Military Review

How the army of Paulus died. Operation "Ring"

46
75 years ago, 10 January 1943, the operation “Ring” began. The troops of the Soviet Don Front proceeded to the final liquidation of the surrounded Stalingrad group of Paulus.


The situation at the front. Operation plan

Soviet offensive in the Stalingrad sector ("Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus") turned into a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The Stalingrad Front and the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front attacked the German Army Group A, which was withdrawing from the North Caucasus. The troops of the South-Western Front attacked in the Donbass. The Voronezh Front deployed active operations on the Upper Don. The German command could no longer save Paulus, surrounded by 6's army.

The Stalingrad strategic operation has entered its final phase. The headquarters of the Soviet Supreme Command planned to quickly destroy the enemy’s surrounded grouping. On December 19, Supreme Commander Stalin sent General N. N. Voronov to the area of ​​the Stalingrad and Don Fronts as Vasilevsky’s deputy in eliminating the surrounding enemy forces at Stalingrad. Voronov, as a representative of the Stavka and the deputy A.Vasilevsky, was instructed to submit no later than 21 December to the Stavka a plan to break through the defenses of the enemy troops surrounded at Stalingrad and eliminate them within several days. Voronov, the commander of the Don front, Rokossovsky, and the chief of staff, M. S. Malinin, began to develop a plan for the final operation. The command and army headquarters were also involved in this work.

By this time, the 62 Army was in the coastal areas of the city; from the north, separated from the troops of V.I. Chuikov by a five-kilometer corridor, stood the 66-i army, the 24-i army adjoined it; the entire western section of the ring was made up of troops of the 65 and 21 armies, while the southern occupied 57 and 64, also separated from the Chuykivtsi corridor 8 kilometers. The outline of the surrounding front resembled an egg, the sharp end of which was stretched to the south-west; here was located a knot of large strongholds of the enemy - Karpovka, Marinovka, Dmitrievka. In the western sector, the Germans carried out reconnaissance in December more than once in preparation for meeting Manstein.

The main question that had to be resolved was: from where it is more expedient to strike the main blow in order to dismember enemy groupings. The North was not suitable for this. The Germans broke through to the Volga there in August and since then they have been continuously fixed on the dominant heights. From the south, one could only count on an auxiliary strike. Therefore, it was decided to cut the “cauldron” from the west along the line of the Vertyachy - Big Rossoshka - Gumrak - Gorodishche, acting adjacent flanks of the 65 and 21 armies. On December 27, the Don Front Command and the representative of the Voronov Headquarters prepared a draft plan that was flown to Moscow on the same day. 28 December Bid announced the approval of the plan with the introduction of a number of changes.

How the army of Paulus died. Operation "Ring"

Soviet gunners, stationed at the German military cemetery, firing at German positions in Stalingrad from 76-mm divisional gun model 1942, ZiS-3

The Stavka directive noted: “... your main task in the first phase of the operation should be the cutting off and destruction of the western group of encircled enemy troops in the area of ​​Kravtsov, Baburkin, Marinovka, Karpovka, so that the main attack of our troops from the Dmitrievka area, state farm No. 1, Baburkin turn south to the area of ​​the Karpovskaya station, and send an auxiliary strike of 57 to the army from the Kravtsov and Sklyarov area to meet the main blow against it and close both blows near the Karpovskaya station. Along with this, the 66 army should be organized through Orlovka in the direction of the Krasny Oktyabr settlement, and to meet this blow, the 62 army should strike, so that both attacks would close and cut off the factory area from the main enemy group. ”

Based on the Bid instructions from December 28, the headquarters of the Don Front and then the army headquarters developed a plan for the first phase of the operation. His main task was formulated as follows: “The purpose of the operation: to cut off, encircle and destroy the western grouping of the surrounding enemy troops in the area: Kravtsov, Zapadnovka, and all. № 1, Dmitrievka, Marinovka ". 4 January 1943 This plan was finally approved. The main attack was laid on the 65 Army of General P.I.Batov, who was in the center of the shock group of the front. The troops of this army were given the task of attacking in the south-east direction on Novyy Rogachik and, in cooperation with other armies, to destroy the enemy in the area west of the r. Rossoshka.

Thus, the operation "Ring" envisaged the dismemberment of the surrounded Stalingrad grouping with a blow from west to east and, as a first stage, the destruction of enemy troops in the south-western projection of the encirclement. In the future, the advancing Soviet troops had to consistently dismember the encircled grouping and destroy it in parts.

Due to the late arrival of gain funds, the preparation of the operation did not end on January 6, as planned from the beginning, but four days later. The rate authorized the postponement of the start date of the operation to January 10 1943.



