Errors of British shipbuilding. Linear Cruiser "Invincible"

171
His Majesty's Invincible ship is the most amazing creation of the British naval genius. He became the first battlecruiser of the world and the ancestor of the new class of warships. Its appearance had a tremendous impact on the naval doctrines of other states of the world, including the strategy and tactics of the use of cruisers. "Invincible", of course, became as epochal among cruisers as the "Dreadnought" among the battleships.

But it is very difficult to understand how all this managed so unfortunate in any respect to the ship.



“Invincible” and its “sisterships” “Inflexible” and “Indomiteble” are subjected to numerous and, in general, fair criticism: their defense is considered ridiculous, the location of the main guns is not optimal, and the speed, although very high, is still insufficient battle cruiser of the First World War. This begs the natural question: how is a country that until recently was the technical leader of the era, the "mistress of the seas" and possessing the most powerful in the world fleet, managed to create such a failed ship? What kind of eclipse did this find on ingenious British designers and engineers?



In the cycle of articles presented to your attention, we will try to understand the reasons for this failure.

For a long time, the British fleet created its armored cruisers linking their construction with armadillos: for example, the last series of British armored cruisers “Minotaur” had much in common with the battleship “Lord Nelson”. Therefore, it is not surprising that after the development and approval of a new and in any respect revolutionary project “Dreadnought”, the British thought about an armored cruiser that could fit the latest battleship.

In order to ensure the best quality of the newest British ships, 22 December 1904 in England created a special committee. Formally, he himself did not decide anything, since he was only an advisory body in the management of military shipbuilding. But it was practically there that the characteristics of the British ships were determined, because it was chaired by John Arbetnot Fisher, who had just taken the post of First Sea Lord, and the head of the military shipbuilding department was only one member of this committee. Besides him, the committee included the most qualified artillery and mine specialists in England, leading shipbuilding engineers, representatives of industry and, interestingly, the head of naval intelligence. In general, Fisher tried to gather in this committee all the best specialists, with whose help it was necessary to make decisions about the projects of future ships.

As it has long been known, the most correct way to create a ship includes determining the range of tasks that it will have to perform and determining the technical characteristics that will ensure the solution of the tasks scheduled. This process is called the development of technical specifications, and in the future the outline design of the ship begins.

Unfortunately, in the case of Invincible, this process was turned upside down. When the committee was presented with draft designs of the future battlecruiser, they noted that

“... the functions of the cruiser are not yet clearly established, but it is believed that, theoretically, they include:
1) conducting intelligence;
2) support for smaller reconnaissance cruisers;
3) an independent service for the protection of trade and the destruction of enemy raiders-cruisers;
4) urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet;
5) pursuing the enemy’s retreating line fleet ... putting it, if possible, in a stalemate, focusing fire on lagging ships. "


Thus, the first problem of the future battle cruiser was the lack of intelligible tasks for the solution of which this ship was created. The committee members saw this and, obviously, tried to rectify the situation, considering the projects submitted to them for compliance with the functionality of armored cruisers. Such an approach is logical, and it could be considered correct ... if the British had at least some clear idea of ​​why they needed ships of this class.

What is an English armored cruiser? First of all, it is a defender of commerce, called upon to defend the British sea communications entangling the world from the encroachments of enemy raiders. And what were the enemy raiders?

They could be divided into three categories: armored, armored and auxiliary cruisers. The most efficient of them were, naturally, armored. But even among them, of course, the power of artillery, speed and protection were largely sacrificed to purely cruising qualities such as seaworthiness and cruising range. A classic illustration is the comparison of domestic ocean raiders "Rurik" and "Russia" with Japanese armored cruisers of the types "Asama" and "Izumo". The latter, possessing much worse seaworthiness and range, had significant advantages in the power of the onboard volley and defense.

Briefly list armored cruisers of other leading maritime powers capable of raiding in the ocean. The French Gluard-type cruisers that were part of the French Navy's 1900-1902, although they had a very impressive 152-mm armor belt and quite decent speed in the 21-21,5 unit, but were armed with only two 194-mm and eight 164-mm The 9 500-10 200 T cannons displacement. The next series of armored cruisers, the Leon Gambetta, received twice more powerful weapons (4 194-mm and 16 164-mm guns) and increased speed by one knot at a similar level of armor, and increased the speed by one knot at a similar level of armor, and 12-mm guns), and increased by one knot at a similar level of armor, and 13 XNUMX-XNUMX for this was the increase in displacement to XNUMX - XNUMX thousand tons.



Americans in 1901-1902 laid armored cruisers of the type "Pennsylvania" with a displacement of 15 thousand tons, armament of 4 203-mm and 14 152-mm and speed of 22 node with 127 mm armored belt. At the beginning of the century, the Germans did not build specialized ocean-based armored raiders, but the Prince Adalbert and York cruisers laid out in 1901-1902 could at least theoretically attack British communications. These cruisers had a displacement of about 10 000 and armament in 4 210-mm and 10 150-mm guns at speed 20,5-21 knots.

The armored cruisers of the leading maritime powers for the most part were inferior to the armored and in defense and in armament, not exceeding the latter in speed. Auxiliary cruisers were armed non-military vessels and, accordingly, were even weaker, but had one advantage: if an ocean liner was armed, it had high speed and excellent seaworthiness, superior to those of warships in fresh weather.

How did the British respond to these threats?

In 1901-1902 The British laid six Devonshire armored cruisers, which they managed to arm with only 4 190-mm and 6 152-mm guns. Their speed was 22 knots, the maximum thickness of the armor belt was 152 mm with relatively moderate displacement, 10850-11000 tons. The ships went into operation almost simultaneously with the French "Leon Gambetta", which they were inferior in almost all parameters, but even before that the British understood that for reliable protection of their sea lanes they will need much more powerful and large ships.

As a result, the British returned to large high-speed cruisers armed with 234-mm artillery. In 1899 g, they had already laid four such ships (of the “Drake” type) which, when displaced in 13 920, carried 152-mm armor, two 234-mm and 16 152-gun, developing the speed of the 23 node. But later the British abandoned this type in favor of lighter and cheaper armored cruisers of the Kent type: this should be regarded as a mistake, because the latter were sufficient only against enemy armored cruisers. In essence, the unsuccessful "Devonshires" were precisely the enlarged and strengthened "Kents", but they still remained insufficient.

But in 1903, the UK is starting to build two series of large armored cruisers Duke of Edinburgh (12 595) and Warrior (13 240). The ships were very fast, developing the 22,5-23 node and had very powerful weapons from six 234-mm guns placed in single-axle turrets installed in such a way as to have the 4 barrel in the side salvo and 3 when firing into the bow and stern. At the same time, the Duke of Edinburgh ships also had 10 152-mm guns in low-lying casemates, and the Warriors had four 190-mm guns in one-gun towers. Reservations "Duke of Edinburgh" and "Warrior" in the opinion of the British provided reasonable protection against 194-mm - 203-mm projectiles.


Warrior


In life, it turned out that British ships suffer from a number of obvious defects, but their description will lead us far beyond the scope of this article. But on paper, the British got excellent cruiser defenders of commerce. They could catch up with almost any armored or armored decker raider, except that liners, converted into auxiliary cruisers, had a chance to get away from them in fresh weather. At the same time, their 234-mm guns were significantly more powerful than the 194-mm - 210-mm guns of French, German, Russian and American cruisers. The level of protection was comparable, but, of course, possessing the strongest artillery, the British had an advantage over any armored cruiser of the world.

But at what cost were all these benefits achieved? The displacement of the British armored cruisers came very close to the battleships: for example, the armadillos of the King Edward VII type, laid down in 1902-1904, had a normal displacement in 15 630 t. At the same time, the firepower of armored cruisers was rated very high. For example, Phillip Watts, head of the military shipbuilding department, had an extremely high opinion of the capabilities of the 234-mm gun. On all appearances, he was greatly impressed by the shooting of the old battleship (usually it is indicated that it was Orion, but it seems to be some kind of mistake). 305-mm shells did not cause the battleship significant damage, but then the ship fired at the Drake cruiser, which came from the stern. His 234-mm projectile pierced the armored deck near the aft tower, passed through the engine rooms to the very bow of the battleship, and there it exploded, causing great damage. In combat, such a hit would lead to the hardest damage to the ship and its failure.

In addition, the results of the English fleet maneuvers undertaken in 1901-1903 should be taken into account. In three training "battles" squadrons converged, and in each case the British formed one squadron of newer and faster battleships, while the older ones had to confront them. As it turned out, the superiority in speed in 1,5 - 2 of the node almost guaranteed a victory - in all three cases, the more high-speed squadron put the enemy “stick over T” and won against the “slow moving” with a crushing score.

Under these conditions, it is completely impossible to imagine that the English admirals, being brought up in an offensive, Nelson spirit, would abandon the idea of ​​forming a fleet of high-speed wing from large armored cruisers to participate in a general battle. They did not refuse: for example, during the 1903 r maneuvers, Vice-Admiral Wilson sent his armored cruisers with an unwavering hand in an attack against the three straggling battleships of the “enemy”.

But how would all this turn out in real combat?

The size and power of the British armored cruisers simply retouched the fact that their defense was not suitable for squadron combat. Look at the same "Warrior"



The 152 mm armor belt protected only the engine and boiler rooms, and opposite the fore and aft 234-mm turrets there were only 102 mm and 76 mm armor belts respectively! And it would be okay for them to have a powerful karapasnaya deck, like the one that had “Asama” and “Iwate” with thick bevels 51 and 63 mm. Instead, the tip of the Warrior defended the 19,1 mm deck in the bow and the 38 mm in the stern, and it is unclear whether this deck had a bevel. But even if it were, it was hardly enough even to protect against 203-mm armor-piercing projectiles, and against 305-mm such a booking did not protect at all.

The British have never been stupid and fully understood the weaknesses of their armored cruisers. Hence the vagueness of the formulations according to their tasks, like “covering up any actions of the fleet”. But in fact, the explosions of three British battlecruisers in Jutland thundered so loudly that the death of Rear-Admiral Arbetnotn’s armored cruiser Difens simply went unnoticed by the general public. But, judging by the descriptions available, the following happened: the first volley of German 305-mm guns from a distance of 40 kbt hit a weakly armored aft part and a strong flame rose above the ship. The next volley landed in the nose, causing the cruiser to explode. It is likely that the first hits led to a fire in the aft cellar, and the second volley - to the explosion of the cellars of the bow tower. You can certainly say that the armored cruisers Arbetnot came under the blow of the newest heavy German ships, and that is what predetermined their fate. But the thing is that if the old Kaiser battleships with their 280-mm guns had appeared in their place, the result would have been the same.

The British Rear Admiral is being scolded for setting up his cruisers under a German strike, but in fairness, we note that Arbetnot did nothing reprehensible - he acted in the vanguard of the fleet, including searching for the enemy, which, according to British views, included in the tasks of his cruisers. Of course, if the Battle of Jutland were to develop somewhere in the vast Pacific or in the Mediterranean, where excellent visibility is more the norm than the exception to the rules, armored cruisers could somehow accomplish this task, watching the enemy from afar. But to lay intelligence on huge, poorly protected ships in the North Sea with its mists, where enemy battleships can be found suddenly in 5 miles from their ship?

Why are there battleships? Let us recall Good Hope, a Drake-type armored cruiser with a Warrior-like reservation of the nasal extremities: 102-mm armor in the nose and 25 mm lower armored deck with 152 mm armor of the tower and barbet. At the very beginning of an unlucky battle for the British under Coronel, the cruiser received a strike of an 210-mm projectile from the Scharnhorst armored cruiser from a distance of approximately 50-60 cable. The projectile was not even armor-piercing, but a high-explosive, but it was also enough for the ship’s bow tower to break down and a high tongue of flame rose in the nose of the cruiser. Most likely the ignition of gunpowder occurred without an explosion in the cellars of the nose tower. At the same time, the German 210-mm artillery system had rather average characteristics and was by no means a super-powerful vundervaffe. All this raises doubts about the durability of protecting the ends of British armored cruisers even against 203-mm shells.


Hood Hope


From the source to the source, the phrase from the naval yearbook Brassay roams:

“But the thing is. that an admiral having an Invincible-class cruiser with 305-mm main-caliber artillery as part of his fleet would undoubtedly decide to put them on the battle line, where their relatively weak armor would harm and high speed would have no value. ”


However, it should be understood that this phrase fully applies to the British armored cruisers. There is no doubt that if the British had to fight at sea in the pre-prednouatnoe era with a strong enemy, their armored cruisers would have suffered great losses, as happened later with the battle cruisers. The discrepancy between the shock and defensive capabilities of the first British battlecruisers did not arise from scratch - it was a consequence of the British systemic error in defining the tasks for their armored cruisers.

All these "Drakes", "Warriors" and "Difensy" had a certain specialization, they were good defenders of commerce - so the British should have limited their activities to this role. But the British could not resist the temptation to use large and powerful ships for squadron combat, although they were not intended for this at all. Strengthen the protection of their armored cruisers seriously, the British could not. In this case, in order to stay in the existing displacement, it was necessary to “cut” the cruising range, armament or speed, but all this was unacceptable, because it would prevent the cruiser from performing the function of a defender of commerce. The second method was an additional increase in displacement, but then the armored cruisers would have become larger than the battleships, and the British were not yet ready for this.

So, it should be understood that when designing the world's first battlecruiser, the British immediately made two key mistakes:

First, they simply did not understand that they were creating a ship of a new class and, accordingly, did not formulate tasks for it. In fact, the British were engaged in designing the next armored cruiser and evaluating various variants of the Invincible projects from the standpoint of the tasks assigned to the Royal Navy's armored cruisers.

