"They fight until they are killed ..."

The memory of the regular, pre-war Red Army, which was almost completely lost in the battles of the summer of 1941, must not be defiled by malicious slander and amateurish speculations.

I can well imagine how many dogs will be lowered on me now. And, nevertheless, on the eve of the century anniversary of the Red Army, I consider it necessary to bring complete clarity to the topic of the so-called “catastrophic defeats” of our army in the summer of 1941.

In the sense that the Armed Forces of the USSR, which existed on 22 in June of that year, are completely UNCONFECTABLE for the reasons for these defeats. And vice versa - they made the maximum of what they could to absorb and dissipate the energy of the first, most powerful blow of the enemy.

Among the most common misconceptions are the following interpretations of the root causes of our military failures of 1941 of the year:

1. Pre-war Stalinist repression against the commanders of the Red Army

2. Incompleteness of rearmament and combat deployment of the Red Army

3. Low moral and political level of the personnel who allegedly did not want to fight for communist Russia

4. Betrayal of the commanders of the Red Army, especially the Western Special Military District

5. The unwillingness of the USSR to a defensive war, allegedly connected with its purely offensive plans to defeat Germany and conquer Europe

All this is nothing else but malicious political speculation, designed, at different times and for different reasons, to transfer the responsibility arrows to the army and make its fighters and commanders the main culprits of the incident.

In the following text, I will try, at least in brief and in general terms, otherwise I would have to write a multi-volume, describe - why it is not so. What the “Military Diary” of the then Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany, Colonel-General Franz Halder, will help me, the main value of which lies precisely in the assessment of the events that took place in real time free of subsequent political overlays.

So, let's start right from 22 June 1941goda - the first day of the war. Here is what Halder writes:


“The overall picture of the first day of the offensive is as follows:
“The German offensive took the enemy by surprise. The tactical order of the enemy was not tactically adapted to defense; His troops in the border zone were scattered over a wide area and tied to the quartering areas. The security of the border itself was generally weak.
... In favor of the conclusion that a significant part of the enemy forces is much deeper in the rear than we thought, and now partially relegated even further, the following facts speak: our troops advanced to the depth of 20 km for the first day of the offensive, then - the absence of a large number of prisoners, an extremely small amount of artillery acting on the side of the enemy ", HTTP://MILITERA.LIB.RU/DB/HALDER/1941_06.HTML

For an experienced military man, which, of course, was the chief of the German General Staff, the overall picture of events became apparent almost immediately. And Halder - a professional warrior who, in general, did not care about Hitler's chatter about the preventive war against the “already ready to attack the USSR”, immediately and unequivocally this Nazi myth completely refuted. The facts he noted “the dispersion of Soviet troops over a vast territory and attachment to their quartering areas”, as well as a direct indication that “a significant part of the enemy’s forces are much deeper in the rear than we thought” clearly and unequivocally indicate that there were no strategic strike groups near the state border, on the eve of 22 June, the Red Army did not create and, therefore, did not prepare for aggression.

Thus, already at this stage of our reasoning, we can safely put a fat cross on all propaganda about the inevitable Soviet aggression at that time, allegedly pushing Hitler to war, and at the same time on all apologists for this false theory - from Goebbels to traitor Rezun.

The army, allegedly prepared for a “liberation campaign in Europe”, could not sit quietly in “winter quarters” scattered throughout the vast territory of the European part of the USSR. Strategic strike forces look a little different.
And if they really hung over the eastern border of the Third Reich in full readiness for a swift rush to the West, then Halder would hardly have had the opportunity to write about the weak resistance of the enemy in the border zone.
Moreover, in the case of the actual existence of such fully mobilized strike groups near the border, and these are millions of soldiers and officers, the picture of military operations would be completely different than the one that took place in real stories. The blow of the Soviet army of the invasion, if it had not even become a knockout for Germany, would surely have broken all plans of Hitler's command. And the Wehrmacht would have to, instead of a victorious march to Moscow, be drawn into large-scale oncoming battles with the striving forward tank wedges of the Red Army. And it’s not a fact that the Germans would be able to contain this impulse.

Because by that time the Red Army had enough forces and means to implement the most decisive offensive strategy - a huge amount of military equipment, including the best in the world, carefully trained in the pre-war period and well-motivated personnel personnel, as well as commanders New wave, received real combat experience and made conclusions from all the mistakes of local conflicts of the end of 30-x - the beginning of 40-x.
By the way, Hitler himself, on the eve of his death in 1945, regretted that he hadn’t done something like Stalin’s purge of commanders on the eve of the war in his army.

Thus, the propaganda version of the preemptive strike of the Germans against the allegedly prepared for the throw of the Red Army, we reject as absolutely groundless and in no way coinciding with the facts of reality.
Now about the even more popular myth in recent years about the "low morale" of the Red Army, who, they say, did not want to fight for the "bloody Stalinist regime" and therefore surrendered to the Germans by the millions and at the first opportunity.
I categorically assert that such accusations are one hundred percent slander against the regular Red Army, which absolutely do not correspond to historical facts.

Let us again turn to Franz Halder, who did not compose politically colored fables and wrote only about what was reflected in official staff reports.

23 June 1941 year
It should be noted the stubbornness of individual Russian compounds in battle. There have been cases when the garrisons of the pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.

26 June 1941 year
Evening summary reports for the 25.6 and 26.6 morning reports from the report:
Army Group South is slowly moving ahead, unfortunately with significant losses. The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has firm and energetic leadership.
A small number of prisoners, along with a very large amount of captured property (including fuel), is characteristic of all sectors of the front.

There are no questions about the trophy property - the retreating forces were forced to leave, most often resulting in unusable condition, heavy armament due to the fact that the ammunition or fuel had run out. The condition of these trophies can be judged by the fact that after a whole week of hostilities Halder complains that the Germans do not have the opportunity to explore the new Russian T-34 tank, because so far they have not managed to capture any of the whole car. But read on:

28 June 1941 year
General Brand: Report on the battles for Brest-Litovsk (31-I Infantry Division). ... ..the resistance of the overwhelmingly large and fanatically fighting enemy forces was very strong, which caused great losses in the 31 th Infantry Division.
... Information from the front confirms that Russians are fighting to the last man everywhere. Only in some places they surrender to captivity ... It is striking that in the seizure of artillery batteries, etc., only a few are surrendered. Part of the Russian fights until they are killed, others run, throw off their uniform uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants.
... Ott, Inspector General of the Infantry, reported on his impressions of the battle near Grodno. The stubborn resistance of the Russian forces us to fight according to the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from statutory principles; now it is already unacceptable.

July 2, 1941

The 17 Army, continues to pursue the withdrawing enemy. This "pursuit" is constantly delayed by stubborn resistance from the enemy, certain groups of which continuously go over to counterattacks, mostly on the flank of advancing troops and, as a rule, with the support of tanks.

July 4, 1941
Fighting with the Russians are extremely stubborn. Captured only a small number of prisoners.

July 5, 1941
The situation at the front in the evening: in the south, our troops, due to the poor condition of the roads and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, are moving forward slowly. The units report that in certain areas the crews of enemy tanks leave their vehicles, but in most cases they lock themselves in tanks and prefer to burn themselves along with the vehicles.

July 11, 1941
Colonel Ochsner reported on his trip to the tank groups Guderian and Hoth. It should be noted:
... b. The command of the enemy acts energetically and skillfully. The enemy fights fiercely and fanatically.
at. Tank compounds suffered significant losses in personnel and materiel. The troops are tired.


The list of such extremely eloquent quotes from the diaries of one of the main generals of the Wehrmacht can be continued ad infinitum. But I think that even the above passages are more than enough to state that there was not even a word about any mass flight of our cadre army and, especially, its “unwillingness to fight”. And this stubborn resistance was not episodic, namely, the general norm of the behavior of the soldiers of the Red Army, which Franz Halder recorded as an absolutely indisputable fact.
The regular army of the USSR fought exactly as it was taught - to the last bullet and the last opportunity to resist, with complete contempt for death and hatred of the enemy. “There are no prisoners,” “few prisoners,” “Russians fight until they are killed.” These confessions of the enemy sound like endless refrain from the pages of the Military Diary.

Thus, we have all grounds with anger and indignation to reject this slander against the Red Army - about its imaginary psychological unpreparedness for war and the supposedly massive anti-Soviet mood of its personnel. There was this - from the word at all!
And, finally, about the so-called "betrayal of the generals." Usually in this regard, our well-read popular books in the bright covers of "connoisseurs of history" mention the Western Front and its commander, Army General Dmitry Pavlov.
To listen to such "experts", so this Pavlov was only preoccupied on the eve of the war with how better to prepare for the surrender of the front entrusted to him to the Germans.

Even if the general of the army of the Soviet Union really had such strange intentions, I have to admit that it came out of his hands very badly. Since the Western front, which, by the way, was the main blow of the Germans, the enemy did not surrender. And again - from the word at all!

Confirmation of what - diaries of the same Halder. At first, the Germans, taking advantage of the surprise attack and the gaps in the Russian defenses, threw their tank groups forward to surround the main forces of the Western Front. And it seemed that they achieved their goal - a significant part of the troops of this strategic direction really hit the ring.
But then, for the Germans themselves, shaped gutting began. Surrounded by Soviet troops did not even think carefully folded weapon following the example of their European colleagues. And Franz Halder has a new reason for a chronic headache.

26 June 1941 year
Significant, surrounded by the enemy group, including in our deep rear, delay the advancement of our infantry divisions.

28 June 1941 year
At the front of Army Group Center, as a result of desperate attempts by the enemy to leave the encirclement in the areas of Volkovysk and Novogrudok, the situation in a number of sectors seriously deteriorated.

30 June 1941 year
In the center of the band of the Army Group Center, our completely mixed divisions are making every effort not to let the enemy’s environment desperately penetrate in all directions from the inner ring.

Isn't it true - a somewhat strange behavior for the army, about which we are told that she only did that, that she ran away from the enemy without looking back, or, on the contrary, she massively asked for German captivity. And only 2 July 1941, that is, on the tenth day of the war, the following entry appears in Halder’s diary:

July 2, 1941
The enemy, located in the Novogrudok area, suffered heavy losses. All the units that managed to leave in the Novogrudok area are actually broken up; besides, they have no ammunition or food. Hence the passivity of the enemy. However, it is impossible to completely exclude the possibility of infiltration of individual small groups of the enemy to the southeast.

As we see, only after a week of fighting in the environment, the activity of the Soviet forces in the ring began to decline. And that is only because by this time the rioters probably had run out of ammunition and food.

And only to 5 of July, the Red Army units surrounded to the west of Minsk, which fought practically until the last bullet, ceased organized resistance. According to the War Diary, over 50 thousands of our military men were taken prisoner. However, judging by the estimates of the same Halder, it was only a small part of the forces that were in the Bialystok-Novogrudok boiler. All the rest actually died in battle.

July 5, 1941
In general, after the enemy, surrounded in the Novogrudok area, no longer makes any more attempts to break out of the encirclement, it can be said with confidence that the enemy grouping that was in the Bialystok projection (the number of which, according to the indications of one captive corps commander, was 15- 20 divisions), preserved miserable remains. From the number of enemy divisions operating before the front of Army Group North, 12-15 divisions should be considered completely destroyed.

In the military language, a “completely destroyed division” is a military unit that fought with the enemy to the last man and completely died in battle.
In essence, this is all you need to know about the so-called "betrayal of the generals" of the Western Special Military District, who allegedly prepared their troops for inglorious surrender to the enemy. There was no change. But in reality there was absolutely heroic, bitter and bloody resistance for the enemy of our divisions, headed by the same generals who allegedly betrayed their homeland.
And what then was, you ask. After all, in the future there were the hardest surroundings and endless columns of prisoners and a retreat all the way to Moscow.

Yes, it was all. But after the main forces of the regular Red Army were destroyed in a border battle. Subsequently, the hastily recruited and abandoned divisions of reservists and militia still had to learn to really fight. And these, in fact, civilians, have learned. But for this it took almost half a year and the front line near Moscow itself.

, And the regular troops fully completed their combat mission. And almost completely died in battle. But not because of some mythical military unpreparedness, or, especially, large-scale betrayal, but solely by virtue of the logic of military actions. Which, in turn, was the result of political decisions taken by the country's leadership on the eve of the war. The main essence of which was at any cost to delay the start of the war with Germany, and ideally to avoid it altogether.

Stalin had nothing to share with Hitler in Europe. The Soviet Union regained almost all former Russian territories for which it claimed. And with this, the program of external expansion of the state for Joseph Stalin, fully focused on the internal self-development of the USSR and the construction of socialism in one single country, was completely exhausted.

Precisely in order to avoid even the slightest hint of preparation for war, Stalin refused to concentrate the shock groups of troops on the border with Germany and ordered them to be dispersed throughout the vast territory of the country. It was this decision that became fatal for the personnel of the Red Army sample 22 June 1941 of the year. Formerly a mighty military force, but scattered throughout the vast spaces, actually condemned to the loss of military initiative, she was deprived of the physical ability to quickly gather her forces in the right place. And, as a result, it is doomed to defeat in parts completely concentrated for the maximum possible strike by the Wehrmacht, which mobilized the military resources of all of Europe.

If you wish, you can, of course, put this fatal decision to blame Stalin. But I personally find it hard to imagine that once I was in his place, I would venture to make another decision. Because this other decision could only be an immediate war with Germany. And, in fact - with the entire Western world, including the United States and the UK. Which, in this case, would most certainly stand on the side of Europe, "subjected to Soviet aggression".

That same war, which Stalin was not so much afraid of (I have no information that he was a coward), didn’t want as much as elementary. Just because he did not consider it necessary for the USSR. And in this sense, he had no options. In the end, our country did everything that depended on it, so that this essentially meaningless war did not happen. But not everything in this world depends only on us.

As for the Red Army, it, even in these, the most unfavorable conditions, completely fulfilled its military duty. And in the year of its century, it has every right to remain in the history of invincible and legendary.

Comments

[Same lech]

In the military language, a “completely destroyed division” is a military unit that fought with the enemy to the last man and completely died in battle.

Meat Bor ... Volkhov Front ... Demyansk ... Rzhevsk ... Nevsky Piglet ... casualties of the rank and file and staff are colossal ... you look at the footage from the excavations in those places where and who they don’t find there ... no Hollywood can recreate the picture of the deaths of thousands and thousands of people ... once again I am convinced how fragile and effemmer human life is in a war.
It is sometimes difficult to read the recollections of eyewitnesses of those years, both Germans and our veterans ... blood, inhuman suffering, cruelty and cynicism of war ... all in one bottle.
I bow to the fighters of the first year of the war ... you just have to go through it inside yourself to understand what they went through in the 1941 war.

[Vend]

Article +. About

in general, there was nothing to do with Hitler's chatter about a preventive war against "the USSR, ready for an attack"

I think it is almost so. Hitler was well aware of the power of the USSR and military development. And it was a really preemptive strike, but not because of the impending attack, but to stop the military development of the USSR.

[Varyag_0711]

Wend Today, 10: 40 ↑ New
And it was a really preemptive strike, but not because of the impending attack, but to stop the military development of the USSR.

And you read Mine Kampf, everything is written there, in black and white. So this is not a preemptive strike, no need to bother with history, we paid too much blood for everything.

[Vend]

Quote: Varyag_0711

Wend Today, 10: 40 ↑ New
And it was a really preemptive strike, but not because of the impending attack, but to stop the military development of the USSR.

And you read Mine Kampf, everything is written there, in black and white. So this is not a preemptive strike, no need to bother with history, we paid too much blood for everything.

You carefully re-read what I wrote. But Hitler’s book “My Struggle” has nothing to do with what later came out under the supervision of Goebels.

[x917nt]

If you read "Mein Kampf", you will be surprised to learn that France has always been, is and will be the main enemy of Germany.

[pilot8878]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Demyansk ... Rzhevsk ...

And yet: Demyansk, Rzhev. Not to offend, but to correct.

[Basil50]

Thanks to the author.
They began to write too much and * assume * all sorts of different things.
The fact that the RED ARMY has completely fulfilled its military duty does not raise any doubts. As there was no doubt in 1941.
Pavlov was not tried at all for betrayal, but for failure to fulfill orders, for unpreparedness to repel aggression.
The fact that there are suspicions of treason is legitimate, the losses were too terrible, and not all losses can be explained * by a sudden attack *. There are many questions, and not all have answers.

[MrK]

Quote: lwimu1976

Pavlov was not tried at all for betrayal, but for failure to fulfill orders, for unpreparedness to repel aggression.

On the sheet 70 of the 4 volume of the investigation file on charges of the head of communications of ZapOV A. G. Grigoriev, his words are written that “even after the telegram Chief of the General Staff of 18 June, the district troops were not put on alert».

[lwimu1976]

You misunderstood me! I apologize! I pulled out a quote. Corrected!
Basil50 Today, 07: 01
Thanks to the author.
They began to write too much and * assume * all sorts of different things.
The fact that the RED ARMY has completely fulfilled its military duty does not raise any doubts. As there was no doubt in 1941.
Pavlov was not tried at all for betrayal, but for failure to fulfill orders, for unpreparedness to repel aggression.
The fact that there are suspicions of treason is legitimate, the losses were too terrible, and not all losses can be explained * by a sudden attack *. There are many questions, and not all have answers.

[E_V_N]

Quote: lwimu1976

Pavlov was not tried at all for betrayal, but for failure to fulfill orders, for unpreparedness to repel aggression.

“Everyone imagines himself a strategist looking at the battle from the side”, it’s good to reason after the “fight” how and where to beat and what to do.
You do not forget that it was a personnel army, where the order is not discussed. but performed. And do not forget that the repressions of 37-39 years passed that plannedly knocked out precisely the “Makhnovism” and “partisanism” that remained from the Civil War, that is, including, independence and “disagreement” with the opinion of the higher leadership.
In any army of a peaceful period, the priority is honoring, lack of personal initiative and unquestioning obedience to any orders of commanders. Proactive and independent are inconvenient and persecuted.
But during the war, completely different commanders and soldiers are needed; here independent and initiative ones are needed. And while the Red Army blindly obeyed orders, and the commanders were waiting for orders, the army was defeated, when initiative began to be promoted from the bottom, command began.
So you see the "generals of victory" there are no marshals-heroes of the civil war. Most of the commanders of the armies and fronts at the end of the war began a war with divisional commanders and corps.
So that everything is actually much simpler, the Germans attacked with initiative commanders, they had already fought for 3 years and conducted a selection. ours lived peacefully, so "slime-dishes" went upstairs. Therefore, Pavlov, of course, is not a traitor, he is simply a typical peacetime commander. It happens to everyone, everywhere and always, so the defenders at the initial stage always lose, the only difference is whether these first defeats are catastrophic for the country.

[lwimu1976]

lwimu1976 5 Today, 20:26 ↑
You misunderstood me! I apologize! I pulled out a quote. Corrected!
Basil50 Today, 07: 01
Thanks to the author.
They began to write too much and * assume * all sorts of different things.
The fact that the RED ARMY has completely fulfilled its military duty does not raise any doubts. As there was no doubt in 1941.
Pavlov was not tried at all for betrayal, but for failure to fulfill orders, for unpreparedness to repel aggression.
The fact that there are suspicions of treason is legitimate, the losses were too terrible, and not all losses can be explained * by a sudden attack *. There are many questions, and not all have answers.

[yehat]

Pavlov was tried for results, but shot because the role of his negligence in the performance of duties was clearly visible. I recall that in the winter there were headquarters tactical games, where Pavlov, according to a very similar scenario, received a rout from Zhukov, he was instructed to figure out the reasons for the failure and to correct himself, but he did nothing to change tactics.
In the light of the frank and systematic failure to comply with the orders of the General Staff in Pavlovo District (for example, in January 41, an order was issued to disguise airfields), what other conclusion could be made except for criminal negligence and, as a result, betrayal?