Soviet forces

The Don Front was significantly strengthened by artillery units, and from January 1, 1943, the 62nd, 64th and 57th armies of the Stalingrad Front were included in it (it was reorganized from the Southern), commanded by Generals V.I. Chuikov, M.S. Shumilov and F. I. Tolbukhin. Even earlier, the 21st Army of the Southwestern Front, commanded by General I.M. Chistyakov, was transferred to the Don Front. The 65th Army, which delivered the main blow, was significantly strengthened, which by the beginning of the operation consisted of eight rifle divisions, 27 artillery regiments of the RVGK, two divisions of rocket artillery, five anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the air defense, three separate artillery divisions of the air defense, six tank regiments, one tank brigade.

As part of the front to the beginning of the operation, there were 212 thousand people (the enemy had 250 thousand soldiers and officers), guns and mortars - 6860, tanks - 257, combat aircraft - 300. The Soviet troops had superiority in guns and mortars (more than one and a half times) and especially in aircraft (three times). The enemy possessed numerical superiority in humans (1,2: 1) and tanks (1,2: 1). True, the combat capability of the advancing Soviet troops was significantly higher than that of the blocked and weakened Paulus army.

In the direction of the main strike, a decisive predominance of forces and means over the enemy was created. For example, in the 65 offensive zone, the Soviet troops had: 62 people, thousand people, enemy - 31 300 (2: 1), guns and mortars - 2428 and 638 (4 and 1), respectively (127: 102), tanks - 1,2 and 1 ( 16: 100). A particularly large role in the operation was assigned to artillery. The most effective artillery fire control system was thought out. Part of the artillery gain was transferred to the rifle divisions, in the support groups of the infantry. The main forces of the front artillery were concentrated in the offensive zone of the army, which was solving the main task, by creating an army long-range group (ADD) and a group of artillery of destruction (AR). The actions of the advancing ground forces were supposed to support the 80 Air Force, which by then had 40 fighters, 80 bomber, XNUMX attack aircraft, and XNUMX night bombers.



Soviet soldiers firing 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937, 53-K on German positions in Stalingrad. January 1943

Germans

By the end of December 1942, the external front moved away from the grouping on 200 - 250 km surrounded by Stalingrad, passing along the line of Novaya Kalitva - Millerovo - Morozovsk - Zimovniki. The territory occupied by the Nazis, was 1400 square. km Enveloped in a dense ring of an environment of about 170 km in length (from north to south - 35 km, from west to east - 53 km), the enemy created a strong and deep defense inside it. The Germans used for this purpose and the former defensive lines of the Soviet troops. The terrain, with its small heights and numerous beams with steep steep shores, as well as a large number of settlements contributed to the organization of solid defense and made offensive operations more difficult.

The presence of equipped airfields in the areas of the Nursery, Basargino junction, Bol. Rossoshki, Gumrak, Art. Voroponovo and others allowed the Germans to take a significant number of aircraft. On average, from 50 tons (in November) to 105 tons of cargo (in December) was transported per day. From January 12 to February 2, this norm did not exceed 60 - 80 tons. On the most successful days, up to 150 tons of cargo were transferred. And in order to maintain the minimum combat effectiveness of the encircled troops, daily deliveries of 700 to 900 tons of cargo (ammunition, food, fuel, etc.) were required. This is a German task aviation I could not decide.

German aviation was not able to perform the task entrusted to it to supply the encircled army. The Soviet 17, 8 and 16 air armies, as well as aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the country's air defense forces, disrupted the delivery of cargo to the "boiler" and destroyed the enemy's transport aircraft. Both the supply bases and the airfields located in the enclosed area were subjected to bombing and ground attack. To combat the enemy's aircraft, Soviet aviation used patrols, duty at the airfield and free hunting. In early December, organized by the Soviet troops, the system of combating the enemy's air transport was based on the division into areas of responsibility. The first zone included the territories from which the supply of the encircled grouping took place, units of the 17 and 8 of the air armies acted here. The second zone was located around the troops of Paulus over the territory controlled by the Red Army. It was created two belts of guidance stations, the zone itself was divided into 5 sectors, one fighter aviation division in each (air defense fighters and 8 and 16 divisions of the air armies). In the third zone was located anti-aircraft artillery, it also surrounded the blocked grouping. It was 15-30 km deep, and at the end of December 1942 had 235 small and medium-caliber guns in it and an 241 anti-aircraft gun. The area occupied by the surrounded Stalingrad group belonged to the fourth zone, there were units of the 8 and 16 air armies and a night regiment of the air defense division. In December, hundreds of enemy transport aircraft were shot down near Stalingrad.

