The fighting of the 35 division began about 12 hours from panic in the wagon train of the 139 regiment - the regiment performed the duties of the lateral vanguard of the corps and went to Schepyatin to join the division. When the regiment approached the edge of the forest east of Shchepyatin, the convoy noticed the appearance of the Austrian cavalry and rushed north with shouts: “Cavalry!”. The regiment commander, who had just refused to believe the chief of the 7 Cavalry Division, that the enemy in large forces was moving from Belz, fell into another extreme - deployed the regiment against an imaginary enemy and launched an offensive on the edge of the forest. The enemy was not there, the regiment returned to the road and arrived safely at Shchepyatin.
35-division at that time was on a halt. The 137 Infantry Regiment near the 13 watch was between Turin and the edge of the woods. The regiment was in a clearing in 2 km of length and width: surrounded by a forest from the 3 sides, and on the fourth side of the clearing was closed by a swamp that separated the forest from Tarnoshin. Two batteries attached to the regiment, stood south of the road - along with one battalion. Rifles were made into goats, field kitchens drove up, and companies began to prepare for dinner. The soldiers reached out into the forest for brushwood - to boil tea after dinner. The regimental commander and officers gathered in the farm of Turin in anticipation of the camp kitchen. The regiment set up a camp guard: forward along the road to the outpost - a platoon from the 5 th company, and on the sides of the road into the forest (on 500 - 600 steps from the road) - patrols.
The command of the regiment did not even suspect that the regiment was actually not covered by anyone from the south - from the side of Unuv, from where the whole 8-I infantry division of the enemy came. The Russian 7 Cavalry Division, which was supposed to conduct reconnaissance to move to the south of the area where the 137 th regiment stopped, halted to Korchmin at that time - leaving no one in the direction of Unuv.
At 14 for hours 30 minutes, soldiers wandering through the woods were suddenly fired upon by an enemy advancing on a broad front from the south — and in a panic ran to their companies. Following them, enemy patrols appeared at the edge of the forest, which opened fire on the regiment's location.
When the bulwarks whistled at the peacefully preparing camp for dinner, instead of taking rifles and responding with fire to the fire, as some soldiers did, the majority of people rushed to flee. But the command staff managed to master the situation. Earlier all artillerymen came to their senses. The guns were removed from the front end - and the batteries opened a quick fire at the enemy's chains, which were going to the edge of the forest.
The artillerymen suspended the enemy and allowed the infantry commanders to organize the process of the battle. The companies got messed up, many units began to retreat - but two companies - the 2-I and 4-I - went on the offensive at the signal of their company commanders. Artillery fire and a two-mouth counterattack turned the tide: the enemy stopped and the regiment was deployed in combat order.
But the intensified enemy began to bypass the flanks of the regiment. It was necessary to bring into reserve reserve battalions - but they could not stop the coverage carried out by the forces of the whole division. Batteries that were openly standing in a clearing began to be shot from the flanks and suffer heavy losses. At the same time, the companies deployed in the meadow began to depart. I had to leave the guns, which for a long time were between the Russian and Austrian chains. The confusion increased even more when the commander of the 137 regiment was wounded in the stomach with a bullet.
10. The commander of the 137 Infantry Regiment, Colonel A. S. Pronin.
The regiment began to retreat.
The chief of the 35 Division solved the task in the spirit of a decisive offensive. He immediately ordered an offensive: the 138 th regiment was to attack from Tarnoshin to the forest west of Turin - to the right of the 137 regiment, and the 139 th infantry regiment from Shchepyatin to the forest east of Turin, to reach the enemy, bypassing the left flank of 137 th regiment.
Fortunately, the Austrian artillery entered the battle very late.
The 138 regiment went on the offensive, but the lack of orientation and swampy woodland, making it difficult to maneuver, led to the fact that the 138 th regiment did not turn around outside the flank of the 137 regiment, but directly behind it and joined its battle formation. The effect of this was small.
The guns of the 35 artillery brigade left in the clearing, meanwhile, were captured by the enemy.
The attack of the 139 regiment from the side of Shchepyatin was more successful - he pressed the opponent, but did not achieve significant results.
By 18, the enemy’s artillery opened fire.
