Judgment Day. Fracture and Completion. Part of 2
By October 20, the Israeli Front Tanks, successively defeating the Syrians, Iraqis and Jordanians, were already 40 km from Damascus ....
However, the story of the events on the northern front would not be complete without mentioning another Israeli operation against the Iraqis. On the night of 11 on 12 of October, a heavy transport helicopter Yasur (CH-53 Sea Stallion qualitatively sharpened by Israelis for their needs) landed a group of saboteurs under the command of 25-year-old captain Shaul Mofaz
(In 1998, he will become the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (in the photo), and in 2002, the Minister of Defense.) In the deep Syrian rear in the area where the borders of Syria, Iraq and Jordan meet. The task was set before him: as far as possible to delay the approach to the front line of armored vehicles from Iraq. The fighters managed to undermine a strategically important bridge, destroy several units of Iraqi armored vehicles from a column stuck on the march and return without losses to the base by helicopter. Iraqis arrived at theaters with an 13 hourly delay. The second such operation failed. Because of the low clouds, the helicopter with the soldiers had to land quite far from the destination. The detachment was discovered by the Syrians and fired upon. It took an urgent evacuation. One fighter from the team was injured ...
In scientifichistorical literature about this war tends to downplay fleet. It is believed that the fleet practically did not play any role. Before preparing for the publication of this article, I was also sure of it. I had to change my mind right during the editing process. Israel, even in peacetime, receives 98% of goods and raw materials through the sea. We should not forget that only a small part of military supplies arrived by air. The dominance of the Israeli fleet at sea not only secured the Israeli coast and frustrated the Arabs' plans to disrupt Israeli communications at sea, but also created a threat to the coast of the enemy. As a result, throughout the war, an entire Syrian armored brigade was located off the coast of Syria, as the Syrians feared landings.
6 October commander of the flotilla of missile boats Michael Barkaи led the flotilla against the Syrians, finding that the first blow needed to be broken them.
Michael Barkai (with a beard) surrounded by colleagues.
The first battle between the Syrian fleet and the Israeli flotilla (in the composition of the missile boats "Mezanеto ”, on which was Barkai,“ Gaash ”,“ Khanиt "," Mivtаx and pеthe chef ”) occurred the same evening off the coast of Latakia and ended with the complete defeat of the Syrians who lost 5 ships, while the Israelis returned to the base without a loss.
Almost immediately after returning from Latakia Binyamin TеLem - the commander of the Navy of Israel and Barkai, began to prepare the fleet for a campaign against Egypt, on the coast of which the patrol boats "Sufа"," Xеroar "and" Kеshet "under the command of Gidon Raz; soon the latter, with the support of the Israeli Air Force, managed to sink one enemy vessel.
Beni Telem and Michael Barkai
Gidon Raz
The next evening the Israeli boats again sailed into the sea and headed towards Egypt with the aim of removing the Hanit, which, having completed preparations for a new voyage before the other ships, was sent on patrol and ran aground. Having coped with this task, the boats retreated, however, due to an error in orientation, complicated by crew fatigue, the “Mezanec” was opposite to Port Said and was attacked by two Komar-type boats transferred to the USSR to Egypt.
There were no hits in the “Mezanek”, and the Egyptian boats managed to escape before the “Mezanek” managed to go a distance to launch their missiles, and Michael Barkai ordered to retreat. The Israeli boats, except for the three remaining for the patrol, returned to the base.
9 October there was a battle at Damietta, in which the Israelis, without any loss, destroyed the ship of the Egyptians 3.
As a result of these first battles, the Syrian Navy lost a third, and the Egyptian Navy lost a quarter of its missile boats. The actions of the Israeli EW completely disoriented the Arabs, who were absolutely unable to even understand what was happening. It seemed to them, because of the false targets on the radars, that there were a lot of Israeli ships and that the actions of the Israeli ships supported helicopters. All this has so affected the Arab sailors that they completely lost the initiative and hid the ships in bases protected by coastal batteries. From that time on, the Arabs began to launch missiles from near approaches to the harbors or from the harbors themselves, relying on the range of their missiles, on luck, and on the cover of coastal batteries. Israel’s supremacy of the sea not only ensured the security of Israel from the sea, but also created a threat to the Arab rears.
"Saar-3"
After gaining dominance at sea, the Israelis began to bombard coastal targets in Egypt and Syria, primarily oil storages. The day after the battle at Damiette, Israeli ships returned to the shores of Egypt and fired at coastal targets.
