Military Review

"Kutsak" Kotin

36
Back in early 1943, the leadership of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA) and the People’s Commissariat tank industry (NKTP) agreed that the time of KV-1s is coming to an end. Instead, heavy tanks IS-1 (233) were to be built in Chelyabinsk, which were a further development of the KV-13. With the same firepower, they were more protected and mobile. But the experienced IS-1 was too "raw" and suffered from poor build quality. In addition, in April 1943, the captured German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E was tested by shelling. It turned out that the Red Army urgently needed a tank with weapons in the form of an 85 mm gun. So the light appeared KV-85, the last production car from the KV family of tanks.


Fast alternative for IP

At first, there was no talk of upgrading the KV-1. According to the draft resolution of the State Defense Committee “On the release of IS tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts at the Kirov NKTP plant”, the production of KV-1s was terminated since June 1943. ChKZ was to switch completely to the production of SU-152, in June it was planned to build 200 of these SAUs, and in July - 100. Also SU-122 should have been built here (in this case, it was about an ACS with an X-NUMX-mm A-122 gun). Since July, the production of these machines also ceased, instead of them, ChKZ was supposed to build on 19 EC-50 and IMS-1 / ISC-152.

This version of the decree was rejected; instead, on May 5, a decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3289 “On reinforcing artillery armament of tanks and self-propelled guns” was signed. According to him, by July 1 1943, two samples of the EC-1 and KV-1 with 85-mm guns were issued for state tests. Preliminary design work on the 85-mm guns, which were launched at the end of March 1943, showed that its installation would require significant changes in the design of the tank.


Installing the D-5T-85 in the IC tower

The design of the 85-mm tank gun with the 52-K anti-aircraft cannon ballistics went on a competitive basis. In Kaliningrad, near Moscow, the team of the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB) was engaged in this. They took the path of minimal changes in the design of the chassis, which greatly accelerated the introduction of improved tanks in the series. The tower was reworked, thanks to which the working conditions for the calculation were improved.

The staff of the design office of the plant No. XXUMX (Sverdlovsk) looked at this topic in a completely different way. Their development was created with the expectation of a serious alteration of the chassis of both tanks, especially with regard to the EC-9. In the course of designing the installation of the D-1 gun, later renamed the D-7T-5, it became clear that it could not be installed in the existing EC-85 tower, primarily because of the diameter of the turret chase. The first draft of the D-1T-5 installation assumed that the diameter of the tower shoulder strap would increase to 85 mm. Toward the end of May 1700, it became clear that the shoulder strap should be increased even more - to 1943 mm. Of course, this led to a serious alteration of the EC-1800 chassis, but they were ready for a similar turn of events in Chelyabinsk. In any case, the EC-1 was remade, and Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk designers did not plan to develop two different towers for one gun.


The same system on top. Due to the compact design in combination with a wider shoulder strap of the tower, the working conditions of the crew were better than in the KV-1

The first moves in the project, which received the drawing index 239, began in mid-May, 1943. Since July, this topic has received the name Object 239. The draft design was ready for 22 May 1943, the project’s lead engineer was M.F. Balgi In addition to the expansion of the shoulder strap, a number of other changes were made to the corps. The radio operator from the control department was removed, the radio moved to the tower, and the fuel tanks were transferred to the forward part of the hull. According to calculations, the combat weight of the tank increased to 46,5 tons. Deputy Commissar of the Tank Industry and Chief Designer of ChKZ Joseph Yakovlevich Kotin was determined to continue the development of this tank, but for the time being avoided publicity of this decision. Nevertheless, the management of NKTP insisted on the manufacture of a prototype. We decided to use the second model KV-1 with the 15002 serial number as the basis for creating a new machine. According to the original plan, the production time of the 239 Object was determined on June 25.

The working drawings of the “10 version with installation of an IP tower” were prepared and put into operation by the 1 of June. At that time, it was planned to use the F-85 system, which is C-31, as the work on the D-5T-85 was delayed. The attitude to the installation of the 85-mm gun in the KV-1 with eloquently speaks this passage from the report on the experimental work:

“It should be noted that, both at Kirovsky and at plant No. XXUMX, work on upgrading the weapons of the KV-100 tank is in turn following the tank EC-1. After the manufacture of parts and assemblies for the EC-2, all attention is paid to, appropriate attention will be paid to the above works. ”


239 object. Chelyabinsk, end of July 1943 of the year

In reality, the factory workers did not manage to invest in the deadlines not only for the 239 Object, but also for the main job - EC-3, aka 237 Object. The fault of the Kirovsky Plant (ChKZ), which, according to the senior military representative of the plant No. XXUMX, withdrew from work, the tower was never completed for any of the tanks. As for the chassis, the first 100 Object was completed by June 30.

