Military Review

Strategic pendulum. Part of 1

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The strategic deployment of enemy forces on the Russian-Austrian front in 1914 had its own specifics (see The first front of Austria-Hungary; TVD Second Patriotic. 1914 year. Part of 2). Operational planning against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Stavka based on intelligence information about the deployment plan of the enemy troops in Galicia. A concentric offensive of the 2 army groups of the Southwestern Front was planned (northern or right flank — 4 and 5, and the southern or left flank — 3 and 8).


Accordingly, the operations of the northern (Lublin-Kholmsk operation) and the southern (Galich-Lviv operation) army groups proceeded autonomously, subsequently being connected by the Gorodok battle. By moving in converging directions, the Russian armies reached the flanks of the Austrian group, crushed them, cutting off the Austrian corps from the RR. San and Dniester, surrounded and destroyed.

But, revealing a leak of information, the enemy changed the plan for 1912 and took the deployment of his troops to the west - by 100 km. And now the Austrian troops were covering their adversary on the northern flank - looming over the right flank of the South-Western Front. On the northern flank of the battle, the Austrians managed to preempt the Russians in their deployment and create a general superiority in forces.


1. Austrian infantry regiment advanced to the front. Linz, August 1914

The correlation of forces reflected the characteristics of operational deployment. The right flank of the South-Western Front (4 and 5 Army - 16 Infantry Divisions) opposed the Austro-Hungarian 1 and 4 Armies (19,5 Infantry Division), the army group of Infantry General I. Ferdinand (3). , the army group of cavalry general G. R. von Kummer (2,5 Infantry Divisions) and the German Silesian Landwehr Corps R. von Voirsch (2 Infantry Divisions) - a total of 27 infantry divisions. 337000 Russian fighters against 590000 Austro-Germans (1 to 1,75 ratio), 1100 Russian guns against 1250 enemy's guns. Equal were only cavalry groups (to the beginning of the operation for 5 divisions). The Austro-German command planned the operation with decisive goals - and could well afford it.


2. To the front. Vienna, August 1914

If, for example, in the Russian 5 Army General P. A. Plehve's cavalry there were about 147000 people, then the opposing enemy troops counted: the Austro-Hungarian 4 Army General of the Infantry M. von Auffenberg - over 200000 and Joseph's group -Fredinanda - about 65000 people. M. Auffenberg cited the following information on the national composition of his army - 100000 Czechs and Slovaks, 20000 Bosnians, Italians and Poles, 50000 Germans and 40000 Hungarians (Magyars) [Auffenberg-Komarow M. von. Aus Österreich-Ungarns Teilnahme am Weltkriege. Berlin und Wien, 1920. S. 107.]. We note this fact because the 4-I army on 50% consisted of the Slavs, but this did not prevent it from being one of the best military associations of Austria-Hungary. A similar situation in the correlation of forces was observed between the Austro-Hungarian 1 army and the opposing Russian 4 army.

Strategic pendulum. Part of 1

3. The commander of the Austrian 1-th Army, cavalry general V. Dunkl.


4. The commander of the Austrian 4 Army General of the infantry M. von Auffenberg.


5. Infantry General Joseph Ferdinand.


6. Cavalry General G. R. von Kummer.


7. R. von Voirsh.

A fundamentally different situation took shape on the southern flank.
The left flank of the Southwestern Front (3 and 8 Army - 354000 people in the 22 infantry divisions) were opposed by the Austro-Hungarian 3 Army and Army Group of the General of the Infantry G. Kevess von Kevessgaz (more than 200000 people in 15 infantry forces) . 1150 Russian guns against 450 Austrian, 7 Russian cavalry divisions opposed 6 Austrian. The enemy overlooked the deployment of the Russian 8 Army General of the cavalry A. A. Brusilov - for which he paid dearly. The troops of the latter were assigned a very important role in the upcoming operation on the environment: "The 8 army, having established itself on the Stryp, changes ... the front of its movement, having the Berezhany-Rohatyn-Podkamen road as its axis ..." [Strategic Essay on the War of 1914 — 1918 CH 1. C. 49.]. The cavalry of the army so successfully covered the deployment of its forces that for the time being the presence of the 8 army was not noticed by the enemy command.

