Military Review

Break through the wall without breaking a head. CH 1.

Is it possible to break through the wall without smashing your head? The positional war led to the establishment of continuous positional fronts - the breach of which was associated with increased losses and required special tactics. We want to talk about the specifics of the offensive during a positional war - based on the experience of the offensive operations of the Russian army 1915 - 1917. and special tactical instructions developed on their basis.

1. Russian trenches in Poland. It was in the autumn - winter of 1914 on the Russian front that the first (yet temporary) establishment of positional fronts took place.

The attack of a fortified position in a positional warfare was characterized by the following features that distinguish it from the offensive during a period of maneuverable combat operations.

1. Any offensive operation of this period was to capture not one, but to assault no less than 2-3 reinforced lanes - and the capture of each of them required serious and thorough preparation. Thus, the operation acquired a protracted and complex nature.

2. Mastering a single line of enemy trenches did not provide a tactical victory — the defender, pulling reserves to the next line, could counterattack to reject the attacker and reduce all his previous successes to zero. It is necessary to master the whole fortified strip. Accordingly, the assault on each defensive line could not be gradual - otherwise the enemy, using a pause, would restore the situation. Thus, this is a long (and at the same time energetic) process consisting of interconnected and carefully calculated stages.

3. During the assault, the attacker's troops suffer heavy losses, his units, located in enemy trenches and message moves, are mixed up - respectively, the management becomes much more complicated. Therefore, the part that made a breakthrough or stopped by enemy resistance before the capture of the entire fortified zone cannot be considered combat-ready. Moreover, the injection into this part of the reserves will not give anything - a new onslaught must be made in absolutely fresh parts. Weakened by the battle and frustrated regiments are required not to reinforce, but to replace, taking them to the reserve (and, if possible, to put in order, and to a deeper rear).

4. Accordingly, it is necessary to echelon the troops in depth and have strong reserves.

5. Attention artillery - the main tool of the attacker - forks. When fighting for fortified positions, artillery must work on two targets — manpower and defensive structures.

2. An indispensable attribute of the positional period of hostilities. Powerful dugout in a full profile trench.

The attack in the context of positional warfare was very difficult and risky, since: a) strong defenses of the defender required systematic artillery preparation, meticulous work of artillery and a large number of projectiles; b) strong and organized enemy fire required thorough engineering preparation of the attack and the creation of artificial approaches to enemy positions — to effectively overcome the sweep space; c) the development of the defense system on the front and in depth required a well-thought-out plan of attack, special training of troops, supply of infantry with strong escort artillery and a clear system of artillery training; d) a special role was assigned to aerial reconnaissance and fire adjustment; e) the concentration of a huge number of shells, guns, engineering property, etc. required a proper degree of development of communication routes - both for the transfer of reserves and for the ammunition supply of forces and means already brought into battle.

Moreover, the complex preparatory work unmasks the intentions of the attacker. Accordingly, the most important task was to carefully observe the secrets in preparing for the operation and the implementation of a whole complex of disguise measures. After all, it is enough for the defender, who promptly discovered the preparation of the offensive by the enemy, to bring in a sufficient amount of additional artillery in order to doom the attacker who lost the fire superiority of the offensive.

But sometimes the desire to keep secret the preparatory activities leads to other extremes - for example, the command of the Russian 7 Army, preparing the winter operation 1915 on the river. Strype, in order to maintain tactical surprise, forbade reconnaissance of enemy positions.

The too severe restriction of intelligence that took place in the winter operation 1915 on Stryp (7-I Army) and in the Naroch operation 1916 (2-I Army) was sometimes replaced by the ratio of a completely opposite order. Thus, during the period of the Baranovichi operation (4 Army) in May 1916, the Polish rifle division was put forward in the first line - and on the very first night several dozen people ran over to the side of the enemy - and gave the Germans valuable information about the upcoming Russian offensive.

The most important problem in a positional war was the question of the interaction of infantry with artillery. Combat experience has found that no artillery preparation is able to adequately pave the way for the advancing infantry, especially in conditions of an increased depth of defense. Therefore, the infantry had to operate as autonomously as possible, having in its combat formations escort artillery and trench guns, as well as devices for the destruction of man-made obstacles. For example, special scissors, axes, hand grenades and pyroxylin cartridges on special poles were used to lay the aisles in the wire obstacles. Existing regulations found it desirable to have 25-30 width passes on the basis of 3-4 passage to the battalion. The wolf pits were first thrown with bundles of brushwood or straw, and on top - bags of earth.

