Military Review

Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Missile cruisers

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In the last part of the cycle, we looked at the development prospects (or rather, the complete absence thereof) of destroyers and large anti-submarine ships of the Russian Navy. The topic of today's article is cruisers.


It must be said that in the USSR this class of ships was given the closest attention: in the post-war period and until 1991 45 ships of this class (including artillery, of course) came into operation, and by December 1, 2015, 8 cruisers remained. (To the heavy aircraft carrier "Admiral fleet Soviet Union Kuznetsov ”we will devote a separate article, because, regardless of the characteristics of the domestic classification, this ship is an aircraft carrier. Today we will limit ourselves to missile cruisers.)

Missile cruisers (RKR) project 1164. 3 units



Displacement (standard / full) - 9 300 / 11 300 t, speed - 32 knots., Armament: 16 PKR "Basalt", 8 * 8 ZRK C-300F "Fort" (64 ZR), 2 * 2 -MA ”(48 ZUR), 1 * 2 130-mm AK-130, 6 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533 torpedo tubes, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for Ka-27 helicopter.

All three ships of this type: "Moscow", "Marshal Ustinov", "Varyag" are in the ranks of the Russian Navy, the first of which is the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, and the last - the Pacific.

Heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) project 1144.2. 3 units



Displacement (standard / full) - 23 750-24 300 / 25 860 - 26 190 t. (Data in different sources differ greatly, sometimes the total displacement of 28 000 t. Is indicated.), Speed ​​- 31 knots, weapons - 20 CRP XRUMX t.), Speed ​​- 6 knots, weapons - 8 CRP XRUMX t. ", 48 * 46 ZRK" Fort "(16 ZUR)," Fort-M "(8 ZUR), 128 * 6 ZRK" Dagger "(144 ZUR), 1 ZRAK" Kortik "(2 ZURK), 130XXXXX -mm AK-130, 2 * 5 533-mm torpedo tubes with the ability to use PLUR of the Vodopad-NK complex, 2 RBU-12000, 1 RBU-6000, hangar on the 3 helicopter.

It was assumed that all three ships of this type, "Peter the Great", "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Admiral Lazarev", would be built according to one project, but in fact they were not identical and had some difference in the nomenclature of weapons. The “Fort-M” air defense missile system is installed only on Peter the Great, on the remaining ships there are two Fort air defense missile systems, their total ammunition is 96 missiles, not 94, as on Peter the Great. Instead, the Dagger and Dagger ZRAK on Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Lazarev set up Osa-M SAM systems (2 per ship) and eight 30-mm AK-630. "Peter the Great" and "Admiral Nakhimov" have 2 RBU-12000 and one RBU-6000, but on the "Admiral Lazarev" - on the contrary, one RBU-12000 and two RBU-6000.

"Peter the Great" is currently serving in the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation, "Admiral Nakhimov" is being modernized. “Admiral Lazarev was withdrawn from the fleet.

Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) project 1144.1. 1 units



Displacement (standard / full) 24 100 / 26 190 t., Speed ​​- 31 knots, armament - 20 PKR "Granit", 12 * 8 ZRK "Fort" (96 ZUR), 2 * 2 ZRK "Osa-M" 48 ZUR), 1 * 2 PU PLUR "Blizzard", 2 * 1 100-mm AK-100, 8 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533-mm torpedo tubes, 1 RBU-CHNXX12000-2, 6000, 3, XNUMX * SNNXX * XNUMX hangar on XNUMX helicopter.

The firstborn of the TARKR class in the domestic fleet, in the USSR received the name "Kirov", in the Russian Navy - "Admiral Ushakov". Dismissed from the Russian Navy in 2002, but not yet utilized.

Needless to say, all the missile cruisers that we have are inherited from the USSR by the Russian Federation. Only Peter the Great was under construction in the Russian Federation, but it was launched in 1989 and by the time of the collapse of the Union was in a fairly high degree of readiness.

Soviet missile cruisers are unique in their own way. weaponcreated in the framework of the concept of combat use of the Navy of the USSR. We will not analyze in detail today. history their creation, because both the RNR of the 1164 project and the TARKR project of the 1144 project are worthy not even of a separate article, but each of a series of articles, but we confine ourselves to the most general milestones.

For some time (after the Second World War), NATO carrier groups were considered the main adversary of our fleet, and during this period the concept of the USSR fleet suggested combating them in our near sea zone, where surface ships would work together with the missile carrier aviation. Although it is worth noting that even then we built completely ocean-going ships, such as Sverdlov-type artillery cruisers (project 68 bis) - apparently, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin well understood that the ocean fleet is an instrument not only of war, but also of the world.

However, after the appearance in the composition of enemy fleets of nuclear submarines (carriers of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, SSBNs), they became a priority goal for our Navy. And here the USSR has, we will not be afraid of this word, insoluble conceptual difficulties.

The fact is that the range of even the very first ballistic missiles of a SSBN was several times greater than the combat radius of deck aircraft, respectively, enemy SSBNs could operate at a greater distance from our shores. In order to counteract them, they had to go to the ocean and / or remote sea areas. This required fairly large surface ships, with powerful sonar equipment, and they were created in the USSR (BOD). However, the BOD, of course, could not successfully operate in the conditions of the overwhelming domination of the United States and NATO in the ocean. In order for the USSR PLO groups to successfully carry out their functions, it was necessary to somehow neutralize the American aircraft carrier and shipboard attack groups. On our shores, this could have been done by the MRA (naval rocket-carrying aircraft), but its limited radius did not allow it to operate in the ocean.

Accordingly, the USSR needed a means of neutralizing the NATO AUG away from its native shores. Initially, this task was assigned to submarines, but it soon became clear that they would not solve this problem on their own. The most realistic way - the creation of its own carrier fleet - for a number of reasons turned out to be unacceptable for the USSR, although domestic sailors really wanted aircraft carriers and eventually the USSR began to build them. However, at the end of 60 and the beginning of 70, aircraft carriers could only be dreamed of, the NPS could not independently destroy the NATO fleets in the ocean, and the country's leadership set the task of destroying the SSBNs.

Then it was decided to shift the focus on the creation of new weapons - long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as the space target designation system for them. The carrier of such missiles was to become a new, specialized class of ocean surface strike ship - the missile cruiser.

What exactly it should be, there was no clarity. Initially they thought about the unification based on the BOD project 1134 and 1134B, so that using the same hull to create ships PLO (that is, BOD), air defense (with accommodation on them the air defense system "Fort") and percussion - carriers of anti-ship missiles. Then they abandoned this in favor of the 1165 rocket cruiser Fugas, which carried both the PKR and the Fort, and then it was closed due to too high a cost - the ship was supposed to be made nuclear. As a result, they returned to the BOD of the 1134B project, but decided not to do unification in a single hull, but a significantly larger missile cruiser based on it.
The idea was to create a flagship of the PLO group, equipped with powerful attack and anti-aircraft weapons, the latter was supposed to provide not object, but zonal air defense (that is, to cover the entire group of ships). So there was a missile cruiser project 1164.

At the same time, and in parallel with the development of a new missile cruiser, domestic design bureaus designed a BOD with a nuclear power plant. They started in the 8 000 tonnage, but later the sailors' appetites grew and as a result, the ship turned out to be a standard displacement of the order (or even higher) 24 000 ton, equipped with almost all the weapons nomenclature existing at that time. Of course, this is a heavy nuclear missile cruiser project 1144.

The fact that the 1164 project was originally created as a missile cruiser, and the 1144 project as a BOD, to some extent explains how in the USSR at the same time, in parallel, two completely different ships were created to perform the same tasks. Of course, such an approach cannot be called sound in any way, but it must be admitted that as a result of this, the Russian Navy received two types of extremely beautiful ships instead of one (forgive me, dear reader, such a lyrical digression).

If we compare the Atlanta (ships of the 1164 project) and the Orlans (the 1144 project), then, of course, the Atlants are smaller and cheaper, and therefore more suitable for high-volume construction. But, of course, the “Orlany” is much more powerful. According to the views of those years, in order to “pierce” the AUG air defense and inflict unacceptable damage to an aircraft carrier (to completely disable or destroy) it was necessary to carry 20 heavy anti-ship missiles in one salvo. Orlan had 20 Granites, the 949A Antey nuclear missile-carriers launched 24 such missiles (to guarantee, so to speak), but Atlanta carried only 16 Basalt. On the Orlans there were two “Fort” air defense missile systems, which meant there was an 2 post for the tracking and target-tracking radar “Volna”. Each such post could direct 6 missiles to 3 targets, respectively, the ability of Orlan to repel massive raids were much higher, especially since Atlanta located in the stern radar "does not see" the nasal sectors - they are closed by the cruiser superstructure. The closest air defense of the Orlan and Atlanta was comparable, but on the Peter the Great, instead of the outdated Osa-M, the Dagger was installed, and instead of the metal cutter AK-630, the Kortik was installed. At Atlanta, due to their smaller size, such a modernization is hardly possible.

In addition, the Atlantov PLO was deliberately sacrificed: the fact is that the placement of the powerful Polynom at that time increased the ship’s displacement by about one and a half thousand tons (the GAK itself weighs about 800 tons) and this was considered unacceptable. As a result, “Atlant” received a very modest “Platinum”, suitable only for self-defense (and even then not very much). At the same time, the capabilities of the Orlan underwater search are not inferior to those of specialized BOD. The presence of an entire air group of three helicopters, without a doubt, provides the Orlan with far better opportunities for PLO, as well as search and tracking of surface targets, rather than one Atlanta helicopter. In addition, the presence of a nuclear power plant provides the Orlan with far better opportunities for escorting enemy carrier groups than Atlanta with its conventional power plant. Atlas, unlike Orlan, has no constructive protection.

An interesting aspect. For a long time it was argued that the weak point of our heavy ships was the BIUS, which was unable to combine the use of the whole variety of weapons installed on cruisers. Perhaps this is true, but the author of this article came across in the network description of the exercises, in which a heavy nuclear missile cruiser, having received airborne target data from the DRLO A-50 aircraft (the target was not observed from the cruiser), issued target designation to the anti-aircraft missile system of a large anti-submarine ship and that without observing the air target himself, and using exclusively the target command received from TARKR, he struck her with an anti-aircraft missile. The data is, of course, completely unofficial, but ...

Of course, nothing is given for nothing. The size of the Orlan is amazing: the full displacement in 26 000 - 28 000 t makes it the largest non-aircraft ship of the world (even the cyclopical SSBN of the 941 "Shark" project is still smaller). Many foreign reference books call the “Peter the Great” a “battlecruiser,” that is, a battle cruiser. No doubt, it would be right to adhere to the Russian classification, but ... looking at the impetuous and formidable silhouette of the Orlan and recalling that combination of speed and fire power that the battle cruisers showed to the world, one wonders: there is something in it.



But such a large and heavy-armed ship turned out to be very expensive. According to some data, the cost of TARKR in the USSR was 450-500 million rubles, which brought it closer to heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers — the TAVKR project 1143.5 (hereinafter “Kuznetsov”) cost 550 million rubles, and the atomic TAVKR 1143.7 - 800 million. rub.

By and large, the Soviet missile cruisers had two fundamental flaws. Firstly, they were not self-sufficient, because their main weapon, anti-ship missiles, could be used for over-the-horizon only by external target designation. To this end, the Legend reconnaissance and target designation system was created in the USSR, and it did allow the use of anti-ship missiles at full range, but with significant restrictions. Passive radar reconnaissance satellites could not always reveal the enemy’s location, and there were never many satellites with active radar in orbit, they did not give 100% coverage of sea and ocean surfaces. These satellites were very expensive, they carried a powerful radar, which allowed NATO warships to be monitored from orbit 270-290 km in height, a nuclear reactor as an energy source for the radar, and a special accelerating stage, which, after the satellite has exhausted its resources , had to withdraw its reactor to orbit 500-1000 km from Earth. In principle, even from there in the end, gravity will pull the reactors back, but this should have happened no earlier than in 250 years. Apparently, in the USSR it was believed that by this time the spacecraft would already be plowing the spaces of the Galaxy and with numerous reactors rolling into the atmosphere we would somehow figure it out.

But what is important is that even the USSR could not provide absolute coverage of the earth’s surface by active satellites of the Legend system, and this meant that one had to wait until the satellite passed over the necessary part of the sea or ocean. In addition, satellites in relatively low orbits, and even unmasking themselves with strong radiation, could be destroyed by anti-satellite missiles. There were other difficulties and, in general, the system did not guarantee the destruction of enemy AUG in the event of a global conflict. Nevertheless, the Soviet missile cruisers remained a formidable weapon and not a single American admiral could feel calm, being within the reach of the Kirov or Glory missiles.

The second big disadvantage of domestic RKR and TARKR is their high specialization. By and large, they could destroy enemy ships, lead and control the actions of a detachment of ships, covering them with their powerful air defense missile systems, but that's all. Such cruisers did not pose any threats to coastal targets - despite the presence of an 130-mm artillery system, it was an excessive risk to bring such large and expensive ships to enemy shores for artillery shelling. Theoretically, the heavy anti-ship missile could be used to destroy ground targets, but practically there was little point. According to some reports, the Granit PKR cost about the same, or even more than the fighter she currently has, and few coastal targets were “worthy” of such expensive ammunition.

In other words, the Soviet concept of countering enemy AUGs: the creation of long-range anti-ship missiles and their carriers (RKR, TARKR, Antey submarine-carrying missile carriers), reconnaissance and target designation systems for these missiles (Legend) and at the same time also the strongest sea ground-based missile-carrying aviation was comparable in cost to building a powerful carrier fleet, but did not provide the same broad capabilities for the destruction of surface, submarine, air and ground targets as those possessed by aircraft carrier groups and.

Today, the capabilities of the Russian Navy missile cruisers are significantly reduced. No, they themselves remained the same, and despite the emergence of newer defensive weapon systems, such as ESSM or SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, the author of this article absolutely did not want to be in the position of the American admiral, whose flagship aircraft carrier Peter the Great launched two dozen "Granites". But the capabilities of the Russian Federation to target the heavy anti-ship missiles were greatly diminished: the Legend was in the USSR, but it self-destructed when the satellites exhausted their resources, and no new ones appeared, Lian could not be deployed. No matter how much NATO's data exchange systems were extolled, their counterpart existed in the USSR Navy (mutual information exchange station or DPSD) and the missile cruiser could use the data received by another ship or aircraft. This possibility exists now, but the number of ships and aircraft compared to the times of the USSR decreased by a factor of several. The only progress is the construction of over-the-horizon radar stations (RFED) in the Russian Federation, but whether they can provide target designation for missiles is not clear, as far as the author is aware, in the USSR they could not issue RP ZGRLS. In addition, ZGRLS are stationary large-scale objects, which, probably, in the event of a serious conflict, it will not be so difficult to damage or destroy much.

Nevertheless, today it is precisely the missile cruisers that represent the “fulcrum” of the domestic surface fleets. What are their prospects?

All three "Atlanta" project 1164 currently remain in service - one can only regret that at one time could not agree with Ukraine on the redemption of the fourth cruiser of this project, which in a high degree of readiness rots at the extension wall. Today this step is impossible, but it would be already meaningless - the ship is too old for completion. At the same time, the 1164 project was literally “stuffed” with weapons and equipment, which made it a very formidable ship, but it greatly reduced its modernization capabilities. "Moscow", "Marshal Ustinov" and "Varyag" became part of the national fleet in the 1983, 1986 and 1989 years, respectively, today they are 35, 32 and 29 years. The age is serious, but with timely repair, the RKR data are quite capable of serving up to forty-five years, so in the next decade none of them will go “retired”. Most likely, during this time the ships will not undergo any cardinal upgrades, although to exclude the installation of new anti-ship missiles in old launchers and the improvement of the “Fort” air defense missile system - however, all this is a guess.

But with the TARKR situation is not so rosy. As we said above, work is currently under way on the Admiral Nakhimov, and its modernization is quite global. It is more or less reliably known about the replacement of Granit with anti-personnel missiles at 80 of modern missiles, such as Caliber, Onyx and, in the long run, Zircon. As for the air defense missile system, initially there were rumors in the press about the installation of the Polimet-Redut system on TARKR. Perhaps, initially such plans existed, but then, apparently, they were abandoned, or perhaps it was originally the speculation of journalists. The fact is that Redut is nothing more than medium-range air defense systems, while C-300-based complexes have a much longer arm. Therefore, the most realistic look is information that the "Admiral Nakhimov" will receive a "Fort-M", like the one that was installed on "Peter the Great". It can also be assumed that the complex will be adapted to use the latest missiles used in the C-400, although this is not a fact. The AK-630 “Metal Cutters” will be reportedly replaced with the “Dagger-M” SIGNATURE. In addition, the installation of the package-NK anti-torpedo complex was planned.

On the timing of repairs and upgrades. Generally speaking, the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR was located at Sevmash from 1999, and in 2008, spent nuclear fuel was unloaded from it. In fact, the ship was sludge rather than under repair. The contract for modernization was concluded only in 2013, but preparatory repair work began earlier - from the moment it became clear that the contract would be concluded. It was assumed that the cruiser would be handed over to the fleet in 2018 g, then in 2019, then the date was again called 2018, then 2020, and now, according to the latest data, it will be 2021 year. In other words, even if we assume that the timeframe does not “leave” again right, and to count the start of repair from the moment the contract is concluded (and not from the actual date of the start of repair), it turns out that repair of Admiral Nakhimov will take 8 years.

A little about the cost. In 2012, the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) State Defense Order Department, Anatoly Shlemov, said that the repair and modernization of the cruiser would cost 30 billion rubles, and the acquisition of new weapon systems - 20 billion rubles, that is, the total cost of work on Admiral Nakhimov »Will be 50 billion rubles. But you need to understand that these were only preliminary figures.

We have long been familiar with the situation when the time needed to repair ships and the cost of repairing them significantly increases from the original. Usually shipbuilders are reproached for this, they say they have forgotten how to work, and appetites are growing, but such a reproach is not quite true, and anyone who worked in production will understand me.

The fact is that a full assessment of the cost of repair can be made only when the unit being repaired is disassembled and it is clear what needs to be repaired, and what needs to be replaced. But in advance, without disassembling the unit, to determine the cost of its repair is akin to fortune telling on the coffee grounds. So-called schedules of preventive repairs help a lot with this “fortune telling,” but under one condition - when they are executed in a timely manner. But with the repair of ships of the fleet, there was a problem back in the USSR, and after 1991 g, one might say, it disappeared - due to the absence of any repair.

And now, when a decision is made to modernize this or that ship, a kind of “cat in a bag” arrives at the shipyard and immediately guess what needs to be repaired and what is not, it is almost impossible. Real repair volumes are already being identified in the course of its implementation, and, of course, these “discoveries” increase both the repair timeframe and its cost. The author of this article is not trying, of course, to portray shipbuilders "white and fluffy", there are enough of their problems there, but the displacement of terms and cost has not only subjective, but also quite objective reasons.

Therefore, it should be understood that 50 billion rubles, voiced by Anatoly Shlemov in 2012, is only a preliminary estimate of the cost of repairs and upgrading of Admiral Nakhimov, which will significantly increase in the process of work. But even these 50 billion rubles. in today's prices, if we recalculate through official data on inflation (and not real inflation) make 77,46 billion rubles, and taking into account the “natural” increase in the cost of repairs, perhaps no less than 85 billion rubles, and maybe even more.

In other words, the repair and modernization of the TARKR project 1144 “Atlant” is an extremely long and costly thing. If we try to express its cost in comparable terms, then the return to operation of the Admiral Nakhimov will cost us more than three frigates of the Admiral series or, for example, more expensive than building a Yasesen-M submarine.

