Military Review

How Manstein saved the German army from the Caucasian "cauldron"

34
During the offensive, Soviet troops advanced 300 – 450 km, liberated most of the Rostov region. However, the German command, skillfully maneuvering and controlling the troops, creating strike groups and launching counterstrikes, managed to avoid encirclement in the Caucasus.


Manstein simply did not have the physical ability to simultaneously rescue the Stalingrad Paulus group, “cover his back” to Kleist in the Caucasus and hold all points of the front, much less stop the enemy and regain previously lost positions, as the German Stavka pointed out to him. There were no reserves, all requests from the headquarters of Army Group Don to transfer at least three divisions from the Kleist group to reinforce Goth, the Headquarters categorically rejected. They threw all those who could on the front line - air defense units, battle groups made up of the rear men, vacationers and convalescents.

At the same time, the army of Paulus has already been written off. Manstein hoped that the German "Stalingrad Fortress" would last as long as possible, diverting the forces of the Red Army. On the evacuation of the 1st tank Army from the North Caucasus - the withdrawal of troops, the removal of heavy equipment, hospitals, various military equipment and materials - Army Group “A”, according to Kleist’s report, required 155 train levels and 25 days. Hope remained on the German ability to maneuver and command troops, creating strike groups and delivering counterattacks, if necessary, to retreat, surrendering less important positions. And these are the Germans, we must give them their due, they knew how to the very end of the war. Manstein had to hold Rostov-on-Don to the end, ensuring the withdrawal of the 1st Panzer Army from the North Caucasus, and for this it was necessary to caste forces from its right flank to the left and organize a powerful counterattack to hold on until the spring thaw.

January

5 January 1943, the Germans left Morozovsk. The Hollidt group slowly retreated to the Seversky Donets, having the task of slowing down the enemy’s advance as much as possible, preventing him from breaking through to the crossings at Belaya Kalitva, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky and Voroshilovgrad. Protecting, thus, approaches to Rostov from the north.

A strong 3-I Guards Army of the South-Western Front, commanded by Lieutenant-General D. D. Lelyushenko, which had, in addition to rifle divisions, three separate tank regiments, 1-th Guards Mechanized, 2-th Guards and 25-th tank corps. In addition, the army of Lelushenko was soon further strengthened, and received two fresh tank corps - 2 of Major General A. F. Popov and 23 of Major General E. G. Pushkin. The 5-I tank army of Lieutenant-General M.M. Popova (1 and 22 tank corps, 40 Guards, and two rifle divisions). Lelyushenko's troops attacked Kamensk, and Popov's tank army developed an offensive against Tatsinskaya. Kamensk, who was defended by the Fretter-Pico group, transferred to the group of the Don Army, and a month later remained in the hands of the enemy. German infantry fought bravely and steadfastly. General Hollidt flexibly maneuvered three of his tank divisions, promptly throwing them into crisis points and inflicting short but sensitive counterattacks. As a result, the command of the 3 Guards Army could not use its power advantage and strike power (mobile units).

Along the northern coast of the Don, at the junction of two German army groups, the 5-I attack army of Lieutenant-General V.D. Tsvetaeva.

In the triangle of the Don, Kuberle, Manych rivers, the four divisions were beating the Soviet attacks of the fairly battered and weakened 4 Tank Army of Goth. The 57 tank corps suffered heavy losses, especially the 23 and 17 tank divisions suffered, the 16 motorized division was also dramatically bled. Romanian troops were completely demoralized and fled or surrendered at the first onslaught. Only the SS Viking division, redeployed from the Caucasus, was fully operational. And General Gotu with these forces needed to solve two complex tasks: 1) to prevent the breakthrough of the Soviet troops to Rostov along the lower reaches of the Don on its left flank; 2) on the right - to ensure the withdrawal of the 1-th tank army.

