Military Review

The Fire Hammer of the Third Rome. Part of 3

86
But, right up to the beginning of 1917, the disproportionately small Russian heavy artillery did not sufficiently influence the course of the war. Organizationally, she also was not associated with field compounds. And even the divisions attached to the army corps occasionally - to participate in major operations.


The usual situation was battery division of divisions — and the batteries “traveled” through armies and corps. Thus, an active participant in the Offensive of the South-Western Front 1916 - the 17 Army Corps - was strengthened by the Brest-Litovsk heavy artillery division only in the Brody-Radziwill area. The division supported the corps only 2 weeks - until the capture of the city of Brody. Thus, from 22 May to mid-July, the strike force fought without the support of heavy artillery.

But the proportion of Russian heavy field artillery to 1917 was noticeably increased. In addition to the aforementioned types of guns, 105-mm Japanese and 120-mm French guns, 150-mm German and 152-mm English howitzers appear on its armament.


Heavy gun "tractor" battery moves to the front, 1916 g. Domestic artillery for 600 years. M., 1986. From the author's library

With 1916, the heavy artillery is enhanced by “tractor” 203-mm and 228-mm howitzers (Vickers systems) - adapted for carrying tracked tractors. Kanet's 6-inch guns (a system of value ranging from 15 to 16 kilometers) were also adapted for traveling on tractors and railway platforms. At the Reserve Heavy Artillery Brigade, a special school of tractor artillery was created - all officers and senior heavy artillery fireworks were required to complete it (according to an accelerated program).

Tractor batteries were perfectly equipped with passenger cars and motorcycles (some of them with a sidecar). For the command of each group of 8 machines, a special technician officer was appointed, who was assisted by a technical master. All officers and fireworks were given a riding horse. A team of scouts and telephonists had 40 riding horses. For the transportation of shells, the tractor battery had 8 three-ton trucks, and for fuel - 2 tanks (on 5 and 3 tons). The commander of the tractor battery was relied on with a passenger car, and for other battery officers, another 2 vehicle. And, as the eyewitness noted: “With confidence, it is possible and should say that not a single army had such rich equipment!”.


203-mm Vickers towed howitzer. Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975. From the author's library

When the Kanet 1915-inch cannons appeared on the front of the 6 in the spring, the complexity and cumbersome installation of these guns was later taken into account when organizing the TAON.

The organization of the second type of heavy artillery, positional, resulted in the creation of separate positional divisions and high-power batteries.


Heavy weapon in position, Northern Front. Pictures of war. Issue 1. M., 1917. From the author's library

And finally, a special purpose heavy artillery corps appeared - the TAON. It consisted of 120 guns - 305-mm calibers (including the 12-inch “obukhovka” and the above-mentioned tractor artillery guns). As General V.I. Gurko recalled, at least three quarters of all Russian heavy artillery, which entered service in the winter from 1916 to 1917, was sent to the front to take part in the large-scale offensive of the 1917 campaign of the year. Soon, the 48 Army Corps under the command of General Scheidemann was formed from this artillery - a feature of the connection was that its combat units were exclusively artillery.

T. o. - there was a combination of heavy artillery of operational and strategic purpose. And the candidacy of his commander - Lieutenant-General G. M. Scheideman, an artilleryman-academician, was chosen perfectly. In total, by the spring of 1917, the TAON numbered 338 artillery barrels. Tractor artillery and large-caliber howitzers from TAON actively and effectively manifested themselves during the Summer Offensive of the South-Western Front 1917 (but the Northern Front was most seriously saturated with heavy artillery — promoted by the communication lines, the echeloned nature of the opponents' defense, and the importance of the covered direction).

The Fire Hammer of the Third Rome. Part of 3
G.M. Scheideman

Thus, in the matter of creating breakthrough artillery, Russia occupied a leading place among the other states parties to the war.

TAON has become a powerful fire resource - Stakes fire reserve. After all, if heavy field artillery was part of army units, submitting to the command of the latter and replenishing the field light artillery with its power in breaking through the fortified lines of enemy defenses, TAON became a powerful means of operational and strategic reinforcement of strike formations - when the creation of a powerful fire fist was required. In the course of strategic offensive operations, the TAON was attached to the attack corps and armies - its guns were combined into artillery groups subordinate to their chiefs, chiefs of artillery, and inspectors of the formations. The power of the caliber TAON and its organizational independence assumed the use of heavy artillery only as a powerful fire hammer. The abnormal weakening of the artillery grouping due to non-strike combat sectors was also excluded.

As of September 1917, the heavy artillery of the Russian Army had the following number of guns: 1203 guns (including 196 - 107-mm guns, 32 - 120-mm guns of the Obukhov factory system, 101 - 120-mm French gun and 558 - 152-mm guns of various systems) and 743 (including 32 - 305-mm howitzers of the Obukhov plant system and 559 - 152-mm howitzers of different systems) howitzers.

The Northern Front was the most heavily cannon - 304 guns (132 - West, 128 - South-West, 136 - Romanian, 94 - Caucasus, 240 - in the rear and 169 - on the formation), and howitzers - Romanian front - 138 guns ( 136 - Western and South-Western, 90 - Northern, 34 - Caucasian, 130 - in the rear and 79 - on the formation).