The next “candidate” for modernization is TARKR “Peter the Great”. For a cruiser that went into service in 1998 and has not undergone major repairs since then, it is time to make a kapitalku, and if so, then at the same time it is also worth modernizing it. But "Admiral Lazarev", obviously, will not be modernized, and for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, the cost of modernization is extremely high. Secondly, to date, only Sevmash can repair and modernize such a level of complexity in the Russian Federation, and in the next 8-10 years it will be occupied by Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great. And thirdly, “Admiral Lazarev” was put into operation in 1984, today “34” already “knocked” him. Even if you put it in the shipyard right now, and taking into account that there it will stay at least 7-8 years, then after upgrading it is unlikely to last more than 10-12 years. At the same time, "Ash", built around the same money and in the same time frame, will last at least 40 years. Thus, even the immediate installation of Admiral Lazarev in repair is a rather dubious event, and even undertaking to repair it in a few more years will not make any sense at all. Unfortunately, all of the above applies to the head TARKR "Admiral Ushakov" ("Kirov").



In general, we can say the following: for some time the situation with the missile cruisers in the Russian Federation has stabilized. In recent years, we had three ships of this class ready for the march and battle: Peter the Great, Moscow and Varyag were on the move, Marshal Ustinov was undergoing renovation and modernization. Now “Ustinov” has returned to service, but it’s time for the “Moscow” to be repaired, then the Varyag will probably be repaired. At the same time, “Peter the Great” will be replaced by the “Admiral Nakhimov”, thus we can expect that in the coming 10 years we will have two cruisers of the 1164 project and one - of the 1144 project. But then “Atlants” will have time to gradually retire - after a decade their lifespan will be 39-45 years., But the Admiral Nakhimov will perhaps remain in the fleet until the 2035-2040.

Will they be replaced?

This may sound seditious, but it is completely unclear whether we need missile cruisers as a class of warships. It is clear that today the Navy of the Russian Federation needs ANY warship, because their numbers have long broken the bottom and, in their current state, the fleet cannot even perform such a key task as covering the deployment areas of SSBNs. In addition, it should be understood that in the future, with the economic policy that the country's leadership is pursuing today, there are no rivers of abundance in our budget foreseen, and if we want to get sometime capable and to some extent respond to our naval objectives , then ship types should be selected taking into account the cost-effectiveness criterion.

At the same time, it is extremely doubtful that the class of missile cruisers satisfies this criterion. For ten years now there has been talk of creating a promising destroyer, and after the start of the HPN 2011-2020, some details about the future project appeared. It became quite clear from them that, in essence, it was not a destroyer that was designed, but a universal missile-artillery surface combatant ship equipped with powerful attack weapons (cruise missiles of various types), a zonal air defense system, the basis of which was to become the S-400 air defense missile system, if not C -500, anti-submarine weapons, etc. However, such universalism obviously does not fit into the dimensions of the destroyer (7-8 thousand tons of standard displacement), respectively, from the very beginning it was said that the displacement of the ship of the new project will be 10-14 thousand tons. In the future, this trend continued - according to the latest data, the displacement of the Leader-type destroyer is 17,5-18,5 thousand tons, while its armament (again, according to unconfirmed rumors) will amount to 60 anti-ship cruise, 128 anti-aircraft and 16 anti-submarine missiles. In other words, this ship, occupying an intermediate position between the modernized Orlan and Atlanta and having an atomic power plant, is a full-fledged missile cruiser. According to the plans announced in the open press, it was planned to build 10-12 of such ships, but the more modest numbers of 6-8 units in the series also “slipped”.

But what is the cost of implementing such a program? We have already seen that repair and modernization of TARKR according to preliminary (and obviously underestimated) forecasts in 2012 g cost 50 billion rubles. but it is obvious that the construction of a new ship would have been much more expensive. It would be completely unsurprising if the cost of the destroyer “Leader” in 2014 prices would be 90-120 billion rubles, or even more. At the same time, the cost of a promising Russian aircraft carrier in 2014 g was estimated at 100-250 billion rubles. In fact, of course, there were many assessments, but the words of Sergei Vlasov, the general director of Nevsky PKB, are most weighty in this case:

“I have once said that in the recent past the American aircraft carrier cost 11 billion dollars, that is, 330 billion rubles. Today it costs already 14 billion dollars. Our aircraft carrier will, of course, be cheaper - from 100 to 250 billion rubles. If it is equipped with various weapons, then the price will increase dramatically, if you put only anti-aircraft systems, the cost will be less ”(RIA News).


At the same time, Sergei Vlasov clarified:

“If the future aircraft carrier has a nuclear power plant, then its displacement will be 80 – 85 thousand tons, and if it is non-nuclear, then 55 – 65 thousand tons.”


The author of this article does not at all call for the next "holy war" in the comments between opponents and supporters of aircraft carriers, but only asks to take into account the fact that the implementation of the program of serial construction of destroyers (and in fact - heavy nuclear cruisers) "Leader" comparable to the program of the creation of the carrier fleet.

Let's sum up. Of the seven missile cruisers that did not go under the gas cutter before 1 December 2015, all seven have been preserved to date, but there are no chances for two TARKRs, Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Lazarev, to return to the fleet. In total, the Russian Navy has five missile cruisers, of which three non-nuclear (1164 projects) will leave the system approximately in 2028-2035, and two nuclear ones may well even live up to 2040-2045.

But the problem is that today we have 28 large oceanic non-avian ships of the ocean zone: 7 cruisers, 19 destroyers and BOD and 2 frigate (counting as such for the 11540 project TFR). Most of them were commissioned in Soviet times, and only a small number of them were laid down in the USSR and completed in the Russian Federation. They become obsolete physically and morally and require replacement, but there is no replacement: until today, in the Russian Federation, not a single large surface ship of the ocean zone has been built (from laying to submission to the fleet). The only replenishment that the fleet can count on in the next 6-7 years is four frigates of the 22350 project, but you need to understand that these are frigates, that is, ships that are inferior to the destroyer class, not to mention the missile cruiser. Yes, we can say that the armament of frigates of the type “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Pots” is far superior to what, for example, our destroyers of the 956 project had. But you need to understand that for its time, the "nine hundred and fifty-sixths" were quite competitive with American destroyers of the Spruens type, in response to which they were created. But the frigate "Gorshkov", with all its undoubted merits, is not at all the modern version of the "Arly Burk" with its XYUM cells of the air defense system, the LRASM anti-ship missile and the anti-aircraft defense based on SM-96 SAM.

The “Leader” project destroyers were positioned as a replacement for the 1164 project missile cruisers, the 956 project destroyers and the 1155 BOD project, but where are these “Leaders”? It was speculated that the first ship of the series would be laid before 2020, but it remained well-intentioned. As for the new HPN 2018-2025 - at first there were rumors that the “Leaders” were removed from there altogether, then there was a denial that work on them would be carried out, but funding (and the pace of work) on this program were reduced. Will there be at least the first "Leader" in time to 2025 g? Riddle. A reasonable alternative to the “Leader” could be the construction of frigates of the 22350M project (in essence - “Gorshkov”, increased to the size of the destroyer of the 21956 project, or “Arly Burke”, if you like). But so far we have not the project, but even the technical specifications for its development.

The conclusion from the foregoing so far only one. The surface ocean fleet, inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR, dies, and nothing, alas, does not replace it. We still have a little time to somehow correct the situation, but it is rapidly ending.

Продолжение следует ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future
Russian Navy. A sad look to the future (part of 2)
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 4. "Halibut" and "Lada"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 5. Specialty boats and this weird EGSONPO
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 6. Corvettes
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 7. Small rocket
Russian Navy. A sad look into the future: a mine-catastrophe
Russian Navy. A sad look into the future: domestic destroyers
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Frigates
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  1. Vard
    Vard 23 March 2018 05: 24
    +6
    The life time of a modern ship ... Until it shoots all the ammunition ... And then no one needs it ... It is completely not clear what combat missions are planned ... Which means the whole theory is a useless air shock ...
    1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
      Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 23 March 2018 08: 17
      0
      Quote: Vard
      The life time of a modern ship ... Until he shoot all the ammunition ...

      Our new RTOs (Buyan and Karakurt) are the ships of the arsenal. But supremacy in the sea cannot be won by them. Very sorry for the last cruiser of the project project 1164 rotted at the factory. Here is the 2017 video of the year, the cruiser at the end of 3 minutes.
      1. pacific
        pacific 23 March 2018 16: 06
        +2
        It seems that the whole plant has already rotted.
        1. arturpraetor
          arturpraetor 23 March 2018 17: 09
          +2
          Not really. He still periodically carries out ship repair, but the city has already raised the issue of simply buying out the territory of the plant, selling everything for scrap, and setting up a park there. In fact, the plant is already on its last legs, and the point is not only that Ukraine - the remaining shipyards of Nikolaev continue to live and build ships, albeit not without problems, but this one ...
      2. bayard
        bayard 23 March 2018 19: 50
        +8
        We were never allowed to build an open sea fleet. Perceiving both the threat and the red line. Whenever Russia tried to build it, all sorts of troubles began to pour on it - the Russo-Japanese War, WWII, WWII, economic and technological sanctions ... bribing officials, sabotage and wrecking. In short, the whole spectrum of counteraction, for the fleet is an instrument of global dominance, and only the “correct” hegemon should dominate.
        Judging by how the latest breakthrough types of Russian weapons were created (in deep secret, conspiratorially, using sophisticated cover schemes), we can conclude that no one would have allowed us ahead of time to lay a mighty fleet. And if we try to do this no matter what, we would lose everything. Is it possible now? Technically, financially, infrastructure - perhaps yes.
        But will we have time for this? If tomorrow is war?
        And she really can strike tomorrow! Because in fair competition, the "exceptional" lost.
        1. Setrac
          Setrac 24 March 2018 15: 42
          +6
          Quote: bayard
          But will we have time for this? If tomorrow is war?

          If war is tomorrow, the fleet will not help us. Well, except for strategic underwater missile carriers.
  2. jonht
    jonht 23 March 2018 06: 18
    +2
    There is still hope that the “innovative” frigates will work out the entire range of weapons, including the RSL, and that all of this will go to work on the new destroyer. Building a hull is not as long as pairing various weapons and auxiliary mechanisms and devices. Especially considering their novelty and childhood diseases.
    1. PSih2097
      PSih2097 23 March 2018 07: 20
      0
      Quote: jonht
      how to pair different weapons and auxiliary mechanisms and devices.

      Well, now it’s not 70 - 80 years old, pairing is done on PeK with the corresponding software, but by the sore it’s to the developers and military specialists who are with them.
      1. jonht
        jonht 23 March 2018 07: 59
        0
        I agree that for specialists, I’m talking about something else ... Cases can be quickly built, but the filling is not so, and brought to mind even longer .... And if this very filling is brought to mind, then we will build faster . (hopefully) lol
        1. tlauicol
          tlauicol 23 March 2018 08: 04
          +4
          Where to build the hull? Nowhere to repair
  3. Scaffold
    Scaffold 23 March 2018 08: 12
    +16
    Today we will not analyze in detail the history of their creation, because both the RRC of project 1164 and the TARKR of project 1144 are worthy of not even a separate article, but a series of articles each

    Andrei, we are ... Well, you understand ... We want, in general! drinks
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 23 March 2018 11: 45
      +3
      I suspect it was just a subtle hint. I suspect - and I hope hi
    2. pacific
      pacific 23 March 2018 16: 08
      +3
      Andrei, we are ... Well, you understand ... We want, in general!

      Support.
  4. EvilLion
    EvilLion 23 March 2018 08: 29
    0
    According to some reports, Granit’s anti-ship missiles cost about the same, or even more, than a modern fighter


    According to some unreliable data in the Second World War, the USSR lost more men than he could recognize. Which does not stop them from repeating.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 19: 09
      +13
      Quote: EvilLion
      According to some unreliable data in the Second World War, the USSR lost more men than he could recognize.

      According to some reports, one should sometimes not throw thought off the threshold, because it does not fit into your view of the world, but think a little about it.
      In Granite there was a powerful AGSN, compare it with what the fighters were equipped with. There was an EW station in Granite. In Granite, a data exchange system between missiles was implemented that front-line fighters did not seem to see. And the armor. And a powerful engine. And all this was shoved into rather modest dimensions by airplane standards.
  5. Cherry Nine
    Cherry Nine 23 March 2018 08: 37
    +1
    Small clarification
    We have already seen that the repair and modernization of TARKR ... cost 50 billion rubles. but it’s obvious that building a new ship would be much more expensive

    Generally speaking, not obvious. If expected such repair (when the object being repaired is in an unknown but frightening state because scheduled repairs have been skipped) and a modernization (not a software update, but a replacement for most weapons systems), then new construction is possible or even more likely cheaper and faster.
    Another thing is that judging by the frigates, the construction of new CDs in the foreseeable future is impossible.
    1. BastaKarapuzik And
      BastaKarapuzik And 23 March 2018 10: 08
      +4
      All the problems that the author describes in the article are a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. If it weren’t for the collapse, the shipbuilding capacities in Nikolaev would not have stood idle.
      The Mistrals, no matter what they say, it was also an option to acquire large enough combat units (since there are not so many shipyards in Russia for building large ships)
      For the Black Sea Fleet, six units of frigates were quite realistic to build (non-delivery of engines from Ukraine is, after all, force majeure, which has already been overcome by now), for India, a similar export type of frigate, several units, was built quite confidently. Varshavyanka quickly turn out, for themselves and for export. Corvettes are being built, Nuclear submarines, icebreakers ... Really great efforts are being made, a lot is being achieved, not everything is coming out at the desired time.
      Is the fleet dying? Yes, he dies any (ships are meant), from the first for service he begins to deteriorate, rust, and so on. And the fact that the enemy managed to thwart the commissioning of a certain number of ships to replace worn ones is such a thing. But do not need too much pessimism, the fleet renewal plan was, it was real, that something could be repaired, modernized, something (Mistral) to buy.
      Now this plan will be replaced with a new one (a lot has already been done). It may turn out to be for the better.
  6. EvilLion
    EvilLion 23 March 2018 09: 05
    +4
    "Swamp fleet, burn archives."

    To repair the trough for the price at which it is possible to purchase, if not a hundred Su-34. Only for a couple of admirals to retain their posts.

    In principle, all the fleet needs is a few analogues of the Atlantes for a normal sea battle, a BOD and a pair of armadillos with guns, to sail (if anti-ship ships and, most importantly, aviation, the enemy fleet, if any, drown, and for this, supersonic anti-ship missiles are just like banal air-based anti-ship missiles like the legendary “exoset”, which has drowned a bunch of all kinds of floating trash) and it’s cheap to shoot a thread of a town for a million people. In the Indian Ocean, in order to catch some American submarines (how can this even be done even by dragging a dozen BODs over an area of ​​millions of square kilometers?), Sailing still does not work, even if you build ships, like the United States, it’s not geographically to break through. This means that fans of aircraft traders and battle-cruisers can only masturbate at the marine giants of the Second World War.

    In general, the BOD task itself involves the reflection and prevention of submarine attacks, if the boat sits aft exactly 100 km from our group, then its existence does not make sense. And here I do not understand nuclear boats with ICBMs. For a long time they have no sense at all somehow contacting with the enemy fleets. It’s only on the map the ocean is small, but in fact the submarine can be found in it only when it allows it itself, or it turns out to be carried out from the base, but this is not our case.

    On ships, except specialized, no means of destruction of ground targets should be placed. As in RTS units, this is a tank, it is durable and beats other equipment, it is a rocket launcher - it is flimsy, but it shoots far and painfully. So it is here. There is a missile cruiser, on it air defense systems and missile systems, one gun 100-130 mm and small anti-aircraft guns. No fucking caliber. To make a self-propelled barge on 50, 100, at least 200 cells with missiles and spit them on command. Then, you see, monsters on 17 tons like the notorious “Leader” will not be needed.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 10: 31
      +9
      Quote: EvilLion
      It’s only on the map the ocean is small, but in fact the submarine can be found in it only when it allows it,

      That is why, when our SSBNs are working out preparations for the use of nuclear weapons they very often hear a rumble - the American nuclear submarines open the torpedo tubes covers
      1. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 23 March 2018 11: 26
        +7
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        they very often hear a rumble

        Most likely, no one was looking for them in the ocean. They graze right from the 12-mile zone.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 March 2018 16: 10
          +10
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          They graze right from the 12 mile zone.

          I'm sure of it. They sit on their tail ...
      2. EvilLion
        EvilLion 23 March 2018 12: 23
        +2
        Or the noise of sea creatures. I won’t ask how the Americans can even know what the boat is doing and whether it is going to launch rockets, except to react to each ascent. And why American submarines can find our boats, and for some reason all our anti-submarine vehicles cannot find a damn right at their bases.
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 23 March 2018 12: 38
          +5
          Quote: EvilLion
          is she going to launch rockets

          The opening of the covers of the shafts can be heard in the same way as the covers of torpedo tubes. Plus characteristic depth and speed.
          Quote: EvilLion
          And why American submarines can find our boats, and for some reason all our anti-submarine vehicles cannot find a damn right at their bases.

          See articles in this series on multipurpose boats and submarine forces.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 23 March 2018 14: 21
            +9
            Quote: Cherry Nine
            See articles in this series on multipurpose boats and submarine forces.

            Yeah ... 1 multi-purpose submarine for five RPKSN Pacific Fleet. And zero of modern TSh on the same Pacific Fleet - so that the SSBN, in which case, may not even survive the exit from the base.
          2. EvilLion
            EvilLion 23 March 2018 14: 31
            +2
            But the noise of the propellers and the operation of the 100500 submarine mechanisms cannot be heard, of course. Only as torpedo tubes open. People love bikes with eerie sounds.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              23 March 2018 15: 26
              +8
              Quote: EvilLion
              But the noise of the propellers and the operation of the 100500 submarine mechanisms cannot, of course, be heard

              It is possible if the HOOK is very good, but not always.
              Quote: EvilLion
              Only as torpedo tubes open.

              This procedure is accompanied by much louder sounds than normal submarine operation.
          3. EvilLion
            EvilLion 23 March 2018 14: 38
            0
            And yes, the submarine pumps huge masses of water through itself. On this, its principle of operation is based. Also, the process is clearly not the quietest.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              23 March 2018 16: 03
              +2
              Quote: EvilLion
              And yes, the submarine pumps huge masses of water through itself.

              ??
              1. 955535
                955535 25 March 2018 09: 07
                +1
                This refers to the work of the circulation lines of the steam turbine installation, polyurethane foam and outboard systems of the cooling circuits of general ship systems
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  25 March 2018 10: 52
                  +1
                  Quote: 955535
                  This refers to the work of the circulation lines of the steam turbine installation, polyurethane foam and outboard systems of the cooling circuits of general ship systems

                  Well, yes, but now it doesn’t produce a lot of noise. Special pumps, vibration dampers ... in general, in the third generation the noise was not great, but in the fourth ... well, not under natural noise, of course, but close to that
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 25 March 2018 19: 42
                    +1
                    It probably has thermal noise in the form. Such a jet of 10 megawatts can even be seen from the satellite.

