January 27 Fight 1904 d at Port Arthur: The Battle Of Opportunities
The 27 battle of January 1904 g is of interest not only as the first battle of armored squadrons in the Russian-Japanese war, but also as the only collision of the main forces of the opponents, in which the Russians did not suffer defeat.
On the evening of January 26, 1904, Heihachiro Togo, commander of the Japanese United fleet, withdrew its main forces to about. Round, located 45 miles from Port Arthur. At 17.05, he told the destroyers, "According to a predetermined plan, go on the attack. I wish you complete success. ” On the night of January 27, 1904, Japanese destroyers attacked the ships of the Russian Pacific Squadron, which were on the outer roads of Port Arthur: this night strike, if not to defeat, then greatly weaken the Russians, then the next morning the main forces of the Japanese fleet could with one blow to destroy the remains of the Russian squadron. Therefore, in the morning of January 27, Togo led to Port Arthur a powerful squadron of 6 armadillos, 5 armored and 4 armored cruisers, including:
The 1 th combat detachment - the battleships of Mikasa (the flag of Vice-Admiral of Togo), Asahi, Fuji, Yashima, Sikishima, Hatsuse;
The 2 combat detachment - armored cruisers Izumo (flag of Rear Admiral Kamimura), Azuma, Yakumo, Tokiva, Ivate;
The 3 combat detachment is the Chitose armored cruisers (flag of Rear Admiral Virgo), Takasago, Kasagi, and Iosino.
Pacific squadron significantly inferior to the Japanese forces. Since the squadron battleships Tsarevich and Retvizan, as well as the Pallas armored cruiser, were damaged by torpedoes, at the disposal of the viceroy E.I. Alekseeva and Vice-Admiral O.V. Stark remained only 5 squadron battleships (Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol, Poltava, Pobeda and Peresvet), the armored cruiser Bayan and 4 armored cruisers (Askold, Diana, Boyarin, "Novik").
The situation was also worsened by the fact that Victory and Peresvet, in their firepower, occupied an intermediate position between the Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. The remaining three Russian battleships could not be considered modern ships, each of them in its fighting qualities roughly corresponded to the oldest and weakest Japanese battleships of the 1 combat squad, Fuji and Yashima, but inferior to the other four. The only advantages of the Russians were the opportunity to fight with the support of the coastal batteries of the fortress of Port Arthur and the presence of quite numerous destroyers.
In 07.00, the 3-th combat squad, which had previously followed along with the main forces of the Japanese, increased speed and moved to Port Arthur for reconnaissance. Rear Admiral Deva was supposed to assess the damage caused by the night mine attack, in the same case, if the large Russian forces attempted to intercept the high-speed Japanese cruisers, the latter would retreat and lure the enemy south of Encounter Rock.
At 07.05, Vice-Admiral Oskar Stark, who was holding his flag on the battleship Petropavlovsk, raised the signal: “The squadron of the Pacific Ocean will load guns with high-explosive shells. "Pallad" signal is canceled. " On the ships, standing on the outer raid under the stenkovye flags, they struck alarm.
In 08.00, the Deva cruisers noticed on Russian ships. “Askold” raised the signal “I can see the enemy on S”, similarly they reported to “Bayan” and “Pallas”, and with “Novik” they asked Petropavlovsk for permission to attack the enemy. According to the testimony of the officer "Askold", the "Petropavlovsk" raised the signal "to the cruisers to attack the enemy", but there are no marks about such a signal in the watch logbooks.
Anyway, “Askold” and “Bayan” went to the Japanese, but the admiral ordered them to return to 08.15, and instead sent the 1 squad of destroyers to attack, but almost immediately called him off, because he decided to go the whole squadron.
In 08.25, at Petropavlovsk, they raised the signal “Breaking off anchor all of a sudden.” From the Golden Mountain, a semaphore would be received, first: “The governor asks the squadron chief in 9 hours,” and almost immediately: “Where is the squadron going?”. In response, O.V. Stark reported on Japanese cruisers to 4, to which 08.35 received the answer: “The governor represents the Squadron Chief to act discretion, bear in mind that somewhere near a stronger Japanese squadron”
In 08.38, the column of Russian cruisers, having the leading “Bayan”, followed Deva's cruisers after them, followed by a column of Russian battleships. But in 09.10, contact with the Japanese was lost and the Russians turned back. Then Deva led the 3-I combat unit to join the main forces and gave a radiogram of the following content: "Most of the enemy is on the outer roadstead. We approached 7000 meters, but didn’t open fire on them. Apparently, several ships suffered from our min. I think it's profitable to attack them "
In 09.20, “Petropavlovsk” raised the signal “The battleships to anchor consistently in order of the wake”, but then changed his order, ordering “Peresvet” and “Victory” to rise to S-off, moreover, the Russian battleships formed a wedge with the flagship battleship its top. “Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 Book I ”indicates that“ Petropavlovsk anchored in 10.45, but the description of events makes one suspect a banal typo - it probably happened in 09.45.
In 09.58, it was transferred from “Golden Mountain” to “Petropavlovsk”: “The governor asks whether the squadron leader has the opportunity to be with him and at what time”, to which the answer was: “The squadron leader will be in 11 hours”.