[E_V_N]

Quote: yehat

I recall that in the winter there were headquarters tactical games, where Pavlov, according to a very similar scenario, received a rout from Zhukov, he was instructed to figure out the reasons for the failure and to correct himself, but he did nothing to change tactics.

Before you say this, first deal with the material. Zhukov, playing for the Germans, using flank attacks, using the configuration of the border, surrounded Pavlov’s troops in the Bialystok ledge, concentrated to “beat the enemy on his own territory”.
Zhukov was the Chief of the General Staff at that time, and it was his prerogative to deploy the cover troops and develop a border cover operation in case of an enemy attack, not the commander of the district. Pavlov did not have the right to independently withdraw troops from the Bialystok ledge, which meant surrendering the vast territory of the USSR without a fight.
So do not say, Zhukov ordered to develop a plan, but Pavlov did not.

[yehat]

For almost a week Pavlov did not know what forces were attacking him. Thought that 2 divisions.
what else do you need to know to rate this person?

[E_V_N]

Quote: yehat

For almost a week Pavlov did not know what forces were attacking him. Thought that 2 divisions.
what else do you need to know to rate this person?

Well, here you are certainly bent and about a week and about two divisions. But the conversation was not about Pavlov’s military capabilities, but that he was a traitor and had no plans to purposefully surrender the front to the enemy. Yes, he was a careerist, not a very talented military commander, but not a German spy and not a traitor.

[97110]

Quote: Vasily50

They began to write too much and * assume * all sorts of different things.

A group of citizens of the Russian Federation, which entered into ownership of the former state property of the RSFSR, cannot be calm until all other things that the author is trying to present as false are proved to other citizens of the Russian Federation. For them, with capitals, this is a matter of life. For us - ? They gave everything meekly, once a year we beat the sovereign father on the phone. To unite in a trade union is terrible, it is easier for the OWNER to hope for conscience ... Another generation will die out, the rest living themselves will not believe that they won someone ...

[Amurets]

It should be noted the stubbornness of individual Russian compounds in battle. There have been cases when the garrisons of the pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.

Here are the recollections of one of the border defenders in 1941, the commander of the DOT garrison near Przemysl. Lieutenant Ivan Krivonogov, one of the members of the crew of the aircraft M. Devyatayev, who hijacked the He-111 aircraft from the island of Usedom in 1945.
The book "The Motherland Calls" 1960. The commander of a separate pulrot Berezin received an order to accept a stronghold of the fortified area. I went with the company commander.
The stronghold of our company is a few long-term firing points located along the San River. In one day, we traveled with Berezin all the pillboxes. Construction was in full swing here. They dug pits, concreted metal frames, and drilled artesian wells. On the front line, ready-made structures were already bombarded, camouflaged with turf, installed weapons, equipped living quarters. An anti-tank moat stretched from bunker to bunker, it was completely finished. Thus, the front line of the bunkers was already operational. [9] ..... The first attack was repelled. The hollow was empty. Only the dead, a lot of the dead remained on her.
Again, enemy artillery of all calibres hit the bunker, but the structure survived this time too. The enemy with even greater forces moved to the front line of the fortified area. The Germans went ahead, but under machine-gun and cannon fire they fell, turned and, knocking each other down, fled back. And then they grouped again and climbed to storm the bunker, which prevented them from moving forward ... From continuous firing, powder gases, incandescent gun trunks and machine guns pounded in the temples.
…The night has come. The first war night in a besieged bunker. We did not go to bed. Each remained at his post, ready at any moment to join the battle. I replaced the first numbers of the gunners with other cadets, on a high-rise near the bunker I set up an observer with a light machine gun, and put the officers on duty. The candles lit in the battle casemates and the commander’s cabin cast a dim light on the tired, stained faces of the soldiers. In the corners lay ominous shadows. No one was talking. We all probably thought about one thing: “Will ours suit? Will there be enough strength to restrain the enemy? ” [20] “And so for 13 days.” Here is the border, the San River, a bridge that was neutral a few days ago. The Germans for a long time could not take possession of it. Here the border guards stood to death, and from our bunkers we scored dozens and hundreds [39] of enemies. Enemies are now free to cross the bridge, and we are driving prisoners in German cars.
The road goes along German territory, along the border. We can clearly see the entire front line of our strong point. Scattered blocks of concrete, hilly land. How many of our comrades are buried under heavy concrete slabs! Here is the pillbox that Volodya Molotkov defended with embrasures. I look with my eyes for the place where my pillbox was and I see its remains: a pile of gray stone. Neighboring pillbox Fedi Skripnichenko. “Sweet, cheerful, frisky Fedya. Who and when will know about your feat? ” - I think.
- Look, how ruined, you bastards, - pointing to the pillboxes, says an unfamiliar soldier. - It can be seen that ours fought to the last. "

[lwimu1976]

but in most cases they lock themselves in tanks and prefer to burn themselves together with cars
An eyewitness account.Ivanovskoe on the Luga river. Summer of 1941.
Three KVs attack the village. On the staple towers (KV-2). One tank drove through the hut. Our next.
We rushed about, ran out, ran back. The tankers saw the hut bypassed, stalled on the road.
They moved and died out. Then smoke started to flow from the tank. The tower flew into our garden. There was no shelling of tanks.

[parusnik]

about the myth even more popular in recent years about the "low morale" of the Red Army men who allegedly did not want to fight for the "bloody Stalinist regime" and therefore, millions and at the first opportunity surrendered to the Germans.

... Army soldiers with low morale will not leave such inscriptions: "I am dying, but I do not give up! Farewell, Motherland. 20 / VII-41g.", "We are not dying shame", "There were five of us: Sedov, Grutov I., Bogolyub, Mikhailov, Selivanov V. We took the first battle on June 22, 1941 - 3.15 h. We die, but we won’t leave ".. and there are many such inscriptions ...

[Gopnik]

So those who left did not have low morale. And those who he had and who surrendered did not leave such inscriptions

[x917nt]

This is now and we understand that the Red Army was not going to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. The Soviet leadership only wanted to flex its muscles in front of its "friend" and show, just in case of fire, that the Soviet Union was strong and ready for any development of events, for which a huge number of troops were pulled to the western borders. Let the neighbor look at this power and throw away his possible plans, rumors about which began to reach the leadership of the USSR. But the German command, analyzing the data of its intelligence, did not understand this. More precisely I understood completely not so. And this mass of Soviet troops on the western borders of the USSR saw a threat to the security of the Reich in the east. This is precisely what caused the Nazi aggression, the purpose of which, according to the Barbarossa plan, was to destroy the Red Army. And just such a development of events was unexpected for the Soviet leadership. And then what happened happened. And that has already been said and retold 1000 times.

[vvvjak]

According to the state, as of 01.01.1941, approximately 3 people were to serve in the Red Army. According to the Abwehr reports to Hitler (the original was posted on the MO website), at the beginning of 200 reconnaissance counted less than 000 divisions. And this is the whole territory of the USSR. Knowing such "power" of the USSR, did Hitler in a panic immediately disband the Wehrmacht with its allies (about 41 mil. People)? Not a single high-ranking military man of the world, at that time, considered the Red Army a serious force (especially after the Finnish war). Hitler bluntly declared the "colossus with feet of clay." So no one was afraid of the USSR, but the Wehrmacht decided to quickly arrange France No. 200, but they ripped off the navel. Retelling 7,5 times.

[yehat]

Hitler evaluated the power of the Red Army based on the results of the Finnish Winter War and Poland. And he had reasons for his conclusions, but he did not quite possess all the information. For example, official intelligence about the equipment of the Red Army, at least, was halved. The latest changes and unverified data were not taken into account (for example, Guderian could not include 3 important facts in the report documents - real volumes of armored vehicles output in the USSR, indirect data on the preparation of new generation tanks and positive conclusions from the Finnish experience + information on the formation of new mechanized corps)
Hitler was not very poorly aware of the potential of Germany, he had a good analysis of the economy and understood that if he could attack the USSR, then no later than the summer of 1941.
Hitler also greatly underestimated the possibilities of coordinating the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition and no less strongly overestimated the role of Italy.
All this eventually came down to the decision to strike.
Moreover, the blow had a good chance of success, for example, if the Italians acted sanely in the Mediterranean, Malta would fall and the Spaniards would deal with Gibraltar,
the position of England would have deteriorated sharply, at least 50 divisions and other forces would be freed from the Reich and its allies for other operations. Wehrmacht fuel would be in abundance, the land lease through Persia would be interrupted. And not the fact that England or the USSR would have stood.
And these are only 2 nuances not large in scale, but there were others.

[Ye hua]

Figured it out myself? Or who suggested? Soviet troops at that time were drawn to China to protect China from the Japs.

[Amurets]

Quote: Ye Hua

Soviet troops at that time were drawn to China to protect China from the Japs.

Or maybe the USSR in the Far East, the truth is also from the Japs.
The Far Eastern Front (FEF) is an operational-strategic association of Soviet troops in the Far East. By 1941, the size of the front reached 500 thousand people. But no less than most of the Red Army.

[vvvjak]

Quote: Ye Hua

Figured it out myself? Or who suggested? Soviet troops at that time were drawn to China to protect China from the Japs.

In addition to the Far East, a large group of Soviet troops was also concentrated in South Asia near the Iranian border. In the Abwehr report, Hitler was indicated not only the number of divisions but also their location.

[lwimu1976]

Quote: The same Lech

In the military language, a “completely destroyed division” is a military unit that fought with the enemy to the last man and completely died in battle.

Meat Bor ... Volkhov Front ... Demyansk ... Rzhevsk ... Nevsky Piglet ... casualties of the rank and file and staff are colossal ... you look at the footage from the excavations in those places where and who they don’t find there ... no Hollywood can recreate the picture of the deaths of thousands and thousands of people ... once again I am convinced how fragile and effemmer human life is in a war.
It is sometimes difficult to read the recollections of eyewitnesses of those years, both Germans and our veterans ... blood, inhuman suffering, cruelty and cynicism of war ... all in one bottle.
I bow to the fighters of the first year of the war ... you just have to go through it inside yourself to understand what they went through in the 1941 war.

Rzhevsk.
I'm Killed Under Rzhev

[Tula gingerbread]

Not Rzhevsk, but Rzhev and this is the 42nd year. In the 41st Vyazma.

[BAI]

This is all in Simonov's "Living and the Dead" described.

[Huumi]

As already got these articles about "perseverance" and "cadaver" about "unwilling" to fight. And again! The Germans stomped to Moscow in 4 months !!! passing is not in a straight line under 2 thousand kilometers !!!! back "they were crushed already for more than 2 and a half years !!!! When releasing the territory again, !!!!! It was recruited more than a million people remaining in the Red Army after seizing territories in the occupied zone. Not captured, wounded - just those who remained for one reason or another. In 2005, Germany handed over cases of prisoners of war — with fingerprints and photos of 5 million people — and that’s not all !!!! Leave these nonsense for 10-year-old schoolchildren. As one veteran said the question is how the Germans fought- "They were extremely belligerent aggressive guys" ... By December 41 more than 3 million people were captured - this is only captured! -Except for the missing, wounded and of course the monstrous losses on the battlefield, the losses , terrible, bitter, colossal. The organization of the people's militia is an example-There wasn’t already a cadre army in such numbers! -I had to collect civilians from cities is one of the direct evidence of the complete defeat of the Red Army for 41 years ...

[Avenich]

Quote: Huumi

The Germans stomped to Moscow in 4 months !!! passing is not in a straight line under 2 thousand kilometers !!!! back them "crushed as much as more than 2 and a half years !!!!.

Ah, what a sweet geography! What from Moscow to Brest, what from Moscow to Berlin, is the same. There is, truth, one more trifle, so, of course, it is inconspicuous for liberals, but the Wehrmacht carried out offensive operations until the age of 43.

Quote: Huumi

By December 41, more than 3 million people were taken prisoner-this is only a prisoner! - Apart from the missing, wounded, and of course those who fell on the battlefield, the losses are monstrous, terrible, bitter, colossal.

And until May 45 how many were captured, you defeated ours. Monstrous losses. However, fingerprinted lists of victims in Dresden are still not shared with anyone. And you know why, the heat from the fire was so great that people burned to ashes. There was nothing to do with fingerprinting. Our allies killed civilians, here is direct evidence of the complete defeat of the Wehrmacht for 45 years ...

[Huumi]

Yes, we ... how many Germans were taken prisoner, how many are there in Dresden, by the way in Papua new Guinea, too many prisoners never shakes prisoners! -I have on the side to which Wehrmacht tama spent something, there are numbers, dates -kilometers. The rest is blah blah blah. And from Brest to Moscow the Germans didn’t run in a straight line by the way ... Will you find otmaz about 4 months too? About 3 or more million prisoners until January forty-second too? -I hasten to assure it is still belittled- there were those masses of people who were not even taken into account, they were shot on the spot .... Liberal damn, there is such a thing as Schwachkopf ... forever. Only when everything happens again, you won’t have to blame the faces with a crooked face for a mirror and look for the guilty

[Avenich]

Quote: Huumi

The rest was blah blah blah. And from Brest to Moscow the Germans didn’t run in a straight line by the way ... Will you find about otmazo too for 4 months?

Are you now my friend will work on a hairdryer? Oh, leave it all the same to you from the hand. And do not be nervous, so much, you are very overstating my self-assessment, so react to only two complex sentences.

Quote: Huumi

Only when everything happens again, you won’t have to blame the faces with a crooked face for a mirror and look for the guilty

Only when everything is repeated you will find these records and you will run with them ... well, I don’t know where ... and shout "I ... said, I ... mother ... warned.

[Huumi]

You essentially write ... Do not waste my or your time

[Avenich]

Quote: Huumi

You essentially write ... Do not waste my or your time

Uh no, dear. You essentially did not answer me, but actually, I did not demand this. So, I made a remark. Well, I’ll write again, losses in the war are inevitable, prisoners of war, stolen by force, victims among the local population, unfortunately, have a place to be. Yes, and in Papua New Guinea the same. And more of them are those who are currently losing. Let's abstract from the Red Army, Stalin, Hitler ... consider soberly and carefully. Yes, at the initial stage, the Wehrmacht was stronger, but the fighters of the Red Army fought to the best of their abilities and capabilities. Otherwise there would be no victory. Yes, many soldiers were captured who were not in wars. Yes, they perished, and absurdly perished, remember, about a bag of concentrate, from "in war, as in war." And again I repeat, how many captured Germans and others by the end of the war, when the Red Army defeated? And the direction of the strike is described in terms of “Babarossa,” the strike on the shortest path to Moscow. This plan was not implemented, then pure improvisation goes on. Who prevented the implementation of this plan, the “Red Army completely defeated” ?, and you say blah ... blah ... blah. And they squeezed the Germans from Moscow to the borders of the Soviet Union ... see for yourself, in short.

[Huumi]

The Red Army was not weaker, not once. This command was weak-mid-senior. As units in themselves, from the platoon, companies and higher, they were never weaker. Guilt in the command and system as such. By December of those personnel units by the essence of the Red Army did not remain. Therefore, they were sent from cadets, old men and civilian divisions — there would be personnel units — the professors and clerks would not fight on the front lines. The Germans stomped around the USSR until December 41 that they had never dreamed of a single army — they knocked them back for more than 2 and a half years. There was no blow on the shortest route to Moscow — the plans changed already in the course of the offensive — as Manstein resisted Hitler’s order to turn parts of the armies to Kiev, he turned, but disobeyed to continue the attack on Moscow. The Germans didn’t go in a straight line to Moscow ... Read the story

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Huumi

As units themselves, from a platoon, companies and higher were never weaker.

There were. If a sergeant sent to reconnaissance crawls up to the German dugout and, not knowing what to do next, returns back - it’s difficult, you know, to believe in the quality of the training of the junior command staff. For reference, this is not the malice of the revisionists, but the case reflected in the order of whom. SZ direction.

[E_V_N]

Quote: Huumi

The Germans stomped around the USSR until December 41 that no army ever dreamed

What about Napoleon? he generally managed to run away 6 months before Moscow.

Quote: Huumi

Read the story

this applies to you.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Huumi

The Germans stomped to Moscow in 4 months !!! passing is not in a straight line under 2 thousand kilometers !!!!

The Germans, in fact, defeated the victorious army in WWI in a month and a half. And before that, giving the enemy 8 months to mobilize and deploy.

Quote: Huumi

back them "crushed as much as more than 2 and a half years !!!!

Paris was surrendered in 1940. And only released in 1944. And the Allies approached Berlin nostril to nostril. This is the question of the timing of the return trip.

[Huumi]

Listen, I’m united to France there, etc., it’s not about them. By the way, the speed of the Germans' advance in Russia was higher than in France ... As one participant of the Great Patriotic War, huge territories in Russia, said, there was much to drape ... and order 227, not a step back, why? -Drap had to be stopped ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Huumi

Listen, I’m the only one to France there, etc., it’s not about them.

We are talking about the strength of the enemy, leaning on the USSR. And this is not propaganda chains of drunk machine gunners with rolled up sleeves, going full-length to machine guns. We were attacked by the best army in Europe, before defeating those who defeated it in the last war. Robbed for “Barbarossa” all captured Europe (see the groans of the Germans at the zoo in the transport units). And she intended to end the full-scale hostilities in the USSR, breaking up the frontier units in 1-2 months, and then the victorious march to the East with the destruction between the case of disparate reserves of internal and Far East districts.

[Gopnik]

And why was the "best army in Europe" German, and not the Red Army?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

And why was the "best army in Europe" German, and not the Red Army?

And because I did not specify the date - for 1941.
And she was better because she was preparing already from the beginning of the 20s. The Reichswehr - “army of commanders” - was originally created in order to prepare the officer and non-commissioned officers corps of the future revived Reich army, as well as for the practical determination of the optimal OSh of the future army. And while around laughed at the plywood tanks and "pilots" on motorcycles, the Germans worked out the main thing - the optimal size of tactical groups and the ratio of the combat arms in them. For the first time, the Kampfgruppe (a motorized regiment reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, and with attached aircraft) appeared at the Reichswehr exercises in the same way, EMNIP, in 1927.
Alas, the Red Army did not have such greenhouse conditions. No one would give us 12 years to train an army of 100, scoring to guard the borders and protection from neighbors (even the Chinese began to offend us).
And the level of education coming to the army with us and the Germans differed like heaven and earth. I already wrote about the fact that even cadets of military schools, future commanders, at the beginning of the 30s, more than 90% had only primary education.

[Gopnik]

So the Red Army has been prepared since the 20s, while, just in greenhouse conditions - no restrictions and reparations. No plywood tanks or army of more than 100 people. - The tanks are real and the army is 000 thousand.
Yes, and no one was forced to clean out from the army of educated officers with the experience of World War II and to take in cadets not educated, but with the "correct" social origin.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

So the Red Army has been prepared since the 20s, while, just in greenhouse conditions - no restrictions and reparations.

Yeah ... and no money. In the mid-30s in the Red Army there were 20 personnel rifle divisions from Kamchatka to Murmansk. The main tank and naval center of the country - Leningrad - was covered by one personnel division! The rest are territories where the regiment’s chief of staff cannot assign a task to the battalion (a real case in the exercises).
The reason is known: a personnel soldier cost the treasury almost five times more expensive than the territory. Hence all the exercises of Tukhachevsky: as much technology as possible, as few soldiers as possible.
And about the 20s ... in 1927 it suddenly became clear that the military industry could not even provide the current needs of the army. And the position of the L / C is such that the commanders are forced to look for a part-time job in order to survive (a familiar picture, isn’t it), and the Red Army financial department asks to increase the salary so that the command staff does not flee the army.

