Military Review

Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 4. Carfat Retreat

60
In the previous article, we showed the main oddities in the descriptions of the battle strings from Gotland 19 June 1915, admitted in various domestic and foreign sources. Now we will try to create a consistent picture of the actions of the 1 th brigade of cruisers M.K. Bakhirev and the detachment of Commodore I. Karth (in fact, it would be correct to write "I. Karpf", because the name of the German commander Johannes von Karpf, but in the future we will stick to stories "Transcriptions" of its naming).


At Russian time in 07.30, the Germans discovered smoke, and at the same time they themselves were spotted by the Bogatyr cruiser, the third in a column of Russian ships. I. Karth immediately turned to the west, in the direction of the Swedish territorial waters, increased the course to full and called on the radio "Roon" and "Lübeck". Five minutes later, in 07.35, on the flagship Admiral Makarov, I. Karth's ships were identified as the Augsburg, a cruiser of the Undine type (sometimes there is a mention of a Nymph-type cruiser, but both are of the same type ships, which in Russian historiography is called cruisers like "Gazelle") and the three destroyers. As soon as the German ships were “clarified,” M.K. Bakhirev immediately turned around, leading the enemy to the course angle 40 degree, and went to intercept him.

German sources do not indicate the speed of the German detachment at the time of contact with the Russians, but, apparently, it was 17 knots. This is precisely the speed that Augsburg kept, returning after completing the task, which I. Karff reported in his radiogram, and Rengarten relayed this information to M.K. Bahirev. No source mentions radiograms in which the Baltic Communications Service fleet would indicate a change in the speed of the German detachment. It follows that the rate of interception at Admiral Makarov was calculated based on the seventeen-node speed of the enemy, and, since M.K. Bakhirev was able to intercept the Germans, it can be assumed that they continued to support 17 knots before the start of the battle.

As for the 1 th squadron of cruisers, before they discovered the enemy, they marched on 19 nodes, but in battle they seemed to be holding 20. Such an “addition” of only one node looks somewhat strange, and it can be assumed that the Russian cruisers did not increase speed after meeting with the enemy. Perhaps, going to intercept, M.K. Bakhirev developed the maximum squadron speed, which, as you know, is slightly lower than the maximum speed of a separate ship in the detachment. And that for the 1 th squadron just had to make 19-20 nodes.

It is not entirely clear how much Admiral Makarov opened fire. Most likely, it took two or three minutes from the moment of identifying the enemy (07.35) to the moment of opening the fire, or perhaps more, because it took the order to change course and execute it, raise the banners flags. Thus, most likely, the guns of the flagship of M.K. Bakhirev spoke at the earliest somewhere in 07.37-07.38, although the Germans (G. Rollman) believe that it was in 07.32. However, such a discrepancy in a few minutes in a combat situation is more than explicable, especially since, as can be judged from the reports, they often constitute a “rounding” of time. The gunners of the flagship Russian ship believed that the distance between the “Admiral Makarov” and the “Augsburg” at the time of the opening of the fire was 44 cable.

Sources say that after three minutes (this is obtained in 07.40-07.41), “Bayan” joined the battle, and “Oleg” and “The Athlete” started shooting at 07.45. At the same time armored cruisers shot at the “Augsburg”, armored decks - at the “Albatross”. Having found out that he was confronted by four Russian cruisers and having fallen under their dense fire, I. Karf turned to 07.45 more to the right on 2. Judging by the maneuvering schemes, M.K. Bakhirev discovered the enemy's turn and turned himself, continuing to keep the German ships on the course angle 40.

But in the next 15 minutes of the battle, from 07.45 to 08.00, quite a few events occurred, the exact time (and even the sequence) of which cannot be established. As we have said, the German detachment was in full swing, but it was different for all German ships. Mainz-class cruisers, to which Augsburg belonged, were developed on tests up to 26,8 nodes. The minelayer "Albatross" had a maximum speed of 20 knots. and probably was able to develop it - it was a relatively young ship that went into service in the 1908. The destroyers of the series, to which the G-135 belonged, showed 26-28 ties, and the S-141 and S -142 »- 30,3 knots Nevertheless, G. Rollman argues that their speed was 20 knots. the "G-135" and a little more - the other two destroyers. Such an assessment is highly questionable for two reasons. Firstly, it is completely unclear why relatively unwary German destroyers (“G-135” went into operation in January, and the other two destroyers - in September 1907) such a drop in speed occurred. Secondly, an analysis of the maneuvering of the parties shows that the destroyers actually went faster than on 20 nodes.


Flagship I.Karfa - light cruiser "Augsburg"


Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have information about the exact position and courses of the German and Russian troops, on the basis of which the determination of the speed of the German ships would be reduced to solving a not too complicated geometric problem. We only know that I. Karth indicated in his report an increase in the distance from 43,8 to 49,2 cables, but G. Rollman does not give an exact time when the distance was 49,2 KBT., Saying only that such a distance was between opponents at the start torpedo attack. If we assume that the torpedo attack took place somewhere between 07.50 and 07.55, which looks the most likely, then it turns out that the German ships managed to increase the distance between them and the pursuing Russians on 5,4 cable for 15-20 minutes. This means that the distance between Augsburg and Admiral Makarov increased with the speed of the 1,6-2,2 node. Why not faster, because the “Augsburg” surpassed the Russian cruisers in speed of knots by six? Obviously, the Russians did intercede with the Germans, as well as the forced maneuvers of the “Augsburg”, who had to “zigzag” on the course in order to avoid coverings.

Thus, the gap between 07.45 and 08.00 looks like this - the Augsburg and the destroyers, giving the most complete advance at the beginning of the battle, continued to break away from the less fast-moving Russian cruisers and from the relatively low-speed Albatross, which naturally fell behind with the description of the battle G. Rollman). But if I.Karf seemed to be thinking only about his own salvation, the destroyer battalion commander considered himself obliged to try to help out the Albatross and therefore raised the signal of a torpedo attack.

In fact, and without any doubt, the German commanders on the destroyers understood the suicidal nature of such an attack and were not at all torn into it. In order to have at least a shadow of a chance to hit the Russian cruisers with torpedoes, you had to get close to them with the 15 (the ultimate range of outdated German torpedoes with which the destroyers were armed was about 16 KBT.), And in an amicable way - with 10, and a similar approach with four cruisers, was, of course, deadly for three destroyers. The maximum that they could achieve with their attack and at the cost of their death was to force the Russians to turn away from Augsburg and Albatross for a time in order to shoot the destroyers at rest, and then continue the pursuit of the cruiser and minzag. Nevertheless, they attacked, and they did it without orders from above.

According to the author of this article, the destroyers went on the attack somewhere around 07.50 or a little later, rushing to cross the course of Russian ships, and got close to 08.00 with Admiral Makarov to about 33-38 cable (as they say Russian sources). In fact, the most probable is the 38 cable count, and the 33 cable figure most likely originated from the book by G. Rollman, who indicates that the German destroyers were fighting (shot at Russian cruisers) in this period and before leaving the battle from the 38,2 distance -32,8 cable. It should be assumed that the smallest distance between the ships of M.K. Bakhirev and the destroyers were later, when they turned away after the "Augsburg" and crossed the Russian course, therefore, at the moment we are talking about 38 cable. On Russian cruisers in 07.55, they even "saw" traces of torpedoes that had passed between Admiral Makarov and Bayan.

Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev responded to the attack exactly as it should. He did not turn off the combat course and did not order to transfer 203-mm or at least 152-mm artillery fire to the destroyers - only three-inch armored cruisers "worked" on them. The Russian commander evidently saw that the Augsburg was breaking the distance, and tried to give its gunners as much time as possible to hit the German cruiser. Three-inch shells did not pose a great threat to more than 500-ton German destroyers. In the Russian-Japanese war, weapons of this caliber could not be stopped even by 350-ton ships, nevertheless their fire "hinted" that the actions of the destroyers were noticed and to a certain extent unnerved their commanders. Again, once again, during the Russian-Japanese war, effective reflection of mine-bearing attacks was obtained only with 120-152-mm caliber guns, the range of the German torpedoes on Russian ships could not be known, and the fact that M.K. Bakhirev continued to hold the enemy on the course angle 40 grad., He went against the path of I. Karfu and did not use his six-inch to repel the attack, indicates anything, but not about the timidity or excessive caution of the Russian commander.

But I. Karth, it seems, simply ran, waving his hand at the direction of the battle. He did not order the destroyers to go on the attack, but did not cancel it when they went into it. Instead, around 07.55, shortly after the start of the attack, apparently making sure that he had broken away enough from the Russian cruisers to slip under their noses to the German coast, I. Karf turned his ship to the north and gave a radiogram order to the Albatross »Break into neutral Norwegian waters.

Honestly, the author of this article has the feeling that from the very beginning of the discovery of Russian cruisers, I.Karfa was seized with panic, and he simply fled headlong to the territorial Swedish waters. And then, seeing that his destroyers went on the attack, he realized that the perfect moment had come to turn to the south, passing under the nose of the Russian cruisers, while they were busy repelling the mine-bearing attack. This feeling of the author, no doubt, is not and cannot be a historical fact. But there is indirect evidence to support this point, we will consider them below.

So, after the start of the attack of the destroyers, the “Augsburg” went against the Russian course and gave the order to the Albatross to break into neutral waters. And here there was another mystery of that distant battle. The fact is that domestic sources describe that after the signal of “Augsburg” on “Albatross” the German destroyers refused to attack, turned behind “Augsburg” and put a smoke screen, which for a time covered both “Augsburg” and “Albatross” from the fire of the Russian ships. Then M.K. Bakhirev ordered the 2 cruisers' semi-brigade "to act according to their discretion," after which the Bogatyr and Oleg that made it turned north. As a result of this maneuver, the Russian cruisers dispersed - the Admiral Makarov and Bayan continued to pursue the Germans in the same course, and the Bogatyr and Oleg went north, as if taking the enemy into ticks.

The Germans describe this episode differently. According to them, when the Augsburg began to lean to the left and sent the Albatross radiogram to the Swedish waters, the Russian cruisers turned north. Then the commander of the battalion of the destroyers, seeing that his flagship was running, and the Russians changed course, considered their duty fulfilled, refused the torpedo attack and turned after Augsburg. That is, the difference in the German and Russian versions seems to be small - whether the German destroyers stopped the attack after turning the Russian cruisers to the north, or before it. At the same time, the 1 brigade of cruisers, as we know, did not turn to the north, but the Bogatyr and Oleg went there about 08.00, which (theoretically) might have seemed to the Germans, like turning the whole brigade to the north.

According to the author of this article, the Russian version of events causes much more confidence than the German version, and here's why. The fact is that at the moment when the Germans abandoned the attack and started putting up a smoke screen, they had until about the intersection of the Russian course about 25 KB. Why so much? The fact is that when “Bogatyr” and “Oleg” turned north (approximately in 08.00), they left the smoke screen and saw “Albatross” only in 08.10. The cruisers went on 19 or 20 nodes, and taking into account the turnaround time, they had to go 10 minutes from the beginning of the maneuver about two and a half to three miles to the north. And this means that it was there (that is, two and a half or three miles to the north) that the edge of the smoke screen began, therefore, at the time of its production, the German destroyers were there.



Just in case, we will give a scheme taken from the book by MA Petrova "Two fights"



By and large, for the attack of the destroyers, it was completely unimportant whether the Russian cruisers turned to the north or not. Roughly speaking, the Russians went east, the Germans went across the line from north to south. Did Russians turn north? Fine, it was enough for the destroyers to turn east, and they would again go against the Russian course. Around 08.00, Russian cruisers and German destroyers appeared to be on the opposite tops of the square, and no matter what side the Russians went to, the Germans had the opportunity to attack, following the course of the enemy. Thus, the turn of the Russian cruisers “to the north” of the Russian cruisers to the north did not prevent the torpedo attack at all.

Nevertheless, the commander of the destroyers flotilla refused to attack. Why? What changed? Only one thing - he learned that the commander of the operation, I. Karf, decided to quit the Albatross. It was completely clear from the fact that the Augsburg went across the path of the Russian cruisers and gave a radiogram with an order to the Albatross to go to Swedish waters. But in a report it is not so easy to write a rationale for the decision to stop the attack: “my immediate superior ran, and the worse for me?”. Moreover, an interesting nuance arose: of course, the commander of the German destroyers had a certain autonomy and had the right to act at his own discretion. But after he raised the signal "Torpedo attack", Commodore I. Karf did not recall him. And this means that the commodore agreed with the decision of his subordinate and believed that a torpedo attack was necessary. The commander of the flotilla made the decision to stop the attack on his own, and it turns out, as if contrary to the opinion of his commander expressed earlier ... Of course, tacit approval is not an order, but it would be nice to find other reasons to stop the attack. And the fact that the Russians, just about that time, seemed to have turned to the north - why not? Well, yes, in fact, they turned a little AFTER the German destroyers got out of the battle, and not before ... But in the report it turned out great: we rushed into the attack, the enemies turned away, and then suddenly the flagship retreated, well, we followed suit.

Please understand correctly - all this, of course, conjecture and nothing more. But the fact is that all the contradictions of the German reports and the description of the battle of Gotland 19 June 1915, made by G. Rollman, just fit perfectly into the version that:

1) German destroyers made themselves die heroically and rushed into a suicide attack;

2) Then, seeing that their flagship is running, they chose to follow his example;

3) Subsequently, they “hesitated” their retreat and tried to give their actions to reports ... eghkm ... let's say, more "tactical brilliance".

The author of this article went through many other options, but the version of the deliberate distortion of reality in the German reports seems to be the most reasonable. Well, let's say, the Germans imagined that the Russians were turning north and the destroyers turned away, but only Bogatyr and Oleg went north, and Admiral Makarov and Bayan continued to follow the same course. And what, the Germans did not notice this, being from Russian cruisers less than four miles away? By the way, Mr. Rollman has “brilliantly” beat this episode - the fact is that after the “Augsburg” radiogram on Albatross, it is quite sensible to try to use any chance, no matter how illusory, he would radio “I ask you to send underwater attacks boats. And so, according to G.Rollman, the Russians, frightened by these very boats, dashed to the north, but then, after some time, their armored cruisers turned back to the east, and the Bogatyr and Oleg continued to move in the same direction ...

Suppose, in fact, reality is distorted not in German reports, but in Russian reports, and in fact M.K. Bakhirev, afraid of the mine-bearing attack, turned away to the north and maneuvered as shown by G. Rollman. But, if he saw such a significant threat in them, then why did he not order to shoot at least six-inch guns at German destroyers? And if ordered - why the Germans do not celebrate this?