The infantry must be well trained in the fight against machine-gun nests, guns, resistance nodes, positions on reverse slopes, etc. If you had to overcome several lines of artificial obstacles, it was necessary to create intermediate lines connected to the rear through communications. Accordingly, it was recommended to include in the assault columns units, armed with hand grenades, shovels, axes, blasting agents. Attacked and detachments sapper. The teams of the “trench cleaners” were important - they had to clear the recaptured positions from the residual groups of enemy fighters. These teams were armed with hand grenades, revolvers, carbines, daggers and lances, and also supplied with pocket electric lanterns.

When storming enemy positions, it was recognized that it was necessary: ​​1) to achieve an advantage in fire, 2) to destroy artificial obstacles, 3) by successful maneuver through the achieved breakthroughs to go to the flank and rear of those sectors and combat groups of the enemy that are still holding.

But if the obstacles could not be neutralized, the offensive stopped, the troops dug in - additional machine guns and melee weapons were pulled up to the battle line, actions with handguns and rifle grenades began, and artillery resumed artillery preparation. But the effect of tactical surprise was lost - and the “gnawing” of the enemy’s defensive positions began.

Of particular importance in the conduct of an offensive battle in a positional war was the uninterrupted supply of the attacking units with ammunition and technical means, as well as the skillful handling of reserves. It was also important to correctly calculate the time needed to solve the tasks. After all, the offensive operation included a series of successive stages, at each of which the question of feeding the operation with reserves and ammunition was of lasting importance.

The troops assigned to the breakthrough and ensuring the use of the breakthrough are the strike or the breakthrough group, and the troops entering the breakthrough and intended to develop and use the breakthrough by striking the enemy’s flanks and rear are a maneuverable group.

But a breakthrough is only the first (albeit the most important) stage of an offensive operation in a positional war. Equally important were the stages of development of the breakthrough and consolidation of the occupied territory.

An offensive battle at the stage of positional warfare demanded increased tactical independence from soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers.

Given the importance of the tactical surprise factor, it was necessary to minimize the duration of artillery preparation while maximizing its effectiveness. Timing and the presence of a clear system in the conduct of artillery fire were an important guarantee of success - the concentration of the guns of necessary calibers, the distribution of targets, the determination of the required volume of ammunition and careful reconnaissance of objects were of key importance. For example, it is important to point defeat defenses, but no less important and the shelling of the entire combat zone of the enemy - the enemy soldiers could hide from the shelling in random trenches, craters from shells, etc.

A significant circumstance for ensuring tactical surprise was the accelerated and secretive transfer, as well as high-quality disguise of fire weapons. It was taken into account that the artillery on a horse-drawn traction passes 60-70, and on a mechanical trap (“tractor artillery”) - 100-200 km per night. Proper subordination of artillery capacities was also important for the effectiveness of the offensive operation, also because the passages made in the wire barriers accurately indicated the enemy's direction of impact, and additional fire support was required for the infantry in such sectors.

Finally, the methodology of artillery preparation and infantry escort of infantry significantly influenced the effectiveness of the offensive operation. For example, the Germans formed a movable barrage of two elements - after heavy fire of heavy artillery, followed by a fire shaft of light artillery, followed by the advancing infantry. Combat experience has shown that when attacking a fortified position, the speed of the fire shaft should not exceed 1-1,5 km per hour, and at the same time move in jumps along 150-200 meters. Of particular importance was the fire of chemical ammunition. And the exact calculation of artillery was of paramount importance in a positional war.