The commander of the Southern Front, Eremenko, planned to surround and destroy Goth's troops as soon as possible. 2-I Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant-General R. Ya. Malinovsky, who developed the offensive from east to west, was aimed at capturing the villages of Tsimlyanskaya and Konstantinovskaya, followed by a turn to the south. The 2 th Guards Mechanized Corps of General KV Sviridov and the 3 Th Guards Tank Corps of General P. A. Rotmistrov were on the edges of the two shock groups of the army. On the left wing of the Southern Front, the troops of the 51 Army, Major General N. I. Trufanov, in cooperation with the 28 Army, Lieutenant General G. F. Gerasimenko, moving along both banks of the Manych, were to close the trap.

On January 3, the 2 Brigade of the Guards Mechanized Corps took possession of Tsimlyansk, threatening the backs of the Hollidt group. Its commander was forced to begin withdrawing his right flank to the Kagalnik River. By 6 in January, the corps of Rotmistrov by the forward detachment broke into the stanitsa of Semikarakorskaya, captured a bridgehead on the north bank of the Don, and with the main forces began the battle for the stanitsa of Konstantinovskaya. A day later, after a five-day heavy battle, the troops of the 51 Army occupied the stronghold and the Zimovniki railway station. The 6 th mechanized corps of Major General S. I. Bogdanov overturning the Viking division became known as the 5 Guards Zimovnikovskim. True, the case itself suffered serious losses. But in the second echelon there were 4-th and 3-th Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 28-I army with mobile units came out to the Steppe. Advanced Soviet troops appeared in 20 kilometers from Novocherkassk, which housed the headquarters of Army Group Don. Manstein had to relocate to Taganrog.

January 5 LF tasks clarified. The 5 Shock Army and the General Kreiser group from the 2 Guards Army by the end of January 7 had to go to Seversky Donets and proceed to force it. The 3 Guards Tank Corps with two infantry divisions had to seize the crossings at Bagaevskaya on the Don and at the village of Vesely on the Manych. By the same time, the 51-I Army and the 3-th Guards Mechanized Corps were to seize Proletarskaya and Budyonnovskaya with a blow from the west.

However, the Germans fought skillfully and bravely, put on strong counterattacks and did not want to be surrounded. On January 9, General Hollidt, having transferred the 11 Tank Division to her right flank (she had become a fire brigade), launched a counterattack against General Tsvetaev’s army and the Kraiser group, squeezing it out and forcing it to go on the defensive. To repel this attack, General Eremenko even had to ask for help from his neighbors - the 5 tank army. For several days the right wing of the law firm could not advance further. The center and the left wing moved extremely slowly - on 2 - 3 km per day. By 14 - 15 January, our troops liberated the villages of Batlaevskaya, Atamanovskaya and Orlovskaya. Only on January 17, front-line troops reached the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River and the northern bank of the river and the Manych channel, where they again met strong enemy resistance. The German 57 Tank Corps of Kirchner continued to hold the bridgehead east of Proletarian. Here the Germans first threw into battle the 503 heavy tank battalion, which had in its composition tanks "Tiger".

Thus, the Soviet offensive stopped. Skillful actions of the German command played their role, with the help of a maneuver, violent resistance and counterstrikes restraining the advance of the superior forces of the Red Army, as well as the mistakes of the Soviet command. In addition, in the Soviet troops, far removed from their supply bases, there was an acute crisis in the supply of ammunition and fuel.

Trying to break through to Rostov, the command of the Southern Front decided to form two mechanized groups: 1) in the 2 Guards Army Band - consisted of General Rotmistrov's 3 Guards Tank Corps, 2 and 5 of the Guards Mechanized Corps and X-NXX-th Gunty Infantry Corps, and XNUM-88 and 2. ; 51) Trufanov's 3 Army was attached to the 4 and XNUMX Guards of the Mechanized Corps aimed at Azov.