Secondly, the tasks for armored cruisers were set incorrectly, because they assumed the use of cruisers intended for combat on communications, not only for their intended purpose, but also as squadrons. In other words, the British completely unreasonably set for the specialized ships the tasks of universal.

To be continued ...
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  1. +3
    9 January 2018 12: 32
    Well, for the sake of objectivity, most likely the appearance of “magnificent cats” was primarily influenced by Fisher’s personality - his obsession with the idea of ​​an “attacking super-ship” ... Which, in general, ended happily with his resignation ...
    1. +3
      9 January 2018 19: 13
      Quote: Taoist
      That, in general, ended happily with his resignation ...

      Well, he didn’t resign because of this :))))
      1. +3
        9 January 2018 21: 48
        Well, he resigned a lot for some reason ... but with his departure the idea flew into the basket immediately ... Partly a similar situation with the "big cruisers" and the death of Stalin ... Also, the ships would have been beautiful ... ;-)
    2. +3
      11 January 2018 13: 05
      Quote: Taoist
      Well, for the sake of objectivity, most likely the appearance of “magnificent cats” was primarily influenced by Fisher’s personality - his obsession with the idea of ​​an “attacking super ship” ...


      This is not entirely true. An excursion into the history of the project debate:
      Fisher, like Watts' chief fleet designer, preferred the 254-mm caliber as the main caliber of battleships, and 234-mm for cruisers. Sketch designs were secretly circulated for inspection in very narrow circles. Serious objections were caused by the use of 254 mm guns for the battleship and 234 mm for the cruiser. Captains Madden, Jackson and Bacon favored the use of 305 mm guns.


      That is, the “practice” commanders spoke for the 305 mm caliber.

      Bacon's arguments came down to the following:
      When firing at a long distance, the time between salvos is not limited by the rate of fire of the guns, but by the flight time of the projectile - due to the need to observe bursts of fallen shells to correct firing on them.] Therefore, a small-caliber weapon loses its trump card - rate of fire.
      305-mm shell has a greater destructive force due to its mass and greater explosive charge.
      305-mm gun provides greater accuracy and less dispersion of shells at large combat distances.
      305-mm projectile has a more trajectory and, therefore, provides a larger area of ​​impact of the target (born flatter trajectory of projectile and hence greater danger space for target at long range).


      The heated debate on the choice of caliber continued until December 1904, when the Admiralty Council made the final decision to use 305 mm guns for both the battleship and the cruiser. An additional argument for choosing this caliber for the cruiser was the unification of weapons of two classes.


      As you can see - the initial position of Fisher is the use of 234 mm guns for battle cruisers.
      1. +3
        11 January 2018 13: 18
        And what does the caliber of guns have to do with it? Speech about the concept in general. And here it was Fisher’s logic that worked - brought to the absolute in the construction of the “white elephants”. The concept of a battlecruiser in itself was not only indistinct, but also vicious in essence. In principle, it’s clear where Fisher got this idea from — he wanted to have a sort of “beater” at the squadron — whoever catches up, imposes a fight at advantageous distances — will slow down and then “lancers” will come up and finish the matter ... It just turned out that they themselves would soon become game ...
        1. +2
          11 January 2018 14: 37
          Quote: Taoist
          In principle, it’s clear where Fisher got this idea from - I wanted to have a sort of “beater” at the squadron -


          "In speed, we must claim that our armored cruisers are obliged to have a noticeable superiority over any armored ships of other countries, both in their existing fleets and in their construction. "1886

          And what does Fisher have to do with it? It was a general English look regarding armored cruisers.
        2. +5
          11 January 2018 14: 57
          Quote: Taoist
          Speech about the concept in general. And here it was Fisher’s logic that worked - brought to the absolute in the construction of the “white elephants”.


          This opinion was not formed from scratch:
          In the years 1899-1902, Fisher commanded the Mediterranean fleet, holding the flag on the battleship of the second class "Rinaun", which he considered a very successful ship. "Rinaun" was slightly faster than the first class battleship due to easier booking and weapons. Larger sizes in bad weather gave him advantages over the cruisers of that time. Fisher believed that, compared with enemy armored cruisers, an ideal cruiser should surpass them in speed and armament.

          Where is the wrong logic here? In addition, this decision was made collegially by a committee chaired by Fisher.
          In his opinion, the armament of an ideal armored cruiser should have been similar to an armadillo, but the cruiser should have high speed due to easier booking. With high speed, the armored cruiser will be able to get tactical advantages over the battleship and will be able to choose the most advantageous battle distance

          Well, at that level of technical development - undoubtedly the speed advantage could be achieved only by weakening the protection.
          He further suggested that:
          Fisher believed that an ideal armored cruiser would gradually displace armadillos or, more precisely, two classes would merge into one.

          In principle, this happened - the battlecruiser Hood became the largest warship of its time, and only the fast-moving battleships that emerged led to the merger of the two development lines - i.e. due to technical development, battleships have reached acceptable speed with relatively high protection - i.e. got the function of battle cruisers - speed.

          The concept of a battlecruiser in itself was not only indistinct, but also vicious in essence.


          I disagree categorically.
          The design of the specific battlecruisers of the Invincible type was vicious.
          However, as a class, battlecruisers proved to be the most popular at the beginning of the war.
          For example, battle cruisers of the “Derflinger” type carried out cover for mine installations and raiding operations - on December 15-17, 2014, “Derflinger” with other ships of the 1st reconnaissance group covered the production of mines with the cruiser “Kolberg” and participated in the 1st reconnaissance group in shelling Scarborough and Coast Station at Whitby.
          Derflinger and Von der Tann fired at Scarborough Harbor on January 24, 1915. German battlecruisers participated in the Battle of Dogger Banks. Luttsov, March 21-22, as part of the 1st intelligence group, participated in the shelling of Lowestoft and Yarmouth. Goeben fired at the Black Sea coastal ports with impunity until the Black Sea dreadnoughts appeared.
          The battle service of battle cruisers is much more saturated with combat episodes than the service of battleships - so you "turned down" about the "vicious" concept :)

          As a means for raiding operations, destroying and interrupting cabotage, operations against convoys, covering airborne operations, the battle cruiser is ideal.
          Moreover, the German battlecruisers proved themselves worthy in linear combat.
        3. +4
          11 January 2018 15: 33
          Quote: Taoist
          It just turned out that they themselves would rather become a game ...


          Let's look at the German battlecruisers - which showed very good resistance to combat damage:
          That writes Erich Raeder, who was with the headquarters of Admiral Scheer on Lutzov during the Battle of Jutland:
          Our battlecruisers emerged from this hell only by some miracle. From time to time they came under the concentrated fire of the entire British fleet from a distance of 8000 yards. Shell after shell hit them, sweeping away the servants of the guns, causing fires in the compartments, making holes in the sides through which water whipped. But they coped with all the tests and took their places in the battle formations of the main forces of the German fleet, leaving the battle in the directions to the south and west.

          We believed that we were able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, although we had no idea how heavy the damage really was. We lost only one Lutz, which, having lost its course and control, was sunk by our own torpedo after his crew was withdrawn by escort ships.
          All our other battlecruisers were able to get to the port on their own, although the Seidlitz, which received the most severe injuries, had to wait several hours to cross the bar ... By the way, the excellent design and measures to combat the survivability of the ships allowed our cruisers to stay afloat and on the go, receiving injuries almost identical to those from which the three British battlecruisers sank.

          Raeder Erich
          Grand admiral
          Chapter 4.
          Skagerrak
          http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/raeder_e/04.ht
          ml
          1. +1
            11 January 2018 16: 38
            I don’t understand something of your logic ... What do we have de facto?
            The battlecruisers as a class left the stage - as there were high-speed LCs in which to achieve good running performance did not have to sacrifice protection.
            The battlecruisers did not fulfill the combat missions assigned to them - they did not provide “corral” functions during the squadron and, due to the weakness of their defense, suffered the most serious losses.
            Line cruisers, even where they fought against the obviously weakest enemy, and had the opportunity to freely choose the distance of the battle received very modest results in relation to the expended resources. (the battle at the Falklands cost the British empty cellars - and this with five times superiority in firepower)
            For all this, the cost of battlecruisers was comparable to normal LCs and their advantage over them was only in "target size".

            And while you continue to convince me that "the concept was correct"?
            1. +1
              11 January 2018 17: 48
              Quote: Taoist
              The battlecruisers as a class left the stage - as there were high-speed LCs in which to achieve good running performance did not have to sacrifice protection.

              I’ll take action: there were high-speed LCs in which in the absence of restrictions on size and displacement to achieve good running performance did not have to sacrifice protection.
              Because the same Yankees because of the Panama Canal had to limit the PTZ and the reservation on all of their postwashington.
              1. +1
                11 January 2018 18: 01
                So just another illustration of the fact that "everything has a price." The battlecruisers just started by inflating the displacement ... For "no options."
            2. +3
              12 January 2018 17: 08
              Quote: Taoist
              The battlecruisers as a class left the stage - as there were high-speed LCs in which to achieve good running performance did not have to sacrifice protection.


              Not certainly in that way. In general, this is a matter of terminology - left the stage or two classes merged into one.
              But the fact remains - for more than 30 years there was a class of battlecruisers and only the development of ship engines - gearboxes that allowed propellers to work in the most favorable modes, the use of steam with higher parameters allowed to bring the power of one unit to 40-70 thousand liters. with. What allowed to raise the speed of the new battleships to 27-30 knots and merge them with the class of battlecruisers - there is such an opinion :). And already the class of high-speed battleships ceased to exist, thanks to aircraft carriers - progress.

              The fact remains that battle cruisers, like faster ones, could overtake a weaker enemy and evade a stronger one (before the appearance of aircraft carriers).
              And this allowed them to be used much more flexibly than battleships - as the German Navy showed during the years of WWII. Line cruisers are the most warships in WWI, when compared to battleships.
              Goeben in the Black Sea basin, perfectly proved that the side that does not have battlecruisers can not effectively resist this class of warships - it will simply be late and miss the enemy - it is pointless to deny it.

              So for its time it was a completely revolutionary class of warships suitable for raiding operations, which the Germans took advantage of.
              1. +1
                12 January 2018 17: 49
                A little expensive for the "raid operations" came out ... But it's all the lyrics. The Germans didn’t just “fool around” like Fisher — they used their LKR successfully ...
                Keben, by the way, is also a good example ... For he acted exactly at that moment while he had "overwhelming superiority in the course" - as soon as he lost that superiority (not completely but an excess of three four knots remained), his actions ended ... So and sat in the Bosphorus.
              2. +1
                12 January 2018 18: 38
                Quote: DimerVladimer
                But the fact remains - for more than 30 years there was a class of battlecruisers and only the development of ship engines - gearboxes that allowed propellers to work in the most favorable modes, the use of steam with higher parameters allowed to bring the power of one unit to 40-70 thousand liters. with.

                First of all - the transition from direct-acting turbines to KTU with GTZA. Even Shershov in his 1940 History of Military Shipbuilding wrote in plain text that the commissioning of GTZA turbines made it possible to raise the shaft power to 80 hp, which allowed (with a four-shaft power plant) to give the ship 000 hp
                Direct exhaust pipe, increased steam parameters, boost - this is more and more for small ships, where everything was squeezed out of the boilers according to the principle "well, shaggy, well, a bit more".
          2. +1
            24 January 2018 18: 35
            not special on this issue, purely as an amateur I can say that my opinion on German ships as the most tenacious was confirmed, because on paper they seem weaker in places than, for example, the same English
            here I always had a question: after all, fools are not kept anywhere, then why it turns out that many ships are better than the German ones according to the declared hacks ... and the Germans rested on survivability (not only that, I read somewhere that fire control systems in They were great)
  2. +6
    9 January 2018 12: 35
    Good article. Thank you, I will wait to continue.
  3. +2
    9 January 2018 12: 45
    yes ... the pirates are not the same ...



  4. +3
    9 January 2018 13: 14
    You know, and even in our time, after the lessons of history regarding these ships, numerous fans of this concept remain - a thin belt, guns and speed to the maximum, and whatever happens. And most importantly - they believe that such cruisers will be truly effective generalists wassat Although, by and large, the same "Blucher" in a certain scenario looks more attractive - for its caliber of guns it is very balanced, and at the same time "all big guns". But he was still an armored cruiser, and the weather from the light kick of the “Invincibles” made the cruisers linear ...
    1. +3
      9 January 2018 13: 48
      Quote: arturpraetor
      You know, and even in our time, after the lessons of history regarding these ships, numerous fans of this concept remain - a thin belt, guns and speed to the maximum, and whatever happens.

      Duc ... there can still be influenced by the fact that now all the ships are - eggshell armed with heavy hammers.
      Quote: arturpraetor
      Although, by and large, the same "Blucher" in a certain scenario looks more attractive - for its caliber of guns it is very balanced, and at the same time "all big guns".

      The Blucher would have been nice if the British had built the “invincibles” with the technical characteristics they had merged with the Germans initially: an all-big-gun cruiser with an 234-mm GK.
      1. +3
        9 January 2018 14: 24
        So ... here it can still be influenced by the fact that now all the ships are like that - an egg shell armed with heavy hammers.

        It is possible, but the transfer of modern realities to events of a century ago cannot be called adequate either. laughing
        The Blucher would have been nice if the British had built the “invincibles” with the technical characteristics they had merged with the Germans initially: an all-big-gun cruiser with an 234-mm GK.

