Military Review

"Artillery Vinaigrette", or the Naval Artillery of Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century

128
No doubt, the British, designing their all-big-gun ships, the Dreadnought and Invincible, intended them to fight at great distances. But an interesting question arises: what distances did the British then consider large? To answer it, you need to understand how the British shot at the beginning of the century.


Surprisingly, until 1901, almost the entire Royal Navy, and until 1905, a significant part of it, led training shooting was conducted at a fixed distance - 1000 yards. This is a 914,4 meter, or almost 5 (FIVE) cable. Methodically it looked like this: the gun was loaded, then the necessary sight was installed, after which the gunner had to catch the moment when the ship would be on an even keel and then (not earlier and not later!) To give a shot. It was necessary to shoot when three points were combined: a slot of the rear sight, a front sight and a target. The slightest delay (or, conversely, a premature shot) led to the projectile flying above the target, or falling into the water in front of it.

It was very difficult to capture the moment of the shot, and among many commanders fleet it was believed that a gunner could not be trained: "gunners are born, not become." In any case, with the existing methods of "control" of fire, even trained gunners could not guarantee any effective firing at a distance of more than 5 cable.

Interestingly, in the British fleet optical scopes appeared, but they were completely unclaimed on ships. The fact is that with the existing methods of shooting, aiming with the help of optics led to the fact that the target came into view only very briefly and quickly disappeared from it. Traditional pillar and fly were much more convenient.

The organization of artillery firing was primitive to the extreme by the fact that they were produced at the same distance in 1000 yards (only in one source the author came across the phrase “shooting less than 2 000 yards,” but, generally speaking, 1000 yards also less 2000 yards). In this case, the prepared calculations showed 20-40% hits.

Surprisingly, such a (completely intolerable) situation in the Royal Navy was considered the norm. The overwhelming majority of officers and admirals of the Royal Navy did not consider artillery firing at all to be an important matter and often treated them as an inevitable evil. Cases in which shells intended for artillery exercises were simply thrown overboard were not so rare. T. Ropp wrote:

"The ship commanders considered it almost the most important task of bringing their appearance to the ideal ... In those years," an elegant look was necessary for promotion "and among the sailors there was a joke that the French could always learn about the approach of the British Mediterranean fleet ships radiance ... Shooting from guns was for these beautiful ships a real disaster. When the flagship officers went ashore to avoid participation in firing, the ships sought to use up the amount of ammunition as quickly as possible, causing less damage to the paint. ”


Probably the first person who tried to change something in the established practice was the fifty-year-old captain Percy Scott. He perfected the machine tools on which the calculations worked off loading the guns in order to train them to deliver ammunition to the gun faster and to load it faster, but his most famous invention is the “Scott marker” or “dotter”. This device worked like this: one sailor moved the target along a vertically set plate in front of the gun sight. At the same time, a special device was mounted on the gun barrel, pushing the pencil forward when pressing the trigger. As a result, at the time of the “shot” the pencil put a dot (in English, dot, from where, in fact, the name “dotter” went) opposite the target, and later it was possible to see where the gun was actually aimed at at the moment of opening the fire.

As a result of the use of these devices, the Scylla cruiser, commanded by captain Percy Scott, demonstrated enchanting accuracy in 1899 by achieving 80% hits.

However, despite these impressive results, no doubt, the real merit of P. Scott lies elsewhere. Once, when his cruiser fired with strong agitation, he noticed that the gunner was not trying to catch the moment of the shot, but was spinning up the vertical tip of the gun in order to try to keep the target in the sight all the time. And P. Scott immediately adopted this method.

В historical It is customary for literature to give praise to P. Scott for his instruments and perseverance in their implementation in the Navy. But in fact, the key merit of P. Scott is not at all a “dotter”, which, of course, was a witty and useful device, but which in itself initially only allowed to achieve better results with the existing, frankly vicious method of shooting. The main merit of P. Scott is that he came up with and put into practice the principle of continuous target retention in the sight, reorganizing the gun guidance process itself (as far as you can understand, he divided the functions of the horizontal and vertical guidance of the gun, appointing two gunners for this). Thus, he created the prerequisites for the use of optical rangefinders, and for shooting at distances significantly exceeding 5 cable.

But in the future, P. Scott was forced for several years not to promote artillery science, but to popularize what had already been achieved. Having received under his command the cruiser "Terribl" P. Scott trained his commanders in their techniques. His brilliant results still attracted the attention of commanders, with the result that the ships of the Chinese station began to train according to the method of P. Scott.


HMS "Terrible"


Surprisingly, but the fact is that in the Royal Navy they did not consider it necessary to compete in artillery training. And even in 1903 g, when P. Scott, at that time became the commander of the Artillery School on about. Whale, strongly suggested introducing shooting competitions between ships and squadrons, the fleet's top management refused to let him in and did not do anything like that. Fortunately, if it did not resolve this, then at least it did not prohibit it, leaving the issues of artillery preparation to the discretion of the fleet commanders. And it just so happened that just at the time of P. Scott's success, the British Mediterranean fleet was commanded by a certain vice-admiral (in 1902, the full admiral) by the name of John Arbethnot Fisher. The next step in the path of artillery progress was to be made precisely for him. Of course, D. Fisher immediately introduced in the fleet entrusted to him and the methods of P. Scott and competitive shooting.

A little remark. As soon as the British fleet (at least its part, that is, the ships of the Chinese station and the Mediterranean fleet) began to shoot using an optical sight, it turned out ... that these sights are completely incapacitated. Admiral C. Bridge responded as follows:

“It is impossible to characterize with greater severity the shameful scandal with our worthless sights; the sights of the guns of the ships of Her Royal Majesty "Centurion" were so defective that the ship could not go into battle with them. "


But, in addition to introducing the new P. Scott, it was D. Fisher who tried to increase the distance of artillery fire and see what would come of it. In 1901 r, the Mediterranean fleet starts firing at shields for long distances - according to some sources up to 25-30 cable.

The result, of course, was disappointing. It turned out that the skills gained by the commanders when shooting at a distance in the 5 cable were absolutely not suitable for shooting at the distance 2-3 miles. As for the fire control system ...

The British battleships had the following, if I may say so, OMS. Each 305-mm tower was connected to a conning tower with a speaking tube (not a telephone!), And a dozen 152-mm guns were divided into three groups with a speaking pipe each. The group was commanded by a casemate officer, there were four cannons in his headquarters - but since they were located on both sides, he usually needed to control the firing of only two guns.

At the top of the navigational felling, the Barra and Struda rangefinder was installed, and a negotiation tube was also laid to it from the conning tower. It was assumed that the range finder reports the distance to the conning tower, and from there this information will be communicated to the commanders of the towers and casemate officers. Alas, back in 1894 g, it turned out that it was absolutely impossible to transfer anything through the negotiation tube during firing - the roar of shots drowned out everything.

Accordingly, the process of bringing the distance to the commanders took place in the traditional, unhurried, not afraid of this word - Victorian style. If the commander of the tower or the casemate officer wanted to know the distance to the enemy, they sent a messenger to the conning tower. There, having listened to the request, they sent the messenger back from where he came from, and already sent their messenger to the range finder. He recognized the distance and then ran to the tower or dungeon to inform her of the interested officer.
Of course, there was no centralized fire control. Each tower commander and casemate officer fired completely on their own, ignoring the others.

The effectiveness of such a fire control system is extremely difficult to diminish. Of course, it would have been possible to shoot for a thousand yards like that, but with an increase in the firing distance, this approach showed its complete inconsistency. The experience of firing squadrons of the Mediterranean fleet prompted D. Fischer the following:

1) The need for a single caliber. Correcting the fire of two or more calibers was almost impossible due to the difficulty of recognizing bursts at the site of the falling projectiles.

2) Fire control must be centralized. This resulted from the fact that during the 25-30 cable course neither the tower commander nor the casemate officers could distinguish the fall of their volleys from the volleys of the other guns and, accordingly, could not adjust the fire

Why did D. Fisher come to this and not P. Scott? It is not that P. Scott did not understand that in the future we should expect an increase in the distances of artillery combat to far more than 5 cables, but he was simply not allowed to carry out his research. Such things cannot be developed theoretically, without constant verification by practice, and P. Scott asked to provide him for the experiments of the armored cruiser Drake. However, someone at the top thought it was overkill and P. Scott was left with nothing. Instead, the Admiralty Council instructed Rear Admirals R. Castens and H. Lambton, who held their flag on Venerable and Victorios, respectively, to study the possibilities of long-range shooting. According to the results of the study, they should give answers to a number of questions, the main of which were:

1) Is a shooting practice program necessary, or is it not needed? (as far as can be understood, the Admiralty attended to this issue only in 1903)

2) Should the guns be controlled centrally, or should the individual guidance of gunners and battery officers be maintained?

Sadly, the brave rear admirals failed their assignments. No, they, of course, spent the amount of coal and shells they were supposed to test, but they did not find out anything that D. Fisher would not have learned after 1901 shooting. At the same time, the admirals ’conclusions contradicted each other, and most importantly - they never were able to offer some efficient methods of artillery fire at a distance of at least 25-30 cable. Responsible commissions have long studied the results of research and methodological recommendations on shooting, compiled by R. Castance and H. Lambton, and came to the conclusion that they still managed to do better at Venerable. Recommendations R. Kastansa were proposed for execution by the commanders of the Royal Navy. Moreover, it was proposed, because they explicitly stated that "alternative systems can be used instead." And since these recommendations were extremely complex (O. Parks directly states: “impossible to implement”), no one followed them.

The main merit of D. Fisher when he was in command of the Mediterranean fleet was that in practice he was convinced of the fairness of the all-big-gun concept. But he was unable to develop new methods of using artillery for firing at increased distances. In other words, D. Fisher found out WHAT should be fired from and how NOT to shoot, but could not suggest how to do it.

Why did D. Fisher not complete his enterprise? Apparently, the problem was that, having organized his famous shooting in 1901, already in 1902 he received a new appointment and became the second sea lord, which he held until the end of 1904. This time in the history of the Royal Navy is called the “Era of Fisher "Because it was then that he carried out his main transformations. Obviously, he simply did not have enough time and opportunities to deal with artillery issues.
However, these possibilities of D. Fisher appeared when he became the first sea lord in October 1904. The caricature that appeared in the weekly Punch in the same month is instructive. In the Admiralty, stylized as a grill bar, there are two: John Bull (a humorous collective image of England) as a visitor and Jackie Fisher as a chef. The inscription under the caricature reads: “No more Gunnery Hash”

And so it turned out in reality: as early as February, 1905 G removed P. Scott to the position of Inspector of Shooting Practice (at the same time raising him in rank). And at the same time, another “protégé” of John Arbetnoth Fisher - John Jellico - becomes the Chief of Naval Artillery. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know the name of the officer who at that time occupied the position of the Captain Artillery School, which P. Scott left, but without a doubt, he was an outstanding person and sharing the views of D. Fisher and P. Scott. Apparently, for the first time in English history, the main “artillery” posts were occupied by unconditionally talented people ready to work together.

And it is from this point that one can finally talk about the start of systematic work to improve the methods of shooting in the Royal Navy. It is in 1905 for the first time in English practice that a new exam is introduced, the so-called “combat shooting”. Its essence is as follows - a warship from all trunks and within 5 minutes firing at a large towed target. At the same time, the course is also changing (unfortunately, O. Parks does not indicate whether the towing vehicle changed the course, or whether the shooting ship did it). The distance during shooting varies from 5 000 to 7 000 yards, i.e. from about 25 to 35 cable. The results were evaluated in points accrued for various achievements - shooting accuracy, rate of fire, timely start of shooting, “keeping” the distance. Points could also be removed - for unused ammunition and other shortcomings.

