Military Review

Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 3. Cruisers opened fire

38
So, in the previous article of the cycle, we discussed in detail the deployment of Russian forces before the battle. And what was the Germans? As we said earlier, in the evening of June 17, when the Russian cruisers were just preparing to go to the rendezvous point to the Vinkov bank, the armored cruiser Roon, the minelayer Albatros and five destroyers left the sea from the Neifarvasser. On the morning of December 18, Commodore I. Karf came out of Libava with light cruisers Augsburg and Lübeck and two destroyers.


These two German units were to meet north-west of Steinworth Lighthouse on 09.30 on the morning of June 18, but the fog prevented the rendezvous. Radio communication, mutual transfer of detachment coordinates, signals by searchlights and sirens, search for destroyers — nothing succeeded and after an hour of mutual and fruitless searches for the Germans, without joining, the two troops went to the northern tip of Gotland. At noon on June 18, the German units dispersed in 10-12 miles with Rear-Admiral M.K. Bakhirev, thanks to the fog, the opponents did not see each other. In Gotland, the fog was much less common (which later helped MK Bakhirev to establish its location), and the Germans were nevertheless reunited. In 19.00, when the Special Purpose Squadron, losing Rurik and Novik in the fog, turned to the southern tip of Gotland, the Germans headed to the mining area - more precisely, the Albatross and Augsburg went there, and other ships took east in order to shield the operation from the possible appearance of Russian ships. “Augsburg” with “Albatross”, heroically avoiding the Russian submarine that met them on the way (which was not there and could not be), went to the place they were looking for, and in full compliance with the plan, 22.30 mined the 160 “Albatross”. At the end of the mine setting, I. Karf exchanged radiograms with his cover ships and the Albatross (during the mining Augsburg, which had previously followed the Albatross, moved to the east). These were the first radiograms that were intercepted by the Baltic Fleet communications service that night, and which were read by Rengarten and their content was transmitted to 01.45 by M.K. Bakhirev.

At 01.30 on July 19, the German detachments reunited, and I. Karf sent a triumphant broadcast about the task of the operation. This radio message was also intercepted and transmitted to the commander of the Special Forces at about 05.00 in the morning. It should be noted that since the interception of the German radiogram by the Baltic Communications Service fleet and up to the moment when the decrypted text of this telegram lay on the table to Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev, who was on the cruiser at sea, no more than 3-3,5 hours passed! Receive a radiogram, decrypt it, check your work, compose a radiogram on the flagship Admiral Makarov, encrypt it, transmit ... Without a doubt, the work of our communications intelligence officers is worthy of the highest praise.

Meanwhile, the unsuspecting I. Karf led his squadron home. In the morning of 07.00 19 June, he released the Roon and Lübeck with four torpedo boats to Libau, and himself on Augsburg and with the Albatross and the S-141 torpedo boats; “S-142” and “G-135” went to the southern tip of Gotland in order to turn from there to Neufarvasser. Exactly half an hour later, on 07.30, a large smoke in the northeast was seen on the Augsburg, and soon the silhouette of a four-pipe cruiser came out of the mist, followed by the second one. Russian and German squads finally met.


The flagship of Rear Admiral M.K. Bakhirev "Admiral Makarov". Photo 1913


What happened later is described in a variety of sources. It would seem that with such an abundance of attention the battle of 19 June 1915 should be literally taken apart piece by piece and there could be no mysteries in it. Instead, alas, we see a lot of mistakes in the description of the battle and a lot of far-reaching conclusions made on deliberately false premises. Therefore, the article offered to your attention is built “from the reverse” - we will not describe the course of events in it, as the author sees it (this will be done in the next article), but consider the main sources' errors in the description of the battle string. Alas, without a detailed description of them to build a consistent picture of those distant events is not possible.

Let's see what happened in the outset of the battle. To do this, take the description of the German historian Heinrich Rollman. It is of some interest that reviewers of the “Wars on the Baltic Sea. 1915, published in Russian in 1937, of course, decisively dismisses "all the chauvinistic agitation and falsification to which the author resorts," but pay tribute to both the volume of materials collected by G. Rollman and the quality of their systematization. .

This is how G. Rollman describes the battlefield: “In 07.30, at Augsburg, they saw smoke (hereinafter Russian time is indicated), soon after that they noticed the silhouette of the Russian cruiser and almost immediately the second one. Then the Russian cruisers lay down on a parallel course and entered the battle, opening fire on 07.32, i.e. after just 2 minutes after the Germans saw the smoke. The speed of the Russian detachment reached 20 nodes. After the U-turn, the Russian cruisers again disappeared in the fog, on the German ships they saw only flashes of shots of their guns, according to which it was guessed that four cruisers were fighting with them. The Russians obviously saw the Germans, because visibility was noticeably better towards the north-west.