[Gopnik]

Well, i.e. also in the economy krivoruky, just "no money." Under tsarism, a cadre army of 1,5 million was kept, and here 500 thousand. can not. You can’t 500 thousand., Contain, 5 times cheaper, 100 thousand., Like the Germans devastated by war and reparations, well, or 200 thousand., What's the question.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

You can’t 500 thousand., Contain, 5 times cheaper, 100 thousand., Like the Germans devastated by war and reparations, well, or 200 thousand., What's the question.

The question is that the security of the Germans is guaranteed by the guarantors of Versailles. And in Europe we have Poles, Finns and Romanians, and in the Far East - Chinese and Japanese. And the Red Army is simply forced to keep two groups on loosely coupled theater of operations - with a sufficient number to scare away potential aggressors.
Those same 20 divisions were divided 50/50 between ETVD and DV.

[Gopnik]

So the Poles, Finns, Romanians and Chinese, and so they all gave up what they wanted.
Well, if you have to keep 500 thousand with normal tanks and planes, God be with them, why didn’t it turn out to create a normal army 10 times larger, and why did the Germans with 100 thousand and plywood tanks work?
And why the tsar could contain a personnel army of 1,5 million, and the Bolsheviks 10 years after and 500 thousand. really can not?

[naidas]

Because only the German army (yes, the British Islet) remained in Europe, few people in word and deed did not participate from the European countries in the attack on the USSR, and even by education a 7-grader experienced brawler attacked a 4-grader who was only about to fight by 1942. , gained from 600 thousand in 1937 in the Red Army to 5-6 million according to the announcement, and many more in Russian are not belmes (in the SA and in the 80s, it was taught Russian)

[Huumi]

That’s precisely because of the losses and sacrifices, but in the article, ah, yes, well, you didn’t do it. Read on the Internet.

[Avenich]

Quote: Huumi

Here is order 227 — not a step back, why? —Drap had to be stopped ...

The answer is simple. The Wehrmacht had a similar one. True, he appeared earlier.

[Huumi]

I'm not interested in the order of the Wehrmacht, he fought not on his land, on ours ...

[Radio technician]

Quote: Huumi

I'm not interested in the order of the Wehrmacht, he fought not on his land, on ours ...

That's because he fought on our land, and not in Guadeloupe, you should be very interested in these orders ... Then it will become clear what, where, when and why.

[Tula gingerbread]

It seems to you that "everything is one." Some tantrums, shouts, confusion. And here is the 41st year and order 227?
The confusion is in your head. Vinaigrette. There is a fact, the Germans themselves in the fall of the 41st noted that the blitzkrieg was ripped off.
And probably not Martians. Those who fought in the 41st without sparing their own lives and foiled this plan and laid the foundations of the Victory, for which they honor, glory and eternal memory.
I do not understand those who seek to cheat everything.
War is war and exploits were both cowardice and betrayal.

[Huumi]

I am not linking now year 41 and order 227-read carefully. I give reasons for the appearance of such an order as such

[E_V_N]

Quote: Huumi

I am not linking now year 41 and order 227-read carefully. I give reasons for the appearance of such an order as such

Are you pretending And what order was to appear? "Save who can"? They retreated for objective and subjective reasons, there was no time or effort to understand in each particular case, the order simply forbade ALL to retreat. What is illogical?

[Gopnik]

Well, for 1,5 months to Paris, it’s all the same, it turns out, they moved more slowly than 4 months before Moscow.
It turns out that there was even more time for the mobilization and deployment of the Red Army. There was no political will

[Tula gingerbread]

This is when "there was more time"? What are you talking about? France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, and hostilities began after 8 months.
Those. France was at war with Germany for 8 months and calmly carried out mobilization, deployment of troops, preparation and deployment of the rear, preparation of the theater of military operations, field fortifications, trenches, etc.
The USSR and Germany immediately entered the fighting on June 22 of the 41st year.
The fighting began immediately along the entire front line and with the highest intensity.
Where is the time for mobilization? And do not confuse mobilization with putting troops on alert.

[Gopnik]

The USSR could calmly deploy and gradually mobilize the army from the autumn of 1939 under the Liberation Campaign, the Winter War and, in general, the war in Europe. Actually, this was what happened, the size of the army increased from autumn 1939 to June 1941 (and decreased after the Winter War). But it could grow even more, and, most importantly, it could well deploy the existing parts more intelligently, absolutely nothing prevented.

[E_V_N]

Quote: Gopnik

The USSR could calmly deploy and gradually mobilize the army from the autumn of 1939 under the Liberation Campaign,

Army mobilization is tantamount to a declaration of war. The USSR did not want war, so mobilization was impossible. You read the newspapers of 1941, orders from the army "No German provocations", and you are a mobilization ...

[Tula gingerbread]

That's it. Although the hidden mobilization went under the guise of a large training camp. BUS
But open, massive and universal was impossible precisely for the reason that you indicated. The Kremlin perfectly remembered what the mobilization announced by Nicholas II turned out to be.

[Gopnik]

Quote: Tula gingerbread

The Kremlin perfectly remembered what turned out to be the mobilization announced by Nicholas II.

Than? What met the enemy mobilized and deployed? Yes, dei-no, this is not our method. It is necessary to meet the enemy unprepared and without allies.

[Tula gingerbread]

Learn the subject, that's all I can advise you. Dozens of works described "what turned out." And here on V.O. there are materials. Of success.

[Gopnik]

Yes, in dozens of works it is written that this is exactly what happened - they met the enemy mobilized and deployed, did not let them catch themselves by surprise, unlike 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

[Gopnik]

Why an ad? Turkey, Sweden and Switzerland, as far as I remember, mobilized the armies (correct if I am mistaken), but no one declared war on them.
In addition, the Soviet Union and in fact waged a war - with Finland, and before that with Poland, and even before that with Japan.
And the USSR in real life, and so sharply increased the size of the army, from 2 to 5 million, it could well increase to 7-8. And most importantly, he could deploy normally, there was time - no one bother

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

It turns out that there was even more time for the mobilization and deployment of the Red Army.

Since when is 4 months more than 9? Or did you forget when the Allies declared war on the Reich?
The Allies had 8 months of Strange War to mobilize and concentrate. When it was not necessary to replenish the broken personnel parts with one hand, form new ones with the other, evacuate the industry with the third, and try to knock out at least something for the first two hands from the factories with the fourth.

[Gopnik]

And who prevented the USSR from mobilizing the army in the fall of 1939? Moreover, in real life, they actually called for "ascribed" for the war with Finland, but after the war, the size of the army again fell for some reason. The USSR had 2 years when m. calmly expand and expand the army as you like.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

And who prevented the USSR from mobilizing the army in the fall of 1939?

And who will feed the country? Who will work behind the machines? Do you even know that you even had to carry out an appeal to the training camp so as not to disrupt agricultural work and the implementation of the defense order?
Here are the fees-41:

To exempt from training camps in 1941 workers and engineering workers:
Commissariats of aviation, shipbuilding, chemical industry, ammunition, weapons and communications;
Kharkov plants No. 183 and No. 75, Leningrad No. 174, Moscow No. 37, Kharkov and Stalingrad Tractor Plants, bearing plants GP31 and GP32;
the fuselage workshop of the Kharkov plant "Hammer and Sickle" of the People's Commissariat for Transport;
Kirov plant of the People’s Commissariat of Mash;
NII-20, a special workshop of small series of the Electrosignal plant, factories Nos. 197 and 203 of the People's Commissariat of Electro-Industry;
Kolchuginsky plant them. Ordzhonikidze, Leningrad factories "Red Vyborzhets" and them. Voroshilov Narkomtsvetmet, as well as all tractor drivers, combine harvesters for the spring sowing and harvesting campaigns.

- "The Military Council of the okrug / front, taking into account the interests of the national economy and local conditions, is allowed, without exceeding the total number of people attracted to the training camp, to make changes to the indicated dates for the training camp and to the number of people recruited for each formation and individual unit."

- "When organizing training camps, require commanders of units to inform the heads of industrial enterprises, collective and state farms in advance about the forthcoming attraction of military personnel from these enterprises and farms to training camps."

© uv. D. Shein
What is the long-term maintenance of a mobilized army showed Germany. in which by 1941, despite all the robberies of the occupied countries, famine had already begun.
And this I am not saying that the call of the personnel alone will not raise the combat readiness of the army. Mobilization of equipment and horses is necessary to bring divisions to combat readiness and conduct full-fledged exercises. That is, the plowing of the women of the USSR will begin already in 1940. Because even the entire available fleet of civilian equipment to mobilize the army is not enough.

[Gopnik]

Well, i.e. it’s better to meet the enemy with an unmobilized army, right?
And a lot in Germany in 1941 died of starvation, more than in the same year in Leningrad? The decision to non-mobilize the army greatly helped the USSR? As a result, it was not only children who had to install machines, but also machines for the Urals that were urgently transferred.
If it is normal to meet a war for the leadership of "expensive", then fighting unprepared will have to be even more expensive.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

Well, i.e. it’s better to meet the enemy with an unmobilized army, right?

It is better to mobilize the army during the threatened period. Like Poland. Like France. Like Finland.
But we were not given such a period.

Quote: Gopnik

The decision to non-mobilize the army greatly helped the USSR? As a result, it was not only children who had to install machines, but also machines for the Urals that were urgently transferred.

If you mobilize the army, then you would have to meet the Germans on the T-26 and I-16. And to produce them themselves - because how to put into production V-2, T-34, KV, Lagg and Yak before the war would not have time, but would not have been able to the war. As they couldn’t put into the series T-50, T-34M, KV-3, I-185, etc.

Quote: Gopnik

As a result, it was not only children who had to install machines, but also machines for the Urals that were urgently transferred.

Which is emergency? Evacoplans have been developed and updated since the beginning of the 20s. All these "little blood on foreign territory"were just propaganda. And very often the officials who had just made such speeches, left the rostrum, went to correct the evacoplan (like Voroshilov, who after another cheer-forward speech expanded the list of areas to be evacuated ).
And the understudies of factories in the European part of the USSR - future evacuation sites - began to be built as planned - according to the plans of the Third Five-Year Plan of 1938-1942.

[Gopnik]

Quote: Alexey RA

But we were not given such a period.

Fine. And what had to happen in order for Stalin to realize that it was time? The Finns, indeed, were mobilized in 1939, and the USSR, when everything was already screaming about the impending war, was waiting for something.

Quote: Alexey RA

If you mobilize the army, then you would have to meet the Germans on the T-26 and I-16. And to produce them themselves - because how to put into production V-2, T-34, KV, Lagg and Yak before the war would not have time, but would not have been able to the war. As they couldn’t put into the series T-50, T-34M, KV-3, I-185, etc.

So they met. And I don’t see the logic of why put the V-2, T-34, KV, Lagg and Yak into production before the war would not have time before 22.06.1941/5/8 if the Red Army on this date was not XNUMX million, but, say, XNUMX million?

Such an emergency when factories from Leningrad and Kharkov were hastily taken out of the Urals literally under the nose of the Germans.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

Fine. And what had to happen in order for Stalin to realize that it was time? The Finns, indeed, were mobilized in 1939, and the USSR, when everything was already screaming about the impending war, was waiting for something.

Finland (and Poland) had a classic threatened period - when territorial claims were put forward against them through diplomatic lines and negotiations were underway. And all this fuss along the line of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lasted for more than six months.
There were no diplomatic preludes in the USSR-Reich war.

Quote: Gopnik

And I don’t see the logic of why put the V-2, T-34, KV, Lagg and Yak into production before the war would not have time before 22.06.1941/5/8 if the Red Army on this date was not XNUMX million, but, say, XNUMX million?

And do you condense 3 million conscripts from a vacuum? All these people before the army worked in industry or agriculture. And, taking into account the requirements of the army, competent specialists from enterprises of Kharkov, Leningrad and Stalingrad will also go to it. Because technically illiterate l / s from the Red Army is enough, and there is no one to teach him even without mobilization - so the new illiterate l / s will only weaken the army.

Quote: Gopnik

Such an emergency when factories from Leningrad and Kharkov were hastily taken out of the Urals literally under the nose of the Germans.

ICH, with all their haste, took them to the backup sites.

[Gopnik]

Quote: Alexey RA

There were no diplomatic preludes in the USSR-Reich war.

Smart people would accept Molotov’s failed negotiations in Berlin as such. But in general, yes, the crafty Germans played dishonestly - raped without any courtship. Ah ah ah.

Quote: Alexey RA

And do you condense 3 million conscripts from a vacuum? All these people before the army worked in industry or agriculture. And, taking into account the requirements of the army, competent specialists from enterprises of Kharkov, Leningrad and Stalingrad will also go to it. Because technically illiterate l / s from the Red Army is enough, and there is no one to teach him even without mobilization - so the new illiterate l / s will only weaken the army.

For 170-195 million. USSR is tears. One would go who really went in 1941 and fought, who does not have armor (i.e., not specialists of defense enterprises). To rifle divisions and artillery to fill the state. Tankers and pilots, and so in bulk - more than in the Wehrmacht.

Quote: Alexey RA

ICH, with all their haste, took them to the backup sites.

Yes, even where. The main thing is that there was a failure in the quantity and quality of products.

[Tula gingerbread]

To the demand of Tukhachevsky to put 100 thousand tanks in the Red Army, Stalin angrily answered - what do you want to ruin the Soviet economy?

[Gopnik]

And he answered correctly. What for the USSR so many tanks? One for each Reichswehr military unit? The Germans did not rivet so much during the whole war, if I am not mistaken.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

The USSR had 2 years when m. calmly expand and expand the army as you like.

What the USSR was doing, increasing the number of personnel divisions in the army almost fivefold - and faced with wild personnel shortages in terms of junior and middle command personnel. Further call of the rank and file from the citizen was meaningless - there simply was no one to cook them.

[Gopnik]

Well, about that I write that
“It turns out that there was even more time for the mobilization and deployment of the Red Army” than in France.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

Well, about that I write that
“It turns out that there was even more time for the mobilization and deployment of the Red Army” than in France.

This is not mobilization or deployment. This is bringing the peacetime army to the requirements of the late 30s - the transition from a personnel-police-territorial system to a personnel-cropped system (in peacetime states).
Mobilization and concentration is the filling of personnel and equipment formed by this reform with people and equipment to wartime states.

[Gopnik]

Yes, whatever you call. The fact is that the USSR did it, because he had time for this. But for some reason, anyway, like, I didn’t have time.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

Yes, whatever you call. The fact is that the USSR did it, because he had time for this. But for some reason, anyway, like, I didn’t have time.

Because all plans for reforming the army were drawn up at least until mid-1942. Previously, neither industry nor cadres were in time.
And for mobilization and concentration, a minimum of a month was needed. And a clear belief that the enemy will attack. Why did we need at least some diplomatic demands from the Reich.

[Gopnik]

Quote: Alexey RA

Because all plans for reforming the army were drawn up at least until mid-1942. Previously, neither industry nor cadres were in time.

That's bad, that's the point. Well, who is to blame? Hitler

Well, this month was. Thanks to Yugoslavia. At least, it was enough not to spread the existing 5 million into several strategic echelons, so that the Germans would be more convenient to beat them in pieces.

[Sanya Terek]

Gopnik is trying to convince that if the wise Anti-Navigator Nikolai ruled the country, a month after the German attack, our troops would have taken Berlin.

[Gopnik]

In principle, if the country was ruled by any Russian government, and not by a gang of rejected by all the gadgets of incomplete Russophobic internationalists, it would be better for Russia and the Russian people, yes.

[Dude]

Damn it, but what you said is more suitable for our days than for 1941

[Huumi]

500 kilometers in only the first month ... you never know how many, I don’t know ... the country is big

[E_V_N]

Quote: Huumi

The Germans stomped to Moscow in 4 months !!! passing is not in a straight line under 2 thousand kilometers !!!! back "they were crushed already for more than 2 and a half years !!!! When releasing the territory again, !!!!! More than a million people remained after the seizure of territories in the occupied zone were recruited to the Red Army. Not captured, wounded - just those who stayed for one reason or another.

Offset throw-in. But nothing that the initial conditions were different? The Wehrmacht, before 1941, had already fought and carried out successful offensive operations for 2 years, conquered all of Europe, and won France equal to itself in a couple of months. That is, by 1941 already had mobilized, trained in interaction, fired at in real battles and ideologically motivated to capture the "living space" of the army. The Red Army practically did not conduct hostilities, Spain, Khalkhin-Gol and Finnish can hardly be considered, since 5% of the army took part in the conflicts, and even these were the level of an army division, not fronts.
In theory, when attacking the enemy’s prepared positions, success requires a 3-fold advantage; in practice, a lot decides the case. The main thing is that in 1941 the Red Army did not sit on the defensive in prepared positions, from Brest to Moscow there was no continuous defense in depth, and battles between the advancing and the undecided enemy usually lead to the defeat of the defender. This is a military truth, hence "on the shoulders of the retreating enemy", "not to allow the enemy to gain a foothold."
In addition, then explain another phenomenon. the territory of the USSR was liberated in 1944, and all of Europe went through almost a year, and Germany itself in the same 4 months, although the Germans had been preparing for German defense for more than 10 years, several units were erected by prisoners of war of the “eastern ramparts”. And the Germans took the same 5 million prisoners. Why so?

[Huumi]

And we didn’t have a khanhin goal? -Spain? -Finland? -We also had an army that managed to fight and had enough order carriers for all these companies and professionals, so it’s not necessary to say that the Wehrmacht’s army is all so ready-made and we’ve just finished our school -there were wars and lessons from them should have been learned. DECEMBER 39 AND THEN JUNE FORTY-FIRST ONE-39 YEAR-SHOWED WHAT THE ARMY IS ABLE AND 41 SHOWED WHAT THE WINTER COMPANY LEARNED-GETS!

[E_V_N]

Quote: Huumi

And we didn’t have a khanhin goal? -Spain? -Finland? -We also had an army that managed to fight and had enough order carriers for all these companies and professionals, so it’s not necessary to say that the Wehrmacht’s army is all so ready-made and we’ve just finished our school -there were wars and lessons from them should have been learned. DECEMBER 39 AND THEN JUNE FORTY-FIRST ONE-39 YEAR-SHOWED WHAT THE ARMY IS ABLE AND 41 SHOWED WHAT THE WINTER COMPANY LEARNED-GETS!

So I immediately explained that Spain (a few tankmen, a few pilots and a few advisers), Khalkhin Gol (a couple of divisions from the Far Eastern Army), Finnish (only 2 months came down to breaking through the Manerheim line) are not the same conflicts and not the same preparations as those Germans neither in terms of the forces involved, nor in the time of battles, nor in the use of tactical and strategic devices. As for the orders ... now you look at our military, also in orders and medals ... and what did everyone deserve in the battles? Ministers Grachev, Serdyukov, Ivanov are famous warriors of course.
Regarding the conclusions, they were just made that the Maginot line didn’t save France, that the Manerheim line didn’t save Finland, it was concluded that the Molotov-Stalin line would not protect the USSR, only from 1940 to 1941 there was too little time that would have time to radically redo all the plans.
This is what you now sitting on the sofa know well how to fight to defeat the Germans immediately in June 1941.