On January 19, the Rotmistrov mechanized group launched an offensive that developed successfully at first. Guardsmen crossed the Manych River in the area of ​​its confluence with the Don, liberated the stanitsa Manychskaya, and captured an important bridgehead. The forward detachment under the command of Colonel A. V. Egorov (eight T-34 tanks, three T-70 tanks, five armored vehicles, nine armored personnel carriers and 200 fighters) by dawn 20 broke through to Bataysk, breaking the railway south of the city. The main forces of the mechanized group were to follow Yegorov. However, to consolidate the success of the vanguard failed. The Germans immediately counterattacked, forced the detachment of Yegorov to retreat. At the same time, the Germans tied up the main forces of Rotmistrov in the area of ​​the stanitsa Manychskaya. This allowed Manstein to gain time for the transfer of additional forces to the crisis area.

On the left flank, the troops of the 51 Army stormed Proletarskaya and forced the Manych. The advanced units of the 28 Army combined with the 30 Division of the 5 Cavalry Corps of the Transcaucasian Front. By January 22 troops of the Southern Front was released Salsk. Thus, the Soviet troops came to Rostov and there was a danger of blocking the German units under the command of Field Marshal Kleist from blocking the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus.

However, at the same time, the German 11-I tank division Balka crossed the Don at Rostov. Along the southern coast Manych climbed to the mouth of the 16-th part of the motorized Schwerin division. 23 January The 11-I tank division, in conjunction with the 16 Moto Division, launched a counterattack against the advancing Soviet troops and drove them to the village of Manychskaya. January 24 German troops attacked the village, but were repulsed. As F. Mellenthin notes in his memoirs, "Wehrmacht Armored Fist": "January 25 The 11-I tank division was ordered to eliminate the bridgehead of the Russians at any cost." After a stubborn battle, during which General Balk misled the Soviet command by imitating a false attack, the Germans managed to push the Soviet troops across the Manych River.

Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. 26 on January 2013. In a military report on the name of the commander of the 2 th Guards Army, 5 reported that 7 tanks and 7 anti-tank guns were left in the 2200 Guards Mechanized Corps, the number of "active bayonets" was reduced to X-UMTHMX The rest of the mobile units also lost their strike power: the 2 Guards Mechanized Corps had 8 tanks on the move, 3 Tank Tanks - 14 tanks. As a result, the mobile units of the mechanized groups temporarily lost the ability for active hostilities.

How Manstein saved the German army from the Caucasian "cauldron"

Commander of the 11 Panzer Division Herman Balk (Balck)

Thus, the counterstrike of the 11 Tank Division allowed temporarily stopping the advance of the Soviet troops on Rostov from the south. “For several weeks, the division made marches every night,” General G. Balk noted, “before dawn, always finding themselves in the most vulnerable place for the enemy and striking an hour before the Russians came. This tactic required incredible pressure from the troops, but then we had few casualties, because we always achieved complete surprise. In the division, it was considered an axiom that “night marches save life”, but justice demands that no one at that time could tell you plainly when our soldiers slept ... ”.

All further attempts of the Southern Front to take Rostov and Bataysk and to intercept the withdrawal of the enemy's Caucasian grouping east did not lead to success. Manstein, maneuvering and striking in retaliation, still held out. In January, the troops of Eremenko advanced by 150 – 200 kilometers, but they could not take Rostov and block the 1 Tank Army in the Caucasus.



February

Only in the beginning of February 1943, after a general change in the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, when the Red Army launched an offensive on the Seversky Donets, Rostov was liberated. Manstein made the decision to withdraw the 4 tank army from the lower reaches of the Don and Donets, redeploying its left flank to the Don group and the Hollidt group to take the old positions on the Mius River, and leave Rostov-on-Don. Due to a significant reduction in the front line, the battle formations were consolidated and mobile units were released, which made it possible to create reserves and in the future to launch a counterattack.

The troops of the Southern Front 7 February occupied Bataysk and Azov. On the night from 7 to 8 in February, the Goth connections began to depart from the Batai bridgehead for the Don, and the Hollidt group went to the Kamensk-Novocherkassk intermediate line. The enemy front troops didn’t notice the maneuver of the enemy immediately, but when they did, they began to pursue. Units of the 28 Army forced the Don across the ice and began an assault on Rostov. The city was defended by the 126 Infantry Regiment, the battle group of the 23 Armored Division and the 503 Heavy Tank Battalion attached to it. “Tigers” in combat conditions confirmed their inability to street battles, showed good weaponry, powerful armor and susceptibility to “childhood diseases”.