3. Attack. Autumn 1914 East Prussia.

In the battle of the 2 Army Corps near Dobronouc, the firing area was a valley in 9 km along the front and 3,5 km in depth. It was necessary to take into account the enemy’s batteries, which are located to the right and to the left of the breakout area of ​​5 km - this was of paramount importance in the course of the struggle for fire superiority. T. o. the whole front of the fight for fire superiority was no less than 19 - 20 km. But the power of the enemy fortifications required the presence of large artillery forces - no less than 45 guns per 1 kilometer of the front of the attack, while the 9 army could allocate all 211 guns to this area. I had to find ways to do a big deal with small means - to solve the problem using the method of gradual transfer of fire. It was also necessary to fight the enemy’s artillery - on the firing range of 19 km, the Austrians had up to 100 guns, artillery of the 2 divisions. It was impossible to crush all these weapons. The task was solved by the Russian gunners as follows: first, the enemy’s observation posts, which had lost contact with their batteries, were crushed, so the batteries, which were south of the front of the attack, were inactive at the most important time. The fact that the Austrian batteries, which stood opposite the northern flank of the attack, were located in the ravines, was also taken into account. They were first defused with gases fired along the valley of the stream, and then finished off with chemical shells. T. o. fire superiority was achieved - despite the artillery power, which clearly did not meet the requirements of the problem to be solved.

Careful organization of fire fighting led to the fact that the attack was very successful - and on the very first day the infantry passed on 2 - 3 km into the depths of the enemy defense. In the future, the efforts of the artillery focused on actions against heights - and the corps gradually mastered them. This determined the final defeat of the Austrians.

4. These were such powerful defensive positions that the Russian army had to break through during positional hostilities.

A completely different situation took shape at the front of the 7 Army in December 1915. In the fight of the 2 Army Corps near Dobropol, the firing area was a height of about 8 km and a depth of 4 km - covering the entire valley of the r. Stryp. The organization of the battle required the presence of at least 300 guns - and there were only 150 of them. Attempts to attack the fortified position of the enemy on the front in 2 - 4 km without taking into account its batteries on the flanks of the breakthrough section (due to the lack of artillery support means) were invariably stopped by the flank fire of the Austrians.

The experience of the war on the Russian front proved the possibility, with the availability of airborne surveillance equipment, to conduct a successful battle with enemy artillery. This experience showed how coherence and interaction of artillery with aviation must be achieved in order to shoot 2 - 3 targets per hour (the norm of joint work of artillery and aviation). In Russian artillery, an artillery reconnaissance service was organized in 1916.

Of great importance was the area on which the batteries operated. So, in the 24 battle in May 1916, the terrain was commanded by the enemy. But the enemy occupied its base — and behind its trenches, the terrain for the length of 2 km rose to a height prepared for defense, but occupied only by reserves. Russian positions covered the location of the enemy arc. In this area, it was possible to identify the observation points of the enemy and the location of all of its 4 batteries covering the defense area. As a result, the Russian gunners managed to quickly achieve fire superiority, the enemy’s batteries and infantry were neutralized, and the Russian infantry carried out a complete breakthrough of the enemy’s front in a two-day battle. The situation was similar during the actions of the 80 Infantry Division in the Prut operation 1915.

In a positional war, quantitative superiority over enemy artillery was the most important guarantee of success. The French norm indicated that this requires the fire of 12 guns for 12-18 minutes at the positions of each identified enemy battery. Russian requirements were more modest - for a successful fight against the enemy's battery, it was considered sufficient to have 1,5 own batteries, i.e. Xnumx guns. In this case, for 9 - 15 minutes of work, the division will destroy the enemy's 20 batteries.

Because of the relative quantitative poverty of the Russian artillery, she was given the task of not destroying the enemy’s battery, but only neutralizing it. And for this it was enough and the 0,5 battery on the enemy's 1 battery - 2 projectile, falling every minute on the enemy battery, will not allow gunners to approach the guns.

And while 1 1 was attacked on the Somme on July 1916 400000 shells, or 8 thousand tons of metal (or 27 trains on 30 cars), the Russian troops spend 145 howitzer and 455 light shells on the Dobronouc breakout to train attacks, having in stock 280 howitzer and 380 light shells on the gun - only about 75000 shells.

Each order required careful expenditure of shells. Thus, the commander of the 6 heavy field artillery brigade, Colonel V.F. Kirey, writes an 21 order from 1916 in May: “I forbid shooting bursts”, “I forbid shooting and shooting with fans”. T. o. - each shot at the target, each shot - with the adjustment. The shells were distributed "in a teaspoon" to the gun, but each shell had to produce a certain effect.