In 09.59, Boyarin received instructions from Admiral "To go reconnaissance from Laoeshana on O to 15mil." The cruiser immediately went to sea, immediately after this O.V. Stark ordered the boat to the ladder. The exact time of departure of the vice-admiral is unknown, but it obviously happened at the eleventh hour.
Desire of the governor E.I. Alekseeva to arrange a meeting at such a time, especially given the fact that he had previously warned O.V. Stark about the presence of a powerful Japanese squad nearby, has no excuse. Of course, E.I. Alekseev could not know anything for certain, because the main forces of X. Togo had not yet been discovered. His warning was only a guess. But the road from Petropavlovsk to the governor’s house took at least an hour, and it was obvious that in the event of the appearance of battleships Kh. Togo, the head of the Russian squadron might not have time to return to his flagship. If this meeting was so important for the governor, it would be wiser to hold it on board the Petropavlovsk. But, apparently, the idea of having to go to a meeting with a subordinate himself, E.I. Alekseev and could not come to mind. Such actions of the governor subjected the squadron of the Pacific to extreme danger.
At that time, Rear Admiral Deva's 3 th combat detachment joined the main forces of H. Togo, the Japanese squadron was no more than 20 miles from Port Arthur. The Japanese have built up a wake column - 1-th, 2-th and 3-th combat units consistently. Immediately after the rebuild, Mikas raised the signal "I will attack the main forces of the enemy now," and soon after that the Japanese found the cruiser Boyarin (they themselves believed they saw Diana).
The latter, of course, immediately turned back and went to Port Arthur, making an 3 shot from the stern 120-mm cannon. Just before the start of the battle, X. Togo ordered to raise the flag flags and raised a signal: “In this battle lies a decisive victory or defeat; let everyone try their best. ”
But even before the Japanese battleships approached the distance of the shot, they raised a signal on "Boyarin": "I see an enemy in great forces." The same thing was reported on "Petropavlovsk" from the battery number XXUMX.
All this put the Russians in an extremely unpleasant position. According to the statute, in the absence of the admiral, his squadron commanded the squadron, in this case, the captain of the rank 1 A. Ebergard. But the problem was that this provision of the charter extended only to the service of peacetime, while in battle the flag-captain was forbidden to operate a squadron. The command in the battle was to take the junior flagship, but ... only in the case of the death of the squadron commander! Here are just O.V. Stark was alive, and therefore the junior flagship of the Pacific Squadron, P.P. Ukhtomsky had no reason to take command over ... The squadron was decapitated, but it is unlikely that the drafters of the charter could be blamed: a situation in which the commander was unharmed, but absent from the leading squadron, obviously could not have occurred to anyone.
To the credit of captain 1 rank A.A. Abergard, if he hesitated, then not for long. He had a choice - to comply with the charter, risking defeat of the main forces of the squadron, or, with a wave of his hand at the law, to take over the command.
In 10.50, “Petropavlovsk” gives a signal: “To the cruisers of the 1 rank go to reinforcements of“ Boyarin ”, and to“ Novik ”they reported a semaphore:“ To go to reinforcements to “Boyarin”, not to leave the fortress area of operations ”
Then, between 10.50 and 10.55 - "Armadillos suddenly anchor everyone suddenly"
In 10.55 - "Angara" to anchor "
In the 11.00 "destroyers off the anchor." At this point, all the 15 Japanese ships were already clearly visible.
In 11.05, "Armadillos build up to the wake along the" Sevastopol ", not observing the order of numbers."
At this, alas, the period of command of the energetic captain of the 1 rank came to an end. Of course, neither is OV Stark nor ei Alekseev could not let the squadron into battle under the command of A.A. Eberhard No explanation for such an incident could be taken into account, and the most disappointing conclusions would be made for both commanders. Therefore, in 11.05, on the "Petropavlovsk" they took the semaphore: "Expect the squadron commander: do not take off the anchor." Accordingly, in 11.10, “Petropavlovsk” gave a new signal: “The battleships have been removed from the anchor all of a sudden”, and after another 2 minutes: “Stay in place.”
The exact time of the start of the battle, alas, is unknown. According to Japanese sources, Mikasa, having approached the Russian squadron on 8500, turned on W, opened fire from the nasal 12-dm turret, while the first shot was made exactly in 11 hours (11.55 Japanese time). At the same time, Russian sources indicate the beginning of the battle the most different times in the interval from 11.07 (the magazine on the Golden Mount) to 11.20 (the magazine "Askold"). Be that as it may, it can be stated with all certainty only one thing - the beginning of the battle was found by the Russian armadillos anchored.