12 February 5-I tank army liberated Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, 5-I attack army - Mines, 13 in February 2-I Guards Army - Novocherkassk, 14 in February 28-I army - Rostov. The German command redeployed its troops to the advance defense line along the r. Mius. An attempt by the LF troops to break through this milestone was not a success, and on February 18 they went over to the defensive.


The corpse of a German soldier on the streets of the liberated city of Rostov-on-Don

The soldiers in the back of a truck traveling down the street Engels in the liberated Rostov-on-Don. 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 of the year is attached to the truck

Results

As a result of the Rostov operation, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 300 — 450 km, and liberated most of the Rostov region. Enemy Army Group "Don" suffered a defeat, but retained combat capability. Because of the skillful actions of the enemy, the mistakes of the Soviet command of the LF, it was not possible to cut off the enemy’s withdrawal routes from the North Caucasus through Rostov and to create a huge “cauldron”.


Residents of the liberated Rostov-on-Don meet Soviet horsemen on Engels Street at the monument to S. M. Kirov
Author:
Articles from this series:
1943 year

How the army of Paulus died. Operation "Ring"
Operation "Spark". To the 75 anniversary of the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad
How to break through the blockade of Leningrad
Russians are coming!
How the Wehrmacht avoided the Caucasian "cauldron"
34 comments
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  1. Theodore
    Theodore 16 March 2018 06: 37
    +2
    We just learned to win! But after Kursk, the Fritzes draped themselves.
  2. Firework
    Firework 16 March 2018 06: 47
    +14
    Germans are upscale professionals, German generals were some of the most experienced
    when somewhere in the cinema of the Germans they make fools this disrespect for the Soviet soldiers who defeated the most experienced army of the world at that time - the Wehrmacht, if the Germans fought like fools of the USSR, the war would have ended in 41
    1. Dart2027
      Dart2027 16 March 2018 19: 51
      +1
      Quote: Salute
      when somewhere in the cinema of the Germans they make fools this disrespect for Soviet soldiers

      Unfortunately, many did not understand this.
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 16 March 2018 20: 35
      +2
      about professionals--
      1.-10 years before the war, it is necessary to build mines, mines, met-combines
      2.- 15 years before the war, it is necessary to release teachers with diplomas and other "bespectacles". to learn how to build and operate according to paragraph 1.
      3. And in parallel with the teachers, it is necessary, for 15 liters before the war, to release engineers (logarithms + liquidus + solidus = material science).
      4. -for 10 liters before the war from p3. must learn to work in clause 1. and clause 2.
      5.-in parallel with n 1-4 should be issued in military schools ml lieutenants -units and equipment for aviation.
      WITHOUT NUMBER - WITH THE HORSE, IT IS NECESSARY TO TRANSFER THE HUGE COUNTRY ON THE ICE. -DO NOT BE AFRAID OF THE MOTOR ROWS.
      further, everyone knows that they did not create EBN and GDP now and personally they could do it INSTEAD of the presidents.
      There was enough air superiority for the surroundings-- and there wasn’t
      materials science and logarithms were not known to many who should know
      see the number of million pieces of brick and cement (85 years ago, manual labor) for ped schools in n2
      1. x917nt
        x917nt 16 March 2018 21: 48
        +2
        Quote: antivirus
        10 years before the war

