Military Review

Errors of the German shipbuilding. Big cruiser "Blucher"

112
In the series of articles “Errors of the British shipbuilding” we have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the world's first battlecruisers of the Invincible type. Now let's look at what happened on the other side of the North Sea.


In February and April, the British began the creation of Inflexible, Indomiteble and Invincible, announcing to the world the birth of a new class of warships - battle cruisers. And now, Germany, a year after these events, begins the construction of a very strange ship — the big cruiser “Blucher”, which in its fighting qualities was significantly inferior to the British ships. How could this happen?

For a start - a little stories. It must be said that German armored cruisers (with the exception of Fürsta Bismarck) in York are inclusive, if they differed in some way from ships of the same class of other maritime powers, it is the absolute absence of any distinctive features. "Facelessness and moderation" - this is a phrase that comes to mind when reading the performance characteristics of the German armored cruisers. "Furst Bismarck" was great because it was specially created for the colonial service, and here one could draw a number of interesting analogies with the British 2 class battleships, and the Russian Peresvet. But, starting with the "Prince Heinrich", the concept of armored cruiser construction in Germany changed radically - now the Kaiser fleet commanders decided that they needed an armored reconnaissance vehicle in a squadron, one for each squadron of battleships.

That is why armored cruisers in Kaiserlmarine were not numerous. From December 1898 g to April 1903 g was laid only five ships of this class - the "Prince Henry", two "Prince Adalbert" and two ships of the type "Roon". They had a moderate displacement - from 8 887 t "Prince Heinrich" to 9 533 t "Roona" (hereinafter we are talking about the normal displacement), moderate armament - 2 * 240-mm, and starting with "Princes Adalbertov" - 4 * 210-mm main guns and 10 * 150-mm medium-caliber, very moderate armor - the maximum thickness of the armor did not exceed 100 mm. The steam engines of these cruisers should have given them a very moderate speed of 20-21 knots, but in fact it turned out even worse. The “Prince Heinrich” “did not reach” the design 20 ties, showing the 19,92 ties, the “Prince Adalbert” and the “Friedrich Karl” with the planned 21 ties could develop only the 20,4 and 20,5 ties, respectively, and only on the ships of the “York” type did the curse fail speeds managed to prevail: both cruisers surpassed the planned 21 bonds, demonstrating 21,143 bonds (“Roon”) and even 21,43 bonds (“York”). Nevertheless, and without a doubt, against the background of the British and French ships of the same class, the German armored cruisers looked like very ordinary walkers.


The armored cruiser "Roon"


On this unhurried progressive development of the German armored cruisers ended. The following ships of this class, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, again marked the change of concept and differed significantly from the ships of the previous series.

First, the Germans once again considered that they needed heavy ships for the colonial service, and therefore they tried to increase not only seaworthiness, which, generally speaking, the previous armored cruisers were very good, but also speed (up to 22,5 knots). It was a rather interesting approach: the Germans considered that high speed was an attribute of the ocean raider, and not the scout in the squadron.

Secondly, the Germans strengthened their booking by increasing the maximum thickness of the armor belt from 100 to 150 mm.

Third, they increased the power of the artillery, adding four more of the same 210-mm guns to the dungeon to the two two-gun turrets of the 210-mm guns. In order to somehow compensate for the increase in weight, and not to waste precious tons of displacement for additional armor to expand the casemates under the new guns, the designers reduced the average caliber to the same number of barrels, leaving only six 150-mm guns.

All of the above led to the appearance of quite good armored raiders, but, of course, this quality improvement led to an increase in the size of ships. The last classic armored cruisers of Germany, which became the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, became significantly larger than the Yorks, having a normal displacement of 11 600 - 11 700 t. The first 28 of December 1904 g laid the Gneisenau, and after only six days - January 3 1905 g, the Scharnhorst tab was held. However, the next armored cruiser of Germany, the Blucher, was laid only on February 21 1907 g, i.e. more than two years after the previous Scharnhorst. Why did this happen?

The fact is that the construction of ships in Kaiser Germany was carried out in accordance with the Law on navy", In which the laying of new warships by year was painted. At the beginning of the century, the second law, approved in 1900, was in force, and with the adoption of armored cruisers, a small problem arose.

Strictly speaking, there were no armored cruisers in Germany, but there were “big cruisers” (“Große Kreuzer”), which, in addition to the armored ships themselves, also included large armored cruisers. Alfred von Tirpitz, in those years not yet a grand admiral, but a state secretary of the naval department, wanted to get a shipbuilding program from the Reichstag that would provide Germany with 1920 a fleet of 38 battleships and 20 large cruisers. However, the Reich did not agree with such an ambitious plan and the program was slightly curtailed, leaving only the 14 large cruisers.

Accordingly, their construction schedule would include laying one keel per year up to and including 1905 g, in which case the number of large cruisers would be exactly 14, including:

1) Kaiserin Augusta Armored Cruiser - 1 units.

2) Victoria Louise-type Armored Cruisers - 5 units.

3) Armored cruisers from Fürsta Bismarck to Scharnhorst - 8 units.

After that, the construction of large cruisers provided for a pause to 1910 g, because the following cruisers should have been laid only to replace those who had already served their time, i.e. for systematic replacement of ships in order to constantly maintain their numbers at the level of 14. Accordingly, after the laying of the Scharnhorst, the “big cruisers” were scheduled for long shipbuilding holidays. However, the situation was corrected by the same indefatigable von Tirpitz - in 1906 r he “pushed through” the return to the original 20 “big cruisers” in the fleet, and their construction resumed.

And here a number of questions arise. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of sources and publications describe the birth of the ninth armored cruiser of Germany like this: the Germans knew about the construction of the Dreadnought and knew that the British had laid the new armored cruisers of the Invincible type to it. But the British managed to misinform the Germans, and they believed that the Invincibles were similar to the Dreadnought, only with 234-mm artillery instead of 305-mm. Therefore, the Germans, who had nothing to do, laid a lightweight resemblance to the “Nassau” with 210-mm cannons, and they lost because of the 210-mm “Blucher”, of course, much inferior to the 305-mm “Invinsible”.

The logical version, in terms of time, everything seems to be the same - but why then did the same Mujenikov mention in his monograph that “Blucher” was designed in 1904-1905, when no one had heard of any “Invincibles”? And the second question. If von Tirpitz obtained permission for the resumption of the construction of the new “big cruisers” in 1906 g, then why was “Blucher” laid only at the beginning of 1907 g? Unfortunately, in Russian sources there are no details of the design of “Blucher” and we can only guess at different degrees of reliability.

From the publication to the publication cited common phrase that the first German dreadnoughts "Nassau" were designed after it became known about the performance characteristics of the "Dreadnought":

“In the spring of 1906, when Dreadnought had already descended from the stocks, Germany was finishing the design of a new squadron battleship with a total displacement of about 15500 tons. However, having received information about the unprecedented tactical and technical characteristics of the British battleship, the Germans began designing a fundamentally new battleship. “Our Dreadnought drove Germany into a tetanus!” Said Lord Fisher in a letter to King Edward VII in October 1907. ”


In fact, everything was “a little” wrong - the Germans came to the “dreadnought” concept and to “Nassau” on their own, although not in the way that the British. In the first years of the twentieth century, the short-term era of fascination with rapid-fire average caliber artillery was coming to an end. The world began to realize that 152-mm projectiles are too weak for even the multitude of their hits to cause significant damage to the battleship. Therefore, there were ideas to increase the average caliber, or supplement it with larger, 203-234-mm guns. At one time, the first version seemed preferable to the Germans, and they increased the average caliber from 150-mm to 170-mm on their armadillos of the Braunschweig and Deutschland type. The British followed a different path, laying a series of battleships King Edward VII, in which, instead of the standard for British battleships of a dozen six-inch guns, 10-152-mm and 4-234-mm guns were installed.


"King Edward VII"


The Germans could not ignore such powerful guns from their rivals, and now, at the beginning of March 1904, the German designers are developing a new design of an armored ship with an even more reinforced average caliber. With a quite moderate displacement of 13 779 T, the ship was armed with four 280-mm guns in two towers (in the bow and stern) and eight 240-mm guns in four towers in the middle of the ship, two towers on each side. In other words, the artillery in this project was located along the same lines as the towers at Nassau, but included both 280-mm and 240-mm guns. The 150-170-mm artillery system was not envisaged by the project - only the anti-mine battery from 16 88 guns. The steam engines were supposed to provide the ship with speed in 19,5 nodes.

The Kaiserlmarine management generally liked the project, but ... they did not perceive the 240-mm guns as a medium caliber, it is quite logical that the battleship offered to their attention has two main calibers. Therefore, they proposed to rework the project in order to eliminate the “two-headed caliber” of the battleship. It is in this, not quite usual way, Germans ... what is most interesting, the concept of “all-big-gun” was never achieved.

The revised project was submitted to 1905 for consideration in October, and it looked extremely interesting. The designers replaced the two-gun 240-mm turrets with single-gun 280-mm: thus, the battleship received eight 280-mm guns from which six could be fired at one side. However, pulling up the “second main caliber” to the “first”, the Germans were not at all going to give up the medium caliber and returned eight 170-mm guns to the ship, marking them in dungeons, which, in fact, does not allow this project to be attributed to “all- big-gun. Mine artillery consisted of twenty 88-mm cannons. Displacement increased to 15 452 t.

In principle, already at this stage, we can say that the Germans have designed their first, even a very weak dreadnought. But, after reviewing the submitted 1905 draft of a thousand-ton ship with eight 15,5-mm guns at the end of 280, the fleet rejected it ... due to the weakness of the onboard volley, in which only 6 guns of the main caliber were involved and which should have been made more powerful. After this, the requirements of the fleet decided to remake the side towers from one to two guns, which suggested itself, and ultimately the Germans did so. In 1906 r, a project of G.7.b appeared, a dozen 280-mm guns, which later became Nassau.


Battleship Nassau, top view


Thus, even before they learned the characteristics of the English Dreadnought in Germany, the Germans arrived at the concept of a heavy ship, at a speed of about 20 units armed with more than eight 280-mm main caliber guns. Why, then, did some delay arise with the laying of new battleships? Prior to this, the Germans, in full compliance with their “Law on the Fleet”, annually laid the keels of new battleships, but they laid down their last squadron battleship in 1905 (Schleswig-Holstein), and the first dreadnought was only in July of 1907.