                    Maybe :) I don’t quite understand what depth is enough to hide thermal pollution.
                    1. Saxahorse
                      Saxahorse 25 March 2018 20: 24
                      +1
                      Staz will recover: the reactor OK-650 capacity of boats of type 955 Borey type is 180-190 MW. The efficiency of the water-to-water reactor is 30-35%. Those. We have an extra 120 MW of heat. Meteorological satellites measure the temperature of the ocean with an accuracy of 0.1 degrees. I don’t know why this accuracy is so numerous for meteorological satellites, but it seems that the submarine will leave a mark in the picture no worse than the inversion. Up to a meter, the position cannot be calculated this way, but it seems to be quite realistic to determine approximately the place of the boat by the wake stream.
                  2. EvilLion
                    EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 16
                    0
                    And what prevents torpedo tubes from lubricating?
        2. Nehist
          Nehist 23 March 2018 12: 40
          +9
          Yes, that's why they can’t. Not what. Those scanty remnants that were once the fleet of the USSR and still on the move are simply physically incapable of creating a normal anti-submarine defense
    2. Days
      Days 24 March 2018 01: 10
      +2
      Quote: EvilLion
      by which it is possible to get no matter how one hundred Su-34

      Who will build them, this hundred? Production capacities (both of final assembly and components) are not taken from the void.
      1. Rader
        Rader 24 March 2018 20: 40
        +2
        Quote: Dagen
        Quote: EvilLion
        by which it is possible to get no matter how one hundred Su-34

        Who will build them, this hundred? Production capacities (both of final assembly and components) are not taken from the void.

        I am more concerned about the question: How can a hundred front-line bombers replace a large surface ship in the ocean zone? How can the Su 34 perform missile cruiser missions ???
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 24 March 2018 20: 59
          0
          very simple, planes destroy sea and land targets with their weapons, instead of the cruiser
          1. Rader
            Rader 25 March 2018 19: 22
            +1
            Quote: vladimir1155
            very simple, planes destroy sea and land targets with their weapons, instead of the cruiser

            Hmmm ... Very interesting .... I just couldn’t think of such a thing ... Do not tell me whether the destruction of sea and land targets at a distance of 3 km from my base is the main task of a ship of the first rank (especially if its displacement is 500 thousand and does he have a nuclear reactor)?
            Do you think that the Su 34 (without a doubt an excellent front-line bomber), even if in the amount of 2, 3, or 10 divisions, will be quite effective (heh) to deal with underwater targets?
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 25 March 2018 19: 53
              0
              the president has announced a batch production of 160, still pack YES are planning. Su34 will perform tasks in the near zone, and coastal-based anti-submarine ships and anti-submarine aviation can fight against the shelves. Tasks of 3500 miles or more can be accomplished by nuclear submarines. And the surface cruisers and destroyers, since there are no problems, they do not need to be solved.
              1. The comment was deleted.
              2. Rader
                Rader 25 March 2018 21: 40
                0
                Quote: vladimir1155
                the president has announced a batch production of 160, still pack YES are planning.

                Well, I have to notice that between "announced" и
                "10 cars entered combat duty"
                passage a lot of time. The possibilities of using the Tu 160 and the effectiveness of this application on surface targets is one big question. And it’s better not to mention about PAK YES, given that at first the information about this project appeared, and then everything abated, but decided to revive the production of the Tu 160 ... However, you no longer have all the hopes for the Su 34 - that’s good.
                Quote: vladimir1155
                Su34 will perform tasks in the near field

                Vladimir, please explain why front-line bomber Su 34?
                Can this machine change anti-ship missiles? Why not Su 30/35 (or what Drying is the basis of naval aviation ...)?
                Quote: vladimir1155
                and anti-submarine ships and coast-based anti-submarine aircraft can fight against shelves.

                I subscribe to every word, with the exception of one ( may) They are required to provide reliable protection against “sub-floating partners”. What do I mean by the word "protect"? The possibility of timely detection of a submarine (that is, not at the moment the conditional SiWulf code makes a volley at conditional Yasen) in the zone of responsibility of the PLO forces and the possibility of its guaranteed destruction. But for these purposes, specialized machines are needed (Ilya 38), but not front-line bombers ....
                Quote: vladimir1155
                Tasks of 3500 miles or more can be accomplished by nuclear submarines.

                It is a pity that you did not answer this question:
                Quote: Rader
                Do not tell me whether the destruction of sea and land targets at a distance of 3 km from its base is the main task of the ship of the first rank

                It may seem strange, but the task of "destroying" is not the most difficult. Usually, you first need to "find." There is also the task of "accompanying". There is also the concept of "demonstration of the flag." But how to provide air defense of the ship’s formation?
                Quote: vladimir1155
                And the surface cruisers and destroyers, since there are no problems, they do not need to be solved.

                See above
                1. The comment was deleted.
                2. Vladimir1155
                  Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 07: 53
                  0
                  I agree with you, we need IL 38, we need to update and develop them. As for detection beyond 3500 miles, satellites are needed for this, the 21st century is all the same .... the task of detecting enemy ships is as far as relevant for defense? what matters to me what they do in Australia, their shores are more important. As for tracking cruisers with destroyers so far behind the targets ..... if it’s the Americans, they will drive a couple of hundred pennants to our escort and crumble it into chips, and as for the submarines, it’s still unknown who will defeat the KR with 600 people or a dapel, which is why battleships they ingloriously stood in bases or died in a brief battle in world wars, which is why all countries abandoned destroyers and cruisers except the United States and China. As for the air defense of the connection, if there is no connection, then it is not necessary and air defense. I looked above and did not find a list of tasks for the KR and EM that coastal aviation and submarines could not solve, together with the IPC and Minesweepers
                  1. Vladimir1155
                    Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 08: 47
                    0
                    http://www.arms-expo.ru/analytics/armed_forces/ko
                    nstantin-sivkov-raketnyy-kompleks-kh-32-menyaet-r
                    asklad-sil-v-borbe-na-more /? utm_referrer = https% 3A
                    % 2F% 2Fzen.yandex.com
                    1. Rader
                      Rader 26 March 2018 16: 11
                      +1
                      Quote: vladimir1155
                      I agree with you, we need IL 38, we need to update and develop them. As for detection beyond 3500 miles, satellites are needed for this, the 21st century is all the same.

                      And also, in the article to which you gave the link it is written:
                      "Even the limited DA forces (as part of the Navy - MRA) are capable of significantly neutralizing American aircraft carrier formations. However, these actions should be properly ensured by the issuance of target designation and cover of strike groups from attacks by coast-based enemy fighters. If this problem is not resolved, the potential of hypersonic missiles will not be realized. "

                      And so, back to the original thesis:
                      A hundred pieces of Su 34, worth as much as the modernization of Orlan (we won’t check this or not), this Orlan can replace it.
                      I already realized that you are a supporter of the idea: "Russia does not need an ocean fleet, enough" mosquito "." You also left only one task: the destruction of “surface” and “underwater” adversaries who approached their native shores. I'm not going to dissuade anyone. Although still recall ... "Why do we need so many transport ships? Are we going to land in England? Are we planning offensive operations in Latin America? No. Cut and sell." After a certain number of years: “To transfer equipment, ammunition and personnel to Tartus. Assad has remained on the strength of the month if we do not do it as soon as possible ... What? There are no transport ships? Use the BDK, buy everything that floats and let it into Syria ..."
                      As a result, we have:
                      To solve the task (for example, the destruction of an AUG which includes 1-2 aircraft carriers with up to 14 universal missile ships, several nuclear submarines), we need (based on the article to which you gave the link) two regiments of Tu 22 M3 (of which there are less than 60 pieces), equipped with X32, a fighter cover - 2 regiments, anti-submarine warfare will require Ilov 38 in an amount unknown to me (although this is not important, because they will not be able to begin their direct duties, as long as the enemy has at least one ship with possibly working air defense) . I didn’t mention about the nuclear submarines, BOD, and satellites because it’s obviously without target designation and the cruiser is useless, the BOD are specialized ships that survive their age, but the nuclear submarines are nuclear submarines.
                      From here questions: Where did we lose a hundred Su 34? And why do we need it in naval aviation? ..
                      Quote: vladimir1155
                      that is why battleships so ingloriously stood in bases or perished in a brief battle in world wars

                      Whoa whoa!!! You are easier, you can call Kaptsov, such bold statements. wink
                      that is why all countries abandoned destroyers and cruisers except the United States and China.

                      Eeeeeee .... And Japan, Italy, Britain, aren't countries already? Or did the Britons call their Daringi (the last of which was built in the distant, almost forgotten from 2014) schooners?
                      1. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 18: 26
                        0
                        let's start with the BDK, the legacy of the USSR, 4 by ocean each, has been used for transport for at least 20 years, ships for landing in support of ground operations, naturally near their shores, they don’t need a navigator, coastal aviation and MPK MRK Minesweeps will help . As for 60 Tu22 and two regiments of fighters, this is the very aircraft that is needed and which is not enough and a hundred SUs will come in handy. Now about Aug, we can destroy it with the help of aviation as you said or with the help of the Premier League, but with the help of the cruiser you can’t destroy it, because you listed 14 escort cruisers
                      2. EvilLion
                        EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 28
                        0
                        Just no one runs into transport ships, without them the fleet ceases to be needed at all, boiling down to coast guard boats.

                        But the battleships in the WWI reached the point where they were scared to be put into battle, they would drown all of a few pieces, they couldn’t build new ones. Although the Japanese soaked during the battle for Gaudalkanal, the fate of the war is being decided, and the Yamato is standing somewhere and smoking. If they lost it, but won the battle, then the HZ would have continued the war in the Pacific.
                3. EvilLion
                  EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 23
                  0
                  There is a radar, there is software, there is a suspension for a rocket, use with anything.
            2. EvilLion
              EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 20
              0
              One or two 130 mm guns do not justify the existence of a ship in the 28 tons, from the point of view of destroying land targets, it has nothing else for this, but the "calibers" are placed on the ground and on arsenal ships.
            3. EvilLion
              EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 21
              0
              The cruiser also does not know how to deal with underwater targets. No way. There is a BOD for this.
        2. EvilLion
          EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 18
          0
          Missiles to board the enemy. Or does the missile cruiser have any other tasks besides destroying surface ships and providing air defense?
          1. Rader
            Rader April 5 2018 20: 00
            0
            Quote: EvilLion
            Missiles to board the enemy.

            And in the following sentence:
            Quote: EvilLion
            destruction of surface ships and air defense


            Quote: EvilLion
            The cruiser also does not know how to deal with underwater targets. No way. There is a BOD for this.

            belay On “Orlan” there is the same set of hydroacoustic equipment (Polynomial), as on the BOD, there is a “Blizzard” / “Waterfall”, RBU 6000/12000 and two K 27 (which will obviously deal with not delivering ice cream). In what sense can not? He looked at the Torah, the Bible and the Koran and did not find a ban on the destruction of submarines imposed on the project 1144.

            Quote: EvilLion
            "calibers" are placed on the ground and ship-arsenals.

            On the ground? No, the contract forbids. And the ships are arsenals .... Oh ... Let's calculate their number together. Get started!
            NNNNOOOOL !!!
            And yes, the ship needs arsenal of air defense. The Americans, the first to propose the concept of an arsenal ship, for some reason took and didn’t build a single one, however, they remade several strategists for Tomahawks, but this is a completely different story ...

            Quote: EvilLion
            There is a radar, there is software, there is a suspension for a rocket, use with anything.

            If this remark refers to the possibility of using Su 34 X32 missiles, then I have to upset you ... Everything is much more complicated. And yes, for the application of the X 32 the aircraft does not require a radar at all. To the carrier aircraft of these missiles presented in total one demand. It should be Tu 22M3M.

            Quote: EvilLion
            Just no one runs into transport ships, without them the fleet ceases to be needed at all, boiling down to coast guard boats.


            It is right. And the lack of this understanding led to the fact that the "Syrian Express" was represented by the BDK and all sorts of trash. But no one tried to sink them, or at least detain them ...

            Quote: EvilLion
            Although the Japanese soaked during the battle for Gaudalkanal, the fate of the war is being decided, and the Yamato is standing somewhere and smoking. If they lost it, but won the battle, then the HZ would have continued the war in the Pacific.

            Well, what’s in the Japanese’s brains, only a Japanese can understand ... But if Japan had “Yamat” (and they actively used them everywhere and everywhere) at the beginning of the war with the USA, and 4 times more aircraft carriers, they would still lose the United States. Economies are not easy to compare. The war lasted a maximum of a year ...
  7. slm976
    slm976 23 March 2018 09: 46
    +6
    Good afternoon, Andrei, in general, a traditionally very interesting article, I liked the whole cycle, but in this phrase you were clearly deceiving:

    The author of this article does not at all call for the next "holy war" in the comments between opponents and supporters of aircraft carriers, but only asks to take into account the fact that the implementation of the program of serial construction of destroyers (and in fact - heavy nuclear cruisers) "Leader" comparable to the program of the creation of the carrier fleet.

    But this statement is absolutely not true))!
    Even if you take the cost of the "Leader" equal to the cost of an aircraft carrier (and it will not be like that) - this is absolutely not identical to the statement that:
    the implementation of the program for the serial construction of destroyers (and, in fact, heavy atomic cruisers) “Leader” is quite comparable in costs to the program for creating an aircraft carrier fleet


    An aircraft carrier in itself is far from an aircraft carrier fleet, it is a large flat high-speed barge, its cost can be comparable to the Leader, but there is also the cost of an air wing, and it is comparable, if not more than the cost of an aircraft carrier, which doubles the cost of an aircraft carrier equipped with an air wing compared with the "Leader" .. well, if we, as you wrote, are talking about the cost
    aircraft carrier fleet programs
    , then you still need to calculate the cost of creating escort ships - that is, Destroyers ... and destroyers with us are again the "Leaders" ...
    That is, the cost of the aircraft carrier fleet construction program will be an order of magnitude more expensive than the cost of the Leaders program, moreover, it will include a destroyer program ..
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 10: 29
      +4
      Quote: slm976
      An aircraft carrier in itself is far from an aircraft carrier fleet, it is a large flat high-speed barge, its cost can be comparable to the Leader, but there is also the cost of an air wing

      Which, in the absence of an aircraft carrier, you will land on land airports to cover the fleet
      Quote: slm976
      then we must also calculate the cost of creating escort ships - that is, destroyers

      So the "Leaders", as it were, are also the ships heading the KUG, i.e. it is not being built to replace the rest of the surface fleet but in addition to it
      1. slm976
        slm976 23 March 2018 11: 11
        +4
        Which, in the absence of an aircraft carrier, you will land on land airports to cover the fleet

        What does it have to do with it? So far, aircraft have not even been developed for a promising aircraft carrier, there are no AWACS aircraft for him either .. who are you planning to land on land airports?
        Andrei, I didn’t write a word, about the necessity / uselessness of the aircraft carrier fleet !! I believe that in the future aircraft carriers are needed, but not instead of something else ...
        I wrote to you about the incorrectness of your comparison of the cost of construction programs !!!
        You compare the (estimated) cost of building a destroyer / cruiser etc. "Leader" fully equipped with weapons and the estimated cost of building an aircraft carrier without taking into account the main caliber (which is an air wing), and on the basis of comparable cost you make an absolutely erroneous conclusion - that the production program of destroyers is comparable to creation program carrier fleet!!
        And the cost of building an air wing, escort ships, aircraft carriers and coastal infrastructure for basing this entire economy - you don’t take it into account at all!
        Only about this was my post ...
        So the "Leaders", as it were, are also the ships heading the KUG, i.e. it is not being built to replace the rest of the surface fleet but in addition to it


        What will be the “Leaders” will depend on when and in what quantities they will be built in general, the “Leader” is a universal NK, which can also lead the KMG and be part of the AB escort. Moreover, having a nuclear power plant, it’s as if in this escort begs. Well, another question, what kind of ships will aircraft carriers escort from us if the Leaders are not intended for this? 22350M, work on which. apparently didn’t even start?
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 23 March 2018 14: 29
          +3
          Quote: slm976
          What does it have to do with it? So far, aircraft have not even been developed for a promising aircraft carrier, there are no AWACS aircraft for him either .. who are you planning to land on land airports?

          It is likely that regardless of the presence or absence of an AB, the need for airborne cover forces for ship groups will not go anywhere. And instead of one aircraft wing AB will have to order and base 2-3 of the same coast-based groups (because they will have to cover for a larger radius than with deck-based) - to cover the same ships from the coast.
          So the cost of an air wing in case of abandonment of the AB will not be possible to save - airplanes will be needed in any case. smile
          SW Exeter, a pomnitsa, in his “big aircraft carrier sketch” suggested that the opponents of AB calculate the cost of building and maintaining a “damn dozen” of the USSR Navy’s bootleg, which would have been unnecessary if they had AV.
          Quote: slm976
          And the cost of building an air wing, escort ships, aircraft carriers and coastal infrastructure for basing this entire economy - you don’t take it into account at all!

          So in the program "Leaders" does not take into account the cost of construction of coastal fighter aircraft and airfields, which will be needed to cover these EMs. smile Because it is similar to death to rely solely on air defense systems in the KUG air defense system from their 40 km range on the WWII.
          1. slm976
            slm976 23 March 2018 15: 42
            +4
            It is likely that regardless of the presence or absence of an AB, the need for airborne cover forces for ship groups will not go anywhere. And instead of one aircraft wing AB will have to order and base 2-3 of the same coast-based groups (because they will have to cover for a larger radius than with deck-based) - to cover the same ships from the coast.


            I'm afraid that this point of view is somewhat new to me). To save at the expense of air wings, on coastal naval aviation .... I met the opposite logic, I’ve met such a sin, I meet it for the first time ..
            At first glance, there are several weaknesses:
            1. Coast-based aviation with all the infrastructure already exists, updating and modernization and construction of new jump airports (or re-conservation of old ones) may be required, but building from scratch is not implied here ... in addition, the functions of coastal aviation are somewhat broader than the KUG cover, therefore, as you correctly noted
            regardless of the presence or absence of AB
            with their wing wings, the need for coast-based aviation will not go anywhere!
            2. Modern aircraft for coastal aviation exists and is actively being built, from deck aviation we only have SU-33, MIG-29K .. several SU-24, that is, what is based on Kuznetsov. The entire nomenclature of carrier-based aviation for a promising aircraft carrier will need to be developed ... this time and money.
            3. Coastal aviation is easily transferred, if necessary, from one point based to another, I don’t see the need to especially increase forces ...
            Well, in principle, the point of view expressed by you is quite interesting .. I have never considered the problem from this angle, I will still think about it.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              23 March 2018 16: 07
              +3
              Quote: slm976
              Coast-based aviation with all the infrastructure already exists,

              Well, you give :))) If it ALREADY exists, then did it come up with a wave of magic and cost us nothing? :))) And if an aircraft carrier with an air group is built, does this mean that an equal number of land aircraft can be removed from the fleet support task and transferred to other operations?
              Quote: slm976
              Modern aircraft for coastal aviation exists and is actively being built, from deck aviation we only have SU-33, MIG-29K ..

              Right. Therefore, the cost of developing an aircraft carrier can add the costs of developing deck aircraft, but not the cost of the aircraft themselves :)
              Quote: slm976
              Coastal aviation is easily transferred, if necessary, from one point to another

              And the same is true for the deck of the aircraft - no one is stopping her from flying from an aircraft carrier in the North, say, to the Far East.
              Quote: slm976
              I have never considered a problem from this angle, I will still think about it.

              It is both honest and extremely worthy - not everyone is able to reflect on the question "Am I right?" hi
              I put a plus comment, although I do not agree with him :)
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 23 March 2018 16: 49
              +6
              Quote: slm976
              1. Coast-based aviation with all the infrastructure already exists, it may be necessary to upgrade and modernize and build new jump airfields (or decommission the old ones), but building from scratch is not meant here ...