        But what, the timing of the war were known in advance? And built, taken into account, built - all this to war? It was for this purpose that the Soviet Union was created, right?
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 16 March 2018 22: 21
          0
          it changes the balance of power - before the war -
    3. Bad_santa
      Bad_santa 18 March 2018 12: 53
      +1
      Not only at the head of professional generals, but with the resources of ALL of Europe. At the same time, the USSR lost a lot of territories. On one willpower stretched out in those crucial years. The rest were either inferior to the Wehrmacht, or were in parity
  3. Korsar4
    Korsar4 16 March 2018 06: 53
    +3
    Each step is a great price. But this step is to the west. And "Our cause is right!" (with).
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 16 March 2018 07: 32
    +3
    Nevertheless, sheer success
  5. Cheburator
    Cheburator 16 March 2018 08: 22
    +17
    Very interestingly shown in the movie "Hot Snow"
    1. Huumi
      Huumi 16 March 2018 18: 37
      0
      Hot snow is a fairy tale about battles with Mannstein by the reflection of a releasing group. As far as this K.A.L did not look, he was shaking with laughter
      1. Korsar4
        Korsar4 16 March 2018 18: 54
        +2
        I do not agree. And the book is strong.
        And in the 1972 film there are quite lively episodes.
        1. Huumi
          Huumi 16 March 2018 23: 41
          0
          Especially the full-length trenches from logs and dugouts as much as 2 floors — where did they get the logs from in the steppe when there was no firewood near Stalingrad. And how did they drop the trenches there? —Laser — remember the words from! They fight for the Motherland "about the countryman .. ..And in the winter they dug such trenches. Built-snow-boxes-corpses-that's the material for shelters
          1. Korsar4
            Korsar4 17 March 2018 05: 57
            0
            Could there be a character of Drozdovsky sending a soldier with grenades to a self-propelled gun? Quite.

            And still remembered.
            "- How old are you, Colonel?
            - 28. "
  6. BAI
    BAI 16 March 2018 09: 44
    +6
    1. The author himself writes:
    During the offensive operation, Soviet troops advanced 300-450 km

    и
    in the Soviet troops, far removed from their supply bases, there was an acute crisis in the supply of ammunition and fuel.

    Not a single attack can go on continuously, sooner or later it is exhausted. And it’s better to stop yourself than the enemy will stop you.
    2.
    5 tanks and 7 anti-tank guns remained in the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, all brigade commanders were killed or injured, the number of “active bayonets” was reduced to 2200 people.
    But such a terrible situation persisted throughout the war. Soviet units fought until complete self-destruction and only after that were withdrawn to the rear. Experienced fighters dropped out, there was no one to pass on the experience, and the new recruits paid for the acquisition of combat experience with blood. (In an article about Matrosov they already talked about this).
    3. Well, and, of course, the experience of the Germans cannot be discounted.
    But still, it seems to me the main reason - fatigue and lack of strength. Manstein, although he wrote that important points were already without protection from the Germans and the Red Army could freely take them, but there was already no real strength.
    1. chenia
      chenia 16 March 2018 10: 19
      +5
      Quote: BAI
      Soviet units fought until complete self-destruction and only after that were withdrawn to the rear. Experienced fighters dropped out, there was no one to pass on the experience, and the new recruits paid for the acquisition of combat experience with blood. (In an article about Matrosov they already talked about this).


      It was. In general, the formation should be withdrawn to understaffing (first to the reserve) after 30% losses. That is, for one newcomer (and then after the training regiment) for two "old men" - combat readiness is quickly restored. Subsequently, it was. But the Germans have the opposite (well, this is at the very end of the war).