        The fact of the matter is that the Germans could not even imagine that the British would create such an unbalanced ship as the Invincible. They proceeded from direct logic and further developed armored cruisers, disa from the British only confirmed their logic. The British, however, developed their not-so-best BrKr, and even brought their concept to the point of absurdity - the 152mm belt with the 305-mm caliber GK, while it became clear on Elswick cruisers that big guns on cardboard ships were not the best option. Nevertheless, it happened just like that, and therefore the Blucher turned out to be a rather slurred ship, and the rest is already the lot of AI.
        1. +2
          9 January 2018 15: 21
          Quote: arturpraetor
          They proceeded from direct logic and further developed armored cruisers, disa from the British only confirmed their logic.

          Well, yes ... if the development of armored CRs in the KR with a single caliber would have been analogous to the EDB mutation in LA, the new KR would have to have a HA of 234 mm.
          If we take the tendency of the development of the EDB and their transition to LK, then it can be seen that King Edward VII and Lord Nelson gave rise to the Dreadnought, which had the same GK, but a larger number of trunks. Similarly, the line "Duke of Edinburgh" - "Warrior" - "Minotaur" was supposed to by logic give rise to the "Dreadnought CD" with the same HA as its predecessors - 234 mm, but with 4-5 BSh HA.
          1. 0
            9 January 2018 15: 39
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Similarly, the line “Duke of Edinburgh” - “Warrior” - “Minotaur” was supposed to logically create the “Dreadnought KR” with the same GK as its predecessors - 234 mm, but with 4-5 BS GK.

            Exactly. And most importantly - with the size of the "Invincible" it would have turned out to be a more balanced ships, and the absence of battleship guns on them would reduce the temptation to use cruisers in battles with battleships. As a result, the resulting type of cruisers would have their own development prospects (like the “Washington” TKRs), but the lines. cruisers after the "Invincible" in any case there was only one fate - to die out with the development of ship EC and "dispersal" of ordinary battleships.
            1. +2
              11 January 2018 13: 23
              Quote: arturpraetor
              Exactly. And most importantly - with the size of the "Invincible" it would have turned out to be a more balanced ships, and the absence of battleship guns on them would reduce the temptation to use cruisers in battles with battleships. As a result, the resulting type of cruisers would have their own development prospects (like the “Washington” TKRs), but the lines. cruisers after the "Invincible" in any case there was only one fate - to die out with the development of ship EC and "dispersal" of ordinary battleships.


              This was investigated and partially found confirmation in 1902.
              Like some theorists of the time, Fisher believed that the ideal armored cruiser would gradually displace armadillos or, more precisely, two classes would merge into one. This opinion could not be shaken even by studies conducted in January 1902 by order of the Admiralty by courses of senior naval officers (English Senior Officers War Course) at the Greenwich Naval College (English Greenwich Naval College).
              The battle between two battleships was considered. The battleship “A” of the classical design had a displacement of 17 tons, a speed of 600 knots, an armor belt of 18–254 mm and armament of four 203 mm, eight 305 mm and twelve 203 mm guns.
              The battleship “B” was smaller, faster by 4 knots and easier to arm and arm - 16 tons, 000 knots, an armor belt of 22 mm and armament of four 152 mm and sixteen 254 mm guns.
              Studies have shown that high speed did not give any tactical advantages, since, despite the possibility of choosing the battle distance, the battleship “A” had advantages at all ranges and was more preferable for linear combat. Only in the case of using three units of “B” against two “A” and firing at a long range, the battleship “B” had advantages due to the greater number of shells produced.

              The "merger" of the battlecruiser with the battleship occurred later - this is a line of high-speed battleships such as Iowa.
              In fact, what you call “overclocking” of battleships is imparting the properties of battlecruisers to battleships — speed.
              But at that time the development of power plants, to ensure greater speed, it was possible only a decrease in security.
              This is not a flaw in the concept - it is an incorrect determination of the appointment of battlecruisers, a linear battle with improper reservation.

              Well, as a class of battlecruisers, Hood showed that there is life after the Invincible, but not long ...
              1. 0
                11 January 2018 20: 32
                Quote: DimerVladimer
                The "merger" of the battlecruiser with the battleship occurred later - this is a line of high-speed battleships such as Iowa.

                Didn’t it all start with Nagato?
                1. 0
                  26 January 2018 10: 48
                  In parallel with the Nagato, the Japanese were building battlecruisers of the Amagi type, so they still adhered to the concept of sharing LK-LKR.
                  It all started, most likely with the “Dunkirk”.
          2. 0
            9 January 2018 19: 29
            Quote: Alexey RA
            If we take the tendency of the development of the EDB and their transition to LK, then it can be seen that King Edward VII and Lord Nelson gave rise to the Dreadnought, which had the same GK, but a larger number of trunks. Similarly, the line “Duke of Edinburgh” - “Warrior” - “Minotaur” was supposed to logically create the “Dreadnought KR” with the same GK as its predecessors - 234 mm, but with 4-5 BS GK.

            Then the Blucher would have been justified, which in terms of its characteristics could well withstand such ships, which, in principle, was designed for it. And so the British outwitted themselves - they built a ship with a critical imbalance in the criterion of "attack-defense", what to defend they are very wasteful in trading from raiders (the very strongest of them were able to cope with loners), and taxpayers will be unhappy with the GK caliber in stock
  5. +4
    9 January 2018 13: 51
    Thank you. Interesting and informative. I will not rush, will there be anything about the cruise battle of the Falkland Islands Spee squadron with the English battle cruisers?
  6. avt
    +3
    9 January 2018 14: 14
    At the same time, the German 210-mm artillery system had rather average characteristics and was not at all a super-powerful wunderwaffe.
    what To the captain, mana. request Actually, the Germans decided qualitatively with a smaller caliber that we and the Angles had a large one. Again, in general, it was a “skirmish” between the prize-winning German from Hoh Zee flotte and a team with a lot of reservists. And tactically the Germans chose the position for battle taking into account the lighting of the time of day correctly. So there weren’t any chance there. nobody is safe from the accident of a successful hit with the consequences. The classics of the genre - ,, Hood "recessed and Savannah" seem, well, like, "Fritz" pierced the tower and artillery shell through and .... flooded it with its own explosion, preventing detonation. Well, on the topic of the article I agree completely, yes. ,, Fischer’s cats are nonsense. Actually, they proved all this in practice in Jutland.
    1. +3
      9 January 2018 19: 19
      Quote: avt
      Actually, the Germans decided qualitatively with a smaller caliber that we and the Angles had a large one. Again, in general, it was a “skirmish” between the prize-winning German from Hoh Zee flotte and a team with a mass of reservists. And tactically, the Germans chose the position for the battle taking into account the lighting of the time correctly

      So the question is not about the chances, but about the quality of the English reservations. It’s clear that Kredok would have been picked up anyway, but the position and the reservists obviously didn’t influence the landmine’s tower and even the fire in the cellar :)))
      Quote: avt
      And no one is safe from the accident of a successful hit with consequences. Classics of the genre - ,, Hood "

      It’s a different case, there’s pure gold shell, but the fact that Scharnhorst’s shell could dive, go below the armored belt and enter directly into the artillery cellar for 5-6 miles (probably somewhere on 5,5) doubtful :)))
    2. +2
      9 January 2018 19: 21
      Quote: avt
      Well, on the topic of the article I agree completely, yes. ,, Fischer’s cats are nonsense. Actually, they proved all this in practice in Jutland.

      Fisher's cats aren’t nonsense - if the opponent is exactly the same in concept cats (sports) from another yard feel But the cats from the Kaiser lawn were fighting and well-fed, so the skin was torn from the Aglitsky specifically, but there were no other cats in the district. request
  7. +3
    9 January 2018 14: 20
    “... the functions of the cruiser are not yet clearly established, but it is believed that, theoretically, they include:
    1) conducting intelligence;
    2) support for smaller reconnaissance cruisers;
    3) an independent service for the protection of trade and the destruction of enemy raiders-cruisers;
    4) urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet;
    5) pursuing the enemy’s retreating line fleet ... putting it, if possible, in a stalemate, focusing fire on lagging ships. "
    So the question arises, where is the notorious statement of LCR in line here?
    1. 0
      9 January 2018 15: 05
      Quote: Kibb
      So the question arises, where is the notorious statement of LCR in line here?


      The idea of ​​operating armored cruisers together with a squadron of armadillos was laid as far back as 1896-1897 when designing armored cruisers of the Kressi type.

      «But it’s also true that within the limits of size and cost, which are not prohibitive, it is now possible to build first-class cruisers with high speed, well-armed and with good reserves of coal, which should have vertical armor of sufficient thickness to provide a margin of buoyancy and stability. Protection against armor-piercing shells from the largest rapid-firing guns and against the penetration of a shell with large explosive charges from larger-caliber guns in battle conditions.

      The main idea underlying the design of these cruisers was that they should be able to take part in the actions of the fleet, and it was important that they act and maneuver together with the battleships so that they do not exceed the last in length
      . ” William Henry White. 1897

      Continuation, I think will be examined in detail in this series of articles.
      1. +2
        9 January 2018 16: 13
        the question was precisely about a specific series of ships.
        they were not built at all for battle in a line and coped brilliantly within their tasks.
        it is not clear what the author considers a "mistake"?
        1. 0
          9 January 2018 16: 36
          Quote: sd68
          the question was precisely about a specific series of ships.
          they were not built at all for battle in a line and coped brilliantly within their tasks.
          it is not clear what the author considers a "mistake"?


          I think we will find out from the following articles.
          1. +4
            9 January 2018 19: 22
            Quote: 27091965i
            I think we will find out from the following articles.

            I think so too:))) hi
            1. 0
              10 January 2018 01: 05
              Excuse me, but did you decide to finish the series about GPV ahead of schedule? Or do both at the same time?
              1. +2
                10 January 2018 17: 41
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                Excuse me, but did you decide to finish the series about GPV ahead of schedule?

                An article on diesel-electric submarines was posted as far back as January 3, but still not on the main one, I almost finished another one on special submarines.
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                Or do both at the same time?

                Three at the same time - battlecruisers, Svetlana and GPV :)))
      2. 0
        9 January 2018 17: 37
        Well., Here it’s still not about LKR. LKR in its pure British form can be considered as Fisher’s expensive fad, but they have never been used in the “line”.
        1. +1
          9 January 2018 18: 22
          Quote: Kibb
          but they were never used in the "line".


          "The idea of ​​the action of armored cruisers in conjunction with a squadron of armadillos"

          Joint actions involve various activities. In publications of that time, combat contact of battle cruisers with the enemy was implied in reconnaissance, pursuit, and periodic encounters with the enemy.
          1. 0
            9 January 2018 20: 48
            I agree, but where is the action in the "line"
            1. +1
              9 January 2018 22: 03
              Quote: Kibb
              I agree, but where is the action in the "line"


              «A type, a cruiser with its advantage in speed of 6 knots compared to battleships and 12 inch guns, “invincibles” is practically suitable to be in line with the fleet in battle, and can be more correctly described as a battleship which, thanks to speed, can catch up practically any warship.»John Arbuthnot Fisher.

              This statement I hope will be enough. Although in the first comment I had in mind when the idea was voiced of using armored cruisers in joint operations with armadillos.
              1. +1
                9 January 2018 22: 14
                The quote is good, but ... Fisher did not command combat formations for 1914.
                Here’s another quote and article: “But it’s all about the fact that the admiral, who has in his fleet an invincible cruiser with 305 mm main caliber artillery, will no doubt decide to put them on the battle line, where their comparatively weak armor protection will be harmful, and high speed will have no value "- practically the LKR sentence that wanders from article to article - but the sentence was handed down to them by the history of development, and not by Fisher’s" phenomenal "ideas
                But somehow no one thought that they had never used it that way.
                1. +2
                  9 January 2018 22: 31
                  Quote: Kibb
                  but they were sentenced by the history of development, and not Fisher’s "phenomenal" ideas


                  You try to look at the construction of battleships and cruisers in a different way. The British received a huge superiority, an attempt to compete with them tried to make only in Germany. The remaining countries were knocked out of the race of supremacy at sea and naturally in the world.
                  1. +1
                    9 January 2018 23: 17
                    So I won’t even argue with that, there’s nothing to be tried and right here
      3. +2
        9 January 2018 18: 20
        Stereotypes - they are so stereotypical: well, a cruiser cannot be larger than a battleship and that’s it! The Germans looked at it easier when creating their LKR ...
    2. 0
      9 January 2018 15: 27
      The fact of the matter is that they were not intended, but set.
      1. 0
        9 January 2018 17: 38
        Give an example - when they were put in line with battleships?
    3. +2
      9 January 2018 19: 21
      It seems to be nowhere, but even in the exercises they did. And intelligence, as shown by the example of Defense, could have ended very badly for certain ships
      1. 0
        9 January 2018 20: 52
        Andrei, I even agree with the title of the article and do not argue - Classic British LKR is an expensive fad, but however, in a real battle in WWI, they were always used exactly as you indicated in the article - the British did not try to replace them with LC.
        1. +1
          9 January 2018 21: 08
          Quote: Kibb
          but however, in a real battle in WWI, they were always used exactly as you indicated in the article - the British did not try to replace them with LC

          Right. But they used them in a squadron battle as scouts, and the RBKR at one time generally allowed it to be used against battleships
          1. 0
            9 January 2018 22: 33
            And they all turned out quite well Beatty played his role, and the losses - well, the war. Somehow, the Japanese still succeeded in using the DBKR against the EDB (yes, “crookedly obliquely” they had to be constantly pulled out from under the EDB, but they won the war)
            1. +2
              10 January 2018 00: 07
              Quote: Kibb
              Beatty played his part, and the losses - well, the war.