The results of the first shooting, P. Scott described as "deplorable". However, it could not be otherwise - the Royal Navy in 1905 g did not have any rules of fire, no sights, which were suitable for their purpose, or devices for controlling the shooting. In other words, the British gunners simply could not shoot at 25-35 cable.

This is also confirmed by D. Fisher’s experimental shooting of 1901, about which O. Parks writes

"... distances 5 000 - 6 000 yards could be the fighting distances of the near future, and with proper fire control, it is quite possible to get a large percentage of hits on distances 8 000 yards and more. ”


So, based on the foregoing, we can safely say that the conventional wisdom that the UK had begun to create the Dreadnought, influenced by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, has no basis. In terms of shooting control, the British and 1905 G still had very little to move from the dead center of the pre-war standards - they knew that since they were shooting, they could not shoot, but they still didn’t figure out how to shoot.



Both the Dreadnought and the Invincible battlecruiser were designed at a time when the fleet had not yet learned how to even shoot 25-30 cables, but already realized that it was possible and hoped to master it soon - if some clever heads would explain the fleet, how it should be done, of course. And sometime later, with the appropriate progress of the artillery science - what the devil of the sea is not joking - it may be possible to fight on the 40 cable (8 000 yards), or even more.

And therefore it is completely pointless to wonder why the British in the Invincible project did not make efforts to ensure the fire of all eight guns on one side. This is the same as asking why a fourth-grade student in middle school does not solve differential equations. The British still had a lot of work to do to learn how to shoot long distances and find out that you need to have at least 8 guns aboard in order to shoot four-gun half-salts, reloading the guns while others are shooting. Well, at the time of the design of the "Dreadnought" their views looked like this:

“The results of firing at long distances showed that if we want to have good results on 6 000 yards (30 kbt - auth. Note) and more, guns must fire slowly and carefully, and aim more easily when the volley gives one gun. Consequently, the need to use a large number of guns disappears, and the advantage of several well-aimed guns with a large explosive charge is enormous ... ... Suppose, to ensure proper rate of fire, every 12-d (305-mm) gun is aimed at the target for a minute. If you shoot six guns consecutively, you can send a projectile of enormous destructive power every 10 seconds. ”


What sighting four-gun salvoes can we talk about?

But there is another aspect that is usually overlooked. In the military-historical literature, it has long been commonplace to what the world should curse the system of training the gunners of the Russian Imperial Navy. But when the top officials of the Royal Navy were still discussing that the ships of the Lady of the Seas would soon learn to shoot 5 000 - 6 000 thousands of yards, Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky led the Second Pacific Squadron entrusted to his command to Tsushima.

“The first Russian volleys saved the Japanese from pleasant illusions. There was no hint of indiscriminate firing, on the contrary for a distance of thousands of yards in 9 it was unusually accurate shootingand in the first few minutes of the Mikaz and Sikisim they got a series of hits with six-inch shells ... "


According to the report of Captain Packinham, a British observer, the entire Russian-Japanese war did not descend from the battleship Asahi, within fifteen minutes of the start of the battle, from 14: 10 to 14: 25 "Mikasa" received nineteen hits - five 305-mm and fourteen 152-mm shells. And another six hits were other Japanese ships. At the same time, at the time of opening fire, the distance between Mikasa and the head Prince Suvorov was at least 38 KB (about 8 000 yards) and increased further.

Here I would like to note this. Studying domestic and foreign, translated into Russian sources devoted to naval history (yes, at least, and O. Parks) you encounter a surprising difference in the approaches of their compilation. While domestic authors consider it a matter of honor to highlight and in no case miss in their research even the most insignificant negative design of ships or combat training of the fleet, foreign authors either bypass these issues in silence, or write in such a way that I have said something about flaws, but there is a persistent feeling that all this stuff is until you begin to analyze the text "with a pencil in your hands."

What should the domestic lover of the history of the navy, who was brought up on the dogma about the curvature of Russian artillerymen of the Russian-Japanese war, feel, seeing such a graph of the level of artillery training cited by O. Parks?



Of course, the burning desire to prostrate before the genius of the British artillery science. But what impression would there be if O. Parks didn’t write a vague “one and the same distance” in the explanation of the schedule, but would directly indicate that it’s about shooting from a 5 cable distance (no other can not, because in 1897 r at long distances simply did not shoot)? The impression IMMEDIATELY reversed: so what, it turns out that in the Royal Navy also in 1907, two years after the Russian-Japanese war, someone still managed to train the gunners in shooting 1000 yards ?!

As an unscientific fantasy: it would be extremely interesting to find out what would happen if, by the wave of a magic wand in the Tsushima Strait, there were suddenly no Rozhdestvensky ships, but the corresponding squadron of Her Majesty’s ships with British sailors and commander. And, of course, with its rifle scopes, the inability to use them, the 5 cable shooting experience, projectiles filled with a large amount of black powder ... But in the best British traditions, polished and sparkling from the keel to the short. The author of this article does not undertake to say for sure, but, in his personal opinion, the English in Tsushima would be waiting for an enchanting debacle.

Thank you for attention!

PS It was assumed that this article will be a continuation of the cycle “Errors of British shipbuilding. The Invincible battle cruiser, but during its writing, the author deviated so much from the original topic that he decided to place it outside of the specified cycle.
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  1. Cartalon
    Cartalon 31 January 2018 15: 47
    +7
    Thanks terribly interesting, the question arises, but what was going on among the French, Germans and Americans?))
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 16: 24
      +5
      Quote: Cartalon
      Thank you

      You're welcome!
      Quote: Cartalon
      the question arises, what was going on among the French, Germans and Americans?

      It is interesting to me too :)))) If I collect enough material - I will write necessarily :)
    2. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 1 February 2018 22: 23
      0
      "The Tsushima Strait were suddenly not Rozhdestvensky’s ships, but the squadron corresponding to them in speed and armament of Her Majesty’s ships with British sailors and the commander" ////

      When you consider that the instructors of the Japanese pr art. It was the British who fired, most likely Rozhdestvensky would have surrendered even faster.
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 1 February 2018 23: 22
        0
        Quote: voyaka uh
        most likely Rozhdestvensky would give up even faster.


        But Rozhdestvensky, in fact, did not give up.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        2 February 2018 12: 48
        +2
        Quote: voyaka uh
        When you consider that the instructors of the Japanese pr art. it was the British who were shooting

        Were not. Originally there were, but then the Japanese went further, helped them in this Sino-Japanese war
        Quote: voyaka uh
        most likely Rozhdestvensky would give up even faster.

        That is, if instead of Christmas would have been the British then Christmas would have surrendered faster? Bravo. And yes, Rozhdestvensky didn’t give up at all
  2. looker-on
    looker-on 31 January 2018 15: 50
    +3
    Brilliantly! Thank you very much. It will be very interesting to read what lessons we have learned after 1905, Andrei. It is believed that the makings of a centralized fire system have Russian roots. The quality and accuracy of shooting after the Russo-Japanese in the Russian fleet increased by an order of magnitude.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 16: 26
      +3
      Quote: looker-on
      Thank you.

      And thank you!
      Quote: looker-on
      It will be very interesting to read what lessons we learned after 1905, Andrei.

      The question, of course, is interesting :))) Both complicated and ambiguous. Because, oddly enough, but the thesis
      Quote: looker-on
      The quality and accuracy of shooting after the Russo-Japanese in the Russian fleet increased by an order of magnitude.

      let's just say ... not in dispute.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 31 January 2018 18: 14
      +5
      Quote: looker-on
      The quality and accuracy of shooting after the Russo-Japanese in the Russian fleet increased by an order of magnitude.

      In the exercises, yes. But in practice ...
      The Black Sea Fleet, all the pre-war time, practiced squadron shooting and individual long-range shooting. In real combat conditions, both squadron firing of the Black Sea Fleet failed. Moreover, in the battle near the Bosphorus, “John Chrysostom” was not even able to shoot individually, although he fired practically in the shooting range (“Goeben” at that time tried unsuccessfully to get into “Eustache”). He pulled the battle "Panteleimon", which from the moment it was put into operation, it actually served as an experimental artillery ship.
      Before the war, the Baltic Fleet also shot a lot and variably, ships regularly took prizes. The war began ... and we have a battle near the island of Gotland. Once again, the failure of the squadron shooting: the burning Albatross went into Swedish waters, the rest of the German ships left completely, while the consumption of Bayan shells was 2/3 BC. Fight “Rurik” in general horror-horror-horror ... especially “pleases” his fight with “Lubeck”: the German 10,5 cm reach the “Rurik”, and the “Rurik” 120-mm give some misses.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 1 February 2018 09: 54
        +2
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Before the war, the Baltic Fleet also shot a lot and variably, ships regularly took prizes. The war began ... and we have a battle near the island of Gotland. Once again, the failure of the squadron shooting: the burning Albatross went into Swedish waters, the rest of the German ships left completely, while the consumption of Bayan shells was 2/3 BC. Fight “Rurik” in general horror-horror-horror ... especially “pleases” his fight with “Lubeck”: the German 10,5 cm reach the “Rurik”, and the “Rurik” 120-mm give some misses.


        Well, shooting in hothouse conditions, training firing is always better - the heads of the art of Derflinger, 2nd-rank captain G. Haase, writes in his memoirs “On the Derflinger in the Battle of Jutland”:
        "... It surprised me that not a single shell hit us, and I began to look at the towers of our enemy. I found that this ship did not shoot at us, but, like its front gun, the flagship cruiser. I looked at the enemy cruiser following him — he had guns pointing at our rear gunner. There was no doubt that the enemy had a mistake from the very beginning of the battle and no one was shooting at us. I laughed in my soul and began, with complete calm, as in training shooting, to control the fire with increasing accuracy. All thoughts of death and death - like a hand off.
        A sports feeling aroused, and everything in me rejoiced and strove to achieve better results. I mumbled quietly: “They don’t shoot at us.” But this news immediately spread throughout the artillery post, where everyone, except for two artillery officers and two non-commissioned officers at the central aim, had to be content with the information we provided, since they could not see the enemy. "


        The psychological load during the battle is so high that it was difficult to deal with it even for an officer who was in a well-booked fire control cabin, and this is not the first battle. One can imagine that the lower ranks of the guns were tested.
        Obviously, this also affected the results of the shooting, when the distance adjustment commands were not heard at the first volleys.

        ... The third and fourth volley were again migratory, despite the fact that after the third I ordered: "4,5 less" (8 gcm). I realized that something was amiss, and shouted into the headphone, connecting me to the ship’s midshipman, who was watching in the central post: "Midshipman Stakhov! Someone lied with the installation. Once again, 4,5 less (8 gkm.)."
        The shooting record then showed that the first “8 less” were not heard and transferred to the guns, and therefore only the sixth salvo, at 5 hours 52 meters, was covered: two drops behind the target, one in front of the target. Meanwhile, the distance was decreasing: the machine was first set to -1 (-2 gkm.), And then -1,5 (-3 gkm.), In addition, I reduced the installation by 9 cabs. (16 gkm.), So now the installation of the sight was 61 cab. (119 gkm.).

