Military Review

Key to the Straits. H. 1

56
The need to seize the Dardanelles in the event of confrontation with the Ottoman Empire was recognized by the command of the Entente from the very beginning of the First World War. The operation in the Straits allowed the Ottoman Empire to be put out of the game - and in fact it was the most promising strategic operation during the 1914 - 1918 war.


But the operation could only be realized if there was complete strategic and operational surprise, as well as competent leadership of the actions of the allied forces. However, force the Dardanelles by forces of one fleet (as originally planned) it turned out to be impossible and it was subsequently necessary to carry out a combined land-sea operation, the success of which was possible only with careful interaction between the fleet and the landing force, skillful leadership of the command in an environment of increased complexity.

Dardanelles-Gallipoli Entente operation 19 February 1915 - 9 January 1916 was closely connected with the Bulgarian-Greek issue and the final success of this most important strategic operation of the First World War depended on the outcome of the struggle for the position of Bulgaria and Greece.

Thus, already in preparation for the operation, the Supreme Military Council of Great Britain decided to disembark (together with the French) troops and create bases on the Greek islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Lemnos. Equally important was attached to the position of the most powerful Balkan state bordering on Turkey - Bulgaria. It was precisely the influence of the regional Balkan powers that was of decisive importance for resolving the issue of nationality of the key geo-strategic point of Eurasia - the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Greece and its role in the diplomatic training of the Dardanelles operation.

The position of Greece largely pushed the British command to organize the Dardanelles operation. Greece provided allied forces with island infrastructure during the operation. At the same time, the position of Bulgaria significantly influenced the timing and parameters of the implementation of the operation.

Ideally, the allies tried to win over both Balkan states to their side.

But without a settlement of the Serbian - Bulgarian - Greek conflict arising from the outcome of the Balkan wars, this was unlikely. Attempts to overcome the last diplomats of the Entente were undertaken both on the threshold and during the Dardanelles operation.

During the preparation of the operation, British Foreign Secretary E. Gray 23. 01. 1915 offered Greece (in exchange for active assistance to Serbia, the Allied Entente) territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor. At the same time, Bulgaria was assured that if the claims of Serbia and Greece were satisfied, then the Bulgarians would receive compensation - in Macedonia.



Greek Prime Minister E. Venizelos called the proposals "ridiculous", and in the memorandums of 24 and 30 in January 1915 to King Constantine insisted on the immediate entry of Greece into world war: the ideal goal was to create a neo-Byzantine empire. The capital of the empire - Constantinople - became a stumbling block for England, France, Russia and Greece.

British diplomacy D. Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, even during the war, was directed against their allies - France (indirectly) and Russia (directly). But, since the acute inter-allied conflict was fraught with the victory of the German bloc, they tried to avoid it - the British tried to use the interests of the Balkan countries as a “bargaining chip”.

Key to the Straits. H. 1

First Lord Admiralty Winston Churchill and First Sea Lord D. Fisher.

In fact, this was the first inter-allied conflict that emerged during the First World War - and it concerned the solution of the question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Its essence was whether the Straits and Constantinople would “internationalize” or they would go (along with the interests of France and England) under the power of Russia.


D.Lloyd George

In addition to the conflict between France and England with Russia, there was also a conflict between France and England - it was highlighted brightly after the victory over "German militarism" and was an echo of the previous historical competition between these powers in Europe and the world.

It should be said that if French diplomats in Constantinople (to a lesser extent) and in the Balkans (to a greater extent) got used to focus on Russian policy quite a long time ago, then for British diplomats, for whom the fact of Russian-English rapprochement was unusual, it was natural to preserve their own As a rule, anti-Russian contacts with the Balkan states.

Yes, and the weight of the Entente powers in different Balkan countries was not the same. Of the 3 historical patron powers of Greece - France, England and Russia - 2 was the first, despite the fact that they objectively played less than Russia in the role of Greece achieving independence, but for various reasons, they had a dominant position in Greece. France was interested in Serbia only in terms of loans and arms orders, while England was even less interested in Serbia. Bulgaria from 80-90's XIX century. became a field of struggle for both Austrian and Russian, as well as English and Russian influence - this country, according to European politicians, was assigned the leading role on the peninsula.