The point here is not at all in the Dreadnought, but in the fact that a number of reasons hindered the immediate transition from battleships to battleships of the new type in Germany. The increase in the number of trunks of the main caliber demanded a sharp increase in displacement, and in fact the ships do not appear from nowhere and should not leave the factory wall to nowhere. Before the laying of the Nassau, the Germans created very limited size battleships, their shipyards and naval bases were focused on the construction and operation of ships with a normal displacement not higher than 15 000 t. To build and maintain basing heavier ships, shipyard upgrades were required, dredging work, etc. Nobody in Germany wanted to start creating giant battleships, in comparison with previous battleships, until there was confidence that the country could build and operate new ships. But all this required money, and after all, in addition to this, new battleships had to significantly surpass the cost of the old squadron battleships, and this too had to be somehow settled.

Why in the article devoted to the armored cruiser "Blucher", we devote so much time to the first German dreadnoughts? Only in order to show the respected reader that all the necessary prerequisites for creating the “Blucher” in the form in which it was built, already existed in 1904-1905. Already during the design of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the Germans had an understanding of the need to strengthen the artillery of their armored cruisers, and this was due to the increase in the number of 210-mm cannons. In 1904 r in Germany, they thought of placing the 6 towers according to the rhombic scheme, in 1905 r - placing the guns of one (280-mm) caliber in these towers, and at the same time they came to the conclusion that even eight guns arranged according to this scheme are all it is not enough.

But why did the Germans undertake to design their next armored cruiser on the eve of shipbuilding holidays, because after the Scharnhorst, according to the Fleet Law, new ships of this class could not be built before 1910? Von Tirpitz writes in his memoirs that the Reichstag rejected the construction of 6 cruisers "because he had to reject something" and that during the ensuing debate it was decided to return to re-examine this issue in 1906. In other words, von Tirpitz obviously expected to return 6 "big cruisers" in the shipbuilding program, and therefore, it is likely that he wanted to have a finished draft of the new ship for 1906. So that it was possible to build it without delay - as soon as permission from the Reichstag is received.

“But please!” The attentive reader will note: “If von Tirpitz was in such a hurry to build cruisers, then why did Blucher not be laid in 1906, but only in 1907 g? Something does not agree here! ”

The thing is, the construction of ships in Germany was a little different, as, for example, in Russia. We usually started building a ship's laying (although the official date of laying was not always the same as the actual start of work). But the Germans had a different way - the official tab was preceded by the so-called “Production preparation and stocks”, and this preparation was very long - for example, for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau it was about 6 months for each ship. This is a very long time for preparatory work and it seems that during the “pre-production and the stocks,” the Germans also carried out work on the actual construction of the ship, that is, the date the ship was laid out did not coincide with the start date of construction. This happened quite often and in other countries - for example, the “Dreadnought” built “in one year and one day” was actually built much longer. Simply, the moment of the official bookmark, from which the notorious “one year and one day” is usually counted, occurred much later than the actual construction of the ship began - in fact, it was not 2 of October 1905 g (the date of the official bookmark) that began to create, but at the beginning May 1905. Thus, the period of its construction was not 12 months and 1 day, but 20 months, if we consider the end of the construction not the date the ship received the fleet, but the exit date for the sea trials (otherwise it should be admitted that the Dreadnought was building the 23 month ).

Hence the interesting consequence. If the author of this article is right in his assumptions, then compare the terms of construction of domestic and German ships "head on", i.e. from the dates of the bookmark to the date of commissioning wrong, because in fact the German ships were built longer.

But back to the "Blucher". Unfortunately, Mujenikov does not indicate the presence and duration of “pre-production and stocks” for “Blucher”, but assuming the existence of this preparation for months in 5-6, by analogy with previous armored cruisers, then, taking into account the date of the bookmark “Blucher” ( 21.02.1907), it is obvious that they started its creation much earlier, i.e. back in 1906. Therefore, the Germans didn’t have any "tetanus" - von Tirpitz convinced the Reichstag of the need for 20 "big cruisers" for the fleet, and soon after that construction work began on the "Blucher"

Nevertheless, I would like to note that the foregoing about “Blucher” is not a collection of reliable facts, but the thoughts and conjectures of the author, which could only be clarified by working in the Bundesarhivas. But in any case, we see that Muzhenikov’s words that the Blucher project was created in 1904-1905 did not contradict the general trends of the development of the German navy. And if the author is right in his assumptions, the Invincible project did not have a special influence on the development of Blucher, since the Germans designed their ship long before information about the first British battlecruisers appeared.

The British desire to present the matter as if both Nassau and Blucher were created under the influence of the achievements of British naval thought still, most likely, has no basis. In the case of Nassau, it can be argued for sure that what happened before Blucher - in the opinion of the author of this article, this was the case. The Germans quite independently came up with the idea of ​​an armored cruiser having at least 4 two-gun turrets of 210-mm guns and developing speed of 25 knots.

Errors of the German shipbuilding. Big cruiser "Blucher"

Artillery positioning options on the Blucher cruiser, considered in 1905-1906


Then, when the "reliable" data on the Invincible became known - allegedly, this cruiser is a copy of the Dreadnought, only with 234 artillery, the Germans probably congratulated themselves on how great they guessed the development trends of the "big cruisers" and approved for the "Blucher" six 210-mm towers located in the rhombic scheme, as in "Nassau". And then, when the true tactical and technical characteristics of the Invincible ships became clear, they clutched their heads, because, of course, the Blucher was not their equal.

To be continued
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  1. hohol95
    hohol95 27 February 2018 15: 34
    +1
    The ideal ship is

    Everything Else - TIN hi
    1. Kars
      Kars 27 February 2018 15: 43
      +9
      What Blucher could not take away, he died beautifully, fighting off to the last.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 27 February 2018 15: 48
        +4
        Vladimir Vasilievich, a polite guest, did not argue that such a straightforward tactic was an eructation of Trafalgar's former glory, and the calendars were ready to open the XNUMXth century ... The British called practical shooting "the right infection." The shudder of the ships on the volleys crippled the fittings, extinguished the lamps in the compartments, the mechanisms shifted from the foundations, the flanges flowed on the pipes, a “tear” appeared in the joints of the hull - everyone did! But the British, preserving purity from "infection", shot badly. It is true that, swimming a lot, they suppressed the world with their keel power, but the power of their calibers was almost zero. The Germans - these were the masters; they don’t give a damn that the glass is flying and the protective cork is bouncing off pieces from the sides. Clinging to the sights, they sit and sit on shields from long distances, and the ships at the Michels are marvelously strong, hardy. The French shy away from one extreme to the other, and now they have become allies of Russia; this means that all mistakes in the development of their fleet will be mechanically taken over by Russian shipyards, for which all of us, gentlemen, have to pay in battles — with blood, burns, amputations ...

        Valentin Pikul
        Three ages okini-san
        1. Usher
          Usher 27 February 2018 16: 27
          +1
          Well, Pikul is still a sailor :) Back in the 90s, the Technique-Youth was an analysis of his writings))) Then the plutong is confused with the towers, then something else)))
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 27 February 2018 16: 55
            +2
            Quote: Usher
            Well, Pikul is still a sailor :) Back in the 90s, the Technique-Youth was an analysis of his writings))) Then the plutong is confused with the towers, then something else)))

            C'mon ... towers appeared at Pikul in the Kyrgyz Republic Askold. belay
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 February 2018 18: 50
              +3
              Quote: Alexey RA
              towers appeared at Pikul in the Kyrgyz Republic Askold

              Well, not hydrofoils, and thanks for that laughing
            2. Comrade
              Comrade 28 February 2018 02: 34
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Pikul towers appeared on Askold.

              He read it from Stepanov, in Port Arthur. There, Askold makes a breakthrough, while a senior artillery officer leads the fire while standing on the roof of the bow tower.
              1. Vladislav 73
                Vladislav 73 3 March 2018 23: 35
                0
                Quote: Comrade
                He read it from Stepanov, in Port Arthur

                Eka not seen, "Askold" with turret gun mounts! laughing So Stepanov and the Bayan cruiser have two-gun tower installations! good
                When both guns were loaded, the conductor reported to the lieutenant the tower commander.

                “The sight is two hundred and seventy!” - the lieutenant commanded from his place. - Pli!

                Both guns threw their shells with a terrible roar and, rolling on the knurls, slowly and smoothly returned to their original place. Although the sound of a shot in the tower was somewhat softened by armor, nevertheless, Zvonarev still rang in his ears for a long time. As soon as the guns fell into place, the sailors hurried, preparing them for a new shot.
                This is the moment when, after the unsuccessful offensive of Kondratenko at the passes, Zvonarev was sent to communicate with the fleet, and he got to the Bayan. hi
        2. nemoXX
          nemoXX 28 February 2018 10: 28
          +1
          Pikul can hardly be considered an expert in naval affairs!
          He possesses a pleasant syllable that gently tickles the inflamed patriotism of injured townsfolk by turning Russian troubles, problems and defeats into "the steepness of domestic production."
          If it is not confirmed by facts, so much the worse for facts.
          Many people like to “win” according to Pikul.
          In practice - it will not work. We must learn from the Germans and the British: all their troubles and defeats are the Path of the Pioneers.
          Whoever criticizes the drowned Titanic, let him first build the best!
      2. Kibb
        Kibb 4 March 2018 13: 40
        0
        Blucher did not die beautifully fighting off - he did not cover the retreat, he was left. The British could not signal, and the Germans could not understand that there was no squadron of battleships for Beatty. As a result, Blucher became a victim, to whom there was no place at all in the LKR squadron.
  2. looker-on
    looker-on 27 February 2018 15: 42
    +5
    Andrew. As always, brilliant. I really look forward to continuing. Tell us someday how you approach the creation of an article. Sources. Helpers. Analysis.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 February 2018 16: 11
      +14
      Thank!:)))
      Quote: looker-on
      Tell us someday how you approach the creation of an article. Sources. Helpers. Analysis.