By this time, alarming information began to come in from the eastern flank of the division — all attempts to contact the 61 Infantry Division had failed. With the onset of darkness, information was obtained that the 61 Division and the cavalry, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, had moved north.
To top it all off, and the cartridges in the division were running out.
Nachaliv-35, for a long time without hesitation, decided to retreat and withdraw his units from the threat of the environment. With the onset of darkness began to withdraw. The enemy pursued only by fire.
During the 4-hour battle, the division lost: officers - 12 killed and 24 wounded, soldiers - 251 killed, 842 wounded, 1100 people went missing (mostly captured).
On the other part of the battlefield - between Korchmin and Vasilov - the third act of the drama of the 17 corps was played out.
The 7 Cavalry Division stopped first south of Korchmin in order to cover the flank of the 35 Infantry Division from the large enemy forces that had left Belz. By 10 hours of the morning, the chief transferred his units a few kilometers to the north - to the region between Krzewice, Vasyliv and Budynin.
4 schema. Dates - a new style
But doubts overcame him: whether he acted correctly, being on the spot, while the task set by the corps commander required movement on Unuv. The enemy did not show up, and he ordered the division to stretch into a marching column on the way to Křevice - in order to go to Unuv along the rear of the 35 Infantry Division.
At this time, the enemy battery opened fire on the wagons of the 35 Division, which were moving towards Vasyl. Art fire confirmed M. S. Tyulin the correctness of the decision - to cover the rear of the case. The 7 Cavalry Division returned to Vasyl. Batteries took the position of higher. 257 on the road from Vasylov to Budynin. The 7 th Kinburn Dragoon Regiment stood behind the right flank of the batteries, and to the left of the batteries were the hussars and the Cossack regiments. In reserve, located Ulan regiment.
The enemy slowly approached from the side of Budynin - and deployed at least a regiment of infantry, supported by fire, first with one, then two batteries. The Austrian infantry offensive developed successfully - until it reached the crest in 1 km from the batteries of the 7 th cavalry division.
In the meantime, a brigade of the 61 Infantry Division began to approach Křevica. The commander of the 61 Division, Major General P. N. Simansky, without waiting for orders from above, on his own initiative, began to deploy his brigade to assist the 7 Cavalry Division. However, the 61 Division was a second-line, freshly broken arm, and the advance of units of the 243 Corps of Kholmsky developed very slowly. The chief of the 7 Cavalry Division sent several officers from his headquarters to the companies that were advancing directly next to his batteries. They found that there were no officers in these companies.
11. P. N. Simansky.
The enemy, stopped in front of the front of the cavalry, began to bypass the flanks and sweep artillery with oblique fire. The batteries ended projectiles. The guns were threatened with death, and M. S. Tyulin decided to attack in the equestrian ranks. The 92 hussar of the 3 th squadron of the 7 th Hussar Belarusian Regiment deployed in 1 km from the enemy - and at a gallop rushed forward. Despite the heavy fire of enemy infantry and heavy losses, the squadron still managed to scoop up Austrian chains, but then the hussars turned back. All 4 officer 3-th squadron, 14 riders and 79 horses died. But the attack distracted all enemy fire, allowing the shells to be brought up to the guns. If the head would use the entire horse mass of its personnel division, reasonably supported by artillery and machine gun fire, the result of a collision with enemy infantry, in which two thirds were fighters just called up from the reserve, could lead to tangible success. But even the attack of one squadron saved the batteries from destruction - the gunners were able to fire before dark.
Losses of the 7 Cavalry Division per day: 4 officer, 50 soldiers and 112 horses.
Meanwhile, the 244 th regiment of the 61 Infantry Division between the 15 and 16 hours passed Radkov. At about 15 hours he was attacked by parts of the Austrian 3 division, supported by armored vehicles. The appearance of the Austrians was unexpected - and after a short battle the regiment lost to 1000 people. Artillery moving with a regiment (24 guns of the 61 artillery brigade and 12 guns of the 17 mortar battalion), with the support of a part of the infantrymen, with their death killed the enemy. But all the artillery and machine guns of the regiment were captured by the enemy.
The parts of the 61 division were rapidly retreating.
Failure was evident, but at the cost of frustration of the brigade of the 61 Infantry Division and the relatively small loss of cavalry, the enemy rounds were stopped - threatening the corps with encirclement.