What next? It must be said that the Russian and Japanese descriptions of the 27 January battle of 1904 in Port Arthur are very different. According to the “Description of hostilities at sea 37-38. Meiji "wake column of the Japanese went from O to W, along the Russian squadron and leading the battle in the starboard. Approaching Lyaoteshany, "Mikasa" turned on 8 points to the left consistently, since the distance to the Russian battleships was already too great for shooting. At this moment (11.25), the Russian coastal artillery entered the battle. As for the Japanese Japanese 2 combat detachment, he lay down on the combat course (that is, he passed the turning point on the W Mikasa) only at 11.12 and fought until 11.31, then turned successively to X battleships departing from Port Arthur. Togo. For the 3 battle squad, the battle began in 11.20, but 11.42 H. Togo ordered the Deva cruisers to turn "all of a sudden" to the left - the Japanese commander noticed that they had fallen under the concentrated fire of the Russian squadron, which the armored cruisers could not withstand. However, the cruisers of the 3 battle squad still fired for a while (3-7 minutes), so the battle for them stopped in 11.45-11.50. In 11.50, the flag flags were lowered on Japanese ships, and the battle was over. At the same time, according to the Japanese, the Russian battleships did not dismantle the anchors - but still the ships of X. Togo retreated, without resuming the battle.
Russian description is significantly different from the Japanese.
By the time the battle began (11.00-11.07), the Russian battleships remained at anchor, but, being fixed, answered the Japanese with fire, and the cruisers were between the squadrons, moving toward the battleships X. Togo. It is not known exactly how much OV returned. Stark on "Petropavlovsk". According to the flagship magazine, the boat of the Russian commander appeared in 11.14 and approached Petropavlovsk "among the enemy shells falling on the roads” and the admiral boarded 11.20, but the commander of Petropavlovsk claimed that he had left the anchor at the direction of the admiral in 11.08. In any case, “Petropavlovsk” was the first to leave the anchor, and went to the enemy, raising the “Follow me” signal.
Following this, O.V. Stark ordered to give another signal: "Do not interfere with shooting, follow me." It can be assumed that this order was related to the cruisers, and they were seen and executed on the “Askold” - the armored cruiser quickly passed along the column of Russian battleships, and then turned them into the wake. But "Bayan" and "Novik", gone further than "Askold", either did not see the signal or ignored it. The first minutes of the battle Russian battleships were perpendicular to the Japanese course and could fire only from nose guns, but somewhere between 11.23 and 11.30 they turned rhombuses to the left and laid down the Japanese on a countercourse, diverging from them with their right sides. At this time, the distance between opponents was reduced to 8 KB or less.
At 11.30, Port Arthur's coastal batteries opened fire. In addition to them, Russian ships undermined by mines participated in the battle, although the latter could not fire for very long and only a few 6 ”shells were fired. "Diana" and "Boyar" during the battle held on to the battleships, but then entered the wake of "Askold"
In 11.40, the Russian commander sent the destroyers on the attack, but after some 5 minutes, canceled the attack.
In 11.45, the Japanese fire weakened and their ships turned into the sea, a signal was raised at the Petropavlovsk: "The admiral expresses his pleasure"
The 11.50 OV Stark turned on the W and ordered a cease fire.
Separate descriptions deserve the actions of "Novik" and "Bayan". Both of these cruisers met the Japanese fleet, but neither of them wanted to retreat, as did the Askold, after the signal of the flagship “Do not stop to shoot.” Novik, having developed the 22 node, got close to Mikasa on 17 KBT, and then turned back. Breaking the distance to 25-27 kb, turned again and went to the Japanese, getting close to them to 15 kb, then intending to retreat again, but at the moment of turning the cruiser received an underwater hole that made steering difficult, which caused Novik to retreat. The Japanese believed that the Novik launched a mine and nearly torpedoed the Iwate armored cruiser, but in fact it was not.
"Bayan" opened fire on "Mikas" with 29 KBT, but seeing the signal "Do not interfere", simply lay down on a course parallel to the Japanese. The brave cruiser went to W, while the Russian battleships turned in the opposite direction, and continued to fire at Mikas until it turned left. Then "Bayan" moved the fire to the next battleship, then the next, and so on. Finally, seeing the order “Construct in the wake column”, “Bayan” followed the Russian battleships.
It may seem that in such “recklessness” there was no point, but this is not so - cruisers distracted the attention of heavy Japanese ships, creating a certain nervousness, thereby easing the position of the few battleships of the Pacific Squadron. For example, it is known that as many as two Japanese battleships fired at Bayan.
In the 27 battle of January 1904, the Japanese showed better shooting than the Russians. The battle took place at 46-26 kbt distances, the statistics of the flow of shells and hits are given below.
The percentage of hits among the Japanese as a whole is twice as high as that of the Russians (2,19% versus 1,08%), but if you look at the table, everything becomes not so clear. For example, the percentage of hits of Japanese 12 "guns is 10,12%, while among Russians it cannot be lower than 7,31% (if 3 12" shells hit Japanese ships). And if we assume that out of two hits with projectiles of unexplained caliber (10 "-12"), one or two could be 12 ", then it turns out that the accuracy of Russian 12" could be 9,75% or 12,19%. The same is true for 6 ”-8” shells - unfortunately, the presence of 9 hits of an unknown caliber (either 6 ”or 8”) does not allow analyzing their accuracy separately, but the total percentage of artillery hits of these calibers made by Russians 1,19 %, the Japanese - 1,93, which makes the difference in 1,62 times (still not double). The extremely low shooting accuracy of the Russian 3 ”had an effect on the general results of the shooting, but these weapons were completely useless in a squadron battle.