And the heterogeneity, if not the hostility of Russian and English politics, manifested itself in Greece and Bulgaria (Serbia had already participated in the war) - which was very out of place on the eve of the fateful Dardanelles operation. Both Russia and England understood the importance of the Balkan theater, considering the most desirable restoration of the Balkan union. But the latter should have been directed (above all) against Austria (Russia's point of view) and against Austria, Germany and Turkey (in the long run and against Russia) (England's point of view). Competing among themselves, the Entente powers lost (primarily in Bulgaria) a significant share of their influence, yielding to the positions of Germany and Austria.

Another aspect that predetermined the dull struggle of England and Russia (with France on the side of England) was the question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire and Constantinople.



Constantinople France was interested more than the Straits. She was interested not so much in the problem of the Straits in the narrow sense of the word (i.e., the right of Russia to carry out trials through the Straits without obstacles), as in the question of the defense of Constantinople (in which serious French interests were present) from both English and Russian domination.

England, on the contrary, could be more indifferent to Constantinople than to the Straits - although the question of the Straits did not belong to the number of "primary" affecting its interests, but this did not mean that she, as the mistress of the seas and the colonial dominion of that time, was ready to contemplate accession in the Straits of Russia, which received the possibility of a free exit of its fleet from the Black Sea.

According to the British, the role of a hostile to Russia "gatekeeper of the Black Sea" instead of a decaying Turkey, was best suited by the Bulgarians - the strongest, most energetic and viable nation of the Balkan Peninsula.

But the unrestrained policy of the government of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria laid upon Bulgaria the responsibility for the inter-allied Second Balkan War, and this spread the attention of British politicians between Greece and Bulgaria - especially since Greece was also a maritime power of the eastern Mediterranean, especially useful during the Dardanelles operation.

Therefore, Greece, which had a fleet and dreamed of capturing the Gallipoli peninsula, and Bulgaria, which had the strongest army in the Balkans, were desirable allies of the Entente.

Russian diplomacy believed that the assistance of Bulgaria, regardless of the outcome of the war, could be ensured by transferring the Macedonian territories to Ishtib and Kochan (to Varadar) to this state, and in the event of a victorious war Bulgaria receives the so-called disputed territory provided for by the Serbo secret application - the Bulgarian Treaty of February 2 29 - from the top of the Golem, north of the Curved Palanca, to the Ohrid Lake (with the inclusion of the Struga).

Serbia had to guarantee these provisions.

But the Greeks and Serbs opposed the territorial concessions to Bulgaria.

As early as September 1, Serbian Prime Minister N. Pasic categorically refused any concessions, until the Entente powers guaranteed Serbia "Serbian-Croatian lands with an adjacent coast", which at this stage of the war was obviously impossible, both on the basis of the current situation on the fronts, and because of the danger of alienating Italy from the Entente by providing Fiume and Dalmatia with Serbia.


Nikola Pasic

The British Foreign Ministry believed that the Entente powers should limit themselves only to an indication of the desirability of compensation in favor of Bulgaria, leaving the Balkan states themselves, mutual negotiations, to determine their size. It is obvious that it was impossible to count on voluntary concessions from Serbia. In relation to Greece, E. Gray declared guarantees against the attack on her by Bulgaria, not realizing that the Greek government, reassured by such assurances, did not even want to make concessions to Bulgaria.

Thus, according to S.D. Sazonov, England was largely responsible for such an outcome of the negotiations - having a war against Germany and Austria, it is impossible not to strive to avoid a clash with Turkey and Bulgaria due to the recklessness of Greece, relying on the connivance of the British .

Such a situation arose on the eve of the storming of the Straits - the Allies could not even diplomatically prepare this operation.

About how the political situation was seen in the event of the beginning of the Dardanelles storming is shown by four views of W. Churchill, which he took into account when preparing the operation:

1) the appearance of the English fleet before Constantinople should have caused a rebellion of the Greek and Armenian population of Turkey and a movement among the Muslims themselves against the Young Turk government;

2) begins the "inevitable" movement of the Bulgarians to Adrianople;

3) Russia would consider itself forced, no matter how difficult the situation on the Austro-German front would be, to take part in placing a cross over the temple of St. Sophia — that is, would help England complete the task of seizing the Straits and Constantinople (at the same time not having enough strength to take the dominant position here);

4) in the event of the fall of the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, Greece joins the Entente, handing over its armed forces to the British.

Of course, to a large extent this was not a political calculation, but the dreams of British politics about the ideal development of the situation.

