After the Greek-Turkish crisis of January 1996, Athens became aware of the need to create a defense system that could become an obstacle to Turkey’s revisionist policy regarding the so-called “gray zones” in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. First of all, the aggravation itself, which occurred on the Imia Islands in 1996 in January, revealed political problems that subsequently developed into a “malignant tumor” and became one of the causes of the economic catastrophe of 2009 and the geopolitical “impoverishment” that followed today. Greece. The need for military reinforcement of the country became a pretext for political opportunists who were enriched at the expense of the Greek taxpayers, playing the role of “intermediaries” between the transnational defense giants and the Ministry of National Defense of Greece. The total “unbridledness” in the field of weapons programs, as well as the total kleptomania of the then Greek government, has reached incredible heights in all spheres. As a result, dozens of offshore companies, bank accounts in the country and abroad, through which “black money” received by bribery, as well as intermediary organizations (government, trade union, etc.) that contributed to whole, and, naturally, friendly states (for example, Germany), which took advantage of the black holes that were formed, in order today to start economic blackmail and discourse on the “impending thunderstorm Greek national sovereignty of death. " Of course, we should not forget about the invaluable "contribution" of Goldman Sachs, which transported, and in fact hid the huge amounts that were spent on armament, with the help of their "undeniable scientific methods", that is, the talented use of so-called swaps.
The scandals that exacerbated the situation of the Greek economy, together with usury-high interest rates of swaps (which Germany allegedly did not notice until today, trying to buy everything “for a penny”) have deep roots, not only economic, but also ideological ones, as regards the implementation of this “theft”. Therefore, it is impossible, firstly, to identify all organizations that participated in this “feast” and to analyze their activities (note that the judicial authorities had not yet been able to identify all cases of corruption before this article was written), and secondly, in detail analyze the ways in which the state was deprived of hundreds of billions of euros. Thus, the purpose of this article is to define the boundaries within which the community of criminal organizations operated, the economic damage suffered directly and indirectly by the Greek Republic, the nature of the applied justice, and of course, what cannot be avoided by silence - geopolitical resonance.
The hunt for the Greek "Red October": Akis, submarines and ENAE
The crown of Greek defense corruption on a truly Hollywood scale is admittedly the 214 submarine scandal associated with the activities of the Hellenic Shipyards shipyard in Scaramanga (ENAE). The case, which began at the end of 1990's, became like a television series, and then turned into a thriller, similar to the Hollywood blockbuster "The Hunt for Red October" with Sean Connery in the title role. In our unsuccessful version, the main role was played by (among other scandals, if not louder, then certainly not less) the former Minister of National Defense under the government of Kostas Simitis, Akis Tsokadzopulos.
Tsohadzopulos has become a fundamental element of what has been called "Deep Papandreistsky PASOK" in Greece (PASOK - Panhellenic Socialist Movement, founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, the ruling party in Greece in 1981-1989, 1993-2004 years 2009 and city.) . After the departure of Andreas Papandreu (the father of the current Greek Prime Minister), he actively sought to lead the party in the inner-party elections, which he eventually lost to the future Prime Minister Kostas Simitis.
Tsohadzopoulos, despite the fact that he ran for the chairman of the party and was subsequently defeated by Simitis, settled in the ministerial chair, namely in the Ministry of National Defense (1996-2001). Simitsi in the framework of the "modernization crusade" could not get around the "great old men" from the PASOK party of Andreas Papandreu, however, he had weak hopes that he could isolate them. As a result, the modernizers and Papandreists together ruined the country's economy and set the stage for the submission of Greece to the IMF.
Negotiations on the construction of German non-nuclear submarines of the 214 project began in 1996 and ended with the signing of the 012B / 2000 agreement, which involved the construction of four submarines, of which one (Papanikolis) was built in Germany at the HDW shipyard in Kiel, and the other three were built at the shipyard ENAE (program "Archimedes"). In addition, after signing the contract 021B / 2002, the same German and Greek companies undertook the repair and modernization of the old submarines of the Greek Navy project 209 / 1200 of the Poseidon type (the Neptune II program). The Minister of National Defense then was Jannos Papandoniu.