It is safe to say that if the Russian army had at the very beginning of the First World War at least an equal number of heavy artillery guns with Germany, then the course of the war and the whole история Russia would be different. E. von Ludendorff not for nothing emphasized the importance of having heavy artillery for the success of field troops - and in almost all German operations we note the presence of heavy and very heavy guns. So, even the landsturm, which was part of the 8 Army during the operation at Tannenberg, had guns of serf artillery. E. von Ludendorff rightly pointed out that by the beginning of the war, none of the warring nations, except the German one, had been able to correctly assess the benefits of artillery concentration. Moreover, the German army also used heavy Austrian 305-mm howitzers, as well as (taking into account the experience of hostilities) from the end of 1916, at the insistence of Emperor Wilhelm II began to receive long-range guns with a flat trajectory of firing, taken from inactive ships.

W. Churchill also emphasized the special significance of heavy artillery: “I was very interested in the fate of the huge mass of heavy artillery, which I, as the Minister of Armaments, prepared ... This weapon, the production of which requires one and a half years. But for the army, both for offensive and for defense, it is very important to have a large number of batteries at your disposal. I recall the struggle that Lloyd George waged with the War Department in 1914 ... ". Further, in his letter to the Prime Minister from 10. 9. 1939 of the year he wrote: “... most of all heavy artillery in the expeditionary corps is lacking. If it turns out that there are not enough heavy batteries, then it will cause fair criticism. ”

Speaking about the advantages of the German heavy artillery, the German historian H. Ritter noted: “In World War I, the material part of the heavy artillery was exemplary. Its large number at the beginning of the war gave the edge in decisive battles and was personally the work of Count Schlieffen ”.

Also noteworthy was the Germans' desire for mounted shooting — that is, to heavy field howitzers.

The shortcomings in the matter of underestimating heavy artillery (especially field) by other belligerent armies had to be overcome in the course of hostilities - incurring unjustifiably high losses in the most important operations of world war.

Thus, the Russian army entered the war with an insufficient number of heavy artillery guns - which contrasted sharply with the situation in the ranks of the enemy. As General A. Lukomsky recalled: “In addition to the lack of projectiles for our artillery, which greatly influenced the morale of the fighters, we met with large-caliber artillery from the enemy in field battles, which further worsened the situation. There was a new need - to urgently give the field army large-caliber artillery, which could equalize our chances with the chances of the enemy and would enable us to ensure the future success of the struggle for fortified positions.

Another eyewitness recalled: “I remember very well that joy, almost the delight with which in the first battles in East Prussia the heavy division approached. In one of the army corps in response to complaints from commanders of field light batteries that the enemy literally falls asleep with their heavy shells, while they are powerless to fight enemy heavy batteries that are beyond the reach of our 3-inch guns, the Corps artillery inspector gave advice to push our light batteries so that the shells of these batteries could hit the enemy’s heavy batteries. Of course, none of the light battery commanders followed this advice, but some of them noticed with irritation that for this they would have to choose positions ahead of their infantry. There is no doubt that the presence of heavy batteries in our country always enhanced the spirit of the troops, whereas their absence acted on the troops in the opposite sense. ”

A miscalculation was the lack of integration of the available heavy artillery units into the structure of field troops.

These omissions, as noted, were characteristic not only of the Russian army.

And they were overcome.

During the war, the number of heavy artillery increased many times, and its structure had 2 heavy artillery regiments, more than 100 heavy artillery divisions (72 individual, 5 Siberian, etc.), siege artillery brigades and regiments, tractor heavy divisions, and also mass separate heavy and heavy position batteries. And in the summer of 1917, the roar of the guns of powerful Russian artillery leveled enemy fortifications. But the imperial infantry, hardened in the battles of the three campaigns, the infantry, which would have fully captured the success of an unprecedented demonstration of firepower, was no longer there. The protester and the democratizing army refused to fight.

The formation and saturation of the new material part was proceeding at full speed and gaining momentum - and when, by the beginning of the 1917 campaign, the Russian Acting had, finally, powerful heavy artillery, and the spring-summer offensive of the Allies on the Entente Austro-Germans were afraid as fire - the enemies internal and external piled our state and plunged it into the abyss of chaos. The mythical “freedoms” turned out to be more important than victory in a world war — and the entire subsequent history took revenge on the Russian people for lack of endurance on the threshold of Victory. Victory - the most important factor in which became the powerful heavy artillery of the Russian Imperial Army, which passed through the hearth of an unprecedented war.
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  1. Blue cop
    Blue cop 11 January 2018 07: 22
    20
    Over 100 only heavy artillery divisions! And the TAON corps, which was unparalleled in other countries!
    Heavy artillery unfolded towards the end of the war - but they did not yield fruit.
    Interesting essay!
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 January 2018 13: 15
      +5
      If we turn to Barsukov, then in 1917 France had 1430 heavy batteries - 5700 heavy guns. Germany - 2015 heavy batteries - 8962 heavy guns.
      Moreover, guns of caliber 400, 420 and 520 mm, as well as sea guns 280-380 mm, fought on the Western Front. The same 420-mm mobile mortars some had before the war - information about their appearance caused feverish work to strengthen border fortresses, because the protection of their fortified structures was designed for the previous product of Mr. Krupp with a caliber of 280 mm.
      1. Blue cop
        Blue cop 11 January 2018 14: 09
        17
        Also not sickly.
        By the way, Germany had 2000 heavy guns at the beginning of the WWII — that is, an increase of 4,4 times (8962 divided by 2000). And Russia - an increase of 8 times (heavy 1203 guns + 743 howitzers divided by heavy 240 guns at the beginning of the war).
        For Russia as an agro-industrial country, the breakthrough was very, very.
        And you need to consider that heavy German guns are considered - in 1918, and Russian heavy guns - in 1917. They have one year plus - and what year, the peak of technology.
        It is necessary to take into account the fact that there was a positional war in the classical sense on the Western Front (and the rate of saturation with equipment multiplied by the insignificant length of the front was different), and on the Eastern Front there was a positionally maneuverable character.
        However - with less resources, we often did more
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 January 2018 15: 37
          +1
          Quote: Blue Cop
          By the way, Germany had 2000 heavy guns at the beginning of the WWII — that is, an increase of 4,4 times (8962 divided by 2000). And Russia - an increase of 8 times (heavy 1203 guns + 743 howitzers divided by heavy 240 guns at the beginning of the war).

