Errors of British shipbuilding. Linear Cruiser "Invincible"
But it is very difficult to understand how all this managed so unfortunate in any respect to the ship.
“Invincible” and its “sisterships” “Inflexible” and “Indomiteble” are subjected to numerous and, in general, fair criticism: their defense is considered ridiculous, the location of the main guns is not optimal, and the speed, although very high, is still insufficient battle cruiser of the First World War. This begs the natural question: how is a country that until recently was the technical leader of the era, the "mistress of the seas" and possessing the most powerful in the world fleet, managed to create such a failed ship? What kind of eclipse did this find on ingenious British designers and engineers?
In the cycle of articles presented to your attention, we will try to understand the reasons for this failure.
For a long time, the British fleet created its armored cruisers linking their construction with armadillos: for example, the last series of British armored cruisers “Minotaur” had much in common with the battleship “Lord Nelson”. Therefore, it is not surprising that after the development and approval of a new and in any respect revolutionary project “Dreadnought”, the British thought about an armored cruiser that could fit the latest battleship.
In order to ensure the best quality of the newest British ships, 22 December 1904 in England created a special committee. Formally, he himself did not decide anything, since he was only an advisory body in the management of military shipbuilding. But it was practically there that the characteristics of the British ships were determined, because it was chaired by John Arbetnot Fisher, who had just taken the post of First Sea Lord, and the head of the military shipbuilding department was only one member of this committee. Besides him, the committee included the most qualified artillery and mine specialists in England, leading shipbuilding engineers, representatives of industry and, interestingly, the head of naval intelligence. In general, Fisher tried to gather in this committee all the best specialists, with whose help it was necessary to make decisions about the projects of future ships.
As it has long been known, the most correct way to create a ship includes determining the range of tasks that it will have to perform and determining the technical characteristics that will ensure the solution of the tasks scheduled. This process is called the development of technical specifications, and in the future the outline design of the ship begins.
Unfortunately, in the case of Invincible, this process was turned upside down. When the committee was presented with draft designs of the future battlecruiser, they noted that
1) conducting intelligence;
2) support for smaller reconnaissance cruisers;
3) an independent service for the protection of trade and the destruction of enemy raiders-cruisers;
4) urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet;
5) pursuing the enemy’s retreating line fleet ... putting it, if possible, in a stalemate, focusing fire on lagging ships. "
Thus, the first problem of the future battle cruiser was the lack of intelligible tasks for the solution of which this ship was created. The committee members saw this and, obviously, tried to rectify the situation, considering the projects submitted to them for compliance with the functionality of armored cruisers. Such an approach is logical, and it could be considered correct ... if the British had at least some clear idea of why they needed ships of this class.
What is an English armored cruiser? First of all, it is a defender of commerce, called upon to defend the British sea communications entangling the world from the encroachments of enemy raiders. And what were the enemy raiders?
They could be divided into three categories: armored, armored and auxiliary cruisers. The most efficient of them were, naturally, armored. But even among them, of course, the power of artillery, speed and protection were largely sacrificed to purely cruising qualities such as seaworthiness and cruising range. A classic illustration is the comparison of domestic ocean raiders "Rurik" and "Russia" with Japanese armored cruisers of the types "Asama" and "Izumo". The latter, possessing much worse seaworthiness and range, had significant advantages in the power of the onboard volley and defense.
Briefly list armored cruisers of other leading maritime powers capable of raiding in the ocean. The French Gluard-type cruisers that were part of the French Navy's 1900-1902, although they had a very impressive 152-mm armor belt and quite decent speed in the 21-21,5 unit, but were armed with only two 194-mm and eight 164-mm The 9 500-10 200 T cannons displacement. The next series of armored cruisers, the Leon Gambetta, received twice more powerful weapons (4 194-mm and 16 164-mm guns) and increased speed by one knot at a similar level of armor, and increased the speed by one knot at a similar level of armor, and 12-mm guns), and increased by one knot at a similar level of armor, and 13 XNUMX-XNUMX for this was the increase in displacement to XNUMX - XNUMX thousand tons.
Americans in 1901-1902 laid armored cruisers of the type "Pennsylvania" with a displacement of 15 thousand tons, armament of 4 203-mm and 14 152-mm and speed of 22 node with 127 mm armored belt. At the beginning of the century, the Germans did not build specialized ocean-based armored raiders, but the Prince Adalbert and York cruisers laid out in 1901-1902 could at least theoretically attack British communications. These cruisers had a displacement of about 10 000 and armament in 4 210-mm and 10 150-mm guns at speed 20,5-21 knots.