      Everything is very simple here - I have been studying the history of the Navy since about 14 years, if not earlier, and this year I will be 43 years old :)))) I have no assistants, but there are some people whom I can turn to with a question if there is a need - this, for example, dear Valentin, excellently versed in the issues of the Russian-Japanese war (and not only), here you can see his comments under the nickname "Comrade". We sometimes argue with him (in a friendly way), but by and large I am much weaker than him. A lot of things have opened for me discussions of the fleet on the alternativehistory website, including when Valentin opened my eyes to a number of nuances that fundamentally changed my idea of ​​the REV. I also received a lot of interesting materials here, for example, from the respected 27091965i, for which I also thank him so much.
      In general, the articles are written like this - the desire has come to work with some topic - I start writing :)))) The fact is that almost any significant event of the armored fleets is not unambiguous and may have an interpretation that is different from the generally accepted one. When I read the sources, then comparing them I came to some conclusions, or I had questions. In general, one can only be horrified by the negligence of official history ... And this is the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, a sea of ​​documents, eyewitness accounts ... How people manage to argue about the times of the Russian princes - I can’t imagine, everything is there with a pitchfork on the water, here there are so many questions on the second world one, moreover, global ones, and even those times ...
      Therefore, in the course of the work on the article, I simply recall all the questions that have arisen with me, revise the sources, refreshing my memory, and now ...
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 27 February 2018 16: 42
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I can’t imagine how people manage to argue about the times of Russian princes, there everything is a pitchfork on the water, there are so many questions on the second world issue, moreover, global ones, and those times ...

        Heh heh heh ... on the issue of impartial chroniclers and their annals - the vile Evgeny Lukin and him are immediately remembered "We rolled your sun!":
        The day before yesterday, immediately after the departure of the Varangians and Vsevolok, three brave men approached the island in the shallows and with them the prince Teplynsky Pillar. Affectionately having a conversation with the chronicler, he inquired whether he does not suffer what he needs, promised to soon bring the hermit supplies, clothes, and ink nuts. Well, he also explained at the same time how to understand such a hastily erected colossus ...
        “And having thanked the good-looking, dispelling the adversaries, like the morning fog,” the goose feather creaked again on parchment, “he gave the vow the Pillars to lay near the place where Yarilina Doroga had a richly decorated temple, very pleasing to our bright and sunlit sun. In the middle of the temple, he ordered the Pillars to be cut down ... - The chronicler paused again and looked doubtfully at the plaster of a wooden monster gathered near the colossus. “... an enormous rounded idol, in all such things I will clarify the sun ...”
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 February 2018 21: 33
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        How people manage to argue about the times of the Russian princes - I can’t imagine, there everything is a pitchfork on the water,

        Well, academics got the titles, so it turns out that common sense ran into the “history” of academics laughing And you will call into question, so right away: “I’m a historian (and then half a page of regalia and achievements), and therefore I know better how it was” wassat fool And as proof, as a control in the Galava, the "historical fact" about the Mongols with the Tatars (or the Tatars with the Mongols), grinded a hundred thousand times request ) Russia conquered lol ...
        And most importantly, they themselves believe in it fool
        Personally, my opinion request
        1. Amurets
          Amurets 28 February 2018 01: 16
          +2
          Quote: Rurikovich
          And most importantly, they themselves believe this fool
          Personally, my opinion is request

          Self-hypnosis is a great power. And what is written with a “pen” in the brain is removed only with an ax, on the block.
      3. looker-on
        looker-on 28 February 2018 13: 13
        +2
        I thought you were much older) I’m also in books since childhood, but with analysis I’m much worse. Thank you very much for your work. And for your love of ships. Good luck in everything
  3. Snakebyte
    Snakebyte 27 February 2018 15: 42
    +3
    Prior to the Nassau bookmark, the Germans created armadillos of very limited sizes, their shipyards and naval bases were oriented towards building and ensuring the operation of ships with a normal displacement of not more than 15 tons. In order to build and ensure the basing of heavier ships, modernization of shipyards, dredging work, etc. No one in Germany wanted to start creating gigantic battleships compared to previous battleships until there was confidence that the country could build and operate new ships. But all this required money, and in addition to this, the new battleships should significantly outrun the old squadron battleships, and this also had to be somehow settled.

    They missed the main reason - the size of the ships was limited to the Kiel Canal, as the size of the American battleships to the Panama. To build larger ships, it was necessary to modernize the Kiel Canal.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 February 2018 15: 53
      +5
      Quote: Snakebyte
      Missed the main reason

      Why?
      Quote: Snakebyte
      ship size limited to Kiel Canal

      The reason is important, but I’m not sure that the Nassau could not have passed the Kiel Canal before it was expanded. In addition, work with the channel continued for quite some time, and were completed only closer to the war, i.e. he did not become an insurmountable obstacle to the construction of dreadnoughts.
      1. Snakebyte
        Snakebyte 27 February 2018 16: 51
        +2
        The Kiel Canal factor is very serious, including the British.
        One of the reasons for the sharp increase in the size of armored ships was the fact that the Germans, bound by the restrictions of the Kiel Canal, could not increase the size (and, accordingly, the characteristics) of their own. Or lose the ability to maneuver forces between the theater of operations. Moreover, the main German shipyards were located in the Baltic.
        The dimensions of the shipyards and docks in principle allowed the Germans to build 20000+-ton ships, they were in no hurry to increase the caliber of artillery, as well as the transition to steam turbines. So, there were no serious technical obstacles to the construction of dreadnought in Germany.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 February 2018 17: 13
          +3
          Quote: Snakebyte
          So, there were no serious technical obstacles to the construction of dreadnought in Germany.

          There were. Firstly, the shipyards needed to increase the stocks, and this is not as easy as it might seem at first glance. Secondly - the descent weight and draft increased, plus questions to the bases - bottom dredging had to be done both there and there.
          1. Potter
            Potter 27 February 2018 20: 24
            +3
            Thanks for the article, first of all.
            About the shipyards and the size of ships under construction.
            In Germany at that time there was a boom in shipbuilding. For several years at the turn of the century, in the pre-pre-mortal era, a dozen ships were built for transatlantic lines of dreadnought size - up to 200m in length.
            The most famous of them are Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse 1897, 190m long, and Deutschland, 1900, the Vulcan shipyard.
            The characteristics of the latter - 208x20,4x8,4m, PM power 36000 hp Until 1907, he was the owner of the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic; the flight operated in 5 days at an average speed of 23,5 knots.
            And already in the pre-dreadnought era, the Germans built such giants as the Emperor (1913), with a length of 280m and a capacity of vocational schools of 62000 hp.
            Source - Belkin, Atlantic Blue Ribbon.
          2. Snakebyte
            Snakebyte 28 February 2018 09: 33
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There were. Firstly, the shipyards needed to increase the stocks, and this is not as easy as it might seem at first glance. Secondly - the descent weight and draft increased, plus questions to the bases - bottom dredging had to be done both there and there.

            Yes, part of the shipyards had to be modernized, but in Germany there were already suitable shipyards for the construction of such large ships. Gonchar’s colleagues comment on the above examples.
            The amount of dredging at the bases was apparently not so large; the Baltic and the North Sea are not the Gulf of Finland. For a couple of years, the Germans managed. But they had to mess with the channel for 7 years.
          3. pacific
            pacific 3 March 2018 03: 14
            +3
            I completely agree with you, Andrey.
            I happened to be in the "rotten corner of the North Sea" - near the mouth of the Elbe. And this is the entrance to the Kiel Canal, Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven. Poison. Isn’t it all the familiar names: the basing places of the High Seas Fleet?
            So - there, aground, aground, with fairly narrow passages for ships and even with significant tides (4-6 meters). I was always amazed at how the Germans went to the WWI on dreadnoughts. There and now with modern navigation aids, agrounding is not uncommon. Alas, he himself had the opportunity to "bite" this dubious pleasure in the same waters. sad
            So, that you are absolutely right - without serious dredging, it was simply impossible to base large warships there.
            PS The British were more fortunate in this regard. Although the tides off the coast of the Island are higher (and the tides are lower, respectively), the depths in ports and approaches are still greater. Especially in Scotland. However, I can’t understand how they were based at Scapa Flow. The bay, although large, deep, but on approaching channels the tidal currents are just crazy: 8-10 knots, and reach up to 16 (!). And all this across the fairway to the entrance to the bay. And God forbid swell from the Atlantic above 3 meters: in combination with the current transverse waves are formed with an almost vertical front.
            No matter how we relate to the British and German, they were actually Sailors with a capital letter.
            PPS English pilots told that the British navigated in the North Sea according to the color (!) And taste (!) Of sea water. Let me remind you that from the navigation equipment on board there is only a magnetic compass with a sextan and a lot, and all the lighthouses are off and the buoys and milestones are removed.
    2. saigon
      saigon 27 February 2018 17: 08
      0
      Actually, in non-wartime there were no problems with passage from the Baltic, and in the military it didn’t get much worse. But docks and bases are another matter, and finances for the army went in a flood.
      So the channel, in my opinion, is included in the list of reasons for limiting the displacement at number eleven, if it is included in the total. Most likely it was up to technology and design.
  4. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 27 February 2018 16: 51
    +2
    It turns out that the Blucher is the link that the British missed the natural evolution of ordinary armored cruisers into large armored cruisers (for some reason called linear): many GK towers, but the caliber is not battleship yet. 12 " smile
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 27 February 2018 17: 14
      0
      It seems ... despite the fact that they did not miss the evolution of armadillos, Agamemnon witnesses that))))
    2. Potter
      Potter 27 February 2018 20: 41
      0
      No, these are the only Germans who truly passed it! Apart from the "pocket" Swedish armored cruiser Fulgia in 4700t with a single caliber 8x152mm in 4 towers. But on the whole, Blucher turned out to be a magnificent vessel, he simply ended up in the wrong place at the wrong time. What is famous for.
  5. yehat
    yehat 27 February 2018 17: 30
    0
    Why, Blucher is a mistake?
    Well, yes, he is weaker than the English cruiser in the main caliber artillery. But why the error is decidedly not clear.
    all the more so because the battle of the Galloping Cancer, i.e. Skageke laughing showed that this advantage was very conditional. article is interesting, but 2 for disclosing the topic.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 27 February 2018 18: 11
      +1
      Quote: yehat
      Why, Blucher is a mistake?
      Well, yes, he is weaker than the English cruiser in the main caliber artillery. But why the error is decidedly not clear.