              That's just Beatty's role ... hmmm ... however, more on that next time :))))
              Quote: Kibb
              Somehow, the Japanese still used the DBKR against the EDB

              With the shells that we had, the Japanese could have fought on Matsushima
              1. +1
                10 January 2018 10: 55
                Yes, of course, if there were shells for the Asamoids in '07, everything would end up disastrously - under the influence of the experience of the PEC, no one noticed that under the effective fire of the EDB, the Asamoids would simply be smashed, and no cruisers from them
                About Beatty, okay, for now let’s leave - I look forward to continuing good
  8. +3
    9 January 2018 14: 22
    drinks Thanks Andrew for your articles! They may be something and debatable for members of the forum, but they certainly cause interest and lively feedback! Keep it up! good
    1. +1
      9 January 2018 19: 23
      Thanks, hold :)))))
  9. +1
    9 January 2018 15: 26
    Quote: arturpraetor
    there remain numerous fans of such a concept - a thin belt, guns and speed to the maximum, and whatever happens. And most importantly - they believe that this kind of edge

    Admiral Makarov was a fan of similar ships sold by Latin American countries.
    1. +1
      9 January 2018 15: 29
      Quote: kvs207
      Admiral Makarov was a fan of similar ships sold by Latin American countries.

      Which does not honor Admiral Makarov. His theoretical calculations were not supported by practice, and if he had checked them in practice, he would have abandoned his ideas of “Russian Elsviks”.
    2. +3
      9 January 2018 16: 31
      Makarov generally intended to build “armless cruisers” ... The same “cavalryman” as Fisher ... The desperate lieutenant youth on mine boats apparently did not give rest.
  10. +2
    9 January 2018 15: 41
    The Japanese put their armored

    cruisers in a line with 2 battles in the Yellow Sea, but this is from despair when Russian mines near Port Arthur killed Hetsusa and Yashima. From 6 left 4. Just then we lost Petropavlovsk and Admiral Makarov S.O.
    1. +2
      9 January 2018 16: 18
      Quote: ydjin
      The Japanese put their armored cruisers in the same line during 2 battles in the Yellow Sea, but this is from despair when, on Russian mines near Port Arthur, Hetsusa and Yashima were killed.

      Duc ... Japanese DBKR - this is practically an EDB of the 2nd rank. They have the same armored belt only a little thinner than our Borodins.
      Quote: ydjin
      We just then lost Petropavlovsk and Admiral Makarov S.O.

      And for exactly the same reason as 2 Japanese EDBs - stereotyped actions and neglect of the mine threat. First, the Japanese put up a mine can on our GXNUMX, and then there were Alaverdi from Amur on the Japanese traditional route.
      However, if there hadn’t been a mine, Makarov could have lost a pair of missiles that day — when, in pursuit of the departing Japanese missiles, he was with his group right in front of Togo's EDB. During the withdrawal to Port Arthur, the distance from our terminal missiles to the enemy was, EMNIP, only about 50 kbt. But Togo needed Makarov to get into the "eight" - therefore, they pursued ours quite accurately.
      1. +1
        9 January 2018 20: 18
        The Japanese armored cruisers did not have a Harvey armor? Borodino’s Kruppovskaya is much more shell-resistant.
        1. +3
          9 January 2018 21: 08
          EMNIP Harvey was only on Asam and Tokiv, the rest was Krupp.
          1. 0
            9 January 2018 23: 21
            on the first harvey (Asama and Tokiva) on the next pair of krupps, on the German and French also krupp
  11. 0
    9 January 2018 15: 50
    But as far as I read the shells of the Russian Navy artillery the same were, to put it mildly, none, General Brink’s armor-piercing systems with a slow fuse could pierce through the Japanese armadillos and explode above the water, while the Japanese HE mines destroyed such that they even melted the armor of the Russian armadillos!
    1. +5
      9 January 2018 16: 29
      The Internet does a bad job ... it gives information but does not teach to think about it. All that you have brought now is at the same time true and not ...
  12. +4
    9 January 2018 15: 51
    By the way, another point, IMHO battlecruisers is an attempt to create just the "universal ship" - which in general was initially doomed to failure. Too many contradictions need to be combined - as a result, they sacrificed the proportionality of military properties and received that very big broads ... instead of the result. After all, if we consider the battlecruiser as an “anti-cruiser”, the advocate of trade - that was the point ... In the end, the fight against the Raiders did not imply a linear battle ... But in the end, no one began to abandon a couple of dozen heavy guns in line, but the fact that they do not have the required combat stability ... Again - the attempt to "harness" into one cart ... led to a sharp increase in size ... The target was stupidly bigger. In general, in terms of “technical paradoxes”, the British, as always, are “ahead of the rest” - since the economy then allowed such “kunshtyuki” —but this also broke the back of the British camel ...
    1. +1
      9 January 2018 16: 32
      black and white, the author leads, for which the series was created
      1) conducting intelligence;
      2) support for smaller reconnaissance cruisers;
      3) an independent service for the protection of trade and the destruction of enemy raiders-cruisers;
      4) urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet;
      5) pursuing the enemy’s retreating line fleet ... putting it, if possible, in a stalemate, focusing fire on lagging ships. "

      brilliantly coped with these functions
      1. +1
        9 January 2018 17: 54
        Exactly, but at the same time it is worth recognizing that the same Ibls are too much, against two Sharnhorsts, for example, a couple of Minotaurs could well cope with them. But in any case, I do not see more than one battle of the WWII in which the British LKR would be used outside of its concept - and yes, they completely coped.
        1. +1
          9 January 2018 18: 52
          Quote: Kibb
          Exactly, but at the same time it is worth recognizing that the same Ibls are too much, against two Sharnhorsts, for example, a couple of Minotaurs could well cope with them.

          We could. And they could not cope before the dark - and Spee would leave.
          After Coronel, the Limes needed a 146% victory - so they sent an overkill group. And then the “Dresden" managed to leave ... for a while. smile
          1. +1
            9 January 2018 21: 04
            And who said that the battle was supposed to happen exactly as it happened - a couple of Minotaurs are in any case stronger than a pair of "Balls", and even one Defense in the Kredok’s squadron (assuming of course a normal crew) could change the result exactly the opposite.
            Now back to the topic of the article - did LKR justify itself in this case? Let's look at other battles with the participation of British LKR in WWI - they were used strictly according to the concept. Today we know that the German LKR was not a cruiser but a LC, and Beatty should not have known about this (although after Doger Banks it would be worth making conclusions)
  13. +1
    9 January 2018 16: 00
    "Analytics" is late ... about a hundred years with a tail :-)
    The British were wrong, but they did. And the rest at this time sucked a paw.
    1. avt
      +2
      9 January 2018 16: 16
      Quote: metallic
      The British were wrong, but they did. And the rest at this time sucked a paw.

      wassat ,, A girl should learn ... and as they say, "but you can also get rich with your little thought for the amusement of the people.
  14. +2
    9 January 2018 16: 56
    it is not clear why the author speaks of an “error”, which he means. It seems that the series of articles is being announced, but it already shows its attitude from the title of the first article.
    The ships of the series coped well with their functions, which the author listed in the article.
    Yes, in those days, the characteristics of ships changed rapidly, which made adjustments to the realities of use, and even more so no one thought to put these ships in line under the concentrated fire of several large ships of the enemy. how it happened with Invisible in the battle of Jutland.
    It’s possible to say that the Dreadnought is one complete mistake, since it didn’t participate in battles at all, and stood in the second line in the Battle of Jutland because of the obvious pointlessness of pushing it forward.
    1. +4
      9 January 2018 19: 04
      Quote: sd68
      it is not clear why the author speaks of an “error”, which he means.

      We read carefully:
      So, it should be understood that when designing the world's first battlecruiser, the British immediately made two key mistakes:
      First, they simply did not understand that they were creating a ship of a new class and, accordingly, did not formulate tasks for it. In fact, the British were engaged in designing the next armored cruiser and evaluating various variants of the Invincible projects from the standpoint of the tasks assigned to the Royal Navy's armored cruisers.
      Secondly, the tasks for armored cruisers were set incorrectly, because they assumed the use of cruisers intended for combat on communications, not only for their intended purpose, but also as squadrons. In other words, the British completely unreasonably set for the specialized ships the tasks of universal.

      In short, the British designed the "large armored cruiser", which was used in the same way as conventional BrKR. And in their application, the main mistake was that, in conditions of visibility characteristic of the North Sea, large BrKR did not represent the support of scouts, but large targets - the detection range of the main enemy forces corresponded to the effective firing range of the enemy’s "large pots". The shells of which the defense of these KR did not keep from the word at all.
      1. +3
        9 January 2018 20: 01
        You answered better than I could have done. drinks
        1. 0
          10 January 2018 09: 00
          Andrey, I'm sorry, but the answer did not convince.
          We are talking about misuse, not the mistakes of shipbuilders.
          In addition, the ships then quickly grew old, the Dreadnought is an example.
          1. +1
            10 January 2018 10: 50
            Quote: sd68
            We are talking about misuse, not the mistakes of shipbuilders.

            What is the wrong application? LKR was used for enemy reconnaissance, the result ... frustratingly speaking, disappointing
      2. +1
        9 January 2018 21: 07
        Exactly so, they could not stand a long battle in the conditions of the North Sea
      3. +1
        10 January 2018 08: 56
        Sorry, but it was just about what was sometimes used incorrectly.
        And shipbuilders are not at all to blame for this.
        1. +1
          10 January 2018 10: 47
          Quote: sd68
          Sorry, but it was just about what was sometimes used incorrectly.
          And shipbuilders are not at all to blame for this.

          The shipbuilders designed the ship to conduct reconnaissance and cover the operations of the fleet. And it was during these operations that 3 LCR were lost.
          That is, LKR were applied according to the initial concept. And the causes of losses should not be sought in the wrong application, but in the discrepancy of the design with the tasks set.
    2. +2
      9 January 2018 19: 11
      Quote: sd68
      why the author speaks of an “error”, which he means. It seems that the series of articles is being announced, but it already shows its attitude from the title of the first article.

      Interestingly, "Invincible" with "Indefatigable" lying on the bottom of the North Sea, also do not think about the error of explaining them where it does not follow by definition? wink
      Quote: sd68
      The ships of the series coped well with their functions, which the author listed in the article

      Then why put them there, which is not described in the application features? Finishing wounded animals is still understandable, but climbing on the rampage to more serious comrades .... negative
      Quote: sd68
      and even more so, no one planned to put these ships in line under the concentrated fire of several large ships of the enemy. how it happened with Invisible in the battle of Jutland.

      C'mon - the British had plenty of BATTLES with excess to act against the Germans (they didn’t even fit in front of the enemy to shoot). Admiral Hood's highlandering in front of the Scheer’s battleships looks childish - it’s better to engage in the direct execution of one of the functions expected for these LKr - search and finishing of wounded animals and their own kind in concept request

      Quote: sd68
      It’s possible to say that the Dreadnought is one complete mistake, since it didn’t participate in battles at all, and stood in the second line in the Battle of Jutland because of the obvious senselessness of pushing it forward

      The “Dreadnought” didn’t reach Yutland for other reasons, and its followers in the form of “Bellerophonts” and “Saint Vincent” took part in that battle, but due to the lack of space in front of the enemy they almost never had a chance to shoot, but this does not mean that that the British considered them second-class ships hi
      1. +1
        10 January 2018 08: 58
        I’m just writing about the fact that it’s not about the mistake of shipbuilders, but about the error of use, and also about the fact that then ships morally aged quickly- Dreadnought
      2. 0
        10 January 2018 10: 48
        Quote: Rurikovich
        Then why put them there, which is not described in the application features?

        Heh heh heh ... the ambush is that all LCR were lost when applied according to the tasks originally set for them - paragraphs 1, 2 and 4.
        1. 0
          11 January 2018 21: 11
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Heh heh heh ... the ambush is that all LCR were lost when applied according to the tasks originally set for them - paragraphs 1, 2 and 4.

          here how to interpret wink
          “Indefatigable” and “Mashulya” did not cover the light forces at all, but got involved in a fight in advance, using numerical superiority with their own kind (only those had better combat stability), and why did the trio of brothers led by “Invincible” climbed to battleships in the midst (after all, the battle was already underway) according to paragraph 4, probably one late Hood knows. It is clear that to cover at the moment of deployment from, let’s say attacks of light forces or to disorient the opponent BUT with your fire! The battle was already on and there was nothing to cover wink
          The only thing I can agree on is poor visibility. For as soon as the sun appeared for a minute, this kitten of Admiral Fisher also fell under the shells of more balanced Kaiser real battlecruisers, which could really fight in line and carry out reconnaissance in battle and support their main forces feel
          1. 0
            12 January 2018 15: 32
            Quote: Rurikovich
            “Indefatigable” and “Mashulya” did not cover the light forces at all, but got involved in a fight in advance, using numerical superiority with their own kind (only for those, the combat stability turned out to be higher)

            This couple performed item 1 and item 4. In the course of which they were confronted with a classically similar adversary who carried out the same points. smile
            1. +1
              13 January 2018 16: 16
              Quote: Alexey RA
              In the course of which they were confronted with a classically similar adversary who carried out the same points.