10 October Israeli ships fired on the Syrian coast.
11 October Israel’s raid to shoot oil tanks off the coast of Syria led to a sea battle when Israeli boats “Gaash”, “Sufa”, “Hetz” and “Keshet” under the command of Barkai collided with two Syrian missile boats at the port of Tartus (the boats were separated into two groups - one went to Tartus, the other - to Banias). The Arabs acted cautiously - a little way out of the harbor, they in 23: 30 fired a rocket salvo and headed back. At full speed, the Israelis reached the range of the “Gabriel” launch and fired these missiles.
Launch of the Gabriel rocket from the Israeli Saar-4 rocket ship
As a result, both Syrian boats (“Komar” and “Wasp”) were damaged, and they were forced to throw themselves ashore.
Missile boat type "Wasp-1"
In this and subsequent operations were also sunk two transport neutral countries (Greek and Japanese).
On the night of October 22 a grenade from an ordinary infantry grenade launcher M72 LAW Israeli naval commandos set fire to the Egyptian rocket boat of the "Komar", standing in the harbor of Ardak.
In this war, the Israelis first fired a Gabriel missile on a ground target - the Egyptian coastal radar, which, as a result, was seriously damaged. In the same operation, two Egyptian radar patrol vessels (armed fishing trawlers, used as patrol ships) were sunk.
Thus, the Israelis achieved complete victory at sea: they defeated the fleets of Syria and Egypt, locked up their remnants at the bases, carried out raids on the enemy coast, etc.
The losses of the Israeli Navy were only 3 or 4 killed (sailor from the Dabur-type patrol boat and 3 fighters of the naval special forces - 2 from 13 Xyett and 1 from 707 subunit) and 24 of the wounded. Several Dabur-type boats were lightly damaged in the Red Sea and were quickly returned to service.
"Dabur"
Only the repair of two missile boats, stranded during the war on the ground, took a relatively long time. Arabs lost 12 missile boats (including 2 missile boats on the Red Sea) and a number of other ships and boats and were trapped in harbors throughout the war.
Sadat, as we remember, and from the very beginning of the war he was not very eager to reach Tel Aviv, but he did not expect such a turn of events. In Washington, the Israeli ambassador learned about the frantic talks between the Americans and the Russians about the possibility of a cease-fire announcement. The soldiers of the Egyptian 3 Army, so long in the dark about what was going on in their rear, were depressed. Sharon ordered Israeli flags to stick into the land as he moved along the west coast to Suez.
In addition, from time to time, the IDF tanks began firing from the west bank at the Egyptian troops at Sinai. Only now the Egyptians understood that they were surrounded. In the Egyptian army, communications were poorly established and often information that was owned by one commander did not reach the others. Anti-aircraft missiles on the coast were destroyed, and the Israelis were bombing now what they wanted. Although the main highway leading to the Sinai positions of the 3 Army was cut, the city of Suez was not yet taken, and it was difficult to talk about the complete encirclement of the Egyptian army. The Israelis sought to finish the encirclement before the announcement of a cease-fire, which was about to be expected from the UN ...
In fact, if America and the Soviet Union had introduced an arms embargo on the warring countries on the first day of the war, the war would have ended in a week. Already on October 12, the Air Force commander informed the command that if American aid was not received by aircraft, then with the current level of losses in two days aviation will not be able to complete all combat missions.
Meanwhile, since the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union has established both sea and air shipments of weapons and ammunition to Syria and, to a lesser extent, to Egypt. American electronic intelligence in Cyprus spotted a surprisingly intense air bridge between the USSR and Syria. The aircraft flew through Hungary and Yugoslavia. It also became known that in Yugoslavia 6000 concentrated Soviet soldiers who were ready to fly to Egypt. This caused the United States, after some delay, to respond with an air bridge to Israel.
After the US made a decision to support the Jewish state, 19 of October 1973, the Arab countries - oil exporters, OPEC members, as part of a preliminary agreement to use oil as “weapons"Announced a full embargo on oil supplies to the United States and restricting supplies to other Western countries, which led to an oil crisis.
European countries were afraid of the Arab boycott and refused to supply Israel with even spare parts for weapons already sold. Neither in England, nor in Germany, Israeli diplomats could not achieve anything ...