In addition, the supply base of the German army was gradually removed to the west, which worsened the capabilities of German aviation. At first, the main bases for the supply of the blocked troops were Tatsinskaya, Morozovsk, Tormosin and Bogoyavlenskaya. But as the Soviet troops moved to the west, the Germans had to move the supply bases further and further from the troops of Paulus's army: to Zverevo, Shakhty, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Novocherkassk, Mechetinskaya and Salsk. At the last stage, airfields were used in Artyomovsk, Gorlovka, Makeyevka and Stalino. As a result, the distance from the enemy aviation bases to the landing sites of the 6 Army was initially 200 km, then increased to 300 and, finally, 450 km.


The German long-distance reconnaissance bomber Focke-Wulf Fw.200 "Condor" captured by Soviet troops at the airfield Nursery (Stalingrad region)

In the first period, the German soldiers believed that the matter was still fixable, that the external front of the encirclement would be broken in the near future. This faith gave them the strength to fight in the most difficult conditions. The officers inspired the soldiers that outside help was coming to Stalingrad. In the second week of December, it became known that large forces under the command of Field Marshal Manstein launched an operation to unblock an surrounded group (As the Germans tried to save the army of Paulus. Operation "Winter Thunderstorm"; "Winter Thunderstorm." H. 2; How to stop the breakthrough of the army group "Got"). The news of the attack of the army group "Got", notes K. Tippelskirkh, "caused a general rise." Recalling these days in the “boiler”, Joachim Wieder noted: “With lightning speed, the cry“ Manstein is coming! ”Spread like new password in all parts of the ring, and above all in our western section of the“ boiler ” where it was particularly tight ... Salvation seemed close. " However, these illusions disappeared when the Manstein-Goth attack failed, and the German troops began to retreat to Rostov.

The last hopes for help from outside, which gave the soldiers moral strength to hold on to the last, disappeared. Under the onslaught of the Soviet troops, the territory of the “cauldron” was gradually shrinking, which now almost all was swept by artillery. Aircraft attacked the nazis from the air. The 62 Army now led offensive battles of a local character. Her warriors were now advancing and knocking out the Nazis from their strongholds and resistance centers, conquering the building after the building, and the street after the street. The Germans realized that they were doomed.


Soviet artillerymen, at the rate of sergeant Bardadymov, are firing at enemy subsidiaries and subordinates on the outskirts of Stalingrad from an 152-mm howitzer ML-20 howitzer 1937 of the year

Soviet gunners firing 76-mm divisional gun model 1939 of the year (SPM) on the German positions on the ruins of Stalingrad

The supply has steadily deteriorated. Had to save ammunition, food, fuel, medicines, etc. The food ration fell to 100 g of bread. Horsemeat was a luxury. Soldiers hunted dogs, cats and birds. This is how Colonel Dingler describes the disasters of the 6 Army: ““ Every night, sitting in dugouts, we listened to the roar of the engines and tried to guess how many German aircraft would fly this time and what they would deliver to us. Food was very difficult from the very beginning, but none of us imagined that soon we would constantly suffer from hunger. We lacked everything: there was not enough bread, shells, and most importantly - fuel. While it was fuel, we could not freeze, and our supply, albeit on a limited scale, was ensured. Firewood had to be delivered from Stalingrad by car, but since we lacked gasoline, it was very rare to go to the city for fuel and it was very cold in our dugouts. Before Christmas 1942 of the year (December 26), troops were given 100 grams of bread per person per day, and after Christmas this ration was reduced to 50 grams. Later, these 50 grams of bread received only those units that were directly engaged in hostilities; in headquarters, starting from the regiment and above, they did not give out bread at all. The rest fed on liquid soup, which they tried to make stronger, digesting horse bones. ”

The surrounded soldiers suffered from frosts (the temperature at the end of December and in January reached minus 20 – 30 degrees), without receiving winter uniforms. During the Soviet counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), army rear bases in Morozovskaya, Tatsinskaya and further to the west remained outside the “boiler”. There were stored tens of thousands of sets of winter uniforms - overcoats with fur, felt boots, wool socks, balaclavas and headphones. As a result, the overwhelming majority of German troops met winter, almost without having appropriate clothing.

