Military Review

Victoria in the August woods. Part of 2

26
On September 10, the Caucasian Grenadiers met the morning of 19 north of Krasnopol, part of the 22 Army Corps near the village of Valno - Monkiny. The 3 th Siberian Army Corps, after a stubborn battle on the line of the Khodorka-Olshanka and the Germans retreating to Suwalki, was: 8-I Siberian Rifle Division at Khodorka, and 7-I Siberian Rifle Division and 2-I Finnish Rifle Brigade - at d. Olshanka - Slippers. In the 14 watch, the detachment of I. V. Kolpikov pushed the Germans, who had bombarded Augustus from the Prussian side of the Velk, back.


M. N. Arkhipov recalled how the 4-I Finnish Infantry Brigade, taking up a position along the river. Malkien was preparing for the crossing: there were no pontoons, and General V. I. Selivachev ordered to assemble boats and knit rafts. The tombs of the Germans marched along the coast, observed day and night - including with the help of rockets. V. I. Selivachev refused to force, fearing large losses, and this decision was right - the offensive of the neighboring units threatened the enemy with a detour, and the Germans left positions on the river without a fight. An eyewitness recalled the heroic deed of lieutenant artillery Zichman. The Finnish people complained about the heavy machine-gun fire of the Germans - and at night Zikhman installed a gun right in the rifle trench. At dawn, the gunners opened direct fire - and broke the German machine-gun nests. The enemy responded with his artillery fire - and the lieutenant died the death of the brave.

Victoria in the August woods. Part of 2
14. The commander of the 4 th Finnish Infantry Brigade, Major General V. I. Selivachev.

The night and day of 19, September, Siberians were fighting hard near Rachka. Moreover, the left-flank 8-I Siberian Rifle Division, located in the area of ​​Khodorka-Rudniki-Konetspol, was overtaken by the Germans from the left flank and forced, turning to the west, to fight on the front of the Stokes-Konsbor-Kurianka. The 7-I Siberian Rifle Division and the 2-I Finnish Rifle Brigade fought on the Olshanka-Yurizdyk front, also gradually turning to the west and adjoining its right flank to the 4-F Finnish Rifle Brigade (concentrated in the Plotsichno-Gavrikhruda-Yurizdyk area). 2-th Caucasian Army Corps fought on the line Tartak - Lake. Perth - Kaletnik.

The enemy suffered a heavy defeat and began to retreat along the whole front - from Kaletniki (north-east of Suvalki) to Barglov (east of Raygorod). On September 20, on the 12 watch, the 2 Caucasian Army Corps occupied Suwalki, advancing to Bacalarzhevo. The 3 th Siberian Army and 22 th Army Corps moved to Rachki.

The retreat of the Germans sometimes assumed a disorderly character, Russian troops got trophies and property thrown by the enemy. The Germans left the wounded soldiers, throwing artillery guns and property. V.E. Flug wrote that concerted actions and valor of the Finnish and Siberian shooters were crowned with desired success: the enemy suffered heavy losses, was knocked down from positions everywhere and began to hastily retreat, leaving prisoners, guns and machine guns. The German front south of Suwalki was broken through.

The operational initiative of the German 8 Army was lost. V.E. Flug noted with satisfaction that in less than a week the enemy’s breakthrough to the Neman was completely eliminated. By its maneuver, having entered the enemy’s communications, the 10 Army forced it to clear the 50 kilometer lane east of the city of Augustów and, returning the lost freedom of maneuvering, restored close combat contact with the left flank of the 1 Army.

German counterstrike and the resumption of the Russian offensive. 22. - 30. 09. 1914


The retreating Germans, seeing the threat of a new Russian invasion of East Prussia, decided to fight back before the border. The oncoming battle unfolded.

2 of the Caucasian Army Corps 22 of September reflected the enemy’s counterstrike and fought at Ganch-Khmelyuvka, the Siberians were at Rachka, the Turkestani fought at Graev-Lyk-Raygorod, and the Finnish of 22-rd army corps at Bacalarzhev. The fact that these battles were stubborn is evidenced by the fact that the 13 th Grenadier Life Regiment of the Erivan Regiment during 21 - September 24 lost the 18 officers and before the 500 the Grenadier, and the 16 Grenadier Mingrelian regiment just behind 21 - 23 September officers.