          Barsukov for Russia has other figures: 240 heavy guns for 1914 and 1430 for 1917.
          Quote: Blue Cop
          For Russia as an agro-industrial country, the breakthrough was very, very.

          But the share of Russian industry in this increase was not particularly high:
          But the proportion of Russian heavy field artillery by 1917 increased markedly. In addition to the aforementioned types of guns, appear on its armament 105 mm японская and 120-mm french guns, 150 mm German and 152-mm english howitzers.
          Since 1916, heavy artillery has been strengthened by “tractor” 203-mm and 228-mm howitzers (Vickers systems)

          In the "Talmud" of Shirokorad, the head of artillery OM and BM simply replete with "foreign cars."
          In addition, do not forget that the increase in the number of barrels was also due to the transfer to the heavy artillery of existing guns - the same marine artillery systems.
          1. Gopnik
            Gopnik 11 January 2018 16: 08
            +2
            Quote: Alexey RA
            not very high


            is it specific?
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 11 January 2018 19: 59
              0
              You can see, for example, the composition of the TAON:
              The TAON organization was entrusted to the commission, chaired by field inspector general E. 3. Barsukov. Its formation was completed in January 1917. The reserve was named the 48th Corps, consisting of 6 TAON brigades (No. 200-205). The corps was 16 pcs. 280 mm Durlachter (Schneider) howitzers, 24 - 152 mm Schneider guns, 18 305 mm howitzers of the Obukhov factory, 48 203 mm Vickers howitzers, 8 305 mm Vickers howitzers, 48 ​​120 mm French guns, 6 120 mm English cannons, 8 152 mm English howitzers, 28 120 mm cannons of the Obukhov factory, 48 152 mm siege guns (200 pounds), 72 152 mm fortress howitzers, 8 152 mm Kane guns and 6 254 mm cannons.
              © Bloodless
              The situation with guns larger than 152 mm is quite indicative.
              1. Gopnik
                Gopnik 11 January 2018 20: 51
                +4
                well i.e. more than 60% among TAON guns (not counting field heavy artillery with their 107 mm cannons and 152 mm howitzers) this is "not very large" in your opinion, clearly.
                And why not higher than 203 mm, for example? Or in general, what, no higher than 300 mm?
              2. Blue cop
                Blue cop 11 January 2018 21: 47
                16
                Forgotten the latest 305mm - ki
                1. Blue cop
                  Blue cop 11 January 2018 21: 48
                  15
                  As part of the TAON corps - in the list of Beskrovny
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 12 January 2018 10: 23
                  +1
                  Quote: Blue Cop
                  Forgotten the latest 305mm - ki

                  Third in the list:
                  18 305-mm howitzers Obukhov plant
                  1. Blue cop
                    Blue cop 12 January 2018 10: 47
                    15
                    Yes, sorry - did not make out.
                    Well, out of 32 12-inch units that were part of the Russian army in September 1917, 18 (i.e., more than half) are concentrated in the TAON.
                    This underlines the importance that was rightly given by the Russian Headquarters to this breakthrough artillery unit
          2. The comment was deleted.
        2. hohol95
          hohol95 11 January 2018 15: 48
          +2
          E. Z. Barsukov
          Artillery of the Russian Army (1900–1917)
          During the war, the armament of heavy field artillery, in excess of 107-mm rapid-fire guns mod. 1910 and 152 mm howitzers mod. 1910, received the following: a) Russian systems - old 42-lin. (107 mm) guns arr. 1877 (Fig. 10), 6-dm. (152 mm) field mortars arr. 1883 (Engelhardt systems mentioned above) and 6-dm. (152 mm) guns at 120 pounds. arr. 1877 (Fig. 11); b) foreign systems - 120 mm French arr. 1878, lit. "E"; Schneider 152-mm siege rapid-firing guns mod. 1910, lit. “B” (Fig. 12); 5 dm. (127 mm) English (60 lb.) Vickers, lit. “P” and 10,5 cm Japanese guns (for data on the guns of these four systems, see table 5); c) 6 dm. (152 mm) rapid-firing (Fig. 13) castle howitzers mod. 1909 (see tab. 4), English 6-dm. (152 mm) Vickers howitzers, lit. "M" and 15 cm howitzers mod. Kruppa (data on howitzers of these two systems, see table. 5).

