, and not the armchair training. The troops were not familiar with the area of ​​operations - as they arrived there often just before the start of the operation. The army command often refused to take direct leadership of the breakthrough and transferred control to the hastily improvised group headquarters, some of whom had not even made a tactical assessment of the terrain and personal familiarization with the latter.

2. The inconsistency of the actions of artillery and infantry. The infantry often seized individual sections of enemy positions, but, finding themselves without artillery support later, was thrown back with heavy losses. The infantry support did not keep up - the latter were forced to move through the open area under the murderous artillery fire of the enemy (due to the lack of pre-equipped engineering-assault bridgeheads).

3. Artillery received impracticable tasks - but "senior artillery commanders did not have the courage to declare the" inconsistency of conditions "." Artillery tasks were set incorrectly.

4. Inappropriate was the choice of attack sites. The General Headquarters saw the main drawback in this area in the fact that “without special preparation” they tried to break through the fortifications of the enemy — moreover, by means of field combat, without the necessary approach to the fortified line of the enemy (also an indication of the absence of engineering assault bridgeheads). As a result, the advancing infantry chains were, in most cases, shot long before approaching the enemy wire.

The factor of barrage of artillery fire was underestimated - and it was he who could cover the Russian infantry that had broken through and reduce its losses. The significance of this fire can be seen in the fact that in the battles on the Jacobstadt front (front of the 5 Army) the German prisoner reported that if the Russians repeated their failed assault, the Germans would be powerless to give them fire resistance - due to the Russian barrage, the delivery of cartridges to their positions was stopped, and the arrows had no more than five cartridges for the rifle, and the machine guns were only empty ribbons.

The width of the breakthrough front was completely inadequate. And in narrow areas, the successfully advancing troops were under the influence of enemy fire, who shot through breakthrough areas from both flanks. Unable to gain a foothold, the troops suffered heavy losses.

The conditions of the terrain also had a great importance on the effectiveness of the operation - the terrain at the attacked site was a continuous swamp.

The commander of the German Eastern Front, Field Marshal P. von Hindenburg, noting the difficult conditions in which the Russian offensive was carried out, wrote that the melting of snow and thaw had turned the battlefield into a bottomless swamp.

Russian artillery, not having a sufficient number of positions, was forced to be far behind, and its maneuvering (especially of heavy artillery) was much more difficult. For the Russian army, the tactical method used by the Germans to deliberately abandon the most dangerous combat sectors was completely unexpected - they retreated to new positions equipped in the rear. As a result, Russian troops often did not have sufficient data on the entire fortified line of the enemy. The result of this “ignorance” was the situation when the artillery worked not only “for nothing”, but also “blindly”. It turned out a vicious circle. Not receiving artillery support, the infantry suffered increased losses.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the terrain in the area of ​​the attack was not equipped and the support of the battle line was openly under the enemy's artillery bombardment, “numb in the water and snow”.

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  1. Theodore
    Theodore 29 March 2018 06: 02
    +4
    Happiness was dying. for the king-priest!
    1. Brutan
      Brutan 29 March 2018 06: 08
      +6
      They die not for kings or general secretaries - but for their homeland
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 06: 28
        +20
        Do not be surprised
        Until now, many divide rulers depending on the color of the flag, not realizing that Russia at all times is Russia.
        1. Brutan
          Brutan 29 March 2018 06: 59
          +6
          Positional warfare is of course more demanding on tactics.
          The tactics of breaking through the positional front
          But tactics should not replace operational art - as in the spring offensive of the Germans in France in 1918. So the front breakthrough techniques were developed that took the path of least resistance.
          Breakthrough areas - so where more tasty from a tactical point of view. The same was true for massing troops.
          Well - Ludendorff is primarily a tactician.
          Ours near Naroch came 2 years earlier - and even tactics suffered so far. Yes, and technical support. They thought it was already in the pros, and the defense is too dense.
          1. soldier
            soldier 29 March 2018 08: 16
            +19
            Ludendorff is primarily a tactician.

            Yes, Ludendorff and Hindenburg had a strategy with a strategy.
            What is worth, for example, the small-town concern for East Prussia in 1914 to the detriment of the general plan with the Austrians - they gave the latter to be eaten.
            One can recall operations only in the Baltic countries that they understand - contrary to the decisions of the High Command.
            1. soldier
              soldier 29 March 2018 08: 47
              +19
              contrary to the decisions of the High Command.

              Yes, summer - autumn 1915
        2. Lieutenant Teterin
          Lieutenant Teterin 29 March 2018 09: 18
          +9
          Quote: squeeze
          Russia at all times Russia.

          There was a time in our history when all Russian was subjected to reproach, in view of "Great Russian chauvinism and oppression." And that state belonged to Russia in the same way as the GDR to Kaiser Germany.
    2. Lieutenant Teterin
      Lieutenant Teterin 29 March 2018 09: 16
      +9
      Generals, officers and lower ranks gave their lives not only for their Sovereign, but also for their people and the Fatherland. It is also necessary to remember this.
      1. Cheburator
        Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 48
        +18
        And for the Sovereign it’s not shameful to fall.
        They shouted later "For the Motherland, for Stalin".
  2. Brutan
    Brutan 29 March 2018 06: 06
    +5
    Hard, bloody experience
    Tactical shortcomings layered on difficult terrain in combination with a lack of ammunition
    A difficult school of positional war ...
    1. soldier
      soldier 29 March 2018 08: 18
      +20
      Difficult school of positional warfare