Not only a small number of shells, but also the hard experience of 1915, when the artillery took up the position in order to detain the enemy, with only 15 - 20 shells on the battery - all this brought up the personnel of the Russian artillery in the spirit of austerity shells. In battles on Rotten Lime 1915, the 10 artilleryman tried it once, 10 once checked the correctness of his calculations - before releasing a projectile. The artilleryman was accustomed to choose the target tactically necessary, learned to distribute his unfortunate 15 shells, while still leaving some of them - “just in case”. In 1916, when the mobilized industry began to produce a fairly significant amount of products, strict discipline of artillery fire still prevailed at the front, and the personnel of the artillery already had the necessary tempering - based on the sad experience of 15. They began to look skeptical at methodical shooting, at the shelling of squares from the side of German artillery, with the consciousness of their own superiority — as unacceptable licentiousness. Each weapon was corrected, gunpowder and fuse marks were studied, 1000 and 1 methods were used - in order to spend the minimum amount of shells on a target. The expenditure of 10-ti shells to zero on one target was considered a disgrace. Artillery technician spent the day and spent the night on the batteries, continuously checking the guns. Shells cleaned, sorted, lubricated. We worked intensively on maps, checked them by aerial photographs. All this was done with the sole purpose - to reduce the consumption of projectiles.

But Russian artillery acted excellently and in such conditions - for all its poverty, it was distinguished by extraordinary flexibility and ability to solve difficult tasks with a very small amount of ammunition, with a lack of communication equipment, and with no centralized tactical leadership.

To be continued
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  1. Adjutant
    Adjutant 12 March 2018 06: 09
    It is difficult to carry out offensive operations against such a defense - and even with the saving of ammunition.
    But they learned how to break through the Austrian fronts in 1916, and the German fronts in 1917. Moreover, if the Western armies could fall asleep with tons of metal, then our gunners had to count everything, save and hit exactly at the poppy. That is why our gunners are the best.
    1. Brutan
      Brutan 12 March 2018 06: 51
      According to the Austrians - Strypa (December 15) is unsuccessful and the Brusilovsky breakthrough is successful.
      According to the Germans, Naroch was unsuccessful, and the summer breakthrough of 17 years at the Zapfronta was realized. They did not develop current for well-known reasons.
      It is very interesting to follow the analysis of the tactics of the offensive in a positional war, to see the development of the process.
      The material is detailed and interesting, I look forward to continuing hi
      1. Razvedka_Boem
        Razvedka_Boem 12 March 2018 10: 12
        It is very interesting to follow the analysis of the tactics of the offensive in a positional war, to see the development of the process.

        As far as I remember, just the Brusilovsky breakthrough became a milestone in the tactics of breaking through the fortified districts.
        I think the author will devote this attention in the following articles.
        1. XII Legion
          XII Legion 12 March 2018 10: 18
          I also hope that he will
          In fact, the totality of ALL breakthroughs during a series of operations (successful and unsuccessful) allowed us to gain experience in the tactics of breaking through positional defense.
          Negatives gradually got rid of, and came to the desired result.
          1. Brutan
            Brutan 12 March 2018 10: 32
            The crown of course was the Summer Offensive of 1917 (it also included the experience of the Brusilovsky breakthrough of 1916) - especially from the point of view of the use of artillery (a series of articles by The Artillery Standard recently came in handy).
          2. Monarchist
            Monarchist 12 March 2018 14: 08
            "allowed to gain experience in the tactics of breaking through the positional defense" as a rule, this experience was gained at the cost of heavy losses.
            In the Second World War, a similar situation was repeated again. Once a front-line soldier told me: in the fall of 1941, when the battery had 25-30 shells, they felt like "bourgeois". I read at Drabkin how one battalion commander in 1944 picked up the trophy ones and was no longer worried about the use of shells. So in the autumn of 1944, it was liquid with our shells
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 12 March 2018 07: 08
    It is good that there were no battles such as the Verdun meat grinder on the Russian front.
    Even the Kovel meat grinder arranged by Brusilov could not be compared with Western ...
  3. Mik13
    Mik13 12 March 2018 08: 11
    An important circumstance for ensuring tactical surprise was an accelerated and covert transfer, as well as high-quality camouflage of fire weapons. It was taken into account that horse-drawn artillery passes 60-70, and mechanically ("tractor artillery") - 100-200 km per night.