Thus, if the Austrians also deployed 3 armies against other 3-x armies of the front, the opponent of the 8-th army was a weaker unit - the army group of Kevess von Kevessgaz (70000 man, 148 guns). But the group had a strong cavalry (3 divisions). Theoretically, the situation could be rectified by the transfer of the 2 Army from the Serbian Front (158000 man, 480 guns) [White A. Galicia battle. C. 55] - but it was thrown gradually, and it was introduced into the battle piecemeal - and in the end it could not turn the tide.


8. Commander of the Austrian 3 Army, cavalry general R. von Broderman.


9. The commander of the Austrian 2-th Army, cavalry general E. von Bem-Ermolli (in the photo - in the center).


10. The infantry general Kevesse von Kevessgaz.

Austrian operational-strategic planning assumed the defeat of the armies of the right flank of the South-Western Front (for this purpose, the enemy and created a significant superiority in forces) - including also through an operation on the environment. In the south, the Austrians expected to hold out until the main forces smashed the northern flank of the Southwestern Front.

The specificity of the strategic deployment was that a large number of troops (up to 198000 people for the Russians and up to 264000 people for the Austrians) arrived in the course of the operation, having a significant impact on its design. To a large extent, operating with suitable reserves and the ability to navigate in the rapidly changing environment of the oncoming battle determined the outcome of the operation.

In total, the Austrians deployed at the front to the 7 of August: Yaroslav - Przemysl - Lviv - Stanislav - Zaleshchiki 3 army and 3 army groups with a total of 800000 people (with German corps), and awaited the arrival of significant reinforcements. Until 2 / 3 forces were concentrated between Przemysl and the mouth of the river. San - against the Russian forces 4 th and 5 th armies concentrating between pp Bug and Vistula.

The grouping of the Austro-Hungarian troops was valuable, provided that joint actions with the Germans were necessary for a concentric offensive in Poland. But the fact that the Germans paid all the attention only to East Prussia greatly devalued the advantages of the strategic deployment of the Austrians. While in the north the Austrians outnumbered the Russians 4 and 5 armies undoubtedly, then on the southern flank the Austro-Hungarian command had insufficient forces, unable to act as a solid barrier that ensured the main operation - between the Bug and the Vistula. A very unfavorable circumstance was the delay in concentration of the 2 army.

Russian 4 army to 5 August focused on the front of Lublin - Kholm - Kovel - Lutsk - Kremenets - Proskurov - they consisted of 691000 people. There were no strategic reserves - retarded divisions and formations of the 9 Army (Guards and 18 Army Corps) acted in their roles.


11. Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the South-Western Front, General of Artillery N. I. Ivanov.

The smallest volume of troops was concentrated in the armies (4-I and 5-I), deployed between the Bug and the Vistula. The bulk of the troops (3-I and 8-I armies) was concentrated on the Rovnensky and Proskurovsky directions - a step backwards in 100 km from the northern group. But, as noted above, the deployment of Russian armies, based on the biased assumption of deploying the enemy almost along the border, in fact led Russian troops not to bypass the flanks of the Austrians, but to their front. This circumstance was aggravated by the weakness of the Russian forces of the right flank (northern front), and also that the front-right army of the front (4) was noticeably pushed forward - this could lead to its local defeat (while the 5 army was pulled east) . But the 3-I and 8-I armies created a powerful grouping that struck at the most important direction - Galich and Lviv.

An unfavorable circumstance was the miscalculation in the deployment of the right-flank armies of the front, where the numerical superiority of the Austrians, with the approach of the troops of G. R. Kummer and R. von Voirsch on the right bank of the river. Wisla, reached 7-mi infantry divisions. But in the southern army group the Russians, in turn, had superior strength — on the 8 infantry divisions — sufficient to guarantee a successful strike against the Austrian 3 Army and the Kevess group.