              Already not what is implied, but planned - on the same Kuril Islands. Since there are not enough existing airfields for cover, they are concentrated not where it is necessary to cover, but there. where it is convenient to build and supply.
              In general, you can estimate the required capacity of the “bush” of airdromes to cover from the coast anti-submarine groups of the Northern Fleet, holding a barrier in front of the SSBN positional areas - provided the enemy has 3-4 AB ("squadron at sea equals a regiment on the shore"). It will be especially good on the right flank - somewhere near the Bear.
              Quote: slm976
              the need for coast-based aviation will not go anywhere!

              Necessity will not disappear. But the required number will decrease at times, since the deck squadron will take on the load of the coastal regiment.
              Quote: slm976
              3. Coastal aviation is easily transferred, if necessary, from one point based to another, I don’t see the need to especially increase forces ...

              Heh heh heh ... but there is one subtle point: to concentrate forces in the required direction, it is necessary to have the appropriate aircraft airfields on it. That is, we will have to build and maintain an aerodrome network in each of the points with all the rear units "for growth" - based on the maximum required number of cars in this direction. And it will not be possible to save money on the rear by throwing them on the sides of the VTA after the combat aircraft - for the transfer of rear units usually takes several times longer.
              Carriers, on the other hand, are moving airfields that do not need to be built in advance in each direction, but only moved to them, concentrating in the right area if necessary. Airplanes, runways, and TEC arrive at the desired point together. smile
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 25 March 2018 20: 31
                0
                the rear can also be deployed not so slowly, and aerodromes can receive a large number of aircraft, so it is clear that the maintenance of coastal aviation is several times more profitable than the AB, where the rear is 1500 people for 20 aircraft, with fuel, a combat warrant, and, most importantly, dependency from the weather and not always reliable equipment https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5ab7649a9a79478fd8
                a35689? utm_referrer = https% 3A% 2F% 2Fzen.yandex.com%
                2F% 3Ffrom% 3Dspecial
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 26 March 2018 10: 19
                  +3
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  the rear can also be deployed not so slowly, and airfields can receive a large number of aircraft

                  Accept - they can. But it will be extremely difficult to work with this "large number" from one lane. And serve too. Well this is not a drill with a flight of a pair of links per day - here you will need to prepare for the flight and raise everything that is at the airport, in the same wavelength.
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  therefore, it is clear that maintaining coastal aviation is much more profitable than AB, where the rear is 1500 people for 20 aircraft

                  More precisely, 5700 people (including the AB crew) on 60-70 aircraft (although during the Cold War the same AB carried up to 100 vehicles).
                  1. EvilLion
                    EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 38
                    +1
                    100 cars, if small and for show. Militants in the USA EMNIP 2-3 squadron F / A-18 by 12 vehicles on the aircraft.
                  2. EvilLion
                    EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 44
                    +1
                    On an aircraft carrier, not only one lane, but also take off from it much more hemorrhoid. On earth, you can take off literally one after another.
              2. EvilLion
                EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 43
                +1
                they are concentrated not where it is necessary to cover, but there. where it is convenient to build and supply


                It is necessary to cover objects, not bare hills, and for the Su-35, the distance in 100 km is not a problem at all.

                Aircraft carriers are moving aerodromes that do not need to be built in advance in each direction, but only moved to them, concentrating in the right area if necessary


                I haven’t seen anything comparable in stupidity for a long time, you will be transferring your fleet from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Ocean longer than the conflict lasts, planes will fly over the day, even taking into account the need for the crews to sleep at least after the ferry.
            3. The comment was deleted.
            4. EvilLion
              EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 37
              +1
              And what is there to think. In any case, build X planes and a barge for them, the same X planes on land and a bunch of destroyers that will be useful on their own.
          2. EvilLion
            EvilLion April 5 2018 08: 34
            +2
            Land aircraft have the best performance characteristics. An aircraft carrier can act only in the Pacific Ocean, that is, where it is not supposed to be fought at all and with no one. The Chinese can shake as much as they like for Southeast Asia, it is vital for them, but we have no interests there. And nobody plans to land in the Philippines.

            At the same time, the autonomy of the aircraft smokers in terms of the combat wing combat effectiveness is very, very limited, no more than 2 weeks with 2 sorties by car.
    2. mkpda
      mkpda 26 March 2018 15: 38
      +1
      You missed an important detail. For the full use of domestic cruisers, external target designation was required. It is with such a system that a comparable cost is obtained with AUG.
  8. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 10: 25
    +3
    The USSR needed a means of neutralizing the AUG of NATO away from their native shores. Initially, this task was assigned to submarines, but very soon it became clear that they themselves would not solve this problem. The most realistic way - creating your own carrier fleet - was unacceptable to the USSR for a number of reasons, although Russian sailors really wanted aircraft carriers and ultimately the USSR began to build them. Nevertheless, in the late 60s and early 70s one could only dream of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines could not defeat NATO fleets in the ocean independently, and the country's leadership set the task of destroying SSBNs.
    Then it was decided to shift the focus on the creation of new weapons - long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as the space target designation system for them. The carrier of such missiles was to become a new, specialized class of ocean surface strike ship - the missile cruiser.

    1. It was precisely the same Soviet SSGNs that solved the task of neutralizing American AUGs. Naturally, not independently, but in the presence of an external control system. And the Americans knew that next to each of their aircraft carriers is 1-2 of our SSGNs.
    2. Nobody still knows how to solve the task of destroying deployed SSBNs, since in order to destroy SSBNs, it must first be discovered.
    3. The carriers of long-range anti-ship missiles in the USSR were to become, first of all, not “a new, specialized class of ocean surface attack ship — missile cruiser”, but PLARKS. And it was this concept that was implemented - look at how many boats were built and how many RRC. Cruisers were needed as the core of their own surface units, and SSBNs, as a means of neutralizing the ACG and searching and tracking (if you were lucky to find) the enemy nuclear submarines.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 15: 33
      +1
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      It was precisely the Soviet SSGNs that solved the task of neutralizing American AUGs. Naturally, not independently, but in the presence of an external control system.

      Admirals of the USSR do not agree with you.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      The carriers of long-range anti-ship missiles in the USSR were to become, first of all, not "a new, specialized class of ocean surface attack ship - a missile cruiser", but PLARKs. And it was this concept that was implemented - look at how many boats were built and how many RRC.

      What, even this I have to do for you? If we undertake to count only ships with anti-ship missiles at 500 + km, then we built 7 RKR + equipped with 5 TAVKR and 11 Basalts 949 + 2 submarine projectiles 949.
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 08: 17
        0
        the wise admiral Amelko disagrees with you, and the parquet admirals for the sake of their bureaucratic interests, (more drugs, more posts, more vanity) inflated the number of large NKs damaging the country
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 26 March 2018 10: 24
          +2
          Quote: vladimir1155
          wise admiral Amelko disagrees with you

          The wise Admiral Amelko, together with Ustinov, is responsible for the construction for our Navy of 4 huge mutants who carried the armament of the cruiser with the displacement of an aircraft carrier, and armed as “mast defense fighters” as an air group. Oh yes, it was thanks to the wise Amelko that the Kuznetsov project lost its catapult.
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 12: 06
            0
            Amelko was for the submarine, but the lobbyists of the parquet admirals turned out to be stronger, and the catapult, why if it is possible without it, the right decision is a springboard, by the way four countries out of 7 with AB use it
  9. Yrec
    Yrec 23 March 2018 12: 29
    +7
    Russia does not have the means to build large surface ships and is not expected in the near future. The submarine fleet, yes, this is a component of the strategic nuclear forces, without it, nowhere. The basis of the surface fleet will be RTOs, and the flagships will be frigates. When the current flagships go to the scrap. The main task of the surface fleet is the defense of the near sea zone and the shooting of the Kyrgyz Republic, being under the umbrella of the coastal missile defense and the protection of coastal aviation. You can throw slippers at me, but this is an objective reality. We do not pull parity either at sea or in the air. All hope for strategic nuclear forces and ground forces.
    1. seos
      seos 23 March 2018 15: 52
      +2
      The maintenance of the fleet is an expensive pleasure, such an item of expenditure can gobble up the entire military budget ...
      1. albert
        albert 23 March 2018 20: 33
        +10
        The maintenance of oligarchs is even more expensive. Until the economic policy of Russia changes, you can forget about the ocean fleet.
  10. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 23 March 2018 13: 18
    +5
    Please take it as a joke.
    The Russian Navy has 2 (two) cruisers not specified by the author. The first is the most powerful ship on Earth. One of his single shot - 70 years of stagnation. And the name of this cruiser is Aurora. This ship is not decommissioned and is part of the Russian Navy. The second cruiser is the artillery project 68 bis "Mikhail Kutuzov." The ship is also not decommissioned and is on the lists of our Navy.
  11. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2018 13: 21
    +2
    My opinion is that Lazarev can be repaired, there is a project, there is experience, the Atlanteans need to be decommissioned, their repairs are very expensive, and their service life has expired, it’s difficult to upgrade them, deck missiles, but the new cruisers and destroyers of Russia are not needed from the word at all,
    1. NEXUS
      NEXUS 23 March 2018 14: 23
      +5
      Quote: vladimir1155
      My opinion is that Lazarev can be repaired

      No one will restore Lazarev. He is in a too deplorable state and, given how many Nakhimov and Lazarev have already been modernized, in the event of restoration they will be transferred to the fleet 30 years later, after Peter Nakhimov, Peter will go on modernization. And now the question is, will Lazarev be relevant in 30 years?
      Money is undoubtedly better to invest in the Leader project. Moreover, the YaSU RITM-200 is already being tested on our new icebreakers.
      At the same time, I consider the construction of destroyer-class ships, or frigates with increased displacement, no less important, which brings them closer to the class of destroyers. But in this matter we haven’t even yet had a horse lying around. There are announcements on project 22350M and that’s all. Although Shoigu said that frkgaty projects 22350 and 22350M and will become the backbone of our fleets. But while things are there.
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 23 March 2018 17: 39
        +1
        if Lazarev’s repair is not practical, then you need to do another SSBN, destroyers and cruisers program to close, for frigates and corvettes to confine yourself to already laid down units, throw all the money into new submarines and repair submarines, as well as minesweepers ... for large surface ships of the Russian Federation there are no problems, for solving local problems such as Syria, the Red Sea, three frigates are enough, and even more so until 2030 in the Atlantean system, 1155, and even 956, and two eagles and Kuzya will serve until 2040-2050
  12. Sonet
    Sonet 23 March 2018 14: 54
    +7
    It must be admitted that the whole history of liberal Russia, Yeltsin-Putin, did not give the country a single large surface ship. Putin went for another 6 years and something tells me that the “Leader” will be laid no earlier than these 6 years.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 23 March 2018 17: 42
      +1
      there will never be a leader, because he became obsolete 100 years ago with battleships .... how do you criticize Putin, and how many submarines have been laid down and built! Glory to the wise president investing in defense, and not squandering people's money on tuft large NK
  13. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 23 March 2018 18: 18
    +2
    A little about the cost. In 2012, the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) State Defense Order Department, Anatoly Shlemov, said that the repair and modernization of the cruiser would cost 30 billion rubles, and the acquisition of new weapon systems - 20 billion rubles, that is, the total cost of work on Admiral Nakhimov »Will be 50 billion rubles. But you need to understand that these were only preliminary figures.

    1. For an aircraft carrier, 250 billion, it’s also a preliminary cost and it is not known whether it includes an air group and all other weapons.
    2. The main task of a missile destroyer or cruiser can beat the next carrier to a range of missiles without external target designation. At 60 km. Granite needs less than two minutes, and if Fort is used against an aircraft carrier, then less than a minute is enough. In addition to the satellite, you can use an airplane or a drone for tracking and target designation.
    3. Another option - the cruiser with its missiles and radars enhances coastal defense and interacts with fighters from land.
    For all these tasks, a cruiser or missile destroyer is much cheaper than an aircraft carrier with its airplanes and its escort.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 19: 30
      +1
      Quote: Kostadinov
      about the 250 billion aircraft carrier, it’s also a preliminary cost and it’s not known if it includes an air group

      Excluded. ONLY AB
      Quote: Kostadinov
      In addition to the satellite, you can use an airplane or a drone for tracking and target designation.

      Where to get it?
  14. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 18: 19
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Admirals of the USSR do not agree with you.

    There were a lot of admirals in the USSR. Large cruisers and their aircraft carriers were "wanted" by admirals-surface troops. Practice and logic acted weakly on them - I mean that the submarines of the "compensation" AUGs solve much more effectively than surface forces.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    What, even this I have to do for you? If we undertake to count only ships with anti-ship missiles at 500 + km, then we built 7 RKR + equipped with 5 TAVKR and 11 Basalts 949 + 2 submarine projectiles 949.

    What, even this I have to do for you? If we undertake to count only ships with anti-ship missiles at 500 + km, then we built 7 RKR + equipped with 5 TAVKR and 11 Basalts 949 + 2 submarine projectiles 949.

    You don’t have to count for me, since you didn’t do it very well. You somehow forgot to count 9 SSGNs pr. 675MK and one pr. 675MU with Basalts (P-500), 4 boats pr. 675MKV with "Volcanoes" (P-1000), as well as several pieces of the old 675s with P-6, which, despite the planned cancellation, also pulled the strap until the "Yeltsin times". Also, do not forget about 11 submarines, pr. 670 with "Amethysts" (firing range up to 70 km) and 6 submarines, pr. 670M1 with "Malachites" (page range up to 120 km); even though their missiles had a small range by modern standards, but more was not required to work according to the data of their own TsU systems; all of these submarines were withdrawn from combat after 1991, and they went to the military service "graze" aircraft carriers without any glitches. And, finally, the submarine of Project 671 RTMK Schuka and Project 971 Schuka-B with Granat missiles having a firing range of up to 2500 km, which these boats armed from 1983 to 1989, until Gorbachev brought them down restriction agreement
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 March 2018 19: 28
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Practice and logic acted weakly on them - I mean that the submarines of the "compensation" AUGs solve much more effectively than surface forces.

      If you are talking about practice, then I think it will not be difficult for you to list all the numerous cases of AUG tracking by our SSGNs :)))) As for the theory, the 3 generation submarine, with its low-noise speed of less than 10 nodes, cannot accompany AUG in principle. At the same time, it would be nice for you to clarify how many times in a situation close to combat (i.e., in military services) you managed to transfer the command from the Legend to the SSAR.
      And after that - yes, we can talk about the theory of confrontation between SSGNGs and AUGs.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      No need to count for me

      so you would consider yourself :)
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      You somehow forgot to count 9 PLARK pr. 675МК and one pr. 675МУ with Basalts (П-500), 4 boats pr. 675МКВ with Volcanoes (П-1000)

      Like yes, but you wrote
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      see how many boats were built and how many RRC.

      You are now writing not about the built, but about the converted submarines, and this is a little different. It is clear that after the appearance of the P-500, they tried to put it on everything that could carry it away, but there were no such large ships in the surface fleet.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      also a few pieces of old 675's with P-6, which, despite the planned retirement, also pulled the strap until the "Yeltsin era". Also, do not forget about the 11 submarine Ave. 670 with "Amethysts" (firing range up to 70 km) and the 6 submarine Ave. 670М1 with "Malachites" (range p. Up to 120 km);

      Well then add to the surface ships 8 RKR project 1134 and 58, as well as 17 destroyers of the project 956 with "Mosquitoes"
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      And, finally, the submarine of the 671 RTMK "Pike" and the 971 submarine of the "Pike-B" with Granat rockets having a firing range of up to 2500 km,

      What relation do cruise missiles have to our conversation to destroy ground targets that cannot be used on ships?
  15. Palagecha
    Palagecha 23 March 2018 20: 24
    +2
    Please do not write more such sad articles about the fleet ... although I am not a fleet, I really like the fleet ... I started to get depressed because of this, because I understand that during my life I will not see the mighty Russian fleet , plowing the vast expanses of the ocean ... ..Write something funny and funny ... or interesting ... about the Marines ... or how they drink tea on the cream ... And then one frustration, honestly!
  16. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 21: 13
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    If you are talking about practice, then I think it will not be difficult for you to list all the numerous cases of AUG tracking by our SSGNs :)))) As for the theory, the 3 generation submarine, with its low-noise speed of less than 10 nodes, cannot accompany AUG in principle. At the same time, it would be nice for you to clarify how many times in a situation close to combat (i.e., in military services) you managed to transfer the command from the Legend to the SSAR.

    The question is mockingly: "enumerate all the numerous cases." These "cases" are in the archives. There are really a lot of cases. And I do not refer to stories from the Internet. Hundreds of submariners have been awarded and rewarded for completing AUG tracking tasks — far more than submarines. Where did you get the idea that the submarine should monitor the AUG exclusively at a low noise? (The surface forces during tracking are not only noisy, but also “looming.”) Happened and organized races, moreover, the aircraft carrier does not go at its maximum speed, but goes with the speed of the warrant. ICRC "Legend" has proven itself very well, information from her submarines was received on schedule (how many times, you ask? Yes, countless), while information from other reconnaissance systems (optical, launch detection systems) went through Legenda; and nobody canceled the long-distance communication system.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 March 2018 10: 24
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Question sounds mockingly

      But no one bothers to write a no less mocking answer, right? :))))
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      These "cases" are in the archives. There are really a lot of cases.

      I suggested you list them :) "A lot" is not the answer.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Hundreds of submariners have been awarded and rewarded for completing AUG tracking tasks — far more than submarines.

      Refer to a document to make it clear that this is not an allegation
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Where did you get the idea that the submarine should monitor the AUG exclusively at a low noise?

      Yes, it’s not a question, watch out at least on the surface. The only problem is that in the event of a real conflict, such a “tracking” SSBN will crash before it even uses weapons
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      ICRC "Legend" has proven itself very well, information from her submarines received clearly on schedule (how many times, you ask? Yes, countless)

      All clear:)))
  17. The comment was deleted.
  18. Old26
    Old26 23 March 2018 22: 12
    +1
    Andrew! Thanks for the next article in the series. And I have a couple of questions for you. You are going to "Kuznetsov" highlight in a separate article. It is understandable. It’s understandable that it’s taken into account in the cruisers section (it’s still classified heavy aircraft carrier, but nonetheless cruiser. But in relation to the two ships of the project 1144. Do not consider it boring, but I think that the term has been preserved, but is still more suitable for the ships that are in the combat structure of the fleet. And Ushakov and Lazarev were withdrawn from the fleet. Yes, not yet disposed of. But is it correct to consider them preserved ???

    Quote: Aristarkh Ludwigovich
    Our new RTOs (Buyan and Karakurt) are the ships of the arsenal.

    I do not agree. Nevertheless, arsenal ships imply the presence of a very large number of launchers for missiles and missiles. To call ships that have 8 launches as arsenal ships - somehow the language does not turn
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 March 2018 10: 26
      +1
      Quote: Old26
      But with respect to the two ships of the 1144 project. Do not consider it boring, but I think that the term has been preserved, but is still more suitable for ships in the combat structure of the fleet. And Ushakov and Lazarev were withdrawn from the fleet. Yes, not yet disposed of. But is it correct to consider them preserved ???

      Honestly, I thought a lot about it myself. But I decided to take it, since the ships were physically preserved
      1. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 24 March 2018 12: 57
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But I decided to take it, since the ships were physically preserved

        Together with Kutuzov, they will have to take the last battle with a monstrous American military museum group consisting of at least 7 attack aircraft carriers (2 Kittyhawk, Midway, 4 Essex), 7 LC (4 Iowa, 2 SoDak, NorKa), the strongest KRT (Salem , Des Moines class) and many others.