As a result, the German army and without active hostilities lost about 1500 people per day during local clashes, strikes of Soviet aviation and artillery, as well as from hunger, frost and disease. The German historian F. Mellenthin in the book “Tank battles of 1939 – 1945” describes the death of the 6 Army: “The Sixth Army was doomed, and now nothing could save Paulus. Even if by some miracle Hitler managed to get consent to attempt to break out of encirclement, the exhausted and half-starved troops would not be able to break the Russian ring, they would not have the means to retreat to Rostov along the ice-covered steppe. The army would have perished during the march, like Napoleon’s soldiers during the retreat from Moscow to the Berezina River. ”

At the same time, the surrounded German group still maintained its combat capability and had the following composition before the start of the operation: 250 personnel thousand people (during December the Germans lost about 80 thousand people), 4130 guns and mortars, 300 tanks and 100 aircraft. However, the moral, psychological and physical condition of the surrounded troops was extremely difficult. Despite the hopelessness of the situation, telegrams from Berlin “Stand up to the end!” Continued to arrive from Berlin. And the once elite German 6 army was ready to hold on, relying on a solid network of strong points and resistance nodes.

“The fact that we are not leaving here should be a fanatical principle,” said Hitler. In order No. 2 from 28 December 1942, when it was already clear that the Wehrmacht had no forces to release the surrounded grouping in Stalingrad, he stated: “... As before, my intention remains to keep the 6 army in its fortress ( in Stalingrad) and create the prerequisites for her release. ” On New Year's Day, the Führer's personal radiogram was received in the name of the commander of the surrounded group. She reaffirmed that Hitler "will not leave to the mercy of the heroic fighters on the Volga and that Germany has the means for the de-blockade of the 6 Army".

6 th army remained to die, until the last handing over the Soviet troops, or to capitulate. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, without thinking, decided to continue the resistance until the last soldier. By this it has doomed tens of thousands of soldiers to death. Such a decision was determined by the motives of both prestige and military strategy. Containment of the Soviet forces in the Stalingrad area, the German high command sought to prevent the collapse of the entire southern wing of the Eastern Front. However, after the failure of Manstein’s offensive and then the loss (in January) of the airfield in the Pitomnik area, the resistance of the surrounded Stalingrad group lost its former military strategic importance. But nevertheless it was continued.


Frozen Germans near Stalingrad

Ultimatum

On January 8, the command of the Don Front presented an ultimatum to the command of the encircled grouping demanding that it stop its senseless resistance and accept the terms of surrender. The ultimatum, signed by N. N. Voronov, representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, and K. K. Rokossovsky, commander of the Don Front, was broadcast by F. Paulus headquarters and delivered by parliamentarians. As volunteers who volunteered to go to the camp of the enemy for the delivery of an ultimatum, the following were approved by the envoy: Major A. Smyslov, worker of the headquarters of the Don Front, interpreter, captain N. N. Dyatlenko.

The ultimatum noted: “All hopes for the salvation of your troops by the offensive of the German troops from the south and southwest did not materialize. The German troops hurrying to your aid are defeated by the Red Army, and the remnants of these troops retreat to Rostov. The German transport aviation, which transports your food, ammunition and fuel standards to you, due to the successful rapid advance of the Red Army, is often forced to change airfields and fly to locations surrounded from afar. In addition, German transport aviation suffers huge losses in aircraft and crews from Russian aviation. Her help to the surrounded troops becomes unreal.

The position of your surrounded troops is difficult. They experience hunger, disease, and cold. The harsh Russian winter begins; severe frosts, cold winds and blizzards are still ahead, and your soldiers are not provided with winter clothing and are in difficult unsanitary conditions. You, as commander, and all the officers of the encircled troops are well aware that you have no real opportunity to break through the ring of encirclement. Your situation is hopeless, and further resistance makes no sense. ”

The Germans were asked to stop the resistance and transfer to the Soviet disposal all the personnel, weapons, all military equipment and military equipment in good condition. The enemy was guaranteed "life and security, and after the war ended, return to Germany or to any country where prisoners of war would express their desire." All personnel were offered to keep their military uniforms, insignia and orders, personal belongings, values, and the highest officers and cold weapon. All who had surrendered were promised normal food, and the wounded, sick, and frostbite - medical care.

