Judgment Day. Fracture and Completion. Part of 1
When the Doomsday War began, both the US and the USSR were not in a hurry with the cease-fire efforts. Unlike the events of the Six-Day War 1967 of the year, when in a few days the UN decided to cease fire, this time there was no such diplomatic agility. I must say that Israeli Foreign Minister Aba Eban has been on constant telephone contact with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger since October 7.
Aba Eban (right) and Henry Kissinger
The question of a cease-fire they discussed almost the very beginning of the war. But after all, they go to a cease-fire only when both belligerents understand that this is beneficial to them. And on October 7, 1973, nobody was interested in the cease-fire. It was humiliating for the Israelis to stop fire when their lines of defense were broken, and the enemy was on their territory, the Arabs were engulfed by the fervor of the offensive and the joy of the first victories and did not even think about a cease-fire. On the Soviet side, the Arabs declared then, at the beginning of the war, that they would agree to a cease-fire only when Israel left the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. It is clear that in Israel they could not agree.
On Tuesday, October 9, when the situation of Israel was worse than ever, Eban had to take the rap at the UN at a Security Council meeting.
The Arabs have managed to file a complaint with the UN that Israel is bombing Damascus, Ismailia and Port Said. Here, usually restrained Eban broke through: “You were the first to attack us and you loudly complain that Israel is defending itself! What are you, really ... ?! ”
The USSR, of course, supported its proteges and put all the responsibility on Israel.
Soviet poster of the period of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. It is interesting in that it uses a real photo tank Shot Kal (English Centurion modernized by the Israelis)
Despite the scope and dynamism of the fighting in the Sinai Peninsula, the most dramatic events occurred at the same time on the Syrian front. Ultimately, the fate of Israel in the early days of the war was decided precisely on the Golan Heights. To understand the validity of this statement, just look at the map of Israel.
Between its territory and the Egyptian troops in 1973 lay Sinai - 200 km of desert. Directly adjacent to Sinai is the Negev Desert - an almost uninhabited territory of Israel. The Syrians, having broken through the IDF's defense in the Golan Heights and forcing the Jordan River, fell directly into Galilee - densely populated areas in northern Israel. From Golan Heights to the sea - just 50 km!
On the night of October 9, against the remnants of the 7 Armored Brigade "Sa'ar Mi-Golan", which was commanded by Avigdor, the Ben-Gal Syrian Command abandoned the 3 Armored and 7 Infantry Divisions, as well as the Republican Guard, the elite of the Syrian Army .
Avigdor Ben-Gal
The main attack of the T-55 and T-62 Republican Guard tanks fell on the 77 armored battalion "Oz", in which only 6 tanks remained. By noon, 9 October, the Syrians finally managed to capture several of the dominant heights, pushing a handful of Israeli tanks left with almost no ammunition. The battle actually broke up into a mass of uncontrollable and uncontrolled command of one-on-one fights, in which crew training and the strength of their nerves played a decisive role. And that, and the other Syrians is clearly not enough. Evidence of this was the 13 surprise attack of the remaining 188 tanks of the Barak (Lightning) tank brigade in the flank of the Syrians.
Tanks of the 188 Tank Brigade AOI near the OP 107
It was commanded by Amos Katz, who replaced the death of Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, who died on the eve.
Amos Katz
Itzhak Ben-Shoham
Very quickly, they hit 30 Syrian tanks and this psychologically turned the tide of battle in their favor. An hour after joining the fire duel of the 188 tank brigade, the Arabs began to withdraw. The Syrian command ordered the transition to defense.