        In short, and here they overlaid. Though cry (((
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 March 2018 13: 07
          +3
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          7 strike aircraft carriers (2 Kittyhawk, Midway, 4 Essex), 7 LC (4 Iowa, 2 SoDak, Norka), the strongest SRT (Salem, Des Moines class) and many others

          In truth, this is the only reason I really want to ever ride in the United States. Climb these giants ... mmmm ..... And I terribly regret that they did not save Oktyabrina or Sevastopol ...
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 24 March 2018 16: 40
            0
            The biggest loss of the museum fleet is the world's first battleship Peter the Great, and it was disposed of in the 50s of the 20th century, outlived all its contemporaries and all who were after it an armadillo, and were not turned into a museum
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 25 March 2018 20: 05
              0
              A purely theoretical machine. I did not participate in any battle. Aurora is even more impressive, they say that a clearly visible dent in its armored cabin is a trace of the shell that wounded the captain under Tsushima.
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 08: 09
                0
                but the oldest
            2. mkpda
              mkpda 26 March 2018 15: 48
              0
              From him there is little that remains after the conversion at the beginning of the last century into a training ship ...
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 28 March 2018 10: 12
                0
                But what do you need for a museum? little was left of the aurora after conversion to a training ship, drowning, dismantling of weapons, or loss of boilers
        2. arturpraetor
          arturpraetor 24 March 2018 13: 14
          +4
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          7 LC (4 Iowa, 2 SoDak, Norka)

          Eight is the only surviving Texas dreadnought in the world. Well, you can still get one of the last surviving armored decks from the bins - Olympia ...
          1. Cherry Nine
            Cherry Nine 24 March 2018 13: 29
            +2
            Quote: arturpraetor
            the only surviving Texas dreadnought

            You are right, forgot about him. But he will greatly slow down the squadron)))
            Quote: arturpraetor
            one of the last surviving armored decks is Olympia.

            So we will reach the sailboats. By the way, in the post-apocalypse just sailboats decide)))
  19. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 22: 25
    +3
    Quote: Palagecha
    You are now writing not about the built, but about the converted submarines, and this is a little different. It is clear that after the appearance of the P-500, they tried to put it on everything that could carry it away, but there were no such large ships in the surface fleet.

    I’m talking about prioritized priorities, which, by the way, didn’t in the late 60s and early 70s, and back in the 50s and since then, in principle, have not changed. And since then more submarine missile cruisers have been built than surface ones. Please note that the cruisers of pr. 58 were initially planned 16, and built 4, project 1134: plan 10 / fact 4, project 1164: plan 10 / fact 3. That is, when they started to evaluate the combat effectiveness of the invested funds it always turned out that the plan large surface ships can be reduced, but for boats - no. As a result, they kept 1-2 cruisers per fleet for "performing representative functions." Otherwise, what kind of fleet without a cruiser? And about TAVKROV and TAKROV I heard only disappointments; basically, of course, this was due to the fact that they left them to serve in non-equipped bases, away from the after-sales service. At the Pacific Fleet they didn’t even have piers for them, as a result, they stood on the roadstead, exhausting teams and knocking out the resource of auxiliary mechanisms; lasted an average of 10 years.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 March 2018 10: 29
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      I’m talking about prioritized priorities, which, by the way, were not set at the end of the 60-s and the beginning of the 70-s, but in the 50-s and since then, in principle, have not changed

      Let's clarify - Nikita Sergeyevich came to the 50 and declared a taboo on large surface ships. Hence the priority of submarines, which has nothing to do with the strategy and tactics of the fleet from the word "in general" - purely political taste. You can’t not know this, respectively, forgive me, I don’t really see the point in the further discussion - why distort so?
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      about is, when they began to evaluate combat effectiveness against invested funds, it always turned out that the plan for large surface ships could be shortened, but for boats - no

      No need to give out fantasies as a historical fact. Well, or refer to a document, work, something else that would confirm that in the cases described by you the series tab was interrupted precisely according to the results of the operation of the first serial ships
  20. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 22: 32
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Well then add to the surface ships 8 RKR project 1134 and 58, as well as 17 destroyers of the project 956 with "Mosquitoes"

    No, I won’t add! Because these are not nuclear ships and cannot accompany the AUG for a long time. How did they do military service, don’t you know? Mostly at anchor points! And if you follow, then give the tanker with fuel oil.
  21. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 23 March 2018 22: 41
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    What relation do cruise missiles have to our conversation to destroy ground targets that cannot be used on ships?

    They have the most direct. The “Pomegranate” could be very accurately displayed on the order, and there, what’s the difference - 200 kt will explode overhead or in a couple of kilometers. And to destroy an aircraft carrier in the database is the best option.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 March 2018 10: 32
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      The “Pomegranate” could be very accurately displayed on the order, and there, what’s the difference - over the head 200 CT will explode or in a couple of kilometers.

      hand face. March to learn materiel!
  22. Comrade
    Comrade 24 March 2018 02: 48
    +4
    Great article, dear Andrey, thanks +!
    Cruisers of the Glory type were built before my eyes, it’s a pity that the Ukrainians once grabbed hold of the Lobova with a stranglehold. Russia offered them a scheme tested on bombers — we are writing off part of the gas debt to you, and you are our cruiser. And they said in response that they would not give up the ship in cash for less than two hundred million dollars. They didn’t agree.
    At the same time, they sold the aircraft carrier by the Chinese for 15 millions, if my memory serves me right. But the ends do not meet, why for the cruiser is so expensive, against the background of an aircraft carrier, they asked?
    We can assume that they were ordered to be intractable in the matter with the cruiser senior merchants ..., sorry, older friends.
  23. Rakovor
    Rakovor 24 March 2018 07: 12
    +5
    What are the carriers in FIG, you guys, come back from heaven to earth. Here, Grena was again postponed to May. Yes, the entire leadership of our military-industrial complex in general, and USC in particular, is praying for Ukraine, and we would have to answer for the miserably failed frigate construction program. What frigates are there, they promised us that the Buyans-M promised to bake like pies. And where are those pies? And this, according to experts, is the best shipbuilding company in Russia. So all of these “Leaders”, “Avalanches” and other “Surfs” are just an empty concussion, the reality is much more severe, even than respected Andrei shows.
  24. MaKeNa
    MaKeNa 24 March 2018 08: 58
    +2
    I’m thinking like a deletant, but what do we especially do in the ocean zone? Capture Guam? Catch American submarines from Greenland or the Caribbean? Well, if something like Syria - we’ll create a strike force! Well, where do we sail on an aircraft carrier? Bomb Britain? We crack it with missiles and from our territory! We must bet on what we can do better! Missiles, submarines, frigates, corvettes and "Bastions" on the shore, and "Daggers" in the air! Let them swim!
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 26 March 2018 10: 31
      +1
      Quote: MaKeNa
      Well, where do we sail on an aircraft carrier? Bomb Britain?

      No. In the Barents Sea to cover our anti-submarine forces holding a barrier on the way to the SSBN positional areas.
      Because from the right flank of this barrier to our nearest airfield - more than five hundred kilometers. And reinforcements from the shore can only admire the sinking wreckage of the ships of the submarine group.
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 12: 18
        0
        But what about coastal Aviation, DAP, tactical nuclear submarines, can they really not protect the SSBN?
  25. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 24 March 2018 09: 40
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    That is why, when our SSBNs are working out preparations for the use of nuclear weapons they very often hear a rumble - the American nuclear submarines open the torpedo tubes covers

    Where did the information come from? From the Internet?
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I'm sure of it. They sit on their tail ...

    Well, confidence is the main argument.
    Quote: Cherry Nine
    The opening of the covers of the shafts can be heard in the same way as the covers of torpedo tubes. Plus characteristic depth and speed.

    As information: the covers of mines with missiles during training alarms never open. Flooding a rocket unnecessarily is an emergency.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 March 2018 10: 34
      +1
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Where did the information come from? From the Internet?

      Yeah. From those who served in the navy.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Well, confidence is the main argument.

      Have you read the articles of Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov?
      From February 11 to August 13 August 2014, the New Hampshire submarine unhindered the entire strategic containment of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 24 March 2018 13: 06
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      the covers of the shafts with missiles never open during training alarms. Flooding a rocket unnecessarily is an emergency.

      OK, I will know.
  26. tchoni
    tchoni 24 March 2018 11: 20
    0
    I have an alternative to these cruisers - an 100-ton ocean-going yacht with a crew of five, an Nlsu shell and four uranium in the stern.
    Banter, of course, in the direction of our oligarchs ....
  27. Old26
    Old26 24 March 2018 13: 28
    +1
    Quote: MaKeNa
    I’m thinking like a deletant, but what do we especially do in the ocean zone? Capture Guam? Catch American submarines from Greenland or the Caribbean?

    Based on this concept, we have nothing to do in the far sea zone. You can get along with ships of the "river-sea" type. And what for all these frigates or destroyers are needed. You are not going to capture anyone? Well then they will begin to capture us. To bite different goodies from the zones of our influence.
    Nothing that the speed and range of weapons of the same enemy is growing? 3-5 years will pass and the armament of the same B-52 may turn out to be X-51 hypersonic missiles with a firing range of 3-4 thousand kilometers? You suggest intercepting them over your own territory or, if necessary, shooting them down in the ocean zone (in which, as you say, we have nothing to do)

    Quote: MaKeNa
    Well, if something like Syria - we’ll create a strike force! Well, where do we sail on an aircraft carrier?

    We were very lucky that we got to Syria - just spit, almost missile boats are enough. And be our ally where far away, in the same South America or Africa? Or to the same Cuba ???
    We will also send our Buyans there with a complete lack of air defense means, restrictions on seaworthiness, autonomy, etc. ?? Or is it better to send an AUG as part of the ships of the ocean zone and an aircraft carrier?

    Or offer to overtake fighter jets for support no matter what in the same Angola across the entire African continent?

    Quote: MaKeNa
    Bomb Britain? We crack it with missiles and from our territory!

    You need to understand that you have not heard of local conflicts, of conflicts in which you have to help your ally on the other side of the globe. For you, there is only one option - to "flip" the same Britain from its territory with nuclear missiles. Global nuclear war, and there can be no other in your opinion. And we won’t get anything in return. How so. This is not by the rules. We can "crack" the enemy with nuclear missiles, but we don’t.

    Quote: MaKeNa
    We must bet on what we can do better! Missiles, submarines, frigates, corvettes

    Yes, we always knew how to build boats. The truth is now we are building for 7-10 years, instead of a year and a half at the adversary. And frigates, too, bake like cakes? How many of them do we have? A dozen and a half, two or three? Or one we still can’t pass ???
    And if necessary, are you going to send corvettes to the same Africa, or to South America ????

    Rockets? Are you going to solve any conflicts with nuclear missiles ?? I'm ashamed to ask how many times have we used nuclear missiles in hostilities? In Egypt, or is there Angola, or in Vietnam?

    Quote: MaKeNa
    and "Bastions" on the shore!

    The “bastions” on the shore are beautiful, spectacular, but never the coastal units can be so flexible as to be compared with the fleet. And not coastal. Well, in the Black Sea, the Bastions can be overtaken from the Novorossiysk region to the Crimea. But how to overtake, for example, the same "Bastions" from Vladivostok to the same Providence Bay, or under Anadyr ??? And the same ocean fleet can meet the enemy at a distance of 2-3 thousand km from its own coast.
    And the Bastions? When an enemy ship approaches a distance of 4-4,5 hundreds of kilometers and previously makes a battery of "Bastions"

    Quote: MaKeNa
    and "Daggers" in the air! Let them swim!

    We have a pathological mania to make a super-wunderwaffe out of everything. ”Even if it’s not or is fake. Did you make a“ wunderwaffe ”from an ordinary subsonic missile, which our enemy has hundreds of times more? Then we made the same“ wunderwaffe ”from a fake TV image , where it was clear that it was linden? Now, "Daggers" What, "Daggers" have shown their effectiveness? Have they already drowned at least one target ???
    Or do you make a conclusion on a three-second take-off and launch movie and further cartoon ???
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 24 March 2018 16: 50
      +1
      Russia has only three allies, the army, aviation and the submarine fleet .... and what kind of allies does the Russian Federation have to shed blood for them? They freed half of Europe, and they poured mud on us, saved the Bulgarians, and they left us. And for Syria and Cuba, three frigates are enough, and the Russian Federation is planning seven new frigates according to the most modest expectations .... and two more TARKs and ABs will be operational until 2040-250. Explicit surplus of surface fleet. And until 2030, there will remain 1155 and 1164
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 25 March 2018 20: 12
        +1
        Already tears flowed .. only the army and navy .. But nothing that this is the first Russian merged all its allies at once and with pleasure? It is clear that no one further seriously wants to subscribe for such partners.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 08: 05
          0
          except Cuba and China, all the allies were just cunning parasites
  28. andy.v.lee
    andy.v.lee 24 March 2018 14: 55
    0
    Until the fascist-oligarchic regime sinks into oblivion, you can forget about the normal construction of the fleet!
  29. Tests
    Tests 25 March 2018 00: 02
    +1
    Dear Andrey! Please do not count Kirov. Evil tongues jerk that he did not roll over just because he is standing exactly on the keel, and Dvina carries the sand every second, washing it more and more. And the moorings on the South Yagra were made in conscience even in Soviet times, and the admiral does not tear the bollards from them ... And when they cut him into needles no one undertakes to predict ...
  30. Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 25 March 2018 05: 41
    +2
    What cruisers are you talking about ??? Ships of this class can only be built and maintained by an economically developed country, such as the USA, or the USSR at one time. Russia cannot build normal destroyers, only ships of the second rank and a cap carriage to each are launched .I recently looked at the thunderstorm of the seas and oceans-Corvette Perfect ...... what perfection is that ??? 1155 and 956 at one time were ships, 1144 was just a beast (more precisely, we called them the bestial grin of socialism). And now, as in the 20-30s of the last century, from chronic lack of money, a destroyed production base, and lack of personnel, we are trying to create a mosquito fleet, which naturally has no analogues in the world. Well, I advise the author to find out the real state of affairs, for example, by the same Lazarev, there’s not even a line at the factory .... there’s simply NOTHING to repair — the sad sight of a rotten ship at the end of the pier . They began to plunder it back in 1992, in the wake of decommissioning the Prudent, Minsk, Novorossiysk ..... And yet, before building the fleet, we need a normal infrastructure, good repair facilities, which, alas, we simply do not have.
  31. Old26
    Old26 25 March 2018 09: 50
    0
    Quote: Dimon19661
    What cruisers are you talking about ??? Ships of this class can only be built and maintained by an economically developed country, such as the USA, or the USSR at one time. Russia cannot build normal destroyers, only ships of the second rank and a cap carriage to each are launched ..

    Well, what about the may not contain you are a little wrong. Contains after all. Yes. The 90s affected ship repair, but cruisers are available in the Russian Navy

    Quote: Dimon19661
    1144-just a beast (more precisely, we called them the bestial grin of socialism) ..

    Actually, Project 1164 ships were called so because of launch containers protruding to the side like teeth
    1. Dimon19661
      Dimon19661 29 March 2018 17: 27
      0
      Yes, no at KTOF it is 1144.
  32. The comment was deleted.
  33. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 25 March 2018 14: 55
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Let's clarify - in the 50s came Nikita Sergeevich and declared a taboo on large surface ships. Hence the priority of submarines, which has nothing to do with the strategy and tactics of the fleet from the word "in general" - purely political taste.

    Khrushchev, although it was all “black and white,” but he didn’t, and he read the analytical notes of the General Staff — they are written for the leadership of the country in a simple, understandable language and at the same time are concise. To continue to build cruisers like 68K (68bis), which were outdated already during the 2nd World War, and even to keep them in available volumes was extremely wasteful. I still managed to catch the old caprels, who blamed Khrushchev for what they had "cut the fleet." But the fleet was needed completely different! Not huge in displacement, but quite different!
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    No need to give out fantasies as a historical fact. Well, or refer to a document, work, something else that would confirm that in the cases described by you the series tab was interrupted precisely according to the results of the operation of the first serial ships

    Andrei, you are somehow strangely leading a discussion. For each objection, ask for a reference, but you yourself almost do not give any links in the article (there is one on S. Vlasov regarding the cost of an aircraft carrier). But you make plenty of statements and conclusions. Is it because there are no links that all your theoretical articles are based on a compilation of notes from the Internet, which many rewrite from each other? And the reason for the interruption of the construction of a series of large surface ships — I have written more than once about this — is not that the ships were bad, but because with the cash available, the efficiency of the boats was much higher.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Have you read the articles of Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov?
    "From February 11 to August 13, 2014, the New Hampshire submarine unhindered the entire strategic containment of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea"

    S.A. Zhandarov is a fan of the creation of the Unified System for Lighting the Situation in the World Ocean (EGSONPO). It is planned to introduce it in the exclusive economic zone of Russia. But how can this system prevent American boats from being at the edge of our territorial waters and record all our "strategists" going out and entering the base? They have a right. Like our submarines at the edge of their guide. But when the boat went into the ocean, try to "hit" it and "open up strategic containment activities!"
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 March 2018 16: 28
      +3
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Continue to build cruisers like the 68K (68bis), which were already obsolete during the 2 World War II.

      ???? There are no words. Generally speaking, the Sverdlovs were at the level of the best artillery 152-mm cruisers in the United States.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Andrei, you are somehow strangely leading a discussion.

      Me? :))) Well, let's see.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      For each objection, ask for a reference, while you yourself almost do not give links in the article

      Everything is very simple. I set forth the generally accepted views on the evolution of the Russian Navy, which are set forth in a huge number of sources, starting with the classic work of Kuzin and the Nikolsky Navy of the USSR 1945-1991. Specifically for this article, A.S. Pavlova "Striking force of the fleet" and "Assassins of aircraft carriers", "Cruisers of the Soviet fleet" A.V. Platonov, something from the Maritime Collection, etc.
      But you criticize the generally accepted views, which I do not see confirmation in the common literature. So I wonder what basis your statements are based on.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      And the reason for the interruption of the construction of a series of large surface ships — I have written more than once about this — is not that the ships were bad, but because with the cash available, the efficiency of the boats was much higher.

      I’ll just remind you that according to the official analysis of the actions of the Russian Navy in the WWII, submarines achieved the Worst results (on a cost / efficiency scale) among other types of forces. The first, by the way, was aviation. See Cousin and Nikolsky on page 8
      As for your words that the effectiveness of submarines is higher ... You see, in the USSR there was one strategic miscalculation. We have if the officer is a submariner, so he is a submariner until retirement, and if he is a submarine, then, accordingly, he serves his whole life on surface ships. At the same time, England, in order to be an admiral in the post-war fleet, it was necessary to serve on surface and submarine ships - this broadened the horizons and gave an understanding of the specifics and capabilities of the surface and submarine fleet.
      Instead, we had a squabble for the honor of the uniform, two poles — roughly speaking, submariners argued that submarines could do anything, submariners — that submarines couldn't do anything, and I clearly see the “underwater” side in your position.
      And the truth is, as always, in the middle.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      But how can this system prevent American boats from being at the edge of our territorial waters and record all our "strategists" going out and entering the base?

      No way. But it can help to ensure that the American "hunters", upon reaching the control of the SSBN, hear the opening covers of our torpedo tubes. OUR Multipurpose Submarines
      1. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 25 March 2018 20: 04
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        There are no words. Generally speaking, the Sverdlovs were at the level of the best 152-mm artillery cruisers in the United States.