          So much for the "navel spurt" of Russian industry ...
          1. Blue cop
            Blue cop 11 January 2018 16: 11
            17
            Guys, I answer immediately to both.
            Alexey RA
            About 240 heavy guns for 1914 - no questions asked. As for 1430 heavy guns for 1917, Barsukov is mistaken. I am enclosing a page from Russia in the world war of 1914 - 1918. (in numbers). This is the official Soviet statistics source. The table for No. 50 in the upper right corner shows that in September 1917 the Russian army had 1203 guns + 743 howitzers - that is, almost 2000 guns.

            hohol95
            But you can recall the "domestic" coatings - 305 mm and 120 mm. This is if we talk about heavy artillery. Its role, as noted, was underestimated - because the volume of "foreign cars" is many times higher than for field artillery - harmonious and unified.
            After all, it was overcome - as much as possible in 3 years.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 11 January 2018 16: 17
              +3
              That's what it is about - UNDERSTIMATED heavy artillery ...
              Many things were underestimated ...
              "To artillery to headquarters captain Konovalov point out the unsuitability of the proposed field gun installation, which in a car will be more susceptible to fire and capture by the enemy than firing from a prepared position ..."
              From the response of the command of the Western Front to the proposal for the use of a gun from a car body, November 1914
              1. Blue cop
                Blue cop 11 January 2018 16: 20
                17
                So the article says - that all countries were underestimated except the Germans.
                But it was overcome.
                Judge for yourself - an increase in the fleet of Russian heavy guns (by all available means) from 240 guns in 1914 to almost 2000 in 1917 - 8 (!!!) times. It seems to be talking about something.
                And the inertness of individual organs and persons - history is familiar in all ages.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 11 January 2018 16: 27
                  +3
                  But the "breakdown" of industry occurred and ...
                  Late we realized ...
                  Did not even have time to make up for the loss of simple field artillery!
                  What was, it was !!! No one objects to this!
                  1. Gopnik
                    Gopnik 11 January 2018 18: 08
                    +5
                    there was no “strain”, production steadily grew up to the Maidan. There were more field tools in 1917 than in 1914, i.e. the losses made up for completely.
                    There were few heavy guns for everyone, as it turned out, and everyone was increasing its production, and not limited to quantity in 1914
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 11 January 2018 20: 18
                      +1
                      Let's open Manikovsky:
                      Everything that the Russian cannon and cannon factories gave and that they managed to get from the Allies from abroad did not far cover the army’s need for guns, especially heavy siege guns.

                      As for the attitude of the ruling spheres to existing gun factories, it can not be called otherwise than criminal.
                      True, at the end of 1916, the production of 76-mm guns was raised to 800 pieces per month (counting and repaired by pipe changes) and could rise to 1.000, but even here they started on the wrong path in the same way as with light shells, t i.e., in obvious and serious damage to guns of a larger caliber. As a result, as can be seen from table 44, the number of field guns in the army was brought up to 1917 in 8.500 (samples from 1902 and 1900 mountain and Japanese); but in terms of heavy artillery hopelessly behind. And the Quartermaster General was absolutely right under the Supreme Commander when, in concluding his note of September 26, 1917 to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, he indicated: “We surpass the enemy in light artillery, but with active operations the lack of heavy artillery is not compensated by the excess of light artillery, and therefore in preparing for spring, howitzers must be urged. "
                      But it was easier to write than to do: switching from a 76-mm gun to at least a 107-mm gun is very difficult, not to mention larger calibers.

                      In 1917, until September, the number of guns on the fronts gradually increased. In general, it can be considered that at the beginning of the war the Russian army had only about 8.000 different kinds of guns in service and in stocks, but in fact it ended the war with about 13.000 guns.

                      That is, not what the front needed was produced. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the factories continued to drive the plan along the shaft for 3 "shells due to shrapnel, to the detriment of grenades (which the front demanded). It was these stocks of both finished shrapnel 3" rounds and their elements that were shot until the 40s .
                      For comparison: Germany started the war with 9388 guns (including 1396 heavy), and ended with 19810 (including 8962 heavy). The numbers are taken from Barsukov.
                      1. Blue cop
                        Blue cop 11 January 2018 20: 40
                        16
                        What we talked about - the Germans increased the park from 2000 (the beginning of the war) to 8962 (1918) (4,4 times)
                        And the Russians - from 240 (the beginning of the war) to 2000 (1917) (8 times).
                        Plus, Russia has minus one year (Germans plus one).
                      2. Gopnik
                        Gopnik 11 January 2018 21: 08
                        +4
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        That is, not what the front needed was produced.


                        Those. want to say that the three-inch front is not needed, or what ?? And why did their French and Germans rivet the whole WWII, and the USSR drove the whole WWII?


                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        The situation was aggravated by the fact that the factories continued to drive the plan on the shaft for 3 "shells due to shrapnel, to the detriment of grenades (which the front demanded).


                        These are your fantasies. The proportion of pomegranates increased constantly, and shrapnel was widely used throughout the war.

                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        For comparison: Germany started the war with 9388 guns (including 1396 heavy), and ended with 19810 (including 8962 heavy).


                        And with what do you suggest comparing these figures? Since you write that by November 1918 Germany had 19810 guns, they would have written how many of them the Red Army had at that time. So they would compare, yes
              2. Gopnik
                Gopnik 11 January 2018 18: 04
                +4
                quite rightly, by the way, they answered. Absurd, some kind of undertaking.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 11 January 2018 20: 09
              +2
              Quote: Blue Cop
              About 240 heavy guns for 1914 - no questions asked. As for 1430 heavy guns for 1917, Barsukov is mistaken.