"Augsburg" gave full speed and pumped oil into the boilers through the nozzles in order to hide the Albatross that followed him in clouds of smoke. "Augsburg" and "Albatross" went zigzagging to impede the sight of the enemy, but they themselves could not shoot, because they did not see the enemy. Despite the measures taken, the Russian salvoes lay down near the cruiser and the high-speed mine layer (“but still they remained under good cover”, writes G. Rollman) and “Augsburg” in 07.45 slowly turned the 2 rumba to the right, while the Albatros strongly lagged behind. "

Having reached this point, G. Rollman interrupts the description of the battle and begins to talk about the possibilities of a torpedo attack — after all, the detachment of I. Karf had three destroyers. And here begins the oddities. G. Rollman writes this:

“Could this attack give any results? Commodore Karth denied this. ”


That is, G. Rollman, simply speaking, declined to express his own opinion, and instead cited the position of I. Carf. And what did I. Karf say? He argued the impossibility of a torpedo attack as follows:
1) the distance from the beginning of the battle has grown from 43,8 cable to 49,2 cable;
2) the sea was "smooth as a mirror";
3) against three destroyers there were four cruisers whose artillery was not damaged;
4) the destroyers were armed with old torpedoes, with a range of no more than 3 000 m;
5) one of the destroyers, the "G-135", had a maximum speed of 20 nodes, the rest were a little faster.

It seems to be all logical, right? But this set of reasons does not fit at all with the description of the battle, given by G. Rollman himself.


19 June 1915 Combat Scheme, by G. Rollman (Russian edition)


If the Russian cruisers in the final battlefield lay on a parallel course, as G.Rollman declares, they would be in the position of catching up. At the same time, the Russians walked (according to G. Rollman!) On 20 nodes. The German squad before a sudden meeting with the ships of M.K. Bakhirev was not in full swing (remember the I. Karf radiogram, in which he pointed out speed knots 17), that is, he needed some time to give this very full stroke. But neither the Albatross nor the G-135 could develop more 20 nodes, moreover, when they came under fire from the Russians, the Germans began to maneuver, knocking down the gauge, however, it is not clear whether they belonged to the destroyers or "chased after volleys "Only" Augsburg "with" Albatross ". All this means that the Germans were slower than the Russian squad on parallel courses, and if so, then the distance between the ships I. Carf and MK Bakhirev should have been reduced, but not increased!

How to explain this paradox? Perhaps the fact is that the flagship of I.Karfa "Augsburg", having speed in 27 with more nodes, of course, was faster than the "Albatross", and the destroyers, and Russian cruisers. He gave full speed and broke away from the rest of the ships of the German squad, the distance between him and the Russian cruisers increased too. But - between the "Augsbug" and the Russian cruisers, and not between the destroyers and the Russian cruisers!

If the maximum speed of the “G-135” really did not exceed 20 nodes, the distance between the German destroyers and Russian cruisers could not increase, and if it did increase, the speed of the German destroyers was much higher than the 20 nodes sounded. And in any case, we come to a certain slyness of the report of I. Karth.

You can, of course, recall the cuff of the “Augsburg” to two points to the right - theoretically the new course led to an increase in the distance between the opponents. But the fact is that the rumba is a 1 / 32 circle, that is, only 11,25 degrees and a gradual flap on 22,5 degrees, started in 07.45, could not lead to an increase in the distance on the 5,4 cable in a few minutes. There is an obvious contradiction that the reports about the combat of the destroyer commanders could probably solve, but alas. Here G. Rollman manages streamlined:

“The division head held the same opinion; his flag officer, recently assigned to the semi-flotilla, considered the attack hopeless. Both destroyer commanders "S-141" and "S-142" in the reports of the battle spoke in the same sense. "


That is, it is clear that on the German destroyers the attack was considered hopeless, but it is completely unclear for what reasons, and do the commanders of the destroyers confirm the reasons outlined in the report of I. Karth?

An interesting nuance - according to the description, G.Rollman (and, obviously, I.Karfa) the Germans almost did not see the Russian cruisers, watching only flashes of their shots, but they could not shoot themselves. However, when the German commanders needed to justify the refusal of a torpedo attack by increasing the distance to the enemy, they indicated a change in the distance to the ships of M.K. Bakhirev up to a tenth of cable length - 43,8 and 49,2 KBT.

But these are flowers, but then surrealism begins. Suppose, nevertheless, that by some miracle (teleportation?), Twenty-node German destroyers did indeed increase the distance by almost 5,5 cable. What does this mean? Recall that the opponents were able to detect each other at a distance of 45-50 cable, because visibility was extremely limited. And the destroyers were able to break the distance to almost five miles, which means that quite a bit more - and they will break away from the Russian squad, which will simply cease to see them. It remains to hold out even a little bit, and nothing will threaten the small German ships ...

Instead, G. Rollman read:

“But at that moment the situation was such that the destroyers had to take into account the possibility of their destruction; for a long time, shells fell in close proximity to them, and it was only a matter of time when the hits would begin. It was necessary to get ahead of the enemy and try to save the Albatross. The division head decided to launch an attack ... ”.


That is, at the very moment when the German destroyers so successfully broke the distance and were about to emerge from the shelling, hiding in the fog, their command suddenly overcame an attack of the blues: “We will not be saved, the Russians will shoot us (blindly ?! ) and still kill everyone, let's attack! ". Special cynicism of the situation is due to the fact that, generally speaking, no one fired at German destroyers during this period of time. "Admiral Makarov" and "Bayan", having entered the battle, beat on "Augsburg", and "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" - on "Albatross".