              Only this enemy turned out to be better designed and built, proving this withstanding heavier shells and sending his vis-à-vis hi
              Therefore, assigning certain functions to ships, you need to make them capable of performing these functions smile
              1. 0
                15 January 2018 19: 49
                Quote: Rurikovich
                Therefore, assigning certain functions to ships, you need to make them capable of performing these functions

                About which, in fact, the author of the article writes to us: since we have set tasks 1, 2, 4 and 5 before the LCR, please be kind enough to provide a constructive opportunity to perform these tasks on the main Royal Navy theater. smile
                It would be foolish to hope that the enemy would continue to build the DBKR. Or that the LCR during the performance of 4 out of 5 tasks will not have at least short-term fire contact with the main forces of the enemy fleet: under the weather conditions of the North Sea, suddenly fly to someone else's “line” - just spit.
    3. +3
      10 January 2018 18: 21
      "it is not clear why the author speaks of an" error ", which he means." /////

      The article shows how difficult it is to guess the right new direction.
      Is it a caliber? (and range), or armor ?, or speed? What is more important?
      But if you don’t experiment, you won’t get anything at all.
      (For this reason, attacks on Zumvolt are ridiculous. This is the same Invincible of our
      time. Until you build and start to apply correctly - do not understand the effectiveness)
      1. 0
        10 January 2018 22: 39
        Bad comparison. What was the "new" Invincible? If you can even find “innovations” with Zumwalt, then in the “cats” they weren’t in principle ... There was a cruiser inflated to the size of insanity, in which all other parameters were sacrificed to speed. Anyone could have guessed that “the plane will not fly”. And only Fisher with his irrepressible energy could push through such a crazy project.
        1. +2
          11 January 2018 13: 03
          Easy to judge in a hundred years. recourse
          Invisible "laid" a whole new class of ships: battlecruisers
          Principle: shoot from afar with long-range 305 mm guns,
          but do not go on rapprochement with the enemy in any case.
          When this was done, they won; when it was not, they lost.
          1. +1
            11 January 2018 13: 26
            What kind of mess in your head ... What is this new concept? Relatively speaking, it has always been a priority - to impose on the enemy a battle distance that is advantageous to you. Here only one problem is drawn ... it is necessary not just to shoot but to hit and not only to hit but also to inflict "sufficient damage" to the enemy. Those. need a balance of fighting qualities. And the “invincibles” turned out to be completely unbalanced - and as a result, they became “famous” mainly for the losses and the practical failure to perform a single real combat mission. Well, do not consider such a battle against the obviously weakest enemy of the Falklands.
            1. 0
              11 January 2018 13: 59
              "What kind of porridge you have in your head" ///

              ...in terms of? "Invincible" - did not lead a new class of warships.
              With powerful art, but weak armor?
              You, as I understand it, do not like this class. You are for balance.
              (To the detriment of speed, of course).
              A legitimate point of view, but not everyone agrees with it.
              1. 0
                11 January 2018 16: 40
                Well then, you need to write Japanese Matsushima in the most innovative ships ... Why not the founder of a new class in your terminology?
                1. 0
                  11 January 2018 16: 50
                  That, probably, that the main caliber only at the stern did not take root somehow. smile
                  But the battlecruisers - yes. The Germans built them better than the British.
                  But the idea itself took root.
                  A balanced weapon is not always better. Sometimes long-range taxis
                  without any protection.
                  1. +1
                    11 January 2018 17: 17
                    Only on condition that the advantage is "overwhelming" - and alas, it was not and could not be. That is why, as a class, battlecruisers lived very briefly and for the most part were unhappy. Well, there is no prodigy ...
                    1. +3
                      12 January 2018 09: 51
                      In the 20th century, the generational change of ships of the 1st class generally occurred rapidly. Just measured by caliber guns and suddenly - oops! - funny biplanes arrive from a primitive aircraft carrier with a torpedo under the fuselage. And all calibers and armored decks become a secondary factor. And most importantly: machine guns and anti-aircraft guns to bring down these aircraft.
                      And after 20 years, this is not enough. You must have your own aircraft carrier in order to attack enemy aircraft. Further worse. RCC. Falklands. Etc.
                      Which ships are effective today? The riddle. But after 100 years, it will become clear. drinks
  15. +2
    9 January 2018 17: 00
    The British made their mistakes, the Germans of their own. Both of them were hard hit by these mistakes.
  16. +2
    9 January 2018 18: 52
    This cruiser was designed as a fighter for trade and an escort of trade caravans .. In this role, he had to use his high speed and long-range heavy weapons with impunity to sink enemy merchant ships and light escort ships from great distances from which he would be out of reach for their guns. ..During the battle with the cruising squadron of Admiral Spee, these British cruisers fully confirmed their purpose, defeating the Germans with their 305 mm cannons from a distance unavailable to their 210 mm guns ... During the Battle of Jutland, these cruisers were thrown into battle against the equally armed German cruisers, superior to the British in booking, which led to the logical ending ...
    1. +1
      9 January 2018 21: 51
      Quote: Nemesis
      In this role, he had to use his high speed and long-range heavy weapons with impunity to sink the enemy’s merchant ships and light escort ships from long distances from which he would be out of reach of their guns.

      For these purposes, a couple of “Korejigs” are even whiter - 32 knots (no one will leave at all) with 15 “sledgehammers (rivals are also not expected lol )
      Quote: Nemesis
      from a distance unattainable for their 210 mm guns ...

      The Germans hit the “Invincible” with 22 rounds and three in the “Inflexible”. It’s another matter that all the hits were at almost maximum range for 210mm guns, so they passed without penetrating both the vertical and horizontal armor of the LCR. Well, 305mm in the quantities that the Germans received is an argument for BrKr. Because this is the result
      1. 0
        9 January 2018 22: 17
        According to the British Encyclopedia ,, Great Oceans '' (Dreadnought) author David Howard page 83-84 German 210 mm shells from Gneisenau and Scharnhorst simply did not reach the target ... At 16 hours 15 minutes , after 3,5 hours of unequal battle, the flagship cruiser Admiral Spee capsized and sank. At 17 hours and 40 minutes, he shot the entire ammunition, Gneisenau, which lost 600 people from 850 during the battle, on the orders of his commander, opened kingstones and lowered the flag ....
        1. +2
          9 January 2018 22: 45
          And VB Muzhennikov in the monograph on the series "Invincible" gives 22 hits, of which the first were already at 13.45. 12 hits 210mm, 6 - 150mm, 4 - not installed. Of these, 11 shells in the upper deck, 6 in the armor belt without breaking through, the rest in the superstructure. The battle was fought on average from 60 to 70 kbt. At this distance, German shells for 152mm armor were no longer effective. Heavier 305mm British shells pierced the armor of the decks and roofs of the towers of the German BrKr, while there were no explosions of ammunition.
          These data are given in many publications and monologues. Denied only by the British wink
          Although the same Wilson in his book "Battleships in the battle of 1914-18." The 1938 edition cites the same data on getting into Invincible Yes hi
          1. +2
            9 January 2018 23: 02
            At the time of the battle, SUAO in LKR were not yet finally mounted, which led to a huge expenditure of shells at those battle distances for the British.
            Three shells hit Inflexible, damaging the 102mm guns on the towers and injuring several people.
            Max. firing range 305/45 guns LKr 15km (82kbt), German 210mm / 40 - average about 81-82 kbt (the same 15 km), 150mm / 40 13,5 km (73 kbt)
            As you can see, they both got each other. The moral is that the heavier shells of the British (385kg) were more effective German 210 mm (108kg) The result is logical hi
            1. 0
              10 January 2018 02: 57
              British deck armor 20-65 mm, according to Wikipedia. According to some sources, it’s even thinner ... Such armor could not protect at any distance ... According to Howard's encyclopedia, more than 50 305 mm shells hit only Gneisenau, he miraculously stayed afloat, losing 2/3 of the team and completely having lost the course. The death of the cruiser was accelerated by Captain Merker, who ordered the Kingstones to be opened after the Germans shot all the ammunition ..
              1. 0
                10 January 2018 21: 21
                Quote: Nemesis
                According to the Howard Encyclopedia, more than 50mm shells hit only Gneisenau

                According to all other data, 30 shells hit Gneisenau and 40 rounds to Scharnhorst (flagship - he got more)
                So your Howard is crazy with the number of hits in the enemy (embellished) and with the number of hits in its own (reduced to zero) wink
                Morality - in order to draw objective conclusions about anything, you need to study several sources and analyze them, and not believe one hi
                1. +1
                  14 January 2018 08: 50
                  Well, the Howard Encyclopedia is British .... Who better to know how many shells hit the British ships than the British ... And the British write that - German shells simply did not reach, because of the great distance
  17. +2
    9 January 2018 18: 56
    With the past, Andrew! drinks hi
    Interestingly, several cycles at once fellow - haven’t finished yet about “Svetlana”, but already quite interesting material about the plot about very extraordinary and controversial “invincibles” smile
    The train of thought is clear to me again. I don’t want to turn back the cycle of O. Parks’ books “Battleships of the British Empire”, because they show parallel lines of development of the British armored cruisers (more likely to complement it, because the Britons really linked BrKr’s actions with the EDB). Therefore, I will speak in my own words, as my own opinion. But first, a plus for the last two paragraphs. In order to know what you get, you first need to decide what you want. Here I completely agree with you!
    The British were simply entangled in three pines. They did not decide what was primary for a particular ship, and what was secondary. Examples of recent battles erroneously led to the fact that they decided to focus on some characteristics to the detriment of others within the limits of displacement. Blurry tasks, their wide range for a specific type of ship and the desire to really get everything at once - that’s what turned out to be Invincible. Typically, there is an example of a more balanced decision to put the cruiser in line at that time - the Japanese Tsukuba! The same Asama in speed and armor, but due to an increase in displacement, the replacement of 203mm guns by 305mm and an increase in the power of the CMU to maintain 20-21uz speed. The Japanese decided that the 178mm was holding 12 ”shells (an example of a RED) and created ships capable of solving tactical tasks together with the EDB. But they held the shell of the Russian battleships, the shells of the first dreadnoughts were much more powerful. So the British bought these assumptions and left 152mm of armor, like the previous BrKr, created cruisers, which, thanks to the GK
    had to perform squadron functions with real cruising characteristics. But the fact is that the Tsukubas actually had a displacement of the Mikasa, that is, they were comparable to their modern battleships. As a result, they got a little more speed due to slightly less armor. Which is not critical in this case. The English simply increased the imbalance in the characteristics and at almost the same displacement as the “dreadnought” wanted even greater speed, which resulted in power (and therefore the weight of the control unit), gobbling up the weight of the reservation. So it turned out what you said in the fourth paragraph in the back.
    So, I think that the erroneous conclusions played after the analysis of the actions of BrKr with the EBR in recent wars, especially the RNW, played a significant role in the error of creating “invinsibles”. And the concept has paid off if you meet peers, where the bias in performance has had a positive effect (the sinking of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Falkland). 22 - 210 mm shells almost did not bring damage, but mistakenly convinced that these ships because of the guns can be put in line against the same ships. This imbalance came out sideways, because in a real battle with real rivals, in addition to the attack, real protection is also needed. request...
    1. +3
      9 January 2018 20: 00
      Greetings, dear Rurikovich!
      You are right in many respects, and, of course, our points of view are very similar in many respects. But there are some nuances, however, I will not anticipate events!
      1. +1
        9 January 2018 20: 05
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But there are some nuances, however, I will not anticipate events!

        Well - recourse ...Will wait Yes smile hi
      2. +2
        10 January 2018 20: 00
        With all respect, Andrew! "Rurikovich was the first", well, so Melnikov called the book ... laughing and yes, I’m also looking forward to continuing about Svetlana. By the way, why didn’t the data on Thunderbolt appear in the seed of the article? All the same, we were a pretty irritant for them. Well, the conclusions here, it seems, are quite obvious: the imbalance of characteristics, and further, the application without taking them into account, is a separate word for Fisher ... But I am happy to wait for all the material to compare my opinion with your resume.
        1. +1
          10 January 2018 21: 15
          Quote: volodimer
          "Rurikovich was the first", well, so Melnikov called the book ...

          Greetings! hi
          It stands on a shelf, only without ".... ovich", next to Polenovskaya "Aurora" and Melnikovsky "Ochakov" wink
          Quote: volodimer
          By the way, why didn’t the data on Thunderbolt appear in the seed of the article?

          This handsome ship is not even in the hypothetical versions of the appearance of the "Invincibles" (unlike the Asama), therefore there is no place for him in this debate feel
          Quote: volodimer
          But I am happy to wait for all the material to compare my opinion with your resume.

          The namesake painfully writes well fellow , it’s interesting to read it, and sometimes you discover new facts, and a person is open to dialogue and criticism (with praise). There are few such authors winked Therefore, his articles are in expectations with a high rating Yes
          Quote: volodimer
          Well, the conclusions here, it seems, are quite obvious: an imbalance of characteristics, and further, application without taking into account such, a separate word Fisher ...

          After reviewing all the material, we will judge wink drinks hi
          1. +2
            11 January 2018 16: 59
            Good books, "Rurik was the first" came across to me at the same time as "Tsushima", it was a strong impression, I almost went to shipbuilding, but in the end sonar. I remembered the Stormbreaker, since the author mentioned the Pennsylvania type brkr and the Prince Adalbert and York cruisers, he looks good in this series.
            In general, we are waiting! drinks
    2. +1
      9 January 2018 20: 21
      Rather, the Tsukuba is the only example of a balanced decision to put a cruiser in line.
      Cruisers of the Asama type met this criterion only by reservation. The armament is extremely insufficient to counter the squadron battleships of the same age. And the real speed from 15 to 17 knots is even less than that of armadillos - peers. An unsuccessful project, which was just very lucky. And the Tsukuba is not even a cruiser, but rather a high-speed squadron battleship. The first, and almost the only representative of the nascent class. The nascent ... but, having gained death on takeoff. Due to the appearance of dreadnoughts. Although, the trend here was similar: to get real (not on paper) high speed, with equivalent armor and weapons, it is necessary to increase displacement.
      1. +2
        9 January 2018 21: 35
        Quote: ignoto
        And the real speed from 15 to 17 knots is even less than that of armadillos - peers.