      At the end of December, it was possible to throw Rokosovsky to Rostov (leaving security units in Stalingrad). The Germans already had no fuel, and even if they got out of Stalingrad in an open field it would be easier to finish.
      We still had no confidence to take a chance. Well, in general, a tit is better .....).
  7. nivander
    nivander 16 March 2018 10: 06
    +2
    so-so little article --- the fact that Manstein is the genius of war, the same Manstein tirelessly emphasized. Like the fact that Manstein is one of two Field Marshals (the second Model) who knew how to poke all (EVERYTHING ALL !!!) reserves that accumulated in the Reich, not achieving with decisive results. P. Karel quite vividly describes the episode of the beginning of March 1944 - when the Model, having "lost everything and everything, pledged himself to bid for new replenishment, however, the Führer yelled at the unlucky Levinsky in the manner of late Zhirinovsky - blamed the surrender of Ukraine (in the case), the death of the 11th and 42nd buildings under Korsun-Shevchenko (in the case), the defeat at Kamenetz-Podolsk (in the case) -nagradil another cross and gave a kick
    1. Monarchist
      Monarchist 16 March 2018 15: 45
      +3
      Nivasander, and Meinstein and Model, are indeed some of the most successful in the Wehrmacht. If Manstein were stupid, they would get a "Caucasian cauldron".
  8. Andrey VOV
    Andrey VOV 16 March 2018 12: 02
    +2
    In no case should the enemy be ever underestimated! What this may lead everyone to know .. besides, we will not forget what was happening in the northwest and on the central front at that time and there really was no place to take powerful, fresh reserves by and large. our soldiers and the Russian army
  9. Luga
    Luga 16 March 2018 12: 51
    +4
    Is Samsonov’s third hypostasis responsible for the “superethnos” and “masters of the West” temporarily gone on vacation? Let him rest.
    Normal article.
  10. NF68
    NF68 16 March 2018 15: 46
    +1
    It is interesting how events would develop near Stalingrad if the Germans did not initially begin to share their forces in order to act simultaneously in the Caucasus and in the region of Stalingrad. Although in these conditions the USSR might have decided to cut off the entire Army Group "South", striking in the direction of the South-West to Rostov.
    1. dzvero
      dzvero 16 March 2018 16: 28
      0
      Most likely, a German shock fist would cut the Volga back in September, cutting off Transcaucasia from the center. Turkey would have entered the war, having fettered all Soviet forces in this region.
      At the Headquarters there were no large reserves for counterattack at that time, and the Germans, possessing a strategic initiative, could crush the Red Army in parts, moving northward, almost behind the rear of the Western fronts.
      So the decision of Hitler and the OKW to strike with “spread fingers” played against them for the second time.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 March 2018 16: 53
        +3
        Quote: dzvero
        Most likely, a German shock fist would cut the Volga back in September, cutting off Transcaucasia from the center.

        Actually, the main blow was to be delivered to the Caucasus. A blow in the direction of Stalingrad was to ensure the flank of this offensive by defeating the Soviet forces. capable of delivering a flank strike.
        Quote: dzvero
        Turkey would have entered the war, having fettered all Soviet forces in this region.

        The Turks are not so crazy to start a war on 3 fronts. having an army with weapons (for the most part) from the mid-30s.
        First Front: Soviet - Transcaucasian Front and its SD. Second front: a joint occupation group in Iran. The third front is the Allies in occupied Syria and in Iraq.
        Quote: dzvero
        So the decision of Hitler and the OKW to strike with “spread fingers” played against them for the second time.

        They had no choice: if they did not defeat the Red Army formations from Stalingrad and to the north, then they would strike 146% on the stretching flank of German troops advancing in the Caucasus. In general, the Germans, as always, planned to deal with the northeastern Red Army group quickly, and then go to the Caucasus. But something went wrong ... smile
        1. dzvero
          dzvero 16 March 2018 17: 24
          0
          But something went wrong ...
          Short and capacious! smile
          In my opinion, the “auxiliary” attack on Stalingrad posed a more serious threat to the USSR than the loss of the Caucasian oil fields.
          If Stalingrad had fallen in September, then I am 99% sure that the Turks would have entered the war. After all, against them would only be weakened parts of the Transcaucasian Front, forced to defend in two directions, and Soviet units from Iran. The British at that time had problems with Romel, the second ate Alamein was still ahead and the transfer of part of the troops against the Turks could result in the loss of Egypt.
          The German plan of two strikes in diverging directions, although it was logical, but a hitch came out with the implementation.
          ...Something went wrong...
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 16 March 2018 18: 34
            +2
            Quote: dzvero
            If Stalingrad had fallen in September, then I am 99% sure that the Turks would have entered the war. After all, against them would only be weakened parts of the Transcaucasian Front, forced to defend in two directions, and Soviet units from Iran.

            Weakened parts are based on SD in mountainous terrain. Plus, there are very few roads in those places and, according to the experience of the First World War, the regiment can delay the advance of the division.
            Quote: dzvero
            The British at that time had problems with Romel, the second ate Alamein was still ahead and the transfer of part of the troops against the Turks could result in the loss of Egypt.