The last premise contains the key to understanding the essence of the Dardanelles operation in its early phase. British troops, used as a landing force, were to have a "moral effect" on Greece and involve it in the operation.

It was the acquisition of such a profitable geopolitical ally as Greece was the most important goal of the operation in the Dardanelles for the British.

Thus, initially the essence of the Dardanelles operation was conceived in the capture of Greece (with the support of England) by the Straits and Constantinople (with the internationalization of the latter), while England, by demonstrating and supporting the Greeks in the Straits, gained control over the oil regions of the Middle East.

In fact, the Dardanelles operation was carried out against Russia - more precisely, against the establishment of its dominion in the Straits.

This explains the sudden change in the mood of E. Venizelos, when he already 24 January 1915 passionately argued to the king that Greece should immediately take part in the war and not only give up, for the sake of bringing to the cause of Bulgaria, from opposing the Serbian concessions in Macedonia, but and most voluntarily give up Kavala. His memorandum, submitted to the King of January 30, was devoted to territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor and the hope that the territory of Greece would be doubled in the future.


Greek Prime Minister E. Venizelos

At the same time, S.D. Sazonov informed the British that Russia would not prevent the occupation of Gallipoli by Greece - but on the condition that the French and British governments take measures to prevent Greece from opposing Russian policy and Russian interests on the Straits. The Russian reservation, supported by France, greatly disappointed the Greek government.


Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire S. D. Sazonov.

The negotiations of England, France and Russia in Athens on February 14, carried out to stimulate Greece to come to the aid of Serbia (in connection with the sending of two allied divisions, supposedly guaranteeing it against the attack from Bulgaria), showed that the 2-multiple theory the increase of the territory before the practical execution of acquisitions is a great distance, and without the consent of Russia, which did not want to allow the Greeks to Constantinople, but ready to draw its armed forces into the struggle with Austria, it will not be possible to resolve the issue. As a result, E. Venizelos refused the entry of Greece into the war - and this refusal, as stated, will be valid until the Entente succeeds in winning over Romania. The Greek Prime Minister called the entry of Greece into the war on the conditions indicated by the allies "an act of madness."

The following thoughts expressed at the meeting of the British Military Council 26, February 1915, on the importance of the Balkan Peninsula for the case of the Entente, consider the role of the main theaters of military operations that have developed by this time:

1. Russia. We should not expect that Russia in the coming months will be able to successfully invade Germany. However, it can be expected that it will link and hold up very significant German forces on its front. There is no reason to assume that Germany will be able in some time to transfer to the west about 1 a million fighters it needs against Russia.

2. Anglo-French positions on the French front are very strong, and cannot be subjected to bypass traffic. The allied positions and forces in France are incomparably more significant than at the beginning of the war. Therefore, the Allies should welcome any German offensive of the largest scale. The chances of repelling it will be favorable - but even if it would have been necessary to retreat to other positions, larger losses for the Germans than those of the allies would represent good compensation. Moreover, four or five British divisions could not decisively influence this result.

3. The Balkan Peninsula is the decisive point, and the only point where it is possible to seize and save the initiative. Provided that there is a corresponding interaction between the land and sea forces and with the available forces, there is confidence that they will be able to capture Constantinople at the end of March 1915 and destroy the Turkish forces in Europe (except those located in Adrianople). This blow can be delivered before the fate of Serbia is decided. His success could have a decisive influence on the situation in the Balkans. He could destroy Turkey as a military force.

The Allies also noted that the troops required for the operation could be concentrated at the Bulair Isthmus (on the Gallipoli Peninsula) by March 21 1915 - if the maritime operation does not lead to success, they can be used on the Gallipoli Peninsula and to ensure the advancement of the fleet. Once the Dardanelles are open, these troops will be able to: a) operate at Constantinople; or b) if Bulgaria takes the side of the Entente and decides to occupy the territory up to the Enos-Midia line, they will be able to pass through Bulgaria to the aid of Serbia; or c) if Bulgaria maintains friendly neutrality, but Greece enters the war, they will be able to advance through Thessaloniki to the aid of Serbia.

Moreover, at this stage E. Venizelos, who feared that England would find the necessary foothold for the Dardanelles operation in Bulgaria, on March 1 suggested sending three Greek divisions to the Dardanelles.

After the next Anglo-Greek negotiations, the British, interested in supporting the Greeks (after the Russian demarche lost interest in the operation) of their fleet, offered them the “principle of internationalization” as a possible option to determine the future fate of Constantinople.