The armored cruisers of the leading maritime powers for the most part were inferior to the armored and in defense and in armament, not exceeding the latter in speed. Auxiliary cruisers were armed non-military vessels and, accordingly, were even weaker, but had one advantage: if an ocean liner was armed, it had high speed and excellent seaworthiness, superior to those of warships in fresh weather.
How did the British respond to these threats?
In 1901-1902 The British laid six Devonshire armored cruisers, which they managed to arm with only 4 190-mm and 6 152-mm guns. Their speed was 22 knots, the maximum thickness of the armor belt was 152 mm with relatively moderate displacement, 10850-11000 tons. The ships went into operation almost simultaneously with the French "Leon Gambetta", which they were inferior in almost all parameters, but even before that the British understood that for reliable protection of their sea lanes they will need much more powerful and large ships.
As a result, the British returned to large high-speed cruisers armed with 234-mm artillery. In 1899 g, they had already laid four such ships (of the “Drake” type) which, when displaced in 13 920, carried 152-mm armor, two 234-mm and 16 152-gun, developing the speed of the 23 node. But later the British abandoned this type in favor of lighter and cheaper armored cruisers of the Kent type: this should be regarded as a mistake, because the latter were sufficient only against enemy armored cruisers. In essence, the unsuccessful "Devonshires" were precisely the enlarged and strengthened "Kents", but they still remained insufficient.
But in 1903, the UK is starting to build two series of large armored cruisers Duke of Edinburgh (12 595) and Warrior (13 240). The ships were very fast, developing the 22,5-23 node and had very powerful weapons from six 234-mm guns placed in single-axle turrets installed in such a way as to have the 4 barrel in the side salvo and 3 when firing into the bow and stern. At the same time, the Duke of Edinburgh ships also had 10 152-mm guns in low-lying casemates, and the Warriors had four 190-mm guns in one-gun towers. Reservations "Duke of Edinburgh" and "Warrior" in the opinion of the British provided reasonable protection against 194-mm - 203-mm projectiles.
In life, it turned out that British ships suffer from a number of obvious defects, but their description will lead us far beyond the scope of this article. But on paper, the British got excellent cruiser defenders of commerce. They could catch up with almost any armored or armored decker raider, except that liners, converted into auxiliary cruisers, had a chance to get away from them in fresh weather. At the same time, their 234-mm guns were significantly more powerful than the 194-mm - 210-mm guns of French, German, Russian and American cruisers. The level of protection was comparable, but, of course, possessing the strongest artillery, the British had an advantage over any armored cruiser of the world.
But at what cost were all these benefits achieved? The displacement of the British armored cruisers came very close to the battleships: for example, the armadillos of the King Edward VII type, laid down in 1902-1904, had a normal displacement in 15 630 t. At the same time, the firepower of armored cruisers was rated very high. For example, Phillip Watts, head of the military shipbuilding department, had an extremely high opinion of the capabilities of the 234-mm gun. On all appearances, he was greatly impressed by the shooting of the old battleship (usually it is indicated that it was Orion, but it seems to be some kind of mistake). 305-mm shells did not cause the battleship significant damage, but then the ship fired at the Drake cruiser, which came from the stern. His 234-mm projectile pierced the armored deck near the aft tower, passed through the engine rooms to the very bow of the battleship, and there it exploded, causing great damage. In combat, such a hit would lead to the hardest damage to the ship and its failure.
In addition, the results of the English fleet maneuvers undertaken in 1901-1903 should be taken into account. In three training "battles" squadrons converged, and in each case the British formed one squadron of newer and faster battleships, while the older ones had to confront them. As it turned out, the superiority in speed in 1,5 - 2 of the node almost guaranteed a victory - in all three cases, the more high-speed squadron put the enemy “stick over T” and won against the “slow moving” with a crushing score.
Under these conditions, it is completely impossible to imagine that the English admirals, being brought up in an offensive, Nelson spirit, would abandon the idea of forming a fleet of high-speed wing from large armored cruisers to participate in a general battle. They did not refuse: for example, during the 1903 r maneuvers, Vice-Admiral Wilson sent his armored cruisers with an unwavering hand in an attack against the three straggling battleships of the “enemy”.
But how would all this turn out in real combat?