In parallel, Plant No.200 completed the reworking of the KV-1 case with the 15002. Metamorphosis was not very big. As planned, the shooter-radio operator on this tank was refused, because the department had to be re-assembled. The ball mount of the course machine gun was brewed, and the machine gun itself was moved to a fixed installation to the right of the driver. Due to the increase in the diameter of the shoulder strap to 1800 mm, I had to redo the under-turret box. On the sides appeared characteristic protrusions. Also to protect the shoulder strap in the bow of the bump appeared. Finally, I had to redo the roof over the driver. As the tower increased, the driver lost the hatch: he now had to climb out and get inside through the tower. As compensation, the driver received periscopic MK-IV devices, which improved visibility.


The welded machine gun and periscopic devices are clearly visible above the driver's access hatch.

By July 11, Plant No.100 assembled a chassis, fuel tanks, a motor and control drives at the 239 Facility. The tower was still not ready. In addition to the work of the Kirov factory, the problem was that the D-5T-85 system existed at that time in a single copy. It was supposed to be installed in the tower of the first sample of the 237 Object, which was fully completed on July 8. The tower for the new tank did not arrive at Plant No.100 and by July 20. Without waiting for its manufacture, the plant completed the assembly of the chassis, which by this day has already passed 40 kilometers. Interestingly, the first sample of the D-5T-85 still turned out to be exactly in the tower of the 239 Object, which was installed on the tank at the end of July.


Alterations increased the combat weight of the tank to 46 tons

The towers of the 237 Object and the 239 Object were absolutely identical. The difference in the combat mass of tanks looks interesting: the first prototype of the 237 Object weighed a little more than 43,2 tons, and the 239 Object - almost 46 tons. At the same time, the upgraded KV-1с was significantly inferior to its successor in terms of security. However, the 239 Object had its advantages. First, he had a more impressive ammunition - 70 cartridges for D-5T against 59 for 237 Object and 55 for 238 Object (KV-1s with standard turret and C-31 cannon). Secondly, no matter how good the future EC-85 would be, but it took time to organize its production. And the Red Army needed a tank capable of fighting the Tigris now. The need for such a machine increased dramatically after the Battle of Kursk died down, in which the very low effectiveness of 76-mm tank guns against the new German tanks was once again confirmed.


Same tank from behind

Short-term tests showed that an increase in combat mass influenced the dynamic characteristics of the 239 Object. The average speed on the highway fell to 16,4 km / h, and along the country road to 15,48 km / h. Fuel consumption increased to 409 liters per 100 kilometers. But the chassis overload did not happen. The temperature of the engine coolant in summer conditions did not exceed 85 degrees, and the oil - 78 degrees. Some reduction in combat performance was not critical. The verdict of the commission was as follows:


Modifications to the hull turned out to be insignificant, which made it possible to quickly launch the mass production of such tanks instead of the KV-1.

“The KV-85 tank (KV-1 tank with a partially modified hull and an IS tank tower mounted on it) the Commission considers it possible to recommend for release instead of KV-1 tanks, until serial development of the IS tanks.”

The final choice in favor of the 239 Object was made during the tests that took place at the Gorokhovetsky Artillery Scientific Test Proving Ground (ANIOP) from 21 to 24 August 1943. Even before the shooting, it was clear that the D-5T was clearly superior to C-31. The recoil length of the cannon was only 240-300 mm, maintenance of the recoil devices was more convenient. The 237 Object Tower was much more convenient for calculating work, which was manifested during the rate of fire tests. For an 239 Object, this parameter is 10-13 shots per minute, 2 times as many as the 238 Object.


Tests of the 239 Object at the Gorokhovetskiy ANIOP. End of August 1943 of the year

Tests at the Gorokhovetsky ANIOP turned out to be, rather, the final test. The fact is that 8 August 1943 of the year, Stalin signed the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3891ss "On the production of KV tanks with 85 mm cannon (KV-85)". According to this document, the choice was made in favor of the 239 Object, in August the release of the first 25 tanks was expected. The advantages of the D-5T were demonstrated in early August during the testing of prototype SU-85. Despite the fact that the D-5C-85 installed in SU-85-II had a lot of minor flaws, it turned out to be better than the CACB development systems.


239 object after shelling, November 1943 of the year

The 239 Object tests did not end there. First, the car passed, according to the decision of the commission, life tests. Then in November 1943, the car participated in the tests, which directly affected its appearance. The fact is that during the testing of the PT8-15 sight, adopted as the TSH-15, the machine was fired from a ZNS-76 5-mm cannon with both armor-piercing projectiles. The purpose of the attack was to test the strength of the device. The sight of shooting from a distance in 300 meters was not injured, but the tank received a series of damage: the driver's cap was knocked out by a hit and damaged the commander's turret. Ahead of the car and waited for other tests, which will be discussed in another material.