Thus, we will dwell on the version that, after the German destroyers attacked, the Augsburg walked along the same course for some time, and then turned to the south-west, interrupting Russian ships and ordered the Albatross to break into neutral waters. German destroyers stopped the attack and went for their flagship, putting a smoke screen. In response, M.K. Bakhirev continued to move forward, but ordered “Bogatyr” and “Oleg” to act at their own discretion, and they turned to the north ... by the way, why?

This act in the national historiography is also traditionally criticized. They say, instead of "decisively moving closer" to the enemy and "rolling it out", they started a difficult maneuvering and useless coverage from both sides. They also summed up the rationale — the envelopment and staging of the enemy “two fires” was a classic tactical device, as was the coverage of the head of the enemy column. And now the Russian commanders, being timid dogmatists of a close mind, became shy, did not take the initiative, but instead acted with a pattern, “according to a textbook” ....

Let's put ourselves in the shoes of the commander of the 2 cruisers brigade.

Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 4. Carfat Retreat


Where was he going? He could, of course, continue to follow the armored cruisers of the 1 second half-brigade, "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" (in the diagram - the 1 variant), but why? On the Bogatyr and Oleg they would no longer see the Albatross they shot at, and what the German ship is doing behind a smoke screen no one knows. Well, how, taking advantage of the invisibility that the chimney gave him, he will run north, break the distance and disappear into the fog in order to try to leave for Libau or make an attempt to break through to the German coast? Look for his fistula then. And besides, if M.K. Bakhirev would like his armored cruisers to follow him; he would not raise a signal to allow them to act independently. What else? Turn right into the smoke screen (2 version)? And if the German destroyers, seeing a similar stupidity of the Russian commander, turned around and met the Russian cruisers shortly, when they entered the smoke?

Here, by the way, the double standards of some domestic authors are well traced - the same A.G. No bad word was said about the British commander of the Mediterranean fleet, E. B. Cunningham, when he did not dare to lead his squadron into the smoke supplied by the Italians in the battle of Calabria (World War II). This battle is also called the “battle of one projectile,” since after a single hit in the flagship battleship the Italians fled from the battlefield. But if the British admiral did not waste time bypassing the smoke screen, then the Italians could hit more than one projectile, but a few more.

Nevertheless, the Englishman acted absolutely correctly - the enemy had enough destroyers to arrange a real Tsushima in heavy smoke for the British ships. And in exactly the same way, the commander of the 2 th cruiser semi-brigade in the battle of Gotland 19 Jun 1915 r acted right when he led his cruisers around the smoke curtains. He could, of course, risk and win some distance to the Albatross, but was it worth the risk of losing the Bogatyr or Oleg? Each of which was more than twice the size of the Undine-class cruiser, which, according to the Russian commander, he was chasing? At the same time, domestic sources, cursing the commanders of cruisers, did not seem to notice that they were leading the path of rapprochement with the Albatross through a smoke screen set by the destroyers. Actually, turning to the north, bypassing the fumes, was at that moment a reasonable and quite optimal decision, the commander of the 2 th half-brigade accepted him, and M.K. Bakhirev subsequently agreed with him completely.

The only point that categorically does not want to fit into the above reconstruction of events - domestic sources claim that the "Augsburg" and the destroyers crossed the course of Russian cruisers at 08.00. If M.K. Bakhirev kept the enemy on the course angle 40 degrees, then this is impossible geometrically. The point is that the moment of the beginning of the mine action attack, the mutual position of Admiral Makarov and Augsburg can be easily described with the help of a simple right triangle, one angle of which is 40 degrees, and the hypotenuse (the distance between Russian and German flagship ships) is 49 cable .



Obviously, wherever German attackers started their attack from, in order to cut the course of the Russian ships in 08.00, being at the same time in 33 cable from them, they would have to be at least a third faster than the Russian cruisers (that is, to develop 24,7-26 bonds), even if they went directly with Augsburg and moved the shortest route to the desired point. But they did not go like that, because they first tried to go on the attack, that is, as quickly as possible get close to the Russian cruisers. As a matter of fact, from this position it is basically impossible to cut the course of Russian ships in 33 cable from them without having an advantage in speed, which means that the information that G-135 could not go faster than 20 nodes is false. In addition, if the German destroyers would have placed the smoke curtain close to the intersection point of the Russian cruisers, then the Bogatyr and Oleg turned north would not need that much time (until 08.10) in order to turn north shooting at the Albatross.

After the start of the production, the smoke screens (around 08.00), first the Albatross, and then the Augsburg, were hidden for some time from the Russian artillerymen. Then at some point in time (perhaps 08.10 08-15 or so), the Augsburg and the destroyers cut off the course of the Russian ships. At that moment, the destroyers separated the 33 cable from the Admiral Makarov, and the Augsburg from the cable 50. Then the German ships went to the left shell of the Russian cruisers and in 08.35 the opponents completely lost sight of each other.

In principle, closer to 08.00, shooting at the “Augsburg” lost its meaning - it went across the path of the Russian cruisers between 07.55-08.00 and now, to continue to hold it at a constant 40 course angle, Mikhail Koronatovich Bahirev would have to turn away from the hidden behind the smoke screen of the Albatross. At the same time, the Augsburg was at the limit of visibility - it was shared with the Russian cruisers of the 50 kbt order, in addition, it was hidden behind a smoke screen. No matter how sad it was to admit it, but the “Augsburg” still managed to leave impassively, and all that remained now was to destroy the Albatross. "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan" followed (roughly) to the east, "Bogatyr and" Oleg "- to the north. At about 08.10 ("Admiral Makarov" a little earlier), they all rounded the German smoke screen and saw the Albatross. Alas, it is not known exactly at what distance he was at this moment from the Russian cruisers, but it was unlikely to be more than 45 KB.

In 08.20, two significant events occurred in their own way. After 10 minutes after the opening of fire (08.10), the first Russian projectile finally hit the Albatross, damaging the upper deck and the board in the stern, after which it hit the German minelayer regularly. The second event G. Rollman describes as follows:

"Augsburg" from 08.20 to 08.33 (time changed to Russian - auth.) I had the opportunity to fire the flagship again from long distances, for which I turned on him to divert attention from the Albatross and call for a chase. But, taking into account the variable visibility, which ranged from 5 to 7 miles, the commodore in any case adhered to a cautious course of action. ”


It is rather difficult to agree with the first statement of G. Rollman, if only because nothing was observed from the Russian ships, and the German historian did not even consider it necessary to mark the heroic turn of the Augsburg towards the enemy in the scheme given in the book. But the second statement concerning the cautious course of action of I. Karth, without any doubt, is quite true. “Augsburg” shot the Russian flagship 13 minutes so carefully that the Admiral Makarov didn’t notice the shelling.

Most likely, it was like this - while the “Augsburg” scammed all the blades, it was covered by the destroyers of the destroyers, so that it lost sight of the Russian cruisers. Then the light cruiser entered the fog band, or in some other weather conditions that reduced his visibility, and lost the Russians to 08.20. After that, “Admiral Makarov” (or “Bayan”) noticed I. Karf’s flagship and opened fire on him as they retreated - the distance between the opponents quickly increased and they stopped seeing the enemy in 08.33 on Augsburg. This correlates very well with the Russian data - on the armored cruisers, the Augsburg and the destroyers in 08.35 stopped seeing. The difference in a couple of minutes is more than explainable by the features of visibility (in one side of the horizon you can see worse than the other) or by simply rounding up the time in the report. At the same time, the shooting of the “Augsburg” did not deserve to be marked separately - well, the enemy cruiser ran, of course, that at the same time it was shooting, so what? The questions here arise only to Commodore I. Carf, who, apparently, and here slightly "embellished" his report, issuing a gunfight at retreat for a heroic attempt to divert the enemy to himself.