[shuravi]

Lovers sprinkle tin with ash, or rather, other people's heads, forget about several points:
1. The point is not the weakness of the Red Army, but the fact that the Wehrmacht was a very powerful military machine skating rink that passed through Europe and crushed all trophies with resources. Her French or the British could not resist.
2. Strategic initiative. Alas, she is on the side of the striker. For he chooses the most convenient time and place, which gives a huge advantage.
3. The Soviet command was informed of the exact date of the attack. This is not true. They reported a lot of different dates, including the 22 of June. But here is the trouble, no one is given a glimpse into the future and the exact date the mentioned date was already after the fact of the attack.
However, bring the USSR your troops in full readiness, it could only be worse. The enemy could easily change the date of the attack, wait until, after an empty expectation, tired troops were sent to rest and hit.
And if anyone has a different opinion, then why is he sitting here? Indeed, besides everything else, the winning tickets of the “Russian Lotto” are sold at the kiosks, let them go, choose the faithful and become millionaires.
4. A huge number of prisoners in the first months. Yes it was. But who got it? Mostly marching troops. That is, yesterday's workers and collective farmers, engineers, students who were called up, changed clothes and sent to the place of deployment of their units. Where they were supposed to get weapons, to be part of the units, crews.
5. Many couch experts, having read Rezun, raise a tantrum about the defensive lines that the "evil" Stalin forbade to build.
Of course, for the amateur, the solid wall of pillboxes bristling with gun and machine gun barrels looks menacing.
But the question is - And how many weapons, personnel per kilometer of such a front? Yes, a lot, because it is necessary to saturate with the indicated forces, taking into account the fact that the enemy will create a concentration of his forces in the breakthrough area. After all, the troops in the URs are static, they cannot help neighbors. So it turns out that, given the length of the western borders, directing the USSR to all the concrete, metal and the entire combat-ready population to build and saturate the URs would not be enough.
Moreover, the recent winter war with the Finns showed. URs as a strategy fail even in rough terrain.
Therefore, in the USSR, the current active defense strategy was developed and implemented.
6. The USSR surpassed the Wehrmacht in tanks and aircraft. Here is a special craftiness. For the "accountants" take all the tanks and planes located in the Red Army in the state and the fact that the Wehrmacht concentrated for the first strike. At the same time, "forgetting" about the real number of tanks and aircraft at the disposal of Germany, both its own and captured ones.
In addition, evaluating the strength of the Red Army also "forget" about such concepts as the percentage of serviceable, combat-ready, the level of training of crews.
And the manipulation of absolute numbers is incorrect. For example, 20 fighters against 60 sounds menacing, but if it turns out that the first is Bf.109F, and the second I-15 without radio, the picture is completely different.

[Huumi]

And now what is the difference of the question, Why? -An article about something, FALSIFICATION! - !!!! The question is why why ... this is from another chapter .. It is clear that soldiers and personnel officers and marshaviks were captured. And it is clear that not everyone there "fled" and those who gathered groups and left west no longer returned ... about that right now, it’s necessary to cut out such articles so that it dangles on the mustache so as not to repeat the mistakes drenched in blood and suffering, it’s getting ready to know that the enemy is “Heather and Cowaren” —and there will be no mercy to us!

[Tula gingerbread]

For fun, look at the German chronicle, in the columns of Soviet prisoners there are a lot of people dressed in civilian clothes. These are the "marshaviks" who didn’t get to the units and are just civilians.
The order of the same Guderian is known, that in occupied settlements, to consider as captives ALL men of military age.
A lot of the prisoners turned out to be military builders and peace builders who worked on the construction of the Molotov line, as well as barracks, airfields, warehouses, etc.
This is also a couple of hundred thousand.

[Huumi]

Yes, I agree ... There is and I know that there was a lot of it. Like the Germans let out with a thousand kick in the ass, there wasn’t much ... Or if the relatives were right out of the thorn ...

[basmach]

Of the 1300 new aircraft delivered to the troops by June 41, there were about 400 combat ready, the crews were smaller than 200 and they were prepared for flights to PMU (in 4 aviation, simple weather conditions (PMU) in the afternoon, difficult weather conditions (SMU) in the afternoon, PMU at night, SMU at night), there were even fewer tank crews of the new T-34 (training the tank crew is a long process. and there is no mechanized driver from the tractor driver at once) High literacy rate - a large number of sergeants did not know how to use the map and compass, not to mention rank and file.

[Tula gingerbread]

Again I turn to the newsreel. Broken Soviet tanks on railway platforms.
Those. they were listed as in service in the Western districts, but in fact, they did not even have time to unload them and they were destroyed in trains. Also interesting is the note of the Main Armored Directorate about the situation with spare parts for tanks of the "old" types.
The figure was given in 6 volumes of the history of the Great Patriotic War.
If I remember correctly, the GABTU application was executed by industry, something by 15-17%. Those. switching to the production of new types of tanks, industry, as they say now, “scored” for the production of spare parts for BTeshkami and T-26; 28
So those who evaluate combat efficiency only by bare numbers, people are illiterate and have no idea how the armed forces function.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: shuravi

In addition, evaluating the strength of the Red Army also "forget" about such concepts as the percentage of serviceable, combat-ready, the level of training of crews.

It is especially chic to compare the number of combat-ready Panzerwaffe tanks (and only from the tank battalions of tank regiments) with the total number of tanks registered in the Red Army, from Vladivostok to Leningrad.

Quote: shuravi

For, for example, 20 fighters against 60 sounds menacing, but if it turns out that the first is Bf.109F, and the second I-15 without radio, the picture is completely different.

In the border districts there was an even more entertaining picture: 60 fighters could be new, but for them there could be only 5-6 trained crews (and prepared for flights only during the day and in the PMU). For the plan for the re-equipment and retraining of aircraft parts was calculated until the summer of 1942.
No wonder the Air Force’s number table introduced another column: the number of vehicles capable of simultaneously flying into the air, depending on the availability of equipment and trained crews. And the figure in this column is usually one and a half times less than the total number of crews in the district (I’m not talking about airplanes).

[Amurets]

Quote: shuravi

Many couch experts, having read Rezun, raise a tantrum about the defensive lines that the "evil" Stalin forbade to build.

Yes there were, they built such lines and you can find a lot if you want how they built: Here are the words of the German sapper Lieutenant Böhm, taken prisoner near Orsha:
"... Our company had the task of blocking the concrete fortifications on the line of the old border of Soviet Russia and undermining them ... We had very good training and prepared to act as part of mobile groups with tank troops ... But we could not complete our task, so how instead of the powerful lines of fortifications that we expected to meet ... we found only scattered abandoned concrete structures, in some places unfinished ... Those firing points that met us with machine-gun fire, we easily avoided using rough terrain ... We took a long time could not believe that this is the same impregnable line of the old border ... "[Svirin, 3]."
Or on VO: https://topwar.ru/1978-zachem-stalin-unichtozhil-
liniyu-stalina.html

[vvvjak]

"2. A strategic initiative. Alas, but it is on the side of the striker. For he chooses the most convenient time and place, which gives a huge advantage." An example of this can be found in the history of the Russian-Swedish war. Charles 12 had about 36 thousand troops of the invasion, experienced and well trained in the battles in Europe (the analogy suggests itself). Peter 1 about 150 thousand troops defending. Not knowing the direction of the Swedish strike, Peter arranged the troops like this: 50 closed Moscow, 50 Peter and 50 between them for quick transfer in one direction or another (than not the progenitor of mech.korpusov). Such a construction forced Karl to leave the rivers in the direction of Ukraine (fighting off night attacks), where he also “fueled” by replenishment of Mazepa's 50 thousand sabers. The USSR did not have a 4-fold advantage neither in the troops nor in equipment. Cover 2500 km. the western border with a solid stationary defense line is simply not realistic (and any defense line broke through sooner or later). The only way out is to create mobile parts that can be quickly transferred to breakthrough areas, striking under the base of the upcoming “wedge”. But "it was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines." In practice, the lack of experience in the application, interaction of units, communications, logistics, equipment resources (a lot of reasons can be listed), even the construction of units (a bunch of tanks with insufficient infantry) led to the disaster in 1941, when the shock units did not fulfill their mission. But nevertheless, the Red Army in 1941 methodically destroyed the qualified military personnel of the Wehrmacht (as historian Isaev said, they peeled like potatoes - layer by layer).

[Sergey Sadchikov]

It seems to me that it’s hard for these people to explain something, they are lovers of destroying Russian soldiers in millions, and taking them in captivity in billions. They don’t even have a cognitive dissonance when they tell here 3-5 mil. Prisoners only, with the Red Army strength at that time about 5 mil., and yet how many more were killed and wounded, I just want to ask the guys ay !!! and who then fought? militias? Memoirs are read to the smithereens of the losers who compose fairy tales from the Brave Tailor series “For good reason, seven strong blows.” Here the prints of 5 million prisoners of war pop up, and as they say the devil is in the details. Very and very often Germans in the occupied territories all men of military age were considered prisoners of war and it didn’t matter whether he fought or not, and considering that only in the first year of the war the territory with a population of 70 million people was seized, then draw your own conclusions. About the fact that the Germans walked to Moscow in 4 months, it also allegedly speaks of the Red Army’s weakness, it doesn’t speak of any weakness, this suggests that the Germans made a bet on the first blow of colossal power and concentrated on the directions of the main attacks many times exceeding in force shock groups, hence the boilers and prisoners, and then the other side of the issue, the tank groups of course advanced well, cut the flanks and organized the boilers, but the infantry cleaned these boilers, and then she washed herself with blood, and that’s enough for the Wehrmacht for only 4 months, stumbled to Moscow, and had to declare a total war, although I remind you that the goal of Barbarossa is the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, so do not tell that the purpose of the war was Moscow, otherwise the Germans were unlucky, they didn’t take Moscow, but they would take it and it would end , nothing would have ended. And the losses of the Germans over these 4 months, Halder, the same storyteller wrote in his diaries about 362 thousand irretrievable losses and 800 thousand wounded, for example, American observers note those who were then on the Eastern Front and seemingly not very engaged give a different picture of 800 thousand. irretrievable losses, and 1,5 million wounded, but as they say, who believes whom, but if you believe Amers, for example, it becomes clear to me why the Germans did not take Moscow. So be critical of all the figures that you describe. So the situation is uncontrollable Wehrmacht for 4 months, reaching Moscow, can be compared with the sprinter running at the styer distance, of course at first he runs far ahead of everyone, but in the final run. he turns out to be the last. As with Vysotsky, "I rushed to 10 as to 000, and sintered."

[vvvjak]

Quote: Sergey Sadchikov

It seems to me that it’s hard for these people to explain something, they are lovers of destroying Russian soldiers with millions, and capturing them with billions

I agree. Another life example. My grandfather was mobilized in 1941 at the beginning of the war. They called up from the military registration and enlistment office, but didn’t reach the troops. the part is gone (consider missing). He returned home, partisan in his native land (all officially, under the patronage of the com. Party of the BSSR). After the liberation of Belarus, they were drafted into the NKVD troops. He did not stay there for long, 1944 was demobilized to restore the national economy of the BSSR (it even happened). Now we consider: 1 missing fighter, 1 partisan, 1 employee of the NKVD, 1 working N / A of the BSSR. Knowing the confusion of those years in the data, even in the archives of the Moscow Region, we can assume that the data of 4 archives were simply summed up and 4 people received it. One is alive, but where else they delved into 3 is unclear. That's all the statistics

[Cetron]

My grandfather died in 1944, was buried in a mass grave, a funeral came home. In the archives of Moscow Region, it is listed as dead. The military enlistment office was listed as a veteran of the Second World War. In fact, seriously injured, after the hospital he was demobilized as a disabled person. We went to his grave in the 70s to remember his fellow soldiers. He died of wounds in 1980.

[Huumi]

And you Baenka do not believe the off.information of MO? Only near Kiev and Vyazma, respectively, more than 600 and 650 thousand people were taken — only captured! Here are the off-numbers, the Germans confirm this, and this is only 2 boilers! 5 million is only the first line, there is still the second line, etc. And by the way, the sprinting is not bad, given the ensuing massacre of 2 and a half years to the borders of the USSR. By the way, according to the Germans, by September 41, their losses reached the level of World War I war (the current is not mentioned exactly which part of it)

[Sergey Sadchikov]

Near Kiev, there were a total of 600 thousand people, and you all captured them, they seemed to have fought for 1,5 months, and left the encirclement and died, etc. .I tell you only give free rein to all the armed forces of the USSR, located on a vast territory from the Caucasus to the Far East, write down to the West of the USSR, and destroy them all there and take them in captivity, and there are also no links in the MO data, so if possess critical thinking, you can always figure out such a variety of information, but this is by the way, if you want, and if not, then you can agree up to 5 million prisoners. By the way, these 2 boilers are the largest and there were no more of them, partly you can pull the Barvenkovsky boiler in 1942, even according to your information you published 1,2 million soldiers, and where you took another 3,5 million prisoners, you probably came without boilers. About honest and punctual Germans. ostensibly taking into account each belly in losses or not, do not tell it was such a lie lying worse than his compatriot Munchausen. It was not in vain that Hitler removed Halder from the post of chief of the general staff in 1942. he asked his generals warriors the question "according to yours, the bastards says, reports on the losses of the Red Army, we have grinded it all 2 times with giblets, so tell me," radishes "are you bad, why are they still fighting with us? Are you not going to give up? By the way, they always lied not only in the Second World War, it’s enough to recall the cauldron of the 2nd Samsonov’s army near Allenstein in the PM in 1914, so according to Ludendorff and Hoffmann, they only captured 90 thousand Russian soldiers, although this was so many soldiers in the 2nd army, and 2 shock corps got into the boiler, and normal historians, who were not impressed by the German order, calculated that there could be between 20 thousand and 30 thousand prisoners, how do you feel the difference between 20 thousand and 90 thousand So with these boilers, "how many Russian troops are there?" 600 thousand write all in prisoners. There is only one answer, the Barbaross plan did not succeed, only because of the critical losses of the Germans, the assembled troops lasted only 4 months, although they thought that this was enough for them to win.

[Huumi]

According to MO, more than 600 thousand were taken, there were more fights! And how many died!? - The statistics are also lame! Even if we assume (that it might be more complete that they took less) and I would not agree much with that ... The Germans spelled out everything quite clearly.

[Sergey Sadchikov]

I repeat once again be critical of the numbers, do not repeat the nonsense of "those who have everything clearly spelled out" as much as needed and recorded. THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF THE RED ARMY, who fell into operational encirclement in the summer-autumn of 1941, amounted to about 1,5 million people
If it had become timely known about the movement of the 1st Panzer Group, then perhaps the troops of the Southwestern Front would have been ordered to withdraw and they would have avoided encirclement. But since there was no information on this subject, the main threat was seen in the 2nd tank group advancing from the north under the command of Heinz Guderian: she had to overcome tens of kilometers to close the encirclement. Guderian was supposed to be held up. But they did not expect that the first tank group would jump out of the box suddenly, like a little devil. As a result, about 1 thousand fighters were in the Kiev "cauldron". About 453 thousand people escaped from it. This was preceded by a multi-day bloody battle. About 25 thousand Red Army men were captured.

As for the German reports, 665 thousand prisoners appear in them. However, in the military journal of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, this total figure is broken down according to where and how many Soviet troops were captured. Thanks to this, it turns out that directly in the area of ​​the Kiev "boiler" of prisoners was captured significantly less. For some reason, even those who were taken prisoner near Gomel were included in the total figure; they had nothing to do with the Kiev “cauldron.” Notice those who were captured near Gomel were recorded both in the Kiev boiler and in the Gomel prisoners, so it turns out that 1 prisoner of war at once increased by 2. The number of prisoners near Kiev amounted to 400 thousand and compare with the "data of those who clearly registered everything" 665 thousand. This is not a slight reduction in losses, as you deigned to speak, but are overstated by 40% !!!! ! In this way, I’m surprised how only 5 million were counted, it would be possible to count 10, which Russians would regret. By the way, it’s "those who clearly registered everything" who wrote in all seriousness about the crowds of Mongols on horses that fed So, when asked by a German divisional commander why she escaped from the battlefield, he charged that they were attacked by wild Mongol hordes and valiant grenadiers fought bravely with them mowing them with machine guns, but then they went crazy with what they saw and the division valiantly with ,,, zero from the battlefield, because it is useless to fight with fanatics., while not forgetting to add that they thrashed the Mongols 10 thousand about how !!!!!! Indeed, where can we compete with them.

[andrew42]

“However, bring your troops to the USSR in full readiness, it could only get worse. The enemy could easily change the date of the attack, wait until after an empty expectation the tired troops were sent to rest and hit.” - There was still a geopolitical factor, very, very significant: a possible alliance of the Reich and Britain for a "crusade against Bolshevism." In 1942, Hitler could well hit the USSR together with the "democratic" British, and the mobilized French. It seems that Stalin deliberately created the appearance of unpreparedness for war, but only now the appearance turned out to be a reality, to the shocked surprise of the leader and his associates.

[Alexey RA]

Because by that time the Red Army had enough forces and means to implement the most decisive offensive strategy - a huge amount of military equipment, including the best in the world, carefully trained in the pre-war period and well-motivated personnel personnel, as well as commanders New wave, received real combat experience and made conclusions from all the mistakes of local conflicts of the end of 30-x - the beginning of 40-x.

In parts of 97 SD rifles manufactured in 1940. , which were on hand for no more than 4 months, up to 29% are reduced to a state of rust in the barrel, machine guns "DP" manufactured in 1939 to 14% also have a deterioration of the barrel channels.
97 sd: The command personnel of the units do not know the optical sight of the Maxim machine gun, the optical sight of the sniper rifle and other types of new weapons. Some of the company’s commanders do not know how to remove a bayonet from a rifle arr 1891 / 30g.
The knowledge of the junior commanding staff is weak, but nevertheless, the weapons in the unit know better than the commanding staff.
The knowledge of ordinary cadets is low.
They do not know automatic weapons at all and are only able to carry rifles and pull the trigger. Extremely poor knowledge of the materiel of small arms and besides the gunners do not know the names of the parts of the machine gun "DP" and the revolver. The machine gunners do not know the name of the parts and rules for disassembling the rifle. To great shame, and chagrin, cadet regiment schools have lesser knowledge of small arms than the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.
There is no need to talk about the rules, cleaning weapons, and their inspection by younger commanders.
This situation should be, since the commander, having no knowledge of small arms, cannot transfer them to his subordinates and demand knowledge from them when he himself does not know him.

© The KOVO weapons verification act for the 1940th year.

[Alexey RA]

But maybe 97 sd was a black sheep in the slender ranks of the Red Army?

135 sd - The technical condition of the weapon is unsatisfactory, with the exception of 791 sp. Small arms in the division from 13 to 40% require military repairs. Particularly poor technical condition of weapons in 497 joint ventures, 184 hap, 168 obs. The care and saving of small arms is unsatisfactory in all parts of the division. The increase in the susceptibility of barrel channels by rifles from 10% to 77% ... For inspection of the commission, rifles and machine guns with a touch of rust were presented: 497 cn - 8 rifles and 3 revolvers, 791 cn - 6 rifles, 1 DP and 11 Nagan revolvers , 276 ap - 23 revolvers, 119 atb - 28 rifles and 2 revolvers "Nagan".
Unfortunately, there are still such commanders as Jr. Lieutenant Comrade *** (791 cn), who has only 6 rifles in the division, and upon inspection all the rifles turned out to be rusty, his personal Nagan revolver was also rusted. , in the drum of which there were three spent cartridges. The revolver, according to the statement of Lieutenant Comrade ***, did not clean after firing for 3 months.

© Order of the troops of the 5th Army "On the results of verification of artifacts and in parts of 135 SD, 36 ltbr, 330 hap argk and hull parts of 27 sk".

Upon examination, they were rusty in the bore, on the outside or dirty with a coating under a bed of sand, garbage and even oats and hay: 1019 rifles, 381 Nagan revolvers, 24 DP machine guns, 13 Maxim machine guns, 15 - 50 mm mortars and 4 120 mm mortars

© Order of the troops of the 5 Army "On the results of verification of artillery weapons in 87 SD"
But maybe such a nightmare was only in the infantry, but for the same tankers everything was different? Alas ... according to the documents of the 1941 of the year, hellish hell was happening in the BTV KOVO: 60% of the rank and file of the BTV had only primary education. And the junior command staff that trained them only had a third of primary education. Curves teach the blind...