Three nerve months

The volume of production of KV-3891 to 85 of August indicated in the decree of the State Treasury No. 12c was reduced to 22 units. But this rather modest volume was not easy to produce. In August, the plant was required to finish the remaining KV-1s and, more difficultly, to fulfill the plan for the production of X-NUMX-T-325. And this is not counting the SU-34, which at that time had a much higher priority than the KV-152. By August 85 no new tank ChKZ has not yet passed. Delivery took place in an emergency situation, for example, 26 tanks were already taken on August 16. Without a trace of such labor "exploits" have not passed. 31 of August to the GABTU sent a letter to the senior military representative at Chelyabinsk Concrete Plant. He reported that in preparing the drawings, the factory design bureau made a number of mistakes, which resulted in a dozen and a half defects: the fuel tanks were fitted in place, as well as projectile styling with electrical equipment, instead of the “Multi-cyclone” filters, older Vortex tanks were installed, there were large problems with scopes. Plant №31, which did not send cargo with the tools for balancing, made its contribution. Already accepted cars in September had to be redone. As a result, the first 9 tanks were able to ship only by September 5. In total, in September, ChKZ shipped 9 tanks, including August 47 tanks.


Serial Sample HF-85. NIBT Polygon, summer 1944 of the year

Problems with the release of the first serial KV-85 were largely the result of not the most conscientious work of subcontractors. Plant №200 began to supply buildings and towers only from August 23. The plant №9, which submitted the first 3 guns of 28 August, 17 30 units and the last two on the morning of the 31 number, distinguished themselves. In addition to the problems with cargoes mentioned, there were other shortcomings as well, so the systems had to be improved. In September, the situation repeated. As of September 19, all 6 tanks had been commissioned, and by September 24 their number had grown to 13. The plant again had to complete the monthly program in the last days in an emergency manner. Nevertheless, the plan in the 63 machine ChKZ still executed, although not without problems. Were found problems with the mechanisms of guidance guns.


From a technical point of view, the car was slightly different from the prototype

Not the best situation with technical documentation has led to the fact that NKTP and GBTU KA had to intervene. October 6 1943 of the year was adopted the protocol for approval of technical documentation on the HF-85. The GBTU KA did not approve a whole number of drawing groups - installation of tanks, a rotating mechanism of a tower, installation of a tank intercom. A number of groups were approved with comments - for example, the engine's power supply system, the installation of an air filter, the hull, the installation of the D-5T system and a course gun, electric trigger, installation of sights. 20 scored a total of such groups, and some of them belonged to the 237 Object, which, from November 1943, was to change the KV-85. The ChKZ leadership did not agree with all the changes that the GBTU KA required, but the design of the machine was gradually refined.


Due to the short production time, the KV-85 externally from different months of production hardly differed from each other.

The plan for October 1943 of the year was the same as for September - 63 machines. Ongoing problems with affiliates led to a repetition of the August and September situations. The first 3 tanks were delivered only by October 10, by the 17 number their number increased to 7, and by October 22 they managed to hand over the entire 20 KV-85. As of October 31, the 56 machines were ready, the rest were finished using the emergency method. In October, 67 KV-85 left for the troops, the remaining 34 vehicles were shipped in early November.

By this time, the production of the EC-85 was launched at ChKZ, the first such tank was commissioned already on November 5. By the way, it turned out to be a temporary measure, since later the EC-122 (EC-2), which had a more powerful tool D-25Т, was launched into the series.

About KV-85 design engineers remembered not the kindest words. N.F. Shashmurin in his memoirs called this car "Kutsak", hinting at the lack of prospects for this tank. According to him, Kotin promoted her as the most simple version of the development of the KV-1. Of course, the memoirs should be treated with a certain degree of criticism, especially given the difficult relationship between Kotin and Shashmurin, but some documents confirm the words of Nikolai Fedorovich. And the production drama accompanying Kutsak all the time of its release showed that Kotin’s opinion on the modernization of the KV-1s as a simple decision was not entirely correct. Even the presence of a more or less finished chassis did not avoid problems during the transfer of production from the KV-1 to the KV-85. 148 tanks, released for 3 of the month, cost factory workers a considerable amount of nerves.

Limited success

Truly large supplies of KV-85 to the troops began from the end of September 1943. 23 numbers in Kosterevo went to train for the acquisition of 27-th Guards Tank Regiment. Machines were built with the money of rural workers of Chuvashia, and the tanks went to the front as part of the column "The collective farmer of Chuvashia." Also, the KV-85 arrived at the recruitment of 7-th, 14-th, 28-th, 30-th and 34-th Guards Tank Regiments. Structurally, these units were no different from those that had previously been armed with KV-1s. Established structure assumed the presence of a tank in the regiment 21, a similar composition remained unchanged until the end of World War II. From the beginning of 1944, the regiments, armed with heavy tanks, became known as Guards heavy tank regiments.