Anyway, around the 08.10, the Russian cruisers focused their fire on the Albatross. Absolutely all the authors: both domestic and foreign, did not find good words for the Russian gunners. In their opinion, the shooting was poorly organized, the Russian commanders were inept, and in general, the shooting of the Albatross turned into a big embarrassment. Let's try to figure out what really happened.

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Articles from this series:
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 1
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 2
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 3. Cruisers opened fire
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  1. Vard
    Vard 26 March 2018 06: 52
    +1
    How wonderful everything is ... then on the map ... and how difficult it is when you stand on the captain’s bridge and shoot at you ... I must say that the Russians in the Baltic were better than the Germans ... significantly ...
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 26 March 2018 09: 17
      0
      were the Germans weaker without an ocean fleet? - they did not need the Baltic Fleet - to speak only of WORLD LIVING, and therefore against Britain
    2. Borik
      Borik 26 March 2018 12: 23
      +5
      And despite the mistakes, this battle remained with the Russian fleet. In addition to the ashore “Albatross”, the German fleet almost lost the armored cruiser “Prince Adalbert”, at that moment he was in a hurry to help Commodore Karf, and the English submarine E-9, under the command of Commander Max Horton, threw a torpedo into it. whether it is a hundred miles from the coast it is still unknown whether they managed to save him.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 26 March 2018 15: 45
      +2
      Quote: Vard
      I must say that the Russians in the Baltic were better than the Germans ... significantly ...

      Alas, the British were the best in the Baltic. smile
      And as for the best Russians, only active mine productions can be recorded in the BF asset. As soon as it came to the battle of surface ships, either the Norrköping Bay or the battle of “Rurik” with “Roon” and “Lubeck” turned out.
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 26 March 2018 08: 15
    +3
    Why, Germans and not to distort the data in the report ..
    1. Cat
      Cat 26 March 2018 11: 39
      +4
      When the paper starts to "smell like fried" and neither can stand it. Especially if your own commando wool is on fire!
      So, I think that I don’t need to start talking about the exceptional pedantry, righteousness and decency of the “German nation”. If anyone wants, then it is worth starting with the memoirs of Grosadmiral Denz .....
  3. sevtrash
    sevtrash 26 March 2018 09: 03
    0
    The Germans almost always were a model of fulfilling their duty, and suddenly, in this battle, were everyone scared in unison? Extremely doubtful.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 26 March 2018 10: 39
      +5
      All the best German sailors at that time dreamed of Der Tag and were preparing to gnaw the throat of the Royal Navy as part of the Hochseeflot. Not the best ships remained in the Baltic, and not the best personnel.
    2. Andy
      Andy 26 March 2018 12: 07
      +1
      Well, if with examples, Novik will be remembered against two destroyers. the Germans were also somehow not very happy ... and here 4 (!) cruisers versus 1 in the company of the minzag and destroyers
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 26 March 2018 14: 41
        0
        Quote: Andy
        Well, if with examples -

        But you don’t have to go far for examples, the Battle of Jutland, Helgoland - there’s such a “mistake” - Blucher - he came up against four battlecruisers, the Spee squadron at the Falklands.
        Of course, everything happens, there are no rules without exceptions, well, the author of the article has too much - they even lie and got scared. It is clear that their assumptions are above all, but not so much.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 March 2018 14: 56
          +2
          Quote: sevtrash
          Of course, everything happens, there are no rules without exceptions, well, the author of the article has too much - they even lie and got scared. It is clear that their assumptions are above all, but not so much.

          There are no questions, as it is written in the article, assumptions about the motives of the Germans' behavior are speculation and not fact. But everything else fits perfectly into this speculation, but any other version - alas, no. So if you can offer a different interpretation - I beg you, but no, well, no, no court. Stay with the argument “this cannot be, because this cannot be ever”
          1. sevtrash
            sevtrash 26 March 2018 16: 34
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But everything else fits perfectly into this speculation, but any other version - alas, no.

            At the beginning of the article you report "... quite a lot of events have occurred whose exact time (and even sequence) cannot be established ...", further "... the author of this article does not have information about the exact position and courses of the German and Russian detachments ... ", and also, summarizing" ... I ask you to understand correctly - all this, of course, is speculation and nothing more ... ". Yes, the way it is - these are your speculations, which somehow do not correlate much with common sense.
            The German fleet (and not only) of the first world (and not only) was distinguished by high moral-volitional qualities, training and suspecting its representatives of elementary cowardice and even conscious neglect of the rules - this is some kind of nonsense. You simply surpassed yourself in substantiating your ambiguous viewswassat
            A series of your conjectures has led to a paradoxical conclusion that does not correspond to historical reality. Maybe you should change your speculation, and not this reality?
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 26 March 2018 17: 24
              +5
              Quote: sevtrash
              The German fleet (and not only) of the first world (and not only) was distinguished by high moral and volitional qualities, training and suspecting its representatives of elementary cowardice, and even conscious disregard for the fulfillment of the rules - this is some kind of nonsense.

              And this is not cowardice, but reasonable caution. If you fly from KRL, MZ and 3 MM to 2 BrKR and 2 BpKR (and not just a trifle with 4 ", but full-fledged tower" six-thousanders "with 6"), then the 101st karate technique will be the only acceptable maneuver: exhausting run of the enemy. MOH goes into Swedish waters, KRL and MM try to cover it, and when it becomes clear that this is completely hopeless, KRL and MM leave so as not to lie near the MZ.
              The same German LKR, too, were not particularly eager to cover themselves with “Blucher”.
              And about German courage ... I can suddenly recall the case when the German KRL escaped from two destroyers, one of which was also damaged (moreover, the Germans saw the hits and considered the EM sunk).
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 March 2018 17: 28
              +4
              Quote: sevtrash
              The German fleet (and not only) of the first world (and not only) was distinguished by high moral and volitional qualities, training and suspecting its representatives of elementary cowardice, and even conscious disregard for the fulfillment of the rules - this is some kind of nonsense.

              Let's just say it just doesn't fit into your picture of the world. In fact, a number of actions of the German command (the flight of Hipper at Dogger Bank, the flight of Scheer, who substituted his battlecruisers, etc.) instead of him for slaughter somehow do not strongly indicate this
              We have an example - Jessen, 3 BRKR against 4 more powerful kamimurins, Rurik shot down, Jessen fights in the ratio of 2 forces to one. And only after a long battle, when it became clear that Stormbreaker and Russia would not do anything, did Jessen retreat.
              Compare with Dogger Bank?
              However, once again I say - believe in what you want. I hope that my articles will make people think, if they do not force someone - I will survive it. And I know you, how VERY committed to the dogma of a person and I do not expect to convince you
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash 26 March 2018 18: 00
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In fact, a number of actions of the German command (the flight of Hipper at Dogger Bank, the flight of Scheer, who substituted his battlecruisers, etc.) instead of him for slaughter somehow do not strongly indicate this

                A rather strange interpretation, however, is quite characteristic for you and bears, apparently, a conjunctural character. Hipper acted as it was possible and needed to act in conditions of confrontation with a stronger opponent. Maybe, according to couch strategists, he should have gone on a frontal attack on Beatty?
                Perhaps the result of the Battle of Jutland has also been revised by you and is considered a mistake? I recall that Britain suffered heavy losses both in ships and in people, Scheer escaped defeat from the superior forces of the enemy, received the rank of full admiral.
                However, perhaps I am anticipating your next article, it will be like "The error of all historians in the view ... of the battle, based on my analysis and my speculation"? laughing
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 March 2018 18: 15
                  0
                  Quote: sevtrash
                  A rather strange interpretation, however, is quite characteristic for you and bears, apparently, a conjunctural character

                  So you with these words come to absolutely any interpretation that differs from the official laughing
                  Quote: sevtrash
                  Hipper acted as it was possible and needed to act in conditions of confrontation with a stronger opponent. Maybe, according to couch strategists, he should have gone on a frontal attack on Beatty?