12. The commander of the 5 Army of the South-Western Front, cavalry general P. A. Plehve.


13. The commander of the 4 Army of the UZF, General of Infantry A. E. von Zalc. Removed from the command of 12 August 1914 g.


14. The commander of the 4 Army of the UZF was General of Infantry AE Evert (in fact, from 12. 08. 1914, legally from 22. 08. 1914).

Considering the greatest application of forces by Austrians and Russians on the opposite flanks of their groupings, the operation turned into a kind of “pendulum” - a competition whose meaning was in whose strongest flank would have time to break an opposing weaker opponent.

So, the Russian 3-I and 8-I armies attacked Lviv, and the 4-I and 5 armies attacked Przemysl and Lviv with the prospect of covering the flanks of the Austrian forces and destroying them in Lvov. The Austrian 1 and 4 armies were advancing towards Lublin.


15. The commander of the 3 Army of the UZF, General of Infantry N. V. Ruzsky.


16. The commander of the 8 Army of the South-Western Front, cavalry general A. A. Brusilov.

The operation was carried out 05. 08. - 13. 09. 1914

The Russian 4 army began to move in the direction of Przemysl. On August 10, its 14 Cavalry Division, supported by the 72 Infantry Regiment of Tula and the 18 Artillery Brigade Division, overthrew the Austro-Hungarian 7 Cavalry Division with the loss of the last 160 man [Golovin N.N. From stories 1914 campaigns on the Russian front. Galician battle. The first period. C. 174.]. It should be noted that the Austrian air reconnaissance immediately revealed the actions of the 4 army.


17. Austrian infantry on the march.


18. Austrian lancers.


19. Austrian wagon train.

On August 10, the Russian 5 Army began advancing - with the mission of attacking Moszysk - Lviv, contributing to the Army 4.

But in the 3-day counter-battle at XRUMX 10 - 12 in August, the 3 corps of the 4 army suffered defeats from the army of V. Dunkl and were driven back to Lublin. In particular, on August 10, the 14 Army Corps on the right flank of the 4 Army was crushed and with great losses thrown back to Krasnik [The 178 Infantry Regiment of Vendensky 45 Infantry Division lost the 800-900 man during the first day of the battle. One battalion and 4 company commanders were killed, 4 company commanders were injured. The 180 th Vindava Infantry Regiment lost up to 1,5 thousand people. See: N. Golovin. From the history of the 1914 campaign on the Russian front. Galician battle. The first period. C. 155.], and the 25-I cavalry, 3-I, 5-I and 12-I infantry divisions and 46-I landshurmenny brigade of the enemy penetrated the 101-km gap. The Austrians counted more than 1 thousand Russian prisoners [Golovin N. N. Decree. cit. C. 157]. The enemy also suffered heavy losses - for example, the Austrian 76 Infantry Regiment in the August 11 battle lost up to 50% of personnel.


20. Lublin, 1914

The Russian command tried to fend off the threat, but there were no strong reserves in the 4 army. On August 11, the 16 th Army Corps failed: in a heavy battle, the 3 Regiment of the 41 Division lost up to 4,4 thousand people - one third [White A. Galicia battle. C. 82]. The Austrians for the day of the 11 battle of August with the corps of the 4 army reported the seizure of several thousand prisoners and more 20 guns [Golovin N. The Battle of Galicia. The first period. C. 168]. Problems with communication, lack of unity in the implementation of the maneuver became the main reason for the failures of the 4 army (the first conclusion was the change of command of the army).


21. Russian infantry on the march.

By the end of August 12, the 4 Army was entrenched at the turn of 20 — 45 km to the west, south, and southeast of Lublin. The front command took measures to deploy reinforcements to its composition, primarily troops of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps.

