Military Review

Is Klim Voroshilov on the Mannerheim Line an Alternative to Atomic Weapons?

76



A famous designer made a memorable review in his memoirs tanks Leonid Kartsev about his equally famous colleague - Joseph Kotin: “He was a talented organizer and an outstanding politician. Further, the names of the heavy tanks created by the Design Bureau had a political connotation: SMK (Sergey Mironovich Kirov), KV (Klim Voroshilov), IS (Joseph Stalin). This psychologically acted, first of all, on customers, and on other officials. ”

Indeed, it is impossible not to notice the politically "correct" names of some of the creatures of Kotin. But it must be admitted that the tanks created by him did not disgrace the names with which they were given. The QMS, however, did not become serial, although it was recommended for adoption by the Red Army. The era of multi-tank tanks is over ...

But the EC-2 is deservedly considered the most powerful and formidable tank of the Second World War. KV-1, with all the problems with its chassis, made it possible for trained crews in the defensive battles of 1941, to arrange for the Germans a "happy life" and badly spoil the triumph of the blitzkrieg. Suffice it to recall at least what the crew of the KV-1 under the command of Zinoviy Kolobanov (22: 0 in favor of the Soviet tank crews. The fantastic result, skill and luck, military-industrial complex, 11 January 2016 g.).

In 1942, the high-speed version of the KV-1 - KV-1 made it possible to win in the changed conditions of the tank war (KV-1 with the eyes of its commander: Successful duel with T-IV, military industrial complex, 5 January 2018).

A tank KV-2, it seems, just did not have time to "his" war - Finnish, which could become his triumph. Samples of the KV tank, both with the 76-mm and with the 152-mm gun, were tested on it, but in small quantities and at the very end of the war.

Tank KV was "unbreakable"

An employee of the Kirov factory Estratov A.I. participated in these tests. Together with the HF, prototypes of QMS and T-100 participated in them.

(cited from the book of Maxim Kolomiets - Winter War: "The tanks break wide sweeps").
This is how the KV battles with the Finns were remembered by their participant: “In the evening, the head of the armored command Comrade Pavlov came to us. “Now,” he says, “comrades,” I will acquaint you with the pillboxes of the Baboshino fortified area. T-28 can not pass - they are burning, we hope for you. Tomorrow morning we will let you into battle, you need to urgently test cars. ”

Upon arrival at the initial position, we were explained the task set before us: after the artillery preparation, we go with the 20 tank tank brigade to attack. Having passed a small part of the forest, a vast glade opened in front of us, tanks were burning on our left and right. Ahead of the going T-28 caught fire, it prevents us from moving forward. Turn off the road - we are afraid to run into mines. Ahead of the anti-tank ditch, planks, wire barriers. We tried to get close to the burning tank and push it off the road. The crew of the T-28 left the tank through the landing hatch and did not turn off the gearbox, we were unable to move the car. An order was received on the radio - turn off the road to the left and move along the anti-tank ditch. The enemy beats shells on the right side of our car, blow by blow, as if they were beating a strong sledgehammer on the board. True frost or trembling leg goes. Another blow by blow - we move. Our commander Kachikhin spoke, nervous. They beat us, the enemy is nowhere to be seen. We remembered the instruction Comrade. Pavlova. The commander of the tank Kachikhin gives the command to look at all the observation devices and look for disguised pillboxes. Suddenly, Bucket shouts: “There is a bump ahead. Look, a pipe came out of it and hid ”. Kachikhin's voice: “This is probably a pillbox. The sight of the pipe is fire! ” I noticed a hillock. On the hill formed poles. Smoke appears from them. The command of the commander followed - “fire on the poles!” I load the gun, me and the mechanic and the loader. We noticed enemy firing points in several places. A strong blow to the projectile on the front of the tank, the tank spattered sparks, another blow. Our gun shook, we stopped the tank. What happened is unknown. They started the engine, tried to move - everything is in order. I say to Kachikhin: “I would have had a bite to eat breakfast, dinner was long over. I am sure that we are not breaking through our tank. ” From the bite refused.

They received an order on the radio: “To our left, a downed T-28. Inspect it and, if possible, tow it to the rear. ” We approached the T-28 closely, despite the heavy shelling of the enemy. I got out of the car - being between the tanks, it was possible to inspect the T-28 and tow it in tow. Towed tank to the rear. Early in the morning Voroshilov PK arrived to us. and with him five commanders in "Romanov" fur coats. Among them was Pavlov D.G. After inspecting the KV machine, they found: a cannon was shot through, some rollers in the chassis were shot, some trucks were beaten, but not completely, the towing cable was broken, there were many hits in the left and right sides - the tank remained intact and unharmed. Now it was clear to us why our gun was trembling, why we were showered with flames of sparks. The military commission was pleased. We shook hands, congratulated on the task. Pavlov ordered Voroshilov to urgently go to the factory and as soon as possible to give the front KV tanks.

An 76-mm gun barrel was brought from the factory. There was no crane - a strong pine tree with a good strong bitch was picked up, the trunk was lifted by a hoist, the tank was driven in manually, under the guidance of artilleryman Voinov I.A., the gun was mounted.

The second time went to battle the QMS and "weaving." In this battle, the QMS was blown up by land mines and remained on the territory of the White Finns. The crew of our car was ordered to return to the factory. New turrets with 152-mm howitzer-gun were prepared at the plant for firing at reinforced concrete structures.

By this time the second HF was ready. Two cars were sent to the front: on one driver Bucket, Commander Komarov, on the other driver Lyashko, Commander Petin. I began to work on preparing the machines for the next battle: refueling with ammunition, fuel, and most importantly, to eliminate the shortcomings of the identified defects. In the Finnish war, the KV tank was unaffected. Of course, there were defects. One day, due to the failure of small 8 mm bolts, the machine almost fell to the enemy. This happened to us in two cars. During the battle, it was already evening, on the Bucket machine, two 8 mm bolts were cut off, which fix the fuel pump with the B-2 engine. Motor stalled, will not start. I worked on another machine with Kolotushkin I.I. We crawled to the Bucket car, crawled into the car through the landing hatch, and discussed the plan for restoring the car. There is a battle, machine-gun bursts, and we need to get out of the car and open the engine hatch, which is located on top of the car. I got out of the tank, opened the engine hatch, then Kolotushkin II got out. and covered me with a tarpaulin, folded in several rows. I am lying on the engine, Kolotushkin climbed into the tank. Lighted electrolight portable lamp. All this was done so that the enemy could not see the light of the portable lamp with which I should work. The bucket turns the engine of the car from the inside, and you need to find the top dead center in the first cylinder of the motor and connect the fuel pump to the engine with two 8 mm bolts at a certain angle. Finally everything is ready, start, the motor is working. We left the battlefield to check the car. ”

Projectiles were not affected by the normal operation of the crew.