        Come on! belay The combat speed is always different from the test speed down. Yes, and ships enter the war with different "years of run", and therefore the wear and tear of vehicles, fouling of the bottom, poor quality fuel, the experience (inexperience) of a team with mechanics, etc. But if you are such a specific critic, is it not better to turn to documents, in order to know the real speed of a ship (objectively or subjectively - from the circumstances of achieving that speed)
        According to the documents, Japanese AsKam-type BrKr during the battle with VOKr had a speed no lower than Russian cruisers (15-17uz), during Tsushima the same cruisers Kamimura operated with 16-18 knots during separate operations. Moreover, according to the passport, the slowest Yakumo and Azuma are capable of 20 knots. To say that the real speed of the EDB, which is 2-3 knots lower in the passport than the Brkr speed in the passport, is very short-sighted. From your words you may get the impression that the combat speed of the cruisers is less than the passport speeds of the battleships. But the fighting speed of the battleships can also be slightly less than the passport wink
        Quote: ignoto
        An unsuccessful project, which was just very lucky.

        It is a successful project for the conditions in which they had to fight. Moderately booked against enemy cruisers and moderately faster for enemy armadillos in real combat conditions. And the fact that they have successfully shown themselves in the line are questions to the enemy Yes
        Quote: ignoto
        And the Tsukuba is not even a cruiser, but rather a high-speed squadron battleship.

        It is precisely that, according to all classifications, the Tsukuba is an armored cruiser, which fully fit the concept of the Japanese fleet in the wake of success in the REV
        Quote: ignoto
        to get real (not on paper) high speed, with equivalent armor and weapons, it is necessary to increase displacement.

        So EVERYTHING rests on the displacement! As you can’t tell about the characteristics, it all depends on the displacement. If you limit the displacement, you get an imbalance in the characteristics and you have to rack your brains over what to sacrifice or how to use this creation later on. If you want power and spit on restrictions - hello to the economy and technology (how much and when it will be able to give your desires, and what the price will be). That's all Yes So if you put a limit in, for example, 15000 tons, then you decide which ship you want in these restrictions and for what purposes hi
        1. +1
          13 January 2018 15: 07
          The impression you get is correct: the real Asam speeds are not higher, or even lower than the real speeds of the armadillos they currently use.
          Therefore, the project is unsuccessful. And how can he be successful. Displacement is limited. And the armor is in excess. The armament against the ships of the line is weak. Total imbalance. And the masses under the normal CMU no longer exist. The CMU was lightweight (the Italians were remembered with their “record holders"), and the contours were not fast, not cruising, but armored. Where does the speed come from? According to the speed characteristics, Asamas can be divided into two groups: in the first group - "English", in the second - "French" and "German". Oddly enough, the first pair with fire tube boilers was not inferior in speed to the pair with water tube-confident 17 knots.
          The British, only in the memoirs, are the first and best of all: in real life with the water-pipe they are tormented like everyone else. Yakumo confidently walked at 16 knots, so in the Yellow Sea acted separately. “Azuma” was not lucky most of all: poor assembly of mechanisms, total: 15 knots.
          Analyze the actions of Asam in the REV
          1. Chemulpo. Rudnev was no commander. He wasn’t going to break through. Wouldn’t there be Asama, that the Varangian would have escaped? Yes, you drive.
          2. The battle against the wok. The real speed of the Rurik is 15 knots. As soon as he was left, and the Japanese fell behind. And how can they keep up: Three cruisers (Azuma with its 15 knots no longer count) against two. More guns, but real fire performance? 6 "shells for the Japanese are heavy, cellars are not optimal. And 8" shells? Yes, and not the fact that 17 knots for Russians is the limit.
          3. In the Yellow Sea, Yakumo could not stop Askold. Neither speed nor fire performance.
          4. In Tsushima, the Asam reservation system has finally been tested. I could not stand it.
          The first couple was dressed in a completely substandard "harvey". 10 "shells from the" obsolete "BWO disabled the most" Asam. "More, I didn’t have to check the booking system: Kamimura didn’t go under fire, but finishing off ... and the Monmouth was finished off with an armored cruiser with 4" artillery.
          Bad project. Two or three battleships, even of the Fuji type, would have been much more useful.
          For a possible example: a squadron of Kamimura from one "Fuji" and two "Italians". The same real 15 knots, and plus a 12 "caliber.
          1. +1
            13 January 2018 18: 56
            Quote: ignoto
            "Yakumo" confidently walked at 16 knots, so in the Yellow Sea acted separately

            “Yakumo” went separately under Arthur due to the fact that the four BrKr guarded the wok, here to give weight to cruisers of the 2nd rank of weight due to their weakness before the Russian cruisers (“Askold”, “Diana”, “Pallas”, “Ba
            yang ") in case the latter left to operate with Arthur. And in the battle at Cape Shantung," Yakumo "acted in the same unit as" Chitose "," Kasagi "," Takasago ", and the same" Asama "created weight in general" Suma " , “Akashi” with “Akitsushima” and “Itsukushima.” In the same battle with Chemulpo, the same “Asama” was also given to level the six-inch “Varyag.” So that these ships alone could influence the situation on the battlefield wink
            Quote: ignoto
            Chemulpo. No commander Rudnev. He was not going to break through

            But the Japanese didn’t know this. wink
            Quote: ignoto
            Fight against wok. The real speed of the Rurik is 15 knots. As soon as he was left, and the Japanese fell behind. And how can they keep up: Three cruisers (Azuma with its 15 knots no longer count) against two. More guns, but real fire performance? 6 "shells for the Japanese are heavy, cellars are not optimal. And 8" shells? Yes, and not the fact that 17 knots for Russians is the limit.

            Stop playing data at your discretion negative ! The Japanese kept the speed necessary for the battle with the wok and they (speed) were no less than Russian winked
            Quote: ignoto
            In the Yellow Sea, Yakumo could not stop Askold. Neither speed nor fire performance.

            And he had it, if Askold went in the opposite direction and contact time was limited?
            Quote: ignoto
            In Tsushima, the Asam reservation system has finally been tested. I could not stand it.

            How many "Asam" drowned during Tsushima? belay
    3. +1
      10 January 2018 09: 10
      Quote: Rurikovich
      . The English simply increased the imbalance in the characteristics and at almost the same displacement as the "dreadnought" wanted even greater speed, which resulted in power (and therefore weight CTU), gobbling up the weight of the reservation.


      The reason for installing 12 inch guns D. Fisher described in his memoirs.
      1. 0
        10 January 2018 21: 03
        Quote: 27091965i
        The reason for installing 12 inch guns D. Fisher described in his memoirs.

        God be with them, with guns. request here already everyone, including the author, recognized the mismatch of offensive qualities as defensive. The ship is simply unbalanced in characteristics and that's all ... request hi
        1. +1
          10 January 2018 21: 55
          Quote: Rurikovich
          God be with them, with guns.


          Sometimes, knowing the reasons that prompted you to make this or that decision, means more than a description of the design of the ship.
          In my opinion, the author writes articles on 5+, someone can agree with me, someone not. hi
          1. +1
            10 January 2018 22: 31
            Quote: 27091965i
            In my opinion, the author writes articles on 5+, someone can agree with me, someone not

            I always claimed wink
            Quote: 27091965i
            Sometimes, knowing the reasons that prompted you to make this or that decision, means more than a description of the design of the ship.

            I do not argue, there is always a reason and a consequence. The author touched on the topic of ambiguous ships in an attempt to get to the truth. Here in the end we will examine his opinion and see if it is consistent with historical documents, conjectures and statements of forum users and explanations of participants in those events request
            For me, the so-called “invincibles” are hypertrophied unbalanced armored cruisers hi
  18. +4
    9 January 2018 19: 39
    “Firstly, they simply did not understand that they were creating a ship of a new class and, accordingly, did not formulate the tasks for it. In fact, the British were engaged in designing another armored cruiser and evaluated various versions of Invincible projects from the perspective of the tasks posed to armored ships Royal Navy cruisers.
    Secondly, the tasks for armored cruisers were set incorrectly, because they assumed the use of cruisers designed to fight on communications, not only for their intended purpose, but also as squadrons. In other words, the British completely unreasonably posed universal tasks for specialized ships. "

    Honestly, I have never seen anywhere in the literature that Invincibles were supposed to be used as squadrons. Absolutely. If we proceed from compliance with the tasks for which the ship was designed, that is, reconnaissance in battle, support of light forces, destruction of raiders, pursuit and encirclement of the retreating enemy, then it fully corresponded to them. All these tasks were supposed to be carried out without entering the enemy artillery reach zone. That is, cruisers were created as armored and at the time of creation they were superior to classmates by head. And the fact that their practical application did not correspond to their design purpose is a question for the admiral, and not for the creators of the ships. There are many examples in the history of wars when military equipment, for one reason or another, is assigned tasks unusual for it. Nothing good, as a rule, does not end there.
    1. +2
      9 January 2018 19: 52
      Quote: Curious
      And the fact that their practical application did not correspond to their design purpose is a question for the admiral, and not for the creators of the ships

      So this is the problem. While the ship is being built, the tastes of the admirals are changing. Then, upon receipt of the goods have to justify their requests. And all right, if there is a modernization stock of the project and the time to correct it. And if there was no such moment? So they threw Fisher's “cats” against more protected classmates, receiving lessons for admirals along the way, surprising them with the fact that “something was wrong with our ships” .... Although in fact it was wrong with the admirals
      Quote: Curious
      There are many examples in the history of wars when military equipment, for one reason or another, is assigned tasks unusual for it. Nothing good, as a rule, does not end there.
    2. +2
      9 January 2018 19: 57
      Quote: Curious
      Honestly, I have never seen anywhere in the literature that Invincibles were supposed to be used as squadrons.

      In this case, we are talking about service at the squadron - neither the DBKR nor the Invincibles met these tasks. It was impossible to trust them and intelligence
      Quote: Curious
      And the fact that their practical application did not match their design purpose is a question for the admiral, and not for the creators of the ships.

      You are right, but you do not take into account that admirals gave TK just ...
      1. +1
        9 January 2018 21: 24
        "In this case, we are talking about service at the squadron - neither the DBKR nor the Invincibles met these tasks. They could not be trusted with intelligence either."
        Why is this all of a sudden? Why suddenly the same Cressi could not conduct reconnaissance at the time of his entry into operation, not to mention the fact that they could successfully carry out any other tasks. And probably it’s not worth interfering with the BRKR and LKR - let’s nevertheless let “flies separately from cutlets” wink
        1. +1
          9 January 2018 21: 48
          Quote: Kibb
          Why is this all of a sudden?

          Defense, Invincible
          1. +1
            9 January 2018 22: 56
            Defense ship of the past era - what other result can be expected under the fire of a dreadnought squadron? Invisible, like other British LCRs, did not explode at all due to lack of reservation - if you remember, heavier British guns calmly pierced thicker German armor.
            The question was different: why is it that the standard British BRKr cannot perform intelligence functions if they are opposed by standard German EDBs and completely incomprehensible German BRKr, at the time of entry into operation, and not on May 31, 1916?
            1. +3
              9 January 2018 23: 06
              Quote: Kibb
              Defense ship of the past era - what other result can be expected under the fire of a dreadnought squadron?

              Put the 4 squadron in its place. The result is the same
              Quote: Kibb
              Invisible, like other British LCRs, didn’t explode at all due to lack of reservation -

              Including because of him. The fact is that if he had German gunpowder in the cellars, then yes, it might not have exploded, but if he had adequate armor, the shell would simply not have reached the cellars
              Quote: Kibb
              if you remember, the heavier British guns calmly pierced the thicker German armor.

              250 mm - limit, pierced 381-mm shell.
              Quote: Kibb
              The question was different: why is it that the standard British BRKr cannot perform intelligence functions if they are opposed by standard German EDB

              Because visibility in the North Sea is disgusting. In Jutland, at the time of the invincible’s death, in some areas visibility was up to five miles, in others even less (it was not uniform). And the discovery of an EBR squadron five miles would end for the British DBKR as well as for Arbuthnot
              1. +1
                10 January 2018 09: 47
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Put the 4 squadron in its place. The result is the same

                Not sure
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Including because of him. The fact is that if he had German gunpowder in the cellars, then yes, it might not have exploded, but if he had adequate armor, the shell would simply not have reached the cellars

                And the shell didn’t even reach the cellars - at least this is true for Indefetigebela (damn it without a hundred grams even smile) and Invincible, with CM more difficult. The projectile hit the tower before the cellars reached fire, not the projectile
                But the German towers also burned with enviable constancy, but the cellars stubbornly did not explode
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                250 mm - limit, pierced 381-mm shell.