But back to G. Rollman. According to him, the flag “Z” was raised on the flagship destroyer and three German ships nevertheless rushed into a torpedo attack. But at that moment I.Karf, realizing that the low-speed Albatross could not be saved, decided to break under the nose of the Russian detachment and began to lean to the left, letting the Albatross radiogram go to neutral Swedish waters.

And here there was a sad incident. The fact is that in the Russian edition of the book by G. Rollman it is indicated that "Augsburg" began to lean to the left and went to intercept the Russian course at 07.35. This is an obvious slip of the pen. G.Rollman describes the events of the battle consistently, here, outlining the events that happened after 07.45, suddenly comes back, which is not typical of him. The turn to the left in 07.35 refutes the entire description of the battle given by G.Rollman before (an attempt to cover the Albatross with a smoke screen, a lapel in 07.45 two points to the right, the decision to pass under the nose of the Russian squadron at the time of the release of the destroyers in a torpedo attack, etc. .). There is nothing of the kind on the battle chart shown by G.Rollman, where Augsburg is leaning to the left near 08.00. Yes, actually, anyone who finds the time and desire to read the page 245 of the Russian edition of the “Wars on the Baltic Sea. 1915 d. ”Will make sure that the turnaround to the Russian course in 07.35 completely contradicts the whole description of this episode of the battle given by the German historian.

Most likely, there was an annoying typo, and this is not about 07.35, but about 07.55, which is not completely out of the context of the picture of the battle and the scheme attached to it. The author of this article did not read G. Rollman in the original and cannot say who made this annoying typo - perhaps the error is present only in the Russian edition. But it is surprising how many authors subsequently did not make out this misstep and replicated this error in their works. We meet her at the respected V.Yu. Gribovsky in the article "Fight Gotland 19 June 1915":

“Augsburg rushed ahead at full speed and began to dodge to the left with 7 and 35 mines, intending to slip under the enemy’s nose.”


It also builds a description of this battle, and AG. Patients:

“Karth immediately realized that he was threatened, and made the only right decision. He decided to throw the Albatross and try to save the cruiser and the destroyers. "Augsburg" increased the course and began to lean to the left "


In fact, as follows from the description of G. Rollman, I. Karf was not at all distinguished by the speed of reaction: after finding Russian ships on 07.30, he found it possible to “trim” the Russian course in almost half an hour.

And when I.Karf made this decision, on the destroyers they found out that the Russian cruisers turned north, that is, went to rapprochement, perpendicular to the German course, in order to pass under the stern of the German detachment (this moment in the above scheme corresponds to 07.00, in Russian time is 08.00). Accordingly, with such a change in the course of low-speed German destroyers, there was a chance, taking to the left, following the "Augsburg", to disperse from the Russian squadron of the left sides. The fact is that having equal speed with the Russians (20 nodes), the German destroyers could not go against the Russian course while the opponents followed in parallel - they unacceptably approached the cruisers, and they would be shot. But after the Russians went north, the Germans had such an opportunity, because the inclination to the left no longer led to such a strong rapprochement with the Russian ships. Destroyer commanders took advantage of this opportunity. The destroyers set up a smoke screen covering the Albatross, and followed the Augsburg. In 08.35, the Augsburg and the destroyers broke through the Russian cruisers and went beyond their limits of visibility.

It seems to be logical, and geometrically consistent, but there is a nuance. The fact is that while writing his book, and it was published in 1929, G. Rollman did not use the Soviet archives, but wrote the book mainly according to German data. As a result, the German historian describes not how Russian ships actually maneuvered, but only how German eyewitnesses imagined Russian maneuvers. But, as you know, in order to make the right impression about a particular battle, it is necessary to read the documents of all the parties involved. As we can see, the version of the Gotland battle as presented by G. Rollman has many internal contradictions, even if the Russian detachment acted exactly as described in the book. Here are the cruisers M.K. Bakhirev maneuvered completely differently. Two statements by G. Rollman, on which all of his description is built: that the Russians started a parallel course at the beginning of the battle and that they turned north to 07.55 - 08.00 turned to the north are in fact incorrect, because domestic sources do not confirm this.

On the other hand, domestic sources claim this ...

What did Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev actually do after visual detection of the enemy? A very simple maneuver, the meaning and purpose of which he absolutely clearly and unequivocally explained in his report, and even before that - in the watch journal “Admiral Makarov”:

"Wishing to embrace the head, we leaned to the left, leading the lead ship to the course angle 40 ° starboard"


But how many reproaches for this maneuver fell upon the head of the commander of the Special Purpose Squad! According to the general opinion, M.K. Bakhirev should, without further ado, and without inventing all sorts of head that, with such a balance of power, are completely unnecessary, just get close to the enemy and “roll” him. So, for example, MA Petrov in the book “Two fights” writes:

“One wonders why this tactical device was needed, superfluous and aimless?”