              I think I understood the reason for the discrepancy. Barsukov and Manikovsky indicated the state of heavy artillery at the fronts Russian army. That is, only heavy artillery in the army is given - without taking into account the rear and repair.
    2. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 16: 03
      0
      Just think, 100 heavy divisions ... Other participants might have had fewer divisions, but there were more barrels ... But the TAON corps had to be created before ... Then it would be possible to compensate for the lack of barrels by massaging them.
  2. Monarchist
    Monarchist 11 January 2018 08: 25
    19
    The TAON Corps is the forerunner of the artillery of the RGK in the Second World War. The "tractor battery" in its equipment even surpassed the heavy artillery of the Red Army in the Second World War (read Voronov, Grabin + d \ f on the DVD "Artillery of Victory"
    1. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 56
      0
      Yes, only in the RGK (not including the GAP divisions and AP corps) of the Red Army, there were an order of magnitude more cannons of large caliber.
      1. Gopnik
        Gopnik 14 January 2018 01: 43
        +3
        oh well, after 30 years and an order of magnitude more? Well, who would have thought. And 30 years after the Second World War, as it was with the artillery of the SA, at the same level as in 1945, or "an order of magnitude more"?
        1. Nukesmoke
          Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 20: 59
          0
          30 years? 1916 + 30 = 1946? You are clearly confused in the complex knowledge and calculations that are difficult for you.
  3. XII Legion
    XII Legion 11 January 2018 09: 06
    22
    Two general brothers.
    CM. Scheidemann commanded in the fall of 1914 the 2nd Army - near Warsaw and Lodz. Voluntarily joined the Red Army.
    And G. Sheideman mentioned in the article by G. (Yu.) Held the posts of inspector of artillery of the corps and army, commanded the TAON and also then joined the Red Army. And at one time he was the head of artillery and the head of the armored forces of the Red Army. The author of a number of very interesting articles on the combat use of artillery in the WWII.
    Such a general family duet
    1. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 21: 00
      0
      Grendaley brothers remember?
  4. igordok
    igordok 11 January 2018 09: 17
    12
    Powerful defense sectors were created on the Northern Front.
    10 "coastal guns (as in the document) already in 1915 were planned to be installed at the Ostrovsky position, near the Bryanchaninovo station of the Warsaw Railway, which was to become a powerful defense unit. There were built 2 batteries 11" mortar, 3 batteries 9 "mortar, 1 9 cannon battery, 1 6 cannon battery in 190 pounds, 1 6 cannon battery (apparently from Caen) and 1 lightweight battery. In front of the station, trenches, shelters and dugouts were built. In addition, a narrow gauge railway was run from the station through Izborsk to Pechki, on which it was planned to transport artillery.
    .
    At the same time, the Narovskaya, Peipsi Lake, Pskov, Ostrov, Svyatogorsk and Novorzhevskaya positions were built. The narrow gauge railway had to go a few versts behind the last three positions. The first to begin construction was from Bryanchaninovo to Pechkov.


    10 "(254-mm) coastal guns in 45 class.
    1. Cat
      Cat 11 January 2018 19: 54
      +5
      In principle, the presence of powerful artillery on the Northern Front was due to its proximity to the fleet and its "reserve". Ships and sea fortresses throughout the First World War acted as donors. The Great Patriotic War was marked by an even more effective “fraud”. And the railway artillery, in principle, owes its existence to the naval "zagashniks" and the "projects" of the tsarist admirals.
      For example, the TM-14s were armed with 14 inch guns ordered for linear armchairs. And the TM-12 was all in store for the battleships. The vigilance in the early years of the Soviet Union is simply surprising. So from the shells 47mm goceks guns on lathes cut belts for rifling and ..... Our tanks and anti-tank guns received 45mm shells.
      To the author and forum users a low bow and "+" to the piggy bank for the article and comments! Thank you so much!!!
      1. soldier
        soldier 12 January 2018 12: 05
        15
        The presence of powerful artillery on the Northern Front is also due to: the importance of the concealed direction (to Petrograd) and the presence of the most layered defense on the Russian Front - the positions were established for 2,5 years and they were only strengthened + difficult terrain and developed fortification.
      2. Nukesmoke
        Nukesmoke 13 January 2018 00: 01
        +1
        Hotchkiss. GOCHKIS, CARL!
        1. Cat
          Cat 13 January 2018 12: 57
          0
          Rights to all 100%
          I have a problem - the paws are big, the phone is small and sometimes it’s "removed my name and then into a puddle"! hi
          1. Nukesmoke
            Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 21: 01
            0
            It is strange that it is very rarely misinterpreted :))))
  5. soldier
    soldier 11 January 2018 10: 11
    19
    It is safe to say that if the Russian army had at least the same amount of heavy artillery guns as Germany at the very beginning of World War I, the course of the war and the whole history of Russia would be different.