The turning point in the war on the Syrian front came when David Elazar, the chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, ordered all reinforcements to be sent to the Golan Heights, and not to divide them into two fronts. He spurred a message about the Iraqi division approaching the Syrian front in 230 tanks and 16 thousand people. (according to other sources - 350 tanks and 18 of thousands of soldiers) The Syrians needed to be sorted out before the Iraqis approached. The completed 146 armored division of Brigadier General Moshe Peled launched a slow attack in the southern sector, gradually ousting the Syrians from the Israeli part of Golan. By the morning of October 11, the 240-I armored division of Major General Dan Laner was able to fully engage in battles and, while the 36-I tank-motorized infantry division, commanded by Brigadier General Rafael Eitan in the north, held up stubborn defenses, two Israeli divisions in the south on the south, in the south, on the south, in the south, held a stubborn defense, two army divisions in the south on the south, in the south, held a stubborn defense, in the south, they were on the south, in the south of the army, Raphael Eitan Syrians back. October 12 division Dana Lanera bypassed Tel-Masharu and freed Nasedzh. Dan Laner ordered to establish on the flank contact with the 9 th Oto motorized rifle brigade, commanded by Colonel Mordechai Ben-Porat, who had reached Tel el-Mal by halfway to Knacker. The Syrians began a disorderly retreat. Until the end of the war was still far away, but the turn on the Syrian front has already arrived. The fighting was already on the Syrian territory, the IDF troops were moving towards Damascus.
To help the crumbling Syrian front, the Jordanian king gallantly sent there his elite 40 Tank Brigade. There was a tank battle, which ended in defeat for the Jordanians. Understanding all the national difficulties of the Jordanian king, the Israeli media did not say a word about the participation of the Jordanian troops in the war and their defeat on the Syrian front.
Parts of the 3 of the Iraqi tank division (mainly T-55 tanks) arrived in Syria on October 10 – 11 and joined the battle on October 12 in 12. From the march, inexperienced Iraqi tankers attacked the 9 and 679 tanks of the Israel Defense Forces. (The 679 Armored Brigade was commanded by Colonel Uri Or) Almost immediately, the 200 of the Iraqi T-54 and T-55 tanks fell under the aimed fire of the Centurion and Shermans with 105-mm guns. The Iraqi division was virtually destroyed: the losses amounted to 80 (according to other sources - even 120) of combat vehicles.
(Interestingly, on the same day, October 12 1973, Sadat rejected the USSR Council - to seek a ceasefire and continued to reject this advice until the IDF tanks appeared on October 10, 19 km from Cairo.)
Dayan, who once again visited the Golan during the offensive, advised Eitan and Lener to bring the troops to the gunshot to Damascus, and for himself concluded that it was possible to bear the brunt of Egypt. Be that as it may, the Iraqis managed to delay the offensive and bring down the attacking rush of the Israelis. The advancing troops were tired, fuel and ammunition were running out. The command of the Israel Defense Forces refused to assault Damascus. Damascus was saved. Israeli troops went over to the defenses. At the front there was a lull until October October 16.
Between 17 and 22 in October, the remnants of the 1 Syrian and 3 Iraqi Panzer divisions made lingering attempts to attack Israeli positions several times. The exception was the seven-hour battle of October 20, when 120 tanks took part in the attack.
Back in the midst of the battles of the Doomsday War, Syria turned to Cuba for help. The Cuban leadership sent 800 tankers to Syria. They traveled to Damascus incognito, through the third countries of Europe and the Middle East. They did not have time to take part in the active phase of the war.
On the Egyptian front, everything was still very vague. In order to divert part of the Israeli troops from the Syrian front, Sadat decides to redeploy the 4 and 21 armored divisions to the east coast, leaving one armored brigade as a strategic reserve on the west coast. Thus it was supposed to break through the Israeli line of defense. This step was a mistake that led to grave consequences.
The Egyptian troops of October 13 launched an offensive, and on Sunday, October 14, a massive tank battle took place, in which about 2000 tanks took part. 1200 Egyptian tanks (not counting motorized infantry armored vehicles) opposed Israeli 800 units. It is believed that by the number of cars this battle is the largest tank battle after 1943. Then on the Kursk Bulge 2700 Germans fought against the Soviet 3000 tanks. In the battle of El Alamein in 1942, "only" 1600 of German, English and Italian tanks took part.
And so, four armored and one mechanized brigade of Egyptians went on the offensive in four directions. Objective: to implement a political decision of President Sadat - to save the Syrian troops fighting in the Golan Heights from defeat. (Already familiar to us from a previous publication, Lieutenant-General Saad Al-Shazli called this decision a "blunder No. XXUMX", my note) Starting the offensive, Egyptian troops came out from under the cover of stationary air defense missile systems on the western bank of the channel. There was nothing to organize the air defense of the attacking units - the export version of the Soviet mobile air defense system “Kub” was purchased in small quantities in 1 year. The massive fire of Israel’s disguised tanks and the high density of anti-tank installations with close air support led to the loss of 1973 tanks, more than in all the days of the war. The Israelis repelled the offensive. General Abraham (Albert) Mandler was killed in this battle by the explosion of a projectile.