[shuravi]

Quote: Alexey RA

© Order of the troops of the 5 Army "On the results of verification of artillery weapons in 87 SD"

I, as a servant, can say in due time that such acts should be approached very carefully. For it is the business of all commissions to produce a result, even where it is not always there.

But maybe such a nightmare was only in the infantry, but for the same tankers everything was different? Alas ... according to the documents of the 1941 of the year, hellish hell was happening in the BTV KOVO: 60% of the rank and file of the BTV had only primary education. And the junior command staff that trained them only had a third of primary education. Curves teach the blind...

Alas, there was no other people in stock.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: shuravi

I, as a servant, can say in due time that such acts should be approached very carefully. For it is the business of all commissions to produce a result, even where it is not always there.

Judging by 97 and 135 SD, a disregard for cleaning weapons was the norm in KOVO.
Also...

139 cn: The commanding staff does not dare to carry out a complete disassembly of the rifles to remove dirt and rust, as the battle of the rifles has changed.

[Amurets]

Quote: Alexey RA

Judging by 97 and 135 SD, a disregard for cleaning weapons was the norm in KOVO.
Besides

And after that, we want the ABC and SVT rifles to work without delay. Although the father of a friend who served in the Second World War during the Second World War, in the Far East, he said that border guards rated these rifles high enough

[Alexey RA]

So it has long been noted: in parts where personnel had a good education, SVT was loved and appreciated. Therefore, the marines and working battalions did not complain to the SVT. But for the mass ordinary soldier of the Red Army, this rifle was extremely complicated.

[Gopnik]

And what kind of education do you need to handle SVT? Is she with software?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

And what kind of education do you need to handle SVT? Is she with software?

And what do you think - can a draftee with three classes master the same gas regulator? Especially if he is taught by the same sergeant with three classes, and one for 100-120 people?

To great shame, and chagrin, cadet regiment schools have lesser knowledge of small arms than the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.

The brake in the formation is a large shortage of personnel, especially the technical and economic services, as well as the younger one. So, for example, in the military unit 9250 (216th motorized division) in one unit for 1200 people, there are only 15 people in command and regiment, in the military unit 1703 (45th tank division) for 100-120 people. Red Army, one average commander.

Classes for the study of weapons in the 24th tank regiment are organized satisfactorily. The disadvantage is the lack of methodological skills and a clear military language among junior commanders. So in the 1st platoon of the 2nd company of the regiment’s school, Junior Sergeant B., conducting classes with cadets on the subject “The device of the brake of the rollback and the reel,” called individual details incorrectly, gave fuzzy formulations, incorrectly explained the device of the reel springs ...

The company commanders, most of them lieutenants who were before the war of 1939-40. junior commanders who completed short-term courses before the war and after this war, due to large personnel losses, were promoted to company commander. Very often there were cases when glaring shortcomings were discovered:
a) Ignorance of the statutes and instructions
b) Ignorance of the organization and armament of the company
c) Ignorance of the compass and inability to work with the map, etc. not to mention higher matters.
Platoon commanders who arrived from military schools at the beginning of the war looked like civilians in military uniform, with absolutely no training. I had to choose the lesser of two evils. Junior lieutenant commanded a company, and lieutenants platoons. The latter urgently needed immediate help and study, and the former could not give them this. It turned out a bewitched circle

© Shein / Ulanov

[Gopnik]

I think it can. And what was taught from the 4th grade, what was missing to deal with the gas regulator? Knowledge of theoretical physics, higher mathematics, history of VKPb?

[Alexey RA]

Well, here’s a draftee with three classes - he can read, write and add, subtract / multiply - divide. And he needs to set the gas regulator depending on the air temperature, shot rifles and the reliability of the automation. Moreover, the same third-grader explains these wisdom to him.
By the way, here is the procedure for adjusting the gas regulator:

It is necessary to remove the ramrod, press the latch of the left ring from below and remove it, remove the upper covers (metal and wood), move the shutter to the rear position when the empty magazine is attached (to put the shutter on the shutter lag), push the gas engine stem back, bringing the stem out of the piston, slightly move the rod to the side and pull it out together with the extension cord and the pry bar, remove the piston.
Using a standard combination wrench or a small adjustable wrench, capture the square faces of your gaze after removing the gas pipe piston. With a tangible but controlled force counterclockwise (normal right-hand thread), unscrew the tube half a turn. Having grabbed the gas regulator pentahedron with a standard combination key (or a pentagonal hole cut into a steel plate with a file), turn the gas regulator to the desired value, making sure that the flat face with the desired number is strictly parallel to the horizontal plane of the rifle and the thin risks near the number on the gas regulator and on the case gas chambers MATCHED! Highlight this spot during operation to make sure the patterns match.
If there is no key (standard or home-made with a pentagon hole), you need to turn out the gas pipe with your hands to the end (it will not hurt to clean the carbon deposits anyway), push the regulator out with a pound and then insert as needed with the required number at the top, still watching coincidence of risks. By the way, when you sort it out, you will understand why the coincidence of the patterns is necessary - you will see inside the gas chamber how the hole of the selected diameter in the regulator and the hole in the chamber from the barrel should fit together.
Then wrap the tube with your hands, apply a reasonable moment with the key at the end, and assemble the rifle in the reverse order. Test her shooting.

There is at least one danger:

the gas regulator with a normal (red-hot) standard key quietly turns and without disassembly, a couple of seconds and that's it! It is a little taut, but it turns.
(...)
If you manage to turn the regulator, it only means that the handset is NOT PREPARED. With intense shooting and accompanying vibration, it will quickly unscrew and additional vibrations will appear in the gas engine, adversely affecting the accuracy and stability of the STP, since it “grasps” only at the end when it is preloaded, and before that it rotates along the thread very easily by hand.

[Gopnik]

Well, what is difficult? Especially for a 19-year-old guy who is used to working with his hands since childhood. They showed it several times - several times he repeated it himself, he can easily learn at KBM. No need to consider people idiots. Higher mathematics, theoretical physics, geography and the history of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks are not explicitly needed here

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

Well, what is difficult? Especially for a 19-year-old guy who is used to working with his hands since childhood.

And for which even cleaning weapons is already an impossible task.

Quote: Gopnik

They showed it several times - several times he repeated it himself, he can easily learn at KBM.

We do not have normal KMB. No. And we do not have a 1970 model SA, in which the sergeant corps is at the very least, but was, and knew something.
We have the Red Army-40, in which a draftee with 3 classes falls into the hands of a sergeant (who has fifty or even a hundred draftees), who teaches something that he often does not know ("He called individual parts incorrectly, gave fuzzy formulations, incorrectly explained the design of the knurling springs")
Oh yes, the training class, training ground, manuals, manuals and visual layouts are partially or completely absent - they are promised by the end of 1941. Because industry cannot keep up with the army in all respects and drives the shaft only in military equipment and weapons.

[Alexey RA]

The condition of these trophies can be judged by the fact that after a whole week of hostilities Halder complains that the Germans have no opportunity to study the new Russian T-34 tank, because so far it has not been possible to capture a single whole vehicle.

Nemirov. June 1941.
And these are not the only T-34s in that area.

[Shurale]

Read carefully, the general complains that he cannot study and cannot capture the T-34 as trophies ... Apparently he cannot study it because for example he cannot send trophies to the rear. There could be many reasons. Either these photos are of the wrong belt, or of the wrong territory that the general talks about.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Shurale

Read carefully, the general complains that he cannot study and cannot capture the T-34 as trophies ...

I read carefully:

Halder complains that the Germans no opportunity to study new Russian tank T-34, because so far it has not been able to capture a single whole car.

That is, the alleged obstacle to the study is that the whole T-34 was not captured.
Photos of June 1941 with whole, unburned T-34s surrounded by soldiers in the field field are quite numerous. In fact, in the first week the Germans got the majority of T-34 mechanized corps of border districts. In the same Nemirov there are photographs of the whole T-34 stuck in the house, and his own photo after removing it from the house.

[BAI]

Nonetheless, without questioning the heroism of our soldiers (including for personal reasons - I have a father of 23 years of birth, this year 4 - 8 people are still alive, my father died with fragments not removed) nonetheless a number of indisputable facts:
1.

Thus, the propaganda version of the preemptive strike of the Germans against the allegedly prepared for the throw of the Red Army, we reject as absolutely groundless and in no way coinciding with the facts of reality.

Then why, according to the plans for military development, it was planned to create several dozen mechanized corps by 1943, with each one supposed to have 1200 tanks, not only T-26 and BT-7, but T-34 and KV-1?

By January 23, 1941, the version of the mobilization plan was substantially revised. It was assumed that the size of the Red Army in wartime would be up to 10 058 791, infantry divisions - up to 209 (growth - 42 divisions), mechanized corps - up to nine (an increase of one micron), tank divisions - up to 20, motorized divisions - up to 9, air divisions - up to 79 (an increase of 24 hell), air regiments - up to 343 (an increase of 10 ap), as well as a significant increase in the number of military equipment {21}. Nevertheless, the version of the plan did not receive official approval from the military and political leadership. The fact, obviously, is that it did not find a place for new views of the participants in the strategic gathering of the leadership of the Red Army. And, in particular, to create large mechanized formations capable of solving operational-tactical tasks, as well as tank and motorized divisions.

After processing this option, a draft new mobilization plan was submitted to the government and approved on February 12, 1941. The plan provided for: the number of the Red Army in time of war - 8 people, the administrations of rifle corps - 682, offices of mechanized corps - 30divisions - 304, including 60 tank and 30 motorized.

The proportion of ground forces was reduced by 2,3%, cavalry - three times. But on the other hand, the number of mechanized corps increased five-fold, air defense and air force units — two-fold, tank troops — three-fold {22}. In an appeal to training camps, the military units of the western and parts of the internal military districts were reinforced by personnel. The number of rifle divisions of the border districts was increased: twenty-one - up to 14 thousand people, seventy-two - up to 12 thousand, six - up to 11 thousand people.

This is for what defense?
2.

It should be noted the stubbornness of individual Russian compounds in battle. There have been cases when the garrisons of the pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender.

I myself have repeatedly referred to Halder, to which I received a remark to VO that Halder is not an authority. God bless him. But a huge number of prisoners in 1941 is also an indisputable fact. What to do with this?

[shuravi]

Quote: BAI

Then why, according to the plans for military development, it was planned to create several dozen mechanized corps by 1943, with each one supposed to have 1200 tanks, not only T-26 and BT-7, but T-34 and KV-1?

This is for what defense?

For the so-called active defense. At the heart of which are counterattacks. With some changes, this strategy is now.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: BAI

Then why, according to the plans for military development, it was planned to create several dozen mechanized corps by 1943, with each one supposed to have 1200 tanks, not only T-26 and BT-7, but T-34 and KV-1?

Say thanks to the intelligence of the Red Army:

Bearing in mind the possibility of rapidly deploying tank production on the basis of existing automotive tractor factories (up to 15-20 plants), as well as increasing the production of tanks at plants with their well-established production, we can assume that Germany will be able to produce up to 18-20 thousand tanks per year .
With the use of French tank factories located in the occupied zone, Germany will be able to additionally receive up to 10.000 tanks per year ...

© Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Golikov. 11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

During the attack on France, the Germans used heavy tanks weighing 32 tons, weapons: one 105 mm gun, one 77 mm gun and 4 to 5 machine guns. Team of 7 people. Width is more than 2 meters. Combat speed up to 18 kilometers. A total of 10 motorized divisions (400 tanks) participated in the offensive, of which only 2-3 had 1 regiment of heavy tanks (in the heavy division, 1 regiment of light and medium tanks — 250 units and a heavy regiment — 150 tanks).

© message from Mars agent from Budapest on 01.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
It was against these tank hordes that our MKs were created. The frequency response, the potential of the German tank factories was evaluated correctly - with the advent of Speer, the German tank industry came to these numbers.

[Tula gingerbread]

Absolutely right! The rating is correct. Moreover, critics forget the military doctrine of the USSR at that time, and it said that the Red Army should have been able to simultaneously confront one adversary or coalition in the West and in the East - one. Japan was meant.
So all this amount of equipment was supposed to fight at the same time on TWO front lines.
The average consumption of equipment during the war amounted to approximately 20 thousand tanks.
So given the intelligence, which provided increased numbers, the amount of equipment needed was calculated correctly.
This is the first. And secondly, the number of equipment and personnel does not indicate that anyone is going to attack or defend.
It testifies only to one thing that you need to be stronger than a likely opponent. And plans testify to plans.
Could the USSR be the first to attack Germany? I think I could, but not in the 41st year.
and not alone. Poking around in Europe without allies is the height of recklessness and gagging.
So, under certain conditions, the USSR could be the first to strike at the Wehrmacht.
And these conditions were obvious. First, the Wehrmacht was supposed to get stuck in France. The balance of power and the experience of the First World War, they said that such a development was quite likely.
The second condition is an alliance with England and France and the request of the allies to join the war.
But the quick defeat of France, immediately changed the strategic situation for the USSR and for the worse.
The USSR no longer had time to complete the planned reorganization and rearmament of the Red Army and completely lost the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment.
Therefore, there is no plan to deliver a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht. Well, except for the draft Zhukov of May 41st, for which he received a scolding from Stalin.
In May of the 41st Red Army, under no circumstances could it get ahead of the Wehrmacht in strategic deployment and deliver a preemptive strike.
that would be suicide.
But there is an order of the General Staff on the development by districts of cover and defense plans.
If I’m not mistaken, all the districts except the West provided such plans to the General Staff.
It was precisely because all the plans for rearmament, the construction of the Molotov line, the reorganization of the Red Army, collapsed and an order appeared that we should not give in to provocations in every way to try to delay the start of the war for the 42nd year.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tula gingerbread

Therefore, there is no plan to deliver a preemptive strike against the Wehrmacht. Well, except for the draft Zhukov of May 41st, for which he received a scolding from Stalin.

Heh heh heh ... but there is Zhukov’s order to conduct the exercises of the fully equipped mechanized corps in September 1941 - a march, attack, defense - in order to test the capabilities of the corps and the need to change its OSh.

... instead of creatively considering whether it would be more convenient to storm Berlin from the northeast or southeast, Comrade Zhukov issued orders to conduct experimental exercises of the mechanized corps of the Moscow Military District in September 1941, during which exercises had to be checked and determined " ... saturation with fire weapons and the most appropriate placement of these funds in units and subunits, controllability of units and subunits, their mobility, organization of intelligence and command and control bodies, saturation of units with means: crossing points, air defense, air defense, etc., the rear of the tank and "a motorized division at all levels, without any conventionality, with a normal depth of supply ..."
"... determine the time required to draw and form the columns of the tank and motorized divisions, the actual depth of the columns on the march, the average speed of the columns, the time required to deploy from the marching order into battle, the front width and the depth of battle formation, determine the adequacy of the means reconnaissance, methods of organizing artillery support for the attack, whether the available time equipment and supplies for all types of supplies correspond to the actual needs of the mechanized corps units and formations and the reality of the rear staff "

© uv. D. Shein
In general, the list of teachings of 1941 suggests, yes ...

Turning to page 13 of the proposed file — this is an extract from the General Staff’s action plan for the operational preparation of the Red Army — we will be perplexed to find that a viewing field trip to the Baltic Special Military District is planned for July 15-30, and the turn The Western District will come only from October 15 to 30, 1941. Would it not be too late to check the operational training of the district’s command staff if Day M © falls on July 6? But in the meantime, we will continue to study the same extract - and we will discover a bilateral military exercise planned for the period from September 1 to October 15 on the theme "The offensive of the reinforced infantry corps against well-prepared defense from inputs to the mechanized corps breakthrough." Mmmm ... and the operations at the same time on the Sovietization of Europe will not interfere with our war games? Isn’t it too late to work out the modern defense and breakthrough of the fortified strip already after a tremendous battle just died out in Europe, during which the Wehrmacht suffered a crushing defeat, and the formidable Soviet freeway tanks rustled their wheels with rubber bandages across the squares of Berlin and Paris, Rome and Madrid? Where will those front-line offensive operations, during which the Soviet general staff plan to use mechanized armies, take place, what topic should the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army reveal by September 10? ..
In the same collection of documents, one can observe similar orders on conducting experimental exercises of the rifle division in the period from July 15 to September 1 in the Kiev Special Military District and on conducting experimental exercises of the mountain rifle division in the period from July 15 to 15 September the Transcaucasian Military District.

© he

[Shurale]

How to be I think to conclude that Stalin wanted to attack Germany? Is not it? After all, the preparation for defense against an adversary who has just won control of Europe somehow does not occur?

[BAI]

Shurale Today, 12:36 ↑
How to be I think to conclude that Stalin wanted to attack Germany?

In fact, the issue of prisoners was related to the statement disproved by the author

The low moral and political level of personnel who allegedly did not want to fight for communist Russia

What are the reasons for fighting for Soviet Russia in general and Stalin in particular:
1. The recruits of the Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia (live under the Soviet Government for 2 years).
2. The relatives of the repressed (4 years have passed).
3. The relatives of the victims and survivors of the famine of 29-31 (10-11 years have passed).
4. The relatives and participants of numerous peasant uprisings of the 20s (15 years have passed).
5. The relatives of the victims of the Civil War and the participants who fought on the side of the White Army (20 years have passed).
6. Those who did not accept the October Revolution (24 years have passed).
These are all far from old people who were subject to draft and were drafted into the army. And for some reason it seems to me that there were a lot of them.

[alstr]

about relatives. It's all different. Here is an example of Sasha Kovalev, whose parents were repressed, but he entered the Solovetsky school, fought and died.
There are reverse examples.
From my grandmother, I know that often they went to the front to avoid responsibility for economic crimes.
Many who did not accept the revolution were nevertheless partisan or helped partisans.

[lwimu1976]

Quote: x917nt

This is now and we understand that the Red Army was not going to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. The Soviet leadership only wanted to flex its muscles in front of its "friend" and show, just in case of fire, that the Soviet Union was strong and ready for any development of events, for which a huge number of troops were pulled to the western borders. Let the neighbor look at this power and throw away his possible plans, rumors about which began to reach the leadership of the USSR. But the German command, analyzing the data of its intelligence, did not understand this. More precisely I understood completely not so. And this mass of Soviet troops on the western borders of the USSR saw a threat to the security of the Reich in the east. This is precisely what caused the Nazi aggression, the purpose of which, according to the Barbarossa plan, was to destroy the Red Army. And just such a development of events was unexpected for the Soviet leadership. And then what happened happened. And that has already been said and retold 1000 times.

This is now and we understand that the Red Army was not going to attack Germany in the summer of 1941.
But I still don’t understand! 3.14 a lot! There are no eyewitnesses. The father served in Chernivtsi. He assumed that the war was coming soon.
But on June 22.06.41, XNUMX he was on vacation. In Moscow.
I told him from Rezun about spring boots. He told me: “Yes, we always had spring boots.” He was looking for his part
demolished new chromes. In Kiev they stopped, they built. They asked: "who writes well?" 4 cl. cp. “I.” All day he wrote out “permits to the trenches.” In the evening he went to the station. Anti-aircraft guns on platforms. Starshina: “comrade political instructor.” (With joy.)
And a bottle of brandy. (Thrifty foreman.)

[BAI]

The inspection report conducted by officers of the General Staff in May 1941 states:

“The list of units not ready for mobilization: 6 sbap - rearmament on a new materiel; 98, 207, 212 dbap - in the formation stage; 97 dbap - not provided with aircraft; 215, 209 sbap - not staffed; 126, 160, 161, 162, 163 IAP - a shortage of military units and materiel, which is 38% for bomber aircraft, and 25% for their fighter aircraft. Five airbases were in the process of formation, and three airbases were not staffed. Limited fit - 128 sbap, 124 IAP, 96 dbap "{23}.