        For four minutes the battle was on, and only now we have achieved cover. Such a result could not please. I explained to myself the wrong measurement of the initial distance by the fact that rangefinders examined at first, before the start of fire, enemy vessels, enlarged by 23 times, and were so depressed by the unfolding picture that they received a sudden order to open fire, they did not have time to check the measured distance. There can be no other explanation, since Zeiss rangefinders throughout the battle acted perfectly ...
  3. long in stock.
    long in stock. 31 January 2018 16: 08
    +4
    sorry if everything is so why did the Japanese win in Tsushima? they prepared the fleet according to English patterns. if they believed the author, they should have lost by the logic of the article. - This did not happen. why?
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 31 January 2018 16: 15
      +5
      Because the Japanese Navy was not an exact copy of the British Navy, and had their own experience according to the experience of the Sino-Japanese War - including practicing shooting at a distance of more than 5 cable (the British naval traditions prevented them from learning quickly from someone else's experience moment). Well, Tsushima was lost due to shortcomings of materiel, in particular shells with an extremely low explosive content - while the Japanese fired powerful landmines, the Russian battleships responded with something that was little distinguishable from simple cast-iron blanks. And all this, the author has long since chewed in his series of articles "Tsushima Myths."
      1. long in stock.
        long in stock. 31 January 2018 16: 27
        +2
        maybe so. but still. ships were bought in England there and equipped. I do not really believe in the possibility of the Japanese to create and install suo in those days. The author himself writes, The results of the first firing, P. Scott described as "deplorable." However, it could not be otherwise - the Royal Navy in 1905 had neither shooting rules, nor sights that met its purpose, nor firing control devices. In other words, the British artillery simply did not know how to shoot at 25-35 cable. Accordingly, Japanese ships didn’t have the same thing.
        1. arturpraetor
          arturpraetor 31 January 2018 16: 32
          +3
          The British and Japanese SLAs were generally the same, but the Japanese had long-range shooting techniques (compared to the British 5 cable), and they actively practiced them, respectively, raising their sights. For this, the Japanese - quite an enterprising and not stupid people - then had enough resources. It is a huge mistake to equate the Japanese and British Navy, for several decades the Japanese had purposefully developed their fleet and had more experience of military operations at sea than the British to follow the path of stupid copying, and the British had a long stagnation in the absence of practice - because for which, in fact, such deplorable affairs with art. firing is almost inevitable: the daily "everyday life" has long stood at the head of the maritime service, pushing the military component.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          31 January 2018 18: 04
          +3
          Quote: Long in stock.
          I do not really believe in the possibility of the Japanese on their own to create and establish suo

          The question was not in the SLA, the Japanese had it frankly so-so, but the individual skill of the gunners was the highest
          1. long in stock.
            long in stock. 31 January 2018 21: 16
            +1
            but you should understand that you can’t get by with just the training of the gunners. you described very well how the connection was made. Accordingly, the process of bringing the distance to the commandants took place in a traditional, unhurried way, we will not be afraid of the word - Victorian style. If the tower commander or casemate officer wanted to know the distance to the enemy, they sent a messenger to the conning tower. There, after listening to the request, they sent the envoy back to where he had come from, and they sent their messenger to the rangefinder. He recognized the distance and then fled to the tower or the casemate to inform the officer of interest to him. With such a case, no preparation of the gunners will save. Andrei, with all due respect, the article is very controversial ..
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              1 February 2018 08: 17
              +3
              Quote: Long in stock.
              oh, you should understand that you can’t get by with just the training of gunmen. You described very well how the connection was made

              The Japanese had a little different. The range finder measured the distance, after which special messengers wrote the distance on the tablets and ran to the gunners, showed :)))
              Quote: Long in stock.
              With all due respect, the article is very controversial ..

              I don’t mind, but will there be any kind of argumentation? :) "The Japanese didn’t know how because the English didn’t know how" is still not an argument, because it is based solely on the opinion that the Japanese didn’t bring anything of their own, but such an opinion needs to be proved somehow
              1. long in stock.
                long in stock. 1 February 2018 08: 32
                +2
                the argument is simple - if there is no means of communication, if there is no single suo then the shooting will be the same for everyone. Due to the training of the commandants, you can increase the percentage of hits, but even shooting the guns will not work together. Each gun will shoot on its own. That could bring a new the Japanese? the speed of the messengers? while they write until they reach_ what distance does the target go?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  1 February 2018 17: 10
                  +2
                  Quote: Long in stock.
                  the argument is simple - if there is no means of communication, if there is no single suo then the shooting will be the same for everyone.

                  Well, the naval history strongly disagrees with you. The Spanish-American War, for example. And I strongly recommend that you look at the results of training firing of the same ships, which after a downtime, the results moved down one and a half times (EMNIP, Cahul after a three-week rest in reserve)
              2. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 2 February 2018 21: 29
                +1
                The proof is that the 3 newest Japanese armadillos (including Mikasa) were built in England and transferred to Japan just before the war (in 2 years). The newest tools needed to be learned to control. The English taught naturally. And not shooting at a minimum distance of 5 cable (1 km), which is anecdotal. In 1902, an alliance treaty was signed between Japan and England. He determined the relationship.
      2. yehat
        yehat 31 January 2018 17: 01
        +1
        The Japanese Navy studied with the Americans, and those from the French, Russians and Germans
      3. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 3 February 2018 13: 36
        0
        "Because the Japanese Navy was not an exact copy of the British Navy," ///

        Exactly what was. Reduced copy of Royal Navy. With the latest English ships, long-range guns, maneuvering and firing methods.
    2. andrewkor
      andrewkor 31 January 2018 16: 27
      +1
      And still the japas tried their best to leave the best commandors to the extra urgent, and Rozhdestvensky had a lot of reservists from the 19th century!
  4. Amurets
    Amurets 31 January 2018 16: 18
    +3
    PS It was assumed that this article will be a continuation of the cycle “Errors of British shipbuilding. The Invincible battle cruiser, but during its writing, the author deviated so much from the original topic that he decided to place it outside of the specified cycle.

    This article does not fit into the cycle, but it very well describes the state of preparation of the commandants of the English fleet. Thanks, interesting. I don’t remember which book I read, EMNIP "Rurik was the first," about how they prepared the commandants in the RIF, using the Berdan rifle mounted on the gun barrel, as well as small-caliber guns. Thanks for the interesting stuff. I just want to add a page with a photo of the Voroshilov Battery tower with a training barrel mounted on the barrel.
    1. Bormanxnumx
      Bormanxnumx 31 January 2018 16: 30
      +1
      Quote: Amurets
      "about how they prepared the commandants in the RIF, using the Berdan rifle mounted on the gun’s barrel,

      An “inserted” barrel was inserted directly into the barrel channel of the “main” gun, and was not attached externally.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        31 January 2018 17: 57
        +2
        Quote: BORMAN82
        An “inserted” barrel was inserted directly into the barrel channel of the “main” gun, and was not attached externally.

        Absolutely not, could be mounted on top
        1. Bormanxnumx
          Bormanxnumx 31 January 2018 20: 16
          +2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Absolutely not, could be mounted on top

          Specifically for the training shooting "Rurik":
          "... In order to delay the wear time of an expensive gun and reduce the costs of equally expensive ammunition, for the training of the commandants came up with stem firing, during which all manipulations were performed on the maintenance of the gun (loading, aiming, shot), but the gun was not fired, but inserted inside the barrel of the 37-47-mm gun was even more economical, with auxiliary firing when the training barrel inserted into the gun’s channel was loaded not with its full-time combat, but with a special hollow “auxiliary cartridge”, the axis of which was the barrel of the 10,67-mm Berdan rifle (Then they used trunks of a three-linear 7,62-mm Mosin rifle), a shot was fired from it. With the same practical training effect, instead of many thousands of rubles, training shooting (a 152-mm shot cost 172 rubles 36kop., a203- mm - 405 rubles. 71 kopecks) cost insignificant expenses on rifle cartridges. Nowadays, barrel firing is simplified - the training barrel is installed not inside, but on the outside of the gun. .. "PM Melnikov. Cruiser I rank "Rurik" 1889-1904
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            1 February 2018 08: 19
            +2
            There are a bunch of photos where the trunks were mounted on top. In terms of exercise, this is completely unimportant
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 16: 40
      +5
      Quote: Amurets
      using the Berdan rifle mounted on the gun’s barrel,

      Yes, that’s absolutely true - this is stem firing. You can’t replace full-fledged shooting with them, but as one of the ways to train artillerymen, it’s wonderful
      1. Dedall
        Dedall 31 January 2018 23: 32
        +3
        Well, the highest and absurd form of such training is being applied now. I mean the case that somehow our unit was rewarded for 1st place in shooting at a martial art contest. By the way, your humble servant also participated in them. And as a bonus, we received a laser simulator worth about 150 thousand. The attached laser, which was inserted through the adapters into the gates of AK and PM, was enough for 5000 shots. And all ... That is, the simulator did not work further without the most important part. And the manufacturing plant refused to send a new one. And the cost of one cartridge, if anyone does not know, is about 5 rubles. So it turns out that this simulator gave savings in ammunition consumption by 25-30 thousand rubles. But he was worth hoo how much! And this shows a purely Russian approach to saving.
      2. Amurets
        Amurets 1 February 2018 05: 14
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Yes, that’s absolutely true - this is stem firing. You can’t replace full-fledged shooting with them, but as one of the ways to train artillerymen, it’s wonderful

        Not a topic, but a remarkable moment. In 1941, on the 30th BB, the trunks removed from the guns were adapted to old carriages and received a small-caliber battery. From the book “The Feat of the 30th Battery .... Okunev also asked several tactical questions. He immediately grabbed the commander’s thought. Four guns, even forty-five millimeters, are a big help in land defense. Skilfully directed shells can do considerable harm to the enemy: break through the side armor of a tank, armored car or an armored personnel carrier, deploy the shield of an anti-tank gun.This is a great way to "pick out" the enemy from the funnels, machine gun nests. A direct hit on a machine gun will immediately destroy it along with the calculation ...
        When Andrienko started designing the carriage, it turned out that all the work would take months. And it was necessary to do very quickly.
        Andrienko went to the rear artillery department, where they promised to give old gun carriages of seventy-six millimeter guns. This greatly simplified the matter. "So adapted training trunks for the defense of the 30th coastal battery.
      3. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 1 February 2018 10: 03
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        and, quite rightly, these are stem firing. You can’t replace full-fledged shooting with them, but as one of the ways to train gunners, it’s wonderful


        Just for shooting at 1000 m.
        For shooting at medium and long distances - this method is useless.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 February 2018 17: 11
          +1
          Quote: DimerVladimer
          For shooting at medium and long distances - this method is useless.

          Why? :)))) On the trunk, at least 100 kbt simulate without problems
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 5 February 2018 12: 24
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Why? :)))) On the trunk, at least 100 kbt simulate without problems


            Rifle cartridge firing results are not visible. The commandor can only see the result after firing, which reduces the effectiveness of the method.
            Explore the caliber of the trunks
            for training tank crews on the direct track - and this is 1000-1500 m.

            14,5X114mm, GRAU index: 2X15, 2X30 or 2X35

            And shooting at a range of 10000 m is only a method suitable for repelling a mine attack.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 31 January 2018 18: 25
      +4
      Quote: Amurets
      I don’t remember which book I read, EMNIP "Rurik was the first," about how they prepared the commandants in the RIF, using the Berdan rifle mounted on the gun barrel, as well as small-caliber guns.

      This was for everyone. Here are the training shots of the IJN Yamashiro LC - from small-caliber barrels fixed over the GK barrels:
  5. Rakovor
    Rakovor 31 January 2018 16: 51
    +3
    Thanks, interesting article. And there are really a lot of questions about the Russo-Japanese War. For example, I still don’t understand why our sailors, who lost the general battle to their superior enemy, are interfered with dirt by everyone who is not lazy, but this enemy himself, after almost 40 years with a bang, who lost his general battle, while having overwhelming superiority in forces no one does not scold and everyone considers them excellent fighters?
  6. yehat
    yehat 31 January 2018 17: 03
    +2
    A very interesting article that opens your eyes to a whole string of processes!
    Thank you!
  7. Nehist
    Nehist 31 January 2018 17: 19
    +2
    Hmm !!! Good day Andrew. It’s a very controversial article ... In the RIF, as far as I remember, the effective battle distance was considered 10-15 cable, and at 25 cable, the shooting should begin when approaching the effective distance, this is the conclusion that was drawn from the Sino-Japanese War. At a distance of 40 cable altogether, only occasional defamation was generally possible. And I would not categorically trust Pekingham, he has too much discrepancy with the Japanese history of war at sea ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 18: 03
      +3
      Quote: Nehist
      Hmm !!! Good day Andrew.