      All went through it.
      Some were even worse. You can recall a series of Champagne and Isonzo - as if really called upon to smash their forehead.
      1. soldier
        soldier 29 March 2018 08: 50
        +18
        Isonzo is generally a classic of swotting - 12 battles at Isonzo (including Caporetto). A full-fledged series of articles on the subject of hostilities on the Italian front of WWI would not be in the way.
        And besides Champagne - different Artois and Picardy.
        Our Strips and Naroch were singular and pursued at least some all-Union goals (assistance to Serbia, France), and Champagne and Isonzo - to keep warm.
  3. kipage
    kipage 29 March 2018 06: 29
    +19
    An interesting analysis of the causes of failure, in terms of tactics of positional warfare
    undoubted plus next article
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 47
      +18
      + + +
      Definitely
      Keep
  4. XII Legion
    XII Legion 29 March 2018 07: 43
    +19
    Indeed, it is difficult to break through the enemy’s positional front without breaking their head.
    A child was born in agony.
    And the Russian army, like the rest, learned not only to break through the enemy’s positional front, but also to gain a foothold in captured positions to develop such breakthroughs.
    Thank you for continuing the quality and interesting cycle!
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 46
      +18
      Really important
      not only break through the enemy’s positional front, but also gain a foothold in captured positions and develop such breakthroughs.

      By degree of difficulty
  5. Albatroz
    Albatroz 29 March 2018 07: 59
    +4
    The hardest tests
    Day thaw, night frost
    A bunch of errors at different levels
    But with all this
    E. von Ludendorff noted that from March 5 to 18, the position of the German 10th Army was critical - on March 8, the Russians managed to gain a very painful success for the Germans in the lake gorge, it was only difficult to repel the strike to the West.

    If they had not yet been in a hurry with the offensive, they waited for heat. Indeed, it is hard to break through the positional fronts on our front.
    1. soldier
      soldier 29 March 2018 08: 14
      +20
      If you weren’t in a hurry

      The German strike at Verdun caused a premature transition to the offensive.
      And by the way, this affected the effectiveness of the summer operations of the Northern and Western Fronts.
      And within a week (from March 22 to March 30 of a new style) of the onoch offensive, the German attacks on Verdun stopped. The German armies in the Russian strip of the Western and Northern fronts were not able to single out any formations to the French front during this period (the most important in the Verdun operation). Moreover, already during the Narech fights, German forces opposing only the 2nd Army increased by 30 thousand bayonets and 230 guns.
      The Northern and Western Fronts fettered a half-million group of Germans.
      1. soldier
        soldier 29 March 2018 08: 46
        +19
        fettered a half-million group of Germans.

        Even more than half a million
        1. Cheburator
          Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 45
          +18
          Even more than half a million

          Yes.
          And we are only talking about the Western and Northern Fronts
  6. parusnik
    parusnik 29 March 2018 08: 00
    +4
    L.-O. O. Sirelius-After the February Revolution, during the purge of the highest command staff, he lost his post and was transferred to the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District on 10.04.1917. 28.09.1917/2/1918 dismissed from service due to illness with a uniform and pension. The fate is unknown. There are many versions. But not one is confirmed. S. Baluev, as the author of the article writes in his book 1920 Successful generals of the forgotten war "..-" one of the most worthy generals of the Russian army of the First World War, a man with higher military education and combat experience. "Since 1 in the Red Army, inspector of military communications of the Higher In 15.07.1919, a member of the Special Meeting at the Commander-in-Chief and the Commission for the Study and Use of the Experience of World War I. He was included in the lists of the General Staff of the Red Army on 07.08.1920/1923/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. Later on teaching work, he died in Moscow in XNUMX.
  7. soldier
    soldier 29 March 2018 08: 44
    +19
    A series of articles is devoted to the analysis of experience.
    Experience gained during the offensive operations of the WWI positional period.
    And experience is always very valuable and instructive. Especially when full-fledged research on the topic practically does not exist.
    Well, working on bugs means that maybe they will not be repeated.
    "Forewarned is forearmed".
    1. BAI
      BAI 29 March 2018 10: 37
      0
      Especially when full-fledged research on the topic practically does not exist.

      Well, what does it mean does not exist?
      For example:
      1. Barsukov E.I. Russian artillery during the world war. T.I. - M .: State Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, 1938. Not very new, but easily accessible.
      2. Litvinenko D.V. The activities of the military governing bodies of Russia on the development of artillery supply during the First World War (1914 - 1918). A dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences. St. Petersburg. SPSU. 2009. This is more difficult, but you can get acquainted if you wish (you can even buy for 500 rubles (this is not advertising - a statement of fact)).
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 13: 43
        +17
        Yes, what are you talking about? What about the article? About artillery supplies? lol
        Well, well, attentive comrades.
        Full-fledged research on the topic of this cycle - that is,
        THE PROBLEM OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE OFFICIAL TACTICS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSITIVE STAGE OF THE WWII REALLY ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT really - DOES NOT EXIST.
        So the Army man is completely RIGHT.
        1. soldier
          soldier 29 March 2018 13: 49
          +18
          BAI

          Well, what does it mean does not exist?

          That's just it that about the problem of the offensive in the positioning in the analysis of the totality of operations there really aren’t any.
          kipage
          Full-fledged research on the topic of this cycle - that is,
          THE PROBLEM OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE OFFICIAL TACTICS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE POSITIVE STAGE OF THE WWII REALLY ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT really - DOES NOT EXIST.

          Exactly
          Once again I see that some hear only their own voices and look at the book - but they see fi..y)
          1. BAI
            BAI 30 March 2018 10: 28
            0
            Now, if you read the first source, you would not have any questions why the second appeared.
            The tops of the tsarist army made a deep mistake in the assumption of waging war only at the expense of mobilization artillery reserves. No stockpiled in peacetime can cover the colossal needs of the modern great war. These stocks are needed only for the outbreak of war, and then the war will be spent on the means that it will be provided with by the productive forces of their country.