Of all the coastal battery guns that took part in the battle, only 5 10 "modern guns and 10 6" Kanet cannons mounted on batteries #2,9 and 15 might have been able to send their shells to the Japanese. But it is highly doubtful that they could even achieve one hit. The fact is that the shooting from these guns was conducted at very large distances for the Russian gunners, and the consumption of shells was extremely low - it’s hardly possible to count on hits in such conditions. According to the author of this article, all hits in Japanese ships reached the ship artillery of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.
The worst quality of firing of Russian commanders has the following reasons:
1) The artillery exercises of 1903 were not carried out in full.
2) Shortly before the outbreak of war, there were more than 1500 senior personnel, including about 500 specialists, including squadron commandants, in reserve. So, on the Varyag cruiser, almost half of the commandants went into the reserve.
3) From November 1, 1903, the ships of the Pacific Squadron stood in an armed reserve and did not conduct combat training. Accordingly, it was not possible to train the newly arrived gunners in artillery and, of course, maintain the level of training achieved in the fall of 1903. The ships were withdrawn from the reserve only on January 19, 1904, and a few days before the start of the war there was no way to seriously train the crews.
4) The beginning of the battle caught the Russian battleships at anchor and the stationary ships were a much better target than the moving battleships of H. Togo.
5) During the battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese wake line was located between the Russian ships and the sun, i.e. the sun's rays blinded the Russians.
In general, it can be argued that the Russian description of the battle is much closer to the truth than the Japanese - at least two important points of Japanese historiography: that the Russian squadron held the whole battle at anchor, and that almost all of the Japanese were hit by the coastal artillery of the Russians - were erroneous.
As a result of the battle, we can state the following:
1) The commander of the 3rd combat detachment, Rear Admiral Deva, acted in a very unprofessional manner. He could neither understand the state of the Russian squadron, nor carry it into the sea so that the main forces of Kh. Togo could break it without entering the zone of operation of the Russian coastal batteries.
2) H. Togo did not organize the fire control of his ships. According to the official description of the battle: “Asahi concentrated fire on br. "Peresvet", "Fuji" and "Yashima" fired at the "Bayan", "Sikishima" fired at the very middle of the crowded enemy ships, and the rear ship "Hatsuse" fired at the ship closest to it "
3) The extremely stretched wake column of the Japanese endangered the 3rd combat detachment, since it was at the time of its passage that the Russians (at least in theory) could achieve maximum fire efficiency.
4) H. Togo's decision to withdraw from the fight has no reasonable explanation.
5) Actions of the governor E.I. Alekseev, who called the head of the Russian squadron to himself, could lead to a heavy defeat of the Russian naval forces.
6) The actions of Vice Admiral O.V. Starks were mostly correct (such as sending the Boyarin cruiser to reconnaissance exactly where the Japanese fleet came from), but pretty hectic, since the admiral constantly canceled his own orders. Nevertheless, the main decision of the battle - the formation of a wake column and the difference with the Japanese on the counter-course - should be considered correct.
7) The reluctance of O.V. Stark to pursue the retreating enemy and continue the battle after 11.50 is understandable: it is difficult to fight with 6 armored ships (including Bayan) against 11 enemy armored ships, especially outside the coastal artillery fire zone. However, the refusal to attempt to attack the "tail" of the Japanese column should be regarded as a mistake by the Russian commander.
In general, the battle 27 January 1904 g can be regarded as a battle of missed opportunities. H. Togo failed to take the chance to defeat the weakened Russian squadron. At the same time, O.V. Stark failed to take advantage of the benefits he had. As subsequently wrote S.I. Lutonin, who fought in that battle as a senior officer of the battleship "Poltava":
“The Japanese came to the first battle without destroyers, and now we could successfully use the often practiced maneuver in the squadron of Admiral Skrydlov, when the destroyers, attacking the opposite sides of their battleships, suddenly jumped out into the gaps and went to attack. Four minutes later, they were on the right mine shot from the enemy, and during the battle, when all attention was paid to a large enemy and small weapons were not servants, all chances were that the attack would succeed. "
As a result of the battle that took place, the Japanese fleet, possessing a significant advantage in strength, failed to neutralize the main forces of the Pacific Squadron and was forced to retreat.
List of used literature:
1. V. Maltsev, “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War” Part I
2. V. Polomoshnov “Fight 28 July 1904 (the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung))”
3. V.N. Cherkasov “Notes of the artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet”
4. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History creation and death.
5. THEM. Koktsinsky "Sea battles and battles of the Russian-Japanese war, or the cause of defeat: a crisis of management"
6. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo.