[x917nt]

Quote: lwimu1976

I expected that the war would be soon.

Turn on federal TV channels now. Or go to any political site or forum. And you too will know that there will be a war soon.

[nivander]

the most tragic is that the Minsk boiler might not have taken place at all. 23/06/41 13 fur case gene. Akhlustin’s counter strike on the 86th German road near Sopotskin and the Boldin’s group’s attack on Grodno tightly blocked the attempt to close the Białystok cauldron only with a viscous mass of German infantry. a day later, then Boldin could break the defense of 256 pd or find a gap in the area of ​​Novy Dvur and .... get into the communications of Gotha. Then the RI axis would greatly change

[Romka47]

Great article !!!! AUTHOR 5+. I have the same point of view at the beginning of the Second World War, but I probably could not have decomposed everything.

[hhhhhhh]

Are we ready to die and not give up? in 1991 we already gave up. ((((

[shuravi]

All lovers refer to Rezun. Consider recognizing him as an analyst, just like calling yourself a fool.

[Luga]

I absolutely agree with the theses of the author. The reasons for the terrible military defeats of 41, of course, are not those that he outlined and criticized. But here is the argument ...
The author forgot the main thing - the task of a soldier is not to die for his homeland, but to make sure that the enemy died for his own. The first thing the author is wrong about is that on the eve of the war, troops were dispersed throughout the USSR. They were concentrated on the western border and, having been hit by the first blow, were disorganized, their supply and management were disrupted, which significantly undermined their combat effectiveness. Yes, they fought valiantly and stubbornly, but the Germans traveled 500 km in a month, and the Soviet troops that remained behind them were mostly destroyed.
And the reason for this is not at all that before the start of the war there was a place to be the wrong arrangement. The point is the general technical backwardness of our country compared to Germany, the point is the inability to manage troops, more precisely, the inability to provide control, supply, a lack of equipment, weapons, qualified specialists as in the operation (in the sense of the direct use in battle) of military equipment (relatively advanced in those times), and its maintenance. Glaring tactical illiteracy took place everywhere, forces (primarily artillery) were distributed evenly along the defense front, reserves were put into battle in parts. In general, German sources note the unsatisfactory level of junior and mid-level commanders in the Red Army. Unfortunately, their assessment is confirmed by objective data for the 41 year. There were, of course, bright moments, but the overall picture was still depressing. And like a cherry on a cake - a complete lack of a stable connection between headquarters at all levels. Commanders, starting from the divisional level, often simply did not know what was happening on the line of contact between them. This is not a connection when orders are sent to the unit leading the battle by an orderly or the signalmen are forced to grip the teeth of the telephone line.
There is much more that can be written on specific types of troops and, in general, throughout the army and navy. For example, to write about the fact that the firepower (roughly speaking, the salvo weight) of the German and Soviet units comparable in number of personnel differed by approximately three times, in favor of the Germans, of course.
The reason for the defeats is simple - we simply did not know how to fight. At all levels - from the Supreme to the platoon commanders.

[vvvjak]

Quote: Luga

The reason for the defeats is simple - we simply did not know how to fight. At all levels - from the Supreme to the platoon commanders.

The question immediately arises, and then what happened? We learned to fight, but how if the entire personnel army is destroyed (there are only more prisoners than the Red Army staff as of 01.01.41 judging by the numbers in the comments above and various "statistics")? The Wehrmacht forgot how to fight, so where did it go if it came to Moscow almost without loss (according to the same "all sorts of statistics" especially western ones)? Or, again, will we write off the battered “corpses”, “general frost”, “without Lend-Lease, we will be killed”?

[Luga]

Quote: vvvjak

The question immediately arises, and then what happened?

And then they studied hard and painfully. And they also stood to death as in 41. More capable commanders advanced - at all levels, from fronts to platoons, transferred the industry to military tracks, and even shots at the Wehrmacht, the Germans did not have time to prepare new ones of the same level. The average level of training of junior and middle command personnel among the Germans steadily fell (initially it was too high), in our country it grew, since it was initially too low (compared to the Germans), it grew on blood, in experience. By the summer of 44, they conditionally caught up and started, especially since by that time we had the most - guns, ammunition, tanks, planes, people ...
The Germans came to Moscow with serious losses, albeit much smaller than ours, but for them the losses were more sensitive.

Quote: vvvjak

Or, again, will we write off the battered “corpses”, “General Frost”, “without Lend-Lease, we have no money”?

Have you heard anything like this from me? Why then say such a thing? I don’t even want to consider and criticize these nonsense, like the ones that the author of the article exposed here (though somehow awkwardly), not to repeat - they are so ridiculous.
And here is the fact that in June of the 41, the Germans excelled us by head in military art in all its aspects (except, perhaps, disguises ), in my opinion - an indisputable fact, as well as the fact that by June of the 44 we were no longer inferior to them in anything, but in the number of troops and equipment they significantly exceeded.

[lwimu1976]

[quote = shuravi] All lovers to refer to Rezun. Bear in mind that recognizing him as an analyst is like calling yourself a fool. [/ Quote]
I'm average, like everyone else. We’ll vote for the smart ones! Or they’re in a thought. (And Drapeko teaches us morality and others teach us!) Please justify why you recognize him as an analyst = what to call yourself a fool. [/ Quote]
Recognize and call the difference too!

[shuravi]

Quote: lwimu1976

Please justify why recognize him as an analyst = what to call yourself a fool.

What is easy to verify:
Rezun builds his speculation on three “whales”:
- BT-7 freeway tank, in parts of which "there were no trucks for transporting the removed tracks".
- One hundred thousand Su-2 (winged jackal)
- I didn’t let Pe-8 enter the Wunderwaffe series.

In practice:
- BT-7 transported its tracks itself. And they were shot because of the low resource.
- Su-2 was twice as expensive as the SB-2 bomber. It was very high-tech, in fact the next generation. There was no question of any super-mass production. Peacetime airplane.
- Pe-8, on the one hand, was very expensive to manufacture, on the other hand, they could not bring the compressor to the supercharger. Therefore, it was produced limited with mediocre performance characteristics mainly for the development of the flight crew. In order to have one, while the designers will solve the issue with altitude.

[vvvjak]

C'mon, three whales. And the "heaps" of abandoned boots (ashamed to Europe in windings), and 100500 million paratroopers (without landing aircraft), and "mobilization means war" by Shapashnikov, and the transfer of industry to martial law, and naive Hitler and monstrous Stalin, and the iron argument " Well, we all understand yes, "etc. Pearls of this author can be listed and listed.

[Nehist]

No, there’s no pearl. Rezun has fairly objective calculations. But here they are served .... It's like with a glass. The glass is half empty or the glass is half full. So it was with Rezun, he presented the facts (it’s hard to deny), but from such an angle that white becomes black and vice versa.

[vvvjak]

Quote: Nehist

No, there’s no pearl. Rezun has fairly objective calculations. But here they are served .... It's like with a glass. The glass is half empty or the glass is half full. So it was with Rezun, he presented the facts (it’s hard to deny), but from such an angle that white becomes black and vice versa.

So objectively, we can predict that the Russian Federation is preparing to seize the European Union. Judge for yourself: the military budget has grown almost 2 times (and compared to 90 times a dozen), re-equipment has taken place by 60% (why?), The staff of military personnel has increased by 50%, more than in all NATO countries combined, capture a bridgehead in Syria (a threat to the south of Europe and control of cargo coming through the Suez Canal), the seizure of Crimea - a very important strategic point and the deployment of forces in the Arctic (control of northern sea and air supplies). And that this is all for defense, but no matter how it is, we all know why this is done. And if you stick in the "imperial ways" of GDP, then in general, as they say in Odessa, "oil painting". Only the "fool" is not clear, but are we not like that?

[Nehist]

So I’m talking about this. The facts can be interpreted as you like. The manipulation of raw data, and especially filed at the right time, gave rise to the myth that the USSR was preparing aggression against Europe

[Tula gingerbread]

There is nothing objective there. Or is this "objective" almost verbatim "one old factory worker said that everyone at the factory knew that the index" A "means freeway."
We are talking about tank production at the Kharkov steam locomotive.
And the fact that the T-34, its ancestor A-32 was purely caterpillar, Rezun is "modestly" silent.
And who is this “objectivity" for? Or with these notorious "mountains of leather boots."
Again - "one local resident, the old man told me that in the woods ..." and so on.
Is it really not clear where Bogdanych dug up this nonsense from?
As an officer, he knew that conscripts who were sent to serve in units located in Europe were equipped with leather belts and spring boots.
So he decided that it was dumb to fight in Europe with a canvas and boots with windings, because they say they decided to change the fighters in leather boots.
Rezun is simply not a fig in the subject of the uniform of that time, where the same French and English soldiers calmly flaunted in boots with windings.
Maybe his fairy tales about Pe-8’s miraculous weapon, “objective calculations” or the “Thunderstorm” mythical plan for which he tried to pass off Zhukov’s project, “deployment considerations” with a plan to deliver a preemptive strike.
Rezun didn’t give any facts, continuous gossip, designed to stun the illiterate layman who was never interested in the topic.
The only thing I can confirm is that it is written fascinatingly, like all fantasy.

[Nehist]

So you read it poorly. There, past the husks and outright nonsense that you brought above. There are archival documents that he cleverly manipulates

[Tula gingerbread]

I’m not just fine, I read it with a pencil in my hands.
By the way, Rezun himself claimed that he did not work in the archives, but took everything from "open sources".

[Shurale]

Thank you so much for the article !!!

[Gopnik]

The whole article is just an example of an unclouded political conscience when a catastrophe is on the face, but no one is to blame “it happened so”, but this song is simple: “Because this other solution could only be an immediate war with Germany. And, in fact, with everything Western by the world, including the US and the UK. "

So I imagine how England reconciles with Germany and attacks the USSR with her.

[voyaka uh]

"along with a very large number of captured property (including fuel)." [Halder]

There are no questions about captured property - the retreating forces were forced to leave,
most often disabling, heavy weapons due to
that ammunition or fuel has run out. [Author]

The author needs to carefully analyze his own quotes:
1) Halder writes that "a large number of captured property (including combustibles) has been seized."
2) The author writes that "that the ammunition or fuel has run out."
And why did it end? -
see paragraph 1. Because ammunition and fuel were captured by the Germans in the first 2-3 days of their offensive.
Then we ask the question: "why were the ammunition and fuel depots near the border?"
And the whole concept of the article crumbles into smoke ...

[shuravi]

Quote: voyaka uh

I am.
Then we ask the question: "why were the ammunition and fuel depots near the border?"
And the whole concept of the article crumbles into smoke ...

Because they were waiting for the war. But they were preparing to fight according to the then existing strategy. It all fits together.

[x917nt]

Quote: shuravi

Because they were waiting for the war. But they were preparing to fight according to the then existing strategy. It all fits together.

Doesn't fit very well.
For the military in 1941, all bones were washed. For their readiness and unpreparedness for the war that they were waiting for. But not only the military were waiting for her.
And here is the question: What did Soviet diplomats do in the first half of 1941? What did the leadership of the country diplomatically do to prevent the war from starting? Yes, Molotov had to live these half a year under the door of Ribbentrop's office, because millions of the lives of the citizens of his country were at stake. Why did not one of the Soviet leaders bother to meet at the highest level with the German side and try to resolve the situation peacefully? Why didn’t they use the language of diplomacy to the end, but stupidly waited for it to blaze with hellfire?

[andrew42]

The political leadership just played brilliantly. Hitler was pulled out for a throw in 1941, without a truce / alliance with Britain, without digesting and mobilizing French resources. Further it could be worse, much worse. But the military leadership turned out to be just not ready. For objective reasons (frames decide everything), and for subjective ones too. They painted the enemy an illusory unpreparedness for war, but in fact it turned out to be real unpreparedness. That is the incident.

[x917nt]

Quote: andrew42

The political leadership just played brilliantly.

Brilliantly??
The best answer for you would be to quote old Churchill.

“It is doubtful that any mistake in history could be compared with that made by Stalin and the communist leaders when they, lying on their backs, expected a terrible blow approaching Russia or were unable to evaluate it.” (C) W. Churchill

[andrew42]

If for you the anti-Soviet and Russophobe sir Winston Churchill, the country's prime minister, a 200-year-old implacable geopolitical opponent of Russia, is a divine revelation, then it remains to shrug. And even to say that such a figure as Churchill was caused solely by political realities, when the Fuhrer sharpened against the USSR began his game and began to break off the leash. Already, it seems, all points have been placed above the “I” —whose exactly the elites were the customers and sponsors of German Nazism, but no, money again for the fish.

[x917nt]

Quote: andrew42

when the Fuhrer, sharpened against the USSR, began his game and began to break off the leash.

Ah, well, everything is clear. Again about the world conspiracy against Russia. You can not continue.

[andrew42]

Is the confrontation between Russia and Britain with allies during the Crimean War a conspiracy theory? Non-stop diplomatic notes on Central Asia - are these the jokes of the British parliament? Turkey’s support and threatening memoranda from the time of the Bulgarian war - a simple bluff that stopped the Russian army in the suburbs of Istanbul? Militarization of Japan and its comprehensive support during the war of 1904-1905, the attacks of destroyers at Dogger Banks - is this again English humor? The intervention of the Civil War - of course, was in your humanitarian aid. Basmachi financing in the 20s / 30s is also from this series. Planning an air strike (together with France) on the Soviet oil fields in Transcazazia in 1939 - was there nothing to do with staff boredom? I can still recall the financing and organization of the murder of Paul the First. Is this not enough?

[x917nt]

Most of the above you do not apply to the USSR. This is all from the history of the Russian Empire. And all of the above also has nothing to do with WWII.
And more.
Turning over the layers of history in the hope of finding at least some grains of pseudo-facts in order to blame their own miscalculations and failures on a certain external enemy is a silly and unpromising undertaking.

[andrew42]

Oh how! So you, dear man, are an ardent fan of the Soviets! Better than Stalin-Dzhugashvili. He during WWII appealed to the glorious traditions of the Russian army, but for you before the USSR there was nothing! Immediately from the Dryopithecus Darwin - straight to the Soviet people. To hear that from a fan of Sir Winston is amazing! You have already decided on the platform, otherwise in one change the six of you turn into an ace and turn back into six.

[x917nt]

Quote: andrew42

So you, dear man, are an ardent fan of the Soviets!

You did not guess. Just the opposite.
Horror stories about a world conspiracy against Russia (especially in the execution of the Anglo-Saxons) are able to convince only illiterate and dark people. And those who understand history understand that even one English tank, Valentine, which appeared in battle in the fall of 41 near Moscow, "weighed" a thousand times more than paper plans for bombing Baku, operations like "Unthinkable" and speeches "a la Fulton".

[Tula gingerbread]

It's funny Do you think that for Britain there was a difference, RI or the USSR? For them it was all Russia.
In the words of Rudyard Kipling, an English intelligence officer known to us from the book, about Mowgli - "the big game will end when everyone dies."
We have not died yet, so the big game of Britain against Russia continues. To know the game of the opponent against you, this is only for stupid people "an occupation is stupid and unpromising."
It is strange that you are not aware that ALL intelligence agencies in the world are doing this. They are looking both in the present and in the past to predict the future.

[x917nt]

Quote: Tula gingerbread

Do you think that for Britain there was a difference, RI or the USSR?

The difference (and huge!) Was for the USSR. If you lived in the USSR in the 20-30s and 40s, would you try to declare that the country continues the policy of tsarist Russia ...)

Quote: Tula gingerbread

ALL intelligence agencies in the world are doing this.

Yes it is. This alone does not mean that information is collected with the goal of further destroying the country.

[voyaka uh]

According to some such strategy, ammunition and fuel depots are placed
near the border? And the troops (except the border) are located on
depth 30-50 kilometers in depth. Moreover, only tank. And without fuel supplies.
But there is no infantry at all - it began to arrive (without weapons - warehouses near the border) in trains later - and directly to German prisoners of war camps.
Historians have been breaking spears of this strategy for 70 years.

[shuravi]

Quote: voyaka uh

According to some such strategy, ammunition and fuel depots are placed
near the border? And the troops (except the border) are located on
depth 30-50 kilometers in depth. Moreover, only tank. And without fuel supplies.
But there is no infantry at all - it began to arrive (without weapons - warehouses near the border) in trains later - and directly to German prisoners of war camps.

And who told you that everything was just like that? Reason?

Historians have been breaking spears of this strategy for 70 years.

This strategy defeated Nazism.

[voyaka uh]

That said Halder. And no one argues with him. Huge ammunition depots Germans
captured at the border intact. Ammunition, shells, fuel, rifles, guns.
(The guns were not shot at the Germans on 22.06/XNUMX). Not a single bridge was blown up by sappers.
But large-scale tank battles began when the Germans delved into the territory of the USSR.
Entire tank corps counterattacked the Germans. And they were defeated in stubborn fierce battles. And in the south, the tankers even pressed the Germans.
One of the reasons for the defeat in these tank battles is that the fuel has run out. And his warehouses were already seized at the borders.
I put the word "strategy" about the beginning of the war in quotation marks.
The USSR rebelled and took Berlin, but after 4 years, retreating to the Volga and suffering multimillion losses.
And the defeat at the beginning of the war was a clear cause of both the retreat and such losses.

[sharp-lad]

The defense strategy of those times implied short and intense defensive battles in the border zone with the transition to decisive and powerful counterattacks deep into the enemy’s territory. They didn’t really think about a preventive attack then. (I'm not talking about the complete absence of such plans.)

[Huumi]

Only a finished down will place weapons and clothing depots at the borders ... for any type of warfare, whether offensive or defensive ..

[shuravi]

Quote: Huumi

Only a finished down will place weapons and clothing depots at the borders ... for any type of warfare, whether offensive or defensive ..

Can you provide accurate warehouse location information? Starting with division subordination.

[sharp-lad]

Well, then NATO is simply overwhelmed with downs at the highest command level, because it has warehouses and equipment in close proximity to the borders of Russia.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: voyaka uh

Then we ask the question: "why were the ammunition and fuel depots near the border?"

They were not there.

Of the total number of district warehouses, 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era in mainly in 1930-1940

© Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.
That is, out of the total number of district warehouses, 78 just could not be at the border itself - for they were beyond the old border.
Moreover:

The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

So the reason is not the movement of warehouses to the border, but the too rapid advance of the Germans, who reached the second and third line of warehouses much faster than anticipated before the war.
Why haven’t they been pushed even further? And how then to carry ammunition, given that the a / m in the army is not enough even with the full mobilization of n / x.

[voyaka uh]

This is contrary to German data. They argue that the bulk
military stocks were captured BEFORE serious clashes with the Red Army.
I think that the reserves were transferred before the war to some temporary
“jump” warehouses at the border that did not fall into the statistics you provided.
The doctrine of the spacecraft changed several times before the war: offensive, defense, preemptive strike,
defense again. Because of this, there was a confusion in the placement of warehouses. The part was on defense
doctrine, part on the counter strike, part on the preemptive strike.

[Tula gingerbread]

And I read that the district fuel depot of the Western Special District was already .... in Maykop!
Wow next, tormented to drive.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: voyaka uh

This is contrary to German data. They argue that the bulk
military stocks were captured BEFORE serious clashes with the Red Army.

Given that serious clashes began already on June 23 - someone, to put it mildly, provides inaccurate information.
Or the Germans had their own gradation of the "bulk" - and for them even the 4th-class warehouse was already large.