But the enemy’s counterattack was repulsed.

As the Russian commander noted, the Germans who had gone on the defensive fought extremely hard on the whole front - they were pushing everything that was possible to the battlefield and went into violent counterattacks, especially on the front of the 2 of the Caucasian corps, which suffered significant losses. But success leaned toward the Russian weapons - especially in the area of ​​the 22 body. Under the command of his decisive commander von der Brinken, displaying high enthusiasm (and despite the serious fatigue of the troops who were in battle for a week), the corps decided the fate of the battle. Finnish arrows in these battles captured the enemy battery.

It should be noted that the advance of the Russian troops on the Kalvariya-Suwalki-Augustow front was developing at a much slower pace than the first invasion of East Prussia in August. Many tactical errors were taken into account, and special attention was paid to the positioning of the captured terrain and the defense of the flanks of the assault force.

Success could have been more significant if the offensive of the 10 Army had not been hampered by intervention from above. So, on September 10, on the basis of some dubious data, the commander-in-chief of the front ordered it to be suspended. Time has been lost.

The delay and postponement of the 10 Army’s onslaught became the main reason for the failure of the renewed late attack.

But the culprit was found - he became the commander of the winner, V. E. Flug. If the front commander, commander 3 of the Siberian and 22 corps and commandant Osovets were awarded, then the commander of the 10 army and the head of staff of the latter were expelled from their posts and sent “at disposal” (the Supreme Commander - commander and commander-in-chief of the armies of the North -West front - chief of staff).


15. Chief of Staff 10 A Lieutenant-General S. D. Markov.

Commenting on this situation, A. Kersnovsky wrote that the Russian 10 Army defeated the German 8 Army — but, despite the victory, Commander V. Ye. Flug was removed from his post: the offensive directives of the General frightened the craven command of the front. In the actions of the winner, the commander of the front, N. V. Ruzsky, and the head of the front headquarters, M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, saw “dangerous activity”. Moreover, the front headquarters FORBIDED the armies to use their victory, inflicting a flank blow from Graev and further to the rear of the Germans, ordering them to act by the cordon method, lining the hull shoulder to shoulder. According to the apt expression of A. A. Kersnovsky, “Gofkrygsrat of the North-Western Front” planned to take Suwalki on 22 September, and V. E. Flug, having captured this city on 2 the day before, 20 September, incurred the wrath of N. V Ruzsky - for the lack of "methods".

The officer of the 4 of the Finnish brigade so conveyed the impression of the commanding staff of the army about the dismissal of VE Flugh from the post: “Not much time had passed, and we were saddened to learn that General Flug, who was in command of our 10 army, was removed from the post. For what? Why? What happened? Full bewilderment. Then we learned: "For the late manifestation of the initiative." The general who was the first to inflict great defeat on the presumptuous Germans, lifted the spirit of the troops with this first victory and almost drove the Germans out of the Russian land, was convicted by his boss ... and 150 years ago for the same successful manifestation of the initiative, Empress Catherine II not only condemned the winner, but generously rewarded and said immortal words: "The winner is not judged."

From the tactical and operational points of view, the battles near Avgustov became a Russian victory. The Stavka summary reported: “The battle of Augustus ended in the victory of our troops over the Germans. German troops in disarray hastily retreat to their borders. " The representative of the British command under the Russian Army A. Knox noted: “the newly formed 10 Army (V. E. Fluga, later F. Sivers), defeated the Germans near Avgustov.”

The official description of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front noted: “Our troops ... acting decisively and bravely, shot down the Germans in the most important directions, overturning into the August forest-swamp forest and the lake region north of it. The Germans fought with extreme stubbornness, but in the end we got the upper hand, displacing the enemy gradually lingering at every turn from the borders of the Suwalki and Lomzhinskaya provinces. Especially serious and persistent battles took place in the Suwalki area. The Germans suffered heavy losses here and were forced to give up their positions. ”

All three phases of the operation were won by the Russian army. Considering that the operations of 1914 were characterized, above all, by the struggle for the Russian Polish “balcony”, the preservation of the status quo can be counted in favor of the Russians. Both sides fettered each other - in this context, we should talk about the fulfillment of the objectives of the operation by both sides, although the chilling maneuver, based on the balance of forces, was more successful for the Germans.