      PMSM, because this KR was unsuitable for service at the main theater of the HZF - the North Sea - already at the construction stage. Designing it may not have been a mistake yet. But the continuation of the construction - yes. As a result, the HZF received a ship that could only be used in the Baltic - because in the North Sea the chance to run into "cats" was too great.
      The Germans were too keen on the evolutionary development of the BrKR in terms of increasing the number of GK trunks, without paying attention to the trend of increasing the caliber of GK guns.
      1. yehat
        yehat 27 February 2018 18: 13
        0
        England had only 3 cats and they appeared much later than Blucher laid
        so it’s still not clear.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 27 February 2018 19: 05
          0
          Quote: yehat
          England had only 3 cats and they appeared much later than Blucher laid

          Duc ... I say that at the design and construction stage, Blucher was still theoretically adequate.
          But the adequacy of the continuation of its completion is already in question - for it was being completed when it became known about the actual performance characteristics of “Invincible” (which, moreover, became part of RN six months earlier than “Blucher”). As a result, the HZF received a ship that was a priori weaker than the new British large armored KR.
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 28 February 2018 09: 56
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            But the adequacy of the continuation of its completion is already in question - for it was being completed when it became known about the actual performance characteristics of “Invincible” (which, moreover, became part of RN six months earlier than “Blucher”). As a result, the HZF received a ship that was a priori weaker than the new British large armored KR.


            At the time of its completion, it was too late to change, and the ship put into operation is still better than dismantled on the slipway.
            He became a training artillery vessel, and only war brought him back into service.
      2. pacific
        pacific 3 March 2018 03: 30
        +1
        Rather, the mistake was not the completion of the Blucher, but the fact that he was not sent to the Baltic and left in the Heather squadron. Those. - improper tactical use.
        And in the Baltic, he could have created a lot of headaches for RIF. So, thank God that the Germans left him as part of the HZF.
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 5 March 2018 15: 06
          +1
          Quote: pacific
          Rather, the mistake was not the completion of the Blucher, but the fact that he was not sent to the Baltic and left in the Heather squadron. Those. - improper tactical use.
          And in the Baltic, he could have created a lot of headaches for RIF. So, thank God that the Germans left him as part of the HZF.


          Hipper's squadron was weak - to somehow strengthen it, Blucher was included in it, who before the start of the war was listed as a training artillery vessel - i.e. the Germans were well aware that the ship was rather unsuccessful in its task - to counter the British LKR. But his participation in the raiding operations was considered justified until the successfully launched British shell interrupted his run, deciding his fate.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 February 2018 18: 26
      +1
      Quote: yehat
      all the more so because the battle of the Galloping Cancer, i.e. Skageke laughing showed that this advantage was very conditional. article is interesting, but 2 for disclosing the topic.

      This is not an article, this is a series of articles, you read the first :))) And there is such an entry below
      To be continued
      1. yehat
        yehat 27 February 2018 18: 43
        0
        zhidems))) I love this topic - all sorts of LC, pelisips, armored cruisers, airships)))
  6. DimanC
    DimanC 27 February 2018 17: 49
    0
    Probably these are “things to come for a long time to come”, but I want to read about the fundamentally smaller caliber of the Germans in comparison with the Naglosaks.
  7. 27091965
    27091965 27 February 2018 18: 11
    0
    Thanks for your interesting articles.

    But the British managed to misinform the Germans, and they believed that the "Invincibles" was a kind of "Dreadnought", with only 234 mm artillery instead of 305 mm. Therefore, the Germans, who did nothing extravagantly, laid down a lightweight likeness of the Nassau with 210 mm cannons, and - were defeated, because the 210 mm Blucher, of course, was much inferior to the 305 mm Invincible.


    I think this is not true, in the buildings for 1905-1906 the armament of the future British battlecruisers is given. Therefore, they could not mislead the Germans. Most likely, the construction of the Blucher was influenced by the discussion of the fleet construction program in France in 1905-1906. She suggested the construction of armored cruisers with 10 guns of 8 inch caliber.

    " In his budget report, the use of one type of guns (10 "8 inches) was used for arming armored cruisers, but since this gun had to be designed, the 194 mm gun proposed by the weapons department was adopted. "1905

    According to Blucher, potential opponents of Germany believed that it would be a ship armed with 8 - 280 mm guns. They suggested that the Germans from 1907 will proceed to the construction of battleships and cruisers with a single 280 mm caliber.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 February 2018 18: 28
      +1
      Quote: 27091965i
      I think this is not true

      Me too :)))) nonetheless, this quote has become a “commonplace” in many publications
      1. 27091965
        27091965 27 February 2018 18: 43
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Me too :)))) nonetheless, this quote has become a “commonplace” in many publications


        Good evening.

        It is difficult for me to answer why in publications issued in Russia this quote became a “common place”, to be honest, I did not meet it in foreign publications. hi
    2. yehat
      yehat 27 February 2018 19: 10
      0
      the discussion of calibers is one-sided, you also need to keep in mind both the size of the sleeve and the mass of the shell, and the lengthening of the gun barrels. in fact, the German guns of 280mm caliber were not inferior to the English 305mm, but were more long-range (although at that time it was unrealistic to use)
      and given the fact that the Germans were usually better protected, the general question arises that the British lost the arms race, despite the number or formal superiority in volley weight or speed.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 February 2018 19: 17
        +2
        Quote: yehat
        in fact, German guns of 280mm caliber were not inferior to English 305mm

        yes how to say? If not for the bad shells, then the English 305-mm head is superior to the German 279-mm. Take at least the weight of the projectile - 385 kg versus 300 kg (roughly). At the same time, the German projectile, as a lighter one, naturally lost its initial speed faster, i.e. penetration of it fell faster with distance.
        1. pacific
          pacific 3 March 2018 03: 45
          0
          A. Patients have an interesting remark (I quote from memory); "... the Germans in the name of their fleet missed one word - they built a fleet of the open NORTHERN sea."
          And in the North Sea, visibility is almost always limited by haze, fog, drizzle. It is good when visibility reaches 60 - 80 kbt. Even now. And also take into account the protective coloring of the ships. So, most often at 70 kb you will even see with a binoculars a blurry silhouette of an indefinite ship.
          So, the Germans had enough armor penetration of their 280mm shells for the North Sea theater of operations.
          PS And the range of visibility is precisely determined, most often, by the met ship: if you see it clearly, measure the distance and get the range of visibility.
      2. 27091965
        27091965 27 February 2018 21: 21
        +1
        Quote: yehat
        the discussion of calibers is one-sided, you also need to keep in mind both the size of the sleeve and the mass of the shell, and the lengthening of the gun barrels. in fact, the German guns of 280mm caliber were not inferior to the English 305mm, but were more long-range (although at that time it was unrealistic to use)


        Caliber matters. This, in principle, can be seen in the example of French armadillos of the Danton type. Initially, they were designed as ships with a single caliber consisting of 12-274 mm guns, but at the insistence of the naval minister, the weapons were changed. In the original design, these ships were quite comparable to the first German battleships. After the changes in the composition of weapons, it was more difficult for them to resist battleships of the Nassau type.
  8. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 27 February 2018 18: 22
    +4
    Bravo! good hi
    The other day, I’ve read many times the Linear Cruisers of Germany by Muzhennikov, in order to refresh memory, keeping in mind your announced cycle about them, dear smile
    Just like an armored cruiser, if we take the completely traditional development of this class of ships in different countries, the Blucher was completely perfect. Of course, all the same problems of displacement limitation and some of the nuances of the project associated with this led to the appearance of a structural flaw in the form of unsuccessful placement of ammunition cellars for the side towers, but otherwise ... The speed advantage over the last peers was decent. An armor thickness of 180mm completely protected the ship from 203-254mm guns of opponents (and, as Dogger Bank shows, the cruiser was quite resistant to larger suitcases), plus ensuring unsinkability at a good level. The choice of caliber is also quite German, based on the balance in the criteria of “defense-attack”. The danger is already qualitatively manifested with the arrival of 12 "in the cruiser. The same" Invincibles "are armored cruisers in fact. The new classification made them linear. request
    so personally, I would opt for the Blucher. The relatively small caliber in relation to classmates is fully compensated by the superior speed and range of the guns of this caliber. And the Germans were able to shoot at maximum distances (Falklands)
    This, of course, is my personal opinion.
    Just "Blucher" appeared five years later than it should. Although this is the story ...
    PS. Well, purely aesthetically, the Germans are simply elegant fellow
    Once again, I thank you for the new excellent cycle and your quite adequate opinion in your views on the naval history of ships and battles
    Best regards hi
    1. yehat
      yehat 27 February 2018 19: 16
      +5
      me in German ships of the 1st World War bribes eye-catching rationality, logic and, as they say, nothing more. Of course, they had flaws, but the ships looked as if it was impossible to do better.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 February 2018 19: 57
        +2
        Quote: yehat
        rationality, logic and, as they say, nothing more.

        Well, for the most part this relates to the development of the Von der Tann - Moltke - Seidlitz - Derflinger series smile , where the latter, in principle, looks generally almost perfect
        1. arturpraetor
          arturpraetor 27 February 2018 20: 41
          +5
          Quote: Rurikovich
          where the latter, in principle, looks generally almost perfect

          Why a little? laughing "Derflinger", IMHO, the best battlecruiser in general, at the time of entry into operation according to the balance of characteristics he had no equal. Here and armor, and the EU with the normal characteristics of the specific power (not like the British), and quite strong weapons ... Just like an example of a balanced project.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 27 February 2018 21: 13
            +2
            Quote: arturpraetor
            It’s just an example of a balanced project.

            Agree hi Moreover, Jutland showed the correctness of the German concept of the battlecruiser.
            Quote: arturpraetor
            Why a little?

            Because there is no ideal in the world of ideal wink drinks
            1. Victor Wolz
              Victor Wolz 28 February 2018 22: 02
              0
              At the end of the WWI, Mackensen could become an ideal battlecruiser, but it did not grow together.
            2. Nehist
              Nehist 28 February 2018 23: 49
              +1
              Well, the concept of the Germans was to create battlecruisers specifically for linear combat, and the British have a purely cruising concept
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 1 March 2018 06: 28
                0
                Quote: Nehist
                Well, the concept of the Germans was to create battlecruisers specifically for linear combat, and the British have a purely cruising concept

                Exactly! yes hi A thorough reservation allowed the Germans to hold the blow and participate in the battle along with the battleships.
                1. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 1 March 2018 13: 09
                  +2
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  Right! A thorough reservation allowed the Germans to hold the blow and participate in the battle along with the battleships.


