Moscow put before the fact. 2 Turkish convoy in support of "al-Nusra" as the first result of the "Sochi Congress"
The second Turkish military convoy is moving through the territory controlled by "Tahrir ash-Sham" (banned in the Russian Federation) to the front line against Syrian government forces in the Al-Eyes region
A lot of angry emotions and misunderstandings are caused by the current military-political situation in the so-called regional link "Russia-Syria-Turkey", the last member of which for a long time deserves at least a good diplomatic beating and "educational work" at the level of foreign affairs agencies, and at the most - a forceful demonstration action and expulsion from the list of participants of the Constitutional Commission, formed within the framework of the Sochi Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, held on January 29 and 30, 2018. On the eve of the above-mentioned congress, numerous bloggers, political scientists and military experts expressed hope for significant progress in the peace process in the north-west of the country, in the territories of the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo, where Ankara should position itself as a real guarantor of the established de-escalation zone. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reminded the Turkish Ministry of Defense of this on January 10, after the incident with a massive strike by dozens of UAVs at the Khmeimim airbase (recall that drones took to the air from the territory of the "Idlib viper", controlled by the Turkish security forces). It is not yet known what guided these "experts" when placing their bets on the congress in Sochi, but very soon Ankara and the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham (Jabhat al-Nusra, banned in the Russian Federation) controlled by it completely confirmed our assumptions regarding incompatibility of the Turkish side.
Firstly, this is the second, more successful, attempt by the Turkish Turkish command to send the “Idlib viper” to the western approaches of a powerful military convoy, represented by a mechanized “fist” of several light four-wheel drive armored vehicles / BRM “Cobra” (these were the machines Turkey delivered to Georgia in front of Georgia Operation “Forcing Peace”), several dozen KIRPI armored vehicles, more than one and a half dozen light infantry fighting vehicles ACV-15 on semitrailers, as well as from several main combat vehicles tanks Leopard 2A4 and M60T-Sabra. This convoy again arrived in the area of the height of Tell al-Ais on the Reyhanli-Ataraib-El-Ais motorway on February 5, 2018, and, like the first deployment attempt (January 29), provoked a clash with Hezbollah units and the Syrian Arab Army .
As in the first case, immediately after the Turkish army began mastering observation posts / strong points at Tell el-Eyes (in the evening), covering the Turks of the Tahrir ash-Sham formation, they opened fire on the fortified government forces near a large the front-line city of Khader, which left the CAA and Hezbollah no other choice than to issue a proper counter battery response using barrel artillery, mortars and large-caliber small arms. Naturally, after that, units of the Turkish army arrived in Al Ays as part of the convoy. In both cases, the Turks suffered losses in a collision with the CAA (more than 6 people. "200", dozens of "300" and a few damaged units of armored vehicles), as evidenced by sources covering the news on the tactical online map of syria.liveuamap.com , but the second time it was decided not to leave positions on the western approaches to Hadera.
Obviously, the primary goal of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey is to maintain fire control over the main transport "artery" of the Syrian army - the Aleppo-Hama highway and the Abu-Duhur-Aleppo railway line. For what? Naturally, to preserve the full potential of the organization of a possible offensive operation of jihadists (with the support of the Turkish army) in the direction of the central and western parts of the province of Aleppo (eastern IT). Ankara will succeed in implementing this strategic plan only after clearing the Afrin and Manbij areas and their transfer to the control of the Syrian Free Army (FSA), after which the military intervention throughout the province of Aleppo will only suffice the blocking of Khanassir-Es X highways for military intervention Safirs, Deir-ez-Zor - Aleppo and Hama-Aleppo. It is worth noting that today's attempts of the “creeping offensive” of the FSA in the area of the liberated Abu Dukhur are connected with this. In particular, 3 in February, government forces were repulsed 6 villages - Al-Majur, Al-Khalib and Tel-Al-Bandera; in these military actions, the FSA is often coordinated with Tahrir ash-Sham, receiving material and technical support from the Turkish army as a reward.
Now let's return to the search for the possible root causes of such unspotted behavior of the 25-thousand-strong terrorist formations of the “Dzhebhat an-Nusra”, the “Free Syrian Army”, as well as their permanent curator - the Turkish Republic. Recall the outcome of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress. All the media virtually rejoiced, pointing to the nonexistent advantages of the creation of the Constitutional Commission, which should begin work on amending the Syrian constitution in Geneva, Switzerland. But in reality, there is nothing to exult: the third part of the seats in this commission was given to the representatives of the opposition negotiating delegations of Syria HNC and SNC, who, in fact, are authorized representatives of the Syrian Free Army officially cooperating with Tahrir ash-Sham. In Russian, the semi-terrorist group supported by Washington and Ankara allowed to stand at the “geopolitical rudder” at the level of Russia, Iran and Turkey. Where is it seen? And we still wonder something! Without any doubt, on such conditions, the Al-Qaeda branch and their unofficial ally of the FSA became quite bold, and, using the Turkish cover, started a very bad “game”.
The next point, unleashing the hands of Ankara and its ally, the SSA, is the refusal of Damascus and Moscow from direct military intervention in the situation around the rebels and the Turkish army in the long-suffering canton Afrin. For the third week already, the Kurdish National Self-Defense Detachments have been forced to independently restrain the frantic opposition forces of the FSA and the regular Turkish army within the borders of the canton, relying not on large-caliber receiver and rocket artillery with armored vehicles, but on ordinary anti-tank missile systems of the "Competition / -M" type. "And" TOW-2A / B ", while the very" preservation of the Syrian territory "about which Vladimir Putin spoke on the day of the withdrawal of most of the Russian military contingent from Syria. The maintenance of communication between Moscow and Ankara on the issues of the operation “Olive Branch” became our most ridiculous mistake from the moment of the situation with the interception of the Su-24M, when the enemy did not incur significant punishment. This led to an even more criminal and tragic incident with the interception of the Su-25 attack aircraft over the central part of the Idlib Gadyushnik (Serakib city), where, to our great regret, it was not possible to save our pilot-hero Roman Filippov, who entered the battle with the terrorists on the ground .