One of the KV-85 in winter camouflage with traces of active use. Winter 1944 of the year

Mastering new cars went differently. The easiest were those units that had previously fought on the KV-1s. From a technical point of view, the difference between the KV-85 and this tank was small. But the KV-85 got into parts that had previously been used by other tanks. For example, the 34 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, where the 22 of October 1943 was sent to the 21 tank. The regiment, which by that time was in the Tula training camp, fought on Churchill IV until KV-85. The tankers of this unit had problems with the operation of new tanks, for example, plugging a long barrel of the D-5T into tree trunks was observed. The 34 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment was the first to use the KV-85 at the front.

As is often the case, the combat debut turned out to be ambiguous. November 20 The 1943 of the 28 of the Ukrainian Front entered the 4 of the 34 of the Ukrainian Front. ttp (on KV-85) and 40 th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (on SU-152). By the morning 8 regiments were on alert. In 9: 40, both regiments received orders: interacting with the infantry of the 9 rifle corps, to break through the enemy defenses and, having captured Malaya Lepetiha, seize the crossing across the Dnieper. The attack involved 20 KV-85 and 9 SU-152. SU-152 went on the attack and, tearing away from the infantry, were on the sights of the German self-propelled units Ferdinand from the 653-th division of tank destroyers. At the same time, the KV-85 attacked, but without the support of the infantry, their attack also proved to be ineffective. 40-th TSAP lost 6 SU-152 padded and 1 burned down, 34-th Guards. TTP lost 9 KV-85, remaining on the territory controlled by the enemy.


This car was hit at the end of the year 1943

The next day, the fighting continued, and in 13: 20 German tanks with the support of Ferdinand went to the counter. SU-152 40-th tsap were distinguished here, who with the return fire destroyed 2 ACS Ferdinand and 3 tank. On the morning of November 22, 1943, as part of 34-th Guards. The milestones were 9-capable HF-85, and in the 40-th TSAP - 5 SU-152 (by the 25 number, the number of the latter increased to 7). By the end of November 29 in 34-th Guards. MTP remained 8 combat-ready KV-85. During the fighting, the regiment destroyed up to 300 soldiers and officers, 2 anti-tank guns, 3 tank and 2 self-propelled units. The regiment's irretrievable losses included the 12 KV-85, another 8 of tanks turned out to be destroyed and evacuated. 16 tank crew killed, 32 went missing, 16 was injured.

SU-152 proved to be more effective: the armed part of them destroyed up to 250 infantrymen, 2 tank, 9 ACS, 18 anti-tank guns, 8 field guns, 10 enemy mortars. Own irrecoverable losses amounted to 4 SU-152, another 6 time SU-152 lined, but they managed to evacuate and put into operation. 8 self-propelled guns were killed, 16 injured.

Given the fact against whom Soviet armored vehicles had to fight, the losses do not look so terrible. It is worth emphasizing that on both sides the data on victories is too high. Among other things, it is also connected with the fact that to destroy and destroy - these are two big differences. This is clearly seen in the number of KV-85 and SU-152, returned to service. The Germans remember only the heavy battles of 26-27 in November, and they allegedly destroyed the 54 of the Soviet tank. Of these, 21 allegedly destroyed the crew of Franz Krechmer. And here the owner of the Iron Cross clearly should have cut his sturgeon. For 26 November, the armored units of the 28 Army lost 8 tanks, of which irrevocably 5, and for 27 the number 25 destroyed and burned. With all the desire to get 54 from 33 does not work.


Trophy KV-85 of the 34-th Guards Tank Regiment, the end of November 1943 year. The machine was used in the 653 division of tank destroyers

It was necessary to fight KV-85 and against the "Tigers". The 7 Guards Tank Regiment KV-85 was sent 28 October 1943. After the re-formation that took place in Tula, the regiment was sent to the 60-th army of the 1-th Ukrainian Front. The regiment went into battle on November 23, literally a few days after the 34 of the Guards. TPP Tankmen had a chance to participate in a defensive operation in the Kiev direction. By December 9, the regiment with a fairly thinned materiel was in the 38 Army. In late January, the regiment remained 9 KV-85.

The high point of these cars came 28 January 1944 of the year. On this day, in 16: 35, a group of 35 German tanks, in cooperation with the infantry, moved towards the state farm named after them. Telman. According to Soviet sources, the SS 1 Panzer Division participated in the attack. The State Farm defended 60 people with two KV-85 and two SU-122 assigned to them under the command of Senior Lieutenant I.L. Podust. According to Soviet data, after three attacks on a state farm, the Germans were short of five Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E, two Pz.Kpfw.IV, three Pz.Kpfw.III, seven armored personnel carriers and six anti-tank guns. Seeing that the enemy decided to surround the state farm, Podust led the defenders out of the encirclement. For this fight, he received the Order of the Red Banner.

The crew of the KV-85, commanded by Lieutenant S.I. Kuleshov, who destroyed the Tiger 2 and 1 Pz.Kpfw.IV. When the German infantry attempted to get close to the tanks, Kuleshov’s machine had crushed about 15 people with caterpillars, the rest fled. The award for battle was the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree. Another "Tiger" was on the account of the SU-122, commanded by the Guard Lieutenant V.F. Mikheev.