It was then that the winged expression of David Elazar was born: “Golda, everything will be fine. We are again, and they are again! ”
The scope of this battle gave the Israelis confidence that the 500 reserve tanks, which used to be on the western, Egyptian, bank of the channel now also turned out to be in Sinai. So, Israeli strategists reasoned, the Egyptian rear was left without protection. To attack, as in 1956 or 1967, the Israelis did not have the strength throughout Sinai, and the war had to be won. I needed a feint. What was needed was not another wall-to-wall brawl, but a well-planned, daring operation. Planned it long before the war, Arik Sharon. Thinking about possible future wars, he outlined on the shore of the Suez Canal a convenient place to cross to the west, African, shore. Anything can happen in the future? This place was located at the upper (northern) tip of the Great Salt Lake, where the water space again took the form of a channel. Sharon leveled in advance a place on the coast for a tank park, led the roads and made a passage to the water in the steep bank of the canal. An hour struck him in the evening of October 14.
The permission of the command of Sharon as the commander of the central sector to force the channel came in 19: 00. Since the mobilization was already over and all the prescribed units were sent to the front, two divisions decided to throw at once into the breakthrough “to Africa” - Sharon and Abraham Adan, whom friends usually called Bren.
Sharon’s place was otherwise called the Chinese farm in memory of some Japanese scientists who either studied agriculture in this dead place, or taught the local fellahs to this, and so abandoned their equipment. In some places there were hieroglyphs stuffed under the stencil, and there was no time to distinguish Japanese from Chinese. It was located almost at the junction of the Second and Third Egyptian armies, poorly covered by the 21 armored division. The plan was as follows: Sharon’s division breaks through to the water, “spreads” the two armies of Egyptians and holds the corridor along which the Bren Adan division rushes to the African coast, having a landing brigade commanded by Brigadier General Mata of Denmark. Part of Sharon’s division is also shipped to the Egyptian coast, and part continues to keep the corridor and provide defense of the crossing point. IDF troops, which will cross over to the African coast, are developing an offensive in both directions from the crossing along the canal bank, as well as moving inland to Cairo. Those troops that will go to the north, will capture Ismailia, those who will go to the south, will go to the rear of the Third Army of the enemy. Well, and those who go straight, will threaten the capital of the country. This should make the Egyptians flinch, mix, scare and surrender.
This whole plan was not a personal initiative of Sharon, as they sometimes write. The operation was discussed jointly by Dayan, Elazar, Bar-Lev, Sharon, Gonen and Adan.
Before the water managed to get through extremely easily. At one in the morning of October 16, the 200 paratroopers of the Mata Brigade swam in rubber boats on the west bank. They quickly swam across the channel, took up positions on the enemy shore, but the enemies themselves were not visible. Having provided a bridgehead, they let know that it was possible to build bridges for tanks and equipment. The troops began to pull closer to the water, and engineers began to build a bridge, but then the Egyptians became alarmed and the crossing point on the Israeli coast was subjected to very heavy shelling. At the same time, units of both Egyptian armies tried to close up and squeeze the Israelis from the water. A very intense battle broke out around the Chinese farm.
It was impossible to even think about any bridges. However, here, according to Saad al-Shazli, a “gross error number XXUMX” was made: the categorical refusal of President Sadat and Defense Minister Ismail to allow the withdrawal of the 2 and 4 armored divisions to the west bank, as well as the 21 brigade assigned 21-th division. This was undesirable for political reasons, since the next morning the Minister of Defense and the President were to be at the National Assembly Session, and the President did not want the slightest suspicion of weakness to darken the triumph. When the next morning, the first reports began to be received on the breakthrough of enemy tanks to the west coast in the vicinity of Deversoire, the ban on the withdrawal of forces from Sinai continued to operate. Instead, it was proposed to counterattack the place where the enemy was crossing the channel.