In fact, it was about the "internationalization" of an entire state controlled by the victorious powers. The Greeks were given a transparent hint at the possibility of the appearance of the Greek prince in the role of High Commissioner in the "internationalized" Constantinople.

But 2 March, 1915, a cold water tub over the heads of the Greeks, and not only the Greeks, became the phrase of S. D. Sazonov, that "under no circumstances can we allow the participation of Greek troops in the entry of Allied forces into Constantinople."

E. Gray drew the attention of the Russian colleague to the importance of forcing the Dardanelles to influence all Balkan states and noted that the Admiralty, for technical reasons, attaches great importance to the Greek fleet, stating that “to prevent Greece would mean to slow down the events greatly”.

On March 5, a regular meeting of the Greek Council was held, at which the size of the Greek airborne detachment was reduced from three to one division. It was also noted that Greece has no plans for Constantinople and the Greek troops, who entered the Ottoman capital, will leave it, having limited themselves to visiting the church of St. Sophia.

As a result, S.D. Sazonov, on March 6, declared to the British ambassador to Russia, D. Buchanan, the position of the emperor - that under no circumstances would he give his consent to any sea or land operations of the Greek armed forces in the Straits.


British Ambassador to Russia D. Buchanan

Russia agreed to allow the Greeks to conduct military operations in the Smyrna region, but this agreement was accompanied by four conditions that were quite difficult for Greece: 1) so that Greece itself offered its assistance in the Dardanelles operation, and was not invited by the Entente; 2) Whatever the results of the operation in the Straits, Greece will not receive any territorial compensation either in southern Thrace or near the Straits; 3) The military operations of the Greek army should be limited to those areas that will be established by the Allied Command; 4) the Greek army under no circumstances should join Constantinople.

As a result, the king of Greece refused to endorse the initiative of E. Venizelos, sending him to resign.

To be continued
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  1. Albatroz
    Albatroz 27 March 2018 06: 19
    +5
    In order to get Greece and (or) Bulgaria, it was worth starting preparations for the Dardanelles operation.
    But the Balkans are like a snake ball - interests intertwined, and everyone tried to bite each other.
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 27 March 2018 07: 54
      +19
      The Balkans are like a snake ball - interests intertwined, and everyone tried to bite each other.

      The Gap of Europe
      1. Reptiloid
        Reptiloid 27 March 2018 08: 31
        +6
        The author began a new series of publications, this topic interests me very much. Thank you. Interesting photos (or reproductions) of political figures, the fact that they are in one article. Immediately famous quotes recall authorship. Lloyd George, for example, "" One of the English goals of the war is achieved. "" ----- when he learned about the freshness of Nicholas2 ..
        Also such words: "" There is no more stupid mistake than trying to jump the abyss in two jumps ""
        1. kipage
          kipage 27 March 2018 14: 37
          +20
          There is no more stupid mistake than trying to jump the abyss in two jumps

          Awesome phrase, did not hear)
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 27 March 2018 06: 55
    +4
    His memorandum, presented to the king on January 30, was devoted to territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor and the hope that the territory of Greece in the future will be doubled.

    Lip no fool.
    And all plans for Asia Minor ended with genocide and massacre of the Greeks in Smyrna and their flight from all Asia Minor .... Greek
    1. alatanas
      alatanas 27 March 2018 11: 13
      +9
      And all plans for Asia Minor ended with genocide and massacre of the Greeks in Smyrna and their number and flight from all of Asia Minor .... Greek

      After the signing of the brotherhood agreement with Moscow in the 1921 year, when the Turks received help with money and weapons from Comrade Lenin.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 27 March 2018 13: 59
        +4
        Quote: alatanas
        After the signing of the brotherhood agreement with Moscow in 1921, when the Turks received help with money and weapons from comrade Lenin.

