Ankara warned in the language of "Point" and "Gradov"
While extremely alarming signals continue to come from the southern regions of the provinces of Homs and Deir ez-Zor about the strengthening of the American and British military contingents with heavy armored vehicles and army aviation to conduct large-scale offensive operations against Syrian government forces in the direction of the Euphrates riverbed, an equally difficult operational and tactical situation persists in the provinces of Hama, Idlib and Aleppo, where the Turkish leadership completely lost its sense of proportion and remembered the times of the Ottoman Empire and was trying to indicate its worthless presence on possible larger area of the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic. Why is it worthless?
Yes, because the strategic success of the pro-Turkish militants from the Free Syrian Army was achieved exclusively within the southwestern, central and northern regions of the Afrin canton, where all the defense was laid on the shoulders of the Kurdish YPG / YPJ people's self-defense detachments except for anti-tank complexes of the first and second generations, including “Baby”, “Fagot” and “Konkurs-M”. They regularly prevented the introduction of units of the 5 of the regular Syrian army assault corps into Afrin, for which they paid with the loss of territories.
Both the obstinacy characteristic of the mentality of Kurdish field commanders in Afrin and the dependence of Bashar al-Assad together with the command of the Syrian Arab army on the agreements reached within the framework of the regional geopolitical ligament Russia-Turkey-de-escalation Idlib and Aleppo provinces. As a result, the Syrian leadership is left with an extremely narrow window of opportunity to influence the situation in Afrin. It was reduced only to the creation of the Nubl corridor, allowing the deployment of armed Syrian militias belonging to the FNL (National Defense Forces or NDF, National Defense Forces), as well as Hezbollah units to Afrin. Without heavy armor and artillery, all these volunteer formations, unfortunately, could not defend the northern and central lands of Afrin, although they demonstrated high endurance and morale before the many times superior FSA and regular Turkish army forces. After all, it took almost 2 a month to create an Afrin boiler at times technologically equipped with pro-Turkish forces!
As a result, the Turkish Armed Forces and the pro-Turkish FSA militants managed to form a powerful enough Northern Front (which also includes Al-Nusra militants) capable of radically influencing the strategic picture in the provinces of Hama, Idlib, Aleppo, and also in the northern part of Latakia. As we predicted in our previous work, the Turkish operation “Olive Branch” was focused exclusively on the occupation of the northern regions of Syria, which Ankara still considers as appendages of its southern silt Hatay, Gaziantep and Kilis. There can be no peaceful return of Afrin and Idlib to Syrian sovereignty, as confirmed by Al-Jazeera news agency 16 in March 2018, and then the main adviser to Turkish President Ibrahim Kalyn.
Even during the final stage of the Olive Branch operation, Erdogan and his entourage announced in advance that it would continue on the territory of the Manbija region, as well as on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, which was recorded in the more global operations of the Euphrates Shield at the end of 2016. As a result, it turned out that this is pure bluff. The Turkish Armed Forces and the FSA formations under their control were neither morally nor technologically completely unprepared for the collision with the Manbij forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which on a regular basis will receive military-technical assistance from the United States and other Western coalition states. In addition, Turkey began to back down even at the official level. So, according to the information agency RIA News"Referring to informed sources in Free Syrian Army, the NE of Turkey and the opposition militarized pro-Turkish forces do not plan an offensive against the city of Manbij, unless they are abandoned by US forces and the SDF. Naturally, no one plans to retreat from the city.
In this case, the Turks have developed a "plan B", consisting in the storming of the Kurdish city of Sinjar, located in the north-western part of Iraq, which is controlled by the fighters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. In this cunning maneuver, Ankara relies on the humble silence of the Iraqi leadership, to whom the destruction of all the existing PKK units by the Turkish Air Force and MTR is extremely advantageous. But this is only part of the problems created during the implementation of Erdogan’s imperial ways.
The rest of the headache still falls on the shoulders of the Syrian military leadership and the Russian military contingent in Syria. In particular, the capture of the city of Afrin by the Turkish army was not enough. The fighting gradually shifted from the central part of the canton towards the Tell Rifat salient and began to cover the Nubl corridor. It was here that the first surprise was presented to the Turks. Without waiting for the pro-Turkish opposition units to approach the dense areas of Az-Zahra and Nubl, units of the Syrian Arab Army advanced in advance to strategically important settlements in the southern part of the Afrin canton - Burj el-Ques, Ekuibah, Dair el-Jamal, El-Alaksah and Tell Rifat, where strongholds were erected, covered by armored vehicles. The YPG, which retreated from the central part of Afrin, also formed their own defensive orders. The introduction of heavy armored vehicles of government troops into Afrin became known thanks to a report on March 19 on the Twitter news page of the Aleppo24 edition. As a consequence, even using tank units of the Turkish army from the side of the Afrin River did not allow the FSA formations to approach the territory controlled by the SAA at a distance that allows them to conduct aimed fire from small arms. The Turks managed to capture only the villages of Barad and Kimar; further progress stopped.