However, the commander of the German 6-th Army rejected the proposal of the Soviet command. On the same day, the commander of the 14 tank corps of General Huba returned to Stalingrad. He returned to the "pot" from Hitler's headquarters, where 28 December flew out to receive the award and where, on the instructions of Paulus, he reported to the Führer on the situation of the surrounded army. Hube brought Hitler's order to continue resistance until the new deblocking offensive of the Wehrmacht, which was promised to begin in the second half of February. Paulus summoned corps commanders who already knew the text of the Soviet ultimatum. The commander also introduced them to General Hube’s report. They all spoke out against surrender. Then came the response of the ground command of the ground forces (OKH). He read: “Surrender is excluded. Every extra day that the army keeps on helps the whole front and draws Russian divisions from it. ”

F. Paulus after the war, in September, 1945, explained his behavior at that moment: “I was a soldier and believed then that I served my people with obedience. As for the responsibility of the officers subordinate to me, from a tactical point of view, they, in carrying out my orders, were in the same forced position as I myself was in the framework of the overall operational situation and the orders given to me. ”




Abandoned German self-propelled guns, captured by Soviet troops in the Stalingrad boiler. This is a Marder II ACS with a 76,2-mm gun. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

To be continued ...
Author:
46 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. parusnik
    parusnik 10 January 2018 07: 51 New
    +6
    Thank you, we are waiting for the continuation.
  2. igordok
    igordok 10 January 2018 09: 15 New
    +4
    Interestingly, the "Marders" cluster is the repair site (SPAM) or the location.
  3. bulat
    bulat 10 January 2018 10: 17 New
    +5
    1500 people a day. For two months, 90000 people. If it were 44, they would not have attacked. But Stalin was right: "We all really needed this victory!"
    1. Forcecom
      Forcecom 10 January 2018 11: 55 New
      +3
      Yes, a victory was needed, but a couch general, but even so, with its resistance, the 6th Army completed its last mission, diverted the Red Army combat units to their destruction, while suffering technical losses and, most importantly, personnel.
      It’s better, as the pots really did in 44-45 (one “Armed Prisoner of War Camp” “what was it worth”) to pull up the second-tier units, leaving the minimum necessary number of mobile units to parry individual attacks, still surrounded group without any fuel reserves and the ammunition wasn’t simple enough for serious offensive operations to organize air defense of the region to completely suppress the "air bridge" and systematically "square-bush way" to iron it with artillery while opportunities to attract for this training artillery units (and to free up military units and teach young “gods of war” in ideal conditions) otherwise leaving the encirclement to ourselves - frost and hunger would do their job. And the fact that the 6th Army would exist for a couple of weeks it would not have made any difference, and the liberated combat units would have been sent either to rest and manning or to the front to develop the success of the offensive where they would be more useful than to destroy the "corpses."
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 January 2018 17: 05 New
        +6
        Quote: Forcecom
        It’s better, as the pots really did in 44-45 (one “Armed Prisoners of War Camp” “what was it worth”) to pull up the second-tier units, leaving the minimum necessary number of mobile units to parry individual attacks,