            Are you going to break through the defense without shells? One tactic?
            1. soldier
              soldier 30 March 2018 12: 19
              +15
              You, as a clever machinist, substitute concepts.
              No, of course it is impossible to break through the defense without shells.
              But the article is not about material support or the release of ammunition.
              And about the TACTICAL FEATURES of the offensive in the conditions of positional war. About how the TACTICS of the offensive developed, its Tricks and WAYS. Procurement is also extremely important, but this is a nuance that needs to be considered separately.
              An article about changing TACTICAL RECEPTIONS and METHODS. By the way - based on secret notes, instructions - recommendations that many have never seen. In contrast to the well-known work of Podorozhny, setting out the course of the operation itself.
  8. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 29 March 2018 09: 14
    +8
    A wonderful and informative article. The experience of positional war came at a high price. Like all participants in that war. But, indicatively, the Russian command learned from its mistakes — Lutsk breakthrough is an example of this. To the author — my gratitude for the work done!
  9. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 09: 38
    0
    Verdun -
    47 days before the start of the offensive, the Germans deployed 1225 guns against the attacked section, including 703 heavy ones (including 175 of them with caliber from 210 to 420 mm). In the direction of the main strike, the density of guns per 1 km of the front was 22 heavy and 8 light. In addition, 152 mortars, of which 2/3 of large and medium calibers, took part in the artillery preparation.
    Twelve divisions with an average density of four battalions per 12 km of front were put into operation.

    And the Russians, as always, managed with their native THREE-INCHES ...
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 44
      +18
      And the Russians, as always, managed with their native THREE-INCHES

      Well not only
      Upcoming support only up to 1000 lungs and 150 heavy guns

      The scale is certainly not the same, but the guns arrived during the operation - albeit not in those quantities.
      Gurko:
      Heavy artillery arrived gradually and only in the amount of not more than 100 barrels (and even then not more than 152 mm caliber).
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 07
        0
        Arriving 47 days before the start and arriving gradually - two HUGE differences!
        On the shock sections of the Naroch operation, the artillery densities for the Russian front of this period were quite high (12-18, and in some places up to 35 guns per kilometer) ...

        What guns? Three-inch or higher howitzers and heavy 107-mm guns?
        The Germans near Verdun -
        In the direction of the main strike, the gun density per 1 km of the front was 22 heavy and 8 light.

        What do you prefer - 22 heavy guns per 1 km - 12 or 15 or a maximum of 35 guns (from 76 to 152 mm, or rather 76 and a maximum of 122 mm)?
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 10: 10
          +18
          They wrote to you that by the beginning of the operation there were 150 heavy guns.
          Something came later.
          Densities are indicated as total.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 23
            +1
            Density is indicated GENERAL without division into CALIBER guns!
            And 150 heavy guns are not enough against 703 German ones near Verdun!
            Clearly not the Verdun forts stormed! Just a SWAMP ...
            In which they froze and died! Well, there was no other sector on the entire Russian front for an offensive that distracted the Germans! There was ... Only Naroch moor ...
            As far back as January, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Western Front, General A.E. Evert, assumed the necessity of attacking the Germans in case of their offensive in France. He writes to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.V. Alekseev: "I admit that the offensive, if it is decided, is highly desirable before spring, when the lakes, rivers and swamps are ice-bound." However, the Headquarters was in no hurry with the development of an offensive plan.
            As a result, preparations for the operation were carried out in a short time, which led to a catastrophic shortage of artillery shells among the Russians: 107-mm guns and 152-mm howitzers had 50 rounds per day, 122-mm - 100, 76,2-mm - 200 each. By the beginning of the operation, only half of these ammunition had been delivered.
            All subordinates of A.F. Ragose corps, except XXXVI, had a shortage of weapons (23 soldiers did not have rifles).
            The most accurate figures for Russian losses are 1018 officers and 77 lower ranks killed and wounded (of which 12 thousand frostbite and frozen).
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 10: 29
              +18
              Yes, I wrote - that the density is common.
              Losses - 78000 Russians and up to 40000 Germans.
              Be that as it may, the losses of the defending Germans in relation to the advancing Russians were quite high.
              1. kipage
                kipage 29 March 2018 10: 30
                +18
                Stormed the powerful STRENGTHENING of the Germans (though not forts).
                The terrain turned into a swamp time of year - spring thaw.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 44
                  +1
                  So, throughout the contact of the Russians with the Germans, there was SPRING SLUTDING or were there still more passable sectors of the front?
                  And what ... The headquarters has been pulling the "cat for ..." month since January?
                  And we ALWAYS and ALL refer to the thaw and frost. From ministers to janitors ... And frosts, and thaw, and heat always come UNSUCHLY ...
                  They were not expected, but they are op and a complete unexpected ...
              2. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 54
                +1
                The loss by the Germans of 40 thousand on the Russian front stopped the operation near Verdun?
                NO.
                For the Russians, 78 thousand were significant losses?
                YES.
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 12: 39
                  +18
                  I wrote below that the operation was not to stop the operation near Verdun, but to prevent the troop transfer from the passive (north-west) section of the Russian Front.
                  Operation hindered? YES.
                  The Germans increased their group against the Northern and Western fronts by 180 thousand, concentrating reserves north of the line of the Pripyat swamps. Did this contribute to the success of the 1st stage of the Brusilovsky breakthrough? YES.
                  The advancing player must create a (classic) superiority over the defender as 3 to 1. And the loss is about 3 to 1.
                  78 thousand to 40 thousand - is the ratio of losses (in the breakthrough of layered defense, lack of ammunition and difficult terrain) more favorable than usual practice? YES.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 48
                    +1
                    Then why did not create an advantage in artillery 3 to 1?
                    Or were there no guns with shells?
                    And the infantry was still in "EXCESS" ...
                    You did not indicate the absence of rifles in almost 24 thousand soldiers on this sector of the front! Or was it enough, as is now customary to say?
                    1. kipage
                      kipage 29 March 2018 13: 33
                      +18
                      Operation COMPLETE was to begin in MAY-JUNE (decision of the All-Union Conference).
                      artillery superiority 3 to 1