    These are absolutely unrealistic figures even for the 1940's. Horse-drawn artillery is capable of covering 20-25 km per day.
    It should be noted that the composition of the artillery convoy includes not only guns, but also ammunition.
    1. OAV09081974
      12 March 2018 08: 19
      Real numbers
      Forced to clarify as the author.
      They were taken not from the ceiling, but from studies of front-line practitioners of Russian artillery based on combat experience.
      In 20-30 many special studies of professionals published in the periodical press of the USSR were published.
      That I am not unfounded - neither in this nor in other cases
      1. Albatroz
        Albatroz 12 March 2018 09: 14
        Real numbers

        Definitely. And indeed, our gunners showed in that war that "the impossible is possible."
        Of course, one can argue in the 21st century - what is possible and real there and what is not. But before the testimony of eyewitnesses and the works of really high-class specialists of those years, arguments like
        These are absolutely unreal numbers.
        grow dim.
        In 20-30 many special studies of professionals published in the periodical press of the USSR were published.

        Moreover, works came out - for example, artillery in a positional war.
        Thank you for the quality material. hi
        1. OAV09081974
          12 March 2018 09: 30
          I remember my first exam on the 1 course - on the discipline History of the Ancient World.
          One student of our group answered - and something told the teacher. To which the latter says: "I don’t know something like that." And then the student replied: "If you do not know this, then this does not mean that it was not." I will not say that after this exam the teacher did with our group ( wassat ) but the moral in general is obvious.
          I do not know what they are used to on this site, but I did not take a single figure from the ceiling.
          So accustomed. Yes, science is different and impossible. Therefore, if the links (so as not to clutter up the text) and are not always indicated, this does not mean that they are not there.
          Thank you, Lieutenant Teterin and other respected colleagues. hi !
      2. Mikado
        Mikado 12 March 2018 11: 46
        In 20-30 many special studies of professionals published in the periodical press of the USSR were published.

        yes, a lot of work came out. Old, still tsarist professionals did their utmost in analyzing the Red Army, however, they "cleaned" a lot of them in the 30s. Also, for the sake of interest, you can see the expatriate military magazine Sentry, following the link on Wikipedia. There, too, there is analytics "on the other side of the barricades," a kind of "Military Review for the Whites," although the level is journalistic.
        It is very interesting to look through materials on the materials of the meeting following the Finnish war. From memory, the general impression: there were publications for the military. But bringing them to the commanders was disgusting. Some brochures simply lay on a shelf (several years!), Some were marked with chipboard, their reading was complicated. In general, let’s put it this way - the education and self-education of commanders was not set in the normal way. We all know about the course of that war .. But the conclusions were made relatively correct, in general! hi
        1. OAV09081974
          12 March 2018 13: 03
          Yes you are right.
          "Hour" wonderful magazine. The same Gurko was published (Evaluation of victories and defeats for example). Something journalistic, but something analytical.
          Experts have suffered their conclusions in practice
        2. Monarchist
          Monarchist 12 March 2018 14: 17
          "the conclusions were made relatively correct," but unfortunately all the commanders took this experience into account. 1941 a vivid example of this + there was a "hatred" we do ourselves with a mustache
      3. BAI
        BAI 12 March 2018 14: 27
        In 20-30 many special studies of professionals published in the periodical press of the USSR were published.

        The experience of the first world and is now being studied.


        SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY №3 / 2009, pp. 58-64


        UDC 355.43

        Colonel A.V. Lebedkin,

        Professor, Department of State and Military Administration, Faculty

        General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus,

        Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor

        Colonel S.N. Melnik,

        Head of the Department of Operational Art, Faculty

        General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus,

        Candidate of Military Sciences

        And about the use of artillery:
        to the “Manual” was attached the “List of tasks” solved by artillery in accordance with the properties of its various types and calibers (tables of the approximate consumption of shells per gun by day, approximate consumption of shells for solving various fire missions, etc.);

        on issues of artillery firing, the following was established:

        firing efficiency should be achieved not by the number of expendable shells, but by methodical firing at its appropriate distribution on targets and careful observation of each shot, therefore, special attention was paid to the accuracy of shooting and correcting fire;

        the importance of the use of airplanes and balloons for reconnaissance, surveillance and correction of fire;

        in the fight against enemy artillery, set the task of suppressing, not destroying;

        widely use incendiary (to defeat the enemy in depth) and chemical shells (as an additional means to suppress machine-gun nests and casemates);