KV-85 in the Crimea. 1452 sap, May 1944 of the year

The end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944, became the apogee of the combat career of the KV-85. The modest volume of production and heavy losses led to the fact that by the summer of 1944, these machines became very rare. For example, in the spring of 1944, the 11 KV-85 was part of the 1452 th self-propelled artillery regiment, which participated in the liberation of the Crimea. Individual vehicles fought in different parts in the summer and autumn of 1944, but these were the last bursts of combat activity. Alas, not a single serial machine of this type has survived to this day. But the object is preserved 239, standing on a pedestal at Avtovo in St. Petersburg. True, before installing it, "ennobled", welded armored course machine gun.
Author:
Originator:
http://warspot.ru/10800-kutsak-kotina
36 comments
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  1. Strashila
    Strashila 30 December 2017 08: 20
    +2
    Classic ... cut off the infantry, Khan tanks.
  2. svp67
    svp67 30 December 2017 08: 23
    14
    In addition, in April 1943, the captured German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E was tested by shelling.
    Here it’s probably worth adding to the author, to clarify the current situation.
    As a source for them were taken the last two options KV-13. In this case, the first prototype, armed 76,2 mm cannon ZIS-5, received the designation IS-1 while maintaining the factory index "Object 233", and the second - with the 122-mm U-11 tank howitzer in the turret borrowed from the experimental heavy tank KV-9 - received the designation IS-2 ("Object 234" )
    Here is this "sweet couple" .... on the left with 122 mm, on the right with 76,2 mm
  3. hohol95
    hohol95 30 December 2017 11: 22
    +6

    Upgraded tanks. "Klim Voroshilov" KV-1C and KV-85.
  4. Monarchist
    Monarchist 30 December 2017 15: 16
    +4
    Thank you for the detailed story about KV85, in the historical literature I sometimes met a mention of this tank, but only in general.
    Kretschmer with 54 tanks reminds me of Baron Munchausen: quite in his style
  5. Paranoid50
    Paranoid50 30 December 2017 15: 48
    16
    Here it is, object 239 in Avtovo.
    1. romandostalo
      romandostalo 30 December 2017 23: 54
      +9
      Favorite childhood object! Dad asked Where we go for a walk and the answer To the tank!
  6. serge siberian
    serge siberian 30 December 2017 19: 27
    +4
    Now I understand why KV disappeared. Thanks to the author for a very good material. And as for the German memoirs, there are also a lot of dreamers there.
  7. Nemesis
    Nemesis 30 December 2017 19: 57
    +4
    KV-85 can be called the first Soviet tank on which a truly effective weapon was installed, capable of fighting against any enemy armored vehicles, and there are no killed tanks in nature ...
  8. beeper
    beeper 31 December 2017 00: 41
    +3
    I liked the article, as well as the comments, and the illustrations are interesting (especially about the tank in Avtovo, I didn’t know that, it turns out, this is a “make-up” Object 239 smile ).
    About (the heads) of the design talents of precisely Kotin, J.Ya. I remain of low opinion (IMHO).
  9. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 31 December 2017 11: 17
    +2
    On the Leningrad front, a paradoxical situation developed up to
    lifting the blockade: the Kirov plant produced tanks - there were a lot of them.
    On the other hand - the Germans - had no tanks at all. But the overwhelming advantage
    could not realize in tanks.
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 1 January 2018 08: 34
      0
      Why tanks in defense?
      1. verner1967
        verner1967 1 January 2018 12: 09
        +1
        Quote: demiurg
        Why tanks in defense?
        tanks are always needed, but why defend if there are so many tanks?
    2. badens1111
      badens1111 1 January 2018 12: 25
      +6
      Quote: voyaka uh
      On the other hand - the Germans - had no tanks at all.

      Awesome illiteracy.
      at least looked into the encyclopedia for the unlearned.
      The forces of the parties in the Leningrad strategic defensive operation
      German forces [edit | edit code]
      From the German side, the Army Group North was involved in the operation, consisting of the 16th and 18th field armies, and the 4th tank group. From the air, ground troops were supported by the 1st air fleet, reinforced by the 8th air corps of V. von Richthofen, in which there were dive bombers not previously used in the band of Army Group North.

      By the beginning of the operation, the 18th Field Army was in Estonia. During the German offensive in the Baltic states at the end of June - beginning of July 1941, the 18th Field Army, pursuing the Soviet troops of the 8th Army, who managed to break away from the enemy and organize a new line of defense, entered into combat contact on July 8, 1941. On July 10, 1941, the 18th Field Army, with its left flank, occupied positions north of Pärnu, then along the Pärnu River to the northeast to the Võhma region and then to the southeast to Tartu and Lake Peipsi.