      Greetings!
      Quote: Nehist
      In the RIF, as far as I remember, the effective battle distance was considered 10-15 cable, and with 25 cable, the shooting should begin when approaching

      Before the REV, yes. Nevertheless, the Christmas 2TOE taught differently, I quoted documents, there are completely different ranges
      Quote: Nehist
      And I would not categorically trust Pekingham, he has too much discrepancy with the Japanese history of war at sea ...

      In case of discrepancies, Pekingham is perhaps more credible than Japanese officialdom. In addition, there is, after all, a "Surgical Description", the most that neither is Japanese, but it with Packinham according to
  8. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 31 January 2018 17: 58
    +2
    Very interesting
  9. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 31 January 2018 18: 19
    +5
    The article is a definite plus! good
    The British were terribly lucky that during these few years of the late 19th and early 20th centuries until the REE they did not wage significant wars with naval powers, but remained in peace of confidence in their unofficial title of Mistress of the Seas. I didn’t have to study with blood, as we did with the Japanese. Therefore, it turned out so successfully that with the right people came the realization of changes in the artillery business. The REV simply confirmed this and only gave acceleration for the implementation of changes. But if in the matter of building ships the British managed to surprise the world with the "Dreadnought", then bringing to mind the artillery economy took time because of the indecently large housekeeping.
    And since the gods were supportive of the Anglo-Saxons, the time before the WWII they had a decent
    Thanks again for the interesting material. hi
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 19: 19
      +3
      Quote: Rurikovich
      The British were terribly lucky that during these few years of the end of the 19 and the beginning of the 20 centuries until the REV they did not wage significant wars with naval powers, but rested in calm assurance of their unofficial title of Mistress of the Seas.

      I subscribe to every word. hi
  10. Dashing
    Dashing 31 January 2018 19: 04
    +2
    I read the material with great interest. Amazed. Still, how strong the stereotypes are: they have invested in us since childhood the postulate of the enlightened West and the bastard race, and you think that the British, unlike us sinners, would have rolled out the Japs under Tsushima. But no. Thanks to the author, countryman.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      31 January 2018 19: 20
      +2
      Quote: DARK
      Still, how strong the stereotypes are: they have invested in us since childhood the postulate of the enlightened West and the bastard race, and you think that the British, unlike us sinners, would have rolled out the Japs under Tsushima

      I totally agree. For this I write :) hi
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 31 January 2018 20: 35
        +3
        Andrei, the Japanese would hardly have defeated the British! The samurai shells would have ended faster. All the same, 57 armadillos is too much))))
        1. Paranoid50
          Paranoid50 31 January 2018 21: 12
          +2
          Quote: Nehist
          57 armadillos is too much))))

          Well, it’s unlikely that they would all be there ... We still need to get to the region. What to guess by "if". Given the facts set forth in Andrei’s article, unacceptable damage to the Britons was guaranteed. yes
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 February 2018 08: 20
          +2
          Well, I wrote - the squadron in number of Rozhdestvensky :)))))
    2. Rakovor
      Rakovor 1 February 2018 13: 32
      0
      Well, if they hadn’t rolled it out, we would have driven it into bases, like the Germans.
  11. faiver
    faiver 31 January 2018 19: 47
    +2
    as always - five points good hi
  12. Bouncer
    Bouncer 31 January 2018 19: 56
    16
    enchanting defeat in Tsushima

    Totally agree
    And the old woman is proruha
    And our weary motley squadrons undeservedly became a boy for - not shaving, but beating
  13. 27091965
    27091965 31 January 2018 20: 08
    +2
    so what, it turns out that in the Royal Navy also in 1907, two years after the Russian-Japanese war, someone still managed to train the gunners in shooting 1000 yards ?!


    The article is a wonderful and very interesting topic, but O. Parks is not worth referring to. He describes the prize firing, in the English sense it is a struggle for the prize, which checked the coherence of artillery calculations, the speed of guidance and the number of hits. They really were conducted at a distance of 800 to 1400 meters. Training firing was conducted at a distance of 3000 to 4000 thousand meters.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 31 January 2018 20: 24
      +2
      Quote: 27091965i
      Training firing was conducted at a distance from 3000 to 4000 thousand meters.

      Ummm ... either the zeros are extra, or "thousands"Otherwise, it turns out that the Britons on the EDB of the beginning of the last century were" Polaris " smile
      Sorry for the tedium.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 31 January 2018 20: 31
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Ummm .... or the extra zeroes, or "thousands."


        I apologize. Thousands are superfluous. Thank. hi
    2. Dedall
      Dedall 31 January 2018 23: 40
      +1
      I can even assume that the English firing on the Royal Nany ships looked about the same as in the video shooting from the Indian cannon. There, the Indians are very funny jumping and dancing. They didn’t come up with this themselves - they peeped from the Angles and creatively developed it.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 February 2018 08: 21
      +2
      Quote: 27091965i
      Training firing was conducted at a distance from 3000 to 4000 thousand meters.

      Much later. Moreover, this is not Parks :)
      1. 27091965
        27091965 1 February 2018 11: 08
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Plus it's not Parks


        Some of the examples you cited were taken from the review "At the Shooting of the Fleet." Commander c. N. Robinson; "Tests of the English gunners" published in 1906.

        Its essence is as follows - a warship from all trunks and for 5 minutes fires at a large towed target. At the same time, there is also a change of course (unfortunately, O. Parks does not indicate whether the towing vehicle changed course or whether the shooting ship did it).


        The goal was not so big. In 1904, the shield area was 600 square meters. feet, in 1905 the size was reduced to 300 square meters. ft.

        Much later


        " Most large ships are now equipped with sights for firing at ranges of up to 9000 yards, although gunners are still not thoroughly trained in their use.
        Until recently, ships were equipped, for their quarterly firing, with special ammunition with a reduced charge, and only once a year, full charges were used. However, the new circular basically abolished practical ammunition, and since 1907, when all these ammunition is used up, only full charge will be used during training firing
        ."

        This French circular from the 1905 of the year made the British not only reduce the area of ​​the target, but also switch to training firing at the distance indicated above.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          1 February 2018 17: 13
          +1
          Quote: 27091965i
          This French circular from the 1905 of the year made the British not only reduce the area of ​​the target, but also switch to training firing at the distance indicated above.

          Nevertheless, it was not this that compelled them, but the question is not that, but that we are talking about firing before 1905. And in 1905, the first live shooting, 25-35 kbt.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 3 February 2018 03: 29
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Nevertheless, it was not this that compelled them, but the question is not that, but that we are talking about firing before 1905. And in 1905, the first live shooting, 25-35 kbt.


            I did not write this comment at the time of the publication of the article, now when the passions subsided not much information;

            " Training at a distance of 5000 to 7400 yards. The length of the target is 15,2 meters, height 10,6 meters. Speed ​​10 to 15 knots. The best record is the battleship "Renown" 30 shots 6 hits, the worst "Royal Oak" 34 shots 1 hit"1900

            Such firing, according to the order, should have been carried out at least once a year.
    4. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 1 February 2018 22: 36
      +1
      "Training firing was conducted at a distance of 3000 to 4000 thousand meters." ////

      Otherwise it can not be. The author confused something with this 1000 m
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        2 February 2018 15: 06
        +2
        Quote: voyaka uh
        Otherwise it can not be.

        This is the same English! :)))) Alas, maybe, and even how it can
    5. geniy
      geniy 6 February 2018 22: 08
      +1
      What do you think: among the participants in the discussion, at least someone can read something? Not to mention understanding what they read? Here you have provided evidence many times that the British fired at very great distances each year - compared with the figure that Andrey from Chelyabinsk cites (a total of 5 cabs). This means that one of the two of you is lying a lot. But you are citing the data from the official report, and you say that such reports on training firing were issued every year for tens of years until 1900. This means that Andrei from Ch is either unable to read at all, because he claims to have studied all available literature on this issue, or Mr. Parks, to whom he refers as the source, does not understand a single foot in the navy.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 7 February 2018 01: 09
        +1
        Quote: geniy
        . This means that Andrei from Ch is either unable to read at all, because he claims to have studied all available literature on this issue, or Mr. Parks, to whom he refers as the source, does not understand a single foot in the navy.


        Dear author, he’s not mistaken, Parks really has a description of such firing, I used an excerpt from the English-language specialized literature of those years, if you look for it you can find it in electronic format. Why I rarely use it when writing books in Russia, I can not answer.
  14. find2312
    find2312 31 January 2018 20: 22
    +1
    Many thanks to the author! An excellent article, an analysis of D. Fischer’s thoughts and actions is especially interesting, I would also like to analyze the training of naval artillerymen of the German fleet in terms of the outcome of Jutland.
  15. Victor Wolz
    Victor Wolz 31 January 2018 22: 26
    +3
    Thank you Andrew for the article, it turns out that the British devil was not so scary). I want to ask you as a specialist: the refusal to purchase Italian armored cruisers is connected, according to Boris Yulin, with corruption or were the British guns really suitable for them and our shells were not suitable for them, and nobody wanted to sell us suitable ones?
  16. sevtrash
    sevtrash 31 January 2018 22: 36
    +2
    The article, of course, is a plus. At the same time, the author again comes up with unsubstantiated propositions about certain "advanced" teaching methods for Rozhestvensky and super-precise shooting by the RIF. Like 2-3 years ago, no evidence was given to the author. On the contrary, in the testimony of officers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron there is no evidence of such methods. On the contrary, everyone notes a low level of shooting, even Rozhdestvensky himself. Moreover, the "brilliant" naval commander did not even reconcile the rangefinders. Only when Nebogatov joined, this reconciliation was completed. Apparently Nebogatov turned out to be a more advanced artilleryman and enlightened Rozhdestvensky?
    1. Dedall
      Dedall 31 January 2018 23: 42
      +1
      And when did Nebogatov reconcile? I remember he died about two weeks before the battle.
      1. Vladislav 73
        Vladislav 73 1 February 2018 02: 07
        +4
        Quote: Dedall
        And when did Nebogatov reconcile? I remember he died about two weeks before the battle.

        Nebogatov actually handed over the remnants of the squadron on the second day of the battle. And Rear Admiral D.G. died von Felkersam, commander of the second armored squad, 3 days before the battle (11.05.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX). The flag on the Oslyabya EBR was not let down by the way, squad teams were not informed not to undermine morale. There is an opinion that the admiral’s flag of the deceased admiral accelerated the death the Japanese armadillo developed the strongest fire precisely at the flagships Suvorov and Oslyab. Temporarily, the commander of the detachment took command of the Oslyabi caperang V.I. Behr, died with his armadillo, refusing to leave the ship. hi
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 February 2018 08: 24
      +2
      Quote: sevtrash
      On the contrary, in the testimony of officers of the 2-th Pacific Squadron there is no evidence of such methods.

