How the Wehrmacht avoided the Caucasian "cauldron"
General situation
The troops of the South-Western and Stalingrad fronts, having carried out a classic encirclement operation, threw the enemy 150 – 250 kilometers and reached the line of New Kalitva - Millerovo - Morozovsk - Tormosin - Kotelnikovsky. In the defense of the enemy, gaps of tens of kilometers were formed. The strategic situation has changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army.
The German High Command strained forces to stop the advance of the Russian troops and stabilize the front. However, the reserves were not at hand, they were burned in the bloody battle of Stalingrad. It took time to replace the dead German, Romanian, Italian divisions. At a meeting at the rate of the Wehrmacht 1 February 1943, Hitler admitted: “The possibility of ending the war in the East through an offensive no longer exists. This we must clearly imagine. Such a statement was surprising for Hitler and his entourage, a glimpse of the true situation on the Russian front. The war finally passed into a protracted stage, the brilliant victories of the Wehrmacht 1941-1942. They were not allowed to crush the Red Army and bring the Soviet Union out of the war. And for a protracted war, a war of attrition, Germany was not ready. But as a whole, the war in the East in Berlin was not yet considered lost, and they hoped soon to turn the tide in their favor. In Germany, the total mobilization of human and material resources began again.
The Soviet army of the 1943 model of the year was in many respects different from the Red Army of the 1941 year. The army has changed qualitatively and transformed outwardly. The Germans were brutal "teachers." The fighters and commanders regained confidence in their forces. The generals acquired a unique experience and now they could resist the Wehrmacht’s first-class combat vehicle. The Red Army studied in a real war, brutal and bloody, and at a great price acquiring the skills of the future best army in the world.
Soviet troops received a new Combat Charter of the infantry, corresponding to modern methods of warfare. New principles of organization and tactical use of artillery, armored forces and aviation. With the abolition of the institute of military commissars in the Red Army, complete unity of command was established. Shoulder straps were introduced, the Russian imperial spirit was returning to the army.
Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “In those days, looking back at the year and a half of the military year passed by the country and leading battles deep within our native land, we firmly believed that the main difficulties were over. The victory at Stalingrad, the clear goal, the ever-increasing power of the rear — all this inspired and called forward to the final victory. ”
In 1942, there was a revival in the Red Army tank and mechanized buildings. According to the staff specified in July, the tank corps consisted of three tank and one motorized rifle brigades, a reconnaissance and motorcycle battalion, a guards mortar division, numbering 7800 people, 168 tanks, 56 guns (including 12 anti-tank and 20 anti-aircraft guns), 44 mortars, 8 rocket launchers, 871 cars. At the same time, a unified staff of tank brigades was approved. The mechanized corps, which appeared in September, were supposed to have three mechanized brigades and one tank brigade, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a division of guards mortars, an armored car and repair battalions, auxiliary units - 15 people, 018 - 175 tanks, 224 guns , 108 mortars, 148 vehicles. Heavy tank breakthrough regiments were created almost simultaneously. The regiment consisted of four companies, five KB or Churchill tanks in each, and a technical support company - 1693 people and 214 combat vehicles. Also in 21, the experience of creating the first tank armies of mixed composition belongs. They, along with two tank corps, included separate tank brigades, cavalry and rifle divisions.
By January 1943, there were 24 tank and 8 mechanized corps in the Red Army. Of these, the operating troops were 19 (14 tank and 5 mechanized), and all - in the south, as part of the South-Western, Southern and Don fronts. According to the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 325 of 16 of October 1942, they should be used in the offensive in the direction of the main attack of the front after the main defensive zone was overcome by combined-arms units as a success echelon of the enemy’s main grouping and defeat by joint actions with the aviation and ground forces of the front ". In defense, tank units do not receive independent sections, but are used for counterstrikes. The main task of the corps is not fighting with enemy tanks, artillery must fight them, but the destruction of its infantry. Along the way, as an educational program for his generals, Stalin explained that it was necessary to use tanks on tank-accessible terrain, that before using them, thorough reconnaissance should be carried out and frontal tank attacks should not be practiced, that all branches of the military should interact with each other, and even the fact that the trucks are not fighting vehicles, but a vehicle, because the motorized infantry to the attack must go on foot. Tank commanders are required to maximize the use of tactics such as stealth, surprise, maneuver, maximum speed, intense fire of all kinds. weapons.
