Military Review

How to hold back the blow of a united Europe

How to hold back the blow of a united EuropeThe Crimean War of 1853 – 1856, as is known, not only eliminated the existing in Europe as a result of the Napoleonic wars and a fairly effective system of regional security, known as the Vienna system, but also became one of the first and most characteristic examples of the formation of the military coalition of the Anglo-Saxon powers. In addition, it was in this case that such a coalition was first used against Russia.

The preparation for the military campaign, unprecedented for that time, was considered in detail by us earlier (see “The Intimidated Coalition”, IEE No. 45 from 08.12.17), and in this material we will analyze the course of the hostilities and consider what lesson Russia has learned from these events.


Having decided to invade Russia, London and Paris focused mainly on the "sore point" of the Russian Empire - the Crimea and its main and only naval base in the south - Sevastopol. At the same time, the main operation of this campaign, not without fierce debates in the capitals of the two main participants of the anti-Russian coalition, was ultimately selected the landing operation, which, interestingly, refuted the beliefs that existed in those years that it was impossible to carry out such enterprises in such sizes. Most of the military specialists of that time were convinced that due to the small capacity of military vessels, the difficulties encountered during sea transportation of horses, the inevitability of accidents in sea navigation, it is simply physically impossible to transport more than 30 – 40 people with necessary reserves at sea at a time. With the invention of steamers and screw ships, most of these problems were, however, removed, and the Crimean landing expedition provided clear evidence of this. In total, a huge number of water craft — more than 600 transport ships — were required to transport the British-French expeditionary force to the Balkans-Crimea region.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that all of this could not have happened if Russian Emperor Nicholas I insisted on the implementation under his leadership of the developed initial, preemptive allies attack, which included troops to the shores of the Bosporus in the number of 32 – 40 thousand people and possible occupation of Constantinople, and went on about his mentor from his youthful years - the “father-commander” Field Marshal Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich, who urged to limit the area of ​​the Russian forces Severn E Balkans and the Caucasus, allegedly, if successful, was to encourage the allies to reconcile with St. Petersburg.

As a result, the epicenter of the efforts of the Russian army became the Northern Balkans, where, despite the successes at the very beginning (practically bloodless occupation of the Danube principalities), in general, there was no luck. At the same time, military historians especially emphasize the fact that, perhaps, the results of a number of failed subsequent actions of the Russian troops on the Danube were one of the reasons that formed the basis of the Allied decision to land in Crimea.

Admittedly, Russian troops in this theater, despite a higher degree of training and equipment than the Turks who opposed them, acted inadequately and very passively, which the future classic of Marxism Friedrich Engels who commented on in the media during those years paid particular attention to. The situation that was unfavorable for the Russian troops was aggravated by the often cool and sometimes openly hostile attitude of the Danube population, who considered themselves descendants of the Roman colonists, who allegedly did not need patronage from Russia. In turn, and hopes that the Slavic population of the Balkans will rise from weapons in the hands to assist the Russian troops, were not justified because of the “immaturity” and because of the poorly carried out work among him (which, however, was taken into account and was crowned with success after a little over two decades).

In many respects, the Russian failures were explained by the position of Army Commander Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov, a non-initiating general, obsequiously, without complying with the drastically changing situation, following the instructions emanating from the distant northern capital. But later, the appointment of the “father-commander” Paskevich as the commander-in-chief of all Russian troops in the south did not lead to any noticeable success on the battlefield. Turkish troops, on the contrary, were not only almost twice as large as the Russian grouping and were encouraged by the possible intervention of European allies on their side, and were also headed by the promising sardarremrem (marshal) Omer Pasha, the Croatian-converted Slav - Croat , the former Austrian subjects. Thus, after a number of local successes of the Ottoman Empire at the Danube Theater, the European allies began to take seriously the "increased skill" of the Turks.