      Quoted 100 times already.
      A word to the senior artillery officer of the battleship "Sisoy the Great" Lieutenant S. A. Malechkin:
      “Shooting was always carried out by the squadron under the personal command and guidance of the squadron chief, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky ... Shooting was carried out over long distances, approximately starting from the 70 booth. and until the 40 cabin., but the "Great Sisu" usually began firing from the 60 cabin. from 12 "guns, and from 50 cabin. from 6" guns, because the elevation angles of the guns did not allow using a larger table range ... ... Shooting was furnished as required by the combat situation, each time the distance was measured both by Barra and Struda instruments, and by rangefinders - Lyuzhol micrometers, and both those, and others served for mutual control. The distances obtained in this way were transferred to the battery and towers using Geisler instruments, and in addition, voice transmission was also available.
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 1 February 2018 08: 57
        +5
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quoted 100 times already.

        Similarly. Already 100 times the same thing. From the testimony of officers of the 2nd Pacific RIF squadron (including Rozhdestvensky):
        ... senior artillery officer Orla Shamshev, his official testimony is "... three firing of the entire squadron ... maximum distance of 55 cable, minimum 15 ... The number of shells fired at the commandant 2 of large guns and 5 of small ... The commandants didn’t fall ... I needed practice ... I asked through the flagship artilleryman for the production of firing. I was refused "...
        ... Rozhdestvensky ... on the second squadron there was very little practical shooting ... I don’t remember how many shots were fired ... "
        ... Senior flag officer Day - "... the squadron went out to fire four times ... a distance of 20-25 cables ... both shooting and maneuvering were found to be unsatisfactory, as was repeatedly indicated by orders of the commander ..."
        Rear Admiral Enquist - "... all firing was unsatisfactory ... distance 20-25 cable ..."
        Flag captain of the headquarters of Clapier de Colong - "... there was no main thing - they did not know how to shoot and there was no move ..."

        It seems that the author (whom it is almost always interesting to read), having created his idea of ​​something, categorically considers it to be correct regardless of the evidence to the contrary.
        1. Town Hall
          Town Hall 1 February 2018 10: 53
          0
          Quote: sevtrash
          It seems that the author (whom it is almost always interesting to read), having created his own idea of ​​something, categorically considers it to be correct regardless of the evidence to the contrary
        2. mkpda
          mkpda 5 February 2018 15: 58
          0
          There was a judicial investigation that could convict any of them. So the officers answered with an eye to the consequences. And yet, the form of the question often forms the answer. Without the wording of the question, the answer becomes taken out of context.
      2. sevtrash
        sevtrash 1 February 2018 09: 20
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        A word to the senior artillery officer of the battleship "Sisoy the Great" Lieutenant S. A. Malechkin:

        Of all the testimonies, only Malechkin speaks of a distance of up to 70 cable, and in particular for his ship, firing from only 60 cable and below. Shamshev speaks of a maximum of 55 cable. All other sources say 15-20-25 cable. As a result, even Malechkin! - Says nothing about shooting over 70 cable. And even close to 70 does not speak.

        Malechkin, by the way, has a page of 3 testimonies, which include complaints about rangefinders and sights. "... after each shooting, all the artillery officers gathered and discussed the results, then after evaluating the shooting, every time there was a lot of wonders for the Varib and St. Iribor’s people, for optic sights. But nobody could take away this mass of questions because the highest guardians of the artillery squadron and the squadron, they themselves did not know anything, and, on the contrary, they often asked to explain to someone who]) was looking for a way to get to the dismantled dismantling ... "
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          3 February 2018 15: 50
          +2
          Sorry, but I see no reason to repeat myself. There is a fact - a number of 2TOE officers indicate that Rozhdestvensky practiced long-range shooting. There is a second fact - not one battleship or cruiser in the Russian steam fleet exceeded the effectiveness of the fire of its head battleships in combat conditions. There is a third fact - the Englishman noted a very good shooting of the Russian head EBRs on almost 40 cables. There is a fourth fact - over 230 hits in Japanese ships. There is a fifth fact - the bulk of hits in the Japanese in the first hour of the battle, i.e. while on our head EDB the SLA was still in order. There is a sixth fact - the Japanese note a sharp drop in the effectiveness of the Eagle shooting just after their concentrated fire knocks out centralized fire control.
          And there you are, repeating about the 25 cable as the range of the firing squadron. And referring at the same time to officers who are not gunners.
          Although EVEN my beloved Kosenko notes the excellent shooting of the same "Oslyaby" at 25 kbt (from the second shell)
          Want a logical explanation why the officers named 20-25 KBT? The final firing (such a small examination) in Nossi-Beh Rozhestvensky arranged just for 25 kbt.
          1. sevtrash
            sevtrash 3 February 2018 23: 20
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            There is a fact - a number of 2TOE officers say that Rozhdestvensky practiced long-range shooting.

            There is just no such fact. Give such opinions from a "number of officers" from official testimony. If you think that Beijing is a model of the actual presentation of the material, then what about the "Beijing effect", this well-known example of bias?
            And most importantly - almost all the indications note the completely unsatisfactory results of practical shooting, 2TE RIF maneuvering, the same Malechkin speaks of an extremely low level of knowledge about Barr and Strode rangefinders and sights of all artillerymen and commandants of the squadron. So what miracle appeared exceptionally accurate shooting? Your decision? Beijingham effect?
          2. sevtrash
            sevtrash 4 February 2018 11: 22
            0
            Counting the Japanese gives 154 (of which 40 to Mikasa) hits in all ships, while the Eagle received 144 hits according to Kostenko (60 Meiji, 76 Beijingham).
            Well, the number of shells fired. Is it not news for you that RIF ships shot more often? This, of course, does not mean more precisely.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              4 February 2018 14: 47
              +2
              Quote: sevtrash
              Counting the Japanese gives 154 (of which 40 is in Mikasa)

              This is in the ships of the armored detachments, and in total - about 230
              Quote: sevtrash
              while the Eagle received 144 hits as rated by Kostenko (60 Meiji, 76 Beijingham).

              It is true, because after an hour of the battle the Borodino FCS failed and the accuracy of the Russians fell sharply. Then there was a beating.
              Quote: sevtrash
              Is it not news for you that RIF ships shot more often?

              The Japanese fired an average of Xnumx twelve-inch shells from an armadillo, Eagle used up Xnumx. A large consumption of shells was observed on the ships of Nebogatov, whom Rozhestvensky, for obvious reasons, did not teach to shoot
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash 4 February 2018 18: 44
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                The Japanese fired an average of 111 twelve-inch shells from an armadillo, Eagle spent 52.

                4 Japanese battleships fired 446 12-inch shells, Eagle 150, Nikolai 1 - 94 shells.
                So more often, but not more precisely. And this is understandable. There were few practical firing, and even during these firing there were few actual shots (according to Malechkin), people did not know how to handle rangefinders and optical sights (Malechkin). Where did the exact shooting come from? Miracle?
                Miracle can already be considered that fell at all. But training on working with guns, guidance, loading certainly produced, probably more often than practical shooting. Which gave the number of shots. But talking about super-precise shooting is like giving a shotgun to a novice hunter, and he immediately gets into the eye and squirrel time after time. Yes, and not just one, but several tens or hundreds at once. Really? About the same as super accurate, in your opinion, shooting 2TE RIF.
    3. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 2 February 2018 11: 48
      +4
      There is also no evidence that royal navy did not practice firing more than 1 km.
      The author found a detailed description of firing at 1 km - thanks. I did not find others and made a sensational conclusion (instead of assuming) that they were not there. And from here logically - "came to Tsushima." lol
      Meanwhile, the Japanese fleet completely copied English. Japanese senior officers studied in England and practiced on British ships. Moreover, the ships were either made in England or according to English designs. And guns, of course. And English instructor officers trained Japanese gunners. When, using all this, the Japanese inflict a heavy defeat on the Pacific and then the Baltic-Black Sea fleets of Russia, then all of a sudden: "The British did not know how to shoot" .... belay
      "And if they came to the strait, they would be Russian, Japanese ..."
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        3 February 2018 15: 37
        +2
        Quote: voyaka uh
        There is no evidence that royal navy did not practice firing more than 1 km.

        In the right corner of the ring, O. Parks, an Englishman, a very famous author of the history of British battleship engineering in the West and a recognized expert in this field, and Theodore Ropp, author of “Creating a Modern Fleet: French Naval Policy 1871 – 1904”, written by him in 1937, which are considered CLASSICS of the works of naval history.
        In the left corner - warrior-uh with his "no evidence"
        Boxing to declare, or immediately recognize yourself as a loser? :))))
        There is evidence, moreover, in Western literature. The fact that you do not want to read it, preferring to hold on to templates familiar from childhood, is your right, but do not say that the author has not proved. Tell me honestly - I do not believe it, because it does not fit into the familiar picture of the world :))) I understand :)
        1. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 3 February 2018 21: 41
          +4
          I understand that there is little material. I tried to rummage through the archives of the Navy - British and Australian. (Australians are very interested in the history of battles in the Pacific Ocean). About the shooting distance - I did not find, unfortunately.
          You have published undoubtedly interesting material. Sights, rangefinders, tower fire control. The article is good, debatable. good
          In my opinion, you got excited with the conclusions. "Chased a sensation" - as they say.
          Install the latest long-range guns on the latest ships and not practice, how to shoot from them? - This is beyond imagination. belay
          You, it seemed to me, have a wrong view of the Victorian era. This was not a period of stagnation, but continuous (and radical) reforms in Britain. Queen Victoria is closer to Vladimir Ilyich than to Nikolai the First. As for the fleet.
          Be sure to continue with the articles. drinks
          And I will “ask you pepper” so that they won’t ask! wassat
          1. Town Hall
            Town Hall 4 February 2018 00: 35
            +3
            27091965i ↑
            Yesterday, 03: 29
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Nevertheless, it was not this that compelled them, but the question is not that, but that we are talking about firing before 1905. And in 1905, the first live shooting, 25-35 kbt.


            I did not write this comment at the time of the publication of the article, now when the passions subsided not much information;
            "Training shots at a distance of 5000 to 7400 yards. Target length 15,2 meters, height 10,6 meters. Movement speed from 10 to 15 knots. Best performance Armadillo" Renown "30 shots 6 hits, worst" Royal Oak "34 shots 1 hit

            November 1900, XNUMX


            Such firing, according to the order, should have been carried out at least once a year.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              4 February 2018 02: 17
              +3
              Quote: Town Hall
              I did not write this comment at the time of the publication of the article, now that the passions subsided not much information

              Thanks! And the source of information - is it possible? :)
              1. 27091965
                27091965 4 February 2018 08: 28
                +4
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Thanks! And the source of information - is it possible? :)


                TARGET PRACTICE for 1900. It deals with training firing, do not confuse with prize, England, France, USA, Sweden, Russia.

                Such reports were printed every year. Below is a table from this report, as a percentage of hits on target, when training English at a distance of 5000 to 7400 yards.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  4 February 2018 11: 24
                  +1
                  Thanks again! Can you tell me where to get these documents?
                  The essence of the matter is the court on the names of the ships, it’s about the Mediterranean squadron which was just commanded by Jackie Fisher :))) That is, I guess that this is not about the Royal Navy at all, but about Fisher’s innovative firing, though I thought that they were the first time held in xnumx and not in xnumx
                  1. 27091965
                    27091965 4 February 2018 13: 08
                    +3
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Thanks again! Can you tell me where to get these documents?


                    I'm at work now, but I think after 3-4 days I can send you an e-mail.

                    That is, I suppose that this is not about the Royal Navy in general, but about Fisher's groundbreaking firing, though I believed that they first took place in 1901, and not in 1900


                    In 1898-1899, the British determined the digital values ​​of three distances for training firing (small, medium and long) and in the same year they began to put them into practice on all squadrons. The change in distance was influenced by the Spanish-American War.