        Andrey, this is impossible. You have been told about this many times during the discussion of the Sverdlovs. On May 15, 1952, the best, it’s the worst, it’s the only “normal” American KRL - the CL-83 is an extremely unsuccessful Cleveland type. There were 2 more “abnormal” Worcesters that passed through the category of curiosities, like the current Zumvolt. The rest were written off, even Fargo.
        So, of the artillery ships, the “probable adversary” had only 4 Iowa LCs, 3 Des Moines CRTs, 2 Oregon City CRTs, and 10 Baltimore CRTs, 19 total, on the discussed date. 1-2 for each Sverdlov built. It seems that in the alternative historical part of your review, have you ever drowned Sverdlov Balt with the post-war SLA?
        And so as not to get up twice. The latter, if I do not confuse anything, Sverdlov was enlisted in the fleet on October 6, 1955. Less than a month later, on November 1, the CAG-1 Boston was commissioned.
        1. Cherry Nine
          Cherry Nine 25 March 2018 20: 28
          0
          PS. On October 6, 1955

          This one went into operation.

          Here before this - 6 years.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 March 2018 10: 06
          +1
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          Andrey, this is impossible.

          Incredibly, but it is a fact :)))) And in order not to start Sverdlovoholivar again, I draw attention to what my opponent said
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          Continue to build cruisers like the 68K (68bis), which were already obsolete during the 2 World War II.

          Those. in this case I meant the 152-mm military cruiser
          1. Cherry Nine
            Cherry Nine 26 March 2018 15: 08
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Those. in this case, I meant the 152 mm military-built cruiser

            So they are all together and outdated during the Second World War)))
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 March 2018 15: 12
              +1
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              So they are all together and outdated during the Second World War)))

              Why? For WWII, they were quite decent and coped well with the escort of heavy ships, Yapov destroyers could have nightmares at night ... In the afternoon - not the worst air defense Quite modern battlecruisers for WWII
              1. Cherry Nine
                Cherry Nine 26 March 2018 17: 00
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                For WWII were quite decent

                Ага.
                But just in time for the summer of 45, the Americans came to the conclusion that the MLO does not steer. Need automatic 3 / 50 with radio fuse.

                Another thing is that by the 50s, when the Americans had taught jet bombs to be bombed, there were no differences between Sverdlov’s air defense system and, I don’t know, Jean Bara.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  26 March 2018 18: 36
                  +1
                  Quote: Cherry Nine
                  But just in time for the summer of 45, the Americans came to the conclusion that the MLO does not steer. Need automatic 3 / 50 with radio fuse.

                  Yes, they did not come to this :)))) They were led to this kamikaze :))))) But the kamikaze is a purely Ippon chip, and besides, in truth, the US air defense even dealt with them without 3 / 50, though and with losses
  34. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 25 March 2018 15: 02
    +1
    To all participants in the discussion for detente - a song from Kamchatka submariners (this will not be shown on TV).
    Link to Cloud Mail.ru, as this site does not support MP4 format:
    https://cloud.mail.ru/public/N9P2/X1qs62J4K
    1. Svarog51
      Svarog51 30 March 2018 04: 39
      +1
      Jury hi
      Link to Cloud Mail.ru, as this site does not support MP4 format:

      Such difficulties due to the footage for the song? If it's just a song, then please.
  35. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 25 March 2018 22: 38
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    We have ... two poles - roughly speaking, submariners proved that submarines can do everything, surface submarines - that submarines cannot do anything and in your position I clearly see the "underwater" side.

    Do not guess! I'm just a surface officer. Specialty "missile weapons of surface ships." But in the process of service, which was much more diverse than the specialization given in the school, he had the opportunity to compare. Views on efficiency clearly and unequivocally - somehow even to my regret - have developed in the end in favor of the boats.
  36. Yura Ehlakov
    Yura Ehlakov 25 March 2018 22: 44
    +1
    What are you listening to, he is such an expert, what they report to him, what is what is not. This pi Duke is rubbing your ears and you have dismissed your ears. I served on a quiet project. Our project was 1155 anti-submarine so what. That we didn’t have a fleet, everything is correct, it is out of date, right now it has been updated, and how, but to read this walrus so everything has rotted badly. The people you that aw wake up right now such ships. On x, these coffins are healthy that they switched to smaller maneuverable ones, and what weapons. The smaller the bug, the more painful it bites. I read it so the expert oh who he is a scribbler no more and then somewhere to hear somewhere read well special. These are trying to undermine you and you are being fought. What he wrote is that in 90 we passed the time to return to reality. Be smarter not being fooled.
    1. Yuriy Malyshko
      Yuriy Malyshko 26 March 2018 00: 20
      0
      Yuri, now will be the most interesting: the defeat of the "theoretician." See below.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 March 2018 12: 16
      +1
      Aminazine intravenously and a glass of polonium at night
  37. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 26 March 2018 01: 40
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    ???? There are no words. Generally speaking, the Sverdlovs were at the level of the best artillery 152-mm cruisers in the United States.

    Regarding artillery cruisers, I will refer to you by respected recognized authors. In this case, the labor A.V. Platonov edited by Admiral I. Kasatonov "Cruisers of the Soviet Navy"
    This work did not open anything new for me, I do not regret at all that I have not read it before. My views, which were established about 20 years ago, were simply confirmed. But you are so intrigued ...
    Approximately 25 pages (more than a quarter of the entire work) sets out a deep story about the futile attempts and dreams of Soviet shipbuilders to create in the pre-war period the semblance of foreign cruisers (pr. 69 "Kronstadt", "Petropavlovsk", pr. 82, pr. 66 .. .). And at the same time Platonov writes (p. 16-18): "The main thing is that the tasks that the 69 cruisers set when they were laid down were either far-fetched or impossible in real life". P. 22:"In the late 40s - early 50s, Kuznetsov, intuitively or quite consciously, realized that the cruisers, pr. 82 ... were completely unnecessary"But they (Stalingrad type) were laid down by 3 pcs., They spent a lot of money on a bloodless terrible war of the country. And then Stalin died, and Kuznetsov's sound thought prevailed, - the monsters were dismantled.
    Further, p. 24: "It can be assumed that Stalin nevertheless largely saw in Stalingrad a ship of prestige, a ship for representation and political purposes." That is what I was talking about.
    Next, on 26 pages, there are recollections of light pre-war and post-war cruisers, including the cruisers 68k and 68bis, which are so exciting to us.
    Page fifty: "Despite the difficulties, in 1950 all 5 cruisers of Project 68k became part of the fleet. Naturally, by that time they were significantly outdated ... In general, no cruisers were built at the beginning of the 50s. "But! (P. 50):"To the five cruisers pr. 1950k that went into operation in 68 over the next 5 years, another 14 cruisers of almost the same quality are added"(meaning pr. 68bis). There are still no clear explanations for this phenomenon, which the author of the work, Platonov A.V. pp. 53-54, also states:" After 1955, it was planned to put into operation at least 10 more such hopelessly obsolete ships ... At the time of entry into service, cruisers of the Sverdlov type were not of special value from a military point of view". Etc.
    The 62 page is about modern, i.e. missile cruisers. But we have already expressed our thoughts about them, as it were, and I haven’t met with refutations of Platonov’s views, this is only confirmation.
    Page fifty: "The first missile cruiser, pr. 58 generally turned out to be by accident ... The second PK (pr. 1134) turned out to be random squared"because instead of a zonal air defense system, only self-defense air defense systems were installed on the cruiser. At the same time, both of these cruisers had practically no sonar sound (1134 slightly above zero), that is, they did not see boats.
    From page 67, we are talking about the most modern Soviet cruisers, pr. 1164 and 1144. But even here the author admits that there was no clear "ideology" regarding them: "(p. 72):" ...in 1990, the Soviet Navy had missile cruisers of four projects (58, 1134, 1164, 1144), the latter two, being peers in fact, were armed with 2 different missile systems. this indirectly indicates that we did not have a solid concept for the use of ships of this class, which means that it is difficult to imagine that we knew which cruisers and why we needed".
  38. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 26 March 2018 03: 42
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I set forth the generally accepted views on the evolution of the Russian Navy, which are set forth in a huge number of sources, starting with the classic work of Kuzin and Nikolsky of the USSR Navy 1945-1991. Specifically for this article, A.S. Pavlova "Striking force of the fleet" and "Assassins of aircraft carriers"

    Intrigued by innermost thoughts and previously inaccessible to me, he rushed to search and read the authors whom you named. A.S. Pavlov's "Striking Force of the Fleet" and "Killer Aircraft Carriers" have already read. So what? In Pavlov’s work “Shock Force of the Fleet” on submarine pr. 949 only enthusiastic assessments; nothing new for me, only my conclusions are confirmed. But in “Killer Aircraft Carriers,” which refers to missile cruisers, pr. 1164, there are a lot of critical assessments: regrets about the failed idea of ​​creating a missile cruiser with powerful anti-submarine defense functions (insufficient PLO), Osa air defense systems are weak, air defense systems are not equipped into a single circuit. Or the phrase: “Despite the resounding nickname "Aircraft Carrier Killer", an adversary of the 1164 project is completely undesirable for such an adversary if there isn’t our aircraft carrier cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" with SU-27 on board.", Or "On long hikes and on visits, such a cruiser sometimes replaces a large industrial exhibition. And if a country thinks of its prestige even for this reason only, it is obliged to keep cruisers in its fleet and continuously demonstrate the flag on long trips. "
    I’ll also add from myself that the crew of the cruiser Project 1164 is 4 times larger than the crew of the boat Project 949A, therefore, there’s more senselessness on the surface cruiser at times, ”I was convinced personally. Here, for example, Pavlov writes about S-300F, "The complex is well-developed and reliable, but troubles do happen here too - in the summer of 1990, during the tests of Chervona Ukrainy near Sevastopol, the shooting was an unsuccessful missile.” Although Pavlov wrote his work in 1998, he didn’t know much. For the fleet, the S-300F complex turned out to be a “stranger”, it wasn’t taught anywhere in naval schools, and given the frenzied turnover of personnel, they never had time to master it properly on cruisers. As a result (the witness himself) in Kamchatka in 1993, the same Chervona Ukraine (the future Varyag), in preparation for the shooting by the Fort, invited land anti-aircraft defense officers to study for military training; They taught for a month, but when they left, they did not switch one toggle switch from the "simulator" position to the "combat" position. They went to sea, RTOs launched three target missiles, the cruiser pulled into the white light three of its anti-aircraft missiles, which, naturally, without falling into the capture matrix, self-destructed. What grade should have been put to "Ukraine"? Of course 2. But they put 3. Allegedly, one target was shot down, the second was damaged. And the crew then prepared for another year for another shooting. And such schools on the shooting of surface cruisers were constantly.
    I tried to find on the Internet a biography of A.S. Pavlova, - did not find. He had the impression that he was just a naval enthusiast, drawing his knowledge from open sources. But his books for attracting young men to the fleet will descend.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I’ll just remind you that according to the official analysis of the actions of the Russian Navy in the WWII, submarines achieved the Worst results (on a cost / efficiency scale) among other types of forces. The first, by the way, was aviation. See Cousin and Nikolsky on page 8

    Oh, and V.P. Cousin with V.I. Nikolsky looked. Diligent men, well done! One drawback is that they, mechanics in the main specialty, did not take on their consultants and editors of someone of their persons trained in the operational-tactical line. But the main thing is that you cite as an argument the effectiveness of the actions of the USSR Navy on naval objectives during the Great Patriotic War! You would still remember Tsushima! But even in the years of the Second World War (I am considering p. 8, to which you refer), the effectiveness of submarines was inferior to NK only in sunken warships and auxiliary vessels by 3%, but it was 10 (!) Times ahead in the number of sunk transports, and the number of lost submarines one sunken ship (ship) of the enemy was 4 times less than the number of lost surface ships! But (footnote!) In this case, the concept of "surface ships" is applied by the authors only to torpedo boats, i.e. about large ships, incl. cruisers are out of the question ... And where are the torpedo boats now?
    And what about aviation, we did not seem to compare the effectiveness of submarines and NKs with you? Although the total number of units sunk by aviation (778) indicated by the authors raises serious doubts, did the adversary have so many?
    And, the most interesting, despite the times of the Second World War, see the authors' conclusion, on page 10: "Submarines of the Russian Navy ranked second after aviation in terms of effectiveness." That is, where were surface ships?
    Sorry, but you reminded me of someone’s widow who flogged herself. My advice to you: do not start cancer by the stone, do not distort at the links and do not expect that you will not be checked.
    I continue to read the work of Kuzin and Nikolsky with interest (after all, 653 pages) and until I find in it contradictions with my well-established views.
    I have the honor.
    1. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 26 March 2018 07: 13
      0
      And why do you call your reflections on the texts referred to as “defeat of the“ theoretician ”?
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      sets out a deep story about the futile attempts and dreams of Soviet shipbuilders

      I can agree with such an assessment of the LCR projects of those years, but I did not expect such an attitude to the history of the fleet from the “surface officer”
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      There are still no clear explanations for this phenomenon, which the author of the work, Platonov A.V., also notes. Page 53-54: "After 1955, it was planned to put into operation at least another 10 such hopelessly morally obsolete ships ... At the time of entry into service, Sverdlov-class cruisers were not of special value from a military point of view"

      You see. The quote you cited (I will not delve into the context) demonstrates, so to speak, the author’s poor contact with reality.
      Not obsolete morally in the mid-late 50s were:
      AB type Forrestal / Kitty Hawk
      EM type Charles F Adams.
      SSB types George Washington and Ethen Allen
      MPL types Skipjack and Thresher
      Etc.

      It is obvious enough that at the time of the mass construction of the Sverdlovs there was no alternative to the Sverdlovs or Adams for the USSR. It was "Sverdlov or nothing." And the Sverdlovs’ series is interesting in this aspect. Now, for example, the Russian Navy has clearly chosen the option "nothing."
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 08: 03
        0
        and I chose nothing correctly for large NKs, but there are a lot of coast-based submarines and aviation, I believe that submarines and aviation are not enough
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        26 March 2018 11: 08
        +2
        Quote: Yuri Malyshko
        Yuri, now will be the most interesting: the defeat of the "theoretician"

        (heavy sigh) Do not boast, go to the army, but boast to rati go :))))
        Quote: Yuri Malyshko
        To the five cruisers pr. 1950k that went into operation in 68 over the next 5 years, another 14 cruisers of almost the same quality are added

        So you managed to throw a whole comment links.
        Now stop, exhale, and answer a simple question. You wrote to me
        Quote: Yuri Malyshko
        Continue to build cruisers like the 68K (68bis), which were already obsolete during the 2 World War II.

        To which I answered you
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        ???? There are no words. Generally speaking, the Sverdlovs were at the level of the best artillery 152-mm cruisers in the United States.

        That is, you said that the Sverdlovs are bad even by the standards of WWII, I objected, and now, in confirmation of your words, you have put on a footcloth, the meaning of which is that the Sverdlovs were morally obsolete AFTER WWII? laughing You do not see any gap in logic, eh, Yuri?
        Yuri, you are ... learn to start the basics of the discussion. And do not replace the topic - None of your quotes confirms your idea that the Sverdlovs were outdated by the standards of WWII.
        Deal with it, I hope? Now you have raised a NEW question - how much the construction of the Sverdlovs was justified in the post-war years.
        For this reason, I will not write anything in the comment, but just send you to my own article
        The cruisers of the 68 bis project: the Sverdlov missions in the post-war fleet of the USSR. 3 part
        If you can object to the essence of the argument - you are welcome
        Quote: Yuri Malyshko
        The 62 page is about modern, i.e. missile cruisers. But we have already expressed our thoughts about them, as it were, and I haven’t met with refutations of Platonov’s views, this is only confirmation.

        Which means only one thing - Platonov you, as they say "on the Internet" niasilili. To begin with, Platonov does not say anywhere that the nuclear submarines or diesel-electric submarines could solve the tasks of destroying the ACG better than the RRC, so we can’t find any confirmation of your point of view. This time. Second, Platonov nowhere says that the RKR of the USSR is not needed - he only says that they are not optimal and they should have been somewhat different. This does not confirm your theory. And you obviously could not finish Platonov to the end, where Platonov speaks about the prospects of creating new RRC
        "
        I would like to believe that in doing so we will not go further our national path, in the construction of true cruisers, focused primarily on the fight against an equivalent surface enemy, but we will see in it precisely a universal ship. In this case, it would be good to recall .... I.V. Stalin. He perfectly understood that a cruiser is not only, but maybe not so much a weapon of war as a tool of peace

        In general, about “Yuri the Smasher”, here again you demonstrate problems of a logical nature. The fact that Platonov criticizes the concept of RKR of the USSR does not mean that RKRs are not needed at all (Platonov directly writes the opposite) and even less so that submarines can solve RKR problems better than RKR.
        Below is the answer to your second sheet
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 March 2018 12: 09
          +2
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          In Pavlov’s work “Shock Force of the Fleet” on submarines of 949 Ave., only enthusiastic assessments; nothing new for me, only my conclusions are confirmed.

          Please tell me, does your kettle not confirm your conclusions? Electric stove? Pillow?
          What is interesting about "Fleet Shock Force"? The fact that this is the eulogy of the PLARK, indeed, some enthusiastic assessments. And at the same time, there is NO WORD in the book that the 949A project copes with the tasks of neutralizing ACG better than the surface component.
          We open the Killer aircraft carriers and ... we see the touching touching selectivity of your vision. You quoted
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          Despite the resounding nickname "Aircraft Carrier Killer", an adversary of the 1164 project is completely undesirable for such an adversary if there isn’t our aircraft carrier cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" with SU-27 on board.

          Let's clarify the quote.
          It is required to destroy planes, and before they reach the line of launching their missiles. Fighter can cope with this task most effectively. And at sea it is, of course, an aircraft carrier that can provide air cover for any ship, providing true control over the sea. It would seem that despite the resounding nickname "Aircraft Carrier Killer", an adversary of the 1164 project would be completely undesirable if such an aircraft carrier as the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov with SU-27 on board is not nearby.

          That is, the author has a place to be sorry about the lack of full-fledged aircraft carriers, but not that the submarines can replace the surface fleet!
          And now let's read Pavlov’s phrase, DIRECTLY REFUTING YOUR THEORY
          Undoubtedly, after the Second World War, aircraft carriers became the main force at sea and one of the main means of delivering nuclear weapons, and the fight against them became one of the main problems ... ... With the advent of nuclear submarines seemingly It was solved, but on the other hand, the anti-submarine capabilities of aircraft carriers quickly increased and the problem of obtaining target designation arose. Constant tracking of these ships was required in order to strike at them at the right time.
          It’s most convenient, again, to monitor with the help of aviation, but by then aircraft carriers, as a “weapon of aggression”, already served us as a strong argument in political disputes, so now we were no longer able to build the same ships: politics turned out to be stronger than common sense. It's a pity.

          That is, the author directly says that aircraft carriers were preferable to submarines, but they were not built. And aircraft carriers are a surface fleet.
          In general, Yuri, you, being new to the topic, do not understand one simple thing. Criticism of the RKR boils down to the fact that it was difficult for them to carry out their tasks without air cover, for which aircraft carriers were needed. But it does not follow from this that submarines are capable of solving the tasks of the surface fleet better than the surface fleet. It follows that the fleet needs aircraft carriers :)))))
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          As a result (witness himself) in Kamchatka in 1993 the same "Chervona Ukraine"

          You pay attention to the YEAR. 1993 d. What do you want from the wild 90's? We “Granites” on “Kuznetsovo” were killed because of the unpreparedness of the personnel., So, let's declare 949A too complex and unusable?
          Speaking of 949. Do you know such a concept as KOH? Can you tell me, about the practical officer, why KON PLARK ... as if "a little" not at the level (EMNIP twice lower) MAPL?
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          One drawback is that they, mechanics in the main specialty, did not take on their consultants and editors of someone of their persons trained in the operational-tactical line.