        Wow .... helped on tens of millions of gold rubles to the invaders. Russia at that time was dying of hunger .....
        England, again, did not help the Greeks ....
        1. kipage
          kipage 27 March 2018 14: 38
          +18
          Moreover
          And military advisers and specialists
          There was even a photo somewhere
        2. co-creator
          co-creator 27 March 2018 17: 29
          +2
          The enemy of the interventionists is my friend and rightly so.
          1. Cheburator
            Cheburator 27 March 2018 17: 37
            +19
            But on the side of the Turks, the eternal enemies of Russia and the same interventionists in the Civil.
            And this is very wrong.
            1. co-creator
              co-creator 27 March 2018 19: 22
              +2
              Is the Greek interventionist in Russia right? Who called them? Who allowed to rob and rape the local population?
              Kemal did not send any military units to Russia, he needed to save his country from invaders.
              And Kemal won not because Lenin helped him, but because the Western allies stopped helping the Greeks. Lenin sent weapons which are enough for one division, and ammunition for a week of fighting.
              1. Cheburator
                Cheburator 27 March 2018 20: 02
                +18
                If you notice - I wrote:
                on the side of the Turks, the eternal enemies of Russia and the same interventionists in the Civil.

                That is, the Turks were interventionists ALSO - in 1918 in the Transcaucasus.
                1. co-creator
                  co-creator 27 March 2018 20: 16
                  +1
                  How would the Caucasus, after the revolution, disconnected from Russia
                  1. Cheburator
                    Cheburator 27 March 2018 20: 20
                    +17
                    No, the intervention of the Turks began even when it was the territory of the Russian Republic - before it disconnected.
          2. Olgovich
            Olgovich 28 March 2018 10: 18
            +3
            Quotation: blooded man
            Enemy of the interventionists my friend and it is right .

            Ally occupiers -your friend. And this is only right for you.
            1. co-creator
              co-creator 28 March 2018 17: 26
              0
              Quote: Olgovich
              The ally of the invaders is your friend. And this is only right for you.

              For all, unless of course you serve the interventionists such as Kolchak.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 29 March 2018 09: 32
                0
                Quotation: blooded man
                For all

                Only yours. For yours gave a third of the country to the invaders forever.
                Forgot?
                Quotation: blooded man
                You do not serve the interventionists such as Kolchak.

                Kolchak served Russia, unlike the Bolsheviks who did the above.
  3. XII Legion
    XII Legion 27 March 2018 07: 16
    +19
    The diplomatic preparation of the operation was not sufficiently completed.
    And not only the allies are to blame for this
    Russia itself did everything so that Greek believers did not appear in Constantinople. Why, why? The caliber of states is different, and Greece (despite the pro-English orientation) has always sympathized with Russia.
    And her role - from the provision of the islands (which Lemnos alone cost) to the direct participation - was extremely important. One of the key states in the region.
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 27 March 2018 07: 55
      +22
      One of the key states in the region.

      In fairness, the Greeks have more rights to Constantinople than the rest combined
      1. Reptiloid
        Reptiloid 27 March 2018 08: 39
        +4
        Quote: Cheburator
        In fairness, the Greeks have more rights to Constantinople than the rest combined
        In different sources there are phrases that Greece and Russia are the heirs of Byzantium.
        I look forward to continuing.
    2. Cartalon
      Cartalon 27 March 2018 08: 03
      +4
      Obviously they thought that if the Greeks occupied something in the straits, they would not leave, naturally, it wasn’t the smartest policy to calculate the next war without winning the current one, but it refutes the thesis that RI depends on its allies, Sazanov’s personal Anglophilia.
  4. Cheburator
    Cheburator 27 March 2018 07: 58
    +18
    You don’t even know what is more difficult - politics or war
    There was no serious preparation for a serious operation at the diplomatic level, and the result turned out to be appropriate.
    And there were options ...
  5. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 27 March 2018 08: 02
    +6
    Great article! In Greek events, the danger of traditional English politics to the allies of England itself is clearly visible. As Colonel Wandam once said, “It’s bad to have an Anglo-Saxon enemy, but God forbid to have him as a friend!”
    The author — my deep appreciation for the work done!
  6. parusnik
    parusnik 27 March 2018 08: 16
    +4
    In fact, the Dardanelles operation was carried out against Russia - more precisely, against the establishment of its dominion in the Straits.
    ..... And that by this time Russia had the preconditions to occupy the straits on its own ...? .. General Alekseev, in every possible way discouraged Nicholas II from carrying out such an operation ... motivating by the lack of forces and means ... Having occupied the Dardanelles, the allies could to provide more substantial military assistance to Russia ... Then, perhaps, by their kindness and soul, they gave it away ... But as subsequent events showed, it did not grow together ..
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 27 March 2018 08: 34
      +19
      by this time, Russia had the prerequisites to occupy the straits on its own ...?