Unfortunately, the tank units were often used by the command to break through the enemy’s defenses, and not to develop the first success, which led to inexpediently high losses during the fighting to break through the enemy defenses, and there were not enough forces to develop the success.
It is worth noting that the staff of the German tank division provided for the presence in the ranks of about 17 thousands of soldiers and officers, 200 tanks and self-propelled units, 222 guns (including 101 anti-tank and 63 anti-aircraft) and 54 mortar, 2147 cars. Thus, the tank division of the Wehrmacht in combat capabilities surpassed the Soviet tank corps and was approximately equal to the mechanized. As part of the German motorized division, which had 14 thousand people, 129 guns and 108 mortars, in the spring of 1942, a tank battalion appeared - 60 tanks.
Finally, the crisis of the country's transition to a war footing and a large-scale, unprecedented stories evacuation. The front received arms, equipment, ammunition, foodstuffs and equipment without fail and in ever-increasing numbers. The enterprises evacuated to the east of the country turned into full power. Entered into service and began to produce products large enterprises built in the east of the country. The Soviet system demonstrated a higher efficiency in the organization of military production than the German one.
At the ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council, JV Stalin noted: “We were not faced with such tasks as evacuating enterprises to the east and transferring industry to weapons production. The Soviet state now has a harmonious and rapidly growing military economy. Therefore, all the efforts of the people could be focused on increasing production and further improving weapons, especially tanks, aircraft, guns, self-propelled artillery. In this we have achieved great success. "
Aerial view from the aircraft U-2 to the Volga bank in Stalingrad after the end of the fighting
Plans of the Soviet Bet
The Supreme Headquarters paid the main attention to the development of success on the southern wing - Donbass and Rostov directions. The southwestern front was to advance to the Seversky Donets and deliver a deep blow through Gorlovka to Mariupol, with access to the Sea of Azov. The Voronezh Front, with the assistance of the Bryansk and South-Western Fronts, was given the task of defeating the main forces of Army Group “B” and liberating Kharkov. The southern front was tasked with strikes at Rostov and Tikhoretskaya to reach the rear of the German Army Group A located in the Caucasus and intercept the most likely ways of its retreat through the Don to the Donbass.
At the same time, measures were envisaged to prevent the German troops from withdrawing from the North Caucasus to the Taman Peninsula with the subsequent transfer to the Crimea. This was supposed to prevent the Black Sea group of troops of the Transcaucasian Front with a blow to Krasnodar, Tikhoretskaya, to join the troops of the Stalingrad Front. The northern group of troops was supposed to tie up the enemy with battles, not allowing them to withdraw from the conceived "boiler".
As a result, it was not possible to surround the enemy in the Caucasus. The Germans hastily withdrew troops from the Caucasus, which they could not win, after the Stalingrad catastrophe, they could get into a huge "cauldron." The troops of the Transcaucasian Front, pursuing the enemy, liberated Mozdok, Cool, Mineralnye Vody, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Armavir during January 1943. The troops of the Southern Front forced the Manych Canal and January 22 liberated Salsk. A link was established between the Transcaucasian and Southern fronts in this area.
German strategy
The German command was determined to resolutely restore the operational and strategic position on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. The decision on this issue was set out in operational order No. 2 from December 28 1942 of the year. It stated that conditions should be created for the liberation of the 6 Army and to avoid "new boilers that may arise as a result of the withdrawal of Allied forces, the formation of front projections defended by their own weak parts, or the enemy’s creation in certain sectors of great superiority." It was also planned to inflict a number of blows in order to "snatch the initiative from the Russians in some areas by maneuverable actions." Considering the threat of Soviet troops leaving the rear of Army Group A, it was decided to consistently withdraw their troops from the south-eastern part of the North Caucasus. Army Group Don was ordered to restrain the advance of the Russians east of Rostov.
In the same order, the troops were instructed to immediately “prepare a large bridgehead near Rostov”, to create a new solid front of defense at the line of the New Kalitva-Armavir-Maykop-Novorossiysk with the intention of retaining the Donbass and a significant part of the North Caucasus. After that, it was supposed to unite the forces of the Don and A armies under the general command of Field Marshal Manstein. As Manstein himself noted: “The German army in this campaign could no longer count on winning victory. Due to the mistakes made in the 1942 summer-fall campaign of the year, it could only be about “coping with defeat,” as Schlieffen once put it.