At the same time, in the Caucasus, the coalition’s affairs were far from the best. Here, just like the Turks on the Danube, but already in favor of the Russian troops, a subjective factor played a role - the appointment of an extraordinary General Prince Vasily Osipovich Bebutov at the beginning of the campaign as head of the current Russian corps. Under the leadership of this commander and his comrades, the Turks suffered a series of serious defeats. The subsequent situation in favor of the allies in this theater could not be corrected either by the action of the “fifth column” - the militant pro-Turkish minded highlanders are actually in the rear of the Russian troops, or the cruising of ships of the united British-French squadron along the Russian Black Sea coast with shelling of ports and settlements and repeated landings True, small landings, or even the secondment of the above-mentioned Turkish commander Omer Pasha, who had proven himself on the Danube here. The major failures of the Turkish army in the Caucasus were largely due to the reluctance of the “senior” allies to perceive this theater as if not the main, then at least “non-core” and, therefore, ostensibly not having to send any reinforcements from the expeditionary forces of the Europeans. This, naturally, caused discontent and sometimes open hostility on the part of the Turkish command in relation to the “passive” European advisers who in large numbers flooded the Turkish units and formations.

Nevertheless, the successes of the Russians in the Caucasus “did not understand” either the Turks, which they hoped for in St. Petersburg, much less London and Paris, which had set themselves the goal of completely destroying Russia.


It is noteworthy that even at the very beginning of the war, seeking the most optimal way of quickly crushing the Russian Empire, the Allies analyzed the option of actions in the Baltic, implying not only the destruction of the nodal points of possible Russian resistance (Kronstadt, Sveaborg, etc.) from the sea, but also the landing of large landings on the coast. However, without the assistance of Sweden, they understood both in London and in Paris, this was impossible to do. Stockholm, not having bought promises to give him a number of Russian territories in case of victory, finally refused to let the allies oppose Russia. It was then that the decision was made to focus on the Crimea, but the Allies also intended to inflict a serious defeat on the Baltic theater, which should greatly enhance their military and political authority in the eyes of all of Europe.

However, this did not happen. Large bases-fortresses (such as Kronstadt) turned out to be out of their teeth, and shelling of the coast and the landing of small landings and the seizure of merchant ships could not affect the course of the war as a whole. Even the capture of the Aland Islands belonging to Russia did not make any significant contribution to the balance of power. Moreover, the failures of the combined British-French squadron, often the result of a mismatch in the actions of the commands of both its parts, did not help to eliminate the mutual hostility of the two main coalition allies. The only thing the British and French have achieved is to divert the qualitatively best Russian forces (guards) to defend the western border and the Baltic coast, instead of sending them to the Crimea.

In the north, the allied squad of warships, having penetrated first into the Kola Bay, and then into the White Sea, fulfilling the decisions of London and Paris about the blockade of Russia's trade ports, in fact engaged in natural piracy at sea. And this despite the promise of London "not to violate the interests of private individuals." Having captured or exterminated dozens of civilian ships, warehouses and dwellings of civilians on the coast, but without taking a single significant military object of the Russians, the British and French were under the gun of fierce criticism even in the "tattered" European media.

A similar situation was developing in the Far East, where Russia had not yet created a permanent naval group by the middle of the XNUMXth century. On the contrary, the British and French had bases and a certain naval power in the Pacific, which they decided to take advantage of, forming a combined squadron led by two rear admirals - British David Price and the French Fevrier de Pointe. Despite the antipathy that has already become traditional for the relations of the Allies and the endless disputes of the two military leaders regarding the optimization of the squadron’s actions, in the end everything came down, as in the Baltic, to trivial piracy, which also did not add credibility fleets neither one nor the other allied countries. An attempt to justify its mission in the region at the end of August 1854 to capture the relatively large Russian base of Petropavlovsk ended in complete failure. The spies of the American loggers working on contracts in the Petropavlovsk region and their information on the state of Russian defense did not help the Allies either. Having lost about 450 people killed and wounded, the allies were forced to retreat. In the world press, which happened quite rarely, sympathies this time turned out to be on the side of the Russians. One newspaper even noted: “The British received a pill that will remain a shameful stain in stories enlightened seafarers and that the waves of all five oceans will never be washed away. ”


However, if on the flanks the situation for Russia was more or less favorable, then at the main theater - in the Crimea - the development of the situation did not cause optimism. Despite the breakdown of schedules for the arrival of the British-French-Turkish assault, confusion and miscalculations in dealing with loading and unloading issues, in early September 1854, the landing of the allies south of Yevpatoria began. It is noteworthy that in this case it was not without sharp disputes between the allies as to where to land, and a plan for subsequent actions. The French commander, Marshal Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, tired by his admission of endless quarrels, was forced to leave the choice to his British counterpart, Lord Fitzroy Raglan. Moreover, experts noted that if it were not for the mistakes of the Russian military leadership regarding the definition of landing dates and elementary measures to counter, this allied operation could have been prevented at the very beginning. Nevertheless, the unloading took place in almost perfect conditions.