The size and power of the British armored cruisers simply retouched the fact that their defense was not suitable for squadron combat. Look at the same "Warrior"
The 152 mm armor belt protected only the engine and boiler rooms, and opposite the fore and aft 234-mm turrets there were only 102 mm and 76 mm armor belts respectively! And it would be okay for them to have a powerful karapasnaya deck, like the one that had “Asama” and “Iwate” with thick bevels 51 and 63 mm. Instead, the tip of the Warrior defended the 19,1 mm deck in the bow and the 38 mm in the stern, and it is unclear whether this deck had a bevel. But even if it were, it was hardly enough even to protect against 203-mm armor-piercing projectiles, and against 305-mm such a booking did not protect at all.
The British have never been stupid and fully understood the weaknesses of their armored cruisers. Hence the vagueness of the formulations according to their tasks, like “covering up any actions of the fleet”. But in fact, the explosions of three British battlecruisers in Jutland thundered so loudly that the death of Rear-Admiral Arbetnotn’s armored cruiser Difens simply went unnoticed by the general public. But, judging by the descriptions available, the following happened: the first volley of German 305-mm guns from a distance of 40 kbt hit a weakly armored aft part and a strong flame rose above the ship. The next volley landed in the nose, causing the cruiser to explode. It is likely that the first hits led to a fire in the aft cellar, and the second volley - to the explosion of the cellars of the bow tower. You can certainly say that the armored cruisers Arbetnot came under the blow of the newest heavy German ships, and that is what predetermined their fate. But the thing is that if the old Kaiser battleships with their 280-mm guns had appeared in their place, the result would have been the same.
The British Rear Admiral is being scolded for setting up his cruisers under a German strike, but in fairness, we note that Arbetnot did nothing reprehensible - he acted in the vanguard of the fleet, including searching for the enemy, which, according to British views, included in the tasks of his cruisers. Of course, if the Battle of Jutland were to develop somewhere in the vast Pacific or in the Mediterranean, where excellent visibility is more the norm than the exception to the rules, armored cruisers could somehow accomplish this task, watching the enemy from afar. But to lay intelligence on huge, poorly protected ships in the North Sea with its mists, where enemy battleships can be found suddenly in 5 miles from their ship?
Why are there battleships? Let us recall Good Hope, a Drake-type armored cruiser with a Warrior-like reservation of the nasal extremities: 102-mm armor in the nose and 25 mm lower armored deck with 152 mm armor of the tower and barbet. At the very beginning of an unlucky battle for the British under Coronel, the cruiser received a strike of an 210-mm projectile from the Scharnhorst armored cruiser from a distance of approximately 50-60 cable. The projectile was not even armor-piercing, but a high-explosive, but it was also enough for the ship’s bow tower to break down and a high tongue of flame rose in the nose of the cruiser. Most likely the ignition of gunpowder occurred without an explosion in the cellars of the nose tower. At the same time, the German 210-mm artillery system had rather average characteristics and was by no means a super-powerful vundervaffe. All this raises doubts about the durability of protecting the ends of British armored cruisers even against 203-mm shells.
From the source to the source, the phrase from the naval yearbook Brassay roams:
However, it should be understood that this phrase fully applies to the British armored cruisers. There is no doubt that if the British had to fight at sea in the pre-prednouatnoe era with a strong enemy, their armored cruisers would have suffered great losses, as happened later with the battle cruisers. The discrepancy between the shock and defensive capabilities of the first British battlecruisers did not arise from scratch - it was a consequence of the British systemic error in defining the tasks for their armored cruisers.
All these "Drakes", "Warriors" and "Difensy" had a certain specialization, they were good defenders of commerce - so the British should have limited their activities to this role. But the British could not resist the temptation to use large and powerful ships for squadron combat, although they were not intended for this at all. Strengthen the protection of their armored cruisers seriously, the British could not. In this case, in order to stay in the existing displacement, it was necessary to “cut” the cruising range, armament or speed, but all this was unacceptable, because it would prevent the cruiser from performing the function of a defender of commerce. The second method was an additional increase in displacement, but then the armored cruisers would have become larger than the battleships, and the British were not yet ready for this.
So, it should be understood that when designing the world's first battlecruiser, the British immediately made two key mistakes:
First, they simply did not understand that they were creating a ship of a new class and, accordingly, did not formulate tasks for it. In fact, the British were engaged in designing the next armored cruiser and evaluating various variants of the Invincible projects from the standpoint of the tasks assigned to the Royal Navy's armored cruisers.
Secondly, the tasks for armored cruisers were set incorrectly, because they assumed the use of cruisers intended for combat on communications, not only for their intended purpose, but also as squadrons. In other words, the British completely unreasonably set for the specialized ships the tasks of universal.
To be continued ...
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