          That is, the Grechko Naval Academy does not provide such knowledge. Oh, how many wonderful discoveries we have ....
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          But the main thing is that you cite as an argument the effectiveness of the actions of the USSR Navy on naval objectives during the Great Patriotic War! You would still remember Tsushima!

          (bending over in half from laughter) That is, in simple words, when you state that Khrushchev has chosen the priority of the submarine fleet on the basis of certain
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          General Staff analytical notes

          ... No I can not. This enchanting ....
          So, we had Khrushchev and he came to power in 1953. The construction of 68 bis was stopped in 1959. The ban on the development of large ships was even earlier. The first nuclear submarine with us entered combat service only in 1961. Accordingly, ANY analytics between these dates will be based on the experience of diesel submarines or on fantasies that nuclear submarines cannot confirm.
          And you want to say that the mythical notes of the General Staff ... relied on the experience of diesel submarines ... but did not take into account the experience of the recently dead WWII? !!!
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          And what about aviation, we did not seem to compare the effectiveness of submarines and NKs with you? Although the total number of units sunk by aviation (778) indicated by the authors raises serious doubts, did the adversary have so many?

          We compared surface and submarine fleets, aircraft carriers, in fact, a component of the surface fleet, and they carry aviation :))) It is clear that we did not have AB in WWII, but the point is that according to the analysis, it’s like the type of submarine troops in WWII were not optimal. That is, military experience did not give priority to submarines, even in communications
          By the way, you again have a funny incident - you doubt the number of "trophies" of aviation, but do not doubt the number of submarine trophies (although in reality they were multiple times lower). This is a gap in logic, and there is a second one - we are now analyzing how the fleet’s data on the best performance of submarines could have had an impact on Khushchev and what matters is not what it really was, but what it was considered in those years.
          The third is also interesting - Khrushchev killed not only NK, but also aviation, despite the fact that according to the analysis ....
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          "The submarines of the Russian Navy ranked 2 in terms of performance after aviation." That is, where were surface ships?

          From which the need for aircraft carriers for the domestic fleet irresistibly followed. Above water, not underwater :)
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          Excuse me, but you reminded me of someone's widow who flogged herself

          This does not bother me. Although it is strange that I served as a catalyst for such strange erotic fantasies.
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          My advice to you

          Yuri, when I need your advice, I will ask you for it. While you are not in that weight category to give me advice, alas.
          1. Yuriy Malyshko
            Yuriy Malyshko 29 March 2018 15: 07
            +1
            Our "expert" from Chelyabinsk did not enter the topic, writing off the obstructed shooting by the Fort cruiser Chervona Ukraine to the "wild 90s:
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            You pay attention to the YEAR. 1993. What do you want from the wild 90s?

            In this case, the "ancient" design jamb stupidly crawled out, which allowed to close the firing chain when something in the system was not in a combat position, and the cruiser’s crew, yes, was guilty, but not absolutely. Nobody has canceled the principle of "protection against a fool" - spit on him, and the number of incidents with equipment (not only military) will increase by a factor. And no 90s on the same day prevented three mrk ("Spill", "Hoarfrost" and "Typhoon") to "perfectly" carry out a missile attack on "Ch. Ukraine", and to "destroy" it, by the way, exactly like the same missiles that were in service with the submarine pr. 670M.
  39. Plombeer
    Plombeer 26 March 2018 07: 59
    +1
    Ships in the holds rot only for 2 reasons: 1 is of course the leakage of fire, fan and water supply systems. 2- this is the main increased humidity, which will increase due to insufficient ventilation. Definitely this is all due to command of the ships. By and large, the sailors of military service only need to serve their term and go home. This rotten command system in the hierarchy of power in the warhead-5 has long been outdated. It is necessary to bring the ships to a full contract staff, where the officers and midshipmen could not force them to fulfill the officers and sailors to fulfill the duties imposed on the officers and midshipmen and not bring the officers and sailors to banal permanent cleaners, when in addition to everything there is constant inspection of the parts of the ship superimposed on foremen and sailors. And also entrusted equipment for constant maintenance. Of course I said here with three boxes. but the one who served it on the ships will fully understand me
  40. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 26 March 2018 11: 03
    +2
    Quote: Cherry Nine
    It is obvious enough that at the time of the mass construction of the Sverdlovs there was no alternative to the Sverdlovs or Adams for the USSR. It was "Sverdlov or nothing." And the Sverdlovs’ series is interesting in this aspect. Now, for example, the Russian Navy has clearly chosen the option "nothing."

    I will explain it in another way. In the early 50s, the experience of the 2nd MV was already generalized in all fleets, when ships like Sverdlov and even more powerful were drowned in large numbers by aircraft and submarines. Therefore, for example, in the United States, large artillery ships ceased to be built at all, the existing ones were mostly mothballed, some were cut, but also mothballed for 15-20 years, almost all were cut; and the freed forces and resources were redirected to R&D in the area of ​​anti-aircraft defense and air defense. So the ships of 68 projects were blindly deaf: they had no sonar and no radar to detect aircraft; but for some reason they installed two five-pipe torpedo tubes, which they then dismantled, since it became clear that they could not find use. Someone writes that in the 68s there was a powerful and thoughtful anti-aircraft artillery system. Full bullshit! Somehow it was possible to shoot only in the daytime. In 1976, in the first year of college, I was in the Mediterranean Sea in practice at the Dzerzhinsky; the commander arranged firing there with anti-aircraft 37-mm twin installations on a meteorological probe. This ball was launched, it was allowed to fly off about 150 meters, and in turn let's shoot with port settings. They shot, incidentally, lying in a drift. Whoever knocks will go on vacation. The first installation fired the allocated ammunition, the ball flies; the second shot - the ball flies, only slowly carried away by the wind, the third ... and so on until the eighth, but the ball flew away. The entire deck is dotted with sleeves. Silent scene. The crew (more than 1000 people) called this ship "prison of peoples" to themselves, since the service was difficult and for many incomprehensible and stupid. But from the shore the cruiser looked, the townsfolk liked. In a word, these ships were suitable only for representative purposes.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 March 2018 12: 53
      +1
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      So the ships of 68's projects were blindly deaf: they had no sonar and radar to detect aircraft

      Hand face. At the time of the commissioning of the Sverdlov cruiser, he had the Rif radar for detecting surface targets and low-flying aircraft, the Gyuis-2 radar for airspace control, the 2 Zalp radar and the Stag-B 2 for fire control the main caliber, the 2 Anchor radar and the Stag-B 6 radar for fire control of anti-aircraft guns, the Zarya radar for torpedo fire control, as well as the identification equipment, including 2 interrogation devices “Torch M3” and as many response devices "Torch-MO". In addition, the cruiser, like Chapaev type ships, was equipped with the Tamir-5N GAS, capable of detecting not only submarines, but also anchor mines.

      In the future, the nomenclature of radar and other target detection systems has expanded considerably: cruisers received more modern radars of general overview of surface and air targets, such as П-8, П-10, П-12, "Kactus", "Kiel", "Klever" and etc. But of particular interest, perhaps, are the means of electronic warfare. The installation of these facilities on cruisers was provided for by the initial project, but by the time they were commissioned, they could not be developed, although space on ships was reserved. The first copy (radar "Coral") passed state tests in 1954, then in 1956 g on "Dzerzhinsky" experienced a more "advanced" model "Crab", but also she did not suit the sailors. Only in 1961, the Krab-11 radar passed state tests and was installed on the Dzerzhinsky cruiser, and some time later 9 cruisers of the 68-bis project received an improved model of the Krab-12. The exact CTR-12 performance characteristics are unknown to the author of this article, but the original model, the Crab, provided protection against the Zarya radar at a distance of 10 km, the Anchor radar - 25 km, and the Zalp radar - 25 km. Apparently, the Crab-12 could well mislead enemy artillery radars at long distances, and one can only regret that cruisers had such opportunities only in 60-s.
      Of no less interest is the Sun-1 heat transfer station (TPS), which is an optoelectronic device designed for covert detection, tracking and identification of bearing targets at night. This station detected the cruiser at a distance of 16 km, the destroyer - 10 km, the accuracy of determining the bearing - 0,2 deg. Of course, the capabilities of the “Sun-1” TPS were much lower than that of the radar stations, but it had a great advantage - unlike the radar, the station did not have active radiation, so it was impossible to detect it during operation.
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Someone writes that the 68's had a powerful and well-thought-out anti-aircraft artillery system. Full bullshit! Somehow it was possible to shoot only in the daytime.

      No comments. By the way, it would be nice at the same time to clarify the readiness of US carrier-based aircraft for night attacks in those years
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      In 1976, in the first year of college, I was in the Mediterranean Sea in practice at Dzerzhinsky; the commander there set up firing with anti-aircraft 37-mm paired installations on a meteorological probe.

      They shot, as I understand it, the same trainees as you.
      1. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 26 March 2018 16: 24
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        They shot, as I understand it, the same trainees as you.

        Suppose, in the 76th year, Exoset could be in place of the probe. A year later - Harpoon. Shoot it down from 37 mm, yes.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        By the way, it would be nice at the same time to clarify the readiness of US carrier-based aircraft for night attacks in those years

        In which years exactly? In the late 30s, when would Sverdlov be nice? In the 52nd, when did the F9 board the decks? Or in the 80s, when Zhdanov Nimitsa with Tomkats and an escort (the first Tika - January 83rd) drove? Well, as I drove, I kept 1200 crew members hostage with a harpoon at my temple, in fact.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 March 2018 17: 34
          +1
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          Suppose, in the 76 year, Exocet could be in place of the probe.

          Cruisers were commissioned in 50's :))))
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          In which years exactly?

          50-e-60-e
          1. Cherry Nine
            Cherry Nine 27 March 2018 04: 11
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            it would be nice at the same time to clarify the readiness of US carrier-based aircraft for night attacks in those years

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            50-e-60-e



            I think it would be presumptuous to rule out night attacks.
  41. acetophenon
    acetophenon 26 March 2018 11: 50
    +1
    Quote: slm976

    An aircraft carrier in itself is far from an aircraft carrier fleet, it’s a large flat high-speed barge,
    ..

    It’s so good that the fools Chinese and Indians have no idea! What to buy from us, we would have built ourselves and did not know sorrow!
  42. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 26 March 2018 18: 31
    0
    Vladimir1155,
    IL 38 engaged in the search for sub, only after the destruction of enemy ships near their native coast
  43. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 27 March 2018 08: 09
    +2
    I will try not to respond to the banter-style noise and only once again draw the attention of the discussion participants to a number of statements by the author of the article, which seem untrue to me. I do not want to make false statements in the future. As an addition to what I have previously stated, today I will take as a basis in the proof of Andrei’s mistakes from Chelyabinsk the work of Kuzin and Nikolsky "The Navy of the USSR 1945-1991" that has become classic, as Andrei says.
    1.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The USSR needed a means of neutralizing the AUG of NATO away from their native shores. Initially, this task was assigned to submarines, but very soon it became clear that they themselves would not solve this problem. The most realistic way - creating your own carrier fleet - was unacceptable to the USSR for a number of reasons, although Russian sailors really wanted aircraft carriers and ultimately the USSR began to build them. Nevertheless, in the late 60s and early 70s one could only dream of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines could not defeat NATO fleets in the ocean independently, and the country's leadership set the task of destroying SSBNs.
    Then it was decided to shift the focus on the creation of new weapons - long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as the space target designation system for them. The carrier of such missiles was to become a new, specialized class of ocean surface strike ship - the missile cruiser.

    My point of view is that there was no “shifting of emphasis” towards the creation of surface cruisers with long-range missiles to combat the AUG in the USSR. We decided to make the fleet more balanced, yes, but the foundation struggle with aircraft carriers, as were SSBNs, they remained so, because the task with the help of submarines was solved more efficiently than with the help of NK. Here's what Kuzin and Nikolsky write on this subject.
    Page 60. "... since the beginning of the 60s in the Soviet Navy, the PLARK began to develop as carriers of anti-ship missiles and aimed primarily at defeating surface ships of a potential enemy. It was the PLARK that became the main component of the anti-aircraft forces of the Soviet Navy. "
    Page 67. "The so-called “anti-avian” task remained the “belly in the eye” of the Navy’s leadership, which was temptingly simple at first glance, the solution of which was “cheap and cheerful” could be assigned to a submarine with anti-ship missiles. ... The design of the new SSGN pr.949, with the same code - "Granite", began at the Central Design Bureau of MT "Rubin" on TTZ issued by the Navy in December 1969.»
    Page 69. "It became clear to many specialists already in the late 70s and early 80s that the SSBN, as a specialized submarine, in the purely military, and in technical aspects, had exhausted itself. Some authorities opposed the development of large-scale construction, pr.949, 949A, proposing to change the whole concept of development of the USSR Navy, but did not want to listen to them. The leadership of the USSR Navy continued to solve the problem of overcoming the ABM-AB carrier system in the traditional way, by increasing the number of SSGNs aimed at each AUG from one to two or three. This bordered on the absurd, because two of these SSBNs cost (even in the USSR where mass construction of atomic submarines was going on) more expensive than, for example, the aircraft carrier pr.11435 Admiral Kuznetsov. In total, it was supposed to build more than 20 submarines pr.949A.»
    He cited the last quote in full so that they would not accuse me of taking something out of context. In the "bottom line" we see that despite the fact that "it became clear to many experts" and "some authorities opposed" The leadership of the USSR Navy continued to solve the problem of overcoming the ABM defense system in the traditional way - by increasing the number of SSGNs aimed at each AUG from one to two to three. That is, the decision was completely different compared to the one Andrei writes about. In a word, as submarines became "the main component in the early 60s, they remained until the end of the USSR. Kuzin and Nikolsky, however, argue that two pr 949A submarines were more expensive than the Kuznetsov. Perhaps. But they forget that Kuznetsov is not an atomic one (only an atomic shepherd can reliably "fall" an atomic carrier), that he needs to add an air wing with other ships and order ships, and at the same time he turns into a target that is constantly visible to the enemy. But two or three if necessary, boats can change each other, and who will replace Kuznetsov? Do you need another one of the same order?
    2.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In general, Yuri, you, being new to the topic, do not understand one simple thing. Criticism of the RKR boils down to the fact that it was difficult for them to carry out their tasks without air cover, for which aircraft carriers were needed. But it does not follow from this that submarines are capable of solving the tasks of the surface fleet better than the surface fleet. It follows that the fleet needs aircraft carriers :)))))

    Yes, I understand everything and not at all against any Wishlist, but there is not enough money for them! See paragraph above.
    3.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Generally speaking, the Sverdlovs were at the level of the best 152-mm artillery cruisers in the United States.