Then, however, the same V.Yu. Gribovsky "acquitted" Rear Admiral. After analyzing the actions of the commander of the Special Purpose Squad, the distinguished historian came to the conclusion:

“In fact, the team maneuvered almost 20-nodal move - the simplest and most advantageous way for firing - at combat loxodrome. After the battle, Bakhirev, obviously, wanted to give his tactical designs more brilliance, which was reflected in his report, and earlier - in the watch log of Admiral Makarov.


Translated into Russian: Mikhail Koronatovich did not plan any coverage of any heads, but simply kept the enemy on a constant course angle, providing his gunners with favorable shooting conditions. Well, then, in a report, he invented a “wand over T”. Why not join a bit, right?

Let's look at the scheme of this maneuver.

Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 3. Cruisers opened fire


So, it is absolutely clear that in this situation M.K. Bakhirev chose the only correct solution. He saw the enemy in 07.30 "left-ahead" of himself. On the Russian cruisers, the German ships were identified as the “Augsburg” and the “Nymph” type cruiser, which meant that the Russian squadron did not have any superiority in speed, because the “Nymph” had a maximum speed of 21,5 knot. But the Germans did not expect to meet the detachment of M.K. Bakhirev, so you can count on some “tetanus” on their part - they will need a little time to analyze the situation and decide what to do. However, the time of "tetanus" was calculated in minutes and it was necessary to properly dispose of it.

What did M.K. Bahirev? He turned against the enemy's course and led the enemy to the heading angle, which allowed the Russian cruisers to shoot the whole board. Thus, the ships of Mikhail Koronatovich simultaneously approached the enemy, and were able to use maximum artillery. At the same time, the new course of the Russian squadron led it to reach the head of the German column and, not least, the ships of M.K. Bakhirev would remain between the German detachment and its base on the German coast.

What other options did the Russian commander have?



It was possible to turn around with the nose to the enemy and rush straight at him, then the distance would be reduced faster (in the diagram, this course is designated as “Variant 1”). But in this case, the enemy would have been on a very sharp course angle and only the nasal turret guns could have fired at the enemy, and then, quite likely, not all cruisers in the convoy, except for M.K. Bakhirev ordered to turn not consecutively, but “all at once”, in order to go on the Germans in the front line. But as soon as the Augsburg realized what was happening, they simply fled, turning away from the Russian cruisers and taking advantage of their excellent speed. The chances of targeting and knocking out a high-speed German cruiser in this case were near-zero. It is possible that with such a maneuver the Russians became close to the Nymph (which, in fact, was an Albatross, but we argue from the position of MK Bakhirev, and he believed that he sees a cruiser of this type before him) they succeeded in reality, but at the same time they missed "Augsburg" almost guaranteed. At the same time, turning to the enemy, allowing at the same time to immediately fight the whole artillery of the starboard, gave the Russians a certain hope to destroy not only Nymph, but Augsburg. Therefore, the refusal to throw “straight at the enemy” according to the 1 Option (see diagram) is more than justified.

The second option is to bring the German ships to the course angle 40 degrees, but not the right one, as M.K. Bakhirev, and the left side does not make sense. Firstly, it is not at all clear whether Russian cruisers would converge with German ships in this case, or would move away from them (there’s no way to understand each other without knowing the exact courses and places of troops relative to each other), and secondly, even if they came together, then very soon the Russian and German detachments would disperse the left sides. Thus, the commander of the Special Purpose Unit would have let the Germans through to their base, which is no good. Moreover, as we know from German sources, on the MK cruisers. Bakhirev saw the Germans better than they saw the Russian ships. Well, if there is a discrepancy on countercourses for the 2 Option M.K. Bakhirev would have to turn around and chase after the Germans - the troops would change places and now the Russian cruisers saw the enemy worse than the enemy.

In other words, carrying out a maneuver of coverage of the head of the German column, M.K. Bakhirev competently solved as many as three tasks - by continuing to cut off the Germans from their bases, he moved closer to the I. Karf detachment and from the very beginning brought the maximum of his artillery into battle. As we see, an equivalent alternative to such a solution of M.K. Bakhirev simply did not exist, but nevertheless, how many "flowers in pots" were thrown into the Russian rear admiral for this maneuver!

And now let's go back to G. Rollman. According to his description, at the beginning of the battle the Russians went to a course parallel to the Germans, but, as we see, nothing of the kind happened, in fact the Russians went against the Germans. Accordingly, the distance between the Russian and German detachments could not increase - it was reduced! Yes, the Germans began to take to the right, thereby leaving the head, but Mikhail Koronatovich followed them and continued to hold the German squad on the course angle 40 degrees - the same “combat loxodromy” that V.Yu. Gribovsky wrote about. That is, it was worth the Germans turn away - M.K. Bakhirev turned after them. With such a maneuvering, the distance between the troops, following with equal speed (MK Bakhirev was walking at 19-20 nodes, the Albatross could not go faster than the 20 nodes, the destroyers, according to the Germans, could not), either could be reduced, or stay roughly constant.