Before embarking on the labyrinth of bribery and the huge sums that the Greek state has lost, we must highlight some technical issues concerning the submarines under discussion. The 214 project is considered a modified version of the 212A project and existed only “on paper” until it was implemented in Greece and South Korea. The need for boats of the 214 project arose from the need to dive to deeper depths than in the Baltic, which is often found in the Aegean Sea. The boats of the 214 project are made in the recycled hull of the boats of the 209 project, specially modified to give the boat the best hydrodynamic characteristics and acoustic secrecy. What makes these boats advanced and forces the potential buyer to stop them is the air-independent power plant (AIP), based on the technology of an electrochemical generator based on the use of REM fuel cells developed by Siemens.
The 214 project boats, which were at the development stage, had high hopes, both in terms of technological innovations and in terms of its capabilities. At the same time, the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the agreement, first, as it turned out later, were not transparent, and secondly, they did not bring any specific compensating benefits, given the enormous cost of the contract, except for promises of new technologies, jobs, economic cooperation, etc. D. The tender passed (as often, if not always, it happened before, and continues to occur today) in the “extreme urgency” mode, and the powers were immediately transferred to the German company Ferrostal (now as part of TKMS). Subsequently, in 2009, as soon as the leadership in the Ministry of National Defense changed again and Evangelos Venizelos became Minister, the Neptune II program was changed; it now included only the modernization of one Greek boat of the 209 / 1200 project and the purchase of two new boats of the 214 project instead of the modernization of the two other boats of the 209 / 1200 project.
In this regard, a logical question arises: how is it possible that the Greek Navy urgently needs armament, and in the 1999 contract the submarines are to be surrendered after five years, and in fact the submarine (Papanikolis) surrenders 21 of December 2010? Secondly, with what calculations did the contract for the modernization of the 209 / 1200 submarines signed, if (as it turned out later) these ships were so old (the buildings of the early 1980's), which turned out to be more profitable to buy more 214 submarines ? Thirdly, why, despite the fact that the French company DCN, in collaboration with the Spanish Navantia, offered the lower cost of the project, presenting the submarine of the Scorpene project, in the end, preference was given to the 214 submarines?
The above questions were the starting point of the judicial thriller, which reached its peak in 2011 due to publications in foreign journals, such as Der Spiegel, investigations of Greek newspapers, such as “Cafemerini”, statements by Tsohadzopoulos in Der Spiegel magazine about ungrounded accusations (strangely, but he was acquitted), which ultimately led to the decision to prosecute the former minister for: 1) bribery and 2) to legalize the proceeds from illegal activities, as well as physical and moral complicity in legalizing of criminal activity.
As it turned out from an interview with the former Director General of the Department of Defense Investment and Armament of Greece Evangelos Vasilakos on Skai, Greece, the preliminary cost of the discussed submarines of the 214 project in 1996, when the negotiations began, was 924 million euros for four units. The company's offer in 1999 was 1,2 billion euros for three boats, and when Greece ordered a fourth in 2002, the cost increased to 1,7 billion euros (!!!). That is, in 2002, the damage (at least visible) for Greek taxpayers was approximately 800 million euros.
After an investigation conducted by Munich prosecutor Knoblauh, the Greek prosecutor’s office filed an accusation “pointing a finger” at the former minister as the top of the pyramid of bribes (shares) that were “distributed” by Dolmarton, Wilberforce, Inveco, etc. It is believed that these intermediaries the shares reached the amount in 300 million euros, and their final recipients were “their people” Tsohadzopoulos, as well as trade union leaders ENAE.
The deal with submarines did not end in 2002, and the expenses of the Greek state continued because of the negligence and panic fears that prevailed under the government of the New Democracy party, which came to power in 2004 to replace PASOK. And again we will quote one of Vasilakos’s statements in an interview: “... when they are engaged in price revisions, 1,7 billion can easily turn into, say, two.” In addition, according to Vasilakos, the so-called bridge financing added to the two (let's say ...) billions, that is, fines for intermediary companies for not receiving boats. They had to be paid through two swaps (again, just like in the time of Simitis), but for reasons that are known only to participants in the process, the attempt with swaps was not successful, and therefore the amounts were paid in full, and these amounts reached 200- 300 million euros (!!!).