The question immediately arises - how true is the author's statement of the recollection that “in the Finnish war the KV tank was unaffected”?

Does this documentary evidence? Yes there is.

Help

On the testing of HF and T-100 on the Karelian Isthmus, February-March 1940.
To test the combat qualities of prototypes of heavy tanks, the following were sent to the acting Army for testing:

1. Tank KV with 152-mm howitzer - 2 units, arrived 16 February;
2. T-100 tank with normal weapons - 1 units, arrived 21 February;
3. Tank KV with normal weapons - 1 units, arrived 26 February;
4. Tank KV with 152 mm howitzer - 1 units, arrived 2 March.

This group of 5 units took part in combat operations from February 22 to March 6 from the 20 Tank Brigade, and from March 7 to 13 from the 1 Tank Brigade. Basically, this type of tank is designed to combat DOT, for which 152-mm howitzers were installed on three KVs.

Due to the fact that the fortification in the direction of the 20 tank tank brigade was broken before the arrival of the heavy tanks, and the brigade did not meet in the subsequent direction of the fighting, it was not possible to check the real power of the fire of this weapon ...

The result of the application revealed that:

1. With the appearance of heavy tanks in the sectors of the enemy’s anti-tank weapons, the latter sought to disable the tank. But making sure that the tanks were invulnerable for anti-tank artillery, the enemy stopped firing at them. When the T-28 and BT appeared, the enemy with their fire took them out of action. According to the observation of tank commanders, they destroyed 14 anti-tank guns.

2. During this same time, 11 firing points located in earthen shelters were destroyed by fire and cannon fire.

3. In the process of fighting, 152-mm howitzers were used to destroy the canine.

Nadolby installed on the surface of the highway in the form of granite boulders. The destruction of their 152-mm projectiles did not give the desired effect, since when it hit the granite nadiba turned over or cracked into several pieces (2 – 3), which did not give complete destruction. Released 18 shells on tank canals for the passage could not be done, which led to the need to organize the undermining of four stones with the help of sappers.

Nadolby (granite), located off-road, but dug into the ground, easily broken shells. The shell, caught in the head, destroyed it to the ground. The four-row 15 projectiles on the rabbis made a fairly good pass (about 6 meters) for all types of tanks ...

The enemy, getting under fire 152-mm howitzers, stopped shelling the advancing tanks ...
The completed mileage: ... KV number 0 - 205 km, KV number 1U - 132 km, KV number 2U - 336 km, KV № ZU - 139 km.
Damage:
… Tank KV No. 0 (14 hits from 37 and 47-mm guns): front square at the junction of inclined sheets - 1, upper inclined sheet (front) - 3, lower inclined sheet (front) - 2, feed - 1, right side hulls - 3, port side - 1, right sloth to the hub - 1, top roller - 1, bottom roller to the hub - 1.

Tank KV No. 1U has no combat hits.
Tank KV No. 2U: combat hit of a projectile from an 37-mm cannon into the square of the front sheets - 1.
Tank SQ No. ZU (12 hits from 37 and 47-mm guns): upper inclined sheet - 1, lower inclined sheet - 1, starboard - 4, body feed - 1, tower - 1, buffer limiter - 1, lower rollers - 2, caterpillar - 1.

All hits in armor made indentations from 10 to 40 mm. Shots of shells on the reservation in no way affected the normal operation of the crew.

The commander of the group of heavy tanks, captain Kolotushkin.

Captain Kolotushkin writes: “having made sure that the tanks were invulnerable, for the anti-tank artillery, the enemy stopped firing at them ... strikes of shells on the reservation (as in the document - M.K.) did not in any way affect the normal operation of the crew”. Awesome results.

Without nuclear weapons is it impossible?

Victor Rezun (who calls himself Suvorov) claims that he tried to get an answer from the British military computer to the question: “How could the Red Army break the Mannerheim line:

“The computer responded quickly and decisively: the direction of the main attack of Lintul - Viipuri; before the attack - fire preparation: the first air explosion, the epicenter - Kanneljärvi, the equivalent of 50 kilotons, the height of 300; the second air blast, the epicenter is Lounatejoki, the equivalent ... the third blast ... the fourth ...

I to operators: stop, car, full back!
- Without nuclear weapons you can not?
- It is impossible, - the computer answers.

I approached him with affection and threats, but the computer stubborn got caught: WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE. Even if you have eight spans in your forehead, even though the computer has the most unimaginable power, the answer is the same: without nuclear weapons, it will not work. NO ONE WILL HAVE ANYTHING! ”

The Red Army, as you know, was able to solve this problem without nuclear weapons, but at the cost of heavy losses, with a delay of several months.

Let us imagine that the HF with 76 - mm and 152 - mm tools would have been created a few months earlier. And not a few pieces of such machines in February - March 1940 of the year, but a few dozen or even hundreds would have begun to destroy the fortifications of the Mannerheim line in December of 1939.

The anti-tank artillery of the Finns ceases, making sure that “tanks are invulnerable”, or dies heroically and senselessly. There are no other options. After all, HF firing is not reflected in the normal operation of their crews. And protected by reliable armor 152 - mm guns are beating at the bunkers of meters that way from twenty. Nuclear weapons would not be needed here. And Marshal Mannerheim’s reputation as a commander would now look very different ...
Author:
Originator:
https://vpk-news.ru/articles/40708
76 comments
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  1. igordok
    igordok 21 January 2018 15: 21
    +7
    Generally interesting, but nothing new.
    By this time, the second HF was ready.

    KV-tank female? Why offend the tank. laughing
    1. Golovan Jack
      Golovan Jack 21 January 2018 15: 24
      12
      Quote: igordok
      KV-tank female?

      Well, yes ... Klava Voroshilov laughing
    2. Nikolaevich I
      Nikolaevich I 21 January 2018 16: 24
      +3
      Quote: igordok
      By this time, the second HF was ready.