V.E. Flug defined the results of his army’s activities in the 2-weekly operation: 1) The Germans were driven back from the Neman and forced to hasty withdrawal; 2) Osovets released; 3) managed to capture Augustov and defeat the Germans in the August forests; 4) almost the entire Russian territory west of the middle reaches of the river. Neman cleared of the enemy; 5) The troops of the 10 Army invaded East Prussia, capturing the years. Lyk and Byala; 6) The Germans have lost the initiative and the ability to: a) do something against the rear of the Russian armies at cf. Vistula; b) to strengthen, at the expense of East Prussia, their troops assigned to deliver the main attack - in Poland.

Russian total losses (killed, wounded and missing) - to 20 thousand people. German casualties by all participants in these battles are characterized as very high: "The Neman was red with blood."

An eyewitness, describing the loss of the Germans under the Suwalki, noted that the whole way of their retreat was littered with German corpses. According to the testimony of prisoners, in the companies left on 20 people. The Finnish shooter recalled: “On the battlefield, during the harvesting and burial of the murdered Germans, which took place on September 20, as well as during the evacuation of the wounded Germans ... it turned out that they belonged to 18 in different regiments after the interrogation. ... The killed Germans and Russians were buried in the forest at the battle site in two mass graves. The number of those killed, indicated on the crosses, was almost the same: Germans, I remember, 294, Russians - 287. But, taking into account that the Germans themselves had buried their dead men who had been taken out of the battle in the village of Gavrikhud, the losses of the Germans were greater than ours, they were enormous. ”

But V. Ye. Flug authoritatively noted that “the loss of Germans is not less than ours,” that is, also no less than 20 of thousands of fighters. Opponent on the pages of the Reichsarkhiv (Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. Bd 5. Berlin, 1929. S. 548) estimated the total losses of the 8 Army in September and the 1 half of October in 20 thousand people - that is, for a period longer than the first August operation.


16. Niva. 1915. No. 4.

The Russians captured up to 3 thousands of prisoners (2,5 thousands were taken by the 10 army - including 1 thousands under Suwalki - Augustus 20 of September), 22 guns, at least 16 machine guns, cars, several dozen charging boxes, carrying vehicles and other property (only during 20 September 2 guns and 7 vehicles were seized). Reichsarkhiv materials confirm this data.

During the fierce battles, the sides suffered heavy losses, up to 20% of the number of German and up to 17% of the number of Russian groups.


17. Russian grave at the Augustus Forest. Chronicle of the war 1914 of the year. - 1914. - No. 14.

The specificity and degree of intensity of the August battles were remembered by their participants for a long time. Thus, the front-line soldier recalled that "All forests were dug over by trenches." The Germans bombarded the Russians with heavy projectiles, inflicting heavy losses on them, but they themselves were also hard hit. They could not stand the Russian onslaught, and retreated. Russian troops reached Rachki - where 23 - September 25 was a continuous artillery battle. The picture was terrifying: the continuous lines of the forest trenches were filled to the top with corpses.

An eyewitness recalled how the gunners, letting the Germans at close range, fired at their column in direct fire. Evaluating the enemy’s losses, he noted that it’s difficult to estimate how many Germans were killed here, but this number is enormous - for example, a German mass grave was found during the attack, to which was attached a note listing the 452 buried, then the same grave with 42 names, and There were a lot of such graves around.

The tactics of V.E. Flug allowed the Russian infantry to display their excellent qualities in the August forests, where bayonet and hand-to-hand fighting were actively used. An eyewitness recalled how, on one of the 11 hours, a forest battle was fought - at the 20-100 meter distance. The soldiers slowly moved among the trunks of huge thick trees, ran across the clearing dug in the trenches, knocking the Germans with bayonets. The soldiers liked it in the woods - it was harder there because they lost contact with their neighbors, but it was easier because they were “freer” from artillery.