        There is only one thing: Paulus, who is sitting in Stalingrad, blocked a large railway junction and the only waterway for delivering oil and cargo from the South Lend-Lease (in 1943, the Yankees finally made their way through Iran). And this traffic jam had to be knocked out before the start of preparation for navigation - for it was still necessary to clear the Volga fairway near the city.
        Railroads were no less important - it’s enough to remember that the winter operations of 1942-1943 in the South were carried out with one railroad to the front. The capabilities of which essentially limited the duration and depth of operations. And the restoration of the Stalingrad railway junction was a critical factor.
        But the Courland POW camp did not bother anyone - he was in a remote corner, and communications by land passed him.
        1. Fat Penguin
          Fat Penguin 10 January 2018 17: 35 New
          0
          The last paragraph is about Crimea almost.
      2. Train
        Train 11 January 2018 12: 26 New
        0
        Duck, and in general the whole operation went around the blade many times — there weren’t enough forces and the ring was liquid — It’s good that Mannstein didn’t listen to Gott for his calls for a breakthrough from the outside, then there would still be enough forces and means, and Gott had 600 thousand for his radiograms tons of fuel with us. At that moment, ours repelled Gott's attacks, if not from the last forces, but on the brink. Paulus told him -Gotta-well, let's wait a bit, well, they still haven’t decided yet. (Apparently Paulus knew better the situation in the Wehrmacht, in particular with the Crimean peninsula). By the way, in the received radiograms, there’s never a slip Hitler’s name was taken with his notorious order to hold on to the end. If Gott approached a couple of weeks earlier and Paulus decided to still break through, we would not have stopped him. But ... frost, time and our tank crews, that stood to death against the Gott group did own business ...
        1. Fat Penguin
          Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 12: 57 New
          0
          600 thousand tons of fuel was?
          :-)
          1. Train
            Train 11 January 2018 13: 04 New
            0
            about 500-600 tons right now revised
            1. Fat Penguin
              Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 13: 07 New
              0
              OK, accepted.
              1. Train
                Train 11 January 2018 13: 10 New
                0
                I wonder why Paulus was calving? -Our intercepted radiographs of Gott and Paulus-there was not a word about Hitler’s order to keep — but Paulus was calving! Well, let's wait and see a couple of days there, in short It’s not clear what Paulus had in mind - even our people admitted that there were not many forces to keep Germans inside the boiler, and from the outside it was already possible to repulse the attacks.
    2. Fat Penguin
      Fat Penguin 10 January 2018 13: 34 New
      +1
      Well, at 44-45 there were also controversial moments, the Kurland group was not stormed, and the Koenigsber group, for example, was stormed - was it worth it? They would also surrender after May 9, probably without a fight - just like Kurland surrendered.
      In Stalingrad, the Germans would have stupidly rested themselves, after the disruption of Manstein’s offensive, they could have waited until they themselves had rested, they could no longer advance.
      1. Fat Penguin
        Fat Penguin 10 January 2018 13: 44 New
        +2
        By the way, with the Crimea. Was it worth it to release him in the spring of 44? The Germans were there in the fall of that year as if they were trapped. Perhaps they would have surrendered without a fight in September 44.
        1. Forcecom
          Forcecom 10 January 2018 15: 48 New
          +4
          That is, you equate the surrounded, cut off from their own warehouses, not to mention the rear supply, the 6th Army located in the field in bad weather conditions (if not worse), the life of which was estimated at 3-4 weeks. By the 17th Army, seated in greenhouse weather conditions in the territory occupied for more than 2 years, having normal maritime communications with the rear bases? With all due respect to the KChF, he could not even completely prevent the evacuation of German units from Sevastopol, let alone talk about the normal blockade of the coast for a long time. Moreover, the restoration of control over the Black Sea was necessary for the continuation of the offensive on the coastal directions of the southern flank of the Red Army.
          All the same, there is a difference between “they die themselves in 3 weeks” and “they sit until they surrender in 1,5 years”, don’t you?
          1. Fat Penguin
            Fat Penguin 10 January 2018 16: 42 New
            0
            Well, the Germans had been sitting in Crimea since October 43 (when the spacecraft blocked Crimea from the north) and nothing, our rush to storm them (except for the Kerch region). The situation in September 44 changed a lot, where could the Germans go? If only to Turkey, and that would give them to the Union. Germans could not leave the Black Sea through the straits either. So the Germans in Crimea would be completely trapped, maybe it would be enough to surrender without a fight.
          2. Train
            Train 11 January 2018 13: 13 New
            0
            Castati, here you are right, why Oktyabrsky could not cut the supply and evacuation? Why Tributz as much as 45 could not prevent the supply of troops to Courland and the evacuation of the wounded? arms supplies, etc? where was our fleet in the Baltic and what was it worth then?
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 10 January 2018 17: 12 New
          +3
          Quote: Fat Penguin
          By the way, with the Crimea. Was it worth it to release him in the spring of 44? The Germans were there in the fall of that year as if they were trapped. Perhaps they would have surrendered without a fight in September 44.

          Not only Germans were in Crimea. In fact, the liberation of Crimea is a blow primarily to Romania. Both in terms of the destruction of the Romanian units on the peninsula, and in terms of the “aircraft carrier Crimea” hovering over Romania from the east. By the way, the evacuation from Crimea also contributed to driving a wedge between the Allies on the Axis. smile
          1. Fat Penguin
            Fat Penguin 10 January 2018 17: 29 New
            0
            It was possible to fly to Romania from other regions, from the Odessa region, for example, no further.
            P.S. In the "armament" section you have been unsubscribed, take a look - where is the topic about the Czech-German self-propelled gun
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 10 January 2018 18: 41 New
              +2
              Quote: Fat Penguin
              It was possible to fly to Romania from other regions, from the Odessa region, for example, no further.