      In the center of the army group, in the area of ​​Pskov - Ostrov, were the positions of the 4th tank group, with a wedge to the northeast to the Slavkovichi. On the left, northern face of the wedge, the 41st motorized corps advanced, on the right, eastern - the 56th motorized corps. Https: //ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9B%D0%B5
      %D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%81%
      D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%
      D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D
      1%8F_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D
      1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%BE%D
      0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F
      And what was included in the tanks, at least 46 motorized hulls, read.
      https://books.google.ru/books?id=l-BDAwAAQBAJ&
      ;pg=PA76&lpg=PA76&dq=%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BB%D
      0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE+%D1%82%D
      0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2+%D0%B2+%D0%BC%D0%BE%
      D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D
      0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC+%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BF%D
      1%83%D1%81%D0%B5+%D0%93%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D
      0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8&source=bl&ots=4mCZjutPtU
      & sig = oWOB5zfh_9d1YeITmXb5XtlHbvM & hl = ru & am
      p; sa = X & ved = 0ahUKEwjJl4fvuLbYAhXDNJoKHf3ZBTwQ6
      AEITTAH#v=onepage&q=%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%
      D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%20%D1%82%D0%B
      0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D0%BC%D0%BE
      %D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%
      D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B
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      %B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8&f=false
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 1 January 2018 14: 26
        +3
        "Stunning illiteracy" ////

        But not mine. smile
        In September 1941, ALL tanks of Army Group North were deployed near Moscow.
        Loaded onto the railway platforms and taken away. The Germans went on the defensive.
        since that time, the Germans had no tanks near Leningrad.
        From time to time they were transferred to the Volgov front,
        to stop several attempts by the Red Army,
        and then taken back.
        1. badens1111
          badens1111 1 January 2018 16: 57
          +8
          Quote: voyaka uh
          In September 1941, ALL tanks of the army group

          These tales, tell yourself and your kind.
          Receive and sign, then do not say that they did not tell you about it.
          https://warspot.ru/9633-mify-sentyabrya-1941-goda
    3. St. Romualditch
      St. Romualditch 3 January 2018 20: 22
      +1
      Quote: voyaka uh
      On the Leningrad front, a paradoxical situation developed up to
      lifting the blockade: the Kirov plant produced tanks - there were a lot of them.
      On the other hand - the Germans - had no tanks at all. But the overwhelming advantage
      could not realize in tanks.

      Wikipedia, Tiger Tank: “The Tiger tanks first went into battle on August 29, 1942 at the Mga station near Leningrad.” (Https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D0%B8%
      D0%B3%D1%80_(%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA)
      And Otto Carius (“Tigers In The Mud”) made his debut on his “Tiger” just near Leningrad and spent there, becoming our big headache, for more than a month.
      So there were tanks. And not just tanks, but cars, which in 45 remained the most formidable opponents
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 4 January 2018 09: 34
        0
        Near Leningrad (on a "quiet" front) Tigers were tested.
        One was even captured by the whole.
        They were not kept there, like serial cars
        1. gladcu2
          gladcu2 4 January 2018 19: 39
          +1
          For an offensive, resources and the possibility of developing an offensive are needed.

          Apparently Leningraders and neighbors were not ready.
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. St. Romualditch
          St. Romualditch 5 January 2018 00: 21
          +2
          Quote: voyaka uh
          Near Leningrad (on a "quiet" front) Tigers were tested.
          One was even captured by the whole.
          They were not kept there, like serial cars


          SW Alexei,
          In the Leningrad direction, in order to lift the blockade, our troops did everything possible and impossible. But it was not possible to break through the blockade until the 44th, including due to the active use of heavy Tiger tanks by the Germans.
          The German tank ass, O. Carius, spent most of his stay on the Eastern Front precisely near Leningrad, where he “made” a name for himself.
          At that time, the PzKfw tank. VI "Tiger", on which he, in view of the enormous advantage over the Allied armored vehicles, achieved such a high "effectiveness", was an ideal machine in defensive battles.
          Thanks to these qualities of their vehicles, the 502nd heavy tank battalion (in which O. Carius fought) was actively used as a "fire brigade" in the most "problematic" sections of the Leningrad Front.
          Very detailed, in detail, this is described in the book "Tanks In The Mud." And also on Wikipedia there is an article that talks about the 502nd heavy tank battalion and its military route.

          https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/502-%D0%B9_%D1%82
          %D1%8F%D0%B6%D1%91%D0%BB%D1%8B%D0%B9_%D1%82%D0%B0
          %D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B9_%D0%B1%D0%B0
          %D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BE%D0%BD

          Some quotes from this article:
          "On February 12, 1943, during one of the battles to break the blockade of Leningrad, three Tigers of the 1st company of the battalion destroyed 10 squadrons. At the same time, the Germans had no casualties - they could shoot the squadron from a safe distance ....
          .... in August 1943. tanks PzKfw. VI "Tiger" from the battalion were involved in battles near Mgi. This unit was quite successfully used by the Germans as a “fire brigade” in the most tense sections of the Mginsky ledge.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 7 January 2018 00: 16
            +1
            Can you imagine how many Tigers were in the heavy tank battalion?
            12-15 pieces in total. And about 40 pieces of PzKpfw III. And this is for the entire Volkhov and Leningrad front.
            1. St. Romualditch
              St. Romualditch 7 January 2018 22: 07
              +1
              Quote: voyaka uh
              Can you imagine how many Tigers were in the heavy tank battalion?
              12-15 pieces in total. And about 40 pieces of PzKpfw III. And this is for the entire Volkhov and Leningrad front.