      Oh, how wrong you are! Here u is understandable! The author noted the sending of the article to the editors .. was busy and wanted to write in a notebook: By this time, the second bottle of Armenian cognac “KV” was already “ready” .. We must go for the third ... But since the author was tired of the “works of the righteous then there was a reduction! yes
    3. Aviator_
      Aviator_ 21 January 2018 16: 51
      +7
      He probably wanted to say "KV car"
      1. Cat
        Cat 21 January 2018 20: 44
        +1
        More likely KeVashka.
        The photo shows the layout of the KV-2 tank. Unfortunately, I don’t know if the KV-2 was preserved in the original?
        If someone tells me I will be grateful.
        1. Aviator_
          Aviator_ 21 January 2018 21: 15
          +3
          KV-2 stands near the Moscow Museum of the Soviet Army, there is a good selection of historical armored vehicles.
    4. M. Michelson
      M. Michelson 24 January 2018 22: 32
      0
      And why offend women with such comments?
      negative
  2. ul_vitalii
    ul_vitalii 21 January 2018 15: 29
    +7
    What a clumsy look.
    1. sxfRipper
      sxfRipper 21 January 2018 16: 39
      +1
      This is a six-inch version.
    2. Crimea26
      Crimea26 21 January 2018 17: 00
      +5
      This is a self-propelled howitzer in essence. He goes in the second lines ..
    3. faiver
      faiver 21 January 2018 17: 29
      0
      the clumsy not only look, but the tank itself, although in fact it’s self-propelled (extremely unsuccessful)
  3. sxfRipper
    sxfRipper 21 January 2018 16: 41
    +2
    The Red Army, as you know, was able to solve this problem without nuclear weapons, but at the cost of heavy losses, with a delay of several months.
    That is what Suvorov wrote about, jerking over the very computer and what was laid in it.
    1. Doliva63
      Doliva63 21 January 2018 18: 40
      14
      Suvorov did not write anything about this. The traitor Rezun wrote.
      1. sxfRipper
        sxfRipper 21 January 2018 21: 57
        +4
        And, well, yes, here is the company of those for whom Suvorov (Rezun) is Judas, etc. They did not read his books, but, like all the people of Savets ...
        Sorry for offtopic.
        1. Doliva63
          Doliva63 22 January 2018 18: 28
          +7
          Why didn’t you read it? We, the Soviet people, were the most reading in the world. And Nietzsche, and Goethe, and Mahabharata, etc. And they also studied this shit.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 26 January 2018 16: 56
          +2
          Quote: sxfRipper
          And, well, yes, here is the company of those for whom Suvorov (Rezun) is Judas, etc. They did not read his books, but, like all the people of Savets ...

          Rezun is a stupid falsifier who, with the help of selective quoting, suppressing uncomfortable information and hypertrophic bulging conveniently skillfully customizes facts to fit his theory. Why stupid? Because the primary sources of his quotes are readily available, and you can see what the author of the quoted quote actually wrote.
          And now you can also refer to documents of those times that do not leave a stone unturned by the theory of "powerful red army. ready to invade Europe in 1941"Rather, the question follows from these documents."how we with such an army and industry were able to fight back in 1941? ".
          A typical example is the "invulnerable HF" so beloved by Rezun. In fact, a 50-mm German anti-tank submarine breaking through is likely - from 700 m and guaranteed - from 400 m (Soviet shooting of captured troop submunitions in 1942). And it is a rare design decision: an almost 50-ton tank with a chassis and transmission designed for 40 tons (as described in the recall of the State Academic Technical University for another project of a 203-mm self-propelled guns based on HF), with an engine cooling system boiling on the highway already speeds of 20 km / h, and with a 7-ton unbalanced tower, with a drive from the 3-ton tower T-28.
  4. vasev
    vasev 21 January 2018 17: 35
    +5
    The photo is not a real KV-2, but a model from the museum in Verkhnyaya Pyshma, assembled from the remains of the KV corps, rollers and tracks of the IS and the homemade tower KV-2. And yet, the KV-2 never placed a screen on the upper frontal sheet.
    1. John22
      John22 23 January 2018 11: 53
      +1
      In the photo is the real first KV No. U-3 armed with a 152 mm howitzer. He had a sloping frontal leaf of the tower. But the tower was tall. The second sample with a low tower with the same gun, called KV No. U-7, had a vertical frontal sheet of the tower. He is better known for the photo.
      1. vasev
        vasev 29 January 2018 20: 29
        0
        [quote] [/ quote] And so it was assembled "real KV-2."
      2. vasev
        vasev 29 January 2018 20: 35
        0
        Here is a photo of the tower of the "real first KV No. U-3 armed with a 152 mm howitzer. Layout.
  5. hohol95
    hohol95 21 January 2018 17: 39
    +3
    It was easier to do not KV-2, but a self-propelled gun with a fixed wheelhouse and 152-mm howitzer! It would come out faster and the car would be easier! But ... Nobody knows why this was not done - and we will never know!
    I had to wait for the SU-152 until 1943 ...
    1. PPD
      PPD 21 January 2018 17: 59
      +1
      Not easier. At the time of creation, systems like su 152 were considered “wrong.”
      supposedly the tower must be. There was already a point of view, saying that the gun in the tower should not go beyond the dimensions of the machine. To destroy the fences with walls, etc. Therefore, in a small HF gun is shorter than t 34.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 21 January 2018 18: 15
        +2
        It is doubtful that the M-10 howitzer would go beyond the dimensions of the hull - a barrel length of 24,3 calibers! The ML-20S has 28 calibers!
        And the first KV-1 guns were L-11s with a long barrel of 30,5 calibers! There were NO other similar guns for tanks in the USSR! L-10 - 26 calibers, KT-28 - 16,5 calibers.
        1. Cat
          Cat 21 January 2018 20: 48
          +3
          You are right for the following serial already set F-32, later F-34 (digital values ​​length in calibers).
        2. PPD
          PPD 21 January 2018 21: 44
          0
          In Qu 1, not Qu 2 shorter. The guns on the serial KVs of the first were shorter than those of the t 34.
          Why, right after the appearance of Kv, it was sometimes criticized — it breaks bridges — only in this way, and the gun-pier would be stronger.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 21 January 2018 22: 56
            +3
            On the first KV-1 and T-34 put guns L-11!
            Only after the F-34 gun was installed on the T-34, did the T-34 gun become longer than the KV-1 gun!
            But when replacing the F-32 gun with the ZiS-5, the KV-1 was already equal to the 34th - the gun’s barrel length was 41,6 caliber versus 41,5 caliber for the F-34!
            Many tanks broke bridges! In the USSR, bridges broke even under Pz.III. And under the Tigers ...