    How important it is to calculate the prospects for the use of appropriate weapons!
    Another evidence that the Germans, carefully preparing for war, paid military attention to increased attention.
  6. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 11 January 2018 11: 10
    19
    An interesting uniformological moment (the brochure of Schenk Artillery, 1909).
  7. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 11 January 2018 11: 53
    14
    A wonderful and very informative series of articles. Attention is drawn to the fact of significant mechanization of heavy artillery batteries, which was previously preferred not to be mentioned in Russian historiography. The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done! hi
    1. Curious
      Curious 11 January 2018 13: 52
      +4
      "Noteworthy is the fact of significant mechanization of heavy artillery batteries, which was previously preferred not to be mentioned in Russian historiography."
      Why not mentioned, mentioned.
      “In view of the weak development of domestic technology, Russian artillery used mechanical traction during the war in extremely limited sizes. With the exception of cars made by the Putilov factory to transport 76 mm Tarnovsky-Lender anti-aircraft guns, the rest of the mechanical engines received during the war Russian artillery was ordered by former allies of Russia, and received far from always benign.
      As for heavy artillery, the Russian artillery used during the war Fowler’s Big Lion and Small Lion steam tractors delivered from England to transport Vickers 305-mm howitzers and which turned out to be unsuitable both for spoiling roads due to their heavy weight and other disadvantages inherent in general steam engines (dependence on water and fuel, a lot of preparation time, noise, etc.); tractors with internal combustion engines - the 60-horsepower Morton wheeled and Allis-Shalmers wheeled-caterpillar and other systems that were used to move the 203-mm and 234-mm Vickers heavy English howitzers. Wheel caterpillar tractors were considered the best.
      "Systems of very heavy siege-type guns were transported unassembled by rail or on specially adapted not only for transportation, but also for firing rail-carriage platforms."
      Barsukov E.Z. Artillery of the Russian army (1900–1917).
      As you can see, it wasn’t especially domestic there.
      1. Some kind of compote
        Some kind of compote 11 January 2018 14: 22
        18
        Well, we think almost domestic Volks Polo Kaluga assembly wink
        From the history of our tractor industry:
        1903 year. The talented student of F.A. Blinov, Yakov Vasilievich Mamin, designed an internal combustion engine that worked on heavy fuel. In this engine, the designer made an additional chamber with a thermal battery in the form of an inserted copper igniter. The ignitor was heated from an external source of heat before starting the engine, and then for the rest of the time the engine was operated by self-ignition, using crude oil as fuel.
        Mom received a patent for the engine in 1903. This circumstance gives the right to assert that the high-pressure uncompressed engine running on heavy fuel was first built in Russia.
        1911 year. Y.V. Mamin made a tractor with an engine of 18 kW of its own design and gave it the name "Russian Tractor-2". After testing and a small alteration, a tractor with a 33 kW engine was created. More than 1914 of these tractors were produced at the Balakovo Plant until 100.
        In addition to the Balakovo plant, shortly before the First World War, several Russian factories (in Rostov-on-Don, Kichkass, Barvenkov, Kharkov, Kolomna, Bryansk, etc.) began to produce tractors. But their role in the history of pre-revolutionary tractor construction is small. The tractor industry practically did not exist. In 1913 there were only 165 tractors in Russia, and by 1917 there were about 1500 tractors.
        1918 year. At the Obukhov plant, the production of tracked-wheeled tractors, similar to the American Holt tractor with a 55 kW engine, began.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 11 January 2018 16: 20
          +8
          Quote: Some kind of Compote
          Well, we think almost domestic Volks Polo Kaluga assembly

          Tradition s. smile For example, the total number of cars produced by Soviet industry during the Second World War included all cars assembled from machine sets delivered to the USSR.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 11 January 2018 17: 00
            +4