              SW Alexei,
              Initially, the question was raised by you in the form of a statement that there were no tanks from the German side near Leningrad.
              Then you didn’t recognize the tanks from the first production of the Tigers captured near Mgoy as tanks.
              Now you do not consider tanks the formation in the form of the 502nd heavy tank battalion.
              But these facts, as they say, lay on the surface. That's why I brought them to you.
              You can go further, delve into the details and reveal the picture with the tanks completely.
              But then it is necessary to agree in advance on the line, to which it is believed that in this section of the front of the tanks, as a kind of troops, there are none at all and after which they are slowly appearing. And then in this type of discussion, I begin to feel like a fool.
            2. The comment was deleted.
            3. St. Romualditch
              St. Romualditch 7 January 2018 22: 11
              +1
              Then, what, in 42-43 years, in the Leningrad direction, does even mean one Tiger with a couple of T-lll on the defensive?
              On a typical, relatively narrow section of the front, where there is a swamp on the left, a swamp on the right and a minefield in front:
              T-lll destroys the assault infantry. And the Tiger, from a distance of 1,5-2 km, easily shoots our attacking tanks and anti-tank artillery uselessly hitting it.
              In such attacks, even KV 85 has no chance.
              Hence the account of the German aces for 150 of our cars.
              Although, one cannot but admit that they were tactically very competent tankers and used the advantages of their equipment to the max.
        4. St. Romualditch
          St. Romualditch 5 January 2018 01: 41
          +3
          Quote: voyaka uh
          Near Leningrad (on a "quiet" front) Tigers were tested.
          One was even captured by the whole.
          They were not kept there, like serial cars


          Tigers weren’t “tested on a“ quiet “front” at all, but made their debut and were actively used at this theater of military operations, primarily because, due to the specifics of the terrain, it was there that they could reveal their full lethal potential.
          We must generally bear in mind that under Leningrad we were opposed by an adversary no less strong than on the other fronts. The opposition was so serious that in the Great Offensive of the summer of 1944, it was easier to get around this section from the south and lock up the entire North Army group in Courland where they had very strong resistance until May 45th
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 7 January 2018 00: 07
            +1
            "We must generally bear in mind that under Leningrad we were opposed by an adversary no less strong than on the other fronts" ////

            On the Leningrad Front, the Germans had 40-year-old reservists-infantrymen and foreign divisions, like the Spaniards. There was no Waffen SS, no grenadiers, no Panzerwaffe divisions. The advantage of the Red Army here, both quantitative and qualitative, was multiple and absolute. But, alas, Meretskov commanded. And that's it. All the elite parts of the Germans were in the center and in the south.
            When the Germans (their best troops) were defeated in the center (Kursk) and they began a general retreat, the weak North group also retreated so as not to be surrounded.
            1. St. Romualditch
              St. Romualditch 7 January 2018 22: 17
              0
              The assertion that on the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, with the multiple and absolute superiority of the Red Army, the Germans sat in a blank defense and waited for the war - does not correspond to the whole nature of the hostilities in the whole and mass of facts in particular.
              For example, let's take the fact of the Fuehrer's April decree No. 41. In which Hitler named the seizure of the Caucasian oil fields and the decisive assault on Leningrad as the main tasks for the 42nd year.
              The consequence of the directive was the transfer of Manstein's 11th army from the Crimea, with a field marshal at the head, and the German plan "Northern Lights", foiled by our counterpart "Sinyavinsky operation."
              Unfortunately, the Red Army suffered heavy losses in it. But the capture of Leningrad prevented.
            2. St. Romualditch
              St. Romualditch 7 January 2018 22: 22
              +1
              Quote: voyaka uh
              weak group North

              On the 42nd year of 1944, the "weak" Army Group "North" was the following:
              16th field army.
              18th field army.
              Operational group “Narva”
              2 Army Corps
              3rd SS Panzer Corps
              1st Air Fleet
              Total: 730 thousand people, 1,2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 7 thousand guns and mortars, 400 aircraft
              The remnants of all this "not elite, reservist ugliness" resisted in Latvia right up to May 23, 1945, after the surrender of Berlin.
  10. User_internet
    User_internet 31 December 2017 20: 13
    +3
    Quote: voyaka uh
    On the Leningrad front, a paradoxical situation developed up to
    lifting the blockade: the Kirov plant produced tanks - there were a lot of them.
    On the other hand - the Germans - had no tanks at all. But the overwhelming advantage
    could not realize in tanks.