            Tank Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" of the 8th company of the 2nd SS SS "Das Reich", which failed on the bridge near the town of Yarmolintsy. Soviet sappers used the car as a support under the restored bridge. 1st UV March-April 1944.
          2. mkpda
            mkpda 22 January 2018 18: 15
            0
            The first KV-1 and T-34 series were armed with the L-11 gun. Then they were rearmament on the F-32 (with the same barrel length - 30,5 cal.) Due to problems with the L-11. But the newest and cheaper F-34 (barrel length 41,5 cal.) In the KV-1 did not get up and until it was redone (ZiS-5), they were forced to put the F-32, and the T-34 was already coming with the F- 34.
    2. Nikolaevich I
      Nikolaevich I 22 January 2018 01: 32
      +5
      Quote: hohol95
      It was easier to do not KV-2, but a self-propelled gun with a fixed wheelhouse and 152-mm howitzer! It would come out faster and the car would be easier! But ... Nobody knows why this was not done - and we will never know!

      Why bother !? Much of that period is explained “simply”: there was no experience, much was new, and there was no meaningful concept until the end ... the concept was born in the process of designing, testing prototypes, including in combat, by the method " trial and error "!!!
      1. Romulus
        Romulus 22 January 2018 02: 24
        +1
        Quote: Nikolaevich I
        and in battle there is a trial and error method !!!

        Familiar genre - women still give birth (s) ...
        1. Nikolaevich I
          Nikolaevich I 22 January 2018 09: 28
          +4
          Quote: Romulus
          Familiar genre - women still give birth (s) ...

          M-d-ah! Something you confuse "fork with a bottle"!
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 22 January 2018 08: 10
        0
        The point is not in experience, but in the “throwing and desires” of the customer (military). Remember the epic with Kurchevsky's products! The military would have a desire ... BUT the military wanted - a UNIVERSAL round-robin car! On this and fixated on the artillery tanks!
      3. hohol95
        hohol95 22 January 2018 09: 10
        +1
        However, when the "roasted cock pecked" - they started designing this "miracle" from which the SU-152 was born.

        KV-7 !!!
    3. mkpda
      mkpda 22 January 2018 18: 28
      0
      Firstly, there was force majeure and making the “big” tower turned out to be faster, more reliable and easier than designing a new fighting compartment in the form of a wheelhouse.
      Secondly, the distortions after the "Tukhachevschina" and the famous processes against a number of high commanders of the Red Army, were expressed in a negative attitude to a number of types of weapons and self-propelled guns in particular.
      Thirdly, the SU-152 appeared on the basis of the KV-6/7, which, in turn, had to solve the problem of turning large shoulder straps in the right quantities and were an ersatz solution.
  6. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 21 January 2018 17: 56
    +5
    Quote from the article:
    And not a few pieces of such machines in February - March 1940, but several dozen or even hundreds would destroy the fortifications of the Mannerheim line in December 1939 year.

    The trouble is not that there were several hundred HF.
    The trouble is that our generals were not ready to fight.
    There were no maps, no reconnaissance. For our generals, the Finnish Army mine war was the news, the news was the sniper impact, the Suomi submachine gun. Even frost, snow. Even these climatic factors were unexpected for our generals.
    And the military-technical advantage of the Red Army over the Finnish army was overwhelming in all types of weapons.
    But if the generals are not ready, then the atomic bomb will not help here. They will throw it somewhere in the swamp past the enemy’s troops for 200-300 km, or else they will drop it on their territory, on the heads of their troops.
    1. mkpda
      mkpda 22 January 2018 11: 56
      0
      Correctly. In fact, they broke through the fortified area of ​​T-28 with B-4. By the way, the T-28 were able to break through the main line of defense during the first assault, but the infantry did not go after the tanks.
    2. M. Michelson
      M. Michelson 24 January 2018 22: 19
      0
      I believe that is not entirely true.
      And the military-technical advantage of the Red Army over the Finnish army was overwhelming in all types of weapons.
      Here, probably, the dog is buried. Our military leaders began to feel dizzy from successes - not just their own, but the military-industrial complex. They counted - decided that the Finns will crush only this way. But it turned out that not all equipment is suitable for specific TVDs. The Finns partly realized the concept of a personnel-territorial army, which we just then were buried deeply.
      Then both Americans (Vietnam) and ours (Afghanistan) will be burned at the same place.
      1. mkpda
        mkpda 25 January 2018 16: 22
        0
        Our commanders had a tear in their head - poor preparation, erroneous reforms and ideological preparation of the times of Tukhachevschina, psychological pressure and loss of sense of army unity against the background of repressions (when most of the repressed were victims of their comrades who, taking advantage of the moment, solved their career tasks at their expense ) Meretskov had to kick himself in the chest, that he would win the war by the forces of his district even knowing that then he would fail and be shot, otherwise his career would face collapse or even execution.
        As for the form of mobilization of the parties, the problem is not in the name, but in relation to their duties. The Red Army refused the territorial organization precisely because of the low level of training of troops, which ultimately affected this war. Most of the mobilized were very poorly trained and required training comparable to new recruits. Another thing is that no one until 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. I didn’t think that from the moment of the announcement of the mobilization it would take about a month, and then these parts should be brought to a combat-ready state - who will give the Red Army a couple of months for this. Only now they began to do something to solve this problem.
        I don’t know about Vietnam, and Afghanistan is an example of the contradiction between the task and the real situation.
  7. intuzazist
    intuzazist 21 January 2018 19: 00
    0
    Quote: igordok
    Generally interesting, but nothing new.
    By this time, the second HF was ready.

    KV-tank female? Why offend the tank. laughing

    The second HF car was ready ............................................. ..
    ................
  8. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 21 January 2018 20: 04
    +2
    Quote from the article:
    The Red Army, as you know, was able to solve this problem without nuclear weaponsBut at the cost of heavy losses, with a delay of several months.

    Heavy losses in the negligent attitude of our generals to their duties.
    For example, for two Finnish coastal batteries (in the total of 8 guns) about 500 shells of the main caliber 305mm from the battleships "Marat" and "October Revolution" were fired. Each shell weighs about 400 kg, only about 2-x hundred tons. Yes, the same number of 130mm shells from the guns of leaders and EM KFB. Moreover, 30 DB-3 bombers from the KSE aviation bombed these Finnish batteries with the FAB 1000 and FAB 500 bombs. And the whole result of eight guns was brought out by two, one 152 mm and one 254 mm, killed with a dozen Finnish batteries. The rest fired back until the end of the war.
    And why do such generals and admirals need nuclear weapons?
    What will they do with him?
    1. shuravi
      shuravi 21 January 2018 23: 11
      +2
      It's funny when sergeants retroactively judge generals. laughing
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 22 January 2018 09: 11
        +4
        Quote: shuravi
        Funny


        Yes, little funnydue to the disregard of our generals for their duties meaninglessly perished, but tens of thousands of junior and middle-level commanders and officers simply froze to death. None of our generals froze, did not even frostbitten their general’s finger.
        I do not write about material costs. They are just monstrous. On the example of the suppression of the KBF, led by Admiral Tributs, two Finnish coastal batteries are visible.
        1. shuravi
          shuravi 22 January 2018 11: 16
          0
          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          Yes, it’s not funny enough, because of the disregard of our generals for their duties, they died senselessly, but tens of thousands of junior and middle-level commanders and officers simply froze to death. None of our generals froze, did not even frostbitten their general’s finger.
          I do not write about material costs. They are just monstrous. On the example of the suppression of the KBF, led by Admiral Tributs, two Finnish coastal batteries are visible.