It is the morning of October 16. The first rays of the sun lit up the exciting endless African landscape and frankly lit 200 Israelis, sitting like roosters on a roost, on another side of the canal and without any bridge. The IDF paratroopers could, of course, take the fight and on a flat table, but who wants to be a suicide? One Egyptian bombing, one Egyptian shelling - that's all. Seasoned guys boiled their tea and sat down to wait, what will happen next. Moisei was not at hand, as luck would have it, and the only thing Sharon could do was to launch certain ferries into the water of the canal that could transport the tanks. Slowly, he transported 30 tanks in this way to aid the paratroopers.
The Egyptians viewed the crossing of the Jews and did not pay attention to the raid of tanks along the western bank of the canal. They were strongly annoyed by the forces of the IDF, located near the water at Sinai, between their forces. The pressure on the Israeli corridor increased. The whole day of October 16 was fighting around the crossing point. The generals again gathered to decide how to proceed. Bar-Lev agreed to ship several more tanks to mainland Egypt by ferry, but he did not know what to do next. Dayan decided to go to Africa to figure it out on the spot. He swam with Sharon to the west bank and examined the positions. Palm trees, eucalyptus trees, cultivated soil and not a single Egyptian soldier around. Seven tanks guarded the bridgehead, and the rest went ahead to beat the enemy, if caught. The generals returned to the Sinai coast. The sand, the stones, the smoking machines and the incessant attacks of the Egyptians everywhere. Heavy bulldozers pushed the broken wrecks of cars off the road to let the tanks approach the water.
Bridge engineers have guided. About him should tell a special deal. The crossing was first carried out on rafts, then - on separate pontoons, then - with the help of a pontoon bridge, built of redeemed rubble bought up in France. The Americans, at one time, refused Israel to supply such equipment, so we had to remember the past and do it on our own. Such extraordinary means as the bridge invented by David Laskov — unsinkable, fully prepared and pre-assembled were put into operation.
The idea was to make the construction of a bridge under fire as easy as possible. The bridge had to be assembled in advance at a safe distance, rolled up to the channel on metal rollers / floats (length 9 m, diameter 1.8 m, inside polyurethane foam, weight 5 tons), push ... and the matter is practically with a hat. The reverse side, of course, was the complexity of transporting the monstrous design: forcing a canal, a length of approximately 200 m was required, which gave a weight of 700 tons. The bridge should be towed by tanks, slowly (up to 10 km / h) and straightforwardly (since changing the course of this thing is a whole story). As an option, it was supposed to drag in three or four pieces, and finally assemble at the finish line. This kind of operation was never planned, they were never worked out, the bridge was supposed to be dragged no more than one or two kilometers away - but this was done.
In reality, the assembly of the bridge began about 20 km east of the canal, and the base was raided aviation Egyptians, three cylinders were damaged. The work was completed on October 12. The 7th brigade was on the Syrian front, and the role of tractors went to the tanks of the 257th battalion of the 421st reserve brigade. For some reason, they decided to carry the bridge from the very beginning in one piece. Five tanks were harnessed to the front, two to the right and left, and one to the rear - to use the brake.
The crews, in the most literal sense, fell asleep from fatigue, but in the end the process started, and the device (immediately called a “dinosaur”) successfully overcame the training segment of three kilometers. Then the “dinosaur” was disguised and waited.
The move resumed on October 15 on 20: 30. Two hours were allocated for the transportation of the bridge and subsequent guidance, but the deadline immediately went to. Then an order from above to stop and wait, then traffic jams, then terrain (dunes, funnels, etc.). To successfully overcome the dunes, the number of tanks was brought to the 18, including the "tank skimmers" that pushed the structure from behind.
The cables were periodically torn ... The installed bridge received the nickname "Johnny Bridge" in memory of Lieutenant Colonel Aaron "Johnny" Tan, an engineering officer in the southern district who died during transportation.
In general, the Israeli troops showed unprecedented speed of adaptation to the new conditions of battle. Tactical techniques were invented on the move, which were not dreamed of by suppliers and manufacturers of Israeli weapons. For example, extending long-range 175-mm American guns from the rear positions to the leading edge (which they should never do, but they turned out to be very useful for suppressing heavy anti-aircraft missile bases), building field fortifications from the so-called "gabions" - metal nets, where without cement poured the improvised stone, and thus built the necessary facilities (that is, very quickly built anything, and anywhere), which broke all efficiency records of the activities of field repair shops that were restored during the night under itye day tanks - all of it paid off.