7. Testimony in the investigation commission for the July 28 fight of the senior artillery officer Lt. V. Cherkasov 1
8. Report of the Chief of Pacific Ocean Squadron V.-A. Stark Deputy E.I.V. January 29 # 523
9. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 Book I. Fleet actions in the southern theater from the beginning of the war to a break in communications with Port Arthur
10. S.I. Lutonin "Activities of the battleship" Poltava "in the Russo-Japanese War 1904 of the Year."
The article used the January 27 battle scheme from the monograph of P.D. Bykova “Russian-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 Actions at sea "
On the evening of January 26, 1904, Heihachiro Togo, commander of the Japanese United fleet, withdrew its main forces to about. Round, located 45 miles from Port Arthur. At 17.05, he told the destroyers, "According to a predetermined plan, go on the attack. I wish you complete success. ” On the night of January 27, 1904, Japanese destroyers attacked the ships of the Russian Pacific Squadron, which were on the outer roads of Port Arthur: this night strike, if not to defeat, then greatly weaken the Russians, then the next morning the main forces of the Japanese fleet could with one blow to destroy the remains of the Russian squadron. Therefore, in the morning of January 27, Togo led to Port Arthur a powerful squadron of 6 armadillos, 5 armored and 4 armored cruisers, including:
The 1 th combat detachment - the battleships of Mikasa (the flag of Vice-Admiral of Togo), Asahi, Fuji, Yashima, Sikishima, Hatsuse;
The 2 combat detachment - armored cruisers Izumo (flag of Rear Admiral Kamimura), Azuma, Yakumo, Tokiva, Ivate;
The 3 combat detachment is the Chitose armored cruisers (flag of Rear Admiral Virgo), Takasago, Kasagi, and Iosino.
Pacific squadron significantly inferior to the Japanese forces. Since the squadron battleships Tsarevich and Retvizan, as well as the Pallas armored cruiser, were damaged by torpedoes, at the disposal of the viceroy E.I. Alekseeva and Vice-Admiral O.V. Stark remained only 5 squadron battleships (Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol, Poltava, Pobeda and Peresvet), the armored cruiser Bayan and 4 armored cruisers (Askold, Diana, Boyarin, "Novik").
The situation was also worsened by the fact that Victory and Peresvet, in their firepower, occupied an intermediate position between the Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. The remaining three Russian battleships could not be considered modern ships, each of them in its fighting qualities roughly corresponded to the oldest and weakest Japanese battleships of the 1 combat squad, Fuji and Yashima, but inferior to the other four. The only advantages of the Russians were the opportunity to fight with the support of the coastal batteries of the fortress of Port Arthur and the presence of quite numerous destroyers.
In 07.00, the 3-th combat squad, which had previously followed along with the main forces of the Japanese, increased speed and moved to Port Arthur for reconnaissance. Rear Admiral Deva was supposed to assess the damage caused by the night mine attack, in the same case, if the large Russian forces attempted to intercept the high-speed Japanese cruisers, the latter would retreat and lure the enemy south of Encounter Rock.
At 07.05, Vice-Admiral Oskar Stark, who was holding his flag on the battleship Petropavlovsk, raised the signal: “The squadron of the Pacific Ocean will load guns with high-explosive shells. "Pallad" signal is canceled. " On the ships, standing on the outer raid under the stenkovye flags, they struck alarm.
In 08.00, the Deva cruisers noticed on Russian ships. “Askold” raised the signal “I can see the enemy on S”, similarly they reported to “Bayan” and “Pallas”, and with “Novik” they asked Petropavlovsk for permission to attack the enemy. According to the testimony of the officer "Askold", the "Petropavlovsk" raised the signal "to the cruisers to attack the enemy", but there are no marks about such a signal in the watch logbooks.
Anyway, “Askold” and “Bayan” went to the Japanese, but the admiral ordered them to return to 08.15, and instead sent the 1 squad of destroyers to attack, but almost immediately called him off, because he decided to go the whole squadron.
In 08.25, at Petropavlovsk, they raised the signal “Breaking off anchor all of a sudden.” From the Golden Mountain, a semaphore would be received, first: “The governor asks the squadron chief in 9 hours,” and almost immediately: “Where is the squadron going?”. In response, O.V. Stark reported on Japanese cruisers to 4, to which 08.35 received the answer: “The governor represents the Squadron Chief to act discretion, bear in mind that somewhere near a stronger Japanese squadron”
In 08.38, the column of Russian cruisers, having the leading “Bayan”, followed Deva's cruisers after them, followed by a column of Russian battleships. But in 09.10, contact with the Japanese was lost and the Russians turned back. Then Deva led the 3-I combat unit to join the main forces and gave a radiogram of the following content: "Most of the enemy is on the outer roadstead. We approached 7000 meters, but didn’t open fire on them. Apparently, several ships suffered from our min. I think it's profitable to attack them "
In 09.20, “Petropavlovsk” raised the signal “The battleships to anchor consistently in order of the wake”, but then changed his order, ordering “Peresvet” and “Victory” to rise to S-off, moreover, the Russian battleships formed a wedge with the flagship battleship its top. “Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 Book I ”indicates that“ Petropavlovsk anchored in 10.45, but the description of events makes one suspect a banal typo - it probably happened in 09.45.
In 09.58, it was transferred from “Golden Mountain” to “Petropavlovsk”: “The governor asks whether the squadron leader has the opportunity to be with him and at what time”, to which the answer was: “The squadron leader will be in 11 hours”.
In 09.59, Boyarin received instructions from Admiral "To go reconnaissance from Laoeshana on O to 15mil." The cruiser immediately went to sea, immediately after this O.V. Stark ordered the boat to the ladder. The exact time of departure of the vice-admiral is unknown, but it obviously happened at the eleventh hour.