    Here is my statement: To continue in the 50s to build cruisers like 68K (68bis), which were outdated already during the 2nd World War, and even keeping them in available volumes was extremely wasteful.
    And here's what Kuzin and Nikolsky say about 68bis of the project
    Page 109. "Giving a general assessment of the ship, it can be noted that he was not the best representative of his class. In terms of its main characteristics, it was inferior to ships built during WWII. So, surpassing the US Navy Cleveland type cruiser in the maximum firing range of 152 mm guns, the 68bis was 1.5 times worse booked, especially on the deck, which is essential for long-range combat. Our ship could not conduct effective fire from 152 mm guns at extreme distances due to the lack of necessary control systems, and at smaller distances the cruiser of the Kpivland type already had fire superiority (152 mm guns are faster, the number of universal 127 mm guns more - 8 on one side against our 6 guns 100 mm). Deprecated at the beginning of the 50s. the power plant of the 68bis cruiser with low steam parameters and boilers with fan blast in the boiler rooms, led to an increase in displacement by 1.3 times compared with Cleveland (with the same cruising range). A major drawback of the entire domestic medium-caliber artillery was the fact that when separately loading the guns with a caliber of 120 - 180 mm, cartridges without shells were used. This made it possible to shoot, if necessary, with incomplete charges (shooting along the shore or unprotected targets at small and medium distances), increasing the survivability of the guns, but did not make it possible to simplify loading, and, therefore, increase the rate of fire. In addition, the use of cartridges is always safer compared to purely gravel loading. ”
    It turns out that Andrei’s statement is not true and at the level of the best American cruisers of the 2nd MV era, our cruiser 68bis was not. And since the 68K pre-war project was obsolete compared to the 68bis post-war project, it was all the more obsolete in relation to the best cruisers in the world during the 2nd MV.
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk, in response to my remark that the ships of 68 projects were blindly deaf, had no sonar, and radar to detect aircraft, and anti-aircraft artillery somehow could only shoot in the daytime, smartly listed the whole list of electronic equipment known to him. Erudite. But it does not represent a real picture. GAS "Tamir-5N" at the serving l / s caused only a feeling of disgust. All radars (except for the additionally installed modern navigation) were on the antediluvian element base and were constantly out of order, while their range, accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets and the level of coordination with artillery did not allow for accurate fire. According to the radar data, a universal caliber could only put a semblance of obstructive fire to an aircraft. There were no real firing radars of the type “Rangout”, “Pennant”, “Turret”, “Bars” that appeared in the early 60s. The MZA had nothing to do with the radar at all - the submachine guns were guided by the commandants from hand-held unstabilized sighting columns, that is, about firing them There was no talk at night.The reaction of air defense forces and means did not keep pace with high-speed air targets.
  44. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 27 March 2018 08: 10
    +3
    In connection with the above, I would like to know from Andrey from Chelyabinsk what he saw the contradiction (lack of logic) between the two sentences I wrote:
    1) Actually my thought: "Continue to build cruisers like 68K (68bis), which are outdated already during the 2nd World War, and even keeping them in available volumes was extremely wasteful". And 2) a cited quote from the work of Platonov"Despite the difficulties, in 1950 all 5 cruisers of Project 68k became part of the fleet. Naturally, by that time they were significantly outdated".
    Isn’t it logical that the product, similarity which (that is, the project 68k laid down before the war and obsolete during its course) became obsolete in the years of the 2nd MV, is morally obsolete even after the 2nd MV?
    They write to me
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    You put on a footcloth, the meaning of which is that the Sverdlovs were morally obsolete AFTER WWII?
    This is how they attributed to me abracadabra, which I did not say - this is called the “woman’s argument” on the part of the opponent. In general, Andrei’s “woman’s argumentation”, as can be seen from the discussion as a whole, is a favorite trick — he counted 4 more examples of attributing to me what I did not say.
    At the same time several answers to the questions asked
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    That is, the Grechko Naval Academy does not provide such knowledge. Oh, how many wonderful discoveries we have ....
    (This is about operational-tactical training). Yes, graduates of VVMU them. Dzerzhinsky will not continue to study at such specialization at the VMA, they have other directions.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    it would be nice at the same time to clarify the readiness of US carrier-based aircraft for night attacks in those years
    What kind of “those years” are of interest is not clear, but the Americans learned to fly at night from the deck back in WWII; the first thirty-two American aircraft F4U-1 "Corsair" "Chance Vought" were converted into night F4U-2 fighters with weapons from four machine guns, a radar, autopilot and other special equipment. These "Corsairs", mass-produced until 1952, became the first Navy night fighters equipped with radars, and achieved certain military successes when operating from aircraft carriers and coastal bases. http://pro-samolet.ru/samolet-usa/63-istrebiteli/
    413-istrebitel-usa-ch And when I was at Dzerzhinsky, the Yankees flew at night like during the day.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Can you tell me, about the practical officer, why KON PLARK ... as if "a little" not at the level (EMNIP twice lower) MAPL?
    Forced to answer the question with a question, - And where did you get secret information?
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    What do you want from the wild 90s?
    I do not want anything. Because with my participation the prepared target missiles flew in the same case with the Fort shooting, as expected, it is only a pity that the missiles flew in vain, and we sweated in vain. The cruising organization, according to my observations, has always been equally aimed at team termination, hence the “funny” stories from the 90s to the 90s.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Please tell me, does your kettle not confirm your conclusions? Electric stove? Pillow?
    The teapot whistles only confirms its boiling. I have a gas stove. And the pillow, when the dream comes, resets all conclusions.
    Such a "footcloth" or "sheet" turned out - this is what the expert from Chelyabinsk says about my objections, although he calls his opuses a very literary term - "articles"; he himself, as a credible source, refers to them and invites me to study them.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 March 2018 10: 36
      +1
      Poor owl laughing She is so uncomfortable on the globe :)
      [quote = Yuri Malyshko] from the beginning of the 60-ies in the USSR Navy PLARK began to develop as carriers of anti-ship missiles and aimed primarily at defeating surface ships of a potential enemy. It was the SSBNs that became the main component of the anti-aircraft forces of the Navy of the USSR [/ quote]
      First, yes. But then
      [quote = Yuri Malyshko] Belm in the eye of the "leadership of the Navy remained the so-called" anti-avian "task, alluringly uncomplicated, at first sight, the solution of which is "cheap and cheerful" could be assigned to SSBN [/ quote]
      That is, “cheap and cheerful” turned ONLY at first glance.
      [quote = Yuri Malyshko] “It became clear to many specialists already at the end of the 70-x beginning of the 80-x that the SSGN, as a specialized submarine, in purely military, and in technical aspects, has exhausted itself. Some authorities opposed the development of large-scale construction of 949, 949A pr., Proposing to change the whole concept of development of the USSR Navy, but did not want to listen to them. The leadership of the USSR Navy continued to solve the problem of overcoming the ABM defense system in the traditional way, by increasing the number of SSGNs aimed at each AUG from one to two or three. [/ Quote]
      What do we see from this quote? That the anti-aircraft mission of the SSGNs was not solved, but they continued to be built by decision of the leadership.
      Well, where can you find the priority of the SSGN over the surface fleet?
      [quote = Yuri Malyshko] That is, the decision was completely different compared to the one about which Andrei writes. [/ quote]
      In what sense is it different? We seem to be discussing your thesis that the submarine fleet is our everything, and is capable of destroying the AUG better than the surface. I don’t see confirmation of this thesis.
      Yuri You are hiding now for the decisions of the leadership of the USSR. OK, but then be consistent - the Soviet leadership eventually decided to build a fully-fledged carrier fleet. And yes, you quote from Cousin only those fragments that are convenient for you.
      [quote] In order to comprehensively justify the development of ships with aircraft weapons
      in the Navy of the USSR in the 60-ies was launched a comprehensive research work
      "Order" dedicated to the indicated problem. In this work involved research
      institutes and design bureaus of the Navy, Air Force, shipbuilding, aviation and others
      defense industries. Thus, a scientifically sound
      and, most importantly, a collective point of view on the problem. The most general findings of this work,
      completed by 1972, boiled down to the following:
      • Aviation support of the Navy is a paramount, urgent task, since it affects the development of naval strategic nuclear forces; without air cover in the conditions of domination of a probable enemy by anti-submarine aviation, we will not be able to provide not only combat stability, but also the deployment of our submarines, both with ballistic missiles and multi-purpose ones, which are the main striking force of the Navy (The ardent apologist of the "submarine war", Grand Admiral K. Denitz, the main cause of failure
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 March 2018 10: 38
        +1
        in the Second World War, the German submarine fleet considered "its insecurity by air cover, reconnaissance, target designation, etc.");
        • successful coastal missile, reconnaissance and anti-submarine aviation, the second most important strike component of the Navy, is impossible without fighter cover;
        • without fighter cover, more or less acceptable combat stability of surface ships is impossible. [/ Quote]
        That is, in simple Russian words, without a surface fleet, a submarine fleet is unable to realize its potential; accordingly, a submarine fleet cannot replace a surface fleet.
        Moreover. In terms of comparative combat effectiveness, Kuzin and Nikolsky DIRECTLY write
        In other words (more specifically and definitely) could be summarized as follows: [quote] "The construction of a fleet not covered by an aviation, primarily fighter," umbrella "is a waste of public money." Unfortunately, in that context this did not sound then. And moreover, again no one dared to directly declare that not ship
        aviation guards the fleet, and the fleet guards the carrier of this aviation, which solves all the problems
        fleet or most of them
        . [/ Quote]
        [quote = Yuri Malyshko] But they forget that the "Kuznetsov" is not atomic (only the atomic "shepherd" can reliably "graze" an atomic carrier), [/ quote]
        Atomic AB - they cannot, AUG - easily (in it, in fact, atomic only AB)
        [quote = Yuri Malyshko] Yes, I understand everything and not at all against any Wishlist, but there is not enough money for them! [/ quote]
        In the USSR, the construction of atomic aircraft carriers began.
        [quote = Yuri Malyshko] Here is my statement: To continue in the 50 years to build cruisers like the 68K (68bis), which were outdated already during the 2 World War, and even to keep them in available volumes was extremely wasteful [/ quote]
        You made the statement, you could not prove it, is there any point in arguing about this further?
        [quote = Yuri Malyshko] Giving a general assessment of the ship, it can be noted that he was not the best representative of his class. According to its main characteristics, it was inferior to ships built during WWII. So, surpassing the US Navy Cleveland light cruiser in the ultimate firing range of 152-mm guns, the 68bis was booked 1.5 times worse, especially on deck [/ quote]
        And again, you demonstrate complete ignorance of the subject, which you undertake to discuss.
        The fact is that the Sverdlov was armored no worse, but better than Cleveland. But Nikolsky and Kuzin could not know about this, because they used the directories that were in use at the time of writing the book. There, the Americans greatly overestimated, embellished the performance characteristics of their cruisers. This did not apply only to cruisers - for example, the same Iowa have long been credited with as many 406 mm armored belts. At the same time, today the USA no longer conceals the real performance characteristics of its ships, so a person who is interested in the topic may well find all this.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 March 2018 10: 39
          +1
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          Our ship could not conduct effective fire from 152-mm guns at extreme distances due to the lack of necessary control systems, and at smaller distances the cruiser of the Kpivland type already had fire superiority

          The Sverdlovs worked perfectly at night, not observing the target, (only on the radar) by the artillery of the GK at a distance of over 110 KB. Cleveland with his guns on 100 KBT could get somewhere by any chance.
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          All radars (except for additionally installed modern navigation) were on the antediluvian element base and were constantly out of order, while their range, accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets and the level of coordination with artillery did not allow for accurate fire.

          Will you be very offended if I say that your words are a lie, from the first to the last word?
          How effective was the domestic radar weapons? In this regard, the shots that took place on 28 in October of 1958, in which the Kuybyshev and Frunze cruisers took part, are very indicative. The shooting was carried out at night and exclusively according to the radar, the shield towed the destroyer of the project “Exuberant” 30-bis, which was completely shaded so that the cruisers could not use optics to observe the towing vehicle.
          Going at speeds above 28, the cruiser’s bonds detected the target from a distance of 190 kb and formed the combat course, and when the distance was reduced to xnumx kb, they began to fire. The Kuybyshev launched two sighting volleys, waited for the shells to fall, fired another third sighting volley, and then both cruisers opened fire to kill. The shooting continued for 131 minutes (unfortunately, it is unclear at the source whether the 3 lasted a minute to kill or all shooting, including sighting) and ended when the target shield was separated from the 3 kbt cruisers. The target hit 117 projectile, including two in the cloth and one - in the body of the shield. The command rated the shooting as “excellent”, and we have no reason to lower the estimate obtained by the cruisers - for such distances and relatively light 3-mm guns, this is really a brilliant result.
          This is not about the Sverdlovs, but about the Chapaevs.
          Quote: Yuri Malyshko
          . GAS "Tamir-5Н" at the serving l / s caused only a feeling of disgust

          :))))) Of course, the equipment of the USSR of the 50's can hardly be called "having no equivalent in the world." But this is bad luck - in the context of our dispute, it does not matter, because the submarines in those years in terms of equipment were absolutely at the same level.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 March 2018 11: 38
            +1
            Quote: Yuri Malyshko
            This is how they attributed to me abracadabra, which I did not say - this is called the "woman's argument"

            This is called juggling - now, when you were given a source, you managed to give an erroneous, but still an argument in defense of your point of view - that the Sverdlovs were worse than WWII cruisers. Prior to this, all your evidence came down to the fact that the Sverdlovs are morally obsolete after WWII :))) And if you are really an officer (I quickly lose faith in this) then you could if you did not admit your obvious wrong. Well, or at least keep silent.
            Quote: Yuri Malyshko
            What kind of "those years" are of interest is not clear, but the Americans learned to fly at night from the deck back in WWII

            Yuri, are you with a story at all? Do you know such a word? Please study at your leisure what happened when, in 1944, the Americans raised their aircraft in the evening in order to strike at Ozawa's retreating formation. And they were forced to sit at dusk. Eighty planes, Carl! Eighty!
            Quote: Yuri Malyshko
            And when I was at Dzerzhinsky, the Yankees flew at night like during the day.

            This is understandable, but it is also clear that in the 76 air defense the 68 bis did not meet the level of threat. Nevertheless, some of the tasks these ships could solve even then
            Quote: Yuri Malyshko
            Forced to answer the question with a question, - And where did you get secret information?

            Yes you are a Jew! laughing ok, you got me through, let me introduce myself: Bond, James, Bond :)))))) Actually - 3 source. Opinions of submarine officers - once, there are two reports from open sources on the number of nuclear submarine combat services, and somewhere I had a link to a calculated KOH, but I won’t find it right away.
            so comment on this fact, or how? And then, you know, when you start talking with a submariner, nobody really praises 949A's capabilities, here 971 is a thing, but 949А ...
            Quote: Yuri Malyshko
            The teapot whistles only confirms its boiling. I have a gas stove. And the pillow, when the dream comes, resets all conclusions.

            Exactly. A monograph about 949A "confirms" your theory exactly as much
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 27 March 2018 13: 19
              0
              do not swear, what difference was the Sverdlov project worse or better, if it is obvious that large NKs were out of date in 1903, the same applies to 1164, 1144 and all Leaders of any meaningless, that’s how much the general staff’s mistakes are
  45. Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 28 March 2018 15: 23
    +3
    Our main theorist was completely upset. In yesterday’s comments addressed to me, using the usual “woman’s argument”, he wrote down on me 5 trivial quotes from the context and some thesis,
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    We seem to be discussing your thesis that the submarine fleet is our everything

    which, again, has nothing to do with me.
    And finally, the “expert” criticized the capabilities of the cruiser 68 bis for firing at aircraft at night (that is, with 100 and 37 mm calibers) for some reason cited as an example a refutation of night shooting of the main 152 mm caliber cruisers at sea targets, - Well, completely upset.
    I believe that this can put an end to the defeat of this article by the “theoretician”, as well as his conclusions on the 68 cruisers, and consider the bis project complete.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 March 2018 16: 27
      +2
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Our main theorist was completely upset.

      Of course. Spending so much time on all sorts of “daughters of an officer”
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      wrote down on me 5 torn from the context of other people's quotes

      :) You quoted them, you are responsible for them :)
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      We seem to be discussing your thesis that the submarine fleet is our everything

      which, again, has nothing to do with me.

      So wonderful, nice, that the discussion was fruitful and you admitted defeat
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      And finally, the “expert” criticized the capabilities of the cruiser 68 bis for firing at aircraft at night (that is, with 100 and 37 mm calibers) for some reason cited as an example a refutation of night shooting of the main 152 mm caliber cruisers at sea targets, - Well, completely upset.

      Actually, this led you to refute your nonsense that the Sverdlovs radar did not provide control of artillery weapons :))) Specifically, this
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      All radars (except for additionally installed modern navigation) were on the antediluvian element base and were constantly out of order, while their range, accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets and the level of coordination with artillery did not allow for accurate fire

      However, as I am once again convinced, the “daughters of officers” are not responsible for their words
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      I believe that this can put an end to the defeat of this article by the “theoretician”, as well as his conclusions on the 68 cruisers, and consider the bis project complete.

      Yeah :) And let the readers judge who defeated whom :)
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 28 March 2018 19: 03
        +1
        the opinion of an objective and extraneous reader ..... with all due respect to you, Andrey, the arguments, Yuri were more convincing, he defeated you
        1. arturpraetor
          arturpraetor 28 March 2018 19: 11
          +1
          Quote: vladimir1155
          opinion of an objective and outsider

          There is definitely no outsider - yes, objective. We are all subjectivists.
          Quote: vladimir1155
          arguments, Yuri was more convincing, he defeated you

          As for me - just not. Yuri has his own point of view, but he failed to “defeat” Andrey.
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 28 March 2018 22: 14
            0
            Well, this is your purely subjective opinion, I did not get involved in their dispute, then I am objective, my concepts are based on irrefutable facts, and not on emotions ...... I think Yuri is the winner, he defeated Andrey as a British great armada, like the Japanese Pearl Harbor and Tsushima, as the Americans of Yamato, as the British of Bismarck, as Marinesko Guslova ... and they all confirm the uselessness of large NK
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 28 March 2018 22: 14
              0
              like Peter Shvedov under Gangut
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          28 March 2018 20: 39
          +3
          Quote: vladimir1155
          with all due respect in you, Andrey, the arguments, Yuri were more convincing, he defeated you

          Are you sure that you made such a judgment based on the results of our discussion, and not because you share the position of Yuri? :))))))) I read your
          Quote: vladimir1155
          if it’s obvious that large NKs are out of date in 1903,

          That is, if the priority of the submarine fleet over the surface one before the Russo-Japanese War (!!!) is obvious to you, then ... are you sure that you are expressing yourself as an arbiter
          Quote: vladimir1155
          opinion of an objective and outsider
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 28 March 2018 22: 07
            0
            more precisely, I didn’t mean the priority of the submarine fleet of the Russian-Japanese war, but the obsolescence of the concept of large NKs, and I don’t refuse words, Tsushima showed the effectiveness of destroyers (torpedo boats, but according to the modern day these are missile boats, not even RTOs), over time the submarines took the niche of effective naval weapons, but the obsolescence of the concept of large NKs has not disappeared, the great armada of Spaniards confirms this concept, it was confirmed by both world wars, Tsushima, Gangut
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              29 March 2018 00: 39
              +3
              Quote: vladimir1155
              more precisely, I didn’t mean the priority of the submarine fleet of the Russian-Japanese war, but the obsolescence of the concept of large NKs, and I don’t refuse words,

              I have no more questions :)))
  46. Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 30 March 2018 13: 38
    +1
    After reading carefully all the comments, I was once again convinced that people who never had anything to do with the army and the Navy had no rule over this site.
  47. Newone
    Newone 30 March 2018 20: 21
    +2
    I would be interested to read the author’s article, where he describes his concept for the development of the Navy. Without this, talk of a "dying" fleet is meaningless. The technological progress and development of weapons systems makes many types of ships obsolete. As an example, battleships.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 March 2018 20: 33
      +1
      Thinking of ending her cycle
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 30 March 2018 23: 59
        +1
        Dear Andrei, Boris’s idea is very fruitful, it would be logical to end your extremely interesting cycle with development prospects, as you can see, it’s bad to give up an unfinished business, be offended by a reasoned dispute, never give up. The Navy's prospects are anti-submarine aircraft, coastal vehicles, drones of all species, underwater tracking systems, minefields and .... Submarines of course, about them you already wrote very intelligibly!
  48. Nemchinov Vl
    Nemchinov Vl April 13 2018 16: 43
    0
    For some reason, it seems to me that most of the problems regarding the construction of new cruiser-class ships (BOD or EM, if you like, and then also TFR / frigates), in the Russian Federation due to the lack of its own powerful offshore gas turbine motor industry. This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that either due to "great love for their diamonds' interests" or insanity (both by the USC and the Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the Navy), from 2013-2014, all the problems of creating (constructing) a gas turbine were one single enterprise - UEC NPO Saturn, instead of starting at that (key !!!) moment, on the basis of enterprises having experience in repairing gas turbine engines (and here could / could still be such enterprises as; and Kronstadt Marine Plant JSC, Metalist-Samara or Dieselzipservice). That is, it was necessary, since 2014 (and it was simply necessary), on the basis of several enterprises (AT LEAST three !!!) to build YOUR necessary gas competition between them and their design bureaus, to build YOUR marine gas turbine MOTORCONSTRUCTION. For these (unfortunately already lost) so far 4 years (it will become longer if USC and UEC continue to try to put everything on one Saturn), it was possible to arrange the production of the most complete line (in terms of power indicators) of analogues of such popular engines as DT -59, M8-KF, DK-59, DS71, or D063 / M-63, DS77, D-090, which are so necessary now for modern shipbuilding. It was only necessary to determine the tasks in time, i.e. to ask each of these three repair enterprises three types of gas turbine engines, the analogues of which, these enterprises would have to learn to produce in series and supply to shipbuilders in the shortest time (2-3 years). If there was such an engine-building production at the facilities of 3-4 enterprises at once, it would already be possible now, having processed minimally the most successful ship designs for placing modern weapon systems on them.
    For example, from BOD 1134 BF (of the Azov type) with minimal project revision and replacing the Rastrub-B strike complex with 24-32 cells of the UKSK 3s-14 UVP (for Caliber / Onyx), medium-range air defense systems Shtorm- N "on the modern" Calm-1 "(or" Hurricane-Tornado) and the Fort-M guidance radar (90 degrees) and use the principles of the Barrier radar (360 degrees) would receive a zonal air defense / missile cruiser.
    On the project 1155, on the site of the second tower art. The installation suggests 16 3 VPU 14s-36 UKKS for the Caliber / Onyx, and at the place of the aft dagger, about 1 VPU Shtil-XNUMX, etc.
    That is, if there was today its own gas turbine engine building, the issue of updating ships of different classes would not have stood in principle.
    And at present, it would be quite possible not only to complete the 22350 series of frigates, but to actually develop 22350m. Serially build the EM 21956 or the cruiser 1134-BF at the shipyard in Kaliningrad, and the frigates 11356 R / M and the updated 1155.1 at the “Bay” in Kerch ... etc.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 April 14 2018 08: 55
      0
      I’ll say as a turbinist, repair is not a production, for example, austenite blades, you can do it at a special enterprise, and not at a repair shop, I generally agree that the problem of gas turbine engine is contrived, it’s not a technical but a bureaucratic problem, thick-shouldered “managers” are sitting and progress rests on them, at one or another production facility, if steam turbines are successfully made, then why can't gas be made? higher temperatures, but not significantly, not fundamentally, especially for marine technology dustiness of air is not relevant, a gas turbine compressor is certainly a more difficult task, but it is solved in aviation, and the Russian Federation has had these technologies for a very long time about competition, why do plants compete? do design bureaus and there are several of them in Russia, let them compete in projects
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