              Logistics. The capture of the Crimea liberated the sea shipping route, which was easier and more efficient for the fleet than land. Let me remind you that naval aviation with a land shoulder of transportation during the liberation of Crimea and the blockade of Sevastopol regularly sat on a starvation ration - it came down to the single-handed allocation of torpedoes and the delivery of jet fuel by TB-3 transporters.
              Plus, the threat of transportation along the Caucasus coast was removed.
              1. Fat Penguin
                Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 06: 04 New
                0
                And what about the fleet? The fleet played only an auxiliary role. The Yasso-Kishenev operation was 99% land-based, and it was after it that Romania and Bulgaria were engaged. That is, the Germans would have fled from Crimea in August 44 without a fight (or surrendered), probably.
                And so how many people have we lost in Crimea in 43-44? These landings alone in the Kerch area - I can’t even understand their meaning.
        3. antivirus
          antivirus 10 January 2018 19: 12 New
          0
          FOR THE EXIT OF ROMANIA AND HUNGARY FROM THE WAR !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
          !!!!!!!!!!!! 1
          and the Turks and little brothers began to smile after the storm of Sevastopol
          and they saw Kolyma from the Danube.
          stools in the barracks - not a sofa in the castle
      2. Train
        Train 11 January 2018 12: 29 New
        0
        We stormed Kurlyanskaya repeatedly, head-on, incurring wild losses, but we couldn’t defeat her (thanks also to Tributsu), it was like fighting at 45 !!! that year, do not block the sea routes for transporting people, shadows and ammunition !? As a result, the group, until the end, received everything that allowed it to hold on for so long, and evacuate the wounded !!! Using the fleet !!!
        1. Fat Penguin
          Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 13: 09 New
          0
          Yes, no one stormed it, they lined flags like wolves, and that’s it.
    3. antivirus
      antivirus 10 January 2018 19: 19 New
      +1
      at headquarters, starting from the regiment and above, they did not give out bread at all. The rest ate liquid soup, which they tried to make stronger by digesting horse bones. ”
      "" from September all products in stores suddenly disappeared and were given min. cards in the morning. IN THE MORNING A POTATO, IN THE EVENING A DRINK OF ITS CLEANING.
      father mother sent to the grandmother in the village.
      I walked (or rode in a peat trolley) from one to others if I wanted to. "" 41G
      Got to the stinky goats LATE
  4. Gartny
    Gartny 10 January 2018 12: 53 New
    +1
    Yes. the lesson from this is one: if the fascist came to share a foreign land, he will rot in this land.
  5. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 10 January 2018 12: 54 New
    +5
    I am proud that my grandfather went through the Battle of Stalingrad and personally saw the captured Paulus.
    1. Train
      Train 11 January 2018 12: 31 New
      0
      And here then you should not tease And so to speak will share the memories of Grandfather with readers! -What did he say? how I saw all this, it’s interesting !!! - I’m waiting for at least a brief description-unique information My friend and Honor to Grandfather!
  6. urman
    urman 10 January 2018 14: 25 New
    +4
    I’m reading all this and I understand that about the dead or good or not what?
    Not that case and time is not a judge! I, more than half and half from the side of Mom and from the side of the Father, died.
    Did my relatives call them here?
    Maybe I'm cruel? And did not understand the Author correctly?
    (if I'm wrong) sorry.
    Well, here's a photograph of these Bastards, frozen, (here it’s not Kolya from Urengoy, but his mentors, that’s necessary .........) Satisfied !!!!!!!!!!!!!
    Do not go where you are not happy !!!
    And console yourself, on your forehead !!!!!!!!
  7. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 10 January 2018 17: 16 New
    +2
    The main question that had to be solved: where is it more expedient to deliver the main blow in order to dismember the enemy group. The north was not good for this. The Germans broke there to the Volga back in August and since then have continuously consolidated their positions on the dominant heights. From the south, one could only count on an auxiliary strike. Therefore, they decided to cut the "cauldron" from the west along the Vertyachy-Bolshaya Rossoshka-Gumrak-Gorodische line, acting along the adjacent flanks of the 65th and 21st armies.

    It is noteworthy, isn’t it: Paulus is surrounded, the troops are starving, but ours will still not storm the boiler from the north - the defense is too strong.
    This is me to the question of why “Mars” failed. For there were no Romanians in the Center Center, and the entire defense was the very same “Northern boiler face”.
  8. tiaman.76
    tiaman.76 10 January 2018 21: 49 New
    0
    it would be better if they died to the end., leave three armies for the protection of "frozen meat" and send the rest to the Kuban and growths, iron a little
    1. Fat Penguin
      Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 06: 08 New
      +1
      If the Germans did not have fuel and food, then they even did not need to be protected, they were physically unable to leave the area of ​​Stalingrad.
      1. Train
        Train 11 January 2018 12: 34 New
        0
        They had fuel — but not much — Gott had it all — up to 600 thousand, or liters, or how much. What Paulus had then in his headquarters (by the way, smart head) no one now knows why he didn’t send troops to meet Gott so and will remain a secret ...
        1. Fat Penguin
          Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 13: 02 New
          0
          Try to walk 300 km off-road in winter if you do not have food :-)
          I used to go skiing in my youth, but the distance was an order of magnitude shorter ... I'm so tired!
          But the Fritz and had no skis. And they would be killed by all means!
          1. Train
            Train 11 January 2018 13: 15 New
            0
            Yes, the fact of the matter is that at that time we didn’t have much strength either! -We barely stopped Gott, if Paulus decided to break through immediately, then most likely he would have connected, and Gott had both fuel and food and everything else. AND HE ABOUT IT RADIATED Paulus!
  9. Evgenijus
    Evgenijus 10 January 2018 21: 51 New
    +1
    Interesting material, I read with pleasure. Thanks to the author, I am waiting for the continuation.
  10. BAI
    BAI 11 January 2018 00: 29 New
    +1
    On the same day, the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps of General Hube returned to Stalingrad.