          Sorry Vanya, but you talk like a housewife. Here you are writing.

          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          For example, for two Finnish coastal batteries (in the total of 8 guns) about 500 shells of the main caliber 305mm from the battleships "Marat" and "October Revolution" were fired. Each shell weighs about 400 kg, only about 2-x hundred tons. Yes, the same number of 130mm shells from the guns of leaders and EM KFB. Moreover, 30 DB-3 bombers from the KSE aviation bombed these Finnish batteries with the FAB 1000 and FAB 500 bombs. And the whole result of eight guns was brought out by two, one 152 mm and one 254 mm, killed with a dozen Finnish batteries. The rest fired back until the end of the war.
          And why do such generals and admirals need nuclear weapons?


          Total 500 shells and such a high result. Judging from the point of view of a specialist, not a cook.
          Let it be known that most of the ammunition in a war is wasted.
          As for the coastal battery, this is not a target at the landfill. It is being built in such a way that to stand under shelling from the main calibers and under bombing.
          1. Ivan Tartugai
            Ivan Tartugai 22 January 2018 13: 50
            0
            Quote: shuravi
            And as for the shore battery, it’s not a target landfill

            Finnish coastal batteries were actually a target at the landfill.
            For the whole company, Finnish coastal batteries fired 58 shots at KBF ships. Firstly, due to the severe shortage of shells, England and France promised to help, but fortunately they were limited to promises. Secondly, due to the fact that the KBF ships were on the aisle and beyond the range of fire exposure of the Finnish battery guns. Those. almost to the 20 shots of our main battleship calibers (and this is the 24 barrel 305 mm), as well as our other ships, the Finns could respond with an 1-1,5 shot. Agree for the Finns the superiority of naval artillery KBF depressing great. Only on 18 of December 1939 of the year the battleship "Marat" made 136 shots from 12 barrels of the main caliber 305 mm, exhausted the entire limit and returned to base, and the result of going to sea is zero.
            For aviation KBF, the situation is similar, i.e. complete superiority in the air, only ground-based air defense. And also 30 DB-3 bombers were bombed with FAB1000 and FAB500 bombs, and the result is zero.
            The only consolation is that the Finns did not sink a single ship of the KBF, the air defense of the batteries was not shot down by any bomber.
            The general result of the actions of naval artillery and KBF aircraft: one 254 mm gun was out of order, a fragment of the 305 mm shell hit the barrel and damaged it. The Finns dismantled the trunk, but they did not have a whole trunk to replace throughout Great Finland. Probably hoped for England and France. An 152 mm shell hit the second 130 mm gun, smashed the shield and damaged some of the mechanisms, and also killed one battery, wounded three. The Finns couldn’t restore this weapon either. And the rest of the shells flew all by, not a single hit, even in the battery.
            Quote: shuravi
            Total 500 shells and so high result. Judged from the point of view of a specialist, not cooks.

            Evaluating these high results People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov NG in his directive for No.16015ss / s of 14 on February 1940 wrote that "Shells fell everywhere, but not on batteries, due to inaccurate knowledge of the locations of these batteries by ship gunners" and that "... the fleet acted uncivilized and illiterate. ".
            If in your opinion, then the People's Commissar Kuznetsov NG judged as a cook, from the point of view of a cook, not a specialist.
            1. shuravi
              shuravi 22 January 2018 20: 45
              0
              Quote: Ivan Tartugay
              Quote: shuravi
              And as for the shore battery, it’s not a target landfill

              Finnish coastal batteries were actually a target at the landfill.
              For the whole company, Finnish coastal batteries fired 58 shots at KBF ships. Firstly, due to the severe shortage of shells, England and France promised to help, but fortunately they were limited to promises. Secondly, due to the fact that the KBF ships were on the aisle and beyond the range of fire exposure of the Finnish battery guns. Those. almost to the 20 shots of our main battleship calibers (and this is the 24 barrel 305 mm), as well as our other ships, the Finns could respond with an 1-1,5 shot. Agree for the Finns the superiority of naval artillery KBF depressing great. Only on 18 of December 1939 of the year the battleship "Marat" made 136 shots from 12 barrels of the main caliber 305 mm, exhausted the entire limit and returned to base, and the result of going to sea is zero.
              For aviation KBF, the situation is similar, i.e. complete superiority in the air, only ground-based air defense. And also 30 DB-3 bombers were bombed with FAB1000 and FAB500 bombs, and the result is zero.
              The only consolation is that the Finns did not sink a single ship of the KBF, the air defense of the batteries was not shot down by any bomber.
              The general result of the actions of naval artillery and KBF aircraft: one 254 mm gun was out of order, a fragment of the 305 mm shell hit the barrel and damaged it. The Finns dismantled the trunk, but they did not have a whole trunk to replace throughout Great Finland. Probably hoped for England and France. An 152 mm shell hit the second 130 mm gun, smashed the shield and damaged some of the mechanisms, and also killed one battery, wounded three. The Finns couldn’t restore this weapon either. And the rest of the shells flew all by, not a single hit, even in the battery.
              Quote: shuravi
              Total 500 shells and so high result. Judged from the point of view of a specialist, not cooks.

              Evaluating these high results People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov NG in his directive for No.16015ss / s of 14 on February 1940 wrote that "Shells fell everywhere, but not on batteries, due to inaccurate knowledge of the locations of these batteries by ship gunners" and that "... the fleet acted uncivilized and illiterate. ".
              If in your opinion, then the People's Commissar Kuznetsov NG judged as a cook, from the point of view of a cook, not a specialist.