                      perhaps it would be created.
                      I had to go on the offensive ahead of schedule - in order to bail out the allies.
                      And the shell hunger has not yet been completely eradicated.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 29 March 2018 14: 59
                        0
                        Have rifle hunger been over?
                        In January 1916, more than a third of all soldiers in the armies of the Western Front were without rifles.
                        Thus, our troops had to attack three months before the deadline; to throw into the battle still untrained, unprepared troops, which had a shortage of weapons, including rifles, to shoot the stockpile of ammunition that they had just begun to accumulate (this led to a catastrophic shortage of artillery shells); to attack in the lake-marshland, in the spring thaw, when the infantry and artillery sank in the mud. Thus, the situation was complicated by extremely severe weather conditions: strong thaws alternated with night frosts, wet snow - with rain, which made the lake swampy region, in which the troops were to act, into practically impassable terrain. As a result, the defeat was predetermined before the start of the attack.

                        A. Samsonov. Naroch operation
  10. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 09: 45
    +2
    The general recorded negative circumstances that affected the effectiveness of the operation — the weakness of artillery (primarily heavy), the lack of surprise, and terrain detrimental to an infantry attack. Heavy artillery arrived gradually and only in the amount of not more than 100 barrels (and even then not more than 152 mm caliber). Preparation for the operation could be completed no earlier than at the end of March - it was believed that by this moment there would be no thaw. The preparation was recorded by the enemy, who concentrated powerful artillery, in abundance equipped with ammunition (while the Russians saved every shell).

    Why in general under such conditions Rushed to destroy their own infantry ???
    Just to show allies ACTIVITY?
    And this is the OFFICERS of THE Czarist education ... Experienced, well-read, loving soldiers, like relatives! (Only "UNLIMITED RED COMMANDERS" could do this).
    Interestingly - objections to this operation were? Or just EXECUTE, and then PLEASE?
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 29 March 2018 09: 50
      +18
      During coalition wars, you need to think about allies
      And if the Germans defeated the French near Verdun?
      The center of connectivity of the entire Western Front.
      B. Liddell-Hart wrote for a reason: "... in March, Russia launched an attack near Lake Naroch, sacrificing herself in order to weaken pressure on France."
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 09: 53
        +18
        There was such a German historian Otto von Moser.
        I will also quote:
        March 18th, i.e. at an unfavorable time of the year, an unexpected Russian offensive began at Lake Naroch and at Pastav, which subsequently spread to Riga and lasted until the beginning of April ... It was conducted by the Russian command extremely energetically ... The Russian troops went into battle with fanatical selflessness ... Although the Russian offensive was repelled thanks to the worthy surprise of the courage of the German troops, but the very fact of the Russian offensive indicated the following two phenomena. Firstly, that there was no serious, let alone long-lasting weakening of the Russian offensive force and will; secondly, that the German Eastern Front really needed that half-million army, which was located between Riga - Pinsk. The need for the presence of such forces in the east was also reinforced by the fact that a significant proportion of German military units were greatly weary of heavy battles during adverse seasons, weather and local soil, as well as hasty and merciless transfers associated with these battles along narrow linear wooded and marshy dirt roads to overcome serious war crises
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 09
        0
        But were the Germans going to withdraw troops from the Russian front and send them to the Western Front?
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 10: 13
          +17
          Yes, during the periods of winter lull just planned transfers were carried out.
          You can look at the trend on the fronts.
          And even more so with the start of a large-scale offensive they would not have been quick to transfer.
          Then, too, were not fools. The French asked for help through the military representative at the Russian Headquarters of General Poe.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 36
            0
            If the Germans carried out planned transfers during that period of winter calm, couldn’t they end by the month of March?
            And then another question - where did the Germans get 49 divisions to help their forces in repelling an attack on the Somme?
            Moreover, in the first blow of the Allied offensive they got 8 divisions!
            And where did the allies find 68 divisions to reinforce the 29 divisions that launched this offensive?
            In March 1916, the French did not have reserves, and from July to September, these reserves were found both among the French and the British!
            So it turns out?
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 10: 43
              +17
              I tell you about the trend.
              In March 1916, the French did not have reserves, and from July to September, these reserves were found both among the French and the British!

              Of course, there may not be any reserves in March, but already in July-September. Everything needs TIME.
              The transfer from the Russian front (primarily the calmer Belarusian-Baltic sector) was likely - and it was not for nothing that the French asked for help. Therefore, on this site and began the offensive.
              By the way about this
              Well, there was no other sector on the entire Russian front for an offensive that distracted the Germans!