An even more significant event in the increasingly overwhelming Syrian-Turkish conflict is the beginning of the use by the Syrian army of large-caliber barreled and rocket artillery. In particular, 19 March 2018, the Syrian was forced to apply the MLRS BM-21 "Grad" in the region of the mountain Jabal Anak, located north of the city of Anadan (northeast "Idlibskogo gadyushnik"). The fact is that the Turkish army sent to the area a powerful military convoy of more than 100 units (BM, bridge-laying, tanker, bulldozer, MXT OBN Sabra, etc.). In accordance with the official data of Ankara, this technique is designed exclusively for the construction of the 60-th observation post north of Anadan within the framework of the notorious so-called “northern de-escalation zone”, covering the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo. But for what purpose are the bridge laying vehicles in the convoy ?! To do this, you need to look at the map of Aleppo Province near Aleppo.
We see that both the central city and its surroundings are covered by a rather narrow river Kueike, the channel width of which in some areas barely exceeds fifteen meters, which may be quite enough for the effective use of bridge layers (assault bridges). The only conclusion that remains is that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey is counting on an offensive operation in the eastern direction, the aim of which could be to capture the city of Aleppo and expel the government troops of the Syrian Arab Republic. Naturally, for the implementation of such an ambitious plan, it will be necessary to involve the FSA and al-Nusra formations from the “Idlib gadyushnik”, which will have to force the Kueike near the village of Wadi Durus (south of Aleppo). The units of the Free Syrian Army from the city of El-Bab, who will have to shut the "boiler" southeast of Aleppo, can advance to these formations. Guided by just such a strategy, the Turks are sending bridge laying machines to Anadan. Everything is very serious! We let them in Afrin, gave up the slack - we are preparing for tougher trials, and at the same time we are looking at the US Armed Forces and learning how to support our allies with the example of covering the Kurds in Manbidzh and Deir ez-Zor.
The Grads went into action, and this is already commendable: a full package of 40 unguided rockets from a position near the city of Khandarat was released on the Turkish convoy and the observation point under construction. It is noteworthy that even after such a warning, Ankara did not settle down and continued provocations in the north of Aleppo. Late in the evening of March 21, the T-155 Turkish Firtina self-propelled guns began shelling the Noubl area, and then the more strategically important Tell-Jibin, controlled by the Syrian Arab Army. The shortest highway for the transportation of reinforcements to the unoccupied part of Afrin “Aleppo - Tell-Rifat” passes through this city. Obviously, the Turkish gunners wanted to temporarily arrest the arrival of heavy CAA armor and new NDF troops in the canton in order for the SSA to get at least a couple of hours to capture the villages of Esh-Shayuh and Ein Daknakh. But these plans were not destined to be accomplished, since an impressive defensive "barrier" was created in advance in the Tell-Rifata area. All of the above events relate exclusively to the Eastern Front of the “Idlib Gadyushnik”, where the Syrian government forces will have to take part in many more grandiose clashes with the Turkish army to preserve Syrian sovereignty over the city of Aleppo and the southern part of the canton of Afrin. But there is also the Western Front, reports from which come several times less often than from Aleppo. And this area is no less problematic.
We all know well that such cities of the "Idlib viper" as Jisr al-Shugur, Al-Tufahyah and Qalaat al-Madik are a real hotbed of those pro-Turkish opposition-terrorist groups FSA and Tahrir ash-Sham, which, thanks to Turkish specialists mastered the basics of using tactical unmanned aircraft as an air component of strikes against military facilities of the Russian Aerospace Forces at the Khmeimim airbase and its environs. Moreover, it is here that the training base is located, where militants are trained, advancing to the territory of the provinces of Hama and Latakia to conduct sabotage, reconnaissance and subversive missions against the Syrian army and the Russian military contingent. The fruits of such activities were a mortar attack on the Khmeimim airbase on the eve of the New Year, as well as a "star raid" of improvised dronescarrying improvised mines with contact fuses on hangers to strike at aircraft parked and on the runway. As we have already noted in our previous works, such a high probability of repeating such strikes is associated with the proximity of Khmeimim to the western border of the “Idlib viper” and the above cities (from 35 to 50 km), which allows unmanned strike vehicles to reach Khmeimim in just 20-30 minutes .
So, 19 March 2018 of the year, according to “Twitter” - the eyewitness “@WaelRussi”, became aware of the inclusion of an air-raid siren at the Khmeimim airbase, which could be connected with the refining of a possible massive rocket attack on Syrian military targets from the Navy and the coalition air force, and with the already familiar threat of a massive strike by the combat drones that flew in from Idlib; All the more so since the day before the information had come about the interception of an unknown air object near Hmeimim. A positive point is that all the incidents with the hand-crafted enemy attack drones end with their destruction by means of the Pantsir-C1 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems defending Russian objects. The negative detail is that these incidents tend to become more frequent. This suggests the following and most appropriate conclusions.