                  Well, don’t tell me - the battle of Jutland showed that the battlecruisers and the Germans received massive flooding, lost speed, burned actively, failed GK - but did not detonate.
                  German battlecruisers significantly lost combat effectiveness by the end of the battle. Most were repaired from three months to six months.
                  Those. against the British battlecruisers, they could be put in line, but not against the full-fledged dreadnought battleships.
                  1. Nehist
                    Nehist 1 March 2018 20: 41
                    0
                    Everything happened exactly the same with full-fledged battleships. Just as actively burned, lost speed, etc. You do not interpret the tasks of the linear cruisers set by Tirpitz unlike Fisher
                    1. DimerVladimer
                      DimerVladimer 6 March 2018 09: 12
                      +1
                      Quote: Nehist
                      You do not interpret the tasks of the linear cruisers set by Tirpitz unlike Fisher


                      Well, if you listen to Muzheninikov, then the Germans put a priority, including fighting in line with battleships. And the British planned that the battlecruisers would go outside the line of battleships. However, I have not yet found confirmation of this in German sources.
  9. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 27 February 2018 22: 47
    +1
    Something the story of "Blucher" resembles the story of "Rurik II". There were also interesting options in preliminary projects, for example, the option with only 10 "guns in the towers. Only ours generally rejected everything new, accepted the most conservative option.

    In general, the weak point of the Blucher project seems to me steam engines. The transition to turbines would free up weight for designers and give place to 280 mm towers instead of 210 mm.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 27 February 2018 23: 25
      +1
      Quote: Saxahorse
      In general, the weak point of the Blucher project seems to me steam engines. The transition to turbines would free up weight for designers and give place to 280 mm towers instead of 210 mm.

      Of course, it would be much better with turbines, but this would not be possible to install 12 280-mm guns. The difference in weight between the 210-mm and 280-mm installations is too large; the EC cannot be so lightened.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 28 February 2018 01: 08
        +1
        Yes, I probably got excited. It will not fit in 15 thousand tons. And in the rejected Rurik II project, there were also not 10 "but 10 pieces of 8" towers.
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 1 March 2018 00: 09
        0
        But intermeddle! The Blucher Tower weighs 195 tons (210mm) and the Von der Tann Tower weighs 400 tons (280mm). It turns out that 10 pieces of 8 "towers are replaced by 5-6 pieces of 11" towers and this is within 15000 tons of displacement.
    2. Snakebyte
      Snakebyte 28 February 2018 09: 44
      0
      Quote: Saxahorse
      In general, the weak point of the Blucher project seems to me steam engines. The transition to turbines would free up weight for designers and give place to 280 mm towers instead of 210 mm.

      It is doubtful. At that time, steam turbines were just starting their development and did not have great advantages over used steam engines. Therefore, the Germans equipped the first series of dreadnoughts equipped with PM. The advantage of turbines began with the advent of turbo gear units.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 28 February 2018 10: 00
        0
        Quote: Snakebyte
        It is doubtful. At that time, steam turbines were just starting their development and did not have great advantages over used steam engines.

        EMNIP, for the KR "Rurik-2" when replacing machines with turbines and while maintaining the gas turbine engine, it was considered possible to increase the speed to 25 knots.
        1. Snakebyte
          Snakebyte 28 February 2018 11: 18
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA
          EMNIP, for the KR "Rurik-2" when replacing machines with turbines and while maintaining the gas turbine engine, it was considered possible to increase the speed to 25 knots.

          What year is this? At the time of the approval of the Rurik drawings, the experience of using steam turbines on large Royal Nevi ships was organized by the Dreadnought and the light cruiser Arethuse.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 28 February 2018 17: 50
            0
            Quote: Snakebyte
            What year is this?

            EMNIP, 1906-1907
            The problem was that the Vickers agreed to replace the power plant, but only if they ordered at least 2 KPs.
    3. yehat
      yehat 28 February 2018 11: 58
      +1
      The minus of many Russian projects was that they constantly waited from the ship for some uber bending of everything that floats. They were swinging very hard, because of which the ship was either unfinished at all, or was excess in terms of performance characteristics or was very unbalanced.
      what is the construction program of the Ishmaels with powerful artillery, but weak protection and crowded Baltic. How they were going to be used is a complete mystery. And Rurik is also partly an unbalanced project.
  10. Curious
    Curious 27 February 2018 23: 27
    0
    "Errors of German shipbuilding. Large cruiser" Blucher "
    It would be interesting to calculate what an attempt to show that the construction of SMS Blücher was a mistake. Moreover, the Germans themselves understood this even during the construction of the ship, so in 1911 they re-trained it in the classroom. There is information about attempts to sell it to Turkey. Alas - to no avail.
    But so far, discussions like "Was the Blücher really such a bad design?" Can be found in German, English, Czech, even Polish and other Italian naval forums. or Frage zum Hergang der Versenkung vom Kreuzer Blücher.
    As for the author’s reflections on the fact that the Invincible project did not have a special influence on the Blucher development, since the Germans designed their ship long before the information about the first British battlecruisers appeared, these are the reflections.
    If we take the well-known German literature on Blucher, which began to be published as early as the thirties of the last century and whose authors definitely had access to the Bundesarchives, then it is written everywhere that the construction of Blucher was a response to British projects.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 February 2018 01: 20
      +3
      Quote: Curious
      If we take the well-known German literature on Blucher, which began to be published as early as the thirties of the last century

      That would be great to explain how in 1905 they designed the ship in response to the Invincible. wink
      1. Curious
        Curious 28 February 2018 02: 58
        +3
        For understanding, it is enough just to recall such a moment as the German-English maritime rivalry at the beginning of the 1906th century. Both sides closely monitored the plans of the enemy. It is enough to look at least the correspondence of the German naval attachés, accredited in London, with Tirpitz, to see that they feature issues that went far beyond the competence of the attaché. As an example, you can cite. the reports of the attachment of Kerper in August 1917, when he, being in the retinue of J. Fisher, who visited King Edward VII on his yacht, managed to obtain information about British naval construction plans until XNUMX. The British worked in the same way in England.
        And as soon as the British in December 1904 created their own Design Committee, its activities became the object of close attention of German intelligence. And information from this intelligence is the basis for the design of the future Blucher. Just in this case, the British Germans outplayed, slipping the misinformation and hiding the truth.
        The Germans talk about this critically.
        "Das Design des Panzerkreuzers“ Blücher ”ergab sich aus einer cleveren britischen Täuschung, die vorgab, dass die neue 'Invincible'-Klasse herkömmliche Panzerkreuzer mit 233,7-mm-Geschützen seinen. Daraufhin bauten Dieuten dieutenieutie dieuten dieuten dieutenuten dieuten dieuten dieuten dieuten dieuten weuten dieuten dieuten dieut "Blücher".
        In short, the Blucher project is the result of elegant British deception.
        1. 27091965
          27091965 28 February 2018 09: 47
          0
          Quote: Curious
          And as soon as the British in December 1904 created their own Design Committee, its activities became the object of close attention of German intelligence. And information from this intelligence is the basis for the design of the future Blucher. Just in this case, the British Germans outplayed, slipping the misinformation and hiding the truth.


          How then to understand the article "Cruiser", published in 1905 in the journal "Society of Naval Designers and Marine Engineers", under the discussion of which Mr. Horace See, Member of Council, compares what the approximate difference in cost of an English "amored cruiser" armed with 8 to 12 inch guns would be with the battleship King Edward VII. I think it is worth noting that the Americans believed that the speed of these ships will be 22 knots and they will have an armor belt of up to 9 inches.

          It turns out that German intelligence was doing everything, just not fulfilling the tasks assigned to it?
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          28 February 2018 10: 41
          +1
          Quote: Curious
          For understanding, it is enough just to recall such a moment as the German-English maritime rivalry at the beginning of the XNUMXth century

          Sorry, but this does not completely answer the question of how the Germans designed their cruiser in 1905 in response to the British ship, information about which became known in 1906.
          Quote: Curious
          And as soon as the British in December 1904 created their own Design Committee, its activities became the object of close attention of German intelligence. And the information from this intelligence is the basis for the design of the future Blucher

          Given the design history of Nassau, the Germans received no information about the Design Committee.
          Quote: Curious
          The Germans speak critically about this

          Forgive me, but what is written in German does not mean that the truth is written in the last resort. Dear Comrade writes below about the timing of the design and the basic decisions of Blucher. In fact, given the fact that
          Quote: Comrade
          On 18 of March 1905, the Kaiser approved one of the projects, but it did not provide for twelve, but eight guns of the main caliber.

          и
          Quote: Comrade
          In the spring of 1905, the Kaiser personally stopped arranging the project he had previously approved, and in May of that year he ordered the project to be revised.
          Thus, the final blueprint built by Blucher was approved by the head of the 22 design department in May 1906.

          and mindful of the fact that the Invincibles were laid in February-April 1906, we just have
          Then, when the "reliable" data on the Invincible became known - allegedly, this cruiser is a copy of the Dreadnought, only with 234 artillery, the Germans probably congratulated themselves on how great they guessed the development trends of the "big cruisers" and approved for the "Blucher" six 210-mm towers located in the rhombic scheme, as in "Nassau". And then, when the true tactical and technical characteristics of the Invincible ships became clear, they clutched their heads, because, of course, the Blucher was not their equal.
          1. Curious
            Curious 28 February 2018 12: 16
            0
            "Excuse me, but this does not completely answer the question of how the Germans designed their cruiser in 1905 in response to the British ship, information about which became known in 1906"
            Everything is based on the assertion that “the information became known in 1906”.
            Sorry, but how do you feel confident that the information about the British ships being designed became known in Germany in 1906, and before that the Germans had no idea about British projects such as Unattainable, Uncatchable and others, which have been ongoing since 1902 and did not take into account in their projects ?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              1 March 2018 08: 46
              +1
              Quote: Curious
              Sorry, but how do you feel confident that the information about the British ships being designed became known in Germany in 1906, and before that the Germans had no idea about British projects such as Unattainable, Uncatchable and others, which have been ongoing since 1902 and did not take into account in their projects ?

              In my opinion, this is obvious - if the Germans knew about these projects, they would NOT have built a "blucher" laughing
              In fact, everything is simple here - usually they are still interested in the performance characteristics of really laid ships - the project is shaky, it can change 100500 times more.
              1. Curious
                Curious 1 March 2018 12: 18
                -1
                "In fact, everything is simple here - usually they are still interested in the performance characteristics of really laid ships ..."
                You must have been a naval attaché, or did you head the 38th Directorate? If you don’t know the plans and analyze the prospects, how will you react to the enemy’s actions in a timely manner? They learned the performance characteristics of the mortgaged ship, while their project in response, while the construction, commissioning, and the enemy is already building the next series.
                With such a strategy you will not go far.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  2 March 2018 12: 01
                  +2
                  Quote: Curious
                  You must have been a naval attaché or headed the 38th Directorate?