        to combat artillery, divisions (batteries) are reduced to anti-battery groups, which are divided into subgroups;

        the importance of obstructive fire with an appointment along the front from 30 to 60 meters per gun;

        the widespread use of night shooting, indicating the assigned units specific tasks, the nature of the shooting and the consumption of shells;

        conducting an oncoming artillery strike (counter-preparation) to defeat the enemy’s manpower, prepared for an attack near the front edge.
        1. Albatroz
          Albatroz 12 March 2018 16: 23
          But the value of research 20-30 years. above - by the fact that the war participants themselves carried out and analyzed fresh combat experience.
          1. soldier
            soldier 13 March 2018 10: 57
            And they, these modern works, are based on the works of 20-30.
            I mean the literature, and not the source base, of course.
            Since the 40s. the focus has already been on the next world war.
            Therefore, historiographically, what happened in the 20-30s has unrivaled value and key importance in terms of specific gravity
    2. BAI
      BAI 12 March 2018 14: 24
      At the expense of the transition - the question is dark. I did not find the numbers directly. But if we proceed from a speed of 10 km / h (which is for a horse, and a tractor of that time, especially a very decent speed), then 100 km - 10 running hours, 200 km - 20 hours. It’s absolutely unrealistic to go 200 km per night, we will not forget about the conditions of limited visibility, they also do not contribute to traffic. But you still need to do rest. Such crossings, or rather transportation - only by rail.
      1. Bouncer
        Bouncer 12 March 2018 15: 57
        The experience of World War I was studied and is being studied.
        Of course, a lot of people. Studied immediately after the war, is being studied now.
        As for the transitions, the author wrote that it was not taken from the ceiling. The experience of war.
        By the way, I have an ed. Warfare. 1920. S. 426. It says that the introduction of tractor traction increased the speed of movement of the gun to 12 miles per hour. And the size of the artillery transition of such artillery can be increased (if necessary) to 150 versts. Milestones, not kilometers.
        1. Albatroz
          Albatroz 12 March 2018 16: 19
          The experience of World War I was studied and is being studied.

          horse-drawn artillery runs 60-70, and mechanical traction ("tractor artillery") - 100-200 km per night.

          If the speed of the horse-drawn battery is 5-10 km per hour, then why can't it go 60-70 km per night?
          And if the tractor speed is higher than horse-drawn 1,5-2 times, then why the tractor battery can not go from 100 to 200 km per night? It is clear that these are forced marches on good roads and special schedules.
          By the way, this, if I’m not mistaken, is the experience of concentrating artillery towards the Brusilovsky breakthrough. To maintain secrecy, transfers were carried out at night.
  4. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 12 March 2018 08: 23
    Great article. The breakthrough of the fortified positions of the PMV required good tactical and operational training of the troops, and the Russian troops showed themselves here at a decent level. And the requirement for artillery to achieve defeat of targets with minimal shells costs not only saves ammunition, but also increases the effectiveness and speed of artillery fire. The author — my sincere gratitude for the work done!
  5. XII Legion
    XII Legion 12 March 2018 10: 14
    Extensive analysis
    The problem of the offensive in positional warfare has not been investigated in detail
    Especially on the basis of a set of instructions and tactical recommendations based on the results
    The beginning of an interesting cycle, thanks
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 12 March 2018 17: 23
      Explored in detail on the Western Front. They put millions of soldiers under machine guns and artillery ...
      Until the British used the tanks they had invented in September 1916 - immediately in large numbers - nothing worked sad .
      1. XII Legion
        XII Legion 12 March 2018 18: 08
        Well, we are talking about the East.
        By the way, regarding the achievement of our gunners.
        In this edition

        it is written (S.128):
        “The Russians were the first to apply accelerated artillery preparation methods (Colonel Gobyato and Colonel Kirey). The question was raised about the individual targeting of each gun, wide maneuver by fire and detailed calculation of artillery preparation. These methods were studied and improved Germans Pulkowski and Bruchmüller. "
        Because our gunners are the best - because at the forefront of the combat use of artillery. They would have more shells - and the war would go more fun.
  6. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 12 March 2018 16: 52
    Thanks for the detailed article.
    Interesting for both professionals and amateurs
    We look forward to continuing good