              The Germans could be more effectively affected by a strike not in Galicia, for example (where Austrian troops were mixed with German forces), but on a purely German section of the front. Bad plot in Belarus? In the Baltic states no better. Moreover, the 5th Army of the Northern Front participated.
              Well, you need to look at the transport issue (from where it is easier to transfer, from where it is closer, etc.) and other circumstances
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 11: 11
                0
                So the Russian victims stopped the 10-month-old Verdun meat grinder?
                Yes or no?
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 12: 22
                  +17
                  But I didn’t say that it was supposed to STOP, it was supposed to prevent the transfer.
                  The meat grinder was not immediately stopped. Too big event.
                  But:
                  Within 2 weeks (the most critical) of the Naroch operation, the Germans stopped active operations near Verdun.
                  And the offensive of the Southwest Front led to the final curtailment of the Verdun operation
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 43
                    +1
                    It turns out that it was the actions of the Russians, and not the resistance of the French, that saved the Western Front from the collapse at Verdun?
                    Russian shed blood, and the French ate baguettes and washed them down with wine!
                    Fine.
                    1. kipage
                      kipage 29 March 2018 12: 51
                      +17
                      Only children are divided into black and white.
                      Usually - everything happens in a complex.
                      Verdun saved both the resistance of the French and the help of the Russians.
                      Like the war - the whole coalition won, by the efforts of all countries, and not just one. The one who stayed afloat at the end.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 00
                        +1
                        Your truth - WHO REMAINS FLOAT ...
                        RI gloriously drowned ...
                      2. hohol95
                        hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 56
                        0
                        Children. children are good...
                        The Germans distributed posters on which the French soldier was dying, and the British or American soldier "taunted" the wife of the dying Frenchman ...
              2. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 11: 39
                0
                And here are a few different reasons for choosing this site for the offensive -
                First one. According to the nearsighted view, it is only possible to help the allies
                offensive against the Germans. There was no such condition in the decisions of the Chantilly conference, and a strong blow made against the Austrians, as the later Brusilovsky breakthrough showed, is just as capable of drawing the Germans' forces from their Western Front, as well as a direct blow to them in any part of their Eastern Front.
                The second one. Overestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy (Germans). They were afraid that the enemy himself might attack, striking in the direction of Petrograd or Moscow. The advance at the junction of the Northern and Western fronts prevented the advance of the Germans, disrupting their breakthrough in the direction of the capitals. That is, in other words, they solved a purely defensive task.
                The third. They were afraid of their own slowness and rated too low
                the carrying capacity of its railways. The transfer of one corps from the Northern Front to the South-Western took 21 to 24 days, from the Western to the South-Western - up to 12-14 days. They became stumped before such a carrying capacity and helplessly dropped their hands, since heroic measures were required to increase it; needed other, higher rates of their own work, needed agility and flexibility.

                NOT. Podorozhny "Narochanskaya operation in March 1916"
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 12: 12
                  +17
                  I perfectly understood this the first time - that it was Podorozhny.
                  You quote it intensely, but the book is not called NAROCHAN, but the Narach operation.
                  ALL circumstances mattered.
      3. BAI
        BAI 29 March 2018 10: 10
        +2
        During coalition wars, you need to think about allies

        in March, Russia launched an attack near Lake Naroch, sacrificing itself to ease pressure on France. ”

        And did anyone say somewhere that the allies on the Western Front conducted some kind of offensive operation to ease the pressure on Russia? In France, the Russian expeditionary force fought, among other things. And some expeditionary force of the allies fought on the territory of Russia (except for the intervention in the Civil)?
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 10: 16
          +17
          And did anyone say somewhere that the allies on the Western Front conducted some kind of offensive operation to ease the pressure on Russia?

          Yes, theoretically such was the autumn offensive of 1915 in Champagne.
          But the Germans on the Russian front had already stopped active operations at that moment. A. A. Svechin, who fought in the Baltic States during the indicated period, noted: “Falkenhayn was chosen the day of September 25 to give the order to switch to defense on the Russian front because only this day our French allies deigned to get ready to take part in the 1915 campaign g., and on this day began their long-awaited offensive in Champagne. Revenues from the French only followed when the Germans completely exhausted the entire program of attacks on the Russian front ... The unpopularity of the allies in the troops during this period was already such that in the 10th army the command did not refer to the need to help the French and make it difficult for the Germans to send reinforcements to the west , and indicated only the need to support the offensive operations of the 2nd and 1st Russian armies. ”
          What to do, Russia better understood the specifics of the coalition war than the "allies".
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 50
            +1
            Or maybe the Rulers of Russia did not understand what Russia itself needed during this war?
      4. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 11: 06
        0
        Press OSLAB ???
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 12: 09
          +17
          They wrote to you -
          the Germans on the Russian front had already stopped active operations at that moment.

          Press somewhat weakened the entry of Italy
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 24
            0
            I am about easing the pressure of the Germans at Verdun.
            And not about the actions of the French.
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 12: 42
              +17
              And I thought - they asked: did the operations of the Allies influence the weakening of pressure on Russia.
              About the Naroch Verdun.
              I wrote above - the German pressure on the verdun was weakened.
              For the whole 2 weeks, during which the Naroch operation took place.
    2. rkkasa xnumx
      rkkasa xnumx 29 March 2018 14: 47
      +2
      Quote: hohol95
      Why in general under such conditions Rushed to destroy their own infantry ???
      Just to show allies ACTIVITY?

      They would not have helped the allies, would have remained without their supplies. Rifles-machine guns-guns-cartridges-shells-equip
      niy for military factories. RI itself was not able to provide itself with all this. They paid for weapons and ammunition not only with gold, but also with the lives of their soldiers.
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 14: 58
        +17
        They would not have helped the allies, would have remained without their supplies.

        They would not have helped the Allies - they would have remained face to face with the German bloc.
        They paid for weapons and ammunition not only with gold, but also with the lives of their soldiers.