Israel’s uninterrupted supply of equipment and ammunition began on the evening of October 12. There was no “political” delay in this. The speed of organization will surprise anyone who is familiar with the American bureaucracy. "Phantoms" flew their course from the United States landing on the Azores. From the bases in New Jersey and Delaware, transport aircraft carried everything that could be needed in the war, from helicopters to warm jackets.
Tank M60 Patton
For the month from October 14 to November 14, 22 000 tons of cargo arrived in Israel from America. 566 flights were made. Something arrived by sea. Among the Americans received help: X-NUMX or 36 F-40 Phantom II, 4 Fighter Douglas A-60 Skyhawk fighters, military equipment and anti-tank weapons, M4 Patton tanks, M60 howitzer, radar systems, several CH-X-HEN-CHUMUM helicopters, several CH-X-HEN-CHUMUM helicopters, CHUMXTHUMX helicopters, howitzer M109 fighter jets, radar systems, several CH-X-HEN-CHUMUM helicopters, howitzer M53, radar systems, several CH-X-HEN-CHUMUM helicopters, several helicopters, two CH-X-HEHUM-CHUMUM helicopters, one CHNXX fighter jets, two MX-howitzer MXNXX fighter jets. airplanes, etc. America supplied weapons to 825 million dollars + shipping costs. US President Richard Nixon addressed the October 19 Congress and asked 2,2 billion dollars in military aid to Israel, “to preserve the balance of power and ensure stability in the Middle East.” Congressmen understood that this was a “balance” with the Soviet Union, and the money was given.
In the USSR, too, did not sleep. Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazli:
“The Soviet Union carried out the largest air delivery in history to assist us. (Of course, the prestige and military capabilities of the Soviet Union were at stake. But mutual interest is the cement of allied relations, and we considered their help to be allied). These deliveries were not planned in advance. They began three days after the start of the war, and by the end of the war the Soviets delivered Egypt and Syria through the air 15000 tons of material means of warfare. Soviet transport aircraft An-12 and An-22 made more than 900 round-trip flights. We received tanks, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition and many other military materials, more than half of them, like almost all tanks, were sent to Syria. The Soviet Air Force and those people in Egypt and Syria who quickly unloaded, sorted, checked, grouped and sent to the front all this mass of materials deserve the highest praise.
In addition, on October 30, the Soviet Union carried out an offshore material supply operation: at least 63 000 tons, mainly to Syria. (This operation would not have been possible without the presence and significant strengthening of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean). ”
In addition, on October 30, the Soviet Union carried out an offshore material supply operation: at least 63 000 tons, mainly to Syria. (This operation would not have been possible without the presence and significant strengthening of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean). ”
Indeed, by October 10, the Soviet naval forces in the conflict area numbered 3 cruisers, 7 destroyers (some of which were equipped with missiles), 9 frigates and corvettes, 2 landing craft, 2 minesweeper and happy auxiliary ships, as well as more 16 submarines ( including at least 4 atomic).
In the Mediterranean, the US 6 fleet at that time had 45 US warships - 2 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 16 destroyers, frigates, patrol boats, 4 patrol vessels, 10 landing ships and 12 auxiliary ships.
In the meantime, starting in October 21, Soviet troops in Hungary began to be brought on alert. By October 24, before 12, the Soviet divisions were ready to be sent to the Middle East, and some of the troops were already pulled to the airfields. Nixon, who still did not end the Vietnam War, was forced to regroup American troops closer to the Arab-Israeli theater of operations. Seeing these actions of the Americans, the Russians began to withdraw troops from Yugoslavia to Hungary.
I myself became an indirect witness of those events. Somewhere in the last days of September, 1973, I was sent on a business trip from the city on the Volga to the territory of the Belarusian Military District. There, for nearly a month, he was engaged in the installation and commissioning of some equipment in a tiny forest garrison. Returning to my unit in the first days of November, I did not find any of my colleagues. A dozen two unfamiliar officers and ensigns roamed about. A week later, recruits from the autumn draft began to arrive under the command of fresh — just from school, junior sergeants, and soon some of them began to live their normal lives ... (By that time, he served as a real grandfather!) After demobilization, I found someone from their former fellow soldiers and from their words I learned that in the middle of October they were alerted, taken to the city department store, where they were dressed in civilian clothes - black suits, white shirts with ties, winter coats with a faux fur collar and Why is a crumpled hat imitation straw. At the site, all were photographed, received international passports and fiber suitcases. (I imagine the look of these "tourists"!) Then, on airplanes, they were transferred somewhere to a rather warm area, where they lived for about two weeks in a large, but stuffy hangar. Let out smoke only at night. Also, unexpectedly, all of them were again loaded onto airplanes and transported to ... Mongolia. There, they served and from there they were demobilized ...