Firstly, Khmeimim’s airbase is tested on the possibility of an “anti-missile umbrella” to repel an MRAU with the help of unmanned aircraft from idlib militants Tahrir ash-Sham. And not only from the side of the “Idlib Gadyushnik”, but also from the Mediterranean air direction, where American AUGs operate, as well as the concealed submarine carriers of the UGM-109E “Tomahawk Block IV” (TMMM) strategic cruise missiles in the Oharo submarines modified by PLARK (SSGN). So, the last unknown means of air attack, which was reported by eyewitnesses 18 March, was approaching the airbase from the sea. It is likely that in terms of “probing” Hmeimim into the gaps in the “air defense umbrella”, Ankara and Washington are working together, in favor of the North Atlantic alliance, hiding behind ostentatious “palace quarrels” and diverging positions on Syrian Kurdistan. Do not look at Erdogan’s loud statements regarding the White House, and the Pentagon’s discontent with the plans to buy the Russian Triumph C-400 air defense system; all this is pure circus performance. And when it comes to such strategically important objects as Avb Hmeimim or the PTEC Tartus, you need to remember Turkey’s membership in the NATO bloc. After all, it is not by chance that Turkey quickly retreated on the issue of an attack on the Kurdish Manbij. This is not only the weakness shown to the United States, but also one of the indicators of the presence of certain agreements, which are unlikely to be announced in the media. And these tests, our "umbrella" is held at a decent level!
Secondly, the next such "star raid of drones" can occur at the time of the rocket attack of the coalition forces on the military facilities of Syria, so that the total number of units of high-precision weapons exceeded the number of target channels of the C-400, C-300B4 and Pantyrey-C1 anti-aircraft missile divisions. The 92Н6Е and СНР 9С32М multifunction radars, as well as the C-400 and C-300B4 operators, face the need to select a much larger number of EHVs, among which you will need to select the most priority ones. Huge funds today in the West European and American special services, as well as in the Turkish ones, have been attracted to the testing of Hamim's “strength”. And however strange it may sound, “Tahrir ash-Sham” with its drones is now one of these “test links”.
Such an intensification of pro-Turkish militants on the western front of Idlib (including developers and UAV operators), generated at the suggestion of Ankara and Washington, did not go unnoticed by the command of the Syrian Arab Army and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. As 16 of March also became known, Syrian artillery did a bit of work on the FSA stronghold and Tahrir ash-Sham on the Western Front of the Idlib Enclave, the city of Jisr al-Shugur. Here is one of the main transshipment bases for the movement of Turkish military goods to jihadists, arranging attacks in the provinces of Hama and Lattakia. A little later, the network spread information about the "mysterious" fall of the operational-tactical ballistic missile 9М79 "Point" in the territory of Turkish Hatay silt (near the town of Yaladaci) with attached photographs of the night survey of the site of the fall. It was published by the Turkish military observer Yusuf Akbaba on his Twitter page.
Here we see minimal damage to the body of the 9М79 / -1 product. Taking into account that, with a stable combat mode, OTBR “Tochka” approaches the target at an angle of the order of 90 degrees (for more efficient optimization of the fragmentation sector, realizing high flying speed and maximally complicating the ability to be captured by the radar of the enemy anti-missile defenses) to collapse even without triggering the high-explosive fragmentation warhead 9H123F. Consequently, there was a failure in the operation of the command-gyro 9B64 / -1 device or the discrete-analog computing device 9B65, which led to a flat trajectory of the rocket with a complete loss of controllability and speed. That is what kept her body intact. The possibility of intercepting Turkish means of air defense is also not confirmed, since there are no traces from the damaging elements of high-explosive fragmentation warheads of the MIM-23K missile on the missile body. Surprised perfectly calculated coordinates of its fall - in a desert area, in 2 km from the Turkish-Syrian border: and you will not stick, and the warning is more than eloquent.
The climax in the plot of the Turkish side's warnings about the unacceptability of the actions of the FSA and "al-Nusra" formations against the government forces of the SAR and the Khmeimim airbase was yesterday's point airstrike on the positions of the pro-Turkish forces in the border city with Turkey Harim. It was not known yet, our VKS or Air Force of Syria, but one thing is known: the times of “soft, fluffy and compliant” Damascus and Moscow are coming to an end.
Information sources:
https://www.newsli.ru/news/world/politika/28800
https://syria.liveuamap.com
https://kurdistan.ru/2018/03/21/news-32200_Armiya_Turcii_ne_budet_shturmovat_siriyskiy_Manbidzh_esli_SSHA_otkazhutsya_vyvesti_kurdov.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/tochka/tochka.shtml
Information