In such circumstances, the German destroyers, if they were really limited in speed, would never have been able to break the distance with the Russian cruisers. But even if by some miracle they managed to do it, and they really ended up in the 49,2 cable from Admiral Makarov, then they followed the Augsburg, crossing the course of the Russian squadron, and even about 5 miles from the Russian ships (though this estimate is Russian, not German), they could only in two cases: if the Russian cruisers, as G.Rollman writes, turned to the north, or if the German destroyers could reach a speed substantially higher than the speed of the Russian cruisers.

Ships M.K. Bakhirev did not turn to the north, which means that in fact the speed of the German destroyers was much higher than indicated in his report I. Karf. And this means, in turn, that reports of German commanders should be treated with extreme caution, and they are clearly not the last resort.

So, we have considered the main “errors” of sources in the description of the beginning of the battle at Gotland 19 June 1915. We can say that we found out what could not be in that fight. Now you can try to imagine what really happened there.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 1
Gotland bout 19 June 1915 g. Part of 2
38 comments
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 20 March 2018 07: 46
    +4
    Very clear, interesting .. look forward to continuing ..
  2. kipage
    kipage 20 March 2018 09: 04
    +16
    Step by step
    And the options are always interesting.
    Thank you
  3. antivirus
    antivirus 20 March 2018 09: 44
    0
    a holiday is when you have joy.

    more than 30 years ago I read: "... 2-3 battles of the fleet in the Baltic did not solve the problems .. and they did not glorify the fleet ... basically the fleet sat out behind minefields"
    compared with 41-44 years, this is the freedom of maneuver and ... waiting - how the fate of the war is decided in the swamps.
    MAIN IMPORTANT: IN MY OPINION --- SAVED THE Navy AGAINST ALLIES, FOR CASE OF TROPHIES OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES
  4. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 20 March 2018 10: 16
    +4
    Thanks for the detailed analysis of the battle descriptions! good
    A familiar picture: after reading the descriptions of the same battle from two sides, it seems that the parties were clearly not at war with each other. smile
    The funny thing is that these descriptions often do not beat even if they are written by one side, but by different commanders.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      20 March 2018 12: 02
      +3
      Quote: Alexey RA
      Thanks for the detailed analysis of the battle descriptions!

      You're welcome!:)
      Quote: Alexey RA
      A familiar picture: after reading the descriptions of the same battle from two sides, it seems that the parties were clearly not at war with each other.

      laughing good I’ll keep this in my memory :))))
      Quote: Alexey RA
      The funny thing is that these descriptions often do not beat even if they are written by one side, but by different commanders.

      Alas, no one canceled the justice of the proverb “lying as an eyewitness”
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 20 March 2018 15: 12
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Alas, no one canceled the justice of the proverb “lying as an eyewitness”

        Well, yes ... and often this happens even in official docks by consciously attributing all the merits to yourself and your subordinates.
        EMNIP, at uv. Ulanov had scans of the docks for the liberation of one city by infantry and tankers - both of them painted everything so that it was they who knocked out the Germans, and mentioned the others a couple of times - so, they helped a little. Moreover, according to the descriptions of the battles, everything happened on the same streets, but, apparently, in parallel worlds. smile
  5. Cat
    Cat 20 March 2018 11: 40
    +2
    I started reading the article in the morning, but I managed to finish reading only at lunch. With porridge with butter, the article went off with a bang!
    Andrey, thanks !!! good
  6. Luga
    Luga 20 March 2018 11: 44
    +4
    What I truly regret is that it has managed to read me about this fight before. I know how it will end. smile And so now he would have pounded his fist on the table and shouted all sorts of nasty things to the author for the fact that “at the most interesting place” we have “a continuation” smile
    Thanks to the author, that's right, I think, and you need to approach the description of the fighting.
  7. arturpraetor
    arturpraetor 20 March 2018 11: 52
    +4
    Topwar is evil. Because of him, colleague Andrei learned to put “To Be Continued ...” in the most interesting place, after a little text ... Oh, and what big and “tasty” articles there were before! And now - just started reading, having fun, and that's all ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      20 March 2018 11: 56
      +6
      Dear colleague, the administration scolds me for this "little bit" that I write very long articles :))))
      1. arturpraetor
        arturpraetor 20 March 2018 12: 37
        +2
        This is what the administration believes are long articles? belay Eeeee damn ... No, I understand, the format of the site, all things, but you have serious analytics - it’s such a sin to divide into small trimmings equal to the volume of some simple cheers-patriotic / liberal / other-stuffed quirks, where there is less text than in nursery rhymes! Well this almost depreciates the material!

        PS By the way, do you want to laugh? The One Who Cannot Be Named on AH declared after a bummer here wassat
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          20 March 2018 12: 42
          +2
          Alas - the material is considered optimal on approximately 4 sheet format A4. This one is six and a half crying
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          20 March 2018 16: 01
          0
          Quote: arturpraetor
          PS By the way, do you want to laugh? The One Who Cannot Be Named on AH declared after a bummer here

          What are you ?! I ran to watch the circus :))))
          1. arturpraetor
            arturpraetor 20 March 2018 17: 05
            0
            Yes, the orderlies already tied him laughing It doesn’t get so hot that from the first comment I understood who it is. Nick also chose rew2-like ones from the category - apparently, with the expectation that no one is sitting there from the topvar wassat
        3. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 21 March 2018 12: 36
          0
          Quote: arturpraetor
          Not, I understand, the format of the site, all things, but you have serious analytics


          Let's not exaggerate.
          The “serious analytics” among historians is to spend the 2-3 of the year in the archives of both sides and analyze the original sources - the original documents.