Against the background of this gig bout, Israel’s diplomacy looked very pitiful. The country was again isolated. The Soviet bloc and the Arab countries forced the majority of African states to curtail relations with Israel.
October 15 1973, the price of a barrel of oil for 78 hours jumped from 3, 01 dollar to 5,11 dollar, and 1 January 1974 doubled and reached 11,65 dollar. (In the US, in 70-s the average wage was 7564 dollars per year or 630 dollars per month; prices for basic foodstuffs: milk - 33 cents, bread - 24 cents per pound, meat (steak) - $ 1,30 per pound.) The rise in oil prices has led to tangible and rapid changes in the development of international relations after October 1973.
Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20 and talked with the Soviet leadership for two days.
So it turned out that Arabs and Jews fought each other, and the Russians and Americans worked out a cease-fire agreement for them. The first cease-fire proposal appeared at the UN on October 13, when Israelis were not in Africa yet, but Sadat then rejected it and rushed to the USSR for help.
Brezhnev said Gromyko:
- It is necessary to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. On their own initiative.
Gromyko cautiously remarked:
- Arabs will be offended, there will be noise.
Brezhnev answered very sharply:
- They went to the ... mother! For so many years we have offered them a sensible way. No, they wanted to make war. Please, we gave them a newest technique - which was not in Vietnam. They had a double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple - in artillery, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons - absolute. So what? They were gouged again. And again they dragged. And again they screamed for us to save them. Sadat twice raised me to the telephone in the middle of the night. Required me to send troops immediately. Not! We will not fight for them. People will not understand us ...
But the Politburo did not dare to change the policy of the Middle East ...
Kissinger and the Russians reached a compromise that Israel could not influence. Israeli Ambassador Dinitsa was simply acquainted with the already prepared text of the UN Security Council resolution on a cease-fire (No. 338 of October 22), which was drafted in Moscow. Israel needed a couple more days to break Egypt. Time began to draw, inviting Kissinger to consult in Israel, especially as Kosygin went to Cairo.
Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazli:
«22 October. Our position on the west bank was steadily deteriorating ... The terrain in the triangle between the Bitter Lakes and the Cairo-Suez road was ideal for tank operations, and the enemy returned to his traditional tactics of using small groups of tanks with tight air support. The resistance of our infantry and airborne units was stubborn. The offensive of the Sharon brigades in the north more or less stopped. In the south, the Adana division advanced further, reaching the Geneife area, from where its artillery could fire the Suez-Cairo road. But she suffered more and more heavy losses. A few minutes before the cease-fire agreement came into force, we launched three P-17E (SCAD) missiles according to enemy forces concentrated in the Deversoire region. (The same shelling, which, as the President immediately announced, was made by our own mythical rocket Al-Kahrir). ”
«23 October. By concentrating four brigades in the southern sector, the enemy used one to constrain our actions and ensure three unobstructed passage to the south. With no resistance, the Israelis surrounded the city of Suez and continued southward to the city of Adabiya on the coast about 16 km south of Suez. They were moving in a column, with headlights on, and our guard posts scattered around the area gazed at them, not knowing what to think. On the way south of Suez, several shots were fired at them, mostly at the command of some junior officer who had the sense to suspect that something was wrong, but the Navy garrison in Adabiya was taken aback, and after a short battle his resistance was crushed. ”
«By October 24 our position was worse than ever. The third army - two reinforced divisions, about 45 000 soldiers and 250 tanks - was completely cut off. The personnel had water and food left on the 4 day. From the encirclement, they were blocked by enemy tanks and our own embankments on the west bank. Since the army was out of range of our air defense missile systems, its positions were open to enemy air raids. She could not make her way west: most of the bridge equipment on this section had already been destroyed by air strikes. It was impossible to help her: the superiority of the enemy in armored vehicles and aircraft was such that we could not break through to her. And when the enemy's air force began to systematically bomb its positions, in the Third Army soon there were already 600 injured in need of evacuation. The situation was hopeless. ”