The question is also logical: “why weren’t the submarines obtained?”. Boats project 214, being a new type, were exposed to "childhood diseases." The most obvious drawback was the roll that appeared at the boat during the ascent. This fact rightly did not like the Ministry of National Defense under the government of "New Democracy." To the question asked by Vasilakos to German manufacturers about what deviation is considered acceptable, the answer was received from the Germans - 90 degrees!
As it turned out later, the Germans had unsuccessfully installed a diesel exhaust silencer in the fence of the boat’s retractable devices so that combustion products could escape from there. As Georgios Tsimbukis, editor-in-chief of Stratigiki magazine, told us, this problem was solved after the Greek side proposed to discharge the products of combustion directly into the sea.
However, if “New Democracy” didn’t want to receive these boats, then why then Minister Meimarakis did not denounce the agreement as it should, once and for all get rid of the huge amount of the original contract and bridge financing costs (which would fit into the framework of reasonable and consistent with the logic of the relationship of the buyer-product)? This question remains unanswered. The only thing that can be assumed is, firstly, that Meimarakis did not want to deal with this issue (as well as any other matter that falls under the jurisdiction of his ministry), for fear of reputational loss, and secondly, that Siemens, which was already firmly rooted in the Greek weapons programs, took care of the financing of the Greek parties, so that the contracts were not given the reverse. All of the above - only assumptions, however, and the inactivity of Meimarakis when he was Minister of National Defense, and the existence of Siemens касс black cash lines ’, are well-known phenomena that have been discussed a thousand times not only in Greece, but also in other European countries, and also outside of Europe. The scandal around the submarines of the project 214 is inextricably linked with the trading activities of the shipyard ENAE.
History Hellenic Shipyards in Scaramanga (ENAE) starts with Stavros Niarhos. As reported in the report by Skai, “1 on April 1985. The shipyards that were in the possession of Stavros Niarhos for the last 25 years have been closed, and workers’ compensation has been assigned to 5600 for the fund of deposits and loans. After reaching an agreement and reducing the number of employees to 4500, the shipyards were placed at the disposal of the Greek state represented by the Greek Industrial Development Bank (ETVA). ”
During the reign of "New Democracy" in 1989-1993. Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis made three attempts to sell these shipyards, but none of them was unsuccessful. This “drama” came to an end when the new PASOK government with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou proposed a “Solomon solution” - the coexistence of ETVA bank and employees, so that 51% of shares belong to the bank, and 49% - to employees.
Thanks to the modernizer and Germanophile Kostas Simitis, things began to come to the desperate situation in which they are now. In 2002, HDW together with Ferrostaal bought Hellenic Shipyards for 6 million euros after Akis signed an agreement to build 214 submarines, and Jannos implemented the option to build a fourth boat and upgrade three 209 submarines / 1200. Kostas Aladzas and other journalists called these agreements "dowry" for HDW, without which the Germans would not have given even one euro to buy ENAE. And this is absolutely true, because in addition to Ferrostaal (which was not yet purchased by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems - TKMS), a host of other German companies, including Siemens and Blohm & Voss, began active operations in Greece, and specifically in the ENAE shipyards, programs "Archimedes" and "Neptune II". To put it more specifically, the then government did not even comply with simple conventions, signing on one and the same day the extension of the Neptune II program (upgrading three 209 / 1200 project boats and implementing an option to build the fourth 214 project boat) ENAE.
As it turned out, the Germans bought the shipyard "not to good." In 1997, a contract was signed between the Greek state railway company OSE and the then board of the ENAE shipyards (despite the fact that Siemens received the lion's share of the contracts) for the construction of railcars. According to the newspaper Elevferotypiya and Internet resource defencenet, OSE paid ENAE shipyards 500 million euros, but in 2003 the new owner of the latter (HDW) announced that it was impossible to complete the agreement, leaving the euro to hang in the air, 208 million euros needless to say, as forfeits.