                    In our literature, the role of Fisher is not much exaggerated, at the initial stage it was a collective work. In the future, yes, all the stars went to him.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      4 February 2018 14: 49
                      +3
                      I would be extremely grateful. I can admit my mistakes if the arguments of opponents are stronger hi
            2. Town Hall
              Town Hall 4 February 2018 11: 40
              +1
              "... In 1899, Fisher, successively replacing the posts of chief of naval artillery of the fleet, third sea lord - chief inspector of the fleet and commander of the squadron in the West Indies, was appointed commander of the Mediterranean fleet - to the most prestigious OFFICE FOR ANY British admiral.


              The beginning of his extensive experiments with long-range shooting dates back to this time.


              In 1901, this practice was introduced as mandatory for a training course in the entire fleet .... "
  17. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 1 February 2018 01: 05
    +1
    Thank you for the article. Parks has seen figures before, but only now he drew attention to the time and compared with the beginning of the construction of dreadnought. Very interesting!
  18. kvs207
    kvs207 1 February 2018 07: 48
    +1
    Quote: long in stock.
    sorry if everything is so why did the Japanese win in Tsushima? they prepared the fleet according to English patterns. if they believed the author, they should have lost by the logic of the article. - This did not happen. why?

    Interesting, exciting, informative and author, as always, thanks. However, questions arise and unexpected conclusions are made. Does the Japanese come out in genius in firing from naval artillery? And what, they shot from long distances and fell, which is interesting))).
    1. long in stock.
      long in stock. 1 February 2018 08: 35
      +2
      on before it was the angles of japanese gunners on yutland to hire ..
    2. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 2 February 2018 00: 45
      +3
      The Yantons were taught to shoot by the very British, who, as the author found out, were not able to shoot themselves.
  19. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 1 February 2018 09: 06
    +1
    A good article to understand the practical experience of shooting.

    Your article is Andrey? http://alternathistory.com/sistemy-upravleniya-ko
    rabelnoi-artilleriei-v-nachale-pmv-ili-voprosov-b
    olshe-chem-otvetov
    ... In 1910, important exercises were held in the Baltic Sea using the Richtungsweiser instrument installed on board the Nassau and Westfalen ships. A high percentage of hits on moving targets from distances up to 11 meters was demonstrated ...

    Comparison of Russian, German and English Suo for 1910-1913. (The GAS of Geisler, Erickson, the Richtungsweiser, the GMS of Admiral Scott “Fire-director”), it looks like your syllable.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      1 February 2018 17: 28
      +2
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Your article is Andrey?

      Yes sir!:))))
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 5 February 2018 12: 30
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: DimerVladimer
        Your article is Andrey?

        Yes sir!:))))


        Excellent article - all the information in one place is concentrated - very convenient.
        True, the ignorant will have the impression that before the appearance of the MSA, they did not shoot at long distances. They fired at the plug with the shooting method - with the corresponding accuracy.
        1. geniy
          geniy 7 February 2018 22: 48
          0
          Thank you so much for your post. Because it seems that you are the only one (except me) who understands that shooting at sea is mainly carried out by the method of shooting at previous projectile drops, and not at all aiming each time and measuring the distance using rangefinders. That is, in fact, the gunner’s gunners do not look at the sights at all. In fact, the senior artillery officer observes the fall of the shells and sees deviations of their falls from the target: under-flight, a flight to the right or left, increases or decreases the elevation angle of the guns, and transmits this via the LMS system, and the commandants only rotate the helms of the guidance and blindly execute his orders. That is, there is almost never any individual guidance of guns in firing at sea, with the exception of small anti-mine guns.
  20. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 1 February 2018 10: 42
    +2
    The results of the first shooting, P. Scott described as "deplorable". However, it could not be otherwise - the Royal Navy in 1905 g did not have any rules of fire, no sights, which were suitable for their purpose, or devices for controlling the shooting. In other words, the British gunners simply could not shoot at 25-35 cable.


    I doubt very much that the British naval gunners could not shoot. You exaggerate Andrei, not knowing the requirements for accuracy.
    It depends on what you mean by “deplorable” results - never to hit, or still 3-5% of hits were received?
    - Compared to 20-40% at a distance of 2000 yards, - 3% for 5000-7000 yards for the first shooting, it will not look like a complete fiasco for us, but not for contemporaries.
    Nevertheless, to make inferences based on several phrases of P. Scott, as applied to one shooting of a particular ship, is at least an exaggeration.

    The author of this article does not undertake to say for sure, but, in his personal opinion, the British in Tsushima would have expected enchanting defeat.

    This is also a very controversial statement, based on the first shooting of one ship - and even without specific data on accuracy ("deplorable" - the concept is extensible and cannot be analyzed).
    1. Rakovor
      Rakovor 1 February 2018 13: 59
      +1
      And in general it is incorrect to compare the English squadron of the 1901 peacetime model with the Japanese 1905 model and the one and a half year-long experience of the war. I think if the Angles had 1,5 years of war behind them, the Yapis would share the fate of the Germans.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        1 February 2018 17: 29
        +1
        Quote: Rakovor
        And in general it is incorrect to compare the English squadron of the 1901 model of the year of peacetime with the Japanese squadron of the 1905 of the year with the one and a half year-long experience of the war.

        Yeah, but I’m comparing it with the Russian Baltic squadron, which had no military experience :)))
        1. Rakovor
          Rakovor 1 February 2018 18: 47
          0
          What does it mean not having. And Rozhestvensky that, on his own inspiration, began firing at 40 kb or more, or according to the results of the battles in the Yellow Sea and the Korean Channel? By military experience, I mean the experience of a warring country as a whole and not of individual ships or squadrons. Therefore, after the first battles, the Angles would begin to intensively improve their OMS and the preparation of artillerymen as a whole, and they would do better than the Yapes, given the industrial and scientific potential of the former and the inert thinking of the latter.
  21. Bersaglieri
    Bersaglieri 1 February 2018 22: 20
    0
    Excellent article!
  22. Vedzmin
    Vedzmin 3 February 2018 01: 21
    0
    Thanks to the author for interesting information! I did not know about this, expecting that the range of training shooting was much more than 1000 yards.
  23. Lexus
    Lexus 4 February 2018 01: 19
    +1
    Explicitly written hi
    1. unknown
      unknown 4 February 2018 08: 44
      +1
      The devil is in the details. They allow you to take a fresh look at the traditional version of the story.
      The bad material: with the destruction of trunks, made by "wire" technology, the British faced even before the so-called RVE. Unsuccessful armored cruisers, with a real speed less than that of modern armadillos. KMU armadillos with low reliability. Japanese "super-shells" for one battle. Was there a REV in reality? And if there was, then in what year, and between whom?
  24. Narak-zempo
    Narak-zempo 4 February 2018 16: 56
    0
    A reasonable question: what methods did the Japanese learn to shoot? Somehow it became a commonplace that in matters of materiel and tactics they were guided by the British.
  25. Jerk
    Jerk 4 February 2018 20: 23
    0
    Hehe))) And as a comment - about decorations)))
  26. sevtrash
    sevtrash 4 February 2018 21: 35
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I can admit my mistakes if the arguments of opponents are stronger

    So, summarizing the information / comments 27091965i and the Town Hall of the British trained in training shooting 5000-7500 yards with 1898, and the conclusion of the article "...what is it, it turns out that in the Royal Navy even in 1907, two years after the Russo-Japanese War, someone still managed to train commandants in shooting at 1000 yards ?!.. "turns out to be insolvent?
    The mistress of the seas nevertheless was her, the sensation did not take place.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      5 February 2018 09: 33
      +2
      Quote: sevtrash
      The mistress of the seas nevertheless was her, the sensation did not take place.

      Let's say all this is true and England really shot at the recommended 5000-7500 yards.
      Look at the% of hits :))))) And compare it with the Japanese and Russian results IN BATTLE, in which the% of hits is always lower than the training
      1. Anry_57
        Anry_57 5 February 2018 11: 18
        0
        Please explain in more detail: how exactly did the gunners specifically aim their guns in battle? Given that there are many medium-caliber guns on any ship, there is no way to distinguish the fall of one gun from another. Did you mention something like that each gunner sought to raise or lower the gun barrel depending on the pitching?
      2. Town Hall
        Town Hall 5 February 2018 11: 56
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: sevtrash
        The mistress of the seas nevertheless was her, the sensation did not take place.

        Let's say all this is true and England really shot at the recommended 5000-7500 yards.
        Look at the% of hits :))))) And compare it with the Japanese and Russian results IN BATTLE, in which the% of hits is always lower than the training




        What to compare? The results of the English fleet firing at long distances in 1900 when these firing at such distances were just in its infancy?


        With what to compare? With the results of similar firing of the Russian fleet in the same 1900? ... Do you have such results? .. or in 1900 did the Russian fleet still not shoot at such distances?