The tanks of the division of Adana with the battle broke through to the crossing and rushed to the west bank. Further events on the two shores developed in absolutely different ways. Around the Chinese farm was such a meat grinder that Sharon received an order from people from Africa to withdraw and retreat from the water. It seemed to Gonen that Sharon’s troops at the crossing point were surrounded and pressed to the water. Sharon, being in battle, saw that he was not surrounded and still holds a corridor through which troops continue to break through to Africa, fuel for tanks and ammunition. But it was given to him with tremendous tension. There was another conflict between Sharon and his superiors. Then they wrote a lot that Sharon had the mindset of a paratrooper, who was used to fighting in the environment, and Gonen had a tanker mindset, always dependent on the rear base, and it was difficult for them to understand each other. After long altercations, Sharon did not withdraw the troops from the African part of Egypt. On the contrary, more and more reinforcements were moving to Africa. Israeli tanks crushed missile systems, approached Ismailia and, most importantly, cut the road along which supplies to the Third Army, fighting at Sinai. Thus, the Israelis seized a bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal and secured a route to Cairo for their tanks.
Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazli:
“I am ashamed to talk about the composition of our forces 17 October. We had 20 infantry and eight armored brigades, grouped into five infantry and two armored divisions. Each infantry division consisted of four tank battalions, one battalion of infantry fighting vehicles, a division of ATRA, one anti-tank battalion, nine artillery batteries (124 tank, 36 Baby installations, 40 BMP, 36 anti 85 mm guns, 90 recoilless rifles, 82 mm and 107 mm , 535 RPGs, 72 field artillery guns, which can also be used as anti-tank guns.While in well-fortified positions with such weapons, the infantry division could repel the attack of forces up to three armored brigades. Nevertheless, we strengthened and each 36 infantry division with additional anti-tank systems, 21 self-propelled anti-tank gun SU-100 and the whole armored brigade. parts immediately after that, but a political decision not to withdraw a single soldier and not a single unit of equipment from Sinai kept these tanks there. Thus, in the morning of October 17, eight armored brigades at the front, somewhat battered in hostilities, were positioned as follows:
- four armored brigades distributed between our 18 bridgeheads. The 2, 7, and 19 divisions were practically inactive;
- one armored brigade led an offensive north of the bridgehead of the Third Army;
- Two armored brigades of the 21 Division, which suffered losses and exhausted by three-day, almost continuous battles, launched an offensive to the south;
- more than 16 km to the west of the channel, one armored brigade cruised along the front of almost 80 km to prevent a new breakthrough of the enemy.
In the combat zone, less than 40 percent of our resources were concentrated. For the battle at Deversuar, we assembled three armored brigades and one infantry brigade against enemy forces in six armored brigades and two infantry brigades — that is, his forces exceeded ours by half, and our offensive plan could only worsen our chances even more. It was a blunder No. 3. On October 17, the Battle of Deversuaire ended in its intended manner.
Step 1. Our offensive in three directions should have begun simultaneously. But, as is usually the case in such cases, everything was successful in the plans, but in practice the synchronization of actions was broken. Each offensive group had to lead the battle alone. Our 116 Infantry Division broke through to the east, to the enemy’s foothold. She managed to destroy several enemy tanks. But when our troops were already at a distance of less than 1,5 km from the canal, they came under heavy enemy fire. Losses grew, and the brigade was forced to retreat.
Step 2. Moving south on the opposite bank, the 21 Division was able to cut the main line of approach of the enemy forces to Deversouar from the east, but she could not move further.
Step 3. Moving north, the 25-I brigade was completely destroyed. The enemy division, consisting of three armored brigades, awaiting the opening of a bridge in 16 km to the east, moved towards our lonely brigade, arranging a classic ambush for it. One brigade blocked our way of approach. The second took the position to our right. The third made a flank round to surround our brigade from the rear. When, moving to the north, our tanks entered the zone of continuous defeat, they attacked them from three sides and pressed them to the lakes from the fourth side. When night fell, only a few surviving tanks were able to retreat back to the bridgehead of the Third Army. Technique and life was wasted. (During the 4 hours, the 86 was knocked out of the 96 T-62 tanks in the fire bag. - Auth. Note). "
- four armored brigades distributed between our 18 bridgeheads. The 2, 7, and 19 divisions were practically inactive;
- one armored brigade led an offensive north of the bridgehead of the Third Army;
- Two armored brigades of the 21 Division, which suffered losses and exhausted by three-day, almost continuous battles, launched an offensive to the south;
- more than 16 km to the west of the channel, one armored brigade cruised along the front of almost 80 km to prevent a new breakthrough of the enemy.