Having performed an action that could not be called anything other than violent, 21 of September 2009 was by the German group ThyssenKrupp, together with the German board of ENAE, terminated the Neptune II agreement, just when there was a pre-election period in Greece, in effect embodying the phrase “feast during the plague. " After taking office, Veniselos, accompanied by Haris Pambukis, sat down at the negotiating table with the Germans to resolve the issue of the supply of submarines. There, he not only gave the green light to receiving the head boat Papanikolis with all its “childhood diseases”, but also made a new order for two additional boats of the 214 project instead of upgrading the two boats of the 209 / 1200 project specified in the previous agreement (one Okeanos boat of the 209 / 1200 project By that time, has already been upgraded). Naturally, he gave in on the question of penalties and agreed to contribute about a billion euros extra (!!!) to build two new boats of the 214 project (some sources limit the amount of 800 million euros, but the problem is to further increase the value of the contract signed in 2000, and in the apparent inability of the political authorities to treat this issue with due seriousness).
After this meeting, the Germans "softened" in terms of ENAE, and began negotiations to sell the shipyard to a new potential owner. Naturally, the future buyer absolutely “did not need to be informed” about the company's debts and claims from the OSE in the amount of 200 million euros.
ENAE was eventually sold to Abu Dhabi MAR from the United Arab Emirates (2010% shares) in 75, while ThyssenKrupp-HDW continued to hold 25% and acted as a subcontractor (the new owner company was listed as the main contractor). 70% Abu Dhabi MAR is owned by the royal family of Abu Dhabi, and 30% is owned by Privinvest Lebanese Iskandar Safa (incumbent managing director of the company).
Problems for Iskandar Safa began in the literal sense of the word "as soon as he crossed the threshold of his office." Nobody informed him about 200-million debt owed to OSE and about compensation to the employees of the ghost company, which, as mentioned above, went bankrupt. However, this was not to be Safa’s main headache. 1 December 2010. He received a letter from the European Anti-Monopoly Committee, which monitored ENAE since 1998 in connection with state funding for ENAE through ETBA. The letter was drafted based on a review of a statement by another Greek shipyard Elefsis Shipyards (planning to build new French frigates FREMM in cooperation with the French association DCNS) about illegal additional funding from Hellenic Shipyards and, in fact, unfair competition. The fine imposed on Hellenic Shipyards by a committee decision was 1 for 2010 in October, together with interest for 539 million euros.
After these discoveries, Safa demanded an explanation from the Greek government, but in reality he received only 132 million euros (this was the so-called “trifle”, as Venizelos later put it) for the amended Neptune II treaty, as well as proceedings with the European Committee , in the end, imposed, among other things, the following restriction, which turned out to be the most severe: “ENAE should not engage in any non-military activity in the next 15 years”. Thus, to the already existing Hellenic Shipyards fine from OSE was added a decision prohibiting any business activity other than building ships for the Greek Navy.
Safa, beside himself with the outcome of the “tragedy”, kept 132 million euros (“trifle”) and did not give the Germans any of this amount, because they were the perpetrators of the situation in which he fell. Subsequently, the Germans, who throughout all events behaved as “bad loosers” (we use the English term here), again terminated the contract, retaining not only the 25% of the contract and the role of the subcontractor, but also the technical information necessary to continue the construction of two new submarines of the 214 project and for testing the submarines of the 214 Katsonis, Pipinos and Matrozos project already built in Scaramanga under the Archimedes program, as well as the upgraded 209 / 1200 Okeanos submarines.
The checkmate to the Greek government (as well as Safa) and at the same time the damage caused by the blow to the first one is incalculable, while the second expresses the intention to stay in Greece and challenge the decision of the European Committee in court. However, he was already very exhausted by attempts to convince the government to pay the debt in 200 (or even more) million euros in the case of the OSE company, since the government is firmly in the position of “check money without departing from the cash register”. And although, judging by recent reports, Safa still came to an agreement with the Germans on the Neptune II Treaty, the current leadership of the Greek Ministry of National Defense (Panos Beglitis) makes statements like this: “There can be no extortion that we do not distribute the dowry, and all the dowry hunters are over for the Ministry of National Defense. "
Continuation of the crime, "The further sins of the fathers": "Leopards without claws"
In 2003, after the sinful years of the rule of Akis, the Greek military department was targeted Tanks Leopard 2 manufactured by the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegman (KMW). We must emphasize here that the choice of them, as well as the choice of project 214 submarines, was not at all bad. Just the opposite.