      They, the prerequisites, will appear in a year with a tail.
      And the same Alekseev will continue to dissuade from such an operation
      Just like a group of generals will persuade the Emperor to recant.
      And later, another character (the Main Speaking Kerensky) will persuade him to go on the Summer Offensive.
      The period of the persuaders (conspirators).
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 27 March 2018 09: 53
        +4
        And later, another character (the Main Speaking Kerensky) will persuade him to go on the Summer Offensive.
        ... More precisely ... persuade
      2. Monarchist
        Monarchist 27 March 2018 17: 25
        +1
        Cheburator, at Shirokorad in the book: “The Miracle Weapon of the Russian Empire”, the plan of occupation of the Straits is analyzed in sufficient detail
        1. Cheburator
          Cheburator 27 March 2018 17: 35
          +16
          There is one.
          And the situation around the straits, planning and implementation are discussed in great detail in Oleinikov’s book “The Turkish Trap: One Hundred Years Later”
    2. Monarchist
      Monarchist 27 March 2018 17: 50
      0
      Dear Sailboat, let's not fantasize in Manilowski: if only we had captured the Straits!
      On the topic of who is to blame for the fact that it was possible to erect a cross over Hagia Sophia, so much has been said.
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 27 March 2018 18: 29
        +2
        let's not fantasize in Manilowski: if only we had captured the Straits!
        ...Do not understand...? And where in my commentary did you see fantasies: if we captured the Straits? ... Let's figure it out ..
        In fact, the Dardanelles operation was carried out against Russia - more precisely, against the establishment of its rule in the Straits
        .
        -This is a quote from the text .. and then my comment ... And that by this time Russia had the preconditions to occupy the straits on its own ...? .. General Alekseev, in every possible way discouraged Nicholas II from carrying out such an operation ... motivating a lack of strength and funds ... By occupying the Dardanelles, the allies could provide more substantial military assistance to Russia ... Then, perhaps, by their kindness and soulfulness, they gave ... But as subsequent events showed, it did not grow together .. My text. Where did you find the phrase ... That the straits should be ours ... If you read my comments ... I never wrote, oh if the straits were ours .. I always adhered to and still hold the view that the straits, nobody and never Russia I would give ... Yes, and Russia simply could not keep them ... I don’t deal with Manilovism ... like oh if, oh if, it weren’t life, but a song would ...
  7. BAI
    BAI 27 March 2018 09: 52
    +3
    instead of the decaying Turkey, the Bulgarians were best suited for the role of a hostile Russia "gatekeeper of the Black Sea"

    The British even then evaluated everything correctly.
    1. Reptiloid
      Reptiloid 27 March 2018 10: 29
      +4
      Quote: BAI
      The British even then evaluated everything correctly.
      It’s even a shame that they achieved success in long-term large programs.
      Not having, however, achieved the complete dissolution of the Republic of Ingushetia with respect to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, their plan was fulfilled in 1918. And approximately, at that time, about which the story in the article, at the end of 1915, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, General Beck, made plans for military-political superiority in Southeast Europe, about which he wrote in the memorandum.
      I hope for a long series of articles !!!!!!!
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 27 March 2018 14: 21
        +2
        Yeah, and then Churchill regretted everything about the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the British did not have particularly cunning plans, acted on the circumstances, like everyone else.
        1. kipage
          kipage 27 March 2018 14: 42
          +17
          The British need a sword on the continent
          And Austria-Hungary is a beautiful country, very sorry
        2. Reptiloid
          Reptiloid 27 March 2018 19: 21
          +1
          Quote: Cartalon
          Yeah, and then Churchill regretted everything about the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the British did not have particularly cunning plans, acted on the circumstances, like everyone else.