An attempt to create a Caucasian "cauldron"
The overall plan of the operation, conceived by the Soviet Stavka, was to surround, dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group “A” under the command of General Ewald von Kleist with coordinated attacks by the troops of the Stalingrad and Transcaucasian fronts from the north-east, south and south-west. German troops from the North Caucasus.
The Stalingrad front under the command of Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko was supposed to deliver the main attack by the armies of the right wing — the 5 shock and 2 guards — along the lower Don in the general direction of Rostov and cut off the withdrawal path for Army Group “A” units. on North. The left wing troops - the 51 and 28 armies - were to advance through Salsk on Tikhoretskaya, to meet the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, to join them in destroying and destroying the enemy grouping between the Kuban and the Manych rivers. The offensive was supported by Major General T. Khryukin's 8 Air Force.
The Transcaucasian Front, under the command of Army General IV Tyulenev, deployed in the 1000-kilometer strip, was to concentrate efforts on its left wing. The main forces of the Black Sea Group, Lieutenant General I. Ye. Petrov, were given the task of breaking through the enemy defenses and developing an offensive on Krasnodar and Tikhoretskaya. The Soviet troops (47, 56, and 18 armies) were opposed by 12 divisions that were part of General Richard von Ruoff’s 17 Army (including 5 Romanian and one Slovaks division). On the right wing of the front, in the areas of Mozdok and Nalchik, was the Northern Group of Forces, Colonel-General I. I. Maslennikov (44, 58, 9, 37, 4, 5 Guards Cavalry shell). The troops of the Northern Group were given the task of preventing the enemy from withdrawing, pressing his main forces against the Main Caucasian Range and crushing them. The 1-I tank army of the cavalry general von Mackensen acted as a part of six divisions against the Northern group (3-I and 13-I tank, 50-I, 111-I, 370-I infantry, 2-I Romanian mountain infantry). In the Kalmyk steppes was located the German barrier - the battle group of Colonel von Jungshults (cavalry regiment). On the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasian Ridge in the band of more than 400 kilometers, the 46 Army, under the command of Lieutenant General K. N. Leselidze, led local battles with three divisions of the 49 Mountain Corps of General Rudolph Conrad.
The Black Sea Fleet, assisting the group of troops of Petrov, was to part of the forces to deploy active operations on enemy communications, as well as to prepare the landing of troops to the rear of the enemy. The actions of the ground forces of the Transcaucasian Front were provided by the 4 and 5 air armies, commanded by generals NF Naumenko and S. K. Goryunov. By the beginning of the offensive, the army was reinforced by nine air regiments, which were armed with about 200 aircraft. The general leadership of the Air Force of the front was carried out by Major General K. A. Vershinin.
Thus, around 686 thousand people were to take part in the operation, with 6 thousand guns and mortars, 545 tanks and 600 combat aircraft. In addition, 289 Black Sea aircraft can be added to them. fleet and bombers of the 50th long-range air division.
The main problem of the Soviet troops was supply. Thus, the supply bases of the Stalingrad Front were located in 300 – 350 kilometers from the troops. It was impossible to bring them up, as they had not yet completed the destruction of the Paulus group in the Stalingrad area. The enemy occupied the most important communications hub in the region. Soviet troops were in dire need of ammunition and fuel. Similar problems experienced and the Transcaucasian Front. It was necessary in a short time in difficult terrain and poorly developed communications to carry out a complex regrouping of troops, to significantly strengthen the Black Sea group with heavy weapons. For a long time, the Caspian communications remained almost the only ways to bring troops and material resources from the eastern and central regions of the country to the Caucasus. The extension of routes and the need for transshipment of goods from rail to water and back significantly increased the delivery time. For example, transport coming from the Urals could move to the destination of the month 3. Already in the Caucasus, mountainous terrain and an underdeveloped road network made it difficult to transfer personnel, equipment and materials directly to the front line. In some areas, the main means of supply were pack companies with a total tonnage of 4. To support the troops operating on the Novorossiysk and Tuapse directions, Black Sea Fleet ships were used.