A war correspondent wrote about a fight between Caucasians and Germans: how Germans bypassed Russians bypassed, but the latter, jumping out of their trench, broke into the enemy, seized it with a bayonet strike - and then, on the backs of the escaping Germans, broke into the 2 tier of enemy trenches . The correspondent called the continuous web of these forest trenches an eternal monument to the valor of Russian soldiers and officers. After all, someone else would backslide in front of such an irresistible position. And Russian soldiers, dotting the moats and trenches with corpses, took bayonets one position after another. The Germans beat them from failures, shot them from trees, ran from trench to trench, hit broken fighters in the back - from disguised dugouts. But they did not manage to stop the valiant Russian troops.

Later in the wilds of August there were many bodies, as if embraced - people died, clutching, and even death did not unclench their hands. 8000 Germans, the correspondent noted, buried only in the August forests. But there are no buried ones either - and only you will depart from the road, as from stumps you see wide open eyes looking at you.

And, as the eyewitness noted, “the German army will remember the August forests”!


18. German trench in the woods.

To be continued
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  1. kipage
    kipage 14 February 2018 06: 18
    +17
    It is possible that the trophies of Russian troops and above.
    Moreover, most of the captured in battle
    A trophy of the 10th Army, carrying trophies, recalled that "(many guns and machine guns were loaded)."
    Super!
    1. XII Legion
      XII Legion 14 February 2018 07: 13
      +17
      Yes, the mentioned trophy of the 10th army wrote that only 21 heavy guns were captured XNUMX.
      And also "thousands of shells, a lot of machine gun belts, a searchlight, Zeiss pipes, a lot of phones, etc."
      About 22 captured guns wrote himself V.E. Flug - trust his opinion.
      1. kipage
        kipage 14 February 2018 07: 56
        +16
        trust his opinion

        Certainly.
        Trophies are generally very interesting.
        Counted differently
        And the part is in the habit of settling in the troops)
        1. Streletskos
          Streletskos 14 February 2018 08: 45
          +16
          part is used to settle in the troops

          And sometimes quite significant
  2. XII Legion
    XII Legion 14 February 2018 07: 17
    +19
    The German army was not only defeated - the opponents suffered comparable losses.
    The answer to those who consider the Russian army worse than the German
    Deprive the latter of predominance in artillery, leave the Germans without a clear command - failures occur.
    Well, forest battles are a difficult form of hostilities.
    And not in vain
    the German army will remember the August forests