        Or do you have the results of long-range firing of the English fleet in 1905? Share the data and compare
  27. geniy
    geniy 6 February 2018 22: 17
    0
    A friend of mine very much asked me to publish the text of his criticisms of this article, since he himself could not do this for technical reasons. . So I ask you not to kick me personally. These are not my thoughts, although I agree with some of them.
    ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
    Great article, I haven’t laughed so long, thanks.
    Without a doubt, the British, designing their ships "all-big-gun" "Dreadnought" and "Invincible", intended them to fight at great distances. But an interesting question arises: what distances did the British then consider great? To answer it, it is necessary to understand how the English fired at the beginning of the century. - They were going to shoot at long distances - but what is big? - Well big and that's it.
    ... among many fleet commanders there was an opinion that it was impossible to train a gunner: "gunners are born, not made." -And how did they take them or give birth?
    ... with the existing methods of “controlling” fire, even trained-yet trained or born-gunners couldn’t guarantee any effective firing at a distance of more than 5 cable ones. And how effective is anyway ?, and then 5 kb -all definitely didn’t hit.
    It is interesting that optical sights already appeared in the British Navy, but they were completely not in demand on ships. The fact is that with existing methods of shooting aiming with optics led to the fact that the target fell into the field of view very briefly and quickly disappeared from it. The traditional rear sight and front sight were much more convenient. (Why sights) -Optical sights appeared-and why, if there is no sense from them? (well done one-checked-nonsense-why start them? And where is the gun near the gun? (seen on small arms)
    ... but such a (completely intolerant) position in the Royal Navy was considered the norm ... - that is, they did not know how to shoot and did not want to learn.
    ... the shells intended for artillery exercises were simply thrown overboard .. and the guns did not spoil at the same time?
    ... As a result, at the time of the “shot” the pencil put a dot (in English dot, from which, in fact, the name “dotter” came from) opposite the target, and later it was possible to see where the gun was actually aimed at the moment of the opening of the fire .- with a pencil, but in a piece of paper — like a rare genius (I remembered, apparently, barefoot childhood and my beloved slingshot) —normal people routinely conducted stem firing.
    As a result of using these devices, the Scylla cruiser, commanded by captain Percy Scott in 1899, showed enchanting accuracy, achieving 80% of hits. But didn’t the geniuses have a lope?
    ... the real merit of P. Scott lies in another. Once, when his cruiser shot with great excitement, he noticed that the gunner was not trying to capture the moment of the shot, but was twisting the gun’s vertical aiming in order to try to keep the target in sight constantly. - And how can guns of a less large caliber imagine this?
    1. geniy
      geniy 6 February 2018 22: 17
      0
      The main merit of P. Scott lies in the fact that he came up with and put into practice the principle of continuous retention of the target in the sight, having reorganized the guidance process himself, invented and implemented.
      guns (as far as you can understand, and how much can you understand ?, he divided the functions of horizontal and vertical guidance of the gun, appointing two gunners for this). Naval guns, even small calibers, had a separate tip and 2 gunners long before the "genius", and here, it turns out, this is all he came up with.
      But in the future, P. Scott was compelled for several years not to advance artillery science, but to popularize what had already been achieved. - The "genius" is tired.
      Surprisingly, the fact is that the Royal Navy did not consider it necessary to compete in artillery preparation, that is, the ships did not conduct training firing? And the rules also didn’t exist? -Or still they shot and the results of the shooting are known? -If they are known, what is difficult to compare?
      ..started firing using an optical sight, it turned out ... that these sights are completely incapable. –– “enemies of the people” took sights? -Just why have you taken it? -To make sure of their uselessness?
      ... D. Fisher tried to increase the distance of artillery fire and see what came of it. In 1901, the Mediterranean fleet began to shoot at shields over long distances - according to some reports, up to 25-30 cable ones .- .. wanted to see ..- like there wasn’t more entertainment? And why at 25-30kb? And not at 60-70? (firing range of medium-caliber guns allowed). A normal person would have done easier: well, you know how to shoot at 5kb — shot at 10 — it turned out — shoot at 15, and this was immediately pricked and it was at 25-30.
      The British battleships had the following, so to speak, LMS ... That is, in the RIF twenty years before this, there was a central firing system — not only the sight and the rear sight were displayed on the combat dials, but also the type of the projectile and the rate of fire and guidance consisted of combining the arrows, and sailors-messengers running on the English fleet (how many plutons on the ship? And how lope to run back and forth? -and what is the transmission rate of information? And who will need this info?) -and this is the LMS?
      The experience of firing squadrons of the Mediterranean fleet suggested to D. Fischer the following: 1) The need for a single caliber. It was almost impossible to correct the fire of two or more calibers due to the difficulties of recognizing bursts at the place where the shells fell. Apparently it is much easier to recognize bursts of shells of one caliber? 2) Fire control should be centralized - you have to be a "genius" and have a lot of firing to guess about this?
      ... and P. Scott left with nothing on his ship he could not conduct these experiments? without "Drake" in any way?
      ... The Admiralty Council instructed Rear Admirals R. Castans and H. Lambton, who held their flag on the Venereable and Victorios, respectively, to study the possibilities of long-range shooting. . According to the results of the study, they should have given answers to a number of questions, the main of which were: 1) Do you need a training shooting program, or is it not needed? (as far as one can understand, the Admiralty took care of this issue only in 1903) a good question is, is it necessary to learn to shoot?
      2) Should the guns be controlled centrally, or should individual guidance by artillerymen and battery officers be maintained? -You already have a central firing system, well, there are feasible runners.
      -Admirals didn’t let us down and developed shooting techniques, though nobody understood them (they couldn’t even compare) and nobody followed them
      ... In other words, D. Fisher found out WHAT to shoot from - you need to shoot from guns and how NOT to shoot, you don’t have to shoot past the target, but couldn’t suggest how to DO it.
      Why did D. Fisher not complete his enterprise? .. Obviously, he simply did not have enough time and opportunities to deal with artillery issues. “The“ genius ”has a lot of business: reforming the fleet, inventing new ship projects ... —that the ships cannot shoot, the“ genius ”didn’t sink to such a trifle.
      And so it happened in reality: already in February 1905, P. Scott was promoted to the position of Inspector of Training Shooting (at the same time increasing his rank). And at the same time, another "protégé" of John Arbuthnot Fisher - John Jellico - becomes the Chief of Naval Artillery. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know the name of the officer who at that time took the position of Captain of the artillery school, which P. Scott left, but without a doubt, he was an outstanding person who shared the views of D. Fisher and P. Scott.
      .... Apparently, for the first time in English history, the main “artillery” positions were occupied by unconditionally talented and ready to work together people — this is Scott, Geliko, and “shift changer” Scott who wished to remain anonymous.
      .... for the first time in English practice a new exam is introduced, the so-called "live shooting". Its essence is as follows - a warship from all trunks and for 5 minutes fires at a large towed target. At the same time, there is also a change of course (unfortunately, O. Parks does not indicate whether the towing of the shield changed course, or whether the shooting ship did it) - how does the author imagine a change in the course of the tug, which carries a huge shield on a 100m cable? (and ours shot at Tendra Island in general, didn’t this Tendra change course?). The distance during the shooting varies from 5 to 000 yards, i.e. from about 7 to 000 cable. The results were evaluated in points awarded for various achievements - accuracy, rate of fire, timely start of shooting, "keeping" distance. Points could also be removed - for unused ammunition and other shortcomings.
      The results of the first firing, P. Scott described as "deplorable." However, it could not be otherwise - the Royal Navy in 1905 had neither shooting rules, nor sights that met its purpose, nor firing control devices. In other words, the British artillery simply did not know how to shoot at 25-35 cable. -Poor British: there are no shooting rules, there are no sights, there are no fire control systems, and they still don’t know how to shoot.
      ... from the dead center of pre-war standards - they knew that since they were shooting, they couldn’t shoot, but they still hadn’t figured out how to shoot. You can’t shoot, but I really want to
      ... it is completely pointless to wonder why the British in the Invincible project did not make efforts to provide fire for all eight guns on one side. Why lowering 8 guns on board? In general, all shipbuilders tried to shoot as many guns on board as possible; otherwise, using a casemate artillery deployment system would be simpler, easier, cheaper.
      The British still had a great deal of work to do to learn how to shoot at long distances and learn that for shooting you should have at least 8 guns on board in order to shoot with four-gun half-salvos, I understood that you must have 8 guns on board to shoot "magic four-gun half-salvos ".
      “The results of firing at long ranges showed that if we want to have good results of 6 yards (000 kbt - approx. Aut.) And more, the guns should shoot slowly and carefully, and aim more easily when a salvo gives one gun. Consequently, the need to use a large number of guns disappears, class-well, and leave 30-2 guns, and when shooting at 3kb, generally 60.
      According to the report of Captain Peckingham, a British observer, the entire Russo-Japanese war did not leave the battleship Asahi, during the fifteen minutes from the start of the battle, from 14:10 to 14:25 Mikasa received nineteen hits - five 305 mm and fourteen 152 mm shells. “And how did he make out what caliber the shell hit the next ship, and at what time?” Yes, I managed to count, another genius.
      ... domestic authors consider it a matter of honor to illuminate and in no case miss even the most insignificant negativity of the design of ships or combat training of the fleet in their research — really, why look for negativity — well, there is no war with a bang, who doesn’t happen?
      What should feel the domestic lover of the history of the Navy, brought up on the dogma of the curvature of Russian artillerymen during the Russo-Japanese war, to feel that there are also the British and regret that they did not fight with them.
      Of course, a burning desire to prostrate before the genius of British artillery science. But what would be the impression if O. Parks didn’t write vague “at the same distance” in the explanation of the schedule, but would have directly indicated that it was about shooting from a distance of 5 cables (no other can't, because in 1897 they simply didn’t shoot long distances)? IMPRESSION IMMEDIATELY changes to the opposite: what is it, it turns out that in the Royal Navy even in 1907, two years after the Russo-Japanese War, someone still managed to train commandants in shooting at 1000 yards ?!
      As an unscientific science fiction: it would be extremely interesting to know what would happen if, by a wave of a magic wand in the Tsushima Strait, all the ships of the Open Sea fleet turned out to be in Rozhestvensky’s status as of 1914. Zinovy ​​would have missed the battle anyway.
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 6 February 2018 23: 38
        0
        No matter what. Dear 27091965i gave a table indicating that this is from the Target Practice of 1900, in which there is data on the effectiveness of firing, Renown, in particular, got hit 30 times from 6 shots - in some kind of exercise. In the Spanish-American war, the latter achieved 4,5% of hits. Proceeding from Koffman for large-caliber RIF, he achieved about the same result. It is clear that the losing side could not be more precise than the winner.
        Bottom line: Neither the article nor the comments revealed the actual state of affairs - in those days - with the LMS, the effective shooting of various fleets. Interestingly, there are no real answers here. Populism.
        1. geniy
          geniy 7 February 2018 01: 41
          0
          You could just agree with you that the article is populism, but you focused all your attention only on the percentage of hits, forgetting that the 27091965i also indicated a distance - from 5000-7400 yards, which sharply contradicts the claims of Andrei from Chelyabinsk as if the British were WWII always fired at only 1000 yards. One of the two of them greatly misinforms the readers.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 7 February 2018 02: 09
            0
            Quote: geniy
            One of the two of them greatly misinforms the readers.


            It seems to me, perhaps you should have written differently, "the topic has not been fully disclosed."
            1. geniy
              geniy 7 February 2018 08: 24
              +1
              I apologize for the word too harsh: "misinformed." Moreover, it personally does not apply to you in any way, but only to Andrey from Chelyabinsk. Your data on the range of training firing at the British in my opinion is absolutely correct. But Andrei’s article is a lie, although unintentional. And it is strange that many admire her. That is, it is clear that Andrei does not understand the principles of guiding naval guns and how the Fire Control System (LMS) works. And the fact that he refers to Parks is the same Parks apparently wrote False. Like others - for example, Pekingham, that allegedly the Japanese were running in battle sailors-messengers with slate boards. In fact, on ships around the world there was a normal OMS of automatic data transfer from the main artillery post to the guns. And such a system was absolutely on all the ships of the world: German, English, Japanese, Italian, Russian. And those fairy tales that Andrey tells are like running messengers-messengers have nothing to do with reality. And that they shot at a distance of 1 kilometer. Although this is really so - with stem firing the range was really that, and simply could not be otherwise. But in real shooting, the distance was several dozen cable ones.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                7 February 2018 09: 44
                +2
                I apologize, you have cited the answer of a person who had the urge to stupidly stupidly, despite the fact that he simply “didn’t force” the article. In addition, he seems to be related to modern artillery and judges to this day - it is clear that he did not see a fly on the gun, and if so, he thinks that it never was, etc. At the same time, the artilleryman is not familiar with firing at sea. He remembers stemming neither from village to town, completely unaware of what he writes - stem shooting was NEVER considered as a way to train the commandor to compensate for pitching. This was especially amusing.
                Quote: geniy
                and how do guns of a less large caliber imagine this?

                Well, the person does not understand how to tighten the scope, for example, say, 305-mm guns. Yes, it’s not a question - give the 1926-27 years of artillery shooting regulations in the mouth and let the materiel teach.
                Quote: geniy
                As a result of using these devices, the Scylla cruiser, commanded by captain Percy Scott in 1899, showed enchanting accuracy, achieving 80% of hits. But didn’t the geniuses have a lope?

                30%
                Quote: geniy
                and P. Scott left with nothing on his ship he could not conduct these experiments? without "Drake" in any way?

                I say - the article "critic" did not master. Scott was not about his ship, he at that time commanded the Artillery School
                Quote: geniy
                That is, in the RIF twenty years before this, there was a central firing system — not only the sight and the rear sight were displayed on the combat dials, but also the type of the projectile and the rate of fire and guidance consisted of combining the arrows, and sailors-messengers running on the English fleet (how many plutons on the ship?

                hand face. The author does not know anything about the SLA. "Years for 20" in Russian ships had an SLA already at 3 degrees of aiming - 45-90-135 from the direction of the ship :) And what he describes is Geisler and K of the 1910 model of the year

                Quote: geniy
                The “genius” has a lot of business: reforming the fleet, inventing new ship projects ... —that the ships cannot shoot, the “genius” did not fall into such a trifle.

                This “critic” is not at all aware of what the Royal Navy was like and how much Fisher had to do at least to overcome the estate in the promotion of officers. In general, there were Augean stables and, becoming PML, he quickly moved forward shooting training. In general, the “critic” once again, wanting to fast, ignores both the text of the article and reality.
                Quote: geniy
                and how did he see what kind of caliber the shell hit the next ship and at what time? Yes, I managed to count, another genius.