              Sorry, but again you have one wringing of hands and a moaning cook. Knowing neither the conditions nor the circumstances, you pull out certain facts and arrange a woman’s tantrum.
              And for this a lot of mind is not necessary.
              However, after all, that no sergeant is a strategist.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 26 January 2018 10: 49
                +1
                The problem is that these "individual facts"there are too many actions by the Baltic Fleet in the SPF.
                The fleet started the war by almost losing the newest KRL “Kirov” sent in Finnish mines to “scout the Finnish batteries” - it was saved ... by the Finnish battery on about. Russera, who opened fire on the Kyrgyz Republic, after which he changed course. Moreover, such "reconnaissance in battle" was carried out regularly, because the fleet did not know anything about the Finnish BO. As a result, the BF collected some information that there were Finnish batteries on certain islands, but could not determine the number of guns or their positions - because the Air Force of the fleet was not involved in these operations.
                The shelling of Björke was also organized very ... peculiarly. Instead of careful aerial reconnaissance of the islands and the use of spotters during the shooting of LCs, the ships simply threw shells over the areas. Moreover, the likely areas of the firing positions of the Finnish guns were determined incorrectly. The security of the positions was also incorrectly assessed - as a result, the required BP consumption was underestimated. And most importantly - the meaning of these shellings is absolutely unclear, because the Red Army was not going to attack along the coast - it did not break through LM in the area of ​​UR Ink, but in the Summa sector, near the Leningrad-Vyborg railway.
                However, the BF was very lucky that it focused on the Björke batteries with their old 10 "and 6". Because then, at the entrance to the Vyborg Bay, a two-gun battery with 12 "/ 52 guns was waiting for him.
    2. sd68
      sd68 21 January 2018 23: 14
      +2
      The fleet had to participate, otherwise the admirals will not be given orders.
      In the Black Sea, war was often shot along the coast without adjustment, which was a waste of ammunition until Stalin banned this practice after the Germans in one day, October 6, 1943, together with the destroyers Ruthless and Capable, drowned the leader of Kharkov during the time they attempted to shell Theodosia and Yalta, all the large ships were then transferred to the Stavka reserve and they did not take part in the hostilities anymore.
      1. Ivan Tartugai
        Ivan Tartugai 22 January 2018 08: 53
        +5
        Quote: sd68
        otherwise admirals orders will not be given

        Such admirals as Oktyabrsky (Ivanov), Kulakov that under Stalin didn’t receive an IV, so after his murder they “caught up on their own”. They became Heroes of the Soviet Union in 1965. And Gorshkov became already twice Hero of the Soviet Union in peacetime, besides this again in peacetime he received seven orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, two orders of the Red Banner. Yes, in addition to the Lenin and State Prizes. Almost like "dear Leonid Ilyich."
        1. BAI
          BAI 22 January 2018 09: 37
          +1
          Well, Rotmistrov under Khrushchev poper uphill.
          1. Ivan Tartugai
            Ivan Tartugai 22 January 2018 12: 05
            0
            Quote: BAI
            Rotmistrov under Khrushchev uphill poper