The transportation of French troops directly to the Crimea with all the reserves and wagons that were with them demanded 172 ships of various sizes, and the transport of British ships to a hundred and fifty steam and sailing transports. The Turkish division was planted on nine ships.

After the completion of the unloading, unpreparedness of the British and Turkish formations for this difficult expedition was revealed. The French, to put it mildly, were surprised by the carelessness of their colleagues and took emergency measures to eliminate the revealed major miscalculations in supplying the troops of their fellow allies with everything they needed and even assumed full food security for the Turkish unit. The indiscretion of the British quartermasters immediately manifested itself in the form of cholera that had spread among the Allied forces and other general diseases.

Nevertheless, in the very first armed clash on the Alma River, which took place a week after the landing, the Allies inflicted a heavy defeat on Russian forces under the leadership of Prince Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov as they advanced to the south of the peninsula. In this battle and in the subsequent battles, a higher level of technical equipment of Western European troops than the Russians showed up, in particular, rifled small arms, which allowed the British and French to inflict significant damage to their opponents, without entering into direct contact with him and avoiding the bayonet battle, which and famous Russian soldiers from the time of Suvorov.


In principle, it was obvious: the Allies needed to seize Sevastopol as quickly as possible, which supposedly should have put an end to this war. The Russian leadership, although aware of the key importance of this base city as a symbol of resistance to the aggressors, but delayed with the improvement of its defenses.

The anti-Russian anti-Russian Crimean Tatars unwittingly did a disservice to their new allied patrons, disorienting them with respect to the supposedly strong northern fortifications of the city, which in reality had only just begun to be erected. The Allies went around Sevastopol from the south, but they could not take it straight off. The heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense began.

In parallel with the massive shelling of the city (during the siege, six series of multi-day bombardments took place) there was a gradual build-up of the Allied troops and bringing it to 120 thousand people, mainly British and French. However, taking advantage of the lack of a closed line of the siege of the city, the Russians also reinforced the garrison to about 40 thousand people, and the general grouping of troops in the Crimea - to 90 thousand people.

The main role in the siege was played by French troops, better trained and learned than their British counterparts. It was the capture of the Malakhov Kurgan by the French, which the British were later forced to recognize, in fact, predetermined the fate of the city. The Turkish and Sardinian troops near Sevastopol were assigned a clearly secondary role. In the end, it was even decided to transfer the Turkish formations from the Crimea to the Caucasus in order to reverse the unfavorable situation there.


The prolonged siege and the numerous victims associated with it caused concern in both London and Paris, since they clearly did not contribute to the popularity of the leadership of both countries. The seeming hopelessness of the stalemate in the Crimea led to an increase in defeatism among the allies and even initially to a massive transition to the Russians. And only a number of cardinal measures taken in both Western European capitals to drastically change the situation in their favor, including a partial change of leadership of the allied forces group, contributed to the revitalization of the French and British troops, the transition to them initiatives and eventually forcing the defenders of Sevastopol 28 August (9 September) 1855 of the year left almost completely destroyed city. But only two days later the Allies decided to enter it.

The Sevastopol epic (apart from other battles) cost so many victims and expenses on both sides that the question arose: isn't it time to end the war in general? At the end of 1855, hostilities everywhere ceased. By this time, the losses were truly tremendous: Russia - over 522 thousand people, Ottoman Empire - up to 400 thousand, France - 95 thousand, Great Britain - 22 thousand people. Russia spent on the war about 800 million rubles., Allied powers - 600 million.

And yet, despite the surrender of Sevastopol and the contour of the defeat in the war as a whole, the situation for Russia was not so catastrophic as foreign and some Russian researchers prefer to emphasize. The fact is that the Russians did not use all their military potential, including the elite guards units and formations that more than once in history decided the outcome of certain campaigns in favor of Russia. The main thing is that it was the allies who realized that it was absolutely pointless to continue the war with gigantic Russia. And in St. Petersburg, they decided to take advantage of the favorable situation on the foreign policy arena, expressed in yet another exacerbation of the contradictions between the main coalition allies, Great Britain and France, in order, on the one hand, to bargain for the most acceptable conditions for making peace, and on the other - entirely concentrate on domestic, including military, reforms to eliminate the root causes that led Russia eventually to a formal defeat.