        In quite dense propaganda brochures about 70 years ago, this was written. Then, even Soviet historical science approached the question of the goals and objectives of the first war more carefully. Especially after they fought the same Germans again in the second war
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 03
        +2
        Come on you ...
        There are many people who believe that industry has already "taken to the war footing" and the country has provided itself to everyone !!!
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 15: 12
          +17
          Let them think what they want
          Or - what he wants laughing
          Just a cliche 70 years ago is already half a century as irrelevant
          1. kipage
            kipage 29 March 2018 15: 15
            +17
            In general, an article on offensive tactics in positional warfare
            Why chat off topic?
            1. rkkasa xnumx
              rkkasa xnumx 29 March 2018 15: 28
              0
              Quote: squeeze
              In general, an article on offensive tactics in positional warfare

              Tactics are just arrows on the cards, and the database itself? Does the logistical support of the database have nothing to do with tactics?
          2. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 16
            0
            You confused the cliche of 70 years ago - THERE WAS NOTHING with the cliche of 30 years ago - EVERYTHING WAS ...
            The truth is somewhere there ... drinks
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 15: 19
              +17
              Confused nothing
              Just this nonsense
              They paid for weapons and ammunition not only with gold, but also with the lives of their soldiers.
              was written in 20-30 years. After the Second World War they began to look more balanced.
              And the truth is for sure - somewhere there. I would like to believe what's next drinks
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 16: 27
                0
                And why hide it - at the time of the Second World War, many knew that the "second front" was paid in blood! After all, the Allies asked for help and the Soviet troops moved the timing of the offensives to earlier ones? And the Americans were in a hurry to speak out against Japan. They had very good experience with such “requests.”
                That's why they “rethought and weighed” - otherwise they themselves would begin to point out the fulfillment of the wishes of the Allies.
  11. BAI
    BAI 29 March 2018 10: 05
    +1
    As a result, the German wire fence remained - which led to high losses of the Russian infantry.

    Yes, the lack of artillery is very serious. I think here, nothing is left of the wire fence.

    The battlefield near Verdun.
  12. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 10: 49
    +1

    Russian soldiers in German trenches captured during the operation in the area of ​​the lakes Naroch - Vishnevskoye.
  13. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 11: 32
    0
    On February 29, General Evert wrote on this occasion to Alekseev the following {15}: "From
    the assumptions of the observatory already reported to you, as well as statistical
    climate data for past years shows that in mid-March, and maybe even
    somewhat earlier, we should expect the beginning of spring thaw. The information I received
    about the area planned for the offensive, show that in the spring thaw he or
    extremely difficult, or completely unsuitable for hostilities: large marshy spaces
    become impassable; many lakes, overflowing, merge together into
    continuous chain; the soil dissolves so much that the movement becomes almost
    impossible. "

    In other words, they were going to attack not only a stronger opponent, but also in
    the area where the terrain itself greatly increases its defenses.
    1. kipage
      kipage 29 March 2018 12: 18
      +17
      I want to draw your attention to 3 aspects.
      1) The article analyzes tactical experience following the results of the Naroch operation, and not the operation itself. Regarding the course of the latter, there is a solid monograph by Podorozhny. It is freely available, and you have repeatedly posted it. Retell - it makes no sense. But CONCLUSIONS on the RESULTS - it is extremely interesting
      2) The Allies had many times more of these “Tricks”. Generally meaningless and bloody. But we, as usual, safely forget about this - doing exclusively self-flagellation.
      3) During the Naroch operation, serious miscalculations were made. They were analyzed, and work was done on the bugs - which in the near future brought its results.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 32
        0
        Experience is a bargain! This is great for us ...
        And why didn’t those people who threw troops in such an offensive gain this experience?
        Or did their general and colonel epaulettes not match the content of their heads?
        And then from emigration I watered the Red Army slop for her mistakes and mistakes in the conduct of hostilities!
        The Allies made up for their losses with colonial recruits, and how was the Russians to make up for the losses? Call Kyrgyz with Uzbeks? Some tried to call for land work and received a bloody riot - which they are now proud of!
        Where did Russia need to take RESERVES?
        The experience is wonderful, but why not study the experience of the Western Front with its meaningless slaughter?
        3) During the Naroch operation, serious miscalculations were made. They were analyzed, and work was done on the bugs - which in the near future brought its results.

        The result - the collapse of the country ... in 1917.
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 12: 44
          +17
          How not to gain experience?
          The result - the collapse of the country. And the success of the offensive of the Southwest Front, which accumulated the experience of the Narach.
          the collapse of the country ... in 1917.
          was caused mainly by socio-economic and administrative problems
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 57
            0
            was caused mainly by socio-economic and administrative problems

            Against the background of past defeats of 1914-1916 ...
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 12: 58
              +17
              And against the backdrop of victories.
              Everyone had victories and defeats.
              Both Germany and Russia. Both collapsed - revolution, conspiracy. Call it what you want.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 06
                0
                One before. The other is a bit later ... But because of my own desire to swallow a piece in the east, to the detriment of the support of my Western front.
                The Ottoman Empire was forgotten ... And AB ...
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 15: 10
                  +17
                  I haven’t forgotten anything.
                  Believe me
  14. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 16
    +1
    Despite the requirement of the commander-in-chief to strike with the flanks, the commander of the 2nd Army 
    set up his troops for the offensive as follows:
    a) General Pleshkov's group - 20 km along the front; in the first line: 1st army and 1st 
    Siberian corps - total 91499 bayonets, 1697 sabers, 144 light and 116 heavy guns. 
    For 1 km of the front: 4660 men and 13 guns;
    b) General Sirelius's group - 15 km along the front (excluding lakes); in the first line: 34th 
    army (without one division) and 4th Siberian corps - a total of 65 bayonets, 229 sabers, 1
    light and 12 heavy guns. 
    For 1 km of the front: 4421 soldiers and 7,5 guns;
    c) General Baluev's group - 22 km along the front; in the first line: 5th and 36th army corps,
    The 3rd Siberian Corps only observes the passages of the swampy area opposite the lake. Slobodskoe - total 
    94 bayonets, 111 sabers, 1 light and 543 heavy guns. 
    For 1 km of the front: 4802 soldiers and 10 guns.