    there are swamps, if you wish, you can’t realize it.
  11. MOSKVITYANIN
    MOSKVITYANIN 2 January 2018 11: 46
    +2
    An interesting and informative article ... well-described production and combat use of the tank ....
    Apparently, at the beginning of the production of the IS-1 (a completely new machine), the manufacturers had more problems than the production of the intermediate model - KV-85 ....
  12. CooL_SnipeR
    CooL_SnipeR 2 January 2018 17: 08
    +2
    Good article, author bow and respect drinks
  13. Stilet
    Stilet 2 January 2018 19: 41
    +2
    Thanks to the author! An interesting article, I read with pleasure.
  14. cedar
    cedar 3 January 2018 18: 28
    +2
    Quote: badens1111
    From the German side, the Army Group North was involved in the operation, consisting of the 16th and 18th field armies, and the 4th tank group. From the air, ground troops were supported by the 1st air fleet, reinforced by the 8th air corps of V. von Richthofen, in which there were dive bombers not previously used in the band of Army Group North.



    Involuntarily, questions beg. How did the Kirov factory, the manufacturer of KV tanks, avoid the fate of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant? But he was about two km away. from the front line and could not only be subjected to massive bombardments from the air, but also to artillery raids of different-caliber German artillery ...
    How in the conditions of the blockade did the plant receive electricity, components, armored steel and everything necessary for the manufacture of HF, which were made for the blockade of about 700 cars ..?
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 4 January 2018 09: 50
      0
      "Like the Kirov factory, the manufacturer of KV tanks" ////

      The Germans did not have the technical resources to destroy the Kirov Plant.
      At Stalingrad, the Germans brought down a powerful concentrated air strike.
      At the beginning of the war there were small raids on Leningrad (2 dozen medium bombers each).
      Then, with the beginning of the blockade, and they were gone. Bombers, like tanks, were taken to the "active" front: Moscow, south.
      Only heavy artillery regularly clockwise fired upon the city. But they had a limit: 20-30 shells per day. (all Leningraders knew this - they considered breaks).
      The supply of the army and industry was. It did not reach (almost) the idle
      civilian population. The real disaster was hunger and cold, not bombs and shells.
      And of course, the constant overwhelming losses of infantry on the Nevsky Piglet.
    2. Andrei
      Andrei 6 January 2018 03: 29
      +1
      Here are photos of pages from the book of Mikhail Baryatinsky
      "Soviet tanks in battle"

      The assembly and repair of tanks was first moved to a safer place, and then completely stopped

      Actually KV tanks were produced a little more than a month from the beginning of the blockade
    3. Andrei
      Andrei 6 January 2018 03: 39
      +1
      And electricity, like the whole city, from where I got opportunities from there, was received from power plants using peat as fuel (there are many peat in the Leningrad Region, - a fuel pipeline was laid along the bottom of Lake Ladoga,

      And with components and equipment and personnel it was bad,
      Some of the allies in connection with the German offensive stopped the production of products, some of the equipment and personnel were evacuated.
      They did everything they could for the front.
    4. mkpda
      mkpda 8 February 2018 15: 39
      +1
      1. The remaining equipment and personnel of the tank production were transferred to the LMZ workshops near the Sverdlovsk embankment of the Neva. Before these workshops reached only aviation.
      2. According to the existing accounting rules, the equipment received for major repairs at the manufacturer was considered as the release of new equipment. That is why there is a breakdown in the number of tanks produced by type (for example, the T-28 was initially calculated 20% more than after reconciling the serial numbers).
  15. The comment was deleted.
  16. gerkost2012
    gerkost2012 8 January 2018 22: 07
    0
    In general, when you read materials about the actions of Soviet tankers during the Great Patriotic War, sometimes it seems that the idiots controlled the troops. Well, what kind of attack could be with the participation of self-propelled guns -152, if their task is not to scoop into enemy positions, but provide fire support for the attack forces with the fire of their powerful guns. After all, these self-propelled guns were a land cruiser, what kind of attack on the hills and ravines and with maneuver? Why the armor was always torn off from the infantry is also understandable, because each crew did not have radio communications, but only on command vehicles, and even if it worked. And most importantly, most often attacked without any intelligence, "forward"! Hence the monstrous loss.
    And as regards R&D and the introduction of a new and promising product, oddly enough, with a rigid system of short-term bonds and so on, the Germans had it all better organized. On the Kursk Bulge, 5 TA Rotmistrova July 12, 1943 suffered huge losses in a collision with enemy armored vehicles near Prokhorovka. . And I had to win. But, the T-34-76 against the Tigers was clearly not good. It’s the same as I-16 vs Me-109.
    The new equipment was supposed to compete not in departments and at meetings, but in small batches at training grounds or on the battlefield. But, in the conditions of overstressed output plans, this was not possible.