Peace negotiations began in Vienna, ending with the signing of the so-called Paris Treaty of 1856. Naturally, the conditions that St. Petersburg had to go to could not be easy: after all, a united Europe opposed Russia. Russia agreed with the ban to have a military fleet and bases in the Black Sea basin, to strengthen the Aland Islands in the Baltic and the implementation of a number of insignificant but nonetheless territorial concessions to Turkey in Bessarabia and the Caucasus. At the same time, and this seemed to be of principle, Russia should not have paid any indemnities. Whereas, for example, France demanded exorbitant material compensation from its ally, Britain, in case it continues to insist on the continuation of hostilities. This position of Paris has further aggravated the British-French relations.


It is noteworthy that even during the war began the rapprochement of St. Petersburg and Paris. Not only did Russian and French commanders, officers, and soldiers have respect for each other for resilience and nobility in battle, they both clearly expressed dislike for the arrogant but “unimportant warriors” - the British, although the latter formally fought in some ranks with the french. But the most significant was the fact that neither Russia, nor the “full-fledged” France wanted to strengthen Britain either in Europe or in the adjacent regions.

Nevertheless, the Anglo-phobian moods did not lead the French to the anti-British camp, while the relations of Great Britain and Russia were completely spoiled. Moreover, their fundamental improvement did not happen, even despite the subsequent participation of both states in the same military coalitions during the two world wars. Yes, and "ungrateful" Austria finally moved to the camp of the enemies of Russia. Relations with Turkey have not undergone any significant metamorphosis, remaining the relationship of two historically formed antagonists. As for the so-called Eastern question, because of which the war formally began, then, in fact, all the fundamental claims of Russia were satisfied.

Thus, the Crimean War, without resolving the serious contradictions of the main players, became only a prelude to subsequent major conflicts in Europe, and indeed in the world as a whole, as a result of the so-called settlement of which the desired stability and tranquility have not yet been established in the regional and international arena. .
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 14 January 2018 15: 57
    The fact is that the Russians did not use their full military potential, including selected guard units and formations, which more than once in history decided the outcome of various campaigns in favor of Russia.
    .... They couldn’t quickly transfer troops and organize their supply ... The reason was a weak railway network. The need to dramatically expand the railway network and attract private capital for this became clear after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War.
    1. Cat
      Cat 14 January 2018 16: 22
      Here, I definitely agree with Alexey! Russia's misfortune is roads, unfortunately the “misfortune - in the form of roads" will be repeated in all the wars of Russia the year before last and past centuries. This rock will haunt us in 1877, 1903-1904, 1914-1917, 1941-1945 + in both Chechen companies.
      Conclusions? Something needs to be done with the roads. And not only with iron, but also with automobile, aerodrome structure, river and sea traffic. Mobility in the territory of the largest state in the world should be accessible to all its citizens, goods, and most importantly, there should be a mobilization option for moving military units.
    2. Gopnik
      Gopnik 15 January 2018 14: 12
      The reason is that no one was going to push the entire army, and especially the guard, into the Crimea, leaving the western borders defenseless.
    3. Prometey
      Prometey 17 January 2018 07: 57
      Quote: parusnik
      Could not, quickly transfer troops and organize their supply ... The reason is the weak railway network.

      Nonsense. Before that, they fought for a very long time without railways, and troops were transferred to the Crimea and the Caucasus by fields. The reason was something else - the western borders were not exposed.
      1. uskrabut
        uskrabut 17 January 2018 15: 30
        The reason is the incompetent command, when the coalition was allowed to land the troops without firing a shot. If there were big losses during the landing, the operation would be turned off as a failed one.
  2. Cat
    Cat 14 January 2018 16: 03
    The author’s view on some aspects of the article is interesting. Although the discord between the "winners" I think was not so deep as to push England and France. Everything is clear with Turkey. The role of Sardinia in the Crimean company is interesting, especially their involvement in military operations against Russia. To be honest, it reminds me of a "mongrel" - which runs around an elephant and barks "let me bite it too!"
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 17 January 2018 07: 59
      Quote: Kotischa
      The role of Sardinia in the Crimean company is interesting, especially their involvement in military operations against Russia.