    Thank you!
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 14 February 2018 08: 45
      +17
      Remember, adversaries)
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 14 February 2018 08: 29
    +9
    V.I. Selivachev-August 28, 1917. Selivachev joined the telegram dated the previous day from the commander-in-chief of the armies of the South-Western Front, General A.I. Denikin, addressed to Kerensky, Kornilov and the commander-in-chief of the fronts in protest against the dismissal of General L.G. Kornilov from the post of Supreme Commander. In connection with Kornilov’s support, the general was arrested on September 2, 1917. Later, General Selivyachev did not return, he left military service. After spending several months in Finland, he returned to Russia. During the period of timelessness in Petrograd, in order to support a large family, wife and six children, he undertook any dirty work - he was engaged in dragging boards and barrels, he worked as a day laborer at the factory. It was only at the end of August 1918 that they managed to get a job in the military archive, and in the autumn of 1918, Selivyachev went on a promotion and moved to Moscow. He worked in the commission for the study and use of the experience of the WWI at the General Headquarters, taught at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army and in intelligence and military control courses. Selivyachev had no reason to love the Bolsheviks. In 1919, he spent several months under arrest in Butyrskaya prison on charges of belonging to an underground joint officer organization. The former general was nearly shot. In August - September 1919, the assistant commander of the Southern Front and at the same time commander of the strike group of troops. He participated in the August offensive against the Volunteer Army in the Kurpian direction, in the region of Belgorod and Volchansk, with the withdrawal to the Koroch-Novy Oskol line and in the Oboyansk direction. He skillfully opposed the successful offensive of the Volunteer Army by General May-Mayevsky and led the entire group out of the encirclement, preserving it from complete rout. He suddenly died on September 17, 1919 from typhus. There were rumors about his poisoning with white agents. Selivyatchev lived an honest life and faithfully served his country.
  4. soldier
    soldier 14 February 2018 08: 35
    +20
    The story of the removal of the Flood is mysterious.
    In general, Ruzsky and his chief of staff Bonch-Bruevich (the brother of another Bonch - the secretary of Lenin, but also a Bolshevik apologist) did more harm than good.
    The stop signal of the victorious 1st August operation, the detrimental role during the 2nd August operation (cordon arrangement of the army, the order to withdraw, etc.) - their work.
    And to the events under consideration.
    Floh himself wrote: “Success would probably be more complete if the offensive were not hindered by intervention from above. So, by the way, early on the morning of September 24, on the basis of some dubious information about a breakthrough made by the Germans of the front of the II Caucasian Corps, the Commander-in-Chief sent a telegram ordering the X Army’s offensive to be immediately stopped, gaining a foothold in occupied places, and eliminating the imaginary breakthrough by concentrating reserves on Suwalki . So far, measures have been taken to clarify the true state of affairs, which turned out to be inconsistent with the information of the front headquarters and quite favorable for us, a lot of precious time has been lost. ”
    And in the Strategic Outline of the War, the dispute between the commander and the commanding front is given: “The 10th Flood Commander considers the current situation quite favorable for the attack on Suwalki: the 19nd Caucasian, XXII and III Siberian corps seize the enemy’s position, delaying the attack gives the enemy time to strengthen and strengthen the position, and therefore decides on September 2 (October 1) to launch an attack and ask for the assistance of XNUMX army.
    Commander-in-Chief General Ruzsky considers this attack to be premature, since the front directive of September 16/29 states that Suwalki should be occupied by the evening of September 22 (October 5), and therefore cities should not be occupied 4 days before the deadline. General Floog continued to insist on his decision, since the corps were already aimed at attacking and if not attacking, they would have to retreat, which could adversely affect the morale of the troops. ”
    Success could be even greater
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 14 February 2018 08: 48
      +20
      But Bonch, in his "memoirs," called the Flug maneuvers "strategic monograms."
      I would be silent in a rag
      And how could the brother of the underground demolitionist become the chief of staff of the front? The mind is incomprehensible. The brother in 1905 organized underground warehouses with weapons, and the other brother - the general.
      We had good power before the revolution, such punctures.
      Later they would have spanked - and this is the end. For family ties only
      1. soldier
        soldier 14 February 2018 09: 21
        +17
        I also do not understand.
        M. D. Bonch-Bruevich in his book “All Power to the Soviets” wrote: “At my insistence, General Floog was called to Bialystok. Soon, Floug was removed from his post and replaced by a more capable and intelligent general.”
        More “capable” is V. F. Sivers, who carried out the so-called “linear-serf” tactics so beloved by M. D. Bonch-Bruevich at the insistence of the front command, and as a result lost the Second August Operation in January-February 1915, killing 20 XNUMXst building.
        Incidentally, A.P. Budberg, comparing the indecisive commander of the 10th Army V.F. Sievers with her former commander V.E. Flug, noted that: "I didn’t and could not have any doubts that if at the end January 1915, General Flug would have commanded our X Army, then he himself, without asking anyone, would immediately order the army to leave east, because with a calm and judicious assessment of our situation then there could be no other solution. "
        And "... General Bonch-Bruevich could not stand sharp and irregular lines, protrusions and bends on the schemes that adorned the walls of his office ...". “... During the period of successful operations of our army under the command of General Flood, and then during our invasion of East Prussia, the front headquarters continuously intervened in our orders where this was not required at all, flooded us with streams of the smallest directions, climbed into he taught all the little things, instructed, and tried in every possible way to emphasize his wise leadership ... in a word did everything to show that "they plowed." But in times of difficult trials, setbacks and hitches of the same period, there was no trace of this interference and leadership; on the contrary, then it was necessary to make a lot of efforts to get any decisions or instructions from the front headquarters on the most important issues of its undeniable competence, since these instructions or decisions were connected with the possibility of further contact with our unsuccessful and non-winning operations. "
        Here is what the same eyewitness wrote about Ruzsky’s doublet - Bonch-Bruevich: “in those days, the actual Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front on the operational side was quite well-known and despised by all enough Bonch, the great vizier with completely exhausted Ruzsky, who gave all operational brains reign in the hands of his “Mascotta” (as he called Bonch-Bruyevich, attributing to him all his successes on the Austrian front) and asserting everything that was reported to him by this empty-minded and illiterate in military affairs ambitious man, drowning in the power that had come to him and not knowing any restraint , no limit in the manifestation of the latter. "
        The commander of the Northwestern Front, the infantry general N.V. Ruzsky, was an incapable general (who failed to coordinate the actions of the front armies).
        Moreover (as well as some commentators on the VO worshiping the Germans) Ruzsky, at a meeting with the commanders on the night of September 18, expressed regret that he agreed to attack Augustov, as it "laid the foundation for all subsequent" risky enterprises "of the 10th army" . And V. Ye. Floug was pretended to be addicted to "unrealizable utopias", such as encircling and destroying enemy corps, - unrealizable due to the impossibility for us to “compete with the Germans in the art of maneuvering”.
        1. soldier
          soldier 14 February 2018 09: 24
          +19
          Bonch-Bruyevich was simply a traitor, who had made efforts to defeat the Russian army (after all, that was the position of his brother - otherwise how could the war be “imperialist” transformed into “civilian”?).
          On September 23, 1914, Floog was removed from his post precisely because of the intrigues of the Quartermaster General of the Front Headquarters, Major General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who opposed the active operations of the 10th Army. Even the regrouping of the army was met with hostility, categorical instructions followed to stop the offensive, etc.
          1. Square
            Square 14 February 2018 09: 59
            +4
            Along the way
            The northwestern front was unlucky for the commander in chief. Zhilinsky, then Ruzsky ...
            1. soldier
              soldier 14 February 2018 12: 16
              +19
              The northwestern front was unlucky for the commander in chief. Zhilinsky, then Ruzsky.