Soviet fighters defend mountain pass in the Caucasus
Rostov operation (January 1 - February 18 of the year 1943)
By the beginning of 1943, the troops of the Stalingrad Front (from 1 in January 1943 of the South) as a result of the Kotelnikovo operation reached the line Loznoy, Priyutnoye. 1 January 1943, the Southern Front (20 divisions, 4 mechanized, 1 tank corps, 16 individual rifle and tank brigades), without a pause, launched an attack on Rostov and Tikhoretskaya.
Our troops were opposed by the Hollidt operational group and the 4 I tank army of the Don group of troops restored after the defeat at Stalingrad (with the group of armies the South from February 13). The commander of the group of armies "Don" E. Manstein on the 500 kilometers of the front had 15 German divisions. At the same time, they were of different combat capability. The 6-i and 11-i tank divisions were fully combat-worthy, the 22-division was defeated, and it was soon disbanded. The 57 th tank corps of General Kirchner, who tried to break through to Stalingrad in December, also completely exhausted his forces. Three airfield divisions of the Luftwaffe were still quite fresh and staffed, but were evaluated by experts as relatively efficient, as the first battles showed.
Romanian troops at the first onslaught evaporated from the front. As the troops of the 7 of the Romanian corps, covering the eastern flank of the army from the Volga, and the troops of the 6 of the Romanian corps, whose task was to cover the area between the 57-m tank corps and Don, were demoralized and lost their fighting efficiency. Romanian soldiers did not want to fight and surrendered in droves.
North of Millerovo, on the left flank of the Don group, where the presence of Italian troops was supposed, an 100-kilometer gap was formed. It was attempted to be closed by the operational group of General Fretter-Picaud, which was quickly formed by the command of group “B”, which consisted of two divisions - the 304 and the 3 mountain infantry. Here, the armies of the South-Western Front acted against the Germans - the 6-I army of Lieutenant General F.Kh. Kharitonov and 1-I Guards Lieutenant-General V.I. Kuznetsova.
In the large bend of the Don, at the turn of the river, Bystraya and Zimla tried to maintain their position with a total length of 200 kilometers of the operational group of General Hollidt (6-I, 11-I, 22-I tank, 336-I, 62-I, 294-I, 387- I, 306-I infantry, 7-I and 8-I airfield divisions). In the area of the German airbases Tatsinskoy and Morozovsk reflected the Soviet attacks 48-y tank corps under the command of General Otto von Knobelsdorf. From the north and east, the Hollidt group was continuously attacked by troops of the 3 th Guards, 5 th Panzer and 5 shock armies.
South of the Don, at the turn of the Kuberle River, the remnants of Hermann Goth's 4 Tank Army defended (17-I, 23-I tank, 15-th airfield, SS Viking SS). Farther south, on the Manych river line, the 5-I motorized division of Major-General Gerhard von Schwerin, redeployed from Elista, occupied a shut-off position. Goth's troops repelled the onslaught of the Soviet 16 Guards, 2 and 51 armies.
A total of seven armies of the South-Western and Southern fronts, which were to dismember and destroy the group of armies "Don", there were 720 thousand people.
Thus, Manstein was supposed to create a miracle: to continue the measures taken to save the 6 Army of Paulus and at the same time cover the rear of Army Group A and protect its communications passing through Rostov-on-Don. For Manstein as an experienced commander, it was logical that, having a many-times superior enemy in front of him, the situation could be saved only by well-coordinated maneuver, without fear of weakening secondary sectors of the front or even leaving previously occupied territories. But Hitler did not want to leave the occupied territories. Now he relied on stubborn resistance at any cost. In general, the Führer ordered - "Stand dead!" And from the reinforcements, Manstein was given only the 7-th tank division. He could only hope that the army of Paulus would hold out as much as possible in the area of Stalingrad, restricting significant Soviet forces.
A. Hitler discusses the battle plan with Field Marshal E. von Manstein. 1943
To be continued ...
- Alexander Samsonov
- 1943 year
How the army of Paulus died. Operation "Ring"
Operation "Spark". To the 75 anniversary of the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad
How to break through the blockade of Leningrad
Russians are coming!
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