                  No, but judging by your aplomb, you did it.
                  There is widespread and erroneous information that the German Blucher was designed under the influence of the data of the Invincibles, which formally laid down a year earlier. You, without the slightest reason and evidence base, undertake to assert that the Germans designed the cruiser in response to the invincible projects. I don’t see what else to talk about.
                  1. Curious
                    Curious 2 March 2018 14: 32
                    -1
                    This is not aplomb, but irony. I said that Blucher’s design could not but be influenced by intelligence and other sources about similar projects in Britain. You, on the whole, are not bad at creating articles on naval topics, in view of the emerging megalomania, you are completely unresponsive to comments on those points that you do not understand.
                    Fair wind!
    2. yehat
      yehat 28 February 2018 12: 00
      +1
      blucher was not a mistake. It just did not quite match the current goals of the fleet, because Germany did not build a cruising fleet, but a fleet for linear battle. It could have been used differently, but that was not part of the German plans.
  11. Comrade
    Comrade 28 February 2018 05: 56
    +6
    And here a number of questions arise. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of sources and publications describe the birth of the ninth armored cruiser of Germany like this: the Germans knew about the construction of the Dreadnought and knew that the British had laid the new armored cruisers of the Invincible type to it. But the British managed to misinform the Germans, and they believed that the Invincibles were similar to the Dreadnought, only with 234-mm artillery instead of 305-mm. Therefore, the Germans, who had nothing to do, laid a lightweight resemblance to the “Nassau” with 210-mm cannons, and they lost because of the 210-mm “Blucher”, of course, much inferior to the 305-mm “Invinsible”.
    This bike was first seen in the book of G. Smirnov "Ships and Battles", published in 1987 by the publishing house "Children's Literature", the key word here is nursery :-)

    The version is logical, everything seems to coincide in terms - but why then did the same Muzhenikov mention in his monograph that the Blucher was designed in 1904-1905 when no one had heard of any Invincibles?[i] [/ i]
    The peasants are mistaken; during the indicated period, the Blucher, which was not known to all of us, was designed, and a number of projects of the large cruiser were created. The main difference is the placement of guns, towers, as well as the number of main guns in the towers and casemates.
    On 18 of March 1905, the Kaiser approved one of the projects, but it did not provide for twelve, but eight guns of the main caliber.
    And a couple of months before, in February 1905, the British already had four cruiser projects, and each provided for the presence of eight 12 '' guns.
    So theoretically, the Germans, through their agents, could well recognize the caliber of the guns of the designed cruisers at the design stage.


    PS
    In the spring of 1905, the Kaiser personally stopped arranging the project he had previously approved, and in May of that year he ordered the project to be revised.
    Thus, the final blueprint built by Blucher was approved by the head of the 22 design department in May 1906.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 February 2018 10: 34
      +1
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Allow in one post to answer immediately everything, including the previous topic
      Quote: Comrade
      Do not tell, dear colleague, gunpowder and gunpowder are different.

      This of course, of course, but the fact is that all this is gunpowder, especially since we are talking about black gunpowder. Please note that the smokeless gunpowder listed by you in the table (all but the first) has very similar characteristics. Those. I meant that any kind of black powder (even with certain differences between them) completely "falls short" of pyroxylin / shimoza, etc., more advanced explosives
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, if we are talking about 12 '' shells, then they were only English.

      So let
      Quote: Comrade
      I unsuccessfully put it, of course, the effect of a shell rupture with gunpowder and with a shimosa will be different. But both in the battle at Cape Shantung and in the Tsushima battle, the Japanese used the same shells, in the sense of both gunpowder and shimoza

      Dear colleague, no :)))))
      I don’t know what kind of shells the Japanese armadillos were equipped with when transferring them to Japan :)))) As far as I know, the British had 305 mm / 40 armor-piercing holes (for the whole time of their existence) (if the greenboard was thrown back, the content of explosives in them was 11,9-12,4 kg) semi-armor-piercing (36,3 kg) and HE Mark IIa high-explosive for which as much as 48,3 kg is indicated (probably this is already lead)
      There may be confusion here, but the point is that the content of explosives in an armor-piercing and high-explosive projectile differed significantly, which, in general, is logical.
      Accordingly, the Japanese could shoot armor-piercing and high-explosive, containing black gunpowder, and armor-piercing and high-explosive, containing shimosa. At the same time, taking into account a correction factor of 1,7 (density), it turns out that the armor-piercing projectile with its (roughly) 12 kg of black powder contained about 20 kg of shimose, and a high-explosive shell with 80 pounds indicated by you, i.e. 36,3 kg of gunpowder - about 60 kg of shimoza.
      Thus, the Japanese fought:
      1) Armor-piercing with 12 kg of black powder
      2) Armor-piercing with 20 kg of shimoza
      3) High explosive with 36,3 kg of gunpowder
      4 High explosive with 60 kg of chimose.
      At the same time, we know that under Shantung, the Japanese used armor-piercing shells quite widely (up to half of the shells consumed), but in Tsushima - at a minimum, they said in tsushima that there were 31 shells in total.
      So, in accordance with the foregoing, it can be assumed that during Shantung, high-explosive with gunpowder and armor-piercing with gunpowder and shimosa fell into Russian ships, while in Tsushima - high-explosive with shimoza, hence the difference in results
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, the shells then had different sizes and different wall thicknesses. That is why in the armor-piercing was 26 pounds and 7 ounces of liddit, and in the shell filled with gunpowder, the latter had eighty pounds.

      Dear colleague, you confused me a little :)))) I talked about the fact that the British equipped their armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing ones first with gunpowder, and then with liddit. Accordingly, if we want to compare their impact, it is worth comparing the mass of explosives in armor-piercing with gunpowder and armor-piercing with liddite, and the same for semi-armor-piercing. But I absolutely do not understand what we get by comparing the semi-armor-piercing powder with the armor-piercing liddite?
      Quote: Comrade
      The husbands are mistaken

      Here, too, it is incomprehensible to me :))) You say that Muzhdenikov is mistaken, but
      Quote: Comrade
      On 18 of March 1905, the Kaiser approved one of the projects, but it did not provide for twelve, but eight guns of the main caliber.

      Great, thanks!
      Quote: Comrade
      In the spring of 1905, the Kaiser personally stopped arranging the project he had previously approved, and in May of that year he ordered the project to be revised.

      Moreover, he stopped arranging it, as I understand it, in terms of weapons
      Quote: Comrade
      Thus, the final blueprint built by Blucher was approved by the head of the 22 design department in May 1906.

      That is, in fact, the final Blucher project was developed from May-April 1905 to May 1906, respectively, all key decisions on the project were made in 1905, and most likely even in the first half - i.e. long before the construction of the Invincibles. And since, as I understand it, the British officially announced the performance characteristics of their cruisers only after they were laid, it turns out that Blucher is a purely German development, without regard to the British. And In this case, Muzhenikov simply incorrectly expressed himself (or I, a sinful one, misunderstood him) - in 1904-1905 the shape of the ship was determined, and the design was completed in 1906
      1. yehat
        yehat 28 February 2018 12: 03
        0
        to pyroxylin / shimoza, etc., more advanced explosives

        Not everyone is ready to call shimosa advanced. It was already abandoned by the Americans at that time after a series of incidents.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 March 2018 08: 47
          +1
          Quote: yehat
          It was already abandoned by the Americans at that time after a series of incidents.

          :))) They even used it in WWII
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 1 March 2018 00: 06
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Accordingly, if we want to compare their impact, it is worth comparing the mass of explosives in armor-piercing with gunpowder and armor-piercing with liddite, and the same for semi-armor-piercing.

        By the way, it may be more correct to compare not the weight but the volume of explosives? The power of the high-explosive effect, for example, is directly related to the number of liters of hot gases released from one liter of substance.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 March 2018 08: 48
          +1
          Quote: Saxahorse
          The power of the high-explosive effect, for example, is directly related to the number of liters of hot gases released from one liter of substance.

          And the amount of gas has a direct relationship with the mass of explosives in this liter :))))))
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 1 March 2018 22: 23
            0
            Tighter does not mean that there are more gases. Here ballistic leads, gunpowder i.e. :) But I wanted to say a little about something else.

            A cavity of 36 liters under the gunpowder cannot be simply taken and scored with liddite (or shimoza). The shell will have a different weight, and hence the ballistics. Another type of projectile will appear in the shooting tables. This is not to mention the fact that liddit can neither be poured nor filled into the finished cavity. It must be invested entirely in an airtight case. And for this, the projectile itself must be structurally adapted.

            In short, it is impossible to buy 12 "shells with gunpowder and stupidly put shimozu there. They are structurally different. And it is clear that you can’t mix them either. Different ballistics.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              2 March 2018 11: 58
              +2
              Quote: Saxahorse
              In short, it is impossible to buy 12 "shells with gunpowder and stupidly pour shimosa there.

              The Japanese did it. Apparently, stupid :)))
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 2 March 2018 23: 51
                0
                Present pliz please. :)
            2. wer2
              wer2 3 March 2018 00: 28
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              In short, it is impossible to buy 12 "shells with gunpowder and stupidly put shimozu there. They are structurally different. And it is clear that you can’t mix them either. Different ballistics.

              Do not tear them pattern. Yes, and it is useless.
              There is such a site http://navweaps.com.
              There, "everything is written correctly and cool." And "he who does not agree is ... a fool."
              However, they do not know the languages. Therefore, footnotes are not read. And there about shimoza in black and white it is written apparently. Which means "apparently, probably, probably." Those. the site does not know the exact information.
              But they have already raised this info to the category of absolute truths.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                4 March 2018 20: 00
                +4
                Quote: wer2
                There is such a site http://navweaps.com.

