By December 2017, the main phase of the confrontation between the Syrian Arab army and the largest “bones” of the Igilov pseudo-caliphate, which lasted more than two years, ended with almost complete defeat of the latter. This was made possible solely thanks to the large-scale support of the Syrian government forces by tactical units and squadrons. aviation Russian aerospace forces from the Khmeimim air base, missile and bomb strikes of long-range bombers Tu-22M2 and "strategists" Tu-95MS / Tu-160, massive missile strikes using the SKM 3M14T "Caliber-NK" from launchers of small missile ships of the Buyan-M class ”, As well as similar attacks from the sides of the submarines“ Veliky Novgorod ”and“ Kolpino ”of project 636.3“ Varshavyanka ”. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his vision of the results of the Syrian campaign on November 11, 2017 during the final press conference held at the end of the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The Russian leader emphasized the success achieved “in confirming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Syria,” and also pointed to the early use of diplomatic and political instruments for settlement, which will become possible immediately after the liquidation of the remaining enclaves of ISIS, Jebhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groups ( banned in Russia) in the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Homs, as well as in the northwestern part of the republic.
Naturally, the statement was made with a sound and objective share of patriotic pathos, as well as pride in the actions of the VKS, which is typical of any adequate head of state, but let's take a look at the final military-political situation in the Syrian theater of operations without embellishment, according to what happened last year. month of events. Despite the fact that the units of the Syrian Armed Forces, together with friendly Hezbollah, Tiger Forces (Al Nimr), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iraqi militias (Hashd al-Shaabi), were able to get 2 years to push ISIS out of vast areas of the central governorates of Syria; to break the resistance of the most powerful Igilovskiy fortifications along the Euphrates channel on the west bank, and also to get ahead of the Kurds in the operation to seize control of Abu Kemal, the establishment of CAA control over the entire territory of the republic did not happen. And this is a fact.
In particular, the entire eastern coast of the Euphrates and the territory of the western coast in the region of Manbij and Afrin, still remain under the control of the pro-American "Syrian Democratic Forces" represented by Kurdish YPG / YPJ units. These sites are nearly ~ 35% of the territory controlled by the government forces of Bashar al-Assad. Kurdish domination in these areas has opened up great prospects for the United States in terms of its long-term presence in Syria, with many “windows” of opportunities for destabilizing actions against the Syrian Arab Army. For example, a full-fledged transshipment base was established in Rakk for the delivery of ISIL and Dzhebhat an-Nusra militants from the Idlib boiler directly to Al-Hasek, where training camps and military bases of the Marine Corps and Special Forces of the United States are located. Similar transshipment bases are located in the Kurdish-controlled cities of Essuvar, Al-Shaddadi, directly at the western border of the largest 171-kilometer "boiler", stretching along the Iraqi-Syrian border between the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Haseke. Neither the Kurds nor the Americans are in a hurry to clean up this tactical cauldron, as it is a real “treasure trove” of Igilovsky cannon fodder for creating the so-called “New Syrian Army”, which the Americans form in the same-name center of Hasak.
If we consider the financial and technological investments that the States can provide to the militants of the new formation, by the middle of the summer of 2018 we can expect the appearance of the 20 - 30 - thousandth and well-trained army (NSA), ready to launch an offensive in many sections of the contact line along the Euphrates and, naturally, Washington will find an argument with provocative methods for direct support of the new formation. It is worth noting that the creation of a new military group is progressing today at an incredibly fast pace. For example, in order to attract as many drivers as possible for the delivery of militants from distribution centers to training camps, the command of the US Armed Forces in Syria offers a very decent salary (about 1 thousand dollars for participating in one such convoy).
The 55-kilometer “security zone” did not disappear anywhere (it is here that the infamous refugee camp “Er-Rukban” is located, which is another supplier of militants for NSA) around the military base of the KMP and SSO United States At-Tanf, located at the junction of the Jordan-Syrian and Iraqi-Syrian borders. No matter how much our media may boast of the fictional dominant tactical position of the Syrian army over the above-mentioned territory, there can be no talk of any kind of “cauldron”. The Syrian Arab Army only covers the rounded border of the state’s “security zone” in the province of Homs, while the 50-kilometer stretch of the Jordan-Syrian border has a full-fledged “corridor” to the At-Tanfa enclave, which is under reliable protection of ILC units equipped high-precision mobile MLRS HIMARS, OTRK ATACMS, various means of air defense and anti-tank weapons, some of which can be transferred from storage bases in Jordan.
Any attempt to eliminate this "security zone" will end for the Syrian armed forces with a large-scale clash with the US Marine Corps, which without the intervention of the Russian Navy and Russian Space Forces will result in the complete destruction of all CAA units involved in the At-Tanf roll, and then a massive missile attack of hundreds "Tomahawks" in the majority of Syrian strategic facilities, which Damascus certainly does not "take out." Here you have all the preservation of territorial integrity. Thank God that even Damascus, and the Mediterranean coast and all the central territories up to Abu Kemal, were able to keep. Before the formation of the NSA, there is not much time left, there certainly will be seen who is ready for anything. Let's hope that Moscow will not back up. For example, judging by the latest data coming from part of the province of Aleppo controlled by pro-Turkish rebels (another weighty stone in the garden of the “preserved territorial integrity of Syria”), in 2018, Ankara is preparing to act more decisively and has no plans to wait until the SDF, with the support of the NSA raised by the Americans, they will be able to go on the offensive in the western operational direction in order to break through the corridor to the Kurdish "boiler" in the Afrin area.