      Their participation was purely symbolic - to please Napoleon III and secure an alliance with France in a possible war against Austria. Therefore, the Italians went to war not because of hatred of the Russians, but because of political opportunistic interests.
  3. polpot
    polpot 14 January 2018 16: 17
    The most modern weapons and the lack of political illusions, the best conclusion from the events of that distant war, to rest on the laurels of 1812 was pleasant, but the reality turned out to be harsher, a very good lesson, unfortunately poorly learned and ended in a drama of World War I
    1. Cat
      Cat 14 January 2018 16: 35
      Quote: polpot
      The most modern weapons and the lack of political illusions, the best conclusion from the events of that distant war, to rest on the laurels of 1812 was pleasant, but the reality turned out to be harsher, a very good lesson, unfortunately poorly learned and ended in a drama of World War I

      True, true, and again true !!!
    2. The centurion
      The centurion 14 January 2018 17: 55
      Quote: polpot
      It was nice to rest on 1812's laurels, but the reality turned out to be more severe

      "In the reign of Nicholas I, army officers and generals only thought of holding their part before the emperor with a ceremonial march. So the Russian army marched with a ceremonial march before the Crimean War. The beginning of the Crimean War was successful. On November 18, the Turkish fleet was destroyed in Sinop Bay. her allies, the British and French, and then the Sardinians, responded for Turkey and sent their steam fleets and troops to the Black and Baltic Seas. The enemy appeared everywhere. A lot of cavalry regiments were needed to protect the coast XN UMX regiments and 1853 equine artillery batteries, and a total of 87 thousands of people, put up only Don people at this difficult time. The enemy looked into the most remote parts of our coast, and it could be expected everywhere. The Allies supported the fleet landed in the Crimea and laid siege to Sevastopol. The army (on 14 only the active infantry numbered 82 general and officer and 1.1.1853 15382 of the lower ranks) seemed indestructible, but the very first armed clashes with the enemy on the Crimean land destroyed this illusion. Due to mistakes in military-technical policy, supplies and training, the million-strong army was able to put on the front only a few truly combat-ready divisions.
      The defense of Sevastopol showed many examples of the courage and resilience of a Nikolaev soldier. But among the brave and steadfast stood out especially brave who committed fabulous feats. Among such people were the sailor Cat and the Cossack of the village of Perekop Osip Ivanovich Zubov. He came to Sevastopol as a hunter, he was already 55 years old, but he was strong, alert, dexterous, and desperately brave. He himself asked the sailors for the bastions, constantly went into reconnaissance, behaved boldly and defiantly, constantly delivering tongues and prisoners. But the Russian army was much inferior to the enemy as weapons. Back in 1823, the English officer Norton invented a cylindro-conical bullet for a rifled choke gun, and in 1853 the same bullet, refined by the French captain Minier, was put into service in many armies and gave the European infantry a weapon of unprecedented rate of fire, range and accuracy firing. New rifles gave the British and French a decisive advantage over the Russian infantry in field battles. Despite the heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol, 8 September 1855 was taken by the allies Malakhov Kurgan, and the Russian army left Sevastopol. Among the failures of the Crimean Front, a report came from the Caucasian Front about the capture of Kars and the surrender of the large Turkish army. The Cossacks of the legendary Don General Baklanov played a decisive role in this victory. By this time, all opponents were very tired of war, and there was a lull on all fronts. The war dragged on, to which the allies were not ready. In the battles with Russian infantry, Cossacks and sailors, the Allies suffered significant losses. In addition to the Crimea, the Allies have not been able to conduct successful amphibious operations anywhere. Technical superiority in small arms also could not be long. Therefore, negotiations began, which ended with the Paris Peace Treaty. "
      1. Gopnik
        Gopnik 15 January 2018 14: 09
        Some nonsense. The Russian army after 1812 conducted several wars.
        Bullets Mignier did not improve the rate of fire, but rather the opposite. And most opponents were armed with smoothbore guns, not rifles
  4. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 14 January 2018 17: 49
    "providing for landing on the banks of the Bosphorus in the amount of 32-40 thousand
    man and the possible occupation of Constantinople "////