Desire of the governor E.I. Alekseeva to arrange a meeting at such a time, especially given the fact that he had previously warned O.V. Stark about the presence of a powerful Japanese squad nearby, has no excuse. Of course, E.I. Alekseev could not know anything for certain, because the main forces of X. Togo had not yet been discovered. His warning was only a guess. But the road from Petropavlovsk to the governor’s house took at least an hour, and it was obvious that in the event of the appearance of battleships Kh. Togo, the head of the Russian squadron might not have time to return to his flagship. If this meeting was so important for the governor, it would be wiser to hold it on board the Petropavlovsk. But, apparently, the idea of having to go to a meeting with a subordinate himself, E.I. Alekseev and could not come to mind. Such actions of the governor subjected the squadron of the Pacific to extreme danger.
At that time, Rear Admiral Deva's 3 th combat detachment joined the main forces of H. Togo, the Japanese squadron was no more than 20 miles from Port Arthur. The Japanese have built up a wake column - 1-th, 2-th and 3-th combat units consistently. Immediately after the rebuild, Mikas raised the signal "I will attack the main forces of the enemy now," and soon after that the Japanese found the cruiser Boyarin (they themselves believed they saw Diana).
The cruiser "Boyar" (in Denmark)
The latter, of course, immediately turned back and went to Port Arthur, making an 3 shot from the stern 120-mm cannon. Just before the start of the battle, X. Togo ordered to raise the flag flags and raised a signal: “In this battle lies a decisive victory or defeat; let everyone try their best. ”
But even before the Japanese battleships approached the distance of the shot, they raised a signal on "Boyarin": "I see an enemy in great forces." The same thing was reported on "Petropavlovsk" from the battery number XXUMX.
All this put the Russians in an extremely unpleasant position. According to the statute, in the absence of the admiral, his squadron commanded the squadron, in this case, the captain of the rank 1 A. Ebergard. But the problem was that this provision of the charter extended only to the service of peacetime, while in battle the flag-captain was forbidden to operate a squadron. The command in the battle was to take the junior flagship, but ... only in the case of the death of the squadron commander! Here are just O.V. Stark was alive, and therefore the junior flagship of the Pacific Squadron, P.P. Ukhtomsky had no reason to take command over ... The squadron was decapitated, but it is unlikely that the drafters of the charter could be blamed: a situation in which the commander was unharmed, but absent from the leading squadron, obviously could not have occurred to anyone.
To the credit of captain 1 rank A.A. Abergard, if he hesitated, then not for long. He had a choice - to comply with the charter, risking defeat of the main forces of the squadron, or, with a wave of his hand at the law, to take over the command.
In 10.50, “Petropavlovsk” gives a signal: “To the cruisers of the 1 rank go to reinforcements of“ Boyarin ”, and to“ Novik ”they reported a semaphore:“ To go to reinforcements to “Boyarin”, not to leave the fortress area of operations ”
Then, between 10.50 and 10.55 - "Armadillos suddenly anchor everyone suddenly"
In 10.55 - "Angara" to anchor "
In the 11.00 "destroyers off the anchor." At this point, all the 15 Japanese ships were already clearly visible.
In 11.05, "Armadillos build up to the wake along the" Sevastopol ", not observing the order of numbers."
At this, alas, the period of command of the energetic captain of the 1 rank came to an end. Of course, neither is OV Stark nor ei Alekseev could not let the squadron into battle under the command of A.A. Eberhard No explanation for such an incident could be taken into account, and the most disappointing conclusions would be made for both commanders. Therefore, in 11.05, on the "Petropavlovsk" they took the semaphore: "Expect the squadron commander: do not take off the anchor." Accordingly, in 11.10, “Petropavlovsk” gave a new signal: “The battleships have been removed from the anchor all of a sudden”, and after another 2 minutes: “Stay in place.”
The exact time of the start of the battle, alas, is unknown. According to Japanese sources, Mikasa, having approached the Russian squadron on 8500, turned on W, opened fire from the nasal 12-dm turret, while the first shot was made exactly in 11 hours (11.55 Japanese time). At the same time, Russian sources indicate the beginning of the battle the most different times in the interval from 11.07 (the magazine on the Golden Mount) to 11.20 (the magazine "Askold"). Be that as it may, it can be stated with all certainty only one thing - the beginning of the battle was found by the Russian armadillos anchored.
What next? It must be said that the Russian and Japanese descriptions of the 27 January battle of 1904 in Port Arthur are very different. According to the “Description of hostilities at sea 37-38. Meiji "wake column of the Japanese went from O to W, along the Russian squadron and leading the battle in the starboard. Approaching Lyaoteshany, "Mikasa" turned on 8 points to the left consistently, since the distance to the Russian battleships was already too great for shooting. At this moment (11.25), the Russian coastal artillery entered the battle. As for the Japanese Japanese 2 combat detachment, he lay down on the combat course (that is, he passed the turning point on the W Mikasa) only at 11.12 and fought until 11.31, then turned successively to X battleships departing from Port Arthur. Togo. For the 3 battle squad, the battle began in 11.20, but 11.42 H. Togo ordered the Deva cruisers to turn "all of a sudden" to the left - the Japanese commander noticed that they had fallen under the concentrated fire of the Russian squadron, which the armored cruisers could not withstand. However, the cruisers of the 3 battle squad still fired for a while (3-7 minutes), so the battle for them stopped in 11.45-11.50. In 11.50, the flag flags were lowered on Japanese ships, and the battle was over. At the same time, according to the Japanese, the Russian battleships did not dismantle the anchors - but still the ships of X. Togo retreated, without resuming the battle.