            Something like this..
            1. Gopnik
              Gopnik 11 January 2018 18: 10
              +6
              Wow, more than 400 tractors. Not bad. I thought that by then less.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 11 January 2018 22: 34
                0
                Do you think that 400 tractors of 13 brands for a front length of about 900 km is quite enough?
                While the fronts themselves used 25 pcs. !!!
                Yes, in the artillery 291 tractor women again for 900 km !!!
                Was that enough?
                1. BRONEVIK
                  BRONEVIK 11 January 2018 23: 16
                  17
                  Here you need to look not at kilometers, but at the number of available trunks of tractor artillery.
                  The available divisions were provided with a mechanical draft. And as the artilleryman noted in the text of the article - not bad
                  1. Nukesmoke
                    Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 53
                    0
                    Only it was not enough.
                    1. BRONEVIK
                      BRONEVIK 13 January 2018 07: 03
                      15
                      There were exactly as many as required.
                      That is - enough.
                      Or do you know how much?
                      1. Nukesmoke
                        Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 21: 03
                        0
                        Yes, we’ll arm the infantry with halberds, light machine guns for fools, and a car a luxury!
                2. Gopnik
                  Gopnik 11 January 2018 23: 43
                  +2
                  And how many tractors were needed in September 1916? For comparison, for example, how many were there in Manchuria in 1905 or in the Balkans in 1877 per kilometer of fronts?
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 12 January 2018 07: 57
                    0
                    You still give an example of the battle of the Kalka River.
    2. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 54
      0
      You did not read simply historiography. The guarantor.
  8. Albatroz
    Albatroz 12 January 2018 07: 55
    12
    Thank you for the informative and interesting series of articles on heavy artillery!
    Hood!
  9. Rotmistr
    Rotmistr 12 January 2018 10: 41
    15
    To the question of the meaning of "foreign cars"
    Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of an artillery officer:
    “On February 20, 1916, by order of the Field Inspector General of the Artillery of Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, two head officers of artillery schools and ten chief officers and 42 soldiers were sent to England from mortar divisions.
    The business trip was aimed at not expecting the arrival of 45-ln ordered in England for Russian artillery. howitzers, prepare for future formations of new batteries, the armament of which should have been these howitzers, instructors and personnel.
    The dispatch to England during the war of such a large group of Russian military ranks should have been arranged very secretly, especially since the route indicated lay first through Finland, then through neutral but crowded with German spies Sweden and Norway, and finally through the German Sea, German fleet, whose submarines were stopped at that time by neutral vessels, examined them and removed suspicious passengers.
    For greater caution when moving, all business travelers had to leave Petrograd in pairs, at intervals of two days, in civilian clothes, of course, suits, carrying military uniforms and cold steel with them in their hand luggage.
    The move was successful.
    Upon arrival in London, each couple dressed in military uniforms and was ordered by our military representative: officers in a private hospital, and soldiers in a beautiful hotel for English soldiers arriving from the front.
    ... When all the business travelers arrived in London, the whole team was sent to the English wartime artillery school, located two hours by train from London, in the area called "Large Hill". On this day, the inhabitants of London had the opportunity to see an extraordinary picture: a clean and neatly dressed Russian military unit walked through the city with songs. This artillery team went to the station. Applause accompanied her before boarding the cars.
    At school, for two weeks, officers and soldiers thoroughly studied the materiel of 45-ln. British howitzer, and for the third week the calculation for two batteries was adjusted and ready for practical shooting.
    At the same time, it turned out that the method adopted by the British for dividing the goniometer (into two semicircles, into 180 divisions each) was inconvenient for us, which was subsequently corrected before sending howitzers to Russia. Goniometers were divided into the divisions we have adopted.
    Practical shooting took place in the presence of the entire school staff and its head, Colonel Thomson, a former commander of one of the equestrian batteries of the 1st British Army, who suffered heavy losses in the first battles with the Germans. Colonel Thomson was wounded in the leg, after which he could not ride freely.
    Our gunners replaced the British in the position of two batteries, and we heard the usual commands. The goniometer was used as Russian (one half), and the batteries without any difficulties and delays built a "fan" and opened fire.
    Due to the extremely limited number of bombs fired by the British for practical firing (there were no shrapnel at all), it was possible to carve out for each battery only two gunshots with the transfer of fire and release a few bombs to defeat.
    The speed with which the Russian gunners mastered the new material for them, the speed of shooting and carrying fires, made a great impression on the British, but our gunners were not happy with the shooting. A large percentage of the bombs did not break, which was what the British paid attention to. The British explained this by the fact that on practical firing they release defective shells. However, subsequently, in Galicia and on the Romanian front, where the newly formed batteries and divisions armed with British howitzers were mainly directed, it turned out that the shooting with shrapnel was not amenable to any proofreading and the shrapnel was torn as she pleased, and the bombs, depending on the hardness
    of the soil on which they fell gave continuos from one quarter to one third, and sometimes even more.
    The alarm raised on this occasion caused the arrival of representatives of the English military mission at the front, who, having been on the firing of one of the divisions armed with their howitzers, brought out the following, justifying their conclusion: the Russians require "lace" work from artillery and save shells. We do not regret the shells, which is why we make up for their shortcomings.
    On our front, the divisions armed with British howitzers did not and could not have serious significance. Heavy on the go, with a small limit of fire (one mile less than our 48-liter howitzer), with dormant shrapnel and a badly exploding bomb, they could not perform critical tasks. Thus, in the history of Russian artillery, the appearance with us of 45 years. an English howitzer can hardly be noted by a more interesting fact than the fact of the practical shooting of Russian artillerymen at a training ground near London. "
  10. soldier
    soldier 12 January 2018 15: 43
    15
    Without exaggeration, Russian heavy artillery was born in WWI
    And in the future - developed and improved
    1. soldier
      soldier 12 January 2018 16: 01
      15
      Heavy field artillery
      1. Serge72
        Serge72 12 January 2018 17: 56
        15
        And the trends are very revealing and significant.
        1. Nukesmoke
          Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 52
          0
          In the form of purchases abroad?
          1. Serge72
            Serge72 13 January 2018 07: 05
            16
            In the form of both production and procurement abroad. It is impossible to increase the scale by 8 times in 3 years only due to production.
            1. Nukesmoke
              Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 23: 11
              0
              The scale of what? Norms 1916 (Manikovsky) of light field guns 11200, light howitzers 2160, heavy guns (without ABM) 1080. The scale of the Wishlist army increased by 8 times, but failed to cover them.
              1. kipage
                kipage 19 January 2018 11: 35
                15
                The scale of heavy artillery in the army
                As already written by a friend in the comments
                The Germans increased the fleet of heavy guns from 2000 (the beginning of the war) to 8962 (1918) (4,4 times)
                And the Russians - from 240 (the beginning of the war) to 2000 (1917) (8 times).
                And do not forget that Russia has minus one year
                1. Nukesmoke
                  Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 13: 19
                  0
                  This shows how Russia is a backward country not only in industry, but also in military science. The Germans understood that it was impossible to fight without heavy artillery, ours tried to fill the enemy with 3 "shrapnel (which is such ineffective rubbish that you shouldn’t write, but it’s very expensive).
                  One cannot but admit - the efforts to mobilize industry in the Empire are admirable! But to do in a couple of years into the war what they could not do in 20 years in the world is impossible.
                  1. kipage
                    kipage 19 January 2018 20: 53
                    15
                    This shows how Russia is a backward country not only in industry, but also in military science. The Germans understood that it was impossible to fight without heavy artillery

                    Then write down here all but the Germans - and the HUNGARY backward with a 300 heavy cannon in '14 and all of Europe and America.
                    ours tried to fill the enemy with 3 "shrapnel (and this is such ineffective rubbish that it’s not worth writing, but it’s very expensive)