Depending on the storage capacity and the availability of production workshops, all artillery warehouses were divided into 4 categories, as a rule, by operational capacity:
a) warehouses of the 1st category, which included production workshops and storage capacities of up to 5000 freight cars;
b) warehouses of the 2nd category had storage capacities of 700 or more wagons;
c) warehouses of 3 categories - up to 500 freight cars, respectively;
d) warehouses of 4 categories - respectively, up to 200 freight cars.

© Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.

Quote: voyaka uh

I think that the reserves were transferred just before the war to some temporary “jump” stores near the border that did not fall into the statistics you quoted.

In fact, the border districts before the war were forced to keep about a fifth of their military base in central warehouses. If they had the opportunity to equip additional field sites - they would hardly have practiced such extraterritorial storage.

The significant discrepancy between the need and the availability of storage space put the western border districts in a difficult position, since they could not provide normal conditions for the storage of 25535 carriages of ammunition, or more than half of all their stocks of shots. I had to resort to the storage of ammunition in the open air and to the equipment of field-type warehouses, which complicated the maintenance of the shots in constant combat readiness. Due to the insufficient provision of the districts with a warehouse area, a significant part of their mobilization stock was deposited in the central warehouses. A total of 7395 ammunition wagons belonging to the districts by their armor were in central warehouses. At the same time, in the border military districts, 11635 wagons of ammunition were stored outdoors.

By the way, there are only two numbers:

In the military districts, by the beginning of the war, there were 111 stationary artillery bases and warehouses, including 3 bases and 5 armament and ammunition depots and 92 ammunition depots, which stored mob reserves and stocks of the current allowances of the districts. Total 50% of all resources of the Red Army were stored in district ammunition depotsaccumulated by the beginning of 1941
About 54% of warehouses of district subordination were in five border districts (LVO, Pribovo, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO).

[voyaka uh]

These figures about the warehouses and property seized by the Germans are indeed
very controversial and very interesting. Where were the warehouses located?
but was there property? Or was it already deployed closer to the border?
For example, the heavy artillery of the spacecraft was immediately captured by the Germans at the border - everything,
along with shells and unpacked, locks in factory lubrication.
Or there was a startling article on VO, which reported that the order
The mass evacuation of industry was already given on the THIRD day of the war.
Can you imagine? The outcomes of border battles are not yet known, tank battles are boiling,
and the plants are already starting to spread east. And where? ”“ Not near Moscow, but immediately to the Urals.
That is, Stalin immediately, on the first day of the war, knew for sure that there would be a defeat of the spacecraft
near the border. He did not have the slightest illusion ...
As far as I understand, in the last year - 1940 - there was a panic in the Kremlin and the General Staff.
The defeat was considered inevitable. And they tried - out of despair - to come up with something extraordinary:
like a preventive strike to reduce, mitigate the degree of damage.
Because of this - a complete confusion in the orders. Local generals did not understand what was being prepared: defense or offensive. Because of the secrecy and fear of the tribunal, they were afraid to ask.
And what happened happened. Neither a preventive strike succeeded, neither a counter strike, nor a defense.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: voyaka uh

For example, the heavy artillery of the spacecraft was immediately captured by the Germans at the border - all, together with shells and unpacked, locks in factory lubrication.

What is all heavy artillery, right?
Chipboard book "Artillery Supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45." gives the following artillery losses of OM and BM by 01.09.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:
- 203 mm howitzers: 75 of 871
- 280 mm mortars: 5 out of 72.
Right at the point of permanent deployment, 27 B-4s were captured. This was the materiel of the unformed 529th Gap BM - the regiment received guns, but did not receive traction.

In the city of Dubno, the 529th howitzer artillery regiment of high power was formed. Due to the lack of mechanical gear, when approaching the Germans, twenty-seven 203-mm B-4 howitzers were thrown in good condition.

Quote: voyaka uh

Or there was a startling article on VO, which reported that the order
The mass evacuation of industry was already given on the THIRD day of the war.

That's right - this is the real doctrine big war Red Army. At the beginning of the great war, an evacoplan automatically came into effect - industry had to be removed from the attacks of the same aircraft. Regardless of the outcome of the border battle.
А little blood, on foreign territory better left to the propagandists. And even before the war they received other instructions:

War is an equation with many unknowns; this alone refutes the thesis of invincibility. The army, of course, must be educated so that it is confident in its abilities. The army needs to instill a spirit of confidence in its power, but not in the sense of boasting. Bragging about invincibility harms the army. Meanwhile, under the conditions of the Red Army and in the entire system of propaganda and agitation, a false understanding of the invincibility of the Red Army was most widely reflected.
... the laws of strategy and tactics are virtually neglected. Organized retreat, organized retreat in certain areas began to be considered a shame. The infantry combat charter directly directs the commanders to meaningless casualties, indicating that "no loss can force the company to stop performing the combat mission, even if only a few people remain in it"

© Mehlis

Quote: voyaka uh

Where were the warehouses located - but was there any property there? Or was it already deployed closer to the border?

Once again: the districts do not have the strength and resources to equip field warehouses even for those ammunition that did not fit into the capital warehouses. Where will they get transport, materials and people to equip additional field sites in the border area for b / p from these same capital depots?

[voyaka uh]

"At the beginning of the great war, the evacoplan automatically entered into force - the industry had to be removed from the attacks of the same aircraft. Regardless of the outcome of the border ..." ////

Do you even understand that the loss from transferring enterprises from place to place is much
exceeds damage from enemy aircraft?
Enterprises cover air defense, and do not evacuate to the Urals, if they are sure of victory.
Evacuation is carried out only if there is a threat of enemy capture of the territory.
If the factories began to be evacuated in the early days of the war, it means they knew that the Germans would capture the places where the factories were. That is, Stalin was sure that the spacecraft would be defeated in border battles, and would have to retreat deeply. Aviation has nothing to do with it.

[andrew42]

That justification and praises addressed to the Red Army, then the full pouring mud in other publications. Maybe enough already rushing around? It’s interesting for the author that everything was well done and heroes, but oops .. something went wrong. The Red Army at the initial stage of the war suffered a heavy defeat from the German Wehrmacht. It is a fact. Before the complete defeat and disorganization, the periods were at hand. In terms of military science, planning and organization of operations, the Wehrmacht was like a professional melee against a strong guy from the yard. This is an objective reality. The continuity of the German officer corps from the time of the WWI against civilian veterans plus hastily promoted Stalinists (without irony), with the Trotskyists and "fellow travelers" considerably cleansed, that they had, they had. The second, communications and operational management, - here the Wehrmacht in the first months was like a sighted against a blind. Third - the heroism of Soviet fighters and even individual units - yes, very often, but not every second was a berserk hero! It is ridiculous to expect sheer heroism from 80% of the personnel, God forbid that 3 out of 10 not flinch, but in fact it was, it ultimately saved. Fourth, the aviation and tank units in the MTO plan were not ready for war even on a local theater. This is also a fact. Well, fifth, the actions of the headquarters of the Western District are not explainable by any unprofessionalism. Maybe Pavlov himself is not a traitor himself, but the posts below clearly trace the work of the disorganizers, moreover, complex, on various aspects of military affairs. Then the Abwehr beat our dry. Eternal glory to the soldiers and commanders who stood to death in such conditions. They forged their death with victory, when there was no glimmer of hope. Military genes were taken out, contrary to the German organization and our carelessness and confusion.

[yehat]

Continuity of the German officer corps since WWI against civilian veterans plus hastily promoted Stalinists

By the way, one of the reasons why the Germans didn’t stop fighting at the border was that there were very few officers in the Red Army who, after the WWII, would have had considerable experience in trench warfare. Often, the Germans took positions that were able to strengthen for a long time simply on the move,
elementary tactical requirements for the deployment of artillery and other things were not fulfilled.

[Tula gingerbread]

And what does the trench war? Was there a lot of it during World War II?
Actually, according to Shaposhnikov’s plan, they were going to use active defense, not tough one.

[yehat]

plans and reality are different.
even near Kursk, where they dug in for six months, the defense was unreliable.
lacked experience even taking into account 2 years of war.

[Tula gingerbread]

Do you call the battle of Kursk a trench warfare? And that the Germans, opposite our trenches, also sat in the trenches?
I think this example is not very successful.

[yehat]

good example. look at the loss ratio -
Manstein on his offensive site had less losses than the defenders, and the attackers did not surround, did not receive any bonuses - they just rolled it in the forehead. These statistics of losses clearly enough show that it was not enough to defend abilities, and to defend oneself in static positions.
And if you look at what the defenders planned - Vatutin wanted to strike clearly unpromising counterattacks, he was besieged by the executors of these orders and Stalin himself.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: yehat

By the way, one of the reasons why the Germans didn’t stop fighting at the border was that there were very few officers in the Red Army who, after the WWII, would have had considerable experience in the trench warfare.

Chihiks ... judging by the Civil War, there were practically no such officers in the entire former Russian army - both white and red. The equipment of normal field positions was something of a series of unscientific fiction.

Since August 14th, when the hands lying under shrapnel were digging shelters, fortification and tactics have developed incredibly. And then "the simplest tactical truths were perceived as a revelation." In the 18th, “trenches and fortifications were not built. The largest that was dug by a hole to protect the shoulders and head, for the most part lay open ”, in the 19th“ our trenches were built extremely remotely ”and in the 20th already on Perekop it was the same. Artillery pulls up and openly shoots at close range, forgetting just everything. Intelligence is such that even in the 18th, the Reds attack suddenly, despite the fact that their plans and radio were read freely. And a constant refrain: “But if the hand of the red machine gunner / gunner didn’t flinch, we would all remain there.”

© ecoross1
ICH, the massive operational construction of field fortifications appeared just in the Civil War - but overseas. Johnny-rebu needed a day to build a position and three to make it impregnable.

[Paranoid50]

Quote: andrew42

That justification and praises addressed to the Red Army, then the full pouring mud in other publications.

And the truth, as always, is approximately in the center (with a slight bias). Many opinions are not always based on real facts, or based on incorrect conclusions from these very facts. Personally, I more or less understand the situation of 1941 (June-September) (as an example) is seen on the basis of the database of the 154th SD (Ulyanovts) of the 63rd SC. Why exactly this division? Well, it’s simple here - it’s a division, in the composition of which my grandfather met the Second World War, who had already passed the Finnish one by that time. There are recollections of the participants (including my grandfather), and some documents - and material for the whole article. So, based on the analysis of this material, the conclusions are obtained, basically, similar to yours. Well, maybe vary in detail. Yes, they got ... Yes, they spit out their broken teeth ... Yes, they wiped away the bloody yushka ... Here, I recall the dialogue from K. Simonov's Living and the Dead. The captured German general says to Serpilin: “Yes, it looks like we will teach you how to fight,” to which the answer follows: “Well, we will wean you.” What ultimately happened, and

This is an objective reality.

[nivander]

listen to the comedians ---- Duc everyone knew how to fight both the French and the British. The Belgians and Dutch Duc were generally demons of war (lasted three whole days). And the magnificent team of Poland in military and applied sports just flew away. And what shots -
Gamelen Arno, Huzinger, Rydz-Smigly, Domb-Bernadsky., Mosnitsky --- titans of military thought And only the red-footed Red Army was knocked out of this splendor

[Taoist]

One thing is not clear why the author attributed to the "errors"
n.2? "The incompleteness of the rearmament and combat deployment of the Red Army."
Unlike everything else, this is reality at 100% - in June the Red Army was in the process of rearmament and, most importantly, in a state of structural change - which in particular led to a loss of controllability of the troops. And if we talk about the “betrayal” of the generals in quotation marks, then it is necessary to talk about the low level of combat training, command and coordination of the troops.

[Snoop]

I did not understand the author of the article. In paragraph 2 of myths, he writes: "2. The incompleteness of the rearmament and combat deployment of the Red Army." And he himself writes that parts of the Red Army are scattered in winter apartments. So this is the incompleteness of combat deployment. I understand that this is to refute Rezun. But then he contradicts himself. In addition, not all units hung out in winter apartments. There is Pokrovsky’s research on the answers of surviving generals and colonels. Basically, the western military districts until June 22 partially raised divisions and brigades. Some since June 16, some from June 18. Except for the truth of the Western Special. For example, in the Baltic region:
Colonel General of the tank forces P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the auto armored forces of PribOVO):

On June 16, at 23 p.m., the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive on putting the compound on alert. The corps commander, Major General N. M, Shestopalov was informed about this at 23 hours on June 17 upon his arrival from the 202nd Motorized Division, where he conducted a mobilization readiness check. On June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. On June 19 and 20, this was done.
On June 16, by order of the district’s headquarters, the 3rd Mechanized Corps (commander of the Major General of the Tank Troops A.V. Kurkin) was also put on alert, which concentrated at the same time in the indicated area.
In the Kiev district:
Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):
Two rifle regiments (187 and 14 joint ventures) divisions were located near the state border since August 1940.
On June 20, 1941, I received this encryption of the General Staff: “All units and units of your unit located on the border itself should be taken back several kilometers, that is, to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units until they violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. Report execution by 24 o’clock on June 21, 1941. ”
Just at the indicated time, I reported by telegraph about the execution of the order. The report was attended by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, who was entrusted with a verification of execution. It is difficult to say for what reasons it was not allowed to take defensive positions, but this was what the enemy took advantage of at the beginning of hostilities.
And so on and so forth ... but according to the Western one can characterize this answer:
Major General P.I. Lapin (former Chief of Staff of the 10th Army):
Judging by the fact that a few days before the start of the war, the district headquarters began to organize a command post, the commander of the ZapOVO troops was oriented on the timing of a possible start of the war. However, for some reason he did not require any action from us.
Under these conditions, we independently managed to prepare only two field command posts (in the forest, and 18 km west of Bialystok, between the stations of Zhednya and Valily), and also transferred the headquarters of the rifle corps: 1st — to Viziu, 5th — to Zambrov.
Up to 70 battalions and divisions with a total number of 40 thousand people were on defensive work at the state border and in the army strip. Scattered along the 150-km front and to great depths, poorly or completely unarmed, they could not represent a real force for the defense of the state border. On the contrary, the personnel of the construction, combat engineer and rifle battalions, at the first attacks of enemy aircraft, without weapons and artillery support, began to retreat east, creating panic in the rear. And what other reaction could there be, for example, among the personnel of the 25th and 31st tank divisions of the 13th mechanized corps, which had several training tanks by the beginning of the war, up to 7 thousand people in each, completely unarmed. This should be clear to everyone.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Snoop

I did not understand the author of the article. In paragraph 2 of myths, he writes: "2. The incompleteness of the rearmament and combat deployment of the Red Army." And he himself writes that parts of the Red Army are scattered in winter apartments. So this is the incompleteness of combat deployment.

Oh-ho-ho ... I’ll tell you more - the incompleteness was even with the placement of units and divisions in those same “winter apartments”. The same tank division, stationed in the Brest Fortress, was envied by the rest of the mechanized corps with black envy - for they were shoved into peasant yards, stables, and even prisons and synagogues. The apotheosis was one of the mechanized corps, which was almost based in various houses and outbuildings within a radius of 50 km from the headquarters. Moreover, the command staff was in the same position - even the commanders of the level of the block with families were forced to huddle in the private sector in the corners.
The scans of reports on the combat readiness of the mechanized corps of the spring of 1941 contain complaints even to Fedorenko himself that it has been impossible to knock out a boiler for the kitchen from the rear of the district for half a year - and there is no way to organize centralized hot meals for the soldiers. Or the fact that the divisions have nowhere to shoot and drive tanks - for the local authorities have not coordinated the allocation of land for new landfills for a year now, and you cannot work on old ones - they are not designed for 76-mm guns and new tanks.

[yehat]

why do people (the author of the article) so easily break into demagogy?

carefully trained in the pre-war period and well-motivated personnel of the Red Army

no! cropped parts that quickly grew 3 times in number simply cannot be carefully trained. And if you go deeper, thoroughness was not even in the skeleton. For example, in the elite air defense regiment of Leningrad (I don’t remember which IAP - they were on electric power) there were only 3 (3, Karl !!!) pilots who could well pilot the long-used I-16. What to say about the latest fighters, which stupidly did not have time to master before the war? And so throughout the army! Of course, there were aces and there were not a few of them, but it is not necessary to say that their influence decided. Moreover, the problems in the command chain and headquarters were much greater.

It is striking that with the capture of artillery batteries, etc., only a few are surrendered. Some Russians fight until they are killed, others flee, throw off uniform uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants.

And now for the facts - in the first days of the war, only one (one, Karl !!!) division actually used artillery in significant volumes. What is the use if artillery personnel fights off with small arms and the guns are silent?
The overwhelming number of guns was lost before they even opened fire or immediately afterwards.

I do not want to clarify further. just less hysteria. History requires objectivity, not emotion.

[BAI]

Well, not a division - a brigade.

The first artillery anti-tank brigade of the RGK, which was formed as part of the 1th army of the Kiev military district in Lutsk. The commander is K.S. Moskalenko, recalled: “The enemy tank destroyer brigade was the only one in the Red Army, had the best 5 mm guns and 76 mm anti-aircraft guns in use at that time, which were used both to destroy air targets and to shoot at ground-based armored targets” [85].

Maybe because she was successful because she could cover herself from air attacks, not hoping for aviation?
And then - the team - the first. And if they had time to form and train the second, third, etc.?
By the way, this brigade spent the entire summer of 41 years in repelling enemy tank attacks and never retreated without an order.

[yehat]

We are talking about fire from closed positions.
The brigade, for all its steepness, could not significantly influence, because the very nature of the battle is close and any major tension of the battles will simply deplete the brigade.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: yehat

And if you go deeper, thoroughness was not even in the skeleton. For example, in the elite air defense regiment of Leningrad (I don’t remember which IAP - they were on electric power) there were only 3 (3, Karl !!!) pilots who could well pilot the long-used I-16.

Duc ... and what else to expect? At a meeting of the senior management of the Red Army December 23-31, 1940 com. LVO Air Force Novikov complained of a regular lack of gasoline and a completely insufficient number of training vehicles - it was impossible to introduce newcomers and maintain the pilots' class.

In order to accelerate the training of flight personnel, it is necessary to stop interruptions in the supply of gasoline. As a rule, every year, comrade People’s Commissar, at the very height of flights in the summer, starting from the month of July, and sometimes from the month of June, the supply of gas stops, parts switch to hungry rations, making flights to the better months because of this for flights (June, July, August). This situation is further intolerable. You won’t learn to fly without gas. The normal supply of gasoline begins again from the month of October, when, in fact, flights according to weather conditions are already beginning to collapse, and airfields are getting wet. To create a powerful Air Fleet, capable of performing combat missions in difficult conditions, interruptions in gasoline must be stopped.
(...)
Having a large number of young flight personnel (in the district of only 823 people), it is imperative to have a larger number of training machines. We now have such a situation that there are 4 pilots per UTI-35 aircraft. UTI-4 flies only 45 minutes, after which recharging is required. Thus, at maximum voltage during the day on this plane, you can bring out or check the training no more than 10 people. So, the remaining 25 people are waiting for the next day, the next turn.

[BUSEYN]

Well said. Separate parts ... And millions of prisoners in the first months. 70% of tanks are lost due to improper operation. The mechanics have 3-4 hours. They saved fuel, and most importantly, motor resources (100 hours at the T-34). Such an article could be written in the 80s. Now it’s somehow stupid.

[yehat]

that's not all - there were a third of mechanics, even by the standards of a truncated staff.
too swung at the number, did not have time to provide staff.
tanks simply had to be approximately half combat-ready.