Leopard 2 in all versions is considered if not the best, then certainly one of the leading military vehicles in the world. The original agreement with the Greek state provided for the purchase of 500 tanks Leopard 2HEL - the amount due to which the contract value soared to incredible heights. In the end, on second thought, the then government with Jannos Papandoniu as Minister of National Defense decided to purchase 170 machines.
In addition, in Germany were purchased 183 used tank Leopard 2A4 (of 250 thousand. Euros per car), 82 used tank Leopard 1A5 (for nothing), 12 Armored Recovery Vehicle Buffel (on Leopard 2 chassis), 36 armored recovery Standard machines (on the Leopard 1 chassis), Leguan tank bridge construction machines 8 (on the Leopard 1 chassis), Biber tank tankers 10 (on the Leopard 1 chassis), a training system for fire training with four tank towers, two trainers with a trainer trainer trainer with four tank towers, two trainer trainers, 4 trainers, 4 trainers, 4 trainers, 4 trainers, a trainer, 4 trainers, 4 trainers, and one trainer. during the first two years, cn special tools, control systems, etc.
It was envisaged that the national defense industry of Greece would take part in the joint production of Leopard 2HEL machines (the participation share in the joint production of 557 million euros), and the imported part should not exceed 50% of the value of each specific contract. The main factor that influenced this decision was considered to be high Greek value added, since, according to preliminary estimates, 665 new jobs should have appeared, and among the companies that were supposed to take part in the process (and therefore, receive technical information) , listed by ELBO, EBO, INTRACOM, MILTECH, SONAK, VALPAK, Hellas Tracks and Thallis. Offset (a term that dangerously differs in all signed contracts) included:
Additional subcontracting for national industries, in addition to co-production activities;
Provision of equipment and technical data to defense enterprises for joint production;
Provision of 235 to Leopard 1A5 tanks, technical information and equipment for their use, as well as other modern equipment for their maintenance;
Construction of the required number of hangars for the parking of purchased machines, as well as facilities for storing equipment;
Buildings for accommodation of professional military who will be engaged in equipment.
At first glance, this seems like a “fair deal”, but the details, which later became clear, completely devalued weapon, which in the literal sense of the word was supposed to revolutionize the Greek Armed Forces. As Vasilakos acknowledged in the Skai channel interview that has been mentioned many times, KMW offered the Greek government to buy 246 Leopard 2HEL tanks, together with ammunition, for the sum of 2,2 billion euros. Instead, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy under the Greek government chose to buy 170 machines for 1,7 billion euros, but without ammunition.
Any sane person understands that when a country buys a weapon, it does so not in order to exhibit it at parades, but in order to improve its geostrategic position. If we assume that Leopard tanks will have to be used in actual combat conditions, is it possible to hope that “the enemy will see them, get scared and run, and the weapon will not have to shoot even once”?
Political "commanders" did not fail to enter into the contest on spears. The future Minister of National Defense (before Meimarakis took the post), and then the deputy and head of the defense department of the New Democracy, made a speech about the lack of transparency in feline armored vehicles negotiations, especially stressing that the share of middlemen is 60 million Euro Spiljopoulos stated directly that the cost of the program was overestimated by at least 30%, and in connection with the shares, he pointed to IBOS (based in Monaco) and EVANSTON (registered in the British Virgin Islands) offshore companies. In his turn, Yannis Papandoniou answered that all this was “ridiculous,” “empty air shaking,” “not serious childish statements”; in connection with the decisions of the government, he noted that "we have no reason to condemn anyone." He called the “natural” increase in the value of the contract, explaining that by fluctuations in the exchange rate of the local currency to the euro with 1994 (when negotiations began) on 2003. He also said that the companies mentioned were completely unknown to him, and “tearing off his clothes” He called it absolutely unbelievable that they were used to enrich government organizations, since the agreement was concluded on the terms of the German side. However, the result remained the same, i.e. the “shares” approached 3% of the total contract amount. As for the overpriced value, it was recognized by the German company itself when the government of New Democracy resumed contract negotiations, and KMW offered an additional supply of weapons and related products in the amount of 100 million euros.