Russian description is significantly different from the Japanese.
By the time the battle began (11.00-11.07), the Russian battleships remained at anchor, but, being fixed, answered the Japanese with fire, and the cruisers were between the squadrons, moving toward the battleships X. Togo. It is not known exactly how much OV returned. Stark on "Petropavlovsk". According to the flagship magazine, the boat of the Russian commander appeared in 11.14 and approached Petropavlovsk "among the enemy shells falling on the roads” and the admiral boarded 11.20, but the commander of Petropavlovsk claimed that he had left the anchor at the direction of the admiral in 11.08. In any case, “Petropavlovsk” was the first to leave the anchor, and went to the enemy, raising the “Follow me” signal.
Following this, O.V. Stark ordered to give another signal: "Do not interfere with shooting, follow me." It can be assumed that this order was related to the cruisers, and they were seen and executed on the “Askold” - the armored cruiser quickly passed along the column of Russian battleships, and then turned them into the wake. But "Bayan" and "Novik", gone further than "Askold", either did not see the signal or ignored it. The first minutes of the battle Russian battleships were perpendicular to the Japanese course and could fire only from nose guns, but somewhere between 11.23 and 11.30 they turned rhombuses to the left and laid down the Japanese on a countercourse, diverging from them with their right sides. At this time, the distance between opponents was reduced to 8 KB or less.
At 11.30, Port Arthur's coastal batteries opened fire. In addition to them, Russian ships undermined by mines participated in the battle, although the latter could not fire for very long and only a few 6 ”shells were fired. "Diana" and "Boyar" during the battle held on to the battleships, but then entered the wake of "Askold"
In 11.40, the Russian commander sent the destroyers on the attack, but after some 5 minutes, canceled the attack.
In 11.45, the Japanese fire weakened and their ships turned into the sea, a signal was raised at the Petropavlovsk: "The admiral expresses his pleasure"
The 11.50 OV Stark turned on the W and ordered a cease fire.
Separate descriptions deserve the actions of "Novik" and "Bayan". Both of these cruisers met the Japanese fleet, but neither of them wanted to retreat, as did the Askold, after the signal of the flagship “Do not stop to shoot.” Novik, having developed the 22 node, got close to Mikasa on 17 KBT, and then turned back. Breaking the distance to 25-27 kb, turned again and went to the Japanese, getting close to them to 15 kb, then intending to retreat again, but at the moment of turning the cruiser received an underwater hole that made steering difficult, which caused Novik to retreat. The Japanese believed that the Novik launched a mine and nearly torpedoed the Iwate armored cruiser, but in fact it was not.
"Bayan" opened fire on "Mikas" with 29 KBT, but seeing the signal "Do not interfere", simply lay down on a course parallel to the Japanese. The brave cruiser went to W, while the Russian battleships turned in the opposite direction, and continued to fire at Mikas until it turned left. Then "Bayan" moved the fire to the next battleship, then the next, and so on. Finally, seeing the order “Construct in the wake column”, “Bayan” followed the Russian battleships.
It may seem that in such “recklessness” there was no point, but this is not so - cruisers distracted the attention of heavy Japanese ships, creating a certain nervousness, thereby easing the position of the few battleships of the Pacific Squadron. For example, it is known that as many as two Japanese battleships fired at Bayan.
In the 27 battle of January 1904, the Japanese showed better shooting than the Russians. The battle took place at 46-26 kbt distances, the statistics of the flow of shells and hits are given below.
The percentage of hits among the Japanese as a whole is twice as high as that of the Russians (2,19% versus 1,08%), but if you look at the table, everything becomes not so clear. For example, the percentage of hits of Japanese 12 "guns is 10,12%, while among Russians it cannot be lower than 7,31% (if 3 12" shells hit Japanese ships). And if we assume that out of two hits with projectiles of unexplained caliber (10 "-12"), one or two could be 12 ", then it turns out that the accuracy of Russian 12" could be 9,75% or 12,19%. The same is true for 6 ”-8” shells - unfortunately, the presence of 9 hits of an unknown caliber (either 6 ”or 8”) does not allow analyzing their accuracy separately, but the total percentage of artillery hits of these calibers made by Russians 1,19 %, the Japanese - 1,93, which makes the difference in 1,62 times (still not double). The extremely low shooting accuracy of the Russian 3 ”had an effect on the general results of the shooting, but these weapons were completely useless in a squadron battle.