At the same time, the Austrians exaggerated the value of victories at Krasnik: being numerically stronger than the Russians and having a more optimal grouping of troops and the possibility of 1 and 4 armies to take the Russian 4 army into ticks, they missed this chance. Moreover, the victory was not used, since the right flank of V. Dankl’s army began to be transferred to the Krasnostava direction — to oppose the forces of the Russian 4-th army of P. A. Plehve. Attempts at the further advance of the Austro-Hungarian 5 Army to the city of Lublin were repelled by counterstrikes of the reserves that had come up.

The August 13-14 battles were heavy for Russians, the 16 and Grenadier corps were again forced to withdraw (the Austrian 5 and 10 corps took up to 2 thousand prisoners).


22. Galicia. On a halt (photo piece-cap. Korsakov).

The position on the front of the Russian 14 corps was somewhat better. From August 15, units of the Russian 4 Army tried to attack. In particular, parts of the 14 corps with bayonet counterattacks rejected the Austrians and captured prisoners and 900 guns to 3. [White A. Decree. Cit. C. 94.]. The 16 and Grenadier corps held out, and the arrival of fresh connections (primarily the 18 body) made it possible to create prerequisites for future action.

Up to the transition to the general offensive of the northern flank armies during the second stage of the Galician battle, the 4 army fought with the group of G. R. Kummer and the Austrian 5 and 10 corps. Thus, in the battles of 17 - 18, Kummer's group was defeated in August (the 95-i landscapeshturmenny division was defeated by Opole, losing more than 1 thousand prisoners, 3 guns and 10 machine guns). Part of the Austrian 24 Division that broke through on the Travniki were stopped.


1 card. Krasnik and Tomashevsk battles. Dating on the map - a new style.

The reinforcements increased the forces of the 4 Army in the 5 infantry divisions: now it included up to 14 infantry and 3,5 cavalry divisions. It was created superiority over the army of V. Dunkl - the latter, although it increased its composition on the 2,5 division, but of low quality (flat pieces). And on the contrary, the change of command of the 4 Army (AE Evert took command) and the approach of the Guards and Caucasians significantly raised the morale of the operational forces.

At the same time, events developed at the front of the second army of the right flank of the front - 5. As a result of the defeat of a neighbor near Krasnik, the front command ordered the 5 army to make a sharp turn to the west (initially it moved south) by helping the left flank of the 4 army. The army of P. A. Plehve was forced to perform 2 tasks that forced her to send corps: to the west, assisting the 4 army, and to the south, covering the left flank of the 3 army.

As a result, the 5 Army came to the battlefield stretched along the front by more than 100 km 2 groups of corps (25-19 and 5-17), which were separated from each other by serious intervals - before the transition. The left flank of the army opened (it should have been provided by the 3 Army, but it was located to the south). P.N. Plehve's 5 Army landed a flank attack from the south — M. Auffenberg’s 4 Army inflicted it.