                And no matter, the German towers didn’t burn due to careless handling of fire

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And the discovery of an EBR squadron five miles would end for the British DBKR as well as for Arbuthnot

                As I already wrote, I’m not sure, but if so, then such a meeting would end equally badly for any BRKr
                It’s easier for the Germans - they have all their interests reduced to the North Sea and the Baltic, British ships are not allowed such luxury. Although, in my opinion, the British were somewhat deceitful - at first they built Cressy, and only then they came up with tasks for them - trade advocates, but in which case they will also be scouts
                1. +2
                  10 January 2018 10: 48
                  Quote: Kibb
                  Not sure

                  What is the cause of uncertainty?
                  Quote: Kibb
                  The projectile hit the tower before the cellars reached fire, not the projectile

                  Absolutely not a fact. The opposite follows from descriptions of observers
                  1. 0
                    10 January 2018 12: 05
                    Four even the last German EDB Deutschland, can even withstand even two older Borodinians (with normal shells and even without Geisler for 10 years). With visibility in the North Sea, everything is clear and understandable, but only in a real battle it may not be lucky. Among other things, what kind of 50 cable ones can we talk about before the REV, 30 is already considered a prohibitive distance
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Absolutely not a fact. The opposite follows from descriptions of observers

                    From the described observations, the hits were in the roof of the tower
                    Although there were other Doger Bank:
                    “The first missile hit had a terrible effect. Having pierced the upper deck in the stern and the fixed armor of the tower, he exploded inside it. The officer’s cabins, the crew room, and all the compartments located nearby were blown to smithereens. In the reloading compartment, a prepared half-charge caught fire. The fire went up into the tower and down into the cellar, and new charges ignited here and there. The calculation of the cellar tried to escape through the door to the working compartment of the neighboring tower, but as a result the charges caught fire and in it, the flash burst into the tower in the same way. As a result, the calculations of two towers were destroyed in one hit. Tongues of flame above the stern towers rose to great heights. " This is a hit by Laeyon
                    to Seydlitz with 17500 yards - as you can see the shell is not 15 ", and the consequences are deplorable
                    1. 0
                      10 January 2018 21: 18
                      And somehow I did not immediately notice, but still
                      “But, judging by the available descriptions, the following happened: the first volley of German 305-mm guns from a distance of 40 kb hit the weakly armored stern and a strong flame rose above the ship. The next salvo hit the bow, causing the cruiser to explode. it is likely that the first hits led to the ignition in the aft cellar, and the second volley to the explosion of the bow cellars of the bow.Of course, we can say that the armored cruisers of Arbuthnot were hit by the latest heavy German ships, and that was what predetermined their fate. in that, if they were in their place the old Kaiser armadillos with their 280-mm guns, the result would be the same. "
                      But the problem is that when Defense was discovered at the bottom, it suddenly turned out that he just got in a short time more than he could withstand and not exploded. And the old Kaiser armadillos with 28cm have a projectile of 240 kg versus 300 kg for 28cm for dreadnoughts and 400 kg for 30.5cm - the difference is huge, but if you add to this the number of trunks ... request wink
                      1. +1
                        10 January 2018 22: 47
                        Quote: Kibb
                        But the problem is that when Defense was discovered at the bottom, it suddenly turned out that he just got in a short time more than he could withstand and not exploded.

                        I have never heard of this. Are you sure you found "Defense", not Warrior :)
      2. +2
        9 January 2018 21: 55
        At the time of commissioning, the Invincibles were classified as armored cruisers, which they were. The battle with the speeder Spee shows how far superior they were to their classmates - peers. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sunk with almost no loss.
        At the beginning of the 1906th century, progress in the field of naval weapons developed at such a speed that ships sometimes sometimes became obsolete on a slipway. Launched in XNUMX, the "Dreadnought" and caused a revolution in shipbuilding in front of the Queen Elizabeth, built six years later, had no chance.
        And reclassified in 1911 from armored to battle cruisers, the Invincibles against the next generation were also weak. This is an objective reality.
  19. +1
    9 January 2018 21: 22
    Why is the mistake ?! Just cruisers need to be able to use ...
    1. +2
      9 January 2018 21: 48
      Yes, I wrote it :)))) True, not all errors, only the very first
  20. 0
    9 January 2018 23: 20
    Excessive versatility is always fraught with .... It is always necessary to sacrifice something, even with the modern development of technology, and even more so in those days, although it always seems that at this time the weapons are the best.
  21. +2
    10 January 2018 03: 05
    I haven’t found any links to sources used by the author. In the book by Fetter A.Yu. “British Royal Navy battlecruisers of the“ Invincible ”type
    Published on the initiative of the St. Petersburg Fleet History Fans Section
    Saint Petersburg 1996,
    I found the initial ideas and prerequisites for creating the creation of such cruisers.
    “After the 90s of the XIX century, the size of the armored cruiser increased, and its artillery weapons grew so much that in this respect it exceeded many linear Ships of the 2nd and 3rd class. The British fleet in particular built a number of such large cruisers, and each type of battleship corresponded to the type of armored cruiser. “Minotaur”, for example, had many common features with “Lord Nelson.” Therefore, it is quite natural that in the beginning of 1902, when, as a result of cooperation between Admiral Fisher and engineer Gard they created a project for a battleship armed only with large-caliber guns (the Untakeable project), they also put forward a plan for creating a large cruiser (the Unapproachable project), which should be built in parallel with the battleship, although at that time the British Navy hadn’t proposed the Project cruiser, armed with guns of only large caliber (since such an issue has never been put on the agenda), “ Unapproachable ”had many things in common with a battleship, differing from it in armor and speed .....
    At this time, the requirements for a large British armored cruiser were formulated as follows:

    1. Speed ​​far exceeding the speed of any existing foreign armored cruiser.

    2. Artillery of the main caliber in the bow and stern, consisting of 254 mm. guns as the most large-sized manually operated, and auxiliary caliber, consisting of 190 mm. guns as the most large-caliber rapid-fire.

    3. Artillery should be positioned so as to provide maximum angles of fire when the maximum possible fire is required in the bow and stern and evenly distributed fire at all other points of the horizon.

    4. Charging and shell cellars should be located under all guns so as to get rid of the corridors for the supply of ammunition and do without a large number of people involved in the transfer of ammunition.

    5. The protection of all guns must withstand the shelling of 203 mm. melinite shells.

    6. Each gun should have its own observation cap, rangefinder and protection for the senior officer.

    7. Highly recommended use of a turbine power plant.

    8. Oil heating boilers.

    9. Reduced to a minimum Add-in with bridges, and all bridges should be removed, with the exception of a light bridge similar to “Renown”.
    10. Telescopic chimneys.
    11. Lack of masts or combat mars - only a mast rack for the radio. There is no need for masts and yards for signaling.

    12. Cargo cranes with motor drive instead of hydraulic cargo booms.

    13. Lightweight steel boats with stamped lining. The maximum possible number of large Berton boats (Berthon), placed under the armored deck.

    14. The complete absence of wood.

    15. Rodless anchors.

    The dimensions of the ship should have been determined on the basis of these requirements. It was noted that if there will be an opportunity to place cars, boilers and other equipment of the power plant in the stern .... "
    1. +1
      10 January 2018 10: 44
      You were a little mistaken, because the requirements you cited did not apply to the Invincibles, but to the cruiser, which eventually became the Minotaur
      1. +1
        10 January 2018 12: 26
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        You were a little mistaken, because the requirements you cited did not apply to the Invincibles, but to the cruiser, which eventually became the Minotaur

        That is why I asked you about this book.
        In fact, these are preliminary studies of the preliminary design of a large armored cruiser. https://www.litmir.me/bd/?b=193319
  22. 0
    10 January 2018 07: 17
    There is a rule of thumb that the armor must match the ship’s main caliber. You can supplement this rule, the armor must correspond to the Civil Code of the alleged enemy. GK of the ship should be sufficient to conduct a battle with the ships to counter with which the ship was built.
    And now I’ll try to develop these postulates on the example of these chakhliks of non-conciliators.

    1. The most important, basic rule has been violated. Either excess HA or armor is excessively weakened.
    2. To combat the alleged goals, 305mm is clearly redundant; it is not needed to combat the enemy’s vanguard or to fight trade fighters.
    3. Reserving a belt in 152 can be taken sufficient against a maximum of 8 "guns, which even at that time was unambiguously small if the cruiser was to engage in reconnaissance and fighting the vanguard.
    4. Well, it is obvious that 152mm of armor is definitely not enough for a battle in a line against ships with 10-12 "guns.

    Well mine noble naval commander findings:
    Everything was brought for the sake of maximum speed, which was intended to replace the armor. But it is obvious now and then that if the reservation is insufficient, it is impossible to conduct OFFensive actions against an opponent with the best armor and weapons and the worst speed.
    Putting LCR in line was not just a mistake, but stupidity, since they lost their only ghostly advantage (speed). What did the British hope, in a wake column at the same speed, fighting with ships with 10-12 "guns?

    My humble opinion is that a more or less universal ship could be obtained with a 10 "GK, somewhat limited in number (for example 4 instead of 5 towers) About the displacement comparable to the displacement of the dreadnought, the weight saved by reducing the weight of the ammunition, the weight of the towers and the number of ammunition of the ammunition could be used to increase the speed and range.
    Yes, such a ship would not have such an overwhelming advantage over trade fighters in a second salvo, but it would definitely win the reservation with the remaining advantage at maximum speed. At the same time, due to the reservation, he could be in line with adult uncles, and would pose a threat to the vanguard of the opponent.
    1. +2
      10 January 2018 09: 05
      Yes, they were not designed for battle in the line, and even in the coastal waters of the North Sea.
      In addition, the ships were aging very quickly.
  23. +3
    10 January 2018 09: 26
    I received an answer that, to be honest, did not convince me and did not explain the confidence of the respected author in the mistakes of English shipbuilders, which he even put in the headline.
    Invisibles are the foremost ships of their time.
    Another thing is that they were built for specific tasks and application concepts, and no one assumed during the construction that they should keep shelling three simultaneously larger German cruisers and even built for coastal waters, with a low side (Invisibles were built for the oceans and should provide high seaworthiness, and accordingly had a high freeboard, unlike the Germans, which automatically affected the thickness of the reservation).
    The large guns of the Invisibles ensured the effectiveness of firing from a long distance.
    Actions against Spee clearly confirmed the high effectiveness of the Invisibles.
    As for the Battle of Jutland, one should not forget that then ships, especially revolutionary ones like Dreadnought and Invisible, became very old morally, technology developed rapidly, and the start of construction of the German Derflinger or Lutzov in 1912 is a very big difference with the ships that designed in 1906.
    A good example of this is the Dreadnought, which is hopelessly outdated already ten years after construction so much that in fact it did not take part in the Battle of Jutland (however, there were other reasons).
    IMHO, the author got excited when he made this statement about the mistake of shipbuilders, and even in the title.
    It is rather about the fallacy of the application.
    1. +1
      10 January 2018 09: 45
      so that the difference in height of the freeboard of Invisible and the Germans was clearly visible

    2. +2
      10 January 2018 10: 35
      Quote: sd68
      Invisibles are the foremost ships of their time.

      The problem is that on the 1, 4 and 5 points of the tasks for the "Invincibles" it was impossible not to assume that they would fight with their classmates equal to them, or even with the battleships of the enemy (point 5) armed with guns of caliber 280mm and higher - And the “Invincible” itself easily breaks through with such guns due to insufficient armor. Those. for reconnaissance at battleships in a squadron battle, chasing enemy battleships and covering up the actions of their main forces, they simply lacked protection for sufficient combat stability, therefore, they could not carry out the tasks assigned to them or could only in the format “come, saw, run away” , what were able and much cheaper light cruisers. The result was a large and expensive ship that could not participate in the first roles in the squadron battle at the time of laying because of the weakness of its own armor, and which had to drive exclusively enemy light forces or raiders in the ocean, possessing a performance characteristics for faithfully performing only 2 from 5 technical task items.

      So yes, this is exactly the mistake. The British themselves set the ceiling for the battlecruisers, created such an unbalanced project, and set themselves up by “teaching” the enemy how to build at least the same (and in fact better) ships with battleships that penetrate the “Invincibles” without any problems. Those. the verdict to the ship lies in itself - too much imbalance and no prospects for further survival, their maximum is to chase the German raiders over the oceans, but for this the 305-mm GK is not that critically necessary. I would even say that the “Invincibles” were lucky that in the WWI they had the chance to show themselves against the obviously weakest, but still quite strong opponent in the person of “Scharnhorst” and “Gneisenau”.
      1. +2
        10 January 2018 10: 38
        I absolutely agree :) I came to the same conclusions drinks
      2. 0
        10 January 2018 11: 17
        For reconnaissance and finishing off the lagging armor and high speed would be quite enough, given the fact that their guns allowed firing from a long distance, which was perfectly justified in operations against Spee.
        Another thing is that progress in shipbuilding then proceeded quickly and new ships had high speeds.
        and even more so, it was not supposed that they would fight at a distance of 30 cables with several obviously larger German ships
        1. 0
          10 January 2018 11: 43
          Quote: sd68
          For reconnaissance and finishing off the lagging armor and high speed would be quite enough

          A mistake made by the British as well - one can meet enemy intelligence on reconnaissance (with a light kick of the Invincible armed with battleship cannons), and when finishing off the stragglers, the laggards can snap back - again from the battleship cannons.
          Quote: sd68
          and even more so, it was not supposed that they would fight at a distance of 30 cables with several obviously larger German ships

          You put so much emphasis on it as if only it matters laughing It was because of the “Invincibles” that the Germans began to equip their fleet with a squadron with battleship cannons — which are the verdict for the “Invincible” with its thin armor. Assuming this was easy — the British would have been fools if they hadn’t understood that the construction of the Invincible would cause an answer from other fleets in the form of building at least the same ships. And here - oops, ah, according to combat missions, they can meet in battle, and the “Invincible” is not protected against them, and the Germans simply did not have such traditions in the tradition of building cardboard with heavy guns. So, the “Invincibles” pronounced their own sentences, and a ship that becomes insolvent even at the time of laying is usually called unsuccessful because of its concept, rather than pushing everything away for progress in shipbuilding and the difference in size. An Invincible would be raked from Nassau with Von der Tann just like a rake from Derflinger in real life - he does not have the means to counter heavy guns of a battleship caliber, while for combat missions, contact with ships carrying such guns is assumed.
          1. 0
            10 January 2018 12: 03
            according to the concept, if you meet a weaker one in reconnaissance, you’ll shoot from a great distance thanks to large guns, a stronger one will leave the battle.
            when finishing the lagging behind - the fire of several of its cruisers will be concentrated on one enemy from a long distance, but you are imposing Invisible a situation that the concept did not provide for.
            And later in the post, in my opinion, you simply rearrange the cause and effect on the one hand, and do not take into account the fact that technical progress in the maritime industry was intensive at that time (I several times gave an example with Dreadnought - is this an erroneous ship?) , which led to an increase in the speed of ships and their other capabilities, on the other hand, blame the English shipbuilders, as the author, as I understand it, for not having guessed that, contrary to the design concept, the Invisibles would be used in line against guys "(at" Derflinger "displacement is almost twice as much plus a low freeboard, as they didn’t do for ocean trips) and even at a short distance.
            You can, rearranging the cause and effect, talk about the significant shortcomings of the English shipbuilders during the construction of the Z-series destroyers, in which they did not put up protection against anti-ship missiles or the American builders of cruisers like Brooklyn who did not foresee the nuclear submarine attack smile
            1. +2
              10 January 2018 12: 32
              Quote: sd68
              according to the concept, if you meet a weaker one in reconnaissance, you’ll shoot from a great distance thanks to large guns, a stronger one will leave the battle.