          And the analysis written by other authors and rewritten many times is an amateur interpretation of sources with errors, often, unfortunately, leading to new errors. That is to say the second layer of errors.
          But reading is curious. + to the author.
          1. arturpraetor
            arturpraetor 21 March 2018 13: 14
            +2
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            Let's not exaggerate.

            Let's not downplay. You, apparently, either have a personal interest here, or did not come across real amateur analytics (which is strange, because there is such a carriage and a small cart on the topvar). Andrei’s colleague’s analysis is quite deep, involving a considerable number of sources - this is enough to call his analyst serious. whether you like it or not.
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            The “serious analytics” among historians is to spend the 2-3 of the year in the archives of both sides and analyze the original sources - the original documents.

            Serious analytics can also be different.
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            And the analysis written by other authors and rewritten many times is an amateur interpretation of sources with errors, often, unfortunately, leading to new errors. That is to say the second layer of errors.

            So even after 2-3 years of studying the source, you can make a lot of mistakes, misunderstand the facts or even engage in outright falsification on emotions in order to create a more convex picture of “the Tsar / Stalin / Vasya Pupkin is bad”. “Serious historians” as well suffer from this.

            Andrei’s colleague has a logic, there is work with material on both sides - albeit not always in the form of primary sources, there is a desire to understand and explain to others, and there is no rigid dogmatism that has swept the brains of many. Based on this, his analytics can be called serious. Is it even better? Yes you can. But because of this, it doesn’t become “amateur”; lovers usually don’t bother to dig into such a detailed subject.

            And yes, curious, thanks in large part to the good syllable of Andrei’s colleague. Which is only a plus, because I knew authors who seemed to think well, made interesting and reasonable conclusions, but how to put it into a clear text is a disaster, for outsiders it is incomprehensible, or even unreadable.
      2. Turist1996
        Turist1996 20 March 2018 15: 36
        0
        Who exactly? Point your finger !!!! :)
        As always - very interesting and even exciting !! Thank you, I look forward to continuing!
  8. Romey
    Romey 20 March 2018 12: 51
    +2
    Andrew! You would compile all your articles into a solid monograph and your work would immediately become a bestseller among lovers of the history of the Navy and the art of naval warfare.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      20 March 2018 13: 43
      +1
      Dear Dmitry, thank you, but ....
      this is possible only if I undertake to publish the book at my own expense. Circulations of naval literature are scanty. Look at the print runs of the monographs! 500 copies - the norm. Which publisher is interested?
      1. Mooh
        Mooh 20 March 2018 17: 42
        +3
        Don't want to try crowdfunding? Leonid Kaganov gathered for the story almost a week. If the administration will advertise you properly, it’s quite possible to put it on a paper book, and then unrealistic prospects open :)

        In all seriousness, I say, do you need to write textbooks or popular science literature, you have the gift to explain complex things in simple words.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          21 March 2018 07: 42
          0
          Quote: MooH
          Don't want to try crowdfunding?

          Hmmm .... Thanks for the offer, did not think about it. But you need to think.
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 21 March 2018 12: 55
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Hmmm .... Thanks for the offer, did not think about it. But you need to think.


            Just approach the selection of sources seriously. You analyze well and see for yourself how many mistakes the first wave of researchers have made - since many works of the first wave of researchers were written, new archives became available.
            There is even no reservation on Blucher (1908) on the internet, and a very real project is stored in the archives of shipyards, designers and the navy, and there is absolutely no need to guess the thickness of decks.