            Khrushchev saved Rotmistrov after the Prokhorovsky massacre. Under Khrushchev in 1962, Rotmistrov became the Chief Marshal of the armored forces. And under Brezhnev in 1965 he became a Hero of the Soviet Union. And a doctor of science and a professor.
            And how many tankers he killed, but career growth was leaps and bounds, and medal orders directly stuck on his chest.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 22 January 2018 12: 15
              0
              Did Rotmistrov attack on his own INITIATIVE?
              So CAM decided and threw his army "in checkers" ...?
              1. mkpda
                mkpda 22 January 2018 17: 59
                0
                It is now difficult to understand real events. Versions from the canonical (70s) to the complete denial of the major battle near Prokhorovka. There is a letter from Rotmistrov to Headquarters complaining about the quality of tanks received from the NTP. Such a complaint was received only from one commander, the rest were silent or recognized the quality as satisfactory (Katukov). The truth is somewhere in the middle (the Germans wrote almost nothing about this battle in their railways), and the number of combat losses was clearly overstated by Rotmistrov.
      2. M. Michelson
        M. Michelson 24 January 2018 22: 28
        0
        Without justifying the admirals, we must make a reservation that Stalin reasoned primarily as a politician, and not as a military man.
        For example, in the summer of 1942, the Allies had a difficult situation at sea. And the additional losses of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would have looked even sadder against this background. Therefore, Stalin took the fleet to Novorossiysk and kept it on a leash there.
        But he did not take into account the fact that Britain is a maritime power, the United States - to a large extent, too; for them, the fleet is a matter of life. And our locked fleets, BF and BSF are just appendages to the army. It is believed that such a decision was a major mistake: it was necessary to sacrifice the fleet in order to extend the defense of Sevastopol. Instead, he was despicably abandoned (not even daring to give the order for surrender, which would save additional lives). But nobody especially needed the fleet they saved there!
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 24 January 2018 22: 46
          0
          Leningrad also had to give the order to CAPITulate? There is such an opinion ...
  9. andrewkor
    andrewkor 22 January 2018 05: 38
    +1
    The first Yakovlev aircraft had the brand AIR-Alexei Ivanovich Rykov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR until 1938 !!!!!
    1. Outsider V.
      Outsider V. 25 January 2018 19: 22
      0
      I will amend: Rykov ceased to be chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in 1930.
  10. BAI
    BAI 22 January 2018 09: 36
    0
    Unfortunately, or fortunately, there is no invulnerable armored vehicles.
  11. Blue fox
    Blue fox 22 January 2018 09: 36
    +9
    I fundamentally disagree with the article and the comments of some colleagues. The KV-2 tank (s) on Mannerheim’s LM line would not do anything (and) and finish (and) the same as QMS (broke through the advanced fortifications of the Summa-Khotinen UR and detonated in a land mine or PT-mine in the depth of defense the enemy right on the highway). I will explain.
    After overcoming the LM pre-field (where the usual T-26s were also enough) and approaching the main line of fortifications in the first attacks, the usual linear T-28s broke through the battle formations of the enemy and were destroyed already in its rear (and not only with fire from the anti-tank forces, but simply with incendiary mixture and subversive anti-tank charges) left without the support of their infantry. Those. there was no organized interaction of infantry and tanks and tankers repeatedly noted that the infantry did not follow the tanks. Moreover, tanks even broke past the Poppius bunker and a height of 65,5 along the highway to Vyborg, but the survivors were forced to return back.
    And in addition to the enemy infantry with bottles and subversive charges, the problem was anti-tank mines and land mines, which saturated the front line of the enemy’s defense, which correctly used narrow defiles and the main possible attack directions of tanks to establish fields and restore them throughout the entire period of battles. A typical example is the attack of three T-28s from the 20th TTB along the so-called “Primorskoye Shosse” of Inkel’s UR, when two of the three T-28s were hit by a VET, and the third, passing a little further, was blown up by a land mine. Moreover, if the first two were not destroyed by the VET, then anyway, going closer to the line of fences would have ended up in a minefield and landmines.
    The only point at which the KV-2 could be effective is direct-fire shelling of the bunkers of the bunkers in cases where large-caliber guns were forced to roll out for direct fire, such as was the case when firing bunkers of the Le-6 Le-7 at / d of the bridge over the Perovka river, when several sighting hits were a lot of work to break through the clearing through a suitable skyscraper and at the cost of artillery losses from the calculation, which were fired by mortars and machine guns (there were not many such successful places). However, bunkers with embrasures of frontal fire were few in important areas, mainly in the first period of the LM construction and they were quite easily destroyed by artillery, and the rest were serious fortifications like Le-6,7; Ink-6,7; Sj-10 with a multilayer floor wall with embrasures, consisting of armored plates, and some bunkers also had an effective angle of inclination of these armored plates, which led to many ricochets. And in order to bring the tank out for direct fire on such an embrasure, it was necessary to substitute the side to other firing points, and, in addition, the Finns flooded the area in front of some bunkers (the flooding dam on the Peronyoki-Perovka river in front of Le-6,7) and made it additionally impassable for tanks in addition to natural conditions (a creek with escaped shores, anti-tank gouges and a swamp adjacent to the highway on one side and a sandy flooded shore of the Gulf of Finland on the other, opposite Ink-6,7).
    For example, the 20th heavy tank brigade with T-28 tanks lost 21 tanks sunk in lakes and swamps.
    In summary:
    KV-2 is not a panacea without organizing competent interaction between tanks and infantry under cover of artillery fire with competent reconnaissance. And in February 1940 this was brilliantly proved when the assault groups reinforced by two or three T-28s under cover of artillery fire along field-filled trenches around the bunker, the most powerful of them were blocked and destroyed (for example Sk-2 "Terttu")
    1. mkpda
      mkpda 22 January 2018 18: 05
      0
      I agree. Only KV-2 - ersatz, which was required against the backdrop of "Tukhachevschiny" and poor combat training in the Red Army. For the T-28, the shielding scheme was ready in 1938, but it was remembered only when the "fried cock" pecked.
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL 22 January 2018 22: 45
        0
        Do not be like Rezun in the assessment of Tukhachevsky. Thanks to him, he managed to establish mass production of tanks, because in 1931 the entire production amounted to 300 vehicles a year! And in just a few years it reached 3000. This is a groundwork for war, when tens of thousands of cars were already produced a year. If the production of T-26, BT had not been launched ... then there would have been no experience and basis for the mass production of wartime tanks. By the way, both the T-26 and BT-7 were not very different from the German T-2, Czech trophy T-35 and T-38, French Renault and so on. At the beginning of the war, the Germans had more trophic armored junk than their own. Here it is still about the preparedness and coordination of the crews, in the tactics and strategy of using armored forces ... and all this without Tukhachevsky. So don't kick the late marshal. The fact that the brigades did of the corps, that the airborne forces, the radio-technical and radar troops did not develop, was not his fault, but the common misfortune.
        1. mkpda
          mkpda 25 January 2018 16: 56
          0
          Reached 3000 tanks a year, but why were they needed in such numbers! Only infantry can occupy and control the territory. Tanks without infantry can only solve a limited number of tasks. For the actions of tanks you need a well-functioning supply. According to the experience of the Second World War, there were 5 vehicles for supplying, supporting and transporting dowry infantry per tank, but where are these trucks to take in such quantities.
          In addition, having squeezed out all the juices from the industry for the production of tanks, they “forgot” about the production of spare parts for them in the right volumes. As a result, at the beginning of the Second World War, most of the tank losses were non-combatant.
          For such a number of tanks, many trained crews were required, and this is a wide range of problems - from eliminating illiteracy to providing fuel and lubricants for training events.
          Well, about the connection. The lack of understanding that the management of mobile means (tanks, aircraft, etc.) can only be attributed to the military illiteracy of the leadership of the Red Army and / or their frank sabotage.
          The organizational leapfrog of the tank troops of the Red Army is directly related to the contradiction between the number of tanks in the troops and the controllability of these units (including ensuring their use). The pre-war mechanized corps of both generations showed their inferiority in terms of controllability and provision of supply.
          I will express my personal opinion if they were to produce 300 T-28s (with standard weapons) per year (planned maximum production volume in peacetime at the KZ) and about the same number of light radio-fired tanks T-26 and BT-5/7 (without wheels) all together, and on the basis of the T-26 auxiliary equipment in the right quantities, it was possible to get the best tank troops in the world at that time.
  12. kord1215
    kord1215 22 January 2018 11: 43
    +2
    Explain to me stupid, as they mention so many laudatory reviews about the Manerheim line, it is necessary to storm with the use of nuclear weapons, heavy tanks, etc. generally helped the finals. As for our lines of Molotov and Stalin - a waste of energy, maneuver warfare is not needed, for modern artillery is not a problem, the Maginot line is common to all and sundry. But who knows how many allies at the end of the war stormed the Siegfried line? From September 1944 to March 1945! Perhaps they didn’t have enough artillery or aviation ?!
    1. mkpda
      mkpda 22 January 2018 17: 47
      +2
      With proper preparation, the line of Mannerheim of the Red Army was to break through in a short time. But intelligence did not work well, the operation was poorly prepared. As a result, a superweapon was required. As for the KV-2, then this is an ersatz. Personally, it’s hard for me to understand why they wanted to put 3 "guns on heavy tanks, although after the WWII this caliber was recognized as weak for fighting field fortification (it’s better not to remember about bunkers). Once again this was confirmed, they began to urgently make a symbiosis of the latest heavy tank with the latest hull howitzer, with the corresponding result.
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL 22 January 2018 22: 38
        0
        At the "winter" war Klim Voroshilov and Meretskov got burned. At first, Stalin rejected Shaposhnikov’s plan, very well thought out and planned, had to do everything manually, in a hurry, return to Shaponikov’s plan. With the advent of Tymoshenko, everything gradually improved from supply to planning operations, and the Mannerheim line was broken.
        1. mkpda
          mkpda 25 January 2018 17: 06
          0
          It was different. Indeed, there was a plan of war with Finland, but it provided for activities that clearly spoke about preparing for hostilities. For political reasons and the small amount of intelligence, this option was rejected amid the assurances of the LVO that it would be possible to solve the task on its own.
    2. shuravi
      shuravi 22 January 2018 20: 49
      +1
      Quote: kord1215
      Explain to me stupid, as they mention so many laudatory reviews about the Manerheim line, it is necessary to storm with the use of nuclear weapons, heavy tanks, etc. generally helped the finals. As for our lines of Molotov and Stalin - a waste of energy, maneuver warfare is not needed, for modern artillery is not a problem, the Maginot line is common to all and sundry. But who knows how many allies at the end of the war stormed the Siegfried line? From September 1944 to March 1945! Perhaps they didn’t have enough artillery or aviation ?!