                  By couch strategist, do you understand Jessen, who risked a battle with the Japanese with a two-to-one power relationship? :))) By the way, Hipper, after knocking out Lyon, had the ratio of 3 to 4, while the 2 of English LCR were behind.
                  In general, what I’m talking about - I offer you a comparison of the actions of Jessen and Hipper. Since the results of this comparison do not fit into your vision of the world, it does not exist for you
                  1. sevtrash
                    sevtrash 26 March 2018 19: 40
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    In general, what I’m talking about - I offer you a comparison of the actions of Jessen and Hipper. Since the results of this comparison do not fit into your vision of the world, it does not exist for you

                    Sometimes - and not only sometimes - I don’t understand you, or you don’t understand / don’t understand what you are saying, or in such a way as you stimulate a discussion, such as the more comments, it’s better for the article.
                    Jessen slipped past Kamimura’s detachment and back to Vladivostok he could only go through battle. Where did you get two to one? Again your speculation? Three Russian, 4 Japanese.
                    The ratio in the battle at Dogger Banks is 3 battlecruisers and 1 armored at Germans and 5 battlecruisers at British. When Lyon rolled out, it was also about Blucher, and Seidlitz was damaged.
                    Where did your speculation come from? Do you have such a peculiar vision of history? How I want, and tossing and turning? If only there were comments?
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      26 March 2018 22: 12
                      +2
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      Sometimes - and not only sometimes - I do not understand you

                      I know that.
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      Jessen slipped past Kamimura’s detachment and back to Vladivostok he could only go through battle. Where did you get two to one?

                      It’s very funny to watch how a simple question so unbalances you. Let us nevertheless read something about the battle in the Korea Strait - how they knocked Rurik out of action, how Jessen stayed with Russia and the Thunder against 4 BRKR Kamimura, how Jessen tried to cover Rurik, how it did not work and Jessen carried Kamimura BRKR the hope that Rurik will get rid of small armored decks ...
                      And then, when you study all this, then compare it with the behavior of Hipper
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      The ratio in the battle at Dogger Banks is 3 battlecruisers and 1 armored at Germans and 5 battlecruisers at British. When Lyon rolled out, it was also about Blucher, and Seidlitz was damaged.

                      Yeah, only the two 305-mm LKR Britons are behind, the battle was, in fact, between the 3 LKR British and 3 LKR and Blucher Germans :) You read the description of the battles, read, and think about what you read.
                      1. sevtrash
                        sevtrash 26 March 2018 23: 43
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        It’s very funny to watch how a simple question so unbalances you.

                        Unbalancing - it's somehow too much laughing Perplexity, it seems like the author positions himself logically thinking, at the same time, some of his comments / provisions go beyond the logic, at least declared.
                        In your article, you finally came to the conclusion that the Germans in the Gotland fight turned out to be cowards, in the discussion, you have actually already declared them cowards in the Battle of Jutland and Dogger Banks. More than strange. I repeat, but the German war machine of the First and Second World War is perfection, well, almost. But volitional qualities, courage, duty, discipline - so indisputably.
                        Your articles seem to be interesting to read, as a shortened summary of what you yourself could read in serious research / books, but laziness or once. On the other hand, the experience of discussions with you, not only your own, but also of others, shows that you should trust the material you set out with care.
            3. Alex
              Alex April 15 2018 17: 50
              +2
              Quote: sevtrash
              The German fleet (and not only) of the first world (and not only) was distinguished by high moral and volitional qualities, training and suspecting its representatives of elementary cowardice, and even conscious disregard for the fulfillment of the rules - this is some kind of nonsense.

              Well, of course, a person from the Ruins has absolutely all nations, well, just samples of courage, morale and professionalism, and only Russians are bluffy dorks who cannot distinguish a shell from a bottle.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 March 2018 12: 29
      +5
      Quote: sevtrash
      The Germans were almost always a model of fulfilling their duty

      In reality, or in youthful literature? I highly recommend the Müllenheim-Rechberg memoirs as an “exemplary” performance of duty, especially the moment where Lutens, when 2 English LK appeared, fell into catatonia ...
      Yes, what goes far - we read Manstein’s memoirs - there the postscript on the postscript sits and drives on the postscript, although he performed his duty properly
      1. arturpraetor
        arturpraetor 26 March 2018 12: 33
        0
        Something you today, dear colleague, with sharp words right to the left and right))
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 March 2018 12: 41
          +2
          Quote: arturpraetor
          Something you today, dear colleague, with sharp words right to the left and right))

          Do you mean my disputes with Yuri in an article on cruisers? :)))) There, he turned around in full breadth :))))) And about this - Rehberg describes the case in such a way that Lindemann EMNIP twice asked Lutens permission to open fire and could not get any answer from him - he just stood and was silent, not giving any orders after the appearance of Hood and the Prince .. In the end, Lindeman with the words "I will not let the battleship out of my ass" gave the order to open fire independently.
          As for Manstein, this is indeed so, beginning with Stalingrad, his memoirs are pure agitation, which has nothing in common with reality. There was an episode when he repelled the attacks of the 1 tank (later), while Manstein did not claim to defeat the 1TA, said that he had broken “several 1TA units” and wrote himself 600 of the killed Russian tanks.
          1 did not have so much at the beginning of the operation, and by the time they met with Manstein, it was a month in battle. You yourself know, in the battles there was usually no replenishment, they fought almost to the last, then they took them to reorganization.
          1. arturpraetor
            arturpraetor 26 March 2018 12: 51
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            then you mean my disputes with Yuri in the article about cruisers? :))))

            This, a glass of polonium and catatonia, too)) You would now write something artistic with such an attitude - it would turn out juicy, bright and generally “tasty”.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 March 2018 13: 08
              +1
              Quote: arturpraetor
              This is a glass of polonium and catatonia, too))

              So they generally swear at me in a comment
              Quote: arturpraetor
              You would now write something artistic with such a spirit

              Yes, I would love to, but I have to sit down for the next article. Publisher, by the way, is silent
              1. arturpraetor
                arturpraetor 26 March 2018 13: 13
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                So they generally swear at me in a comment

                I honestly missed the mats, but I liked the level of evidence and the appearance of the next “daughter of the officer”))
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Yes, I would love to, but I have to sit down for the next article.

                It’s also important, here I can only support you, otherwise that reading has decisively ended. By the way, I’ve recently sat down on writing articles - though I publish them only on the AH, I haven’t reached the top level yet)) Although I think one of the future is to try publishing here.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Publisher, by the way, is silent

                It doesn’t mean anything yet. A friend of mine told me that he sent his book (though not the genre — a collection of short stories for children) to the publishing house, and received an answer after 7 months. The answer, I think, in any case should come, albeit a negative one.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 March 2018 13: 19
                  +2
                  Quote: arturpraetor
                  Mats honestly missed

                  so what?
                  Quote: Yura Ehlakov
                  This pi Duke is rubbing your ears and you have dismissed your ears

                  So I suggested ... intravenously ...
                  Quote: arturpraetor
                  It doesn’t mean anything yet.