«23 October. By concentrating four brigades in the southern sector, the enemy used one to constrain our actions and ensure three unobstructed passage to the south. With no resistance, the Israelis surrounded the city of Suez and continued southward to the city of Adabiya on the coast about 16 km south of Suez. They were moving in a column, with headlights on, and our guard posts scattered around the area gazed at them, not knowing what to think. On the way south of Suez, several shots were fired at them, mostly at the command of some junior officer who had the sense to suspect that something was wrong, but the Navy garrison in Adabiya was taken aback, and after a short battle his resistance was crushed. ”
«By October 24 our position was worse than ever. The third army - two reinforced divisions, about 45 000 soldiers and 250 tanks - was completely cut off. The personnel had water and food left on the 4 day. From the encirclement, they were blocked by enemy tanks and our own embankments on the west bank. Since the army was out of range of our air defense missile systems, its positions were open to enemy air raids. She could not make her way west: most of the bridge equipment on this section had already been destroyed by air strikes. It was impossible to help her: the superiority of the enemy in armored vehicles and aircraft was such that we could not break through to her. And when the enemy's air force began to systematically bomb its positions, in the Third Army soon there were already 600 injured in need of evacuation. The situation was hopeless. ”
October 24 Soviet leadership warned Israel “About the worst consequences” in case of it "Aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria". At the same time, Brezhnev sent an urgent telegram to Richard Nixon, in which he assured the American side that if it were passive in resolving the crisis, the USSR would be faced with the necessity “Urgently consider taking the necessary unilateral steps.” The increased combat readiness of 7 divisions of the Soviet airborne troops was announced. In response, the United States declared an alarm in the nuclear forces.
By this time, the Third Egyptian Army at Sinai was fully surrounded. Israeli troops occupied 1600 square. km the continental territory of Egypt, and Israeli tanks were in 70 km from Cairo. Considering the American-Soviet-Arab-UN considerations, Israel was forced to stop the offensive, to abandon the idea of forcing the Third Army to surrender, to allow the transportation of food and medicines to it. October 25 increased alert in the Soviet divisions and US nuclear forces was canceled.
The war is over!
The final cease-fire agreement was signed by the military of both countries on the 101 kilometer of the Cairo-Suez highway on November 11.
Israeli troops gradually retreated back to Sinai. January 18 The 1974 Agreement was signed on the disengagement of troops at Sinai, and the Israelis had already left the channel zone themselves. The Syrians, true to themselves, signed an agreement on the separation of troops only on May 30. Syria was returning part of the Golan Heights with Quneitra on the terms of demilitarization and deployment of UN troops here ...
The Israeli military victory was not backed up by diplomatic achievements, partly because of the negligence of diplomats, partly because of the purely objective alignment of forces in the world arena. 8 Thousands of Egyptian prisoners were exchanged for Israeli 240. Approximately 15 000 Egyptians, 3 500 Syrians, and 2 700 Israelis were killed in the war.
Egyptian prisoners
(As I have already said, the numbers of losses from the source to the source may differ. There are various reasons for this, we will not go into details now. Here are enough consensus figures:
The Israeli Air Force lost from 103 to 115 aircraft, of which 7 is in aerial combat. Israeli pilot 53 killed, 44 captured, 53 was rescued after a bailout or an emergency landing. Lost 810 tanks and armored vehicles, 2700 soldiers killed, 5500 − 7500 wounded, 290 − 530 people were captured.
The Arabs lost in the 368 technique of airplanes and helicopters, 1 775 tanks and armored vehicles. Losses in people amounted to 18 500 dead, 51 000 injured and 9 370 prisoners.)
Israel captured in the form of trophies a very large amount of ammunition, light, heavy weapons and armored vehicles.
However, in the 1973 war of the year, ALL participants declared themselves winners:
Syria and Egypt proud of the fact that the initial stage of the war plunged Israel into confusion, the Jewish state managed to catch a surprise and deliver a sensitive blow. They were proud of the courage and good military skills of their soldiers on the battlefield, the shame of the inglorious Six Day War was washed away. The leaders of these countries in their usual manner presented an almost complete defeat of their troops on the battlefield as a great victory. Until now, in Egypt, the highest award for bravery for military personnel is the Order of the Sinai Star, for the victory over Israel.