      Defensive lines make sense with a very small extent and most importantly, a very rugged terrain. When the garrisons of defensive lines do not need a lot of personnel and weapons. For they are rigidly attached and cannot maneuver.
      In this regard, the Finnish line was much more favorable than the French one. For the USSR, there was no sense in them at all.
      1. LeonidL
        LeonidL 22 January 2018 22: 35
        0
        There was a point, but ... in 1939 all the URs were mothballed, the weapons were removed, the military units of permanent base, who knew everything and everything, were either withdrawn or disbanded. In 1941 they didn’t manage to either restore or occupy. In the same places where they managed to restore and organize the SDs, they helped a lot, for example, the Kiev SDs. The French, on the Maginot line, were bypassed through the Ardennes. The Germans took Fort Emuel in Belgium with a combined landing - from the sky in gliders, and through the Alberta Canal in assault boats ...
        1. shuravi
          shuravi 23 January 2018 02: 01
          +1
          Quote: LeonidL
          There was a point, but ... in 1939 all the URs were mothballed, the weapons were removed, the military units of permanent base, who knew everything and everything, were either withdrawn or disbanded. In 1941 they didn’t manage to either restore or occupy. In the same places where they managed to restore and organize the SDs, they helped a lot, for example, the Kiev SDs. The French, on the Maginot line, were bypassed through the Ardennes. The Germans took Fort Emuel in Belgium with a combined landing - from the sky in gliders, and through the Alberta Canal in assault boats ...


          The main disadvantage of SD is that the troops involved in their troops have zero mobility. They cannot even help neighbors. Therefore, the enemy can easily create local superiority and break through the defense. The same winter war showed the viciousness of the defense strategy through SD. Therefore, the latter only made sense in local areas.
          By the way, the Maginot line was broken, read.
      2. mkpda
        mkpda 25 January 2018 17: 18
        0
        You correctly noticed that ur are static. But they are conceived (as a rule) to cover important areas until the main forces approach or carry out an operation in another place, which will relieve pressure on this sector of the front — to win the pace. For the Red Army, the SD system was important with the then existing mobilization system. The trouble is that the URs on the new border were built in a hurry and sometimes with mistakes, they were late to complete the construction of the war, and for the sake of them, because of cost savings, they preserved the URs on the old border. As a result, both systems of SDs, as systems in battles, did not take part and were passed without big problems for the enemy (although they could be used more efficiently).
  13. LeonidL
    LeonidL 22 January 2018 22: 30
    0
    Rezun’s worthless computer, and he himself, as a historian, is zero, rather a hysteric and a mythologizer-dreamer. I don’t think that clever Britons entrusted this “runaway” master to read something serious in a military college, people with scientific degrees and degrees, with big stars, and not with such a small flawed mind like Mr. Brehun read there.
    1. Humungus
      Humungus 24 March 2018 23: 48
      0
      Your "big-star" generals carry such a "blizzard" that Rezun is forgiven, but he ordered, not he himself wrote these 100500 books, there is a team of authors. InfoVoynushka and all.
  14. Blue fox
    Blue fox 23 January 2018 09: 21
    0
    Quote: shuravi
    The main disadvantage of SD is that the troops involved in their troops have zero mobility.

    It’s not entirely true, during the Soviet-Finnish general of engineering troops, Khrenov (at that time brigade commander) proposed on the secondary flank where the troops were defending rather than attacking, use the KaUR forces, which were machine gun and artillery battalions with reinforcements in the form of artillery battalion and these forces were successfully used promptly deployed from the old border (by the way, many URs had their own autorots), freeing up parts that were used in the direction of the main attack.
    As for the expediency of the URs, KaUR, for example, fulfilled its task and restrained the Finns' advance, which managed to capture only a few advanced fortifications with battles, after which from the autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1944 the Finns carried out only small tactical operations (see the history of the fight for bunkers № 007 or "Oyanen's bunker").
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 26 January 2018 11: 39
      0
      Quote: Blue Fox
      It’s not entirely true that during the Soviet-Finnish general of engineering troops, Khrenov (at that time brigade commander) proposed to use KaUR forces on the secondary flank, where the troops were defending rather than attacking.

      In the same way, SDs were used both in the Second World War and in the war against Japan.
      UR even participated in the Berlin operation.
      Quote: Blue Fox
      As for the expediency of the URs, KaUR, for example, fulfilled its mission and restrained the Finns' advance, which managed to capture only a few advanced fortifications with battles, after which from the autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1944 the Finns carried out only small tactical operations

      KaUR was just lucky - the same army of the early-mid-30s model, against which it was built, came against it: infantry, few tanks, practically no artillery of OM and BM. Against the army of the early 40s, its 3-4-6-embrasure blockhouse with embrasures of frontal fire (making up the majority of DOS) would last two or three days, after which they would be shut up with fire of the same 8.8 cm or assault guns. How did this happen with the "relatives" of KaUR in Ukraine - there the Stalin Line (even with infantry filling) the Germans broke through in 3-4 days.
  15. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 23 January 2018 19: 58
    0
    A confusing article, with some half-invented memoirs. One shot barrel is worth it. Type no one noticed while fired and in the list of damage to the KV-2 tanks of his ops, either. Rezun with his "smart" computer and atomic bombs is generally nonsense. As an argument, or even just a fact, it is simply indecent to cite this.
  16. kig
    kig 26 January 2018 10: 48
    0
    If yes, as it were ... one can still recall a grandmother who did not become a grandfather. But it was as it was.
  17. Blue fox
    Blue fox 29 January 2018 10: 12
    0
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Against the army of the early 40s, its 3-4-6-embrasure blockhouse with embrasures of frontal fire (making up the majority of DOS) would last two or three days, after which they would be shut up with fire of the same 8.8 cm or assault guns. How did this happen with the "relatives" of KaUR in Ukraine - there the Stalin Line (even with infantry filling) the Germans broke through in 3-4 days.

    I think they would have lasted a little longer, because both artillery and assault guns would have to be pulled for direct fire through a limited number of roads and blown up bridges, 3-4 days the bunkers of the Krasnogvardeisky Urals lasted somewhere.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. kord1215
      kord1215 3 February 2018 13: 44
      0
      Then why did the Finns last so long? Maybe not only the availability of artillery. The Red Army even set the B-4 for direct fire ...