These data appeared due to the investigation of the newspaper “Kafimerini”, which in one of the issues for May 2010 published the following information obtained on the basis of a huge amount of documents collected by it: “The works for which specific shares were paid to intermediaries concerned various areas, from technical support simulators for managing purchased equipment (share of 10% intermediaries) and total work package worth over 10 million euros, before retrofitting 1 million euro machines (share of 27% intermediaries) and Leopard 3 machines and XNUM agreements 017 / 1 worth 01 million euros (share of middlemen 237%) ".
Further, the study provides the following information: “Offset deals reached the cost of 50 million euros for the“ works ”themselves and were divided between 10 by Greek, German and French companies, and the share of intermediaries fluctuated around 5%, i.e. approximately 2,5 million euros. In total, for 16 contracts between the Ministry of National Defense and a number of Greek and German companies “around” Wegman, whose value is close to 324 million euros, the share of intermediaries exceeded the amount of 10 million euros. The Liberian company GRAMONT Services LTD, founded by 3 February 1998 in the same law office in Athens, played a central role in this rampage of intermediary shares ... This practice continued with the supply of weapons of the new generation Leopard 2HEL. Intermediary interest was paid twice a year to a Cypriot company that had accounts in the People’s Bank of Cyprus (Laiki Bank) in the Nicosia office ... The most important of these contracts is the one for the PzH 2000 artillery, worth 237 million euros. Of the 2% intermediary share, approximately the former head of the General Directorate of Armament received approximately 1%. Deutsche Elno, which participated in an offset transaction worth approximately 1 million euros, placed some amount of intermediary share or on accounts in Cyprus or in checks, which could easily be traced (if desired) by the Special Control Service ... "
Another major issue - the problem of the "claws of the cat family", that is, ammunition - is simply simply "lost" in history; here and the planned share of intermediaries, and the government’s abdication of the words of its predecessors, and the resulting waivers of offset deals and even 5000 shells that Greece received with the purchase of Leopard 2A4 tanks, and, of course, the direct and indirect pressure applied during all political and military circles — in short, the Endless story, as defensivenet’s site very aptly defines. Without any transition (because everything is so confused that it is impossible to avoid inconsistency) let us briefly say that 17 in January 2008. Meimarakis signed an order to purchase 50 thousands of 120-mm armor-piercing sub-caliber shots of German-made Rheinmetall DM63 (German-made 30) mm tank cumulative cumulative shots ATK M120A830 (American) for the Leopard 1 series tanks. Their value reached 2 million euros. Attempts were made within the framework of the offset agreement to involve the Greek industry in the production of these shots, and at some point everything indicated that the greatest ammunition problem in the world (that is, the Greek one) would be resolved safely. The end, however, was not so prosperous, as the Vasilakos mentioned for unexplained reasons to this day stated that "it is impossible to conclude interstate agreements with these two countries [Germany and the USA], because this contradicts the immutable Greek conditions."
As a result, 15 in October 2008. The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy under the Greek government adopted a decree No. 13 on the implementation of the program, again announcing an open tender for the supply of tank ammunition. From 2008 to the present day, the Greek armed forces are content with 3500 with DM33A2 armor-piercing sabot shells left over from the 5000 mentioned, bought with Leopard 2A4 tanks. In all likelihood, the topic “was reloaded”, as can be learned from the publications of the specialized Greek edition, literally in September 2011, that is, simultaneously with the writing of this article. Namely, the purchase of 4500 armor-piercing DM53A1 sub-caliber shots from the stocks of the armed forces of the Netherlands, which are liquidating their tank fleet, which were originally offered at a price of 2500 euros per unit, is now expected from the stocks of the armed forces of the Netherlands. This offer also includes 4500 training armor-piercing DM48 sub-caliber shots. In addition, negotiations are continuing with the German concern Rheinmetal on the purchase of an additional 9000 armor-piercing sub-caliber shots DM63 and 3000 of fragmentation-cumulative shots DM12A2. Negotiations are delayed, as the Germans estimate each projectile in 5350 euro (!). Finally, in the near future, a gratuitous supply from the US 3000 armed forces of M830 tank fragmentation-cumulative shots from stocks in Kuwait is expected. Naturally, we cannot say with certainty when exactly these shells will be received, or whether they will be received at all.