                    Yeah, the Germans only called the "scythe of death." For maneuvering war - that’s it. The action of Russian three-inch shrapnel against openly located or moving targets was terrifying. One eight-gun light battery could destroy an entire battalion of infantry or a cavalry regiment in a few minutes.
                    No wonder the French put everything on a 75-mm-ku.
                    It’s just that the war took on a different character than planned
                    1. Nukesmoke
                      Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 21: 51
                      0
                      The French MAY increase the fleet of guns at times as needed (by the way 300 against 240 for us). But the custodians had at least not only shrapnel.
                      "Scythe of death" if you shove the column. And if you hide even in a hut - from a shrapnel sense "zero". If the chain - then the effect falls. If it is creeping even less. And then very quickly there was nothing to mow.
                      1. kipage
                        kipage 19 January 2018 22: 06
                        15
                        The Russian field 76-mm gun was armed, in addition to shrapnel, and a high-explosive grenade. People who accidentally fell into the area of ​​its operation turned into a sieve, most residential buildings, not excluding stone ones, were pierced by a three-inch grenade, but it was, however, rather weak for destroying earthen shelters.
                        What a column. Battle formations in the form of chains and waves of chains. Their scythe of death also coughed up.
                        And for the hut there is a high-explosive grenade.
  11. Nukesmoke
    Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 51
    0
    Can you see the number of trunks in comparison with other participants? Without denying the titanic efforts to create heavy artillery, nevertheless, how much?
  12. Nukesmoke
    Nukesmoke 12 January 2018 23: 59
    0
    Blue Cop, Country A built 1000 cars in one year and 1100 cars in the next. 10% growth
    Country B built 1 car in one year, in the next 2 cars. 200% growth

    Undoubtedly, the dynamics of the development of country B are 10 times more effective than country A!
    1. Gopnik
      Gopnik 14 January 2018 01: 40
      +4
      certainly yes. And what is wrong?
      1. Nukesmoke
        Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 23: 12
        0
        In country A after 2 years 2100 vehicles, in country B 3 vehicles a)))
        1. kipage
          kipage 19 January 2018 11: 33
          15
          Is not a fact
          For 2 years, the first could stagnate, and the second could increase at times.
          The main thing is trends
          As with any process
          1. Nukesmoke
            Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 13: 19
            0
            For B, the trends are such that “Achilles will not catch the turtle”: ((((
            1. kipage
              kipage 19 January 2018 20: 55
              15
              Tense - catch up.
              Caught up with the 20-30s. and surpassed
              1. Nukesmoke
                Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 21: 52
                0
                And Peter could. Only there is a trend break. And until 1914 they were not going to break the trend ... It's ridiculous - by importing locomobiles, they reduced workers in locomotive plants ...
  13. kipage
    kipage 13 January 2018 06: 52
    15
    Impressive as the pace of development of domestic heavy artillery
    So is the scale of the formation of parts of mobile and positional TA
    Thanks to the author
    Keep it up!
    1. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 18 January 2018 23: 13
      0
      You simply did not compare with other participating powers.
      1. kipage
        kipage 19 January 2018 11: 29
        15
        I compared everything.
        It's not about momentary quantities, but about trends
        The progress achieved is the most striking.
        And then - there would be more
        Yet
        1. Nukesmoke
          Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 13: 21
          0
          The trend is such that to increase the large-caliber guns there was not enough production capacity, it was impossible to create them because of the lack of machine tool industry and industrial personnel, and I had to buy abroad.
          1. kipage
            kipage 19 January 2018 19: 28
            15
            Capacities were created one way or another.
            Several plants plus prospects
            1. Nukesmoke
              Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 21: 53
              0
              Capacities were created for the possible sale of machine tools to us. In any case, this path was unpromising.
              1. kipage
                kipage 19 January 2018 22: 02
                16
                3 powerful art plants - if we talk about heavy artillery.
                About machine tool industry - the production of metal-cutting machine tools in Russia in 1913 amounted to 1,8 thousand units, the park of installed machine tools in 1908 totaled 75 thousand units.
                Not enough, but ...
                Industrialization would go one way or another
                The agrarian-industrial country was turning into an industrial one. And everyone would have built (completed) - without excesses.
                1. Nukesmoke
                  Nukesmoke 20 January 2018 22: 33
                  0
                  Do not be war. I say - the war led to a record race. So France is not the goal for which it was necessary to derail everything.
                  1. kipage
                    kipage 22 January 2018 06: 52
                    15
                    France has nothing to do with it.
                    It has already been repeatedly said that Russia's entry into the WWII was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation. If she had not entered the war, she would have been piled up in droves, and after the defeat of France and Serbia, a guaranteed rout with the seizure of a number of territories was waiting for her.
  14. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 19 January 2018 11: 38
    15
    Nukesmoke,
    Yes, we’ll arm the infantry with halberds, light machine guns for fools, and a car a luxury!

    This is what?
    I asked a colleague about the number of tractor divisions. Or do you know how many there were?
    1. Nukesmoke
      Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 13: 22
      0
      Not enough. Arranged?
      1. BRONEVIK
        BRONEVIK 19 January 2018 19: 30
        15
        Well, if you approach philosophically, then always something is not enough.
        But the TAON was staffed by tractor divisions in the state, and these divisions had all the required materiel
        1. Nukesmoke
          Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 21: 54
          0
          Naturally. True, not enough guns, but on the state. The only pity is that quality does not steer against quality + quantity.
  15. Nukesmoke
    Nukesmoke 19 January 2018 22: 24
    0
    kipage,
    The Germans mowed columns and sometimes tight chains. But it was sometimes (something like with a machine gun on the flank) and only at the beginning of the war.
    We started with shrapnel, and then a pomegranate appeared, although private traders continued to drive shrapnel (they cost more).
    In any case, when it was impossible to realize maneuvering qualities, the whole concept went to hell. And given that to realize the advantage - the most numerous cavalry in the world, ours did not succeed ...