            Simply, these studies are either funded from university funds or by major publishers. But publishers are interested in large-scale circulation, and the topic of the Navy is very narrow.
            The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation finances historical research and projects that are interesting to it - far from everything creates a positive image and is financed.
            Here you need to look for a sponsor, go to the German archives, work in the archives of the Navy.
            Half a year to search for documents, half a year to translate and systematize - but in the end an interesting work confirmed by historical documents.
        2. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 21 March 2018 10: 33
          0
          absolutely support !!!!
  9. belost79
    belost79 20 March 2018 15: 36
    +1
    I must say that the Russo-Japanese War in general and Tsushima in particular taught a lot of Russian sailors. If such an operation was carried out in the Japanese war, then one cruiser would not even leave the raid due to damage to cars, one would run into stones in the fog, someone would be lost. And when they unexpectedly met the enemy, they did not rush to cut him, but hastened to hide in the fog, "... so as not to endanger the ships from being fired from enemy artillery pieces"
    1. saigon
      saigon 20 March 2018 18: 17
      0
      Well, and what on the example of this battle the Baltic Fleet sailors learned? Compared to the Japanese war?
      In the Tsushima battle, the system was kept to the end. Gotland did not hold back a little system. Do a lot of clever maneuvers exceeding the enemy in terms of the weight of a volley multiple times, taking into account that the minzag could only scratch our cruisers.
      Here are examples from the Japanese war, tell me when the cruisers and which ones didn’t leave the raid after receiving the order? Well, the cruiser flew near Vladivostok on stones in the fog, so he did not molt from the battle, but the admiral rolled on it for a meeting and did not let him slow down in the fog. But the cruiser because of the breakdown of the cars did not go into battle, I would like to know the name.
      1. belost79
        belost79 20 March 2018 20: 03
        0
        On May 2, 2004, after the detonation of Hatsuse and Yasima, the cruiser received an order to separate the couples. The senior officer of the Bayan cruiser told Lutonin, an officer from Poltava, that he would not be ready to leave before 4 pm. Lutonin was very surprised why their Poltava was ready to leave at one o’clock in the afternoon, and the newest cruiser would be ready at 4 o’clock only.
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 20 March 2018 21: 09
          0
          Perhaps Poltava partially stood in pairs and the Bayan is not. This explains everything. As far as I remember, it was precisely that the cruisers were not in pairs. And it was crazy to send cruisers with destroyers to attack in the light of day
          1. belost79
            belost79 21 March 2018 09: 23
            0
            Maybe. Apparently, Lutonin was mentally retarded, and could not guess before that. Frantic tsarism, what to take from them.
  10. Monarchist
    Monarchist 20 March 2018 18: 26
    +2
    Andrey, you would like to change your nickname to “Andrey from the Fleet”: you have all the work in the fleet and my opinion is interesting.
    I had an initial thought: to ask you to write a cycle about little-known naval battles, heroic ships. Or such an example: we know about the captain "Mercury", but besides him, the ships and others whose names were called ships
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 March 2018 19: 12
      0
      Quote: Monarchist
      I had an initial thought: to ask you to write a cycle about little-known naval battles, heroic ships

      And start with the cruiser Varyag, about which so many rush was broken? :))))) This will be a holivar laughing
      Just kidding. Thanks for the idea. I will think about it, evaluate my capabilities and knowledge. Maybe something will come out
  11. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 20 March 2018 19: 55
    +1
    Plus in the morning hi
    In addition: Psychologically, any action where the death of something or anyone is supposed implies the inclusion of the organism (s) in the mode when battle events begin to flow for the observer (participant) in a special mode. Distances are perceived differently, side nuances from different angles look different. Therefore, descriptions from opposite sides can vary not only in memories, but even in documents. Someone saw, someone not, someone thought, someone came up with something, someone did not remember the important. Even time for all participants flows differently. Because in order to get a clear picture, you need to bring everything together, derive a common denominator (relative to something) and .... in short, we are waiting for the continuation smile hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 March 2018 07: 44
      0
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Distances are perceived differently, side nuances from different angles look different.

      Quite right, dear Rurikovich. Without a doubt, the vast majority of eyewitnesses are absolutely sure that they are telling the truth.
  12. NF68
    NF68 20 March 2018 20: 48
    +1
    + + + + + + + + + +
  13. Vedzmin
    Vedzmin 21 March 2018 01: 55
    +1
    Thank you, interesting material, easy to read. Waiting for the next part.
  14. Comrade
    Comrade 21 March 2018 03: 54
    +1
    Dear Andrey, thanks for continuing the cycle +!
    Discuss here and discuss, but time, alas, only enough for a couple of replicas.
    Here is how G. Rollman describes the beginning of the battle: “In 07.30 on“ Augsburg ”they saw smoke (Russian time is indicated hereinafter), soon after that they noticed the silhouette of the Russian cruiser

    Most likely, there was an annoying typo, and this is not about 07.35, but about 07.55

    Possible negligence of the translator. Judge for yourself, in the text of the Commodore they call "Karf", while in fact his last name is KarпF. (Johannes von Karpf).

    It seems a trifle, but the eye hurts. Since negligence is allowed here, where are the guarantees that everything else did not work after the sleeves?
    Rollman says that "in 6 hours 30 meters Augsburg I saw a lot of smoke on SO, and soon after that a four-pipe ship stepped out of the fog. "
    And in a message from the deputy chief of admiral’s headquarters, Benke (Der stellvertretende Chef des Admiralstabes) from 3 July it says that the German compound discovered the Russian armored cruiser at about six in the morning (Auf der Rückkehr von einer Vorpostenstellung traf am 2. Juli gegen 6 Uhr morgens ein Teil unserer leichten Ostseestreitkräfte, die, ihrer Aufgabe gemäß, in aufgelöster Ordnung fuhren, zwischen Gotland und Windau bei strichweise unsichtigem Wetter auf russische panzerkreuzer).
    This gives reason to believe that the “Admiral Makarov” was discovered by the Germans dozens of minutes before it was spotted from “Augsburg” (most likely, from one of the destroyers). The fact is not without interest.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      21 March 2018 06: 48
      +1
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      Discuss here and discuss, but time, alas, only enough for a couple of replicas.

      Very sorry. But maybe another day?
      Quote: Comrade
      Possible negligence of the translator.