Syria, in honor of the victory over Israel, also approved a very honorable order of the “Sixth of October”, because these countries are convinced that in 1973 they really defeated the “Zionists” and “dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army”. It must be admitted that it sounds beautiful, almost like the victory of the Red Army near Moscow, which has dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi Wehrmacht. Arabic officialism states: the incalculable hordes of the Israeli occupiers were defeated by the joint efforts of courageous Egyptian and Syrian soldiers who were able to successfully overcome the monstrous Israeli fortified areas in the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. The most important official holidays in Egypt are the Day of Sinai and the Day of the Armed Forces, and in Syria - the Day of the October War, established in honor of the great victory.
On this day off, the Victory Museums are open in Damascus and Cairo, in which visitors can admire the trophy technique of the defeated Zionist enemy, the magnificent Panorama (a replicating panorama of the battle on the memorial hill in Waterloo) depicting cowardly Israelites skewering from the Arab heroes . Before the revolution in Egypt and the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, a military parade of the Victory was held every year, but now they are limited to a military parade. In the center of Damascus for the most important events built a memorial of the "heroes of the October war."
But for some reason, while in Syria they introduced criminal liability for conducting historical research on the theme of the October war. Syrian leaders have gone through a good Soviet school: everything that interferes with the official interpretation of events is to hide behind seven seals. To their chagrin, now is not up to the parades ...
USA - due to the fact that they managed to adequately get out of a difficult situation: on the one hand, they demonstrated their power, on the other - they did not allow slipping into the Third World War with the use of thermonuclear weapons. In addition, there was another real achievement: not only was it possible to help its ally Israel to get out of the war even stronger than before, but also to gain a new ally in the Middle East - Egypt. In Egypt’s politics, after the war, a lurch towards America was finally taking shape: the leader of the Arab world descended from the Soviet orbit and increasingly entered the sphere of American influence. The Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have become even more dependent on the United States even more than before. (Subsequently, this played a fatal role for the USSR: President Ronald Reagan agreed to lower the price of oil. The Soviet Union was left without an inflow of currency and what happened happened ...)
the USSR - due to the fact that Soviet weapons, especially missile weapons, turned out to be very effective, the intensive training of Arab officers in the Soviet military schools bore fruit - a severe blow was dealt to Israel. At the same time, it was possible to thoroughly tickle the nerves of the United States, which were already experiencing not the best of times because of Vietnam. Before the collapse of the USSR, it was still far away, and in those years, despite the loss of Egypt, the USSR received dividends: positions in Libya strengthened, the war led to an increase in oil prices, due to which export of Soviet oil began to bring huge income in dollars. (Today, we already understand that the low efficiency of economic activities in the Soviet Union will not allow us to intelligently manage unexpected opportunities. A country hooked on an “oil needle” will slow down its scientific and technological development, which will lead to an economic decline in years.)
Israel - because it once again demonstrated the ability of small forces to smash the Arab armies that are many times superior in all parameters. In fact, this victory came at a very high price for Israel. It was the bloodiest war in the history of Israel. It lasted only 18 days, but led to huge human losses. About 2700 people died on the battlefield. Who among the readers has not forgotten the Afghan war, just have to remember what a deep wound 15 thousands of dead were. Imagine that (God forbid!), Then the country would lose a quarter of a million of its sons. So in proportion to the population of Israel, you can compare the losses in this war ...
Witnesses of that war forever remain in the memory of this picture - hundreds of coffins wrapped with Israeli flags on their way to places of eternal rest. Almost a quarter of the population was drafted into the army. Imagine the 35 of millions of Russians who are drafted into the army today ... The industry has almost stopped. GDP fell sharply, consumer goods went up by 25%, inflation crept up ...
Somewhere in February, protest rallies began in Israel 1974. Dissatisfaction with the government in the country was great.
Protest. The inscriptions on the posters: "Who is to blame?" and "Dayan, that's enough."
However, on November 18, 1973, the government authorized the chairman of the Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat
draw up a commission of inquiry that will conduct an investigation and provide the government with a report on decisions taken by military and civilian officials on the basis of information existing on the eve of the war.
Agranata Commission. From left to right: Lieutenant-General (in reserve) Igael Yadin, Judge Moshe Landoy, Chairman of the Commission, Judge Shimon Agranat, State Controller Dr. Yitzhak Nebenzal and Lieutenant-General (in reserve) Haim Laskov.
The commission heard 90 witnesses and received 188 more testimony from military personnel.
Commission hears testimony
1 April 1974, the first preliminary report of the Agranata Commission was published. The commission blamed the unwillingness for war on the leadership of the army and military intelligence.