                "Critic" is not aware that the Japanese on all ships tried to record the time of hits of enemy shells? For example, in the first hour of the battle, ships of armored squads recorded the exact time of more than 60 hits. So yes - it is quite possible that more shells could have entered Mikasu, Packinham speaks only about those hits whose time was recorded.
                Quote: geniy
                Zinovy ​​would have made a fight anyway.

                That is, if, instead of Rozhdestvensky, the British suddenly fought with the Japanese, then the Russians lost anyway?
                Quote: geniy
                since he himself cannot do this for technical reasons

                I am very happy about this, because such nonsense in the comments is completely unnecessary
                1. geniy
                  geniy 7 February 2018 12: 20
                  0
                  Firstly, I want to inform everyone that in this post I’m writing not my own comments, but the answer of my friend, and I’m quite stressful in this correspondence, since I receive the answers by phone and still have to manually retype them.
                  But in fact, they gave me answers to two points: 1. Scott increased the accuracy of shooting to 80%, while before it was only 30%. But you took this last figure from the post of the participant under the nickname 27091965i, where he claims that the distances of the annual training firing were from 5000 to 7400 yards. You claim in your article that in the English fleet until 1907 they never shot at a distance of over 1000 yards.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    7 February 2018 14: 46
                    +2
                    Quote: geniy
                    , and the answer of my friend, and I’m quite stressful in this correspondence

                    Well, don’t lead, who is forcing you? :)))) Save me the need to answer stupid questions. And it’s okay, if a person doesn’t understand something, he would ask for clarification, and it’s of little interest to me personally to explain something to militant illiteracy.
                    Quote: geniy
                    But in fact, they gave me answers to two points

                    But in fact I don’t see what to answer at all, since all the “questions” are either chewed up in the article or have nothing to do with it. Those that can be tied to the topic with a stretch - I replied
                    Quote: geniy
                    the cott increased its accuracy to 80%, while before it there was only 30%. But you took this last digit from the post of the participant under the nickname 27091965i

                    (heavy sigh) I took this figure from O. Parks' monograph and it is given in the article
                    The prepared calculations showed 20-40% of hits.

                    I showed you the average - 30%. If you are not able to read the article and see the numbers - I am not to blame.
                2. geniy
                  geniy 7 February 2018 12: 32
                  0
                  Point 2. I would like to know how you generally understand the principle of guidance of naval guns of medium and large caliber. That is, in the book the cruiser Varyag clearly states that the Geisler system (which was invented long before and used on the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser built in 1886 - that is, long before the 1910 you mentioned, it is said that on Varyag the dial scale, for example, horizontal aiming had the range is up to 180 degrees. And you say that the Geisler system allowed only a rough range of three values. Let it be known that cannon shells flying over long distances experience lateral deviation - derivation. And moreover, it is not constant - there are no derivation at all over short ranges, but it’s distant. Therefore, aiming with sea guns simply looking at the sight or at the sight is impossible. And I believe that the main gunner calculated both the derivation and deviation of the projectile during its flight on the course of the enemy ship and automatically transmitted this data via the Geisler system to the guns , and the gunners, the commandants on this system received the so-called Full Hugo Guidance. Are you every commandor to independently calculate all the corrections for the course of his and the enemy’s ship, and derivation, and wind correction?
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    7 February 2018 15: 21
                    +1
                    Quote: geniy
                    I would like to know how you generally understand the principle of guidance of medium-sized and large-caliber naval guns

                    Did not try to read the article? :))))
                    Quote: geniy
                    That is, in the book the cruiser Varyag clearly states that the Geisler system (which was invented long before that and was used even on the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov built seem 1886 g

                    For those who are not able to read not that article, but at least a comment, I repeat again
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And what he describes is Geisler and K of the 1910 sample of the year

                    Again. SAMPLE 1910 YEARS. So understandable?
                    Naturally, the Geisler system existed before, but it was much less perfect, but the principle of combining arrows was realized much later. At the same time, the principle of combining the arrows, which you are referring to, is "twisting" since the elevation angle adjusted for pitching was reflected on the dial, and the aim of the gunner was to "twist" the sight so that the arrows align. At the same time, such a thing did not appear immediately on Geisler, but with the addition of the Erickson device to Geisler (before this combination of arrows as such was not - Geisler showed the sight on an even keel, but Ericsson's device allowed to adjust for pitching centrally.
                    Well, what stood on the Varyag cruiser is the SLA mod 1893 / 4 r, there, ATTENTION, the aiming angles were not transmitted there. The dials reported only the distance to the target, and the HL angles were determined directly at the guns
                    Quote: geniy
                    And you say that the Geisler system allowed only a crude range of three values.

                    20 years before the events described was 1880 g, and then there was only the DMS of Davydov, the principle of which I briefly described
                    Quote: geniy
                    And I believe that the chief artilleryman calculated both the derivation and deviation of the projectile during its flight on the course of the enemy ship and automatically transmitted this data via the Geisler system to the guns, and the gunners commandants on this system received the so-called Full Guidance

                    Yeah. After xnumx g
              2. 27091965
                27091965 7 February 2018 14: 52
                0
                Quote: geniy
                And the fact that he refers to Parks is the same Parks apparently wrote False.


                Yes, O. Parks does not lie, just in the publication where it is written, only one part of the description of all the shootings is indicated. This is mainly prize shooting.
          2. sevtrash
            sevtrash 7 February 2018 17: 21
            0
            Quote: geniy
            but you focused all your attention only on the percentage of hits, forgetting that 27091965i also indicated the distance - from 5000-7400 yards, which sharply contradicts Andrei’s statements from Chelyabinsk that the British always shot at 1000 yards before WWII.

            A little higher, I also wrote about this. And Andrey from Chelyabinsk was simply mistaken, in fact, he practically admitted this in the comments, apparently, he did not work enough with the sources. He writes well and interestingly, but then suddenly it turns out that some provisions are false. It seems that he finds some source close to his ideas, writes an article, and then it turns out that there are sources with data of the opposite nature.
            Here about the same. Speaking of firing accuracy, it would be nice to give comparative data on the fleets, indicate the sources, and not hide them. Moreover, there is, it turns out the same Target practice.
            In general, it remains once again to conclude that the topic is interesting - if it is considered the effectiveness of shooting and SLA, and not the overthrow of authorities - but not disclosed.
            Of course, somewhere there is a book / article in which all this is, you need to look or wait, maybe someone will post / share the link. request
            1. geniy
              geniy 7 February 2018 18: 28
              0
              Dear sevtrash, Andrey was not just mistaken. I believe that the reason for his error lies very deeply. In fact, he is not very guilty. In my opinion, in those days - around 1900, all data on the accuracy of shooting in all countries were completely open and even published in special naval literature. but when the Russo-Japanese War took place, and then the First World War, and in naval battles a staggeringly low percentage of hits was revealed in comparison with training shootings, then all accuracy and distance data were put into secret archives, which are not accessible to ordinary history buffs. And therefore, in my opinion, neither Andrei, nor you, and no one else, in principle, will be able to access data on firing accuracy if some senior admiral does not allow him as a friend.
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash 7 February 2018 21: 47
                0
                Quote: geniy
                and no one else, in principle, will be able to access data on firing accuracy unless some high-ranking admiral allows him as a friend.

                I hope not, but this is already history, such weapons and OMS in the past. It's just that this topic is not interesting to the absolute majority. Among professional military historians, there can certainly be people who possess such information or who know about books / sources with much more detailed information. Or it is necessary to conduct a more serious search for sources and more serious analytical work with them. Only now who would have taken or found.
                1. geniy
                  geniy 7 February 2018 22: 29
                  0
                  Dear Sirs! Does any of you understand this problem?
                  You understand that this is not only about the British Navy, and the range of firing practice in it. Andrei was already asked a question about the state of affairs in other fleets: French, German and American. And he honestly admitted that he knew nothing about it. In fact, this comparison should be even more extensive - there were much more free countries and fleets: the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet, Italian, Austro-Hungarian, Greek, Turkish, Mexican, Argentinean, Brazilian, Swedish, Norwegian and Chinese. Chilean. And in every fleet there are dozens of warships. And each ship necessarily produced training artillery firing at least once a year, or even more. And all this continued from the century of electricity of 1880 to the widespread proliferation of rockets and the emergence of electronics - until about 1960. And this means that since each ship necessarily compiled a report on artillery firing, then, if summed up over all fleets of the world, millions of sheets must be saved! And this means that historians want it or don’t want to - but inevitably they would have to come across tons of these documents in the archives. But none of this has been published. You believe in the same way as my friend whom I already wrote about that all historians around the world are incredibly lazy and simply do not want to publish all this. And I’m sure that all these documents in all countries are kept in highly secret archives, and nobody just saw them. Although some particularly trusted historians have the opportunity to visit these archives. I suspect that one of these historians is our well-known Russian coryphaeus Melnikov Rafail Mikhailovich. In his books, I met amazing figures about the accuracy of training shooting, but none of the readers even noticed this!
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              8 February 2018 19: 35
              +2
              Quote: sevtrash
              apparently did not work enough with sources.

              here is a little different. My problem is that I did not bother to learn English, so a huge layer of foreign publications is not available to me - I, with the rarest exception, only operate with works that have been translated into Russian
              For example, the same target practitioner I was looking for in an English Internet, but to no avail. I knew that such statistics exist, but I could not find it, it does not lie on the surface
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash 8 February 2018 21: 31
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                For example, the same target practitioner I was looking for in an English Internet, but to no avail. I knew that such statistics exist, but I could not find it, it does not lie on the surface

                Similarly, I tried to find, but did not find soon. If you dig, but you need to do this, you can probably pull something out. I found such a site, for example
                http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/C
                ategory: Source
                This page links to a bunch of resources. I searched only in the national archive, but did not find. I'm not as enthusiastic as you are, but still somehow try to find, if I find this Target practice I’ll drop the link.
  28. geniy
    geniy 7 February 2018 12: 44
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Well, a person does not understand how to tighten the scope of, say, a 305-mm gun.

    I would like to know from you how personally you understand the principle of vertical guidance of naval guns, especially medium and large caliber. What does your phrase “tighten the scope” mean? That is, a ship at sea experiences at least a small pitching, for example, 2-3 degrees, and a random vertical deviation of a few tenths of a degree gives a guaranteed miss of hundreds of meters. That is, according to Admiral Makarov, each gun must be pointed with an accuracy of at least tenths of a degree - and this is when rolling! And it would seem that if every commandor wanted to track the pitching, he would constantly have to rotate the gun’s flywheels, and at the same time take into account the course of his and the enemy’s ship, the strength of the wind, and much more. And at the same time, monitor the fall of their shells and adjust their shooting and the fall of the shells: under-flight, deflection to the right and left, and at the same time be able to distinguish between the fall of the shells of their guns and the drops of the shells of neighboring guns of exactly the same caliber: for example, on the cruiser Varyag 6 six-inch guns on board, and exactly the same six-inch guns of the battleships of the Borodino type. And you write as if the guns simply "twisted the scope" Of course you can really "twist the scope" - but what is the use of this? for it induces the need for guns so that the shells fly precisely at the target, and not at the sight. Therefore, I would like to know how you generally understand the principle of guidance of naval guns.
  29. Kibb
    Kibb 8 February 2018 19: 22
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    This “critic” is not at all aware of what the Royal Navy was like and how much Fisher had to do at least to overcome the estate in the promotion of officers. In general, there were Augean stables and, becoming PML, he quickly moved forward shooting training. In general, the “critic” once again, wanting to fast, ignores both the text of the article and reality.

    Well, it’s also hard to argue with cockroaches in Fisher’s head, but you’re right - Fisher did a lot for RN