                  Well, yes, they make the decision 3 of the month, and I set off on January 17, while there is time
                  Quote: arturpraetor
                  The answer, I think, should come anyway

                  No, they do not give answers, alas. Those. if after 3 months nothing means it didn’t fit
                  You have a wonderful article!
                  1. arturpraetor
                    arturpraetor 26 March 2018 13: 26
                    +1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    So I suggested ... intravenously ...

                    It's time to stop reading on autopilot))) I read the Duke as a Duke, retroactively thought it was somehow strange, and went on to read about the many new ships in the Pacific Fleet (this is like the most deprived fleet now in the Russian Federation by the number of new ships?).
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You have a wonderful article!

                    Thank you very much, dear colleague!
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      26 March 2018 13: 45
                      +1
                      Quote: arturpraetor
                      I read Duke as Duke

                      good laughing If:)))))))
                    2. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 26 March 2018 17: 26
                      +2
                      Quote: arturpraetor
                      I read "Duke" as "Duke",

                      That's right - "Duke of Peace." smile
          2. Town Hall
            Town Hall 26 March 2018 12: 58
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There was an episode when he repelled the attacks of the 1st tank (later) while Manstein did not claim to defeat 1TA, said that he had smashed "several 1TA formations" and wrote to himself 600 killed Russian tanks.
            1 did not have so much at the beginning of the operation, and by the time they met with Manstein, it was a month in battle. You yourself know, in the battles there was usually no replenishment, they fought almost to the last, then they took them to reorganization.




            What kind of episode are you talking about? ... what operation?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 March 2018 13: 09
              +1
              Town Hall, is this very important? I spent this reconciliation years ago 10, now, in order to answer your question you need to sit down on a new one. I can, but are you sure it's worth the time?
              1. Town Hall
                Town Hall 26 March 2018 13: 17
                0
                And what's important on this site?) ... you blame Manstein for lying .. it became interesting just
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 March 2018 13: 44
                  +1
                  Quote: Town Hall
                  it became interesting just

                  Then some other time (maybe I’d risk writing an article about this), but now sit at least half a day ...
                  1. Town Hall
                    Town Hall 26 March 2018 14: 18
                    0
                    I will help you save time) ...


                    Manstein never met with the first tank army of the Red Army of the first formation. They fought in different places during that period, spring-summer 1.


                    He met with the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Red Army. Twice. In July -43rd on Dug. And in August 43rd in operation Rumyantsev.


                    In which of these did he announce that he had destroyed 600 tanks of the 1st Guards TA ?. Which in this army naturally could not be, by definition, in your opinion)
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      26 March 2018 14: 52
                      +1
                      Quote: Town Hall
                      Manstein never met with the 1-th tank army of the Red Army of the first formation

                      That is, that the 1-th GTA is the 1-th TA after the Citadel escaped you? And what do you mean by "first formation"?
                      Quote: Town Hall
                      He met with the 1-th Guards Tank Army of the Red Army. Twice.

                      Quite possibly, I do not remember this offhand.
                      Quote: Town Hall
                      In July -43-go on Dug. And in August 43-go in operation Rumyantsev.

                      Town Hall, spare me your "help." 1 TA became 1TA 25 April 1944 g. Thus, you managed to contradict yourself - if, as you write, Manstein met only with 1 GTA it could not be in 1943 r
                      1. Town Hall
                        Town Hall 26 March 2018 15: 17
                        0
                        Distort as always when you swim in the topic. I wrote 1 Guards .TA just for simplicity, so as not to write 1TA of the second formation and distinguish it from 1 TA of the first formation, with which Manstein never fought.


                        In the Battle of Kursk, the army, comprising the 6th and 31st tank, 3rd mechanized corps, a number of other formations and units, participated in a defensive battle against the German tank group advancing in the Oboyan direction, forcing him to stop the offensive. During the 10-day battles, the army lost 312 combat vehicles.
                        From August 1943 to 3, in the Belgorod-Kharkov operation of 11, army troops marched 120 km with battles, captured the city of Bogodukhov, cut up a large group of German troops, ensuring the reflection of the enemy’s counterattack in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka. On August 11, the 1st Panzer Army cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway and swept the enemy’s Kharkov group. As a result of the subsequent counterattack of Manstein’s troops, the army suffered heavy losses - 288 tanks were irretrievably lost, 417 were destroyed.



                        This is the loss of the army in July and August 43. On 3-in the army there were 08.43 tanks and self-propelled guns. As part of the 580th TA, which was also part of the Rumyantsev operation, along with the 1st TA, there were also about 5 vehicles. This is -600 at the time beginning.


                        Manstein says that the Germans destroyed about 700 tanks. Where is the lie?
                      2. Town Hall
                        Town Hall 26 March 2018 15: 24
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk





                        First Formation Edit

                        Formed in July 1942 on the basis of the 38th Army and a number of formations and units of the Stalingrad Front. [3]

                        At the beginning of August 1942, the command of the 1st TA was turned to form the control of the Southeast Front, and the troops were transferred to other armies.


                        I mean it.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 26 March 2018 16: 55
              +2
              Quote: Town Hall
              What kind of episode are you talking about? ... what operation?

              Most likely, this is the beginning of 1944. And not 1 TA, but 3 and 4 TA. There, Manstein does indeed have a farical description of how the Germans filled and captured more equipment than was in both TAs. And after a couple of weeks, these armies, apparently with grief, launched an offensive - and in the face of the innumerable hordes of Soviet tanks that appeared from somewhere (in those armies that were most recently destroyed in memoirs, during the debauchery), Manstein was forced to heroically level the front line.
              1. Town Hall
                Town Hall 26 March 2018 17: 46
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Most likely, this is the beginning of 1944. And not 1 TA, but 3 and 4 TA. There, Manstein does indeed have a farical description of how the Germans filled and captured more equipment than was in both TAs.




                You seriously think, like the author from Chelyabinsk, that during the war in the Red Army there was no marching replenishment, the armies did not receive new tanks, artillery, infantry, etc. during the months-long offensives, new compounds were not given for reinforcement and operate only with numbers on the moment of the start of battles ?.



                For you personally and not from Manstein, the data:


                "... Rybalko’s army was put into reserve a week earlier: it entered the battle with 419 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, during the battle it received the same amount from the reserve and from the repair service and lost 752 combat vehicles (" 3rd Guards Tank "P. 151).
                ."


                Laugh at Manstein yet ... or at your knowledge
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 27 March 2018 09: 56
                  0
                  Quote: Town Hall
                  You seriously think, like the author from Chelyabinsk, that during the war in the Red Army there was no marching replenishment, the armies did not receive new tanks, artillery, infantry, etc. during the months-long offensives, new compounds were not given for reinforcement and operate only with numbers on the moment of the start of battles ?.

                  We are not considering the documents of the Red Army, but the memoirs of Manstein. In which he writes the following on his blue eye:
                  The following data may also be of interest, characterizing the combat operations of individual armies that were part of our group. Of course, in some cases errors could have occurred here, caused by double counting, for example, of damaged tanks.
                  According to these reports, the enemy lost: in January - 17653 prisoners, Xnumx tank, 588 guns, 2481 anti-tank guns; in February - 7700 prisoners, 1055 tanks, 200 guns, 885 anti-tank guns.

                  At the same time, a couple of paragraphs above, Manstein writes that between July 1943 and January 1944:
                  In total, the enemy in front of our front in the above period received about 2700 new tanks, but we (including self-propelled guns) only 872.