To be continued
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  1. Same lech
    Same lech 22 January 2018 06: 29
    11
    Very interesting article ...
    I look mostly infantry fought ... no mechanization.
    The war was very different from the wars of the times of Kutuzov and Suvorov ...
    war on the depletion of human and material resources on both sides ... which naturally led to the natural collapse of both empires.
  2. XII Legion
    XII Legion 22 January 2018 06: 58
    19
    One of the key battles of not only the 1914 campaign, but of the entire WWII
    It was not about encircling a couple of corps, but about defeating the core of the entire Austrian army.
    But the Russians had a worthy adversary - both in the face of the army of the dual empire, and in the person of command. The battle went on with varying success and the maneuvering of the opponents led to pendulum movements in several measures.
    Thank you!
  3. Olgovich
    Olgovich 22 January 2018 07: 02
    12
    the operation turned into a kind of “pendulum” - a competition, the meaning of which was that whose strongest flank had time to defeat the weaker opponent opposing it.
    The Russian was stronger ...
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 22 January 2018 07: 38
    11
    A.E. von Salz - After being removed from command on August 12, 1914, he was appointed a member of the Alexander Committee on the wounded. At the same time, the commander of the troops of the Kazan Military District from 24.09 to 18.10.1914, and from 08.11.1914 the commandant of the Peter and Paul Fortress. Head of the Petrograd Military District from 18.11.1914/31.03.1915/1916 to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX In XNUMX he died in Petrograd.
  5. soldier
    soldier 22 January 2018 07: 57
    22
    The situation on the Russian right flank was difficult. The general superiority of forces and enemy coverage - at first they shot down the strongly advanced 4th Army, and then they tried to surround the 5th Army, which was left alone.
    Thank God that the generalship was selected qualitatively - after the change of the Saltz, the stubborn Evert, and especially Pleve, was proactive and energetic.
    Although the enemy on this flank had cool commanders - Commander-1 Dunkl (cavalier of the Order of Maria Theresa, former chief of defense of Tyrol), Commander-4 Auffenberg (former Minister of War) and Wojrsch (one of the best German generals) - nothing is wrong with ours could not do it. They survived until the approach of the 9th army of Lechitsky and avoided defeat and encirclement.
  6. Serge72
    Serge72 22 January 2018 08: 14
    20
    The fate of the entire campaign of 1914 was decided in Galicia
    The main theater of the two empires - pulled up the third
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 22 January 2018 09: 44
      +1
      it all depended on the race to Paris - the Germans went west and AV-Vgry fool around with RI, then the Germans cut the balcony! AT ANY ENERGY COMMANDARES LEFT POLAND.
      1. Serge72
        Serge72 22 January 2018 10: 00
        18
        On the contrary, the rout of the main forces of the Austro-Hungarian army specifically influenced Schlieffen’s plan.
        The Germans were forced at times to increase their presence in the east.
        The 1914 campaign was won at the expense of Marne and Galicia. Well, having won in Galicia and influenced the victory on the Marne, Russia made the entire campaign of 1914 (and since the collapse of the lightning war led a-g to defeat, this was the whole war).
        Poland - this is later, impromptu beyond. Giving nothing.
        The energetic commanders have done their job - at the right time and place
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 22 January 2018 10: 02
          +1
          after 3 g their energy was not enough
          1. Serge72
            Serge72 22 January 2018 10: 25
            17
            After 3 years, positional warfare, another alignment. Yes, and one was no longer in this world
            And then, you see, there is still such a thing - if you look at events not as a bilateral war, but as a war of blocs - that you need to work for a TOTAL victory, the picture is a little different.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 22 January 2018 15: 55
              0
              Of course the other - enchanted energetic comrades and their sovereign. then some coms in 18g

              power is needed against allies, not against enemies
              1. Serge72
                Serge72 22 January 2018 16: 36
                16
                Strength is needed against everyone)
                As they said in one movie
                May the force be with you))
                1. antivirus
                  antivirus 22 January 2018 16: 57
                  0
                  even against fried chicken
                  1. Serge72
                    Serge72 22 January 2018 18: 42
                    15
                    Yes
                    And against the roosters)
                    1. antivirus
                      antivirus 22 January 2018 21: 40
                      0
                      it’s good to be a specialist in military affairs (and grilling) - to correct generals.
                      I can only chat, I can discuss the facts.
                      what was ---- it really happened and you can’t change
                      and did not want, in childhood, to become an astronaut
                      1. soldier
                        soldier 22 January 2018 21: 52
                        15
                        It's good to be a specialist in any business
                        We are not correcting the generals here, but are discussing military-historical facts. Or then why generally speak on any topic if you do not change anything?
                        The history of topics is indicative, which allows you to analyze.
                        And try to avoid something in the present and future ...
  7. Albatroz
    Albatroz 22 January 2018 09: 20
    10
    So it’s not clear whether Redl was really recruited or planned
    After all
    the deployment of the Russian armies, based on the preconceived assumption that the enemy was deployed almost along the border, actually led the Russian troops not to bypass the flanks of the Austrians, but to their front.
    - The Austrians were very happy.
    Colorful and informative article hi
    We look forward to continuing
    1. soldier
      soldier 22 January 2018 20: 01
      15
      The film is very interesting "Colonel Redl" is 1985
      Maybe really - a good misinformation from Getzendorf
  8. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 22 January 2018 12: 45
    18
    People did not live, the Viennese waltz did not dance.
    Sorry for the color of the European nation.
    Interestingly
    Thanks to the author good
  9. soldier
    soldier 22 January 2018 19: 58
    16
    The cavalry of the army so successfully covered the deployment of its forces that the presence of the 8th army was for the time being not noticed by the enemy command.