In the combat zone, less than 40 percent of our resources were concentrated. For the battle at Deversuar, we assembled three armored brigades and one infantry brigade against enemy forces in six armored brigades and two infantry brigades — that is, his forces exceeded ours by half, and our offensive plan could only worsen our chances even more. It was a blunder No. 3. On October 17, the Battle of Deversuaire ended in its intended manner.
Step 1. Our offensive in three directions should have begun simultaneously. But, as is usually the case in such cases, everything was successful in the plans, but in practice the synchronization of actions was broken. Each offensive group had to lead the battle alone. Our 116 Infantry Division broke through to the east, to the enemy’s foothold. She managed to destroy several enemy tanks. But when our troops were already at a distance of less than 1,5 km from the canal, they came under heavy enemy fire. Losses grew, and the brigade was forced to retreat.
Step 2. Moving south on the opposite bank, the 21 Division was able to cut the main line of approach of the enemy forces to Deversouar from the east, but she could not move further.
Step 3. Moving north, the 25-I brigade was completely destroyed. The enemy division, consisting of three armored brigades, awaiting the opening of a bridge in 16 km to the east, moved towards our lonely brigade, arranging a classic ambush for it. One brigade blocked our way of approach. The second took the position to our right. The third made a flank round to surround our brigade from the rear. When, moving to the north, our tanks entered the zone of continuous defeat, they attacked them from three sides and pressed them to the lakes from the fourth side. When night fell, only a few surviving tanks were able to retreat back to the bridgehead of the Third Army. Technique and life was wasted. (During the 4 hours, the 86 was knocked out of the 96 T-62 tanks in the fire bag. - Auth. Note). "
The turning point finally occurred on October 19, when it came to the Egyptians that the Third Army was surrounded, and Israeli tanks were in 100 km from Cairo ...
Although Saad al-Shazli believed that even then something could have been saved if it were not for the president’s refusal to withdraw four Egyptian armored brigades from the east bank (two of the 16 division, one of the 2 and th). On the east bank, the Egyptians had more strength than they needed, and on the west bank, too little to reflect the very real threat of the encirclement of the Second and Third armies. As a result, the Third Army (19 45 soldiers and 000 tanks) was surrounded, cut off from the supply bases and its fate was decided by the Israelis and American diplomats. Subsequently, the encircled Third Army became Israel’s political trump card. For the sake of the salvation of its surrounded soldiers, Egypt will have to make very painful concessions ...
The ending should ...
Sources:
M. Shterenshis. Israel. The history of the state. 2009.
Arab-Israeli war 1973 of the year. Chronicle of events on historical documents.
Duke H. Arab-Israeli wars: from the war of independence to the Lebanese campaign. T.2., 1986.
Arab-Israeli wars. Arab look. 2008.
Forcing the Suez Canal. Saad al-Shazli. 1979. Translation into Russian, 2006.
Baryatinsky M. Israeli tanks in battle.
Roads should roll. Learn The Cave of the Evil Bookvoed and others.
For those interested in the topic: here are two very interesting, in my opinion, the film. Participants of the events talk about what happened. Views of the military from both sides of the conflict, maps, documentary footage, computer graphics, high-quality translation into Russian. The films are long, but I did not regret the time spent on them.
Golan Heights 1973 (Tanks T-55, T-62, Centurion "Shot Kal").
Doomsday War (Battle of Sinai).
Golan Heights 1973 (Tanks T-55, T-62, Centurion "Shot Kal").
Doomsday War (Battle of Sinai).
- Alexander Privalov
- Judgment Day. The eve of. Part of 1
Judgment Day. The eve of. Part of 2
Judgment Day. Start. Part of 1
Judgment Day. Start. Part of 2
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