                  That is, for half a year replenishment of the Red Army amounted to 2700 tanks. And in January alone, the loss of the Red Army - 2873 tanks.
                  But not only that - after such epic losses, two weeks later the red road of the Red Army launched an offensive.
                  In early March, the enemy then launched an offensive on the left flank of the 8th army. Within two weeks, he was able to make up for the losses incurred by him during the attack of our tank corps during the release of the German group, surrounded southwest of Cherkassy.
                  1. Town Hall
                    Town Hall 27 March 2018 10: 20
                    0
                    I don’t understand why you are so surprised. According to official Soviet data, only in January only the 3rd TA that launched the operation with 400 tanks received the same amount and out of 800 tanks was put into reserve on January 28 with less than 100 tanks on the balance sheet. For the rest of the tank armies, individual tank and mechanized corps, the situation is exactly the same.


                    As for the pace of "recovery" .43rd year. Arc. Losses are terrible. Production of tanks is lower than in the 44th .... 1st TA enters battle on July 5th. Staff-550 tanks and self-propelled guns. Withdrawn from battles through 9 days. Losses of 300 with a tail of tanks. The army is practically defeated. After three weeks, on August 3, the same 1st TA begins the operation of Rumyantsev fully equipped with 570 tanks. By the end of August, the loss of the army of 700 tanks was again defeated. But in the fall, again fighting in Ukraine.


                    It seems that you belittle the power of the Soviet military-industrial complex during the war)
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 26 March 2018 16: 49
        +2
        Greetings! hi
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Yes, what goes far - we read Manstein’s memoirs - there the postscript on the postscript sits and drives on the postscript, although he performed his duty properly

        Bgggg ... You still remember the first battle of “Panther”. In the official memoirs are descriptions - they say, if not for the raw tanks, then the Panzerwaffe would have torn everyone in that attack.
        And when the same attack begins to recover from the primary documents and memoirs of the participants, it turns out that it was not a reel...
        Since the Panthers marched without infantry, they did not notice any signs of an adversary until they drove straight into a minefield two kilometers east of Cherkassky. How tanks were instantly immobilized. The leading battalion of Major Gerhard Tebbe stood in the zone of defeat, and Soviet artillery began shelling the German unit that had fallen into the trap.

        At the same time, the commander of the 52th battalion not only lost control, but fell into a coma from fear.
        Since the situation was extremely dangerous, and there were no orders from the battalion commander, I ran to his tank as quickly as I could. It was urgent to leave the fenced area to avoid further losses. When I looked down at the tower, I saw the battalion commander trembling with terror. It was Major Tebbe from the Tank School in Putlos, whom I remembered as captain at the time I was studying there. He was sent last night to replace the sick before the onset of the Sievers battalion commander. It was clear that the baptism of fire that he had to experience on the first day at the front was too strong. After I explained to him that we should immediately begin to move in order to prevent further meaningless losses (author's note - one can only guess in which expressions Gabriel tried to convey this thought to the battalion commander who fell into a stupor from fear!), He was able to squeeze in response: “Yes, Gabriel, withdraw the battalion!”

        All quotes - according to the article by uv. Y. Pasholoka.
  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    26 March 2018 17: 21
    +3
    Well, Town Hall, congratulations - you spent my time :))))
    This is January 1944 g, battles near Lipovets. The Kirovograd operation has just ended. We found the weakness of the Germans at the junction of THEM 1 TA and 4TA, as well as 4 TA and Army Group Center. Manstein writes
    Much more dangerous was the fact that by about the 6 of January, the enemy realized what great chances of success he could get when using the front line break between the 1 tank army and the right flank of the 4 tank army, as well as the large gap created between the 4 tank army and the group Army Center

    As a result, we deal two blows at the joints of the German 4TA. Between the German 1TA and 4 TA, units of our 1th and 40 combined arms are attacking. Manstein writes
    At the same time, the enemy with large forces (the 1 tank and 40 armies) continued to advance south through the gap created between the 1 and 4 tank armies.

    What's next? Word to Manstein
    The command of the army group could choose two paths in connection with the situation. Should the enemy be further prevented from moving towards the almost open northern flank of the army group, which was fraught with the danger of a deep detour of its northern flank? Or was it more important to prevent the enemy from finally breaking through the gap between the 1 and 4 tank armies? In order to solve both of these tasks at the same time, there was not enough strength.
    We decided to eliminate the second danger first

    Fine! And what are the Germans doing?
    The first blow was dealt by 7 ak and 3 mk in the eastern part of this gap on the 40 army of the enemy. Then also with the concentric blow of 3 TC and 26 TC, which, in addition to the tank divisions 1 SD, 4 SDH and 18 Hell, in the western part of the breach, large forces of the Soviet 1 tank army were surrounded and defeated. As a result of the last strike — I don’t have any data on the first strike — the enemy lost along with 8000 only 5500 prisoners killed, 700 tanks, over 200 guns and about 500 anti-tank guns. During these battles, our troops damaged fourteen rifle divisions and five tank and mechanized corps. However, the enemy, of course, managed to remove at least some of the people from the environment

    In other words, Manstein does not even claim 600, as I wrote, but 700 tanks!
    That's just really there we had already two tank corps, 11 TK and 8 TK. There were 246 tanks and self-propelled guns in these corps according to the state, and they actually were in battles since December. Surely they lost something in the reflection of the first strike. But Manstein managed to “kill” the 700 tanks of two of our shopping malls in the course of only one second strike!
    Town Hall, I have a big request. No more objections, huh :))))) Have you already demonstrated your ignorance in this matter in full, maybe enough for today?
    1. Town Hall
      Town Hall 26 March 2018 17: 34
      +1
      Finding out that by 1943 everything at Manstein converged with the destroyed Soviet tanks, they abruptly jumped in 1944) ...



      ".... The Germans advanced 25-30 km, but failed to achieve more.

      After a week-long respite on January 24, they again struck in the Vinnitsa and Uman directions and, after four days of fighting, surrounded in the Lipovets area parts of the 1st Panzer and five divisions of the 17th and 21st Corps of the 38th Army.

      On January 27, the 2nd Panzer Army, Lieutenant General S.I., arrived from the Headquarters reserve and was thrown to the aid of Moskalenko and Katukov. Bogdanova.

      True, our generals complain that this army had only two corps of "small composition". But, at the very least, Bogdanov had about 300 cars.


      Another thing is that the 2nd tank was introduced into the battle extremely unsuccessfully: on a wide front and in parts. She failed to achieve decisive results, but the surrounded Soviet units managed to break out of the ring, although they suffered heavy losses.



      According to Manstein, “along with 8000 killed only 5500 prisoners, 700 tanks, over 200 guns,” the enemy lost.

      Marshal Moskalenko ridicules these “fantastic numbers of Hitler’s Field Marshal” and immediately reports that on January 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Army had 73 tanks and 13 self-propelled artillery installations, and the 1st Panzer had only 67 tanks and 22 self-propelled guns.


      But after all, Katukov’s army entered the operation fully equipped, having about 600 combat vehicles.


      Moreover, on January 15, it included the 31st Panzer Corps from the Headquarters reserve, which totaled 260 tanks and self-propelled guns. Hence the loss - 771 car.


      In fact, there was nothing left of the 1st Panzer, except for headquarters, and by order of the front commander her command was withdrawn to the rear for staffing.


      The same can be said about the 5th Guards Tank Corps of General V.M. Alekseeva.


