An unanswered offer for NATO
On the eve of the 20 anniversary of the establishment of the CSTO, a meeting was held between the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the countries participating in this association. The meeting was held in the Kazakh capital and was filled with talk far not only about the upcoming anniversary, but also that the CSTO had long outgrown, let's say, children's pants, and may well declare their interests in different regions of the world. One of the key issues discussed in Astana is the question that the CSTO is ready to offer cooperation to the North Atlantic Alliance to solve a number of tasks: from eliminating the threat of drugs and working together on leveling the effects of man-made and natural disasters to countering terrorism. At a meeting with colleagues from other CSTO member countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov expressed the view that the CSTO is ready to call on NATO to fully and productively cooperate in various areas.
The proposal to cooperate with NATO can certainly be viewed as an attempt to enter into a constructive dialogue with Brussels and Washington, but the reaction of the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Rasmussen, was far from the one that was obviously expected of him in Astana. Rasmussen said that he does not see the need for NATO to go for any joint activity with the CSTO, since the Alliance can cope with the threats identified by the CSTO members and without outside help. Apparently, Rasmussen believes that NATO “fights” excellently with Afghan drug trafficking, and terrorists anywhere in the world shudder and hide in the corners from just one mention of the word “NATO”.
Such a reaction of Brussels suggests that the West is not ready to view the CSTO as an organization capable of working with NATO on an equal footing. This once again confirms that NATO’s attitude to any Russian, even if obviously productive, initiatives that are offered in any format are obviously negative. How much Washington and Brussels would not say about readiness for a “reset” in relations with Russia, but in fact, any reset is doomed to turn into a pile of debris at the first stage of its implementation. Apparently, the stereotype about Russia, as the number one enemy, is a stereotype far from Mitt Romney alone, but of the whole “progressive West”. Rasmussen's words once again show that the West is not ready to get rid of the phobias of the Cold War and to perceive Russia and its allies as equal partners, cooperation with which can bring tangible benefits.
However, the response of Mr. Rasmussen is, as they say, his case, and he can reject the CSTO initiatives as much as he wants, but there is one nuance that Brussels and Washington will obviously not be able to dissociate from. According to the documents signed by the delegates of the participating countries (by the way signed by everyone except Uzbekistan), the CSTO is committed to working with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This suggests that the CSTO are going to conduct a certain kind of peacekeeping work, guided by their own principles. After all, today, it must be admitted, there is a hefty roll of the UN towards the interests of NATO. In essence, the UN itself began to be perceived by Washington and Brussels as a kind of tool for achieving its goals. And if the CSTO is really ready to implement its own initiatives through the United Nations, then this will be a sharp injection for NATO, who feels a de facto monopoly on world order.
But issues of cooperation with the UN concerning peacekeeping may raise a number of issues within the CSTO itself. And the main question is that if the CSTO enters the initiative of a global peacekeeping nature, then you should not expect the deployment of the Organization’s military contingents to the same Syria or Libya. It is obvious that the venture with the introduction of troops by the CSTO to any other country is doomed to a complete lack of support among the citizens of the participating countries. However, here we need to talk about the issue of terminology. The world has become accustomed to judging the words "peacemaking initiatives" solely through the prism of understanding this term by Washington and Brussels. Now even the phrase “peacekeeping operation” itself has become, almost, a synonym for the real war itself. These are the obvious fruits of NATO work "alone."
Speaking about the CSTO initiative, it is necessary to understand that at the meeting in Astana an idea emerged to restore the real effectiveness of peacekeeping missions with diplomatic tools. For this, it is not at all necessary to send a couple of tens of thousands of soldiers anywhere. After all, peacekeeping missions are much more effective if they are based on constructive diplomatic dialogue, and not on the use of Tomahawks. If we turn back today, we can realize the scale of all the "peacekeeping" missions of the West. Entering the NATO contingent in any region is a war already a priori. Therefore, the CSTO initiative looks like a real counterweight to the NATO understanding of restoring order in the world, which almost always turns into open military pressure on one of the parties to the conflict.
In this regard, we can assume that the CSTO chose a very thoughtful way of their future work. The proposal on mutually beneficial partnership rejected by Rasmussen will now be an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to the United Nations who really want to work for peace and stability, and who are looking for an excuse to sell the next billionth portion under peacekeeping weaponsstale in warehouses.
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