Of all the coastal battery guns that took part in the battle, only 5 10 "modern guns and 10 6" Kanet cannons mounted on batteries #2,9 and 15 might have been able to send their shells to the Japanese. But it is highly doubtful that they could even achieve one hit. The fact is that the shooting from these guns was conducted at very large distances for the Russian gunners, and the consumption of shells was extremely low - it’s hardly possible to count on hits in such conditions. According to the author of this article, all hits in Japanese ships reached the ship artillery of the Pacific Ocean Squadron.
The worst quality of firing of Russian commanders has the following reasons:
1) The artillery exercises of 1903 were not carried out in full.
2) Shortly before the outbreak of war, there were more than 1500 senior personnel, including about 500 specialists, including squadron commandants, in reserve. So, on the Varyag cruiser, almost half of the commandants went into the reserve.
3) From November 1, 1903, the ships of the Pacific Squadron stood in an armed reserve and did not conduct combat training. Accordingly, it was not possible to train the newly arrived gunners in artillery and, of course, maintain the level of training achieved in the fall of 1903. The ships were withdrawn from the reserve only on January 19, 1904, and a few days before the start of the war there was no way to seriously train the crews.
4) The beginning of the battle caught the Russian battleships at anchor and the stationary ships were a much better target than the moving battleships of H. Togo.
5) During the battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese wake line was located between the Russian ships and the sun, i.e. the sun's rays blinded the Russians.
In general, it can be argued that the Russian description of the battle is much closer to the truth than the Japanese - at least two important points of Japanese historiography: that the Russian squadron held the whole battle at anchor, and that almost all of the Japanese were hit by the coastal artillery of the Russians - were erroneous.
As a result of the battle, we can state the following:
1) The commander of the 3rd combat detachment, Rear Admiral Deva, acted in a very unprofessional manner. He could neither understand the state of the Russian squadron, nor carry it into the sea so that the main forces of Kh. Togo could break it without entering the zone of operation of the Russian coastal batteries.
2) H. Togo did not organize the fire control of his ships. According to the official description of the battle: “Asahi concentrated fire on br. "Peresvet", "Fuji" and "Yashima" fired at the "Bayan", "Sikishima" fired at the very middle of the crowded enemy ships, and the rear ship "Hatsuse" fired at the ship closest to it "
3) The extremely stretched wake column of the Japanese endangered the 3rd combat detachment, since it was at the time of its passage that the Russians (at least in theory) could achieve maximum fire efficiency.
4) H. Togo's decision to withdraw from the fight has no reasonable explanation.
5) Actions of the governor E.I. Alekseev, who called the head of the Russian squadron to himself, could lead to a heavy defeat of the Russian naval forces.
6) The actions of Vice Admiral O.V. Starks were mostly correct (such as sending the Boyarin cruiser to reconnaissance exactly where the Japanese fleet came from), but pretty hectic, since the admiral constantly canceled his own orders. Nevertheless, the main decision of the battle - the formation of a wake column and the difference with the Japanese on the counter-course - should be considered correct.
7) The reluctance of O.V. Stark to pursue the retreating enemy and continue the battle after 11.50 is understandable: it is difficult to fight with 6 armored ships (including Bayan) against 11 enemy armored ships, especially outside the coastal artillery fire zone. However, the refusal to attempt to attack the "tail" of the Japanese column should be regarded as a mistake by the Russian commander.
In general, the battle 27 January 1904 g can be regarded as a battle of missed opportunities. H. Togo failed to take the chance to defeat the weakened Russian squadron. At the same time, O.V. Stark failed to take advantage of the benefits he had. As subsequently wrote S.I. Lutonin, who fought in that battle as a senior officer of the battleship "Poltava":
“The Japanese came to the first battle without destroyers, and now we could successfully use the often practiced maneuver in the squadron of Admiral Skrydlov, when the destroyers, attacking the opposite sides of their battleships, suddenly jumped out into the gaps and went to attack. Four minutes later, they were on the right mine shot from the enemy, and during the battle, when all attention was paid to a large enemy and small weapons were not servants, all chances were that the attack would succeed. "
As a result of the battle that took place, the Japanese fleet, possessing a significant advantage in strength, failed to neutralize the main forces of the Pacific Squadron and was forced to retreat.
List of used literature:
1. V. Maltsev, “On the Question of Accuracy of Shooting in the Russian-Japanese War” Part I
2. V. Polomoshnov “Fight 28 July 1904 (the battle in the Yellow Sea (the battle at Cape Shantung))”
3. V.N. Cherkasov “Notes of the artillery officer of the battleship Peresvet”
4. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History creation and death.
5. THEM. Koktsinsky "Sea battles and battles of the Russian-Japanese war, or the cause of defeat: a crisis of management"
6. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo.
7. Testimony in the investigation commission for the July 28 fight of the senior artillery officer Lt. V. Cherkasov 1
8. Report of the Chief of Pacific Ocean Squadron V.-A. Stark Deputy E.I.V. January 29 # 523
9. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 Book I. Fleet actions in the southern theater from the beginning of the war to a break in communications with Port Arthur
10. S.I. Lutonin "Activities of the battleship" Poltava "in the Russo-Japanese War 1904 of the Year."
The article used the January 27 battle scheme from the monograph of P.D. Bykova “Russian-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 Actions at sea "
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