          Churchill ---- sorry? And did you believe?
          The collapse of Austria-Hungary, the topic, of course, is interesting, but I still need to master it .....
  8. antivirus
    antivirus 27 March 2018 10: 54
    +1
    50 years before (the IVS did not support) the communist uprising in Greece and the simultaneous adoption of Bulgaria by the 16th republic of the USSR.
    EVERYTHING ALREADY DECIDED AT THE END OF 19 V
    and WWI is no exception to those. Even the mighty Britain could not change them. A circle of snakes-friends-allies-neighbors
  9. Bouncer
    Bouncer 27 March 2018 12: 21
    +18
    With competent influence on the vacillating "Balkans", a different result of the Dardanelles operation was possible.
    If at least one of them (Greece has a fleet, Bulgaria has an army), and ideally both of them, joined the efforts of the Entente.
    Of course, the approaches were multidimensional, but after all it was possible to play on contradictions - for example, Anglo-French.
    Here the art of diplomacy was worth demonstrating. There were chances, and not bad.
    1. kipage
      kipage 27 March 2018 14: 43
      +17
      Yes, there are always options and chances
    2. Monarchist
      Monarchist 27 March 2018 17: 20
      0
      And FIG knows whether it would work out or not. Too confusing there: as a result of the Second Balkan War, Bulgaria well “annoyed” Serbia and Greece. And now they are invited to perform together. It’s almost the same as putting a jealous wife in the same bed as a homeowner. Can you imagine that?
      1. kipage
        kipage 27 March 2018 17: 30
        +16
        Well, at least one of them
        And then both profuca
        1. Cheburator
          Cheburator 27 March 2018 20: 09
          +16
          The military option for the success of the Bosphorus operation is well considered in articles on VO
          "So was the Bosphorus expedition a chance?" In the summer of 1916, if we were to realize this option, the Allies would be forced to admit a fait accompli.
  10. alatanas
    alatanas 27 March 2018 16: 09
    +1
    can be ensured by the transfer to this state of the Macedonian territories of Ishtib and Kochan


    Stip and Kochani
    1. kipage
      kipage 27 March 2018 16: 36
      +16
      How do you know that the correct transcription is so and not so?
      1. alatanas
        alatanas 28 March 2018 17: 13
        0
        Well, because it is very close, take a map of the Balkan Peninsula and see.
        Ishtib - Turkish transcription, they do not have slv, which would start with two consonants.
        1. kipage
          kipage 28 March 2018 17: 22
          +15
          And what does a modern map have to do with it
          If I understand correctly, it is necessary to make an amendment to the TRANSLATION of the diplomatic document of those years.
          1. alatanas
            alatanas 29 March 2018 09: 39
            0
            For centuries, the local population called these settlements
            1. kipage
              kipage 29 March 2018 14: 07
              +15
              local (I’m silent about who the locals are) can be called (and is it called?)
              1. alatanas
                alatanas 30 March 2018 11: 06
                0
                A strange opinion ... If, for example, I wrote instead of Moscow - Kvakva, howls would probably be raised to heaven. what
                1. kipage
                  kipage 30 March 2018 12: 23
                  +15
                  yes write what you want
                  you do this regularly.
                  kuzhiz raised because of one letter, but it is not clear that now they can call something like that, and 100 years ago - be called like that. Moreover, the author used, as I understand, the translation of a diplomatic document - and in translations the transcription is also distorted.
                  1. alatanas
                    alatanas 30 March 2018 13: 36
                    0
                    Shtip (Shchip - bolg.) Was called so from the IV century, Kochani - from the XIV century.
                    Keep boiling for nothing!
                    1. kipage
                      kipage 30 March 2018 13: 53
                      +15
                      Yes, you are boiling along the way, they got to the bottom with nonsense.
                      I personally do not care what is there and what is called
                      If it is called so in the document and not otherwise. All questions are for translators of those years.
  11. Monarchist
    Monarchist 27 March 2018 17: 09
    0
    Quote: Olgovich
    Quote: alatanas
    After the signing of the brotherhood agreement with Moscow in 1921, when the Turks received help with money and weapons from comrade Lenin.

    Wow .... helped on tens of millions of gold rubles to the invaders. Russia at that time was dying of hunger .....
    England, again, did not help the Greeks ....

    V. And Leib Bronshtein dreamed of the World Revolution, and in the Soviet Union they were ready to fill the Papuans with gold in the name of chimeras.
  12. Monarchist
    Monarchist 27 March 2018 17: 36
    0
    If we consider the Dardanelles operation from the point of view of military strategy, this is one thing, but diplomatic consent - UTOPIA
    1. Cheburator
      Cheburator 27 March 2018 17: 39
      +16
      There were diplomatic options.
      With greater unity in the position of the allies.
      Unfortunately missed
  13. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 28 March 2018 15: 15
    +15
    Interesting topic and article
    We look forward to continuing good
  14. Mac Simka
    Mac Simka 28 March 2018 22: 06
    +5
    Very good, objective and balanced article! To the author - my respect. I look forward to continuing with impatience.