    Here you have 35 guns per 1 km of the front.
    1. kipage
      kipage 29 March 2018 12: 47
      +17
      BARSUKOV.
      THE SPECIALIST ON ARTILLERY indicated: density from 12 to 35 guns per kilometer of the front.
      He conducted a very serious analysis.
      If you haven’t read something or don’t know, don’t speak.
      Attach a page so that they won’t think of anything))
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 55
        +1
        So in terms of caliber, how were these guns distributed?
        How many 76 mm destroyed the German position?
        Without advanced observers.
        You write yourself - the machine-gun points were not suppressed, but where did the artillery shoot?
        And where was that POWERFUL industry that did not provide the troops with guns and HE shells? And she continued to drive shrapnel ...
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 12: 56
          +17
          What am I writing myself?
          What points?
          1. kipage
            kipage 29 March 2018 12: 57
            +17
            By 1917, shell hunger has been eliminated, if that.
            It's a bit late.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 09
              0
              Criminally late ...
          2. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 08
            0
            The article says -
            As a result, the German wire fence remained - which led to high losses of the Russian infantry. Towards the end of the operation, enemy barriers and trenches in several areas were destroyed, but dugouts were largely preserved. The messages were littered with the corpses of the Germans - which also impeded the actions of the Russian infantry. Although there were no continuous passages in the wire fences, the infantry coped with the sharp wire. But the gunners of the group M. M. Pleshkov could not destroy the German machine-gun points located in the forest. The enemy artillery fire was not suppressed either - it was not possible to properly identify the positions of the latter due to the lack of aerial reconnaissance and high-quality observation posts.

            Where did the GODS OF WAR generally shoot ???
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 15: 10
              +17
              So do the research.
              Flag in hand)
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 27
                0
                There is a flag. Send the drum ...
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 15: 33
                  +17
                  You will find the drum yourself)
  15. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 21
    +1
     As for the secrecy of the offensive, in the Naroch operation of 1916 it looked like an open secret.
    In the old Russian army it was not customary to hide much of what should have been secret.
    Getting acquainted with the affairs of large army headquarters, we find, for example, the following queries:
    "Please let me know which army is the Vishnev estate of Count Khrebtovich-Butenev, Oshmyansky 
    county, Vilna province? "
    And Count Khrebtovich-Butenev received an obliging answer: the estate is such and such "on the night of January 12, 1916 
    was included in the area of ​​the 10th Army ".
    After the Naroch operation, the Russians noted poor observance of military secrets. Already on March 14 (it was established later by the investigating authorities) among the grooms and orderlies of the senior command staff, there was open talk about the upcoming offensive. The same conversations, in their words, were conducted among the local population. Ludendorff notes in his memoirs that "from the beginning of March we have received information about the impending Russian offensive on 
    Vilnius. "

    NOT. Podorozhny "Naroch operation in March 1916"
    1. kipage
      kipage 29 March 2018 12: 49
      +17
      I already realized that they downloaded this book))
      With all due respect (to Podorozhny) - this is not the ultimate truth.
      There are a lot of special works.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 29 March 2018 12: 51
        0
        I don’t have time to look for special works.
        But they probably end with one conclusion - a mediocre operation for the good of the Allies!
        They didn’t give us such “gifts”!
        1. kipage
          kipage 29 March 2018 12: 55
          +17
          That is the value of research - in the search, and not in retelling what is known.
          As for the densities - I will send you the page of Barsukov’s work here. He is an outstanding specialist in artillery; he analyzed the experience of its use in the Naroch operation. And it’s not for us to argue with him - and not even for Podorozhny.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 29 March 2018 13: 01
            +1
            I do not argue!
            I cannot understand those who claim the following -
            There was enough of everything in the country, industry gained momentum to supply the army, and we should go all at once to Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Istanbul ...
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 13: 36
              +17
              we should go at once to Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Istanbul ...

              I have never claimed this, and the industry - GETTING SPEED. And the pace of recruitment was not bad.
              There was no point in taking the capital - the war was different. Ultimately, it was not the CREDIT strategy that won, but the IMMOR strategy.
              The Entente in any case won the war, it was only necessary to sit out.
              And about the info at Barsukov, so as not to touch the talker)
              Title of the magazine, then the beginning of the article and the page - where about 12-35 guns said
              1. kipage
                kipage 29 March 2018 13: 37
                +17
                Here is the first page of the article
                1. kipage
                  kipage 29 March 2018 13: 39
                  +17
                  And here is the page where the density is.
                  It is very tiring of course to spend energy and time on these disputes. How do you not understand that I’m doing nothing without any reason?
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 29 March 2018 13: 55
                    +17
                    Dear Kipzh
                    In vain, mark the beads)
                    Experience shows that this is a dead matter. The main thing here, in the comments, is who will shout louder and stomp harder. Some popularizers, who occupy almost the entire site, cannot understand that it is impossible to know everything - about knights, and tanks, and banks)) and the versions they offer, due to not always well-informed information, are not always perfect.
                    Well, narrow questions are of interest only to true enthusiasts.
                    2 sides of the same coin, ce la vie.
                    1. kipage
                      kipage 29 March 2018 15: 05
                      +17
                      You are absolutely right
                      Spending time teaching an individual grandfather, of course, makes sense.
                      Let it be better to correspond with yourself - as it is established)
                    2. hohol95
                      hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 12
                      0
                      Well, narrow questions are of interest only to true enthusiasts.