As a result of the findings of the commission, Chief of the General Staff David Elazar, Commander of the Southern Military District, General Shmuel Gonin, Head of Military Intelligence (AMAN) Eli Zeira and his deputy Arieh Shalev were dismissed. Lieutenant Colonel Bendman, head of Egypt’s department at AMAN (Anaf-6 department) and Lieutenant Colonel Gedaliah, who was in charge of intelligence in the Southern Military District, was not recommended for use in intelligence-related positions.
The commission did not point out any flaws in the actions of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir. However, the publication of the report reinforced the public outcry caused by a lack of readiness for war, and Golda Meir announced the resignation of the government on 11 on April 1974.
The final (third) report was completed on 30 on January 1975 of the year, however, a significant part of it was subject to publication only after 30 years. The report mentioned that Mossad received a timely warning of Egypt’s intention to attack Israel on October 6, but the military intelligence’s categorical opinion that there would be no such attack had a blinding effect on both the Mossad leadership and the country's political leadership. .
In 1995, the publication of all commission reports was allowed, with the exception of roughly the 50 pages, which remain classified. In 2008, it was decided to remove secrecy from most of the commission’s minutes, which contained testimony from David Elazar, Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Shmuel Gonen and some other officials. In February 2012, the commission’s report was published on the website of the Israel Defense Forces and Security Systems Archives. (At one time I had a personal conversation with the deputy head of this respected department. When asked if the last unpublished pages of the Agranat report hide some secrets of decisive political importance, he swore to me that these materials are not published solely for ethical reasons. )
12 September 2013 - through 40 years after the Doomsday War - the testimony of Prime Minister Golda Meir was published. The Prime Minister explained to the commission that she was not well versed in military issues. She made a mistake when she refrained from mobilizing reservists, but the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and all the ministers were against the mobilization, and she could not come into conflict with the head of the AMAN and the Chief of the General Staff. Meir also noted that she did not regret that she had not made a decision on a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria, since this would have provoked international criticism and would have jeopardized American military assistance.
At the end of October, 2013 was first declassified and published the testimony of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan of the Agranat Commission. When the commission asked why the reservist mobilization was not announced, he replied that he fully relied on the opinion of the General Staff chief, David Elazar. According to Dayan, the reports of the special services of the Mossad and the military intelligence of AMAN were contradictory, and Elazar believed that by concentrating troops on the border with Israel, Egypt was conducting maneuvers. Accordingly, there were enough reasons to refrain from mobilizing. “If we were the first to do this without sufficient reason, we would be accused of aggression against the Arab countries,” said Dayan. When asked whether he was guided by delaying the mobilization of reservists, considerations of a different nature, Dayan replied:
I relied on him. He is the chief of the General Staff, he is not my personal driver. He should have told me: Mr. Minister, let's mobilize reservists. But he did not say that. And without him, I did not dare to assume such responsibility.
In accordance with the recommendations of the Agranat Commission, the Israeli security services began to pay greater attention to Arab countries and to verify the reliability of the information received. The Center for Political Studies was also set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel to further assess intelligence, and then the Israel National Security Council was established at the Office of the Prime Minister for a separate consultative government body in the field of security.
Years will pass, and 19 November 1977 of the year at 20 hours of the evening the plane "Egypt-01" will land at Ben Gurion airport. The head of the most powerful Arab state, President of Egypt Anwar Sadat, will step on the Israeli land under the fanfare of the military orchestra. He will personally arrive to invite Israel to make peace. But this, already completely different story ...
Well, that's the end of the publication of a series of articles on the Doomsday War. Judging by the comments, my work was not in vain, and the readers learned facts unknown to them earlier, or expanded their knowledge of facts and events that they already knew. I am grateful to readers for recommendations, suggestions and questions on the topic. I think that I managed to take a lot into account and to give more or less distinct answers to most of them. Perhaps there are still questions, or new ones have appeared. I will answer them, as usual, in working order, in the comments.
Sources:
M. Shterenshis. Israel. The history of the state. Xnumx
ARABO-ISRAELI WAR OF 1973 OF THE YEAR. Chronicle of events on historical documents.
Duke H. Arab-Israeli Wars: From the War of Independence to the Lebanese Campaign. T.2., 1986.
"Forcing the Suez Canal". Saad al-Shazli. 1979. Translation into Russian 2006 year.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. Xnumx
Wikipedia articles, Cyclopaedia etc.
Information