                It remains only to understand what this Murzilka has to do with it.
  12. yehat
    yehat 28 February 2018 12: 38
    0
    by chance, I had a chance to play NavyField, where you can control boats and conduct artillery fire, independently guiding guns. It is full of conventions, but still ...
    layouts of towers like Nassau, the dreadnought and rhombus, as on a heap of it. cruisers, to me, based on that experience, do not seem successful. A volley of the number of guns on board is fine, but in my opinion the ship’s overall ergonomics and rationality are no less important, which seems to be violated when using schemes with towers in the center of the hull differently from the French Brittany or Japanese cruisers.
    in general, this seems like a dead end and has become relatively effective in a very narrow timeframe for the development of fleet artillery.
  13. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 28 February 2018 13: 07
    +1
    I love it when Andrei Nikolaevich writes. Here is not only a good article, but also no less informative comments.
    Thank you!
  14. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 28 February 2018 13: 29
    +2
    Greetings Andrew !!! The next topic that you raised is very interesting and ambiguous. For example, why is Blucher always compared with battlecruisers? After all, "Blucher" was a large or armored cruiser. During this period of time, many countries built or finished building their armored cruisers. Perhaps the German should be compared with Rurik (Russia, 1909), Minotaur (England, 1908), Warrior (England, 1906), Black Prince (England, 1906), Ibuki (Japan, 1911) , Tsukuba (Japan, 1907), San Giorgio (Italy, 1911), Amalfi (Italy, 1909), Georgios Averoff (Greece, 1911), Tennessee (USA, 1906), Edgar Queen "(France, 1911)," Ernest Renan "(France, 1909), etc. Then everything falls into place. The Germans built their ship to counter other armored cruisers. And in comparison with them, the German looks good, but in some positions (booking, speed) it’s just wonderful.
    1. Kibb
      Kibb 5 March 2018 10: 30
      0
      Actually, Andrei writes about this - as it is customary in Russian sources to talk about deceived Germans, but from the dates given by the author and you, it is clear that Blucher was created as an answer to the Minotaur, the Germans simply did not really understand why big cruisers were needed at all (before Von der Tann, but he is not a cruiser at all)
  15. Comrade
    Comrade 1 March 2018 04: 37
    +3
    Dear Andrew,
    You know how you can touch upon interesting topics, for which, as our mutual friend says, personal Turkish delight :-)

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Allow in one post to answer immediately everything, including the previous topic

    Yes, of course.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    it turns out that the armor-piercing projectile with its (roughly) 12 kg of black powder contained about 20 kg of shimose, and a HE shell with the indicated 80 pounds, i.e. 36,3 kg of gunpowder - about 60 kg of chimose.

    Dear colleague, I’m sorry, I’m probably not expressing myself clearly enough. The explosive weights given by me do not refer to shells from the period of the Russo-Japanese War, but to shells used by the British during the Battle of Jutland.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    under Shantung, the Japanese used armor-piercing shells quite widely (up to half of the shells consumed), but in Tsushima - at a minimum, they said at Tsushima that there were only 31 shells.

    With all due respect to the inhabitants there, I must say that this figure does not reflect the real situation. The fact is that the information on the consumption of shells of Togo’s compound (1th battle detachment) in the Tsushima battle, as well as the nomenclature of 12 '' shells fired, is still classified. To the 2 mth combat detachment (Kimimura’s compound), this does not apply.
    How did I come to this conclusion? When you go to "Top Secret History", you see sections with catalogs there. So, the catalog of documents with the consumption of ammunition does not include the relevant documents about Tsushima. And the fact that these documents exist, simply did not put them on public display, eloquently says the following fact. Each document has its own pass-through code, and the numbers in this code show that in the file cabinet we do not have the documents we need. It looks as follows (exaggerated): 1; 2; 3; 10; 11; 12. Six figures are missing, just four armadillos and two armored cruisers.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Moreover, he stopped arranging it, as I understand it, in terms of weapons

    No, the project as such ceased to suit him. Let me remind you that it was an “improved Scharnhorst,” with the replacement of casemates of main-caliber guns with single-gun towers.
    In April 1905, the Kaiser returned from Italy, where he was greatly impressed by the Italian high-speed battleship. Wilhelm II gave the command to design the same. But the relevant department actually lowered the "valuable instruction" of the emperor on the brakes, and instead of the German "Regina Elena" designed the "Blucher" in the form in which we know from photographs.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In this case, Muzhenikov simply incorrectly expressed himself (or I, a many-sinner, misunderstood him) - the appearance of the ship was determined in 1904-1905 and the design was completed in 1906

    Dear Andrey, Muzhenikov is still mistaken. For between the "old" and the "new" "Blucher" there is nothing in common. In the first case, you see Scharnhorst - the same architecture, the same body, the same four pipes. Just slightly increased the displacement by placing four towers.
    And when we look at the options for the "new" Blucher, we see a completely different ship, very similar to the "Von der Tann". It was designed from scratch, without regard to the previous options, and there was a struggle for this project. German sailors liked the idea of ​​a fast battleship, but the Department of Structures had its own opinion on this subject.
    And last, dear colleague. The fact that the new British cruisers carry 12 shells was reported by the German naval attache in London 31 on May 190 in his report6 . Prior to this, such information was not received through official channels in Germany.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      5 March 2018 10: 33
      +2
      Greetings, dear Valentine! hi
      Quote: Comrade
      for which you, as our mutual friend says, personal Turkish delight :-)

      Thank you :)))) By the way, this week is the first article in the series about the Gotland fight :)))
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear colleague, I’m sorry, I’m probably not expressing myself clearly enough. The explosive weights given by me do not refer to shells from the period of the Russo-Japanese War, but to shells used by the British during the Battle of Jutland.

      Without any doubt. But the fact is that, as I understand it, in terms of explosives they were comparable to those that were sold to the Japanese.
      Quote: Comrade
      With all due respect to the inhabitants there, I must say that this figure does not reflect the real situation. The fact is that the information on the consumption of shells of the Togo compound (1st combat detachment) in the Tsushima battle, as well as the nomenclature of 12 '' shells fired, is still classified.

      Or it was not posted for some other reason. In any case, dear colleague, we have an interesting picture:
      1) We know that the Japanese purchased shells in England and we know that they exchanged the filling for shimosa.
      2) We do not know how many shells received this very shimoza and in what battle which shells were used
      3) We understand that a high-explosive English shell will in any case contain more shimoza than armor-piercing.
      4) We know that in ZhM the Japanese used armor-piercing shells a lot, but according to reports, they hardly used them in Tsushima. However, the latter, we have no confirmation from a top secret story. The rebuttals, however, are also
      5) We have evidence (of the same Semenov) that the shells used in Tsushima were "different"
      In all these five points, the hypothesis that the Japanese fired mainly at armor-piercing and high-explosive with gunpowder, or armor-piercing with shimosa, fits very well. In fact, even if it suddenly turns out that the Japanese used armor-piercing shells in Tsushima a lot, then this will not completely refute the hypothesis - it can be proved / refuted only by studying which shells with which filling were used in each of the battles. In any case, it’s rather difficult for me to agree that my hypothesis is wrong, on the grounds that the Secret History maybe refutes it :)
      In addition, I would like to note that in order to inflict severe damage to the much stronger German battlecruisers, 20-30 hits with liddit shells were enough, although, again, it is possible that the British partially shot and powder.
      Quote: Comrade
      Dear Andrey, Muzhenikov is still mistaken. For between the "old" and the "new" "Blucher" there is nothing in common.

      Thanks for the interesting information! On the other hand, I would like to note that nevertheless, all its forms are included in the design process of the ship, i.e. the fact that Blucher was an improved Scharnhorst in the first iteration is not a sign that we should put this aside. A lot of ships in the design process radically change their characteristics - but at least remember our destroyers of the project 956 "Sarych", which began to be created as fire support ships for the landing :)))
      Actually, we have that Blucher was developed in 1904-1906, despite the fact that the ship began to acquire its final appearance after the decisions of April-May 1905.
      Quote: Comrade
      The fact that the new British cruisers carry 12 '' shells, in his report, said the German naval attache in London on May 31, 1906

      And they continued to build Blucher with 210 mm, because the project was already approved? Maniacs Ordnunga. laughing
  16. pacific
    pacific 3 March 2018 04: 17
    +2
    Thanks Andrew!
    Finally, the long-awaited series of articles on German LKR HZF has begun! Hooray! Hooray! Hooray!
    Blucher has already sparked a lively and informative discussion. I hope the rest of the German LCR will be just as interesting.
  17. Comrade
    Comrade 5 March 2018 05: 31
    0
    Quote: wer2
    Do not tear them pattern. There is such a site http://navweaps.com. And there about shimoza in black and white it is written apparently. Which means "apparently, probably, probably." Those. the site does not know the exact information.


    Man, let me tear the template for you. We have four historical facts:
    1) Japan at the beginning of the 20th century not made shells with caliber more than 152 mm
    2) Japan in 1904-1905 g. Used shells of caliber 305 mm, stuffed with "shimoza"
    3) Japan did not buy in England 305 mm shells stuffed with "shimoza"
    4) Japan bought 305 mm shells in England, stuffed with gunpowder and liddit.

    Know how to link everything together?
    1. Kibb
      Kibb 5 March 2018 10: 21
      0
      In general, it’s not difficult to connect everything - one question, how is the leaddit fundamentally different from shimoza? But there could be a difference in fuses. hi
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        5 March 2018 14: 01
        +2
        Quote: Kibb
        In general, it’s not difficult to connect everything - one question, how is the leaddit fundamentally different from shimoza?

        Fundamentally - nothing, but I have some doubts that the British started shelling with leaddite at the time when they were delivered to Japan
        1. Kibb
          Kibb 5 March 2018 14: 54
          0
          It is not only you have such doubts. It’s just that it doesn’t absolutely differ from the filling with leadite or shimosa (both picric and the same) with the same body and fuse, but if there is another fuse, the differences can be very serious.
          1. Kibb
            Kibb 5 March 2018 15: 14
            0
            Remember the shelling of Chesma, because not only the armor of Sevastopol was checked there, but also the shells of 07 and 11, and most importantly, two types of fuses for the BB - and the picture was completely different. If a 305mm 11 year with one fuse was torn when it hit or passed the armor of the main belt, then with the other fuse the same shell completely pierced 10 "felling and exploded when hit in the opposite wall
        2. 27091965
          27091965 5 March 2018 18: 17
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Fundamentally - nothing, but I have some doubts that the British started shelling with leaddite at the time when they were delivered to Japan


          "During the first attack on Port Arthur, on February 9, 1904, and in Vladivostok, on March 6, 1904, part of the Japanese shells (leaddit) did not explode, but during the bombing of Port Arthur on March 10, 1904 all the shells exploded. This quality improvement coincides with the date of introduction of the shimosa in the Japanese Navy."Artilleristische Monatshefte 1907.