      I would not be surprised at all, the poet wrote that perhaps only the Russian edition contains a mistake.
      Quote: Comrade
      This gives reason to believe that the “Admiral Makarov” was discovered by the Germans dozens of minutes before it was noticed from “Augsburg”

      I think - no, dear colleague, and that’s why - not one of Karp’s ships (let him be Karp, okay? This is not true, but somehow generally accepted in Russian literature, apparently with the easy hand of Rollman’s translators) was not close enough to Russian ships to make out Makarov or Rurik. If the Germans had seen them before, Karp would not have separated the detachment, would not have let Roon and Lubeck and destroyers go to Libau, radio would have been active, etc.
      At the same time, the Germans constantly “saw” Russian ships where they were not. But, again, if someone had dreamed of a Russian cruiser, the Germans would have taken some measures, but they weren’t - which means, alas, another mistake in the documents of the Germans
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 22 March 2018 03: 42
        +1
        Dear Andrey!

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Very sorry. But maybe another day?

        I would be glad to go to heaven, but they will not allow sins :-) In the new apartment, there is so much to do before the summer that the cat wept for free time ..
        There are a couple of articles in development when I finish them, and I don’t know :-(

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I would not be surprised at all, the poet wrote that perhaps only the Russian edition contains a mistake.

        And the original costs about 50 euros, in addition, it is printed in Gothic, without a habit and a letter you won’t immediately understand :-)

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I think - no, dear colleague, and here's why - not one of Karp’s ships was close enough to Russian ships

        Dear colleague, without cards with the courses of all ships you can’t know anything for sure.


        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        If the Germans had seen them before, Karp would not have divided the detachment, would not have let Roon and Lubeck and destroyers go to Libau

        So the detachment was divided into six, and the Makarov was seen around six. It may be the beginning of the seventh.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        radio would be active

        Not necessary. not for trolling, of course, but I must say that the Japanese from Izumo, for example, having discovered Rozhestvensky’s squadron, did not immediately send a telegram. They needed to look closely who is in front of them, etc.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        then, alas, another mistake in the documents of the Germans

        Everything is possible, however, although the message came out on the second day, details are given there that do not give reason to doubt Benke's competence. So, the number of victims on the "Albatross" is indicated quite correctly.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          22 March 2018 19: 07
          0
          Greetings, dear Valentine!
          Quote: Comrade
          There is so much to do in the new apartment before the summer that the cat wept for free time ..

          I understand and do not insist. Sorry.
          Quote: Comrade
          Dear colleague, without cards with the courses of all ships you can’t know anything for sure.

          Dear colleague, in fact, with maps and courses it is quite difficult to know something for sure, because the ships for the most part were dead reckoning, because there are fogs and any errors are possible when making maps. But the most important thing is that we know the general directions - the Germans walked roughly, from north to south (rather south-west) and Bakhirev intercepted them, moving from the southeast. In this case, what courses do not draw - destroyers could not see Makarov.
          the Germans did not send them in search, we know for sure about this - there is nothing like that in the reports. If the Germans at the beginning of 7 saw the Russian cruiser Karpf, they would immediately have called for support, because he and Augsburg and Albatross and one armored cruiser are not competitors. By the way, Karpf called for help as soon as he saw smokes - whom he sees he did not know yet.
          At least Karpf would have changed course, but we don’t see anything of this, because Bakhirev was building interception courses from Rängarten radiograms, and they did not report changes near 06.00, and they would not have time to relay Bakhirev. Nevertheless, Bahirev nevertheless intercepted the Germans, which means that they were following the old course.
          In general, the discovery of the Russian cruiser does not fit into the situation as we know it. Maybe everything, but if the Germans really saw the BRKR, then in this case their reports, Rollman’s book, all our descriptions are lies from the first to the last word, deliberate misinformation, and I’m not ready to believe in such a conspiracy. That is, it’s wrong - I’m ready to believe, but one line of Benke’s report as evidence is not enough for me.
          Quote: Comrade
          Not necessary. not for trolling, of course, but I must say that the Japanese from Izumo, for example, having discovered Rozhestvensky’s squadron, did not immediately send a telegram. They needed to look closely who is in front of them, etc.

          Of course, but Izumo, after all, is a scout, so he scouted, so he delayed with a radiogram :)))) And the destroyer, following the squad, was supposed to yell about contact so that they could hear it on Augsburg without a radio. laughing
          Quote: Comrade
          Everything is possible, however, although the message came out on the second day, details are given there that do not give reason to doubt Benke's competence.

          Dear colleague, I do not understand what Benke’s competence is in this case. What competence can he have? He did not see anything himself and knew about the incident only from eyewitness reports. He is not an expert, but just a compiler - and the fact that his compilation is mostly correct does not insure him against errors.
          My version is that Karpf discovered radio conversations, by the way, and at the same time Bakhirev received the last radiogram, but thought he heard conversations of sentinel Russian ships. That is, the discovery of Russian cruisers was, but not visual, but through radio intelligence, and Karpf believed that they were not next to him. This fact erroneously (or simply incorrectly) reproduced Benke in his message