We are talking about the recent deployment of the Improved Hawk anti-aircraft missile system on the outskirts of the Kurdish canton of Afrin, which is actually a tactical "cauldron" of the Kurdish YPG unit in the province of Aleppo. This was 2 on January 2018, the News Desk reported, citing Turkish sources. In the photos published in the publication, you can see the standard open-type M192 launcher of the open type, the equipped 3 SAM MIM-23B, as well as the centimeter radar for the X-band AN / MPQ-46 / 57 X-band, which has a range of targets for large targets. EPR in 100 km and intended to highlight high-altitude, medium-altitude and low-altitude targets for MIM-23B missiles. Photos of such elements of the anti-missile battalion, such as the AN / MPQ-51 radar rangefinder or AN / MPQ-48 low-altitude detector / target designator, are missing; the exact number of M192 launchers is also unknown, and therefore it is impossible to determine the number of transferred batteries of the complex.
RPN AN / MPQ-46
At the same time, according to the lights of an unknown settlement flickering on the night horizon, it can be assumed that the I-Hawk battery is most likely deployed on an elevated plain in the vicinity of the Azaz-Kafra-Mari triangle, and the radars are aimed at the western air direction. objective only taking into account information from a Turkish source, as well as relying on the fact that Turkish UAVs regularly patrol the canton of Arin (this is confirmed by the online monitoring resource of the aircraft with the included Flightradar24 transponders). Meanwhile, if we look at the situation from a tactical point of view, we will see the following. From the southern, western and northern OH, the canton of Afrin is surrounded by the territory controlled by the pro-Turkish SSA and directly the Turkish border; consequently, non-aviation and stationed YPGs do not pose a threat to units of the Turkish army.
But in the direction of the Euphrates (Manbij), the situation is completely different, where the SDF, supported by the Americans, together with the New Syrian Army, may well resort to offensive actions from the Kurdish fortified Al-Arimah area in the direction of the Afrin canton for the subsequent unification of Syrian Kurdistan. It is here (in the eastern air route!) That the Turkish armed forces are threatened with the appearance of unmanned strike and reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force. On the basis of this, one more conclusion can be made: Turkish sources intentionally spread false information; in reality, the Improved Hawk battery “scans” the airspace above the bed of the Euphrates and part of the Raqqa governorate.
However, the US Air Force received an answer to this question a long time ago, because the flights of the Raptors, equipped with advanced and sophisticated passive electronic intelligence systems AN / ALR-94 (with a distributed aperture of 30 antenna modules), did not stop, and even the aircraft of the strategic radio electronic RC-135V / W reconnaissance services with the REER 55000 AEELS complexes continue to be regulars of the Syrian airspace. This electronic equipment allows you to find radio sources from a few dozen to 300 - 500 km (depending on the height of the flight, and hence the radio horizon). If the Turkish Hawk, deployed in rebel positions, is in sleep mode and receives information on the AN / TSW-8 command and control station from third-party radar equipment of the Turkish Air Force, it will be possible to detect it only through strategic drone RQ-4A / B equipped with airborne side-looking radar complexes AN / ZPY-2 MP-RTIP, or in active mode of operation of airborne AFAR-radars of American F / A-18E / F, F-35A and F-22A fighters.
At the same time, a quite logical question arises, what is the real expediency of deploying the Turkish I-Hawk air defense system on the contact line with the Kurdish territories? The answer to this question is in the tactical and technical characteristics of the air defense system. The Improved Hawk Complexes, which are in service with the Turkish Air Force, were developed in 1972 and, according to information from the militaryedge.org resource, some of them were upgraded according to the Hawk PIP-3R program (Hawk-21). ) by analogy with the Romanian complexes. As a result, the upgraded MIM-3K rocket with a heavier and more powerful warhead can be integrated into the ammunition and radio-electronic architecture of the Turkish Hawks PIP-23R. This means that the complex is capable of intercepting operational-tactical ballistic missiles with a range of about 120 - 160 km, as well as single anti-radar missiles.
Nevertheless, the channel of a single battery with a radar AN / MPQ-46 illumination corresponds to an intercepted target 1, which may not be enough to repel a missile strike with several high-speed air attack weapons (for example, anti-radar missiles). Moreover, the old parabolic searchlight radar has extremely low noise immunity, which does not allow to withstand even simple noise and barrage interference. The MIM-23K interceptor missile has only large stabilizers with small aerodynamic rudders and far from the best structural strength, and therefore the range of overloads during maneuvering can reach only 20 units. As a result, extremely low-maneuverable medium-speed aerodynamic and ballistic objects can be hit. Even despite the radius of action in 40 km, which allows you to cover most of the airspace over the Afrin Boiler and Kurdish territory in the Manbij area, the Hawk PIP-3R air defense missile system is not able to form a full-fledged flightless zone over these territories, because the minimum height of interception he has remained the same (30 m), while modern attack helicopters and reconnaissance UAVs operate at altitudes of 20 and less than meters.
From all of the above, we can make a single conclusion: the deployment of the advanced Hawk complex in the north of Syria has a pronounced demonstration character aimed at intimidating Kurdish YPG / YPJ units, as well as “cooling” hot heads in the Pentagon, who are considering throwing SDF units in the direction of canton afrin. In the real reflection of the enemy’s massive missile strike, or the single use of highly mobile aircraft equipped with electronic warfare equipment, the single-channel Hawk (even in the PIP-3R version) will look extremely mediocre. And all supporters of the opinion that the Hawk complex has been deployed exclusively to counter the Syrian Air Force equipped with obsolete Su-22 and Su-24 / М2 front-line bombers, we hasten to upset. Even if this were true, there would be no talk of any efficiency and no-fly zone, since only one or two X-58 anti-radar missiles launched from “Drying” ".