          Unfortunately, the author does not indicate the exact date. But perhaps the replacement of explosives in shells occurred in late February, early March 1904.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 5 March 2018 21: 42
            0
            "As an explosive (HE) for high-explosive and armor-piercing shells and for torpedo warheads, the Japanese fleet took on January 26.01.1893, XNUMX the" shimoza powder "developed by engineer M. Shimoza."
            1. 27091965
              27091965 5 March 2018 22: 26
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              "As an explosive (HE) for high-explosive and armor-piercing shells and for torpedo warheads, the Japanese fleet took on January 26.01.1893, XNUMX the" shimoza powder "developed by engineer M. Shimoza."


              This is not about adopting weapons, but about replacing explosives in large-caliber shells.
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 6 March 2018 00: 29
                0
                And it was originally there. The Japanese began to cost a large fleet in 1894, they had no reason to stockpile new shells with an old explosive.
  18. Kibb
    Kibb 5 March 2018 10: 18
    0
    Quote: saigon
    Actually, in non-wartime there were no problems with passage from the Baltic, and in the military it didn’t get much worse. But docks and bases are another matter, and finances for the army went in a flood.
    So the channel, in my opinion, is included in the list of reasons for limiting the displacement at number eleven, if it is included in the total. Most likely it was up to technology and design.

    The problem was - the Kiel Canal, without its modernization, new battleships could not pass to the Baltic, but even the Germans could not dream of navigating ships through the Danish Straits during the war with Britain request
  19. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 5 March 2018 21: 52
    0
    Comrade Today, 05:31 New
    ...
    Man, let me tear the template for you. We have four historical facts:
    1) Japan at the beginning of the 152th century did not produce shells with caliber more than XNUMX mm


    And on what, excuse me for concreteness, is such a categorical statement based? Did Togo personally inform you of such details? Generally speaking, there is other information.

    “By the beginning of the war with Russia, the Japanese fleet was armed with two types of 305-mm armor-piercing shells of their own production - forged steel No. 1 and cast No. 2. .. they were part of the ammunition of all battleships, and they used the Fuji and Yasima By tradition, all armor-piercing shells were white, with 305 mm No. 1 having one and No. 2 having two red stripes; HE shells of all calibres were painted brown with a yellow strip. "

    As you can see, even the marking of their own Japanese 12 shells is well known. I find it difficult to determine the sources of your strange information.
  20. Comrade
    Comrade 6 March 2018 05: 47
    0
    Quote: Kibb
    How is liddit fundamentally different from shimoza?

    The fundamental difference between these two explosives lies in the raw materials from which liddite and chimose were synthesized.

    Quote: Kibb
    But there could be a difference in fuses.

    The Japanese established their own, Ijuin systems.

    Quote: 27091965i
    But perhaps the replacement of explosives in shells occurred in late February, early March 1904 year.

    In a collection of reports by the English naval attache, one of the documents describes in detail the state of the artillery at Fuji. So it says explicitly that all ammunition on an armadillo yet to wars were equipped with shimoza. It is likely that on other ships for the experiment or for any other reasons they could partially leave shells with both gunpowder and liddit.

    Quote: Saxahorse
    As you can see, even the marking of their own Japanese 12 shells is well known. I find it difficult to determine the sources of your strange information.

    It doesn’t matter, this is from the "Edition of the Naval Scientific Department of the Main Naval Headquarters." A detailed review is given both on the materiel and on the infrastructure of the Navy of Japan. The author of the book, where did you quote from, freely dealt with a fragment of the report, which is mentioned in my commentary above. It does not say that these are shells of Japanese manufacture, only their types are indicated there according to the Japanese classification, and it is immediately specified what type this corresponds to in the English fleet.
    By the way, English guns of English production, too, had a Japanese classification, but this, of course, does not mean that the ships of Togo and Kamimura guns of the main caliber were made in Japan.
    Regarding the "suitcases" with a shimoza, the opinion of colleagues inclined to the idea that the Japanese could acquire unloaded shells for the purpose of subsequently equipping their shimoza is quite justified.
    Moreover, there is a clear hint of this in the Fuji artillery report. And then to say, what is the point of paying for a full-fledged equipped projectile with a fuse, if you can buy an empty blank and fill it with whatever you want? It turns out quite logical, especially considering that the Japanese had their own fuses. They bought an empty shell without a fuse, equipped it with a shimoza, and put its own fuse. What could prevent the Japanese from doing so?
    1. 27091965
      27091965 6 March 2018 08: 55
      0
      Quote: Comrade
      So it says explicitly that all the ammunition on the battleship was equipped with a shimoza even before the war. It is likely that on other ships for the experiment or for any other reasons they could partially leave shells with both gunpowder and liddit.


      I’m not trying to refute this, having a certain influence on the Japanese, maybe England took the opportunity to test their shells equipped with leaddit in practice.
    2. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 6 March 2018 22: 10
      0
      Quote: Comrade
      It doesn’t matter, this is from the "Edition of the Naval Scientific Department of the Main Naval Headquarters." A detailed review is given both on the materiel and on the infrastructure of the Navy of Japan.

      Is this the publication of the Russian State Musical School in 1907? There is doubt that they can fully describe the Japanese military industry of that time.

      Quote: Comrade
      The author of the book, where did you quote from, freely dealt with a fragment of the report, which is mentioned in my commentary above. It does not say that these are Japanese-made shells, only their types are indicated there

      I believe that the author did not manage with this report alone during the preparation of his book. apparently he had reasons not to doubt the origin of these shells.

      Quote: Comrade
      By the way, the English guns of the English production also had a Japanese classification ..

      It is interesting to note that the author in the same chapter on this occasion added: "- forged steel No. 1 and alloy No. 2. The latter, according to the seconded English advisers, differed in poor workmanship and often caused various incidents. Nevertheless, they included "to the ammunition of all the battleships, and only they were used at Fuji and Yasima." It is immediately noticeable that English advisers are unlikely to respond so much about English shells :)

      Quote: Comrade
      They bought an empty shell without a fuse, equipped it with a shimoza, and put its own fuse. What could prevent the Japanese from doing so?

      When purchasing blanks, the issue of quality control will become more acute. In the case of a shell, this is checked simply by shooting there, in England, in the case of blanks - that sailed that sailed. Before the manufacturer, half a ball and two oceans. There is another nuance. 19th century Japan, like any 3rd world country, had a problem - where to get the currency? Foreign currency loans were divided carefully, it would be more logical to take either scarce raw materials (steel for example) or technologically advanced products not yet mastered by their industry (guns for example). And it’s neither here nor there .. It’s more logical to grind by ourselves.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 7 March 2018 06: 34
        0
        Is this the edition of the Russian GMSH 1907 of the year?

        For the first time I hear about this.
        [quoteI suppose that the author did not manage this report alone during the preparation of his book] [/ quote]
        This is your assumption in support of his personal opinion.
        The latter, according to the seconded English advisers, were of poor manufacturing quality and often became the cause of various incidents.

        A colleague, a collection of reports, I went many times "from cover to cover." There is not what you are talking about, more precisely Balakin or someone else writes. Likewise, there is no information in the reports that the Japanese armored cruisers did not give more than 15 nodes. These are all tales that are attributed to the English attache for solidity. And designed for those who can not check.
        And it’s neither here nor there .. It’s more logical to grind by ourselves.

        What to sharpen? There was a special steel, and the big question is whether the Japanese cooked it. When necessary, the Japanese did not skimp on the currency. For example, having coal mines, during the war they brought coal from England. And we ran on Japanese coal, which we had time to buy before the war, or on the same States or Australia.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 7 March 2018 20: 26
          0
          Quote: Comrade
          Comrade Today, 06:34 ↑ New
          Is this the edition of the Russian GMSH 1907 of the year?
          For the first time I hear about this.

          This is a marine collection of reports and reports on the results of the REE. I did not study it, I just came across links.

          Quote: Comrade
          A colleague, a collection of reports, I went many times "from cover to cover." There is not what you are talking about, more precisely Balakin or someone else writes.

          Please explain in this case which "Edition .." you are referring to.
          Quote: Comrade
          What to sharpen? There was a special steel, and the big question is whether the Japanese cooked it. When necessary, the Japanese did not skimp on the currency.

          Therefore, I clarified whether they buy either scarce raw materials (steel of the right grade) or an advanced product. Paying with currency is a simple semi-finished product, there is no reason. As far as I remember, the Japanese ordered a large batch of shells in 1905. Either in March or in April, apparently their capacities were already sorely lacking. But these shells are unlikely to have sailed to Japan before Tsushima.

          I want to recall - "In 1900, military factories and arsenals accounted for 40% of all state-owned enterprises, which concentrated 54% of workers among those who worked in state-owned enterprises." Against this background, the assumption that Japan did not produce its own ammunition at all looks strange. Well, it’s not the Harakiri technique that they honed by such a crowd in arsenals .. :)
  21. Comrade
    Comrade 6 March 2018 06: 19
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    Quote: Saxahorse
    By the beginning of the war with Russia, the Japanese fleet was armed with two types of 305-mm armor-piercing shells of their own production - forged steel No. 1 and cast No. 2. ..they were part of the ammunition of all the battleships, and only they were used on the Fuji and Yasima.

    By the way, Balakin, from whom you borrowed this quote, repeatedly distorted the report of Commander T. Jackson, and this is bad. Either the author of The Tsushima Triumphs neglected the original source, or could not read the text of the original source correctly. It’s clearly stated there that they used “armored piercing” Fuji only Shells No. 2.
    Eh, Balakin, Balakin ... Or isn’t that what he says?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 6 March 2018 22: 16
      0
      You almost guessed :) Yes, this quote is from the book of S. A. Balakin, but not "Triumphs .." but a little earlier - "Mikasa and others ... Japanese battleships 1897-1905."

      But references to these No. 1 "forged" and No. 2 "cast" more than once came across in other sources. The topic of premature explosions of Japanese shells is of interest to many.
  22. Varna
    Varna 8 March 2018 23: 01
    0
    The article would be perfect and perfect if the respected author would be able to pull himself together and refrain from his own speculations and assumptions. So they say and so, everything that is currently known is known about Blucher in RuNet, so to speak, metal mined from RuNet ore. Then sign, Andrew from Chelyabinsk.
    No, the author decided to add his engraving on metal ingots (so to speak, Vasya was here) and this spoiled the whole pleasantness of the article and the desire to express gratitude to the unbiased and scrupulous material. Probably it was not worth it, it would be necessary to stay within the framework, believe me, people would be very respectful with you anyway, the article is wonderful. Of course, my remark is spiteful, sorry.