The army commander, reporting to 17 Commodore about the failure of the 25 Corps (thrown back to Krasnostava), ordered: to reach the northern flank of the 19 Corps (about 80 km of march), ensuring the northern flank of the 19 Corps from the detour, and then all three Corps (5-th, 19-th and 17-th) attack and defeat the enemy from Tomashev, acting in the flank and rear of the Austrians, attacking the 25-corps and the 4-th army.
To accomplish this task, all three shock corps submitted to the commander of the 17 corps.
On 15, the 15 on August 8, the commander 17 sent an order to his subordinate 19 and 5 units, ordering them to continue to do what they had successfully carried out - Kohmarov, 19 and 5 — to attack in the general direction to Tomashev. Summoning the chief of the divisional chiefs to him, he handed him control of the corps - wanting to focus on the responsible work of managing the army group. But the acting commander did not receive either headquarters or communications — and the troops of the 17 corps stopped receiving any orders after 17 hours.
The night of the 16 August, the formations of the 17 Corps spent: 3-Infantry Division at Poledov, Gubinek, f. Poddembina, 35-division - in the area Ulkhovek; the 61 Infantry Division continued to withdraw to Mircea, and the 7 Cavalry Division spent the night at Lykošin.
P.P. Pototsky, who acted as corps commander, arrived in the Old Village.
In general, the situation was not disastrous.
The 19 body was holding, the 5 body was a major success in the battle of Laschoff. The 17 Corps was also in a relative order: the 3 Infantry Division retained its combat capability, the 35 Infantry Division retreated safely (only one regiment suffered badly), in the 61 Infantry Brigade one regiment also suffered greatly (but another approached just arrived by rail), the cavalry was in perfect order.
And P. P. Yakovlev gave the following order on 16 August: to hold the front of the 19 and 5 cases, and to discard the enemy, threatening the flank and rear of the army from Belz, Unv, with parts of the 17 case. But then the 17 body was given 2 of the day to clean up.
The counter battle of the 17 Corps at Tarnoshin completed.
Having lost 52 guns, a lot of machine guns and over 3 thousands of soldiers killed, wounded and captured, the corps failed.
He faced a quantitatively and qualitatively equivalent opponent, was suddenly attacked in the flank and forced to take the battle at a disadvantage - having the weakest of his units on the open flank - the 61 Infantry Division. The defeat of the latter determined the overall failure. A third of the corps forces were in the unfavorable terrain for combat, the control also caused serious complaints.
But the Austrian command, despite the first success, could not achieve major operational results. It did not achieve the encirclement of the 17 corps (which was possible on the night of August 16), allowed the Russians to leave - and within two days the 17 corps had successfully resisted the battle at the Old Village.
The most important flaw in the management of the 17-corps was to build a connection on the march. It was oriented only for a battle in the direction to the west, without taking into account the possibility of a battle to the south. That is why the brigade of the 61 division, which, while conducting the battle front to the west, would be hidden behind the first-line formations, was at the weakest point. Therefore, the p. Solokiya (to secure the flank), the masking role of forests (in the direction of Lviv), the Tarnoshinsky group of forests and swamps (which so much constrained the 35 division).
The comorus should have provided sufficiently complete information about the enemy on both operational lines — to Lviv and Tomashev. The corps on the march was preferable to lead the ledges to the right - to be able to deploy its parts to the south and west. And knowing about the movement on the flank of the enemy's 3 Infantry Division, it was possible to focus on her efforts on the 35, 3 and 7 divisions, leaving the 44 brigade and 8 brigade against the 61 and Austrians divisions of the Austrians and the XNUMX divisions. Infantry Division.
The optimal method of management was the formation of a series of short orders (instead of lengthy orders covering the smallest nuances), the purpose of which was to set regular tasks for military units, directing them to a firmly set goal.
The activity of the lower commanders of the 17 corps was at its height, demonstrating the manifestation of the necessary initiative — decisions were taken independently, and parts were taken out of a difficult situation. It is enough to recall the initiative of the commanders of the 2 and 4 companies in the first minutes of panic in the 137 infantry regiment.
All this became an important lesson for the corps, which at the second stage of the Tomashevsky battle solved a very important and responsible combat task.
Bivak Russian troops in Galicia