[antivirus]

Of the units, it is reported that in some areas the enemy tank crews leave their vehicles, but in most cases they lock themselves in tanks and prefer to burn themselves together with vehicles
antivirus 2 Today, 08:54
TA war ... it will seem to grandchildren that it was as long as for us
as "the time of Ochakov and the conquest of Crimea"
May 9, 82 g after the relay, in honor of Victory Day, at Victory Square (where the start and finish) go to school.
To meet me, not an old man, in a nice linen suit, 3 rows of planks, gray-haired, with a black and gray-haired mustache: "Stalin had Georgians' favorites, they were sent to tank troops, so many were burned out"
not verbatim. You always do not remember and understand the main thing in life. Why did he speak with a stranger? Did the veteran himself see this and could not remain silent?
I remembered now - a photo with tumbled out of the hatch, charred

[Lexus]

That generation was exactly made of STEEL. And the Leader of the Country of Soviets corresponded to them. Thanks to the WINNING PEOPLE for sacrificing themselves and giving us life, a bow and a bright memory!

[Brutan]

As Bradley told his soldiers: your task is not to die heroically in the battle for the motherland, but to do so - so that those sons of bitches die for the motherland.
And despite all the heroism, due to objective and subjective factors, most of the pre-war Red Army died or was captured.
Of course with big losses for the Germans

[lwimu1976]

Quote: BAI

This is all in Simonov's "Living and the Dead" described.

So Rokossovsky (Soldier's duty!) Or Simonov? ("With one gun ...")

[LeonidL]

The most honest and best of what was written about the first months of the war is General Petrov’s most honest memoirs, “The Past With Us,” there is an interesting collection, “The Bitter Summer of 1941,” and there are my articles.

[andrew42]

Why is it determined then? Rokossovsky - Strategist. Simonov is a war singer, political instructor of "mass influence". His business is "burn verb." We confuse warm and soft again.

[Suhow]

YES, PEOPLE were at that time, the WEAPONS are not us .... here we have what we have ..... No, unfortunately, who would we go for and partners "try to make sure that they don’t appear. I apologize for not quite a humane comparison, but at this time we need the Russian Hitler, which nevertheless united Germany and Austria.

[LeonidL]

The article is in principle true, but ... about the readiness and availability of armored vehicles. It was almost impossible to strike back. The tanks of the BT series were discontinued in the 40th year and, alas, the production of spare parts was discontinued. Read the memoirs of tankers who climbed the repair funds collecting from several one combat-ready tank. So it was on the entire front line from Karelia to Odessa. It’s ridiculous to talk about the combat value of the six-ton ​​Vickers T-26. The fault of the Western Front command is that, despite the whole picture provided by intelligence, the deployment was not carried out according to the plan for covering the border. But even this is not so important - ZAPOVO artillery was in camps at training camps separate from formations and from ammunition depots. The same is anti-aircraft. It is not necessary to discount the factor that, having jumped from the post of divisional commander to the post of comfront, the commanders of the main districts did not have the proper training. By the way, Stalin deleted from the verdict Pavlov, Klimovsky and others words about treason. Alas, all three confrontations were not very well prepared. And also about the "preemptive strike". Zhukov absolutely honestly wrote that he and Tymoshenko’s proposal aroused anger in Stalin - he promised to tear his head off. The same is the "plan" of Vasilevsky and Meretskov’s attempt. the fact is that Stalin, not being at least until the 43rd year a real military commander and commander, was an excellent military-political leader. His role in the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact has not yet been correctly evaluated, as has the brilliant political maneuver with the pact itself. Stalin, the only one possessed complete and accurate information of all intelligence agencies of the USSR, including foreign agents in the United States and Britain. Information came from what is called from the tables of Western leaders. By June 22nd 1941, the military-economic potential of Hitler's United Europe was many times greater than the potential of the USSR available at that moment. Stalin understood this perfectly and did everything possible and impossible to create a coalition against Germany. Moreover, primarily with the participation of the world factory - the United States. The US leadership, led by Roosevelt, made a decision under pressure from isolationists in Congress and the Senate - to help the USSR only in the event of an unprovoked attack on the USSR by Germany and not to help in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany. But from the east, Japan was ready to seize the USSR in the victorious march of the Wehrmacht, and Turkey had already set its sights on the South Caucasus ... that is, Stalin acted extremely wisely, giving Hitler the opportunity to attack and clinging bloodyly, tied up with all the wedges. Well, then it went as it went, just like in Poland, France, Greece and so on. What to argue, in 1941 the Wehrmacht and its general staff were a cut above prepared, fired, equipped, armed than the Red Army. 1941 is a bitter year. Until 1943, Stalin and his generals learned to fight. Stalin, like Lenin in the Civil, sent to the front his thin-necked and thick-necked vodka polynazirateli, but alas, it did not help much. Particularly failed Mehlis in the Crimea, Kaganovich in the Caucasus, Kulik, Voroshilov, Budyonny ... Beria showed himself a little better. Since 1943, Stalin not only transferred purely military command to military professionals, but he himself understood his true appointment as the military-political leader of the country.

[Cynic]

Beautifully written and most importantly, found the Main Error and the Wrong!
Characteristic of recent materials, earlier such materials were more straightforward, now, given the sobering up of the successes of democracy in the Russian Federation, they have become more sophisticatedly inflective: Everything was for ..., hmm, good, but the Wehrmacht and its OKW were O_GO_GO, and with us, at the very top, it’s far NOT O_GO_GO, in general, it’s sour ...
Wrote at best ignoramus, at worst ...

[Oleg 53]

It is difficult to agree with the author, betrayal and criminal negligence among the top leadership of the RKK would have otherwise fulfilled the order to be put on combat alert ... the complete loss of command of the troops by General Pavlov could not be called betrayal. The fact that among the generals there were followers of Tukhachevsky who wanted to carry out a coup with the help of the Germans is obvious. Like the fact that millions of soldiers and officers fought to the last drop of blood ... had no combat experience, yes, there were mediocre and dumbasses in command, yes ... the fact that an offensive can always create a partial advantage on the tip of the strike and break through the defense too Yes. But where were our generals before, maybe someone forgot a couple of old films of the war with a direct speech of historical figures in particular, Zhukov told Pavlov, but I defeated you in maneuvers just like you lost an army ... and many say that Pavlov was not an amateur. But Tymoshenko is also not to blame ... it will be a long time before we put all the points. But there is a fact of the heroism of a soldier, the unpreparedness and betrayal of generals and marshals. And Stalin may have unnecessarily trusted his marshals, but he, too, could not pull this strap alone. He, as the leader of the country, did everything possible to delay the start of the war, rearm the army and navy, are ready to evacuate factories, building new ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

So the Poles, Finns, Romanians and Chinese, and so they all gave up what they wanted.

Seriously? The Finns, in fact, in negotiations with Deninkin asked Karelia and the Kola Peninsula. And the second Soviet-Finnish war was fought just for Karelia, which the Finns did not get.
About native Polish cities I will not even remind Kiev and Smolensk.

Quote: Gopnik

Well, if you have to keep 500 thousand with normal tanks and planes, God be with them, why didn’t it turn out to create a normal army 10 times larger, and why did the Germans with 100 thousand and plywood tanks work?

Because the German 100 army was originally created as an army of officers and non-commissioners to deploy the future Wehrmacht. As a result, by 000 the Germans had a personnel corps and reserve - only privates were lacking. In the presence of competent non-commissioned companies in sufficient numbers, the problem of ordinary soldiers was solved in a year.
For the Red Army, this was impossible - we needed a classic army, with real privates, and not disguised as non-commissioned ones. And with such an army, problems begin even with the deployment of classic triplets. And not only here - the French also stepped on this rake.

Quote: Gopnik

And why the tsar could contain a personnel army of 1,5 million, and the Bolsheviks 10 years after and 500 thousand. really can not?

Read "Simonov NS The military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: the pace of economic growth, structure, organization of production and management." - What were the capabilities of the military-industrial complex of the USSR at the end of the 20s.

[Gopnik]

Quote: Alexey RA

And the second Soviet-Finnish war was fought just for Karelia, which the Finns did not get.

The Finns wanted what they got in 1920. But in the “second war” the regular Finnish army did not participate (with the exception of military specialist officers), and the state of war was not declared, so Finland would hardly have received anything if it had not participated in the war. In fact, this is a "kulak rebellion", among them, but with a national coloring.

Quote: Alexey RA

Because the German 100 army was originally created as an army of officers and non-commissioners to deploy the future Wehrmacht. As a result, by 000 the Germans had a personnel corps and reserve - only privates were lacking. In the presence of competent non-commissioned companies in sufficient numbers, the problem of ordinary soldiers was solved in a year.

Fine. What prevented the USSR from doing the same - 100 thousand. for deployment, plus 400 thousand. "classic army"? In general, some kind of nonsense, the Germans from 100 thousand. on cardboard tanks were able to deploy a combat-ready "best in the world" army of 7 million, and the USSR of 500 thousand. I couldn’t make an effective army of 5 million on real tanks. And this ridiculous fact comes up with some ridiculous excuses - something always interferes with a bad dancer.

Quote: Alexey RA

Read "Simonov NS The military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: the pace of economic growth, structure, organization of production and management." - What were the capabilities of the military-industrial complex of the USSR at the end of the 20s.

And what will I see there? That the military-industrial complex of the USSR was weaker than the military-industrial complex of Russia and the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich? Those. we all lied that before the war, the Soviet economy is the second in the world?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gopnik

The Finns wanted what they got in 1920. But in the “second war” the regular Finnish army did not participate (with the exception of military specialist officers), and the state of war was not declared, so Finland would hardly have received anything if it had not participated in the war. In fact, this is a "kulak rebellion", among them, but with a national coloring.

So in the Texas war with Mexico, the US regular army did not participate. And Texas has become an American state.
If we take the times closer, we can recall the Silesian uprisings, according to the results of which Germany lost 18% of the national coal production and 70% of zinc - the land went to the Poles.

Quote: Gopnik

Fine. What prevented the USSR from doing the same - 100 thousand. for deployment, plus 400 thousand. "classic army"?

No money left. Either 100 commanders and sergeants, or 000 of the classical army. Therefore, they experimented with cheap territorial connections and a three-treaded system until the end of the 500s. What are the territories well showed Khalkhin-Gol, namely - 000 SD, freshly reformed (June 30) from terrdivizii:

The division showed low combat readiness. So, on the night of July 11-12, 1939, two battalions of the 603rd Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division twice left without any orders. There were attempts to treacherously shoot the composition of the composition. On July 12, 1939, by order of Commander G.K. Zhukov, all commanders of regiments, battalions, companies, and even platoons of 82 rifle divisions, recently called up from the reserve, were transferred respectively to deputy posts. At the head of units and subunits were placed commanders from the 36 motorized rifle division that had shown themselves to be excellent. Only by decisive measures were the command, the political department, the prosecutor’s office and the tribunal brought about in part.

Quote: Gopnik

And what will I see there? That the military-industrial complex of the USSR was weaker than the military-industrial complex of Russia and the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich?

That the USSR military-industrial complex was virtually absent at the end of the 20s - factories whose machinery were not updated from pre-revolutionary times survived as best they could.

Quote: Gopnik

Those. we all lied that before the war, the Soviet economy is the second in the world?

Do you believe propaganda? Or that statistics on gross indicators reflect the true economic power of the country?

[Gopnik]

Quote: Alexey RA

No money left. Either 100 commanders and sergeants, or 000 of the classical army.

So why not 100 commanders and 000 privates to them ??

Quote: Alexey RA

That the USSR military-industrial complex was virtually absent at the end of the 20s - factories whose machinery were not updated from pre-revolutionary times survived as best they could.

Since pre-revolutionary times, in relation to the end of the 20s, it’s actually 10 or a little more than years.

Quote: Alexey RA

Do you believe propaganda? Or that statistics on gross indicators reflect the true economic power of the country?

Well, in general, it’s clear now. Unlucky people came half-educated (at best), read idiotic books, they all turned them around, they didn’t manage to create anything, the country is in the ass in all respects and no one is, it’s not to blame, it’s like, it’s broken in a locked room, the second is lost. " I guessed something like that.

[hohol95]

So why not 100 commanders and 000 privates to them ??

For a country such as the USSR in the late 20s and early 30s, would this number of troops be enough?

[Gopnik]

well, in fact, there were so many Red Army

[hohol95]

Watching what years to take!
By the fall of 1920 - 5 500 000 people.
By January 1925 - 562 people.
As of January 1, 1937 - 1 people ..
On February 21 1939 of the year - 1 910 477 people.
At 20 September 1939 of the year - 5 289 400 people.

[hohol95]

Peace time, in brackets - military.
1936:
Territorial SD: from 1862 to 2853 (13000).
Some statistics on the location of the garrisons of regiments of territorial divisions.
29 sd - Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Dorogobush.
64 sd Smolensk, Roslavl, Orsha
48 sd –Rzhev, Kalinin, Vyshny Volochek
33 sd Mogilev –Bykhov-Chausy
81 sd — all in Kolodishchi, near Minsk (rare exception)
7 CD –Nezhin, Chernihiv, Romny, Konotop
14 sd Vladimir-Shuya-Murom
18 sd –Yaroslavl-Rybinsk-Rostov
19 SD was located, often on a battalion basis - Voronezh, Valuyki, Gryaz, Buturlinovka, Bobrov, Novokhopersk, Ostrogozhsk, Alekseevka
82 sd Perm-Kungur –Sverdlovsk
85 sd Chelyabinsk-Zlatoust - Miass-Troitsk-Kurgan
31 sd Astrakhan-Stalingrad, between its garrisons was
53 CD Red Kut, Enegels, Pugachev
22 sd Stavropol-Novorossiysk
10cd Armavir-Maykop-Tikhoretsk
2nd Georgian –Telavi-Tbilissi-Gori

Where does coherence come from with such arrangements of parts.

In view of economy, such divisions were dispersed by garrisons over a long distance — along regiments (sometimes even battalions) —to “be closer to the enlisted personnel” (otherwise the conscripts called up for a month would spend a huge percentage of their “gathering time” on getting to the unit ) Therefore, it was difficult to even assemble a regiment, and especially a division, during the period of short-term training.
Those. everything rested in the majority only in solo training and, to the maximum, the cobbling together of small units (platoons, calculations of guns.rot, batteries).
Given the level of education, it is possible to imagine the level of training of these reserve personnel.
Since the territory of the SD constituted the majority of the infantry, one can imagine the level of personnel of the red infantry - where 2/3 of the commanders were engaged in primary training year after year, and rarely participated in the exercises. Given the fact that at the end of the 20s the paints themselves had to be pulled over the ears in different schools and courses, this is the level of team personnel, their tactical, combined arms and technical level, especially in the SD, you can imagine.
But many TerrSDs were supposed, in 1937, to give 2 regular divisions. Those. for example, with 1800 people m \ in (that is, the commanders are only involved in the initial training and putting together of small units that are rarely involved in exercises) to become two divisions in the then states, approximately 27 people.
The level of “what a herd it was” can be imagined.
But!
It was believed that against the bulk of the opponents (Poland, Romania, Japan - the main "suppliers" of infantry divisions to that front line) and so it goes.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexey RA

The Finns, in fact, in negotiations with Deninkin asked Karelia and the Kola Peninsula.

Wrong - they were negotiating with Yudenich.

[Tula gingerbread]

Quote: x917nt

The difference (and huge!) Was for the USSR. If you lived in the USSR in the 20-30s and 40s, would you try to declare that the country continues the policy of tsarist Russia ...)

The point is not what to say, but what to do. And in fact the USSR continued in some aspects the polikyu RI.
Here are some examples that may convince you.
The return of the Baltic states, the annexation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, forcing Finland to lease bases in the Baltic Sea.
Sever- movement there began even with the Republic of Ingushetia - the railway, the port of Nikolaev on Murman.
And the continuation of the USSR - the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Naval Base in Murmansk, the Northern Fleet, which had direct access to the Atlantic, and this affected the interests of England.
Strengthening the position of the USSR in Central Asia, which England considered its patrimony.
And finally, the Far East is the Asia-Pacific region. The construction of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, etc.
Even as they continued. Only of course no one spoke.

[arsen69]

Yes, in general, everything is true. As you know, the USSR was subjected to aggression by the combined army of Europe, and not just the German army, which was behind all the economic and industrial power of the continent. It is enough to know how many non-German units were in the Wehrmacht and the production technology of whose countries, besides Germany, was in service with it. Therefore, the blow was very strong.
Another important point. Nazi Germany was no less ideological than the Soviet Union, and perhaps even more. Therefore, the idea of ​​racial superiority, the thesis that the Germans are a nation of gentlemen, left its mark on many aspects, including the provision of information about their own losses. According to this approach — the “supermen” cannot die in batches — the data on the Wehrmacht’s losses during the war were systematically downplayed, or even kept secret. So the German historians had great difficulty finding out their true scale, and this fully happened relatively recently, already in the 2000s. So, although the losses of the Red Army in the initial period of the war were higher, but the losses of the Germans were also colossal. What is even worth the assault on Sevastopol, where Hitler’s maniacal desire to take this city at all costs has destroyed, without exaggeration, the color of the German army, its most combat-ready units (many German generals blamed Hitler for this and considered it an unforgivable mistake). The same can be said about the siege of Leningrad, it is enough to know how many German military cemeteries are located near St. Petersburg and in the Leningrad region, and how many Fritz found their graves there, these are monstrous figures.
All these facts, the awareness of which is coming to many only now, allow us to get rid of the liberal-perestroika mythology about the Great Patriotic War, which they tried to regale us for quite a long time, and once again experience reverence for the feat that our ancestors who defended the country in the most terrible conflict human history.

[Gopnik]

Alexey RA,

Quote: Alexey RA

We do not have normal KMB. No. And we do not have a 1970 model SA, in which the sergeant corps is at the very least, but was, and knew something.
We have the Red Army-40, in which a draftee with 3 classes falls into the hands of a sergeant (who has fifty or even a hundred draftees), who teaches something that he himself often doesn’t know ("he called out individual details incorrectly, gave fuzzy formulations, incorrectly explained the design of the knurled springs ").
Oh yes, the training class, training ground, manuals, manuals and visual layouts are partially or completely absent - they are promised by the end of 1941. Because industry cannot keep up with the army in all respects and drives the shaft only in military equipment and weapons.

So where does the notorious 3 classes of education then, since it is not in them? Learning to handle weapons is possible without education at all, it is precisely in order and discipline. If you are taught to clean a weapon and make sure that it is cleaned - it will be clean. And if the commanders do not care, then you do not care.
And the fact that the Red Army did not have normal commanders, unlike the Wehrmacht, is another matter and another question.

[lwimu1976]

Quote: Huumi

I'm not interested in the order of the Wehrmacht, he fought not on his land, on ours ...

And our wars had to oppose the executors of these orders by spilling their blood!

[dekapolsev]

The fact that “there was no betrayal of the generals” sounded unconvincing. It seems that it did happen: the generals drove the army into a cauldron, and already there "the soldiers fought bravely surrounded" - as the author writes. An indirect confirmation of the “presence of traitor generals” (and the fact that not everyone was identified and shot along with Tukhachevsky and Pavlov) is the behavior of the great marshals after the death of Stalin: Zhukov arrested Beria (creator of the Soviet nuclear project and Stalin's successor), Konev sentenced him for execution (for espionage in favor of England), Moskalenko and Batitsky were shot - all this in order to bring to power the former commissar of the First Ukrainian Front - Mr. Khrushchev. (by the way, I think - they are Vatutin too). Given the consequences of Khrushchev’s rule, all this is very similar to surrendering the country.

[Alexander Greene]

What is the most important thing in the initial period of World War II? The German troops in the initial period of the war did not fulfill the main strategic task. According to Barbaross's plan, the Red Army was to be defeated in a short time in border battles by three shock army groups. And this could happen if all parts of the Red Army were concentrated in the border area. But that did not happen. The army survived and reached Berlin !.

[Old warrior]

So much effort and sacrifice ... and after only 50 years, the complete collapse of the country, which they then defended. Shame and Shame on us all.