Army aviation, military aviation and air traffic: theft extends to the entire spectrum of the armed forces
The envelope concerning the medium-sized NH90 helicopters was opened in 2004, and the study has shown that it is still “lying in the table”. The need for the supply of transport helicopters arose after the incident on Imii in 1996 due to the need for the transfer of troops to these disputed islands located in the so-called. "Gray areas". No one doubts the need to purchase transport helicopters, and even in greater quantities than was ordered, since in the event of a hypothetical conflict, it will be necessary to transfer troops to a hot spot as soon as possible. However, this does not mean that you need to purchase the latest transport helicopters at exorbitant prices; and yet they were later purchased, but did not cover the need for the transfer of military units.
We are talking about the helicopters NH90 Eurocopter, which were included in the Greek procurement budget for 2001-2005. The plans concerned the purchase of an XTUM variant transport helicopter with four sets of medical evacuation equipment and four special-purpose helicopters, along with spare parts for initial maintenance, bibliography and training programs. The total purchase price was ... 16 675 523 euros (!!!), i.e. Greece paid 069 million euros for each helicopter, while it could buy Eurocopter Super Puma or Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters that had already proved themselves 33-10 million euros per car. However, let's take a closer look at one of the “most attractive deals”.
29 August 2003, that is, on the day of the order of NH90 helicopters, the Greek state made an advance payment of 40%, despite the fact that the usual prepayment is at the most 20%. The ministry’s initial forecast was 15% (by 5% per year) of the total cost, but this turned out to be only well-intentioned, since 40% was finally paid out, moreover, in just two months. Naturally, there was no shortage of objections from the future Minister Spillotopoulos, but the answer to the question of how and on what grounds the army is transferred from Bell UH-1H and AB.204 / 205 helicopters to NH90, was well argued. It seemed that the inspection commission organized later, under the direction of Alexis Zorbas, was in step with the interests of justice, but this road led only to the table. Here we will present some of the glaring points of this route, which were published in the magazine "Strategies" in April 2007.
The helicopters that were going to order, had to, according to the requirements of the military, carry 1300 people in one flight;
The Supreme Military Council was offered a choice between Sikorsky H-92 and NH Industries / Eurocopter NH90 helicopters;
In the end, the NH90 helicopter was chosen, and, of course, it was decided to implement the project immediately, as this helicopter was at the testing stage, and found that more time might be needed (obvious excuses for immediate implementation);
The primary supply order, which was signed by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Minister Papandoniu, included the delivery of 32 transport helicopters of the new generation (with an option for four more helicopters), as well as four medical helicopters and six special-purpose helicopters.
We reported on how this agreement was drafted above, and it is worthwhile to emphasize once again the complete lack of elementary choice in the negotiation process. The results, along with the proposed points for new negotiations, are extremely numerous and indicative, but for this study we summarize and give the darkest moments of a dishonest and superficial agreement signed on dubious and to this day not certain conditions.
The Scandinavian countries bought NH90 helicopters for 20 million euros per unit, why did the Greek government have to pay 33 million?
The confirmation order was issued a day after the presentation of the minutes of the negotiations, and the latter was not sent to the authorized consulting bodies, due to the high cost of the contract and its features.
While the decision on the immediate implementation of the purchase in addition to the time factor, was also based on the intention to participate in the joint production of the helicopter at the request of the NAHEMA (NATO Helicopter Design and Development and Logistics Agency), this application was never filed! That is, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy deceived the state or did it give orders that were never executed?
The initial requirement for Greek value added was 10% of the contract amount, but then it was reduced to 1,19% (!!!).