              In the summer of 1915, a short time (until the Northern Front in August 1915 was divided into Northern and Western), the commander-in-chief was MV Alekseev, a talented staff officer and a good general.
              Of course - P.A. Pleve was the ideal candidate - for a short time he was acting as an intercom front, Northern at the end of 1915.
              1. Square
                Square 14 February 2018 12: 34
                +3
                Cadres decide everything laughing
                Well, if not all, then half the battle hi
          2. BAI
            BAI 14 February 2018 10: 58
            +3
            The whole society at that time was not in vain talking about treason at the very top. 1915 year:
            In memoirs, the Chairman of the State Duma, M.V. Rodzianko wrote: "Treason was felt in everything, and nothing else could not explain the incredible events that took place before everyone's eyes." Even those who were engaged in catching spies — the leaders of counterintelligence of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts, Generals Batyushin and Bonch-Bruyevich, fell under suspicion.
            1. soldier
              soldier 14 February 2018 12: 13
              +18
              Batyushin was just dealing with these issues.
              The founder of domestic economic counterintelligence.
              Solemnly reburied in Russia. Under the auspices of the FSB.
            2. soldier
              soldier 14 February 2018 12: 20
              +19
              Whose hands reached Bonch-Bruevich understandably.
              Ruzsky is simply incompetent.
              It was necessary to clean up a little generality before 1914, to check the quality of command, personal and family ties. Leave such as Flug, Pleve, Lechitsky, Brusilov, Radkevich, Shcherbachev and others.
              And the rest - a filthy broom.
              The rotation process, of course, went naturally: good comcor became commanders, and commanders became comforters. And that is wonderful.
              But it took time, and the war did not wait.
              1. BRONEVIK
                BRONEVIK 14 February 2018 14: 40
                +17
                As Betka employee K. Lemke wrote:
                espionage not only has a close relationship with the political movement in Russia, but it can be said with certainty that it even feeds such a movement