            Just the British need to crush the Turks in the first place - for they threaten the oil production and oil refining of the Island Empire. Plus, there is a threat of a blow through Syria to Egypt - towards Rommel.
            And in this situation, limes will primarily crush the weakest link - the Turks. The forces for this can be taken by canceling Operation Anakim ("Burmese meat grinder").
            Quote: dzvero
            The German plan of two strikes in diverging directions, although it was logical, but a hitch came out with the implementation.

            Just the Germans, as always, planned on the brinktaking for the main most optimistic scenario. In 1941, it turned out to be a Barbarossa failure. In 1942, Directive 41 stalled literally from the very beginning, when Paulus, carrying out the planned attack on Voronezh with the subsequent turn to the south, unexpectedly met fresh Soviet tank formations in the Voronezh region and barely escaped from there, prompted by the Führer. Moreover, he did not break out completely - his army group was forced to leave the two most equipped panzerdivisia in the north.
            In addition to personnel changes, the July counterattacks forced the German command to leave the 2th and 9th tank divisions, replenished before the start of the Blau and received the third tank battalion, in the 11nd Army band. During the entire battle in the southern sector of the front, they remained aloof. The thinning of the advancing buildings in Stalingrad has begun.
            © Isaev
            9 panzerdivisia, in addition to other tanks, included 61 "three-langs", 11 panzerdivisia - as many as 110. More than all other divisions assigned for the summer offensive.
          2. antivirus
            antivirus 16 March 2018 22: 26
            0
            the strategy of the military generals and the bookkeeper "Hans" -intendant (also general) diverged earlier.
            everyone thought, but the first- "you need to do it and there will be a victory." and second- "resources are enough only to xx further kayuk, so first one, then another"
            many times - about "Hitler's fault" - "victory for the generals. defeat for Hitler"
            THIS PLAN HAS BEEN AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. HAD NOT ONE HITLER SCREAMED AND PUNCHED IN THE FACE OF THE GENERALS AND THOSE LOST WENT TO GO TO FIGHT.
            The generals clearly understood the difficulty of the task — their opinion was taken into account.
            watered goals prevailed. military in the background. it has always been and will be. prim Syria.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 19 March 2018 10: 24
              +1
              Quote: antivirus
              many times - about "Hitler's fault" - "victory for the generals. defeat for Hitler"
              THIS PLAN HAS BEEN AGREED AND ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS. HAD NOT ONE HITLER SCREAMED AND PUNCHED IN THE FACE OF THE GENERALS AND THOSE LOST WENT TO GO TO FIGHT.

              So ... the generals survived, Hitler - no. So the generals fell in memoirs all their schools on Adolf - well, who will delve into the documents. looking for those who actually gave the order. smile
              And when they started digging, they found out, for example, that the “stop order” near Dunkirk was given to von Rundstedt - at the urgent request of the tankers. Hitler, on the other hand, endorsed him only the next day after the start of execution (moreover, von Rundstedt proved to him the necessity of this order).
    2. Huumi
      Huumi 16 March 2018 18: 40
      0
      But it’s interesting by the way .. We probably would have taken Stalingrad
      1. x917nt
        x917nt 16 March 2018 21: 52
        0
        ..if the British did not fight in Africa.
  11. Monarchist
    Monarchist 16 March 2018 16: 02
    +1
    “I always found myself in the place most vulnerable to the enemy and an hour before the Russians attacked”, for this we need 3 things: 1) to be able to calculate the enemy’s move, 2) to organize intelligence correctly, 3) to coordinate actions.
    Eremenko was inclined to boast, and then could retroactively justify himself: “I would be glad, but ...” (I had read about this in the “Soviet War” and in the “Privy Advisor to the Leader” (Prada, I do not cut x. L. as a quarrel).
    Regarding the Tigers: there were publications (it seems that Samsonov also had it) that the Tiger was first used on the Leningrad Front.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 March 2018 17: 00
      +2
      Quote: Monarchist
      Regarding the Tigers: there were publications (it seems that Samsonov also had it) that the Tiger was first used on the Leningrad Front.