The landing site of Major Filippov, the lightning speed of events, as well as the current tactical situation did not allow for the prompt conduct of a search and rescue operation. But a completely logical question arises: why wasn’t this act of aggression committed by an al-Nusra against our attack aircraft prevented in advance? After all, it is known that the Turkish side has all the known levers of influence on Tahrir ash-Sham. The answer is quite simple: in this case, the Turks tried to "discard" the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces from operations in direct support of the Syrian army in an offensive operation against Tahrir ash-Sham. The Russian “Rooks” and their professional pilots are a real headache for the pro-Turkish forces in Idlib.
In view of this, with all due respect to our numerous media and chief orientalist Semyon Bagdasarov, it is necessary to avoid streamlining the picture in Idlib Gadyushnik in the style of "ATS are open for arms supplies to thousands of militants" or "the supply of MANPADS was controlled by the CIA / SBU. It is necessary to speak bluntly: the main share of responsibility, including awareness of the impending interception, as well as the transfer of the portable air defense system to the Tahrir ash-Sham fighters lies on Ankara, and only partial - on Washington. Interested in preserving the occupation of the “Idlib bridgehead” by terrorists exclusively Turkey, this is impossible not to realize. It is worth noting that this is not the whole range of events that occurred in the Syrian theater of operations with the participation of the Turkish army over the past few days. In particular, on February 5, during short-term clashes of a Turkish convoy with CAA subunits under Hader, a section of the reports in the syria.liveuamap.com online map referring to Syrian sources reported on a missile strike by the Turkish armed forces on the town of Sughaideliyah, which is under attack by the Turkish armed forces northwest of Hadera. The type of missiles is not reported, but it is noted that they were long-range missiles. In all likelihood, we are talking about long-range tactical cruise missiles (200 km) SOM from Tubitak-SAGE, which have recently reached operational combat readiness, or about Yyldyrim J-600T tactical ballistic missiles. Be that as it may, this strike was the last straw of patience for the Syrian Arab Army. The mirror response followed quickly enough.
By February 6, in the vicinity of the Quires airbase (in the north of the Aleppo governorate) additional air defense assets were deployed. Informed sources in Damascus reported that the new tools are designed to create an air defense "barrier" over the northern territories of the Syrian Arab Republic, without specifying the creation of a no-fly zone over the canton of Afrin. On this basis, it can be assumed that not only the Pantsir-С1 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems were deployed in the Deir-Hafer area, but also the more long-range Buk-M2E or C-200В. Buk-М2 complexes, for example, have a range of high-altitude targets in 50 km, which means that they can close airspace over almost the entire Azaz region controlled by the FSA, as well as over the southern outskirts of Manbij and Afrin. More importantly, this troop-to-air missile system can be opposed to most air attack weapons (EAS), which are in service with the Army and Air Forces of Turkey.
A significant role is played here: high speed of the target being hit (4000 km / h), multi-channel availability due to the presence of several 9А317 SOUs equipped with target illumination radars, as well as decent minimum radar target signature limits (EPR around 0,02 - 0,05 m2); This makes it possible to destroy HARM-type anti-radar missiles and modern OTB systems. It already brings its fruits. In particular, if a week ago light multipurpose / ATX T129 attack helicopters, as well as countless reconnaissance UAVs, were patrolling over the mountainous terrain of the canton of Afrin, today most Kurdish resources do not have any reports that could include manned or unmanned aerial vehicles. Turkish Air Force. If you look at the online flight monitor of the aircraft with the included Flightradar24 transponders, then note that all reconnaissance drones of the Anka-A / B and Bayraktar TB-2 types ply in Turkish airspace, over the southern sections of the silt Hatay, Kilis (at an altitude of about 6500 m), without violating the air lines of the SAR in the area of Afrin. Apparently, the sobering effect on hotheads in Turkish General Staff was excellent.
The first trophies of the YPG from the Turkish army: "art" BMP ACV-15
It is worth mentioning the recent statement by the senior political adviser to Erdogan - Ilnur Chevik, made during an interview with the Lebanese edition of AMN. A high-ranking representative of the Turkish authorities stated that “there are no plans to transfer the canton of Afrin to the Syrian government forces after clearing the region of the Kurdish YPG people's self-defense detachments”. This interview was practically not replicated in our media, while Ankara demonstrates an open disregard for all norms of international law, both at the diplomatic level and at the military-political level. As it became known later, the Turkish side did not draw any bonuses from its position on Idlib and Afrin; while Damascus finally provided the Iraqi Kurdish volunteer detachments (YBS) and YPG from Manbij, Kamyshly and Hasek with a “green corridor” to transfer to the canton Afrin through the so-called “Nubl Isthmus” north of Aleppo. New defenders of Afrin entered the region of thousands of cars tormented by the bombardment, bringing up a huge number of anti-tank and small weapons, so that the ambitious strategy of Turkey, "Tahrir ash-Sham" and the FSA to seize the north of ATS and build a single "anti-Assad front" is doomed to early failure.
Information sources:
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/turkey-will-not-hand-afrin-assad-erdogans-adviser/
https://vz.ru/news/2018/2/7/907242.html
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
Information