                So there!
  5. Adjutant
    Adjutant 14 February 2018 13: 40
    +6
    All of these people had enough
    Schubert and Francois - among the Germans, Boroevichs and Archduke Ferdinands among the Austrians.
    In 18, even the March allies had a forfeit - the commanders showed themselves poorly. One Foch on top.
    The phenomenon is general (in terms of inconsistency of the position), but of course not everyone persuaded the emperor to renounce (like Ruzsky) or slowed down the victorious offensive (Bonch). The latter, so immediately after February 17th, entered no where else, but in the Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers and Workers (!!) Deputies (Pskovsky) and in November the chief of staff at Krylenko. That is, he was an agent of influence, subversive anti-state activity during the WWII - this is obvious. No less Ruzsky earned a fierce end - and died in his bed.
    Counterintelligence missed)
  6. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 14 February 2018 14: 41
    +16
    Here they are, handsome
  7. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 14 February 2018 14: 45
    +16
    And here are two acrobat brothers
    Bonchie
    Bruevichi


    Why, when appointing the general, they did not take into account the merits of the brother-underground-saboteur - I also do not understand
  8. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 14 February 2018 15: 23
    +19
    And a few words about the future fate of the estranged generals in WWI
    V.E. Flug was toiling for 8 months, and then received a corps and distinguished himself in the Vilna operation and in the Offensive of the South-West Fleet of 1916 (the Yazlovets breakthrough of the Flug corps is a brilliant thing even against the background of other breakthroughs). And he remained the corps commander. He started the war with the commander, and ended with a commander.
    S. D. Markov received a division and fought near Warsaw and in the одód операции operation. During the latter, he was wounded and then actively did not fight. He started the war with the army chief of staff, and ended with the division commander.
    Such are the fate of two generals - the organizers of the first serious victory operation over the Germans on the Eastern Front of WWI. But 2 other generals broke his career — a Februaryist and a Bolshevik (a wonderful tandem)) - and the fact of decapitation of the 10th Army comes back to life 4 months later, during the Second August Operation.
    Ruzsky later distinguished himself by curtailing the counter-offensive of the troops of P. A. Pleve during the Vilna operation, and in 1916 canceling the 12th Army’s landing operation in the rear of the German army, etc. etc.
    And Bonch-Bruevich will initiate the eviction of Jews from the frontline (on charges of total espionage in favor of the enemy), will be one of the main actors who prepared a falsified case on charges of Colonel Myasoedov, etc. etc.
    But this, as they say, is another story
  9. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 14 February 2018 16: 17
    +16
    Great interesting good
    Waiting for the end
  10. Black joe
    Black joe 14 February 2018 19: 48
    +1
    Contrary to everything
    And that's great
  11. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 15 February 2018 09: 12
    +12
    Great article. The fighting in the Augustow Forests is the best confirmation that the cadre Russian army at the level of training of lower ranks and non-commissioned officers was in no way inferior to the German one. And according to the experience of the Second World War, our senior and headquarters officers were also at a decent level — courageous, daring, initiative people. It is only a pity that the generals at the headquarters level were seriously struck by the “disease of caution” that was prevalent in the Army at the end of the 19th century. However, these generals after the war were to be replaced by those initiative officers who showed themselves brilliantly at the lower levels. Should be....
  12. Blue cop
    Blue cop 15 February 2018 12: 35
    +15
    An excellent example of the successful military operations of the RIA against the German troops in the WWII.
    The troops of both sides were already seriously diluted with reservists, spare. Although, of course, “personnel” left a serious imprint - especially at the beginning, until many of the formations became elite front-line forces. Including secondary (for example, our 101st Front, Silesian Landver Corps or Senegalese arrows).
    The Russian forces also acted successfully against the Germans at the stage when the personnel had already sunk into oblivion (for example, the battle at Kiselin in the station "Broken Steel"). The level of German troops also declined - for example, Podorozhny writes about this in his work on the Naroch operation. Big losses made themselves felt.
    Russians and Germans were worthy opponents throughout the war.
    The generals during the war were also forged beautiful, but the ongoing rotation process was washed away by revolutions ...