It was assumed that funding would come from the armament budget, but eventually a SWAP Agreement financing program was drawn up, which increased the contract value by about 41,6 million euros (in fact, two swap operations were carried out).
Probably the worst result was that Greece signed the 29 article, which stipulates that if the option is exercised, the cost of supplying a transport helicopter and a special-purpose helicopter will be 30,2 and 32,9 million euros, respectively, instead of initial prices in 28,5 and 31,2 million euros.
Truly amazing originality, as stated by the editor of journal research, Jannis Petridis.
After long delays, given that the contract was signed in 2003, it was not until June of 2011 that Greece began to receive the first NH90 helicopters. Eurocopter, at least, offered a discount to the Greek state in the amount of 17% of the original value of the contract due to delays in the supply, but the problem is not only this and this does not end there. It consists in the criminal manipulation of agreements, in the appropriation by some organizations of part of the profits to the detriment of the Greek state, the inability to denounce the contract and the complete impunity of companies bearing only “political responsibility”, which of course they forget.
To complete the story of the scandals (only known) in the field of armaments, you need to report those that erupted around the ASPIS II complexes for the Greek Air Force.
The procurement program of the on-board ASPIS II defense complexes (USPs) manufactured by Raytheon, an American corporation, to equip the latest Lockheed Martin F-16C / D Block 52 + fighter planes of the Greek Air Force is a continuation of the BKO ASPIS I program for Greek F-16 Block 30 / 50 fighters (80 ASPIS systems) I were shipped from 1997 to 1999.). The Defensenet portal reported the following information:
“The ASPIS II contract includes the supply of 60 airborne defense complexes consisting of the ALR-93 (V) radiation warning receiver, the ALQ-187 active jamming station, the ALE-47 automatic passive jamming automatic system and the digital radio frequency (RF) system with records in memory. The US company Raytheon received an advance payment of $ 64,6 million (242 million dollars - the total contract value announced in April 2003) from the Department of Defense in 2003 to begin production of a complete set of AUV ASPIS II for F-Fighter jets 16C / D Block 52 +, which are in service. "
Four years later, it turned out that Raytheon was not able to cope with the technical shortcomings of the BKO ASPIS II, and the corresponding aircraft of the Greek Air Force were left without a defense system, while other systems somehow installed on the F-16C / D Block 52 +.
Summarizing and summarizing all the above, we pay attention to the following points.
Now Greece is mired in a quagmire, primarily economic, and one of the reasons for this situation was the predatory attacks by government and non-governmental elements that devastated the state treasury. These elements have not yet been punished for their actions, which can be equated even with high treason. Although Akis Tsohadzopulos was expelled from parliament, the Court of Cassation recently ruled that the Tsohadzopulos case does not fall under his authority, but under the authority of the Criminal Court, but only if it is proved that Tsohadzopulos was involved in laundering black revenues. All this means that neither Tsohadzopulos nor Simitis, who was a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy under the government together with the current Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou and Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos, will be punished. Along with them Spilotopoulos, Meimarakis and Papandoniu, who carry only “political responsibility canceled after the statute of limitations”, go unpunished.
Therefore, Greece faces the next choice. It may remain in the vicious circle of government crimes and inaction of the people, face to face with scandals of unprecedented scale. On the other hand (and this is much more complicated), according to the ancient myth of Hercules, it can take the path of virtue, the union of the West and the post-Soviet world, in the framework of initiatives of cooperation between the USA and Russia, as well as the Lisbon Treaty. Greece can, subject to revision of both political and military doctrine, implement the armaments programs proposed by Russia (BMP-3 and others), so that the new weapons are used in coordination with Western-style weapons in combat operations; Thus, it is possible to achieve new opportunities for waging war in the framework of the so-called Hybrid Warfare.
Thus, the geopolitical position of Greece will improve so much that it will become a real link on the world map and a new barrier (in cooperation with Israel and under the control of great powers) on the path of Islamic extremism, which is gaining momentum every day thanks to the processes in the Middle East. However, this scenario seems to be more and more utopian, as Germany enslaves Greece economically, using Greece’s dependence on various organizations participating in the crime, who from the very beginning were henchmen of the federalist policy of ascending regional German hegemony.