    A striking example of the strategic role of cavalry in WWI.
    One of the tasks of strategic cavalry is to cover concentration and deployment.
    And opposite
    Austrian air reconnaissance immediately revealed the actions of the 4th Army.
    - An example of successful aerial reconnaissance, which served the Austrians a great service.
    The maneuvering period of the WWI most vividly highlighted the tactical training of troops and the operational training of command personnel.
  10. antivirus
    antivirus 23 January 2018 07: 36
    0
    soldier,
    if yes if
    if GDP introduced troops to the Donbass - then ...
    if Korolev brought to flight H1, then would fly to Mars, right away, in transit ...
    to discuss, always, and conclusions 100 years ago have already been made.
    and learn from memories, hot pursuits of losers - only for your learning
    1. soldier
      soldier 23 January 2018 08: 34
      15
      Conclusions can be made different. Analyzing incl. little-studied documents and unknown memoirs - and not only losers.
      And not only for their learning
      Tell me, then what's the point of talking about even later periods, looking at medieval pictures? Probably no sense at all? After all, the conclusions of 500 years are made. Is not it?
      1. soldier
        soldier 23 January 2018 08: 36
        15
        And the point is nostalgic for the Soviet era? History, too, has drawn all conclusions, and you will not return anything. The past is the past
      2. antivirus
        antivirus 23 January 2018 08: 41
        0
        each in his own right
        You watch your
        I see - the general vitality of the people, state
        and they sprout, emerge from the object of your interest - a war of energy — concentrated at a point (for each soldier a place where to die — to win) and time, like an athlete’s Snatch
        what forces were the soldiers of 14 g and their women. remaining in the villages? the outcome of the war?
        and most importantly - PROSPECTS that open after the Victory (for whom, someone to die).
        1. soldier
          soldier 23 January 2018 08: 57
          15
          Prospects are the preservation of the territorial integrity of Russia (we already spoke about the claims of the German bloc) and the impetus for subsequent economic development (due to reparations and annexation of new territories or control over important geopolitical points).
          Women in the villages grieved in all wars, you won’t get anywhere from this. Including during local modern conflicts - when people die in general it is not known for what.
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 23 January 2018 09: 01
            0
            and again about the Great October Socialist Revolution
            - how much from "reparations to the economy" will be given to medical schools and institutes ??? --for the treatment of women and men
            ... and 37 more questions
            1. soldier
              soldier 23 January 2018 09: 05
              15
              Yes, and the victory made it possible to solve many issues much cheaper - both territorially and materially, and in terms of human lives.
    2. soldier
      soldier 23 January 2018 13: 23
      15
      antivirus
      and learn from the memories of losers

      And who is the loser? If the Austro-German generals - then, on the basis of this, he is all like that, since he has turned down strategic operations.
  11. Streletskos
    Streletskos 24 January 2018 09: 15
    15
    A great series about operations!
    About many, especially for the 15th year and there is no full-fledged information
    Continuation and again continuation!
  12. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 25 January 2018 21: 10
    12
    Very interesting and informative article. Once again I am convinced that at the beginning of the war the Austrian cadre army was a rather dangerous enemy, but the Russian command was better prepared.