              It was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines ... Even in the REV, the battle between the scouts was in the order of things, although they also had to run on paper. The battle with equal scouts "Invincible" is contraindicated.
              Quote: sd68
              you are imposing a situation on Invisible that the concept did not provide for.

              Yeah urgent arrival and cover of any actions of the fleet - what's this?
              Quote: sd68
              and you don’t take into account that technical progress in the maritime industry was then intensively going on (I several times gave an example with the Dreadnought - what, is this an erroneous ship?)

              Your example with the Dreadnought is incorrect - it was not so unbalanced. He had quite good stability against his own guns, “Invincible” did not have one at all. And then I already told you 300 times, and not only I - “Invincible” is supposed to fight with classmates, or even short skirmishes with enemy battleships, but it’s absolutely not suitable for them because of the thin armor. Even at the time of bookmarking. This feature did not arise with the progress of scientific and technological progress, not with time, but already from the moment the project was approved - despite the fact that a battle with carriers of heavy guns was supposed. This is a mistake, and not my "not taking into account technological progress in maritime affairs."
              Quote: sd68
              Invisibles will apply in line against the "big guys"

              You ignore the fact that the “Invincible” could have scooped to the full from the armadillo, and from the “Von der Tann”, which is not very large wink He does not have enough protection against them.
              Quote: sd68
              You can, rearranging cause and effect

              Colleague, no one rearranges anything, contrary to your imagination. As an reconnaissance agent, a cover-up for the main forces and a pursuer of enemy battleships, the Invincible should have better armor protection, as these items provided for contact with enemy carriers of battleships, and this is already at the design stage. And already at the design stage, a mistake was made - underestimation of the value of armor in favor of speed and powerful weapons. And as a consequence of this - when the ships tried to be used in reconnaissance, and they - as is the norm for intelligence things - clashed with their own kind, "Invincible" was waiting for an epic fail. And the point here is not that the Derflinger was larger - it actually has the same caliber and numerical composition of the GK artillery, which you deliberately ignore, resting on the displacement digits. Yes, and even dropping it, we recall the “Von der Tann” ignored by you - for “Invincible” a meeting with him would be as fatal as for a close “Indefatigable”, although the favorite displacement digits are close there, and the bookmark gap is minimal .
              1. 0
                10 January 2018 15: 58
                Ships were built for different purposes.
                and the fact that Von der Tann had more armor with the same displacement - a direct consequence of the different concept of application.
                If you need to reduce the caliber of guns, reduce the freeboard height and seaworthiness, and thereby increase the reservation, then for the Battle of Jutland and the North Sea it is.
                But for actions on the Falklands and others, no.
                As for the Indefatigable bookmark and the other two slightly altered Invisibles - at that time it was already a mistake, I agree
                with you in this matter.
                1. 0
                  11 January 2018 03: 27
                  Well, for what purpose which of the ships was built?
              2. 0
                10 January 2018 16: 09
                Against Scharnhorst, it was a great ship, but in the series of Indefatigable it was already necessary to take into account the appearance of Von der Tann.
                Progress was fast ...
              3. 0
                10 January 2018 16: 43
                Sorry, I am writing in pieces, not very much over time.
                to understand how progress was going on then compare Scharnhorst and Von der Tann, the minimum time gap, and then Von der Tann and Derflinger - also a small time gap.
      3. +1
        10 January 2018 12: 04
        Quote: arturpraetor
        Those. the verdict to the ship lies in itself - too much imbalance and no prospects for further survival, their maximum is to chase German raiders beyond the oceans, but for this a 305-mm GK is not that critically necessary.


        A very interesting discussion, and the most interesting is that the evaluation of projects is practically no different from the evaluation of those times;

        " The armament is powerful enough to cause serious damage to warships outside their armor, and the defense is sufficient against medium-caliber guns, but these ships will be too weak to deal with new armadillos. "1905
        1. +1
          10 January 2018 12: 53
          The fact is that real history has shown that the ideal “squadron cruiser” is a large well-armored and high-speed and well-armed battleship (and prohibitively expensive), but with such a battleship the “squadron cruiser” is simply not needed. And then the aircraft carriers arrived and the Washington Agreement
          1. +1
            10 January 2018 13: 36
            Quote: Kibb
            The fact is that real history has shown that the ideal “squadron cruiser” is a large well-armored and high-speed and well-armed battleship (and prohibitively expensive),


            In principle, this can be said not history has shown; this conclusion was reached when discussing the problem of the tasks facing these ships in 1905. But the idea of ​​a large-caliber gun and heavy projectile prevailed;

            " The significance was shown in the use of armored cruisers, which the admiral of Togo made at the battle of Tsushima. However, in order to benefit from such faster ships, they should be armed and protected so as to meet battleships on equal terms, that is, they themselves must be battleships. "1905
          2. +1
            10 January 2018 19: 35
            Quote: Kibb
            The fact is that real history has shown that the ideal “squadron cruiser” is a large, well-armored and high-speed and well-armed battleship

            In short, for reconnaissance in the North Sea, the 5th Squadron of LCs (and 2-3 KRL squadrons to it) is ideal. smile They would have to throw a couple of knots ...
            With such RN scouts, the German intelligence forces will definitely have a higher roof. smile
            1. 0
              10 January 2018 20: 51
              Well, in principle, it is, they would really add a couple of confident nodes to another commander, and they would not have a price (although ships are still very good)
  24. +1
    10 January 2018 21: 36
    "His Majesty's Invincible ship is an amazing creation of the British naval genius."

    Just now I’m reading about the pinnacle of the English look at the battlecruiser - Koreiges, Furios and others like them. That's where the absurdity is.
    1. 0
      10 January 2018 23: 10
      This is not an English look, but Fischer’s look - the schiza is certainly complete, but even more complete, though Hoody, as they could be before Jutland, the LKR “lungs” had narrowly specialized tasks, but Fisher also had followers (Lexington for example). Glory to Gd Washington Treaty stopped this craziness
  25. 0
    10 January 2018 23: 32
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk,
    For some reason, it seems that it was about Defense that was discussed, I'll try to search
    1. +1
      11 January 2018 00: 00
      I would be very grateful. This is extremely important information. hi drinks
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. 0
        11 January 2018 08: 31
        So it seems even Wikipedia says: At the time, it was believed that Defense had been reduced to fragments by the explosion, but the wreck was discovered in mid-1984 by Clive Cussler and a NUMA survey of the North Sea and English Channel at coordinates 56 ° 58′02 ″ N 05 ° 49′50 ″ ECoordinates: 56 ° 58′02 ″ N 05 ° 49′50 ″ E. [15] It was dived upon in 2001 by a team led by nautical archaeologist Innes McCartney and found to be largely intact, despite the violence of her sinking. [16] [17]
        "At one time, it was believed that Defense had shattered into pieces from the explosion, but in mid-1984 they found the crash site and it turned out that the ship was basically intact."
        1. +1
          11 January 2018 10: 21
          Quote: Scaffold
          At one time, it was believed that Defense had crumbled to pieces from the explosion, but in the middle of the 1984 of the year they found the crash site and it turned out that the ship was basically intact.

          I am not friendly with English-speaking sources, alas. But from the fact that you quoted in no way follows the absence of an explosion of the nasal artillery cellar
          1. 0
            11 January 2018 11: 34
            http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/29393/3/HMS%20De
            fence%20ijna%20submission%20IJM%20final%20for%20B
            URO.pdf
            Here there is an English-language (alas) file, where there is a diagram of the fragments of a cruiser.

            From it it is very similar that it was just in the nose that it exploded.
            1. +1
              11 January 2018 12: 55
              Quote: Scaffold
              From it it is very similar that it was just in the nose that it exploded.

              I absolutely agree, thanks!
  26. +2
    11 January 2018 12: 15
    But in the future, the British abandoned this type in favor of lighter and cheaper armored cruisers of the "Kent" type: this should be regarded as a mistake, because the latter were sufficient only against enemy armored cruisers


    I do not agree with this opinion.
    For a raider, any encounter with a weaker armed enemy and receiving combat damage is fatal, since there is nowhere to repair a raider, unlike the British, who even having met a battle superior ship can break the distance, get out of battle, pursue, build up sufficient forces against Raider.
    But the task of detecting a raider - requires 5-7 times more ships.
    Therefore, the counter-nuclear forces should not have been too expensive - the decision of the committee is fully justified economically.

    A great late example is the La Plata battle of the Admiral Graf Spee raider with the heavy cruiser Exeter (type York) and two lightweight Achilles and Ajax (type Leander). The British timely concentrated weak forces and inflicted
    some damage to the raider. Despite the absence of critical damage, "Graf Spee" as a combat unit has lost its effectiveness (fire control systems are destroyed, ammunition is running out). Which predetermined the finale.
    His sistership Admiral Scheer (under Theodore Cranke) was more cautious - avoiding meetings with counter-raider forces. It took the Admiral Sheer about an hour to sink the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay escorting the convoy HX-84. This enabled most of the convoy to disperse, avoiding a complete defeat. What causes doubts about the combat value of auxiliary cruisers.
    1. 0
      11 January 2018 17: 40
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      For a raider, any encounter with a weaker armed enemy and receiving combat damage is fatal, since there is nowhere to repair a raider, unlike the British, who even having met a battle superior ship can break the distance, get out of battle, pursue, build up sufficient forces against Raider.

      There is one more subtle point here - the enemy has always fewer large oceanic DBKRs than small oceanic missile systems. And against all kinds of “Nuremberg” and other small raiders, the British “Kentes” and “Devonshires” were completely nothing. You do not have to go far for an example - the battle of light forces under the Falklands.
      By the way, it is noteworthy that the situation "the battle of the BRKR against the theoretically high-speed BKRR" was discussed in Britain long before the WWII - after the construction for the Novik RIF. And the article on our cruiser in the British press just showed that it is impossible to rely on tabular data on speed, because there are no measured miles in the open sea. And on a rampage, a large BRKR loses fewer nodes than a small BKRR and can maintain full speed longer (not to mention the fact that the counter-trader has better basing conditions and can repair cars).
      The theory was confirmed by practice: “Kent” alone caught up with “Nuremberg”, “Cornwall” caught up with “Leipzig”. Although the tables do not seem to have been. smile
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Despite the absence of critical damage, "Graf Spee" as a combat unit has lost its effectiveness (fire control systems are destroyed, ammunition is running out). Which predetermined the finale.

      EMNIP, at Spee, it was not the SuAO that failed, but the fuel and oil cleaning systems for engines, as well as desalination plants, were seriously damaged. In short, there was nothing to count on a breakthrough and a break. Moreover, less than a day has passed since Spee arrived at the neutral port, a fresh Cumberland took the place of the battered Exeter in Harwood's group.
      Harwood had 2 damaged KRL and a "fresh" Cumberland CTR, which replaced the heavily damaged Exeter. Moreover, “Cumberland” in 1935-1939. went through the "post-Washington" modernization, during which he received an armored belt 76-114 mm thick.
      Langsdorf has a damaged battleship with more than half its ammunition stockpiled (in the battle, Spee fired 414 shells, mostly high-explosive, with a standard ammunition shell of 720 shells).
      1. +1
        12 January 2018 09: 27
        I’ve heard about the cleaning system for the first time. But the Germans misunderstood who opposes them. then yes. weird.
        1. 0
          12 January 2018 15: 43
          Quote: Conductor
          I’ve heard about the cleaning system for the first time.

          This is from "Pocket Battleships of the Deutschland Class: Warships of the Kriegsmarine" by Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke - p. 176:
          36 dead, 60 wounded. Seventeen 6in hits, causing minor damage, two 8in hits in non-vulnerable areas below armor deck, but oil purification and desalination plants destroyed,all kitchens wrecked. Ammunition stocks very low.

          The last sentence, by the way, is also indicative in terms of the possibility of a breakthrough and the continuation of cruising. smile
      2. 0
        18 January 2018 05: 20
        Therefore, in Port Arthur, the Boyarin, by virtue of its better seaworthiness, was considered the best cruiser for service with the squadron than the faster, but less navigable Novik.
  27. 0
    12 January 2018 09: 25
    Good article, Andrei Rakhmet again.
  28. 0
    22 January 2018 10: 48
    Quote: avt
    You can and your little thought to get rich for the fun of the people.

    The idea is almost brilliant, but it is not clear - why :-)

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"