      "Tigers" near Leningrad in 1942 experienced. And they suffered the first losses there.
      But here the full-blooded schwerpanserabeutailung, armed with “tigers”, was indeed thrown into battle in the south for the first time.
  12. NF68
    NF68 16 March 2018 20: 54
    +1
    Quote: dzvero
    Most likely, a German shock fist would cut the Volga back in September, cutting off Transcaucasia from the center. Turkey would have entered the war, having fettered all Soviet forces in this region.
    At the Headquarters there were no large reserves for counterattack at that time, and the Germans, possessing a strategic initiative, could crush the Red Army in parts, moving northward, almost behind the rear of the Western fronts.
    So the decision of Hitler and the OKW to strike with “spread fingers” played against them for the second time.


    The Wehrmacht in the 1942 year, too, could no longer advance on a wide front, as it was in the 1941 year. So the Germans would have to devote significant forces to defend themselves from an attack on the left flank of their group. Here, for the Germans, too, not everything is so simple and unambiguous.
  13. myobius59
    myobius59 16 March 2018 23: 34
    +3
    Communication, communication, communication. Communication again !!!!
    50% of troubles 41-42 and even 43 years from lack of communication More precisely, RADIO.
    Even in the battle on the Kursk arc only commanders of tank platoons had radios. That is, two tanks from a platoon, and 6 from a company (count further) were deaf, and could not hear no orders, no warnings.
    The same is true in aviation. Transceivers even at 45m were not on all fighters, many flew only with receivers.
    Hence often unreasonable huge losses, due to an inept maneuver, due to an order not received in time, due to the fact that your colleague could not warn you in time, and many more because of what.
    Paying tribute to the talent of the Nazi generals, it must be said that the interaction between reconnaissance, reconnaissance aircraft, strike aircraft and infantry units ALWAYS implied EXCELLENT radio communications, which provided (along with highly mechanized units) such fast, CONFIDENT, effective maneuvers.
    We had the exact opposite situation. The pre-war installation of wired communications and couriers completely discredited itself at the beginning of the war. And we could not establish the production of walkie-talkies in the required quantities until the end of the war. But even where this radio communication was, the inertia of our commanders, and mistrust of it did not allow us to use it 100%.
    The case more or less moved only from Bagration.
    Do you know that one of our best pilots, Grigory Rechkalov, answered the question when he was asked, what is the best thing about the AeroCobra? So, he replied that there was a radio connection. She worked PERFECTLY, and they ALWAYS could warn each other of all surprises, which helped them to win and reduce losses.
    Our planes had all the ABOVE, and the pilots often even turned off the radios altogether, because in addition to the cod, they still could not hear anything. The Germans had the same radio quality as the American, which our pilots flying in captured vehicles also noted.
    On earth, things were no better, or even worse.
    Here are the reasons for such clumsy actions of our commanders in battles 41-42, and even 43 years. The inability to conduct maneuvering operations (then they will learn how to do it, but what was the price of this training) was supplemented by the useless connection between units, between aviation and infantry, between infantry and artillery, between aviation and tank units, etc.
    And when at last our generals and marshals understood the real price of radio communications, then things started at 44m and 45m.
    And in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft, we EVEN AT 41m AND 42m ALWAYS outperformed the Germans. But the inability to concentrate tank and air units in the right directions was also a disaster for our generals, along with radio communications.
    But this is a completely different story, as the artist Kanevsky says.
    1. Alex1117
      Alex1117 16 February 2019 08: 38
      0
      As for the wired connection, you're in vain. Comrade Stalin was not a fool. But he requested several million kilometers of field cable from the United States. And he received one and a half million kilometers of field cable. Against less than 70 thousand kilometers of field cable released during the entire war by our own industry.
      Lend-Lease radios were also delivered fairly well. And the chargers for them are in about the same proportion as the field cable. By the way, we didn’t return a single radio to the Americans after the war. Used in the national economy until the end of the 1960s. Then they transferred to DOSAAF.