    Here we must pay tribute to the Germans. Where and when did the Soviet general return to the encircled troops, whose situation was hopeless? But fly away from the boiler, leaving the entrusted troops to die - this is not uncommon. Sevastopol alone was worth it.
    1. Fat Penguin
      Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 06: 12 New
      0
      Hitler ordered him to return, and he returned. What was he to do? No need to pass off need for virtue.
      Efremov died, but did not fly away from his entourage, although he was just offered to fly away.
      1. revnagan
        revnagan 25 May 2018 11: 48 New
        0
        Kirponos died, with a rifle in his hands, making his way out of the Kiev boiler, refusing to evacuate by plane ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 January 2018 10: 39 New
      +3
      Quote: BAI
      Here we must pay tribute to the Germans. Where and when did the Soviet general return to the encircled troops, whose situation was hopeless? But fly away from the boiler, leaving the entrusted troops to die - this is not uncommon. Sevastopol alone was worth it.

      Everything would be fine, but here's one misfortune: in January 1943, Hans-Valentin Hube flew out of the boiler. laughing
      Quite a few high-ranking officers and generals were taken out of the "cauldron". So, in addition to the commander of the XIV corps, General Hube, the commander of the 60th motorized division, Major General Kolleraman, was taken out of Stalingrad. Among the LI army corps commanders, the “cauldron" left: the commander of the 79th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Count von Schwerin, the commander of the disbanded 94th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Pfeiffer, and the commander of the 305th Infantry Division, Major General Stenmets. The commander of the 384th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General von Goblenz, was removed from the composition of the commanders of the formations of the 9th Army Corps from Stalingrad. The list of officers removed from the IV Corps was opened by its commander, General of the Engineering Forces Jeneke. Also, the “cauldron" was left by Goering's nestling - the commander of the 14th anti-aircraft division, Major General Pickert. More precisely, he flew out of the "cauldron", and he managed to return on the day when the Nursery was lost. Pickert did not fly to Gumrak. The process of exporting valuable personnel from the boiler affected not only generals. Colonels Zelle and Stiott, commanders of engineering troops, did not remain surrounded. There were also less significant people, for example, Major Willy Langeith, who commanded a tank regiment in the 1945th Panzer Division, the future commander of the Kurmark division in XNUMX.
    3. Train
      Train 11 January 2018 12: 35 New
      0
      Vlasov did not fly away from the cauldron, Efremov Hero did not fly away from the cauldron ...
      1. Fat Penguin
        Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 13: 11 New
        0
        Vlasov could not fly away, it seems ...
  11. oldav
    oldav 11 January 2018 07: 22 New
    +1
    Why did they hold the bridgeheads in Stalingrad itself at the final stage? What was the point?
    1. Fat Penguin
      Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 09: 12 New
      0
      And why were they taken? What would the Germans finally please? After November 19, the Fritzes didn’t storm the paddy. So why was it necessary to leave? Was there a paddy and everything was equipped, right up to the warehouses — should all this be given to the Germans? "In the trenches of Stalingrad" read? There, one of our characters didn’t even want to attack, he took root in defense, he ate oranges :-)
      1. oldav
        oldav 11 January 2018 10: 07 New
        0
        I think that the “mess” was still there, plus it was necessary to supply this entire group. All the same, the Germans would not have crossed the Volga anymore. It would be more logical to simply hit from cannons from the other side along them.
        1. Fat Penguin
          Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 12: 50 New
          0
          Not sure about the mess, why did the Germans attack then? Plus the Volga froze. Troops generally need to be supplied, where to go? Our other parts also had to be supplied and it was also difficult.
          "Mash" was at any point in the ring of the environment.
  12. Fat Penguin
    Fat Penguin 11 January 2018 13: 06 New
    +1
    No offense ...
    But as I read the “Book of Future Commanders” as a child, I didn’t read anything particularly new about the Battle of Stalingrad (apart from the recollections of ordinary participants, it’s interesting sometimes).