      Rybalko’s army was put into reserve a week earlier: it entered the battle with 419 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, during the battle it received the same amount from the reserve and from the repair service and lost 752 combat vehicles (“3rd Guards Tank” p. 151 ) ... "



      Again, Manstein converges ....
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        26 March 2018 18: 21
        +2
        Quote: Town Hall
        Again, Manstein converges ....

        Town Hall, re-read my comment again. And Manstein - again. He speaks Russian in white that 700 tanks are ONLY related to 1TA. Moreover, during ONE counterattack only. And you here already managed to weave everyone up to Rybalko. And yes, that 32 shopping mall did not participate in these battles you do not care. And that 8 and 11 TC since December in the battles without replenishment - too.
        I repeat, I once examined this episode in detail, listing all the units that participated in the battles and the tanks that they might have.
        You pull the owl onto the globe - under 700 of the tanks indicated by Manstein, you are pulling losses from all over the front. But the trouble is - Manstein didn’t talk about that. Read Manstein. Carefully:)
        1. Town Hall
          Town Hall 26 March 2018 18: 38
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          And that 8 and 11 TC since December in the battles without replenishment - too.




          Who told you this? The 3rd Guards TA in the same battles in the same battles from the end of December to mid-January transferred 400 tanks in addition to the 400 available at the beginning of the operation, and the 1st TA did not transmit a single one?). ..Stavka selectively related to this issue, apparently so that later on would you have the numbers in the case of Manstein’s "refutation").


          In your opinion, those about 300 tanks which the Stavka threw to save the surrounded 1st TA and the Germans burned, should have been counted according to a separate list and not included in the common cauldron 700 wounded in those battles, so that it would be more convenient for you?)
        2. Town Hall
          Town Hall 26 March 2018 18: 54
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          And yes, that 32 mk did not participate in these battles you do not care.



          The 32nd TC, don’t care. But I didn’t seem to write anything about it. And the 31st, it worries. It was transferred by Headquarters to the 6st TA from January 1th, where it left on January 29th and was included in composition of the 3rd TA. Rather, what is left of it.


          Where did you fight, which was part of the 1st TA 31st TC from January 6 to 29, 1944?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            26 March 2018 18: 58
            0
            Quote: Town Hall
            31-th-excitement. He was transferred by Headquarters to the 6-th from January 1. From where he left the 29-th. January. And was included in the 3-th TA. More accurately, what was left of him.

            But he did not participate in the strike at the joint 1 and 4 TA of the Germans. So, his losses have nothing to do with the recommended 700 tanks
            1. Town Hall
              Town Hall 26 March 2018 19: 08
              0
              Does it relate to battles surrounded by the 1st TA?
        3. Town Hall
          Town Hall 26 March 2018 19: 06
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          You pull the owl onto the globe - under 700 of the tanks indicated by Manstein, you are pulling losses from all over the front. But the trouble is - Manstein didn’t talk about that. Read Manstein. Carefully:)




          I re-read it again. Attentively)



          "... The first strike was struck by 7 ak and 3 tk in the eastern part of this gap on 40 enemy armies. Then also by a concentric strike of 3 tk and 26 tk, in which, apart from the tank divisions, 1 PD, 4 GSD and 18 Hell, in the western part of the breach was surrounded and defeated by large forces of the Soviet tank army 1. As a result of the last strike — I don’t have any information about the first strike — the enemy lost along with 8000 killed only 5500 prisoners, 700 tanks, over 200 guns and about 500 anti-tank guns. During these battles, our troops damaged fourteen rifle divisions and five tank and mechanized corps. However, the enemy, of course, managed to withdraw at least some of the people from the environment {* 19}. [609]


          Maybe you will re-read Manstein more closely? ... or do you think that when talking about the losses inflicted on 14 infantry divisions and 5 (!) Tank and mechanized corps, Manstein meant only 1 SLT?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            26 March 2018 21: 45
            +1
            Quote: Town Hall
            Then also with the concentric blow of 3 mk and 26 mk, in which, in addition to the tank divisions 1 pd, 4 militia and xnumx hell, in the western part of the breach, large forces of the Soviet 1 tank army were surrounded and defeated.

            Quote: Town Hall
            As a result of the last strike - I do not have data on the first strike now - the enemy lost along with 8000 only 5500 prisoners killed, 700 tanks, over 200 guns and about 500 anti-tank guns.
            1. Scaffold
              Scaffold 26 March 2018 23: 07
              +2
              Why are you wasting time on rational evidence? wink Many of our compatriots observe the worship of Germans in the most acute form. This is an absolutely irrational diagnosis, a kind of Stockholm syndrome. In their eyes, a cowardly German scum, drenched in blood on the top of the head - an example of knightly honor and valor. You won’t prove anything to them.
              1. arturpraetor
                arturpraetor 26 March 2018 23: 56
                +2
                Just the inability to give balanced assessments and going to extremes. Extremes are stupidly simpler, and balanced estimates - it's so complicated and boring, so many shades of gray instead of black and white little world ...)))
            2. Town Hall
              Town Hall 27 March 2018 09: 32
              0
              understandably. as always. there is yet another overvalued idea and woe to those facts that do not fit into it). God and a half paragraph know how literate the translation is in isolation from everything else written and that’s all. the sensation is ready. the myths are overthrown)


              Py.Sy.It is interesting that prevented “liar” Manstein from writing in Suvorov “what their Basurmans feel sorry for” about the results of the first week’s battles ... but they write like that for a boring “I don’t write numbers from the ceiling” ... Typical behavior of a liar ...


              Py.Py.Sy ... in a future article out of sports interest, conduct a comparative analysis of the data of a liar Manshtein with honest reports of Soviet commanders on that operation. Interesting reading will work out)
              1. Scaffold
                Scaffold 27 March 2018 15: 36
                0
                I'm not talking about Manstein personally, but about all the German warriors. Especially about their honesty and valor.
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                27 March 2018 16: 23
                0
                Quote: Town Hall
                and woe to those facts that do not fit into it

                Town Hall You have not brought a single fact in support of your brilliant idea :)
                Quote: Town Hall
                one and a half paragraph from God knows how competent the translation is made

                Yes, no question, take the source and prove that the translation is incorrect :)))
                Quote: Town Hall
                apart from everything else written

                This is where - in isolation? Outside the Town Hall, your attempt to whitewash the whitewash. And for Manshtein in terms of losses and so on throughout the chapter - the epic fel sits and the epic feil drives. According to 43-44 he has a continuous pulling of an owl on the globe and the case I have cited does not stand out against the background of other lies
                1. Town Hall
                  Town Hall 27 March 2018 21: 28
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  And for Manshtein in terms of losses and so on throughout the chapter - the epic fel sits and the epic feil drives.



                  Seriously?. Manstein operates with numbers. In my posts there are also enough numbers and links .. you only have squeals and ridiculous attempts to insult your opponent. Expose Manstein with numbers and not bukaffkami
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    27 March 2018 23: 23
                    +1
                    Quote: Town Hall
                    you only have squeals and ridiculous attempts to insult your opponent.

                    :))) That's why I love you, Town Hall, for the ability to stand to death, calling white black and vice versa. You already quoted Manstein, no, unconvincingly :)))) Okay, have fun, and let those who read our census be judged
  5. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 26 March 2018 18: 57
    0
    Article plus in the morning good yes
    I completely agree with the vision of this historical event of the author yes
    I also agree with the explanations of some points, for I virtually put myself in the place of historical persons and think what I would do in this case. So the two sides AT THIS MOMENT acted quite adequately and rationally hi