    What could be the landing to Constantinople, when a simple transfer
    troops ONLINE from Petersburg-Moscow to Crimea was a problem?
    There was not even a railway.
    The British in the short time that they were in Crimea, managed to build,
    put into operation (and then, before the site from the Crimea, - to disassemble!)
    railway to supply troops.
    1. Cat
      Cat 14 January 2018 18: 09
      By the beginning of the events described in the Tauride province there were about 30 thousand regular troops of the Russian army. At the mouth of the Danube is still about 50 thousand. So, with reasonable logistics on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet with the involvement of merchant and fishing vessels in the Bosror area, it was possible to land a 30 thousandth corps, barring Bospor. Then, using the river system and coastal transportation through the Black and Azov Seas, to raise the irregulars from central Russia and the Volga region.
      The word experience was the transfer of the military contingent of the Black Sea sailors.
    2. Antares
      Antares 14 January 2018 18: 15
      Quote: voyaka uh
      providing for landing on the banks of the Bosphorus in the amount of 32-40 thousand
      man and the possible occupation of Constantinople "////
      What could be the landing to Constantinople, when a simple transfer
      troops ONLINE from Petersburg-Moscow to Crimea was a problem?

      By land, Russia has always taken heavy roads at all times and the tanks will not pass (Napoleon found element 5 in Poland and the Republic of Ingushetia). But 20 thousand landing was planned on the ships of the Navy (as before, they drove to the Caucasus) But 20 thousand are few. But warships cannot take much. There were no transports. The plan of Nikolai / Menshikov was too risky.
      As for the land, RI lost outright the competition. The allies had everything in the Crimea, and meanwhile, on Perekop, everything that was needed (Shostka’s gunpowder and Lugansk shells) with other supplies was plunged into mud ... The critical point is Perekop. Railway to the main arsenal of the entire South was not yet and did not appear until the end of the war. Convenient harbors of Balaklava, trains to positions ... the allies had problems with delivery (storms), but RI had everything in its territory, the roads were impassable.
      True, the composition of the belligerents was interesting. Totleben and his counterparts of the allies were worth each other, Khrulev and Bosque, Nakhimov, Kornilov, Istomin, etc.
      That war became a harbinger of great wars of the future, long standing, trench wars, artillery duels ...
      1. sibiryouk
        sibiryouk 15 January 2018 19: 02
        But on the eve of the Sinop battle, the Russian Black Sea Fleet transported the 12th division to the Caucasus, from the Odessa region across the whole sea - so there were some landing opportunities!
    3. Pissarro
      Pissarro 13 February 2018 05: 16
      Twenty years before the events described, Russia was already deploying 30th troops during the Bosphorus expedition. At that moment, Turkey acted as an ally of Russia, Nikolai saved the Sultan from the Egyptian rebellious Pasha. That is, the experience was the transfer of troops
  5. Curious
    Curious 14 January 2018 19: 02
    "By this time, the losses were really enormous: Russia - over 522 thousand people, the Ottoman Empire - up to 400 thousand, France - 95 thousand, Great Britain - 22 thousand people."
    The losses of Russia and Turkey are taken from Brockhaus and Efron. The author should devote a separate chapter to this issue, since it is controversial.
    Vinogradov gives the figure of Russia's losses of about 300 thousand, Zayonchkovsky 143 thousand. There are other figures, but in any case, more than half a million losses look unrealistic.
    1. Cat
      Cat 15 January 2018 19: 13
      Losses of Russia are read with sanitary, and the UK only combat. So draw your own conclusions.
  6. Alf
    Alf 14 January 2018 21: 54
    Stockholm, not buying promises to give him a number of Russian territories in case of victory, ultimately refused the Allies to oppose Russia.

    Once again I am affirming in the thought that Lavrenty Palych was right in saying, Beat determines consciousness.
    The descendants of the Vikings recalled how their Tsar Peter with Russian soldiers grunted and decided not to arise. So drunk that still hurt back.
  7. Serge72
    Serge72 15 January 2018 20: 39
    And why
    formation of a military coalition of Anglo-Saxon powers
    Anglo-Saxon power alone.
    Americans seemed to be normal towards Russia at that time
  8. RUSS
    RUSS 15 January 2018 20: 47
    There is an excellent historical film "World Zero" on the Internet, I recommend