                      And all the rest for you - ENTUSASISTS and PSESISMISTS!
                      Thanks for your kind words!
                  2. hohol95
                    hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 12
                    0
                    Thank. I will try to find and read.
                    1. kipage
                      kipage 29 March 2018 15: 17
                      +17
                      Search
                      Read
                      Man is not alive by the Internet alone laughing
  16. kipage
    kipage 29 March 2018 15: 02
    +17
    hohol95,
    A. Samsonov. Naroch operation

    What kind of A. Samsonov is this?
    Among historians, this is not)
    Podorozhny, I know Barsukov.
    What kind of character?
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 30
      0
      Our neighbor in VO and the author of articles about World War I Samsonov Alexander laughing
      Naroch operation March 9, 2016
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 15: 32
        +18
        Is it a historian equal to Podorozhny and Barsukov?
        Are you laughing?
        Moreover, this is a pseudonym of another - a real person
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 42
          0
          Then you don’t like Podorozhny ...
          Nestor Petrovich Severov also considered himself an EXCLUSIVE HISTORY ...
          1. kipage
            kipage 29 March 2018 15: 45
            +18
            Why is Podorozhny not like?
            Нравится.
            But in matters of the use of artillery, Barsukov, a professional artilleryman, is a priority.
            Well, Samsonov -
            Nestor Petrovich Severov also considered himself an EXCLUSIVE HISTORY
            just in time ...
            if possible, no comment
  17. kipage
    kipage 29 March 2018 15: 13
    +18
    hohol95,
    RI gloriously drowned

    That's it - like you and rejoiced.
    But ...
    The union drowned no less loudly. The truth is there is nothing to rejoice about
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 25
      0
      Thank you for telling me my emotions - I find myself rejoicing good .
      But you are deeply mistaken. I’m just very curious why in such a beautiful country the situation was so bad with the leaders of all levels and industry by 1914! Rejoiced at the start of the war, shouted about throwing "Michels" hats.
      But the whole country did not succeed in getting on the rails of the whole country ...
      Those areas of production in which growth finally manifested itself by 1917 could no longer help with such guidance!
      It turns out that the Germans held "the best of the worst" against our troops, and the Russian army was worse than these "worst".
      So, do not attribute to me unnecessary emotions ...
      1. kipage
        kipage 29 March 2018 15: 31
        +18
        If it seemed to me that in the phrase "how RI drowned" joy - I apologize.
        It turns out the Germans held against our troops "the best of the worst"

        I attribute this phrase to misinformation. Were the 1st and 17th AKs that fought on the Russian front the worst? And the 1st division, which did not climb out from the Carpathians? And the 10th AK, one of the best in the German army.
        Stamps to get rid of.
        the Russian army was worse than these "worst".

        This is no comment at all.
        Follow the battle schedules of opponents, when we talk about individual operations - so that
        Germans held against our troops "the best of the worst"
        didn't sound
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 39
          0
          And why in the article there is no indication of the fighting on April 15, 1916. When the Germans launched a counterattack.
          Using a pause, the enemy prepared a counterattack. On April 15, about 200 heavy German guns opened fire. A mixture of high-explosive shells, shrapnel and poisonous gases covered the Russian trenches. Since gas masks were stored in warehouses in the immediate rear, and not directly in positions, the Russian troops lost a considerable number of people poisoned - only in the area of ​​one of the regiments about 2000 people were out of order. Thanks to this, the Germans were able to get around the defended ledge and attack it from the rear. The 1200 soldiers and 18 warrant officers who had just recently arrived at the front were taken by surprise and surrendered. The Russians had to retreat to their original positions.
          1. kipage
            kipage 29 March 2018 15: 42
            +18
            Literacy)
            Probably because the NAROCH OPERATION took place on March 5-18, 1916.
            Therefore, there is neither April nor May.
            Samsonov mentioned confuses the Mitau operation in December 1916 and the German counterattack in January 1917.
            But do not mix - periodization for that and periodization.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 29 March 2018 15: 57
              0
              Do not attribute this to Samsonov ...
              This is from other places.
  18. hohol95
    hohol95 29 March 2018 16: 54
    0
    E. Z. Barsukov
    Conclusions from the experience of the war of 1914-1917 on the Russian front regarding artillery tactics
    The main ideas of artillery tactics: the suddenness and massing of fire, the depth of destruction and the consequent concentration of fire and the combination of artillery operations, to which the Austro-Germans and French came only as a result of the world war of 1914–1918, - Russian artillery sought to enforce even pre-war time in 1905–1914
    However, the Russian gunners fully mastered and began to implement these basic ideas only in the last period of the First World War, when the war emphasized the need for their implementation in a sharper and clearer form. As for the combined arms command of the Russian army, it, in general, remained alien to these ideas until the end of the war.

    So the soldiers' foreheads were smashed against the walls of others ...
  19. kipage
    kipage 29 March 2018 19: 14
    +17
    But at the end of the war, everything returned to normal.
    The events described in the article Artillery Standard are an illustration. Artillery in the summer of 1917 actually did all the work for the infantry. The infantry could only occupy the destroyed.
    And what were the brilliant results of artillery preparation during the Brusilovsky breakthrough.
    So everything was aligned.
    Just the tactical experience of operations such as Narochskaya was not in vain.
  20. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 29 March 2018 20: 53
    +16
    The headquarters managed to establish the reasons for the tactical failure of the operation
    The main thing is what are the conclusions made after the "debriefing."
    Fine good
    We look forward to continuing.