Military Review

Operation Mars

53

Scheme. Operation Mars 25 November - 20 December 1942


By November 1942, in the western direction of the Soviet-German front, in a strip 1050 km wide, from Kholm to Bolkhov, there were 30% of the rifle, cavalry, tank and mechanized connections. From the side of the enemy, over 26% of the infantry and 42% of the tank divisions were deployed here. In accordance with the concept of the upcoming campaign, formulated by A. Hitler on October 14 in Operational Order No. 1, the German troops were required to "at all costs keep the achieved lines from any enemy attempt to break through them." At the same time, the main efforts in defense were planned to be concentrated in the zone of Army Group Center. According to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, the main blow of the Red Army should have been expected against it. Therefore, on the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, well-developed in engineering terms were prepared in advance, the separation depth of which reached 80-100 km.

As for the leadership of the USSR, it saw the common military-political goal of the upcoming campaign in order to intercept the strategic initiative in the armed struggle and thereby achieve a turning point in the war. At the first stage, it was planned to crush the enemy in the area of ​​Stalingrad, after which, striking at Rostov, go to the rear of his North Caucasian group and prevent its withdrawal to the Donbass. At the same time, it was planned to launch an offensive in the area of ​​the Upper Don with its subsequent development on Kurs, Bryansk and Kharkov. In the western direction, in turn, it was necessary to conduct an offensive operation, which received the code name "Mars".

The troops of the Kalininsky and the right wing of the Western fronts were attracted to it. In accordance with the final intent of the representative of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command GK General Army. Zhukov was planning to deliver the main attack by groups of two fronts in converging directions. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses on the first day of the offensive, after which mobile units would be brought into battle. By the end of the third - fourth day, they were to unite in the area southwest of Sychevka and thereby complete the encirclement of the German 9 Army. For the simultaneous dissection of it into parts, a whole series of other blows were envisaged.

So, in the Kalininsky Front, whose troops were led by Lieutenant-General M.A. Purkaev, 3-I attack army was supposed to conduct an attack on Velikiye Luki and Novosokolniki (Velikie Luki operation). His 41-I army struck from the west of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, south of Bely, and the 22-I army - along the valley of the r. Luchesa. 39-I army was introduced into battle at the top of the ledge.

By decision of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev 31-I and 20-I armies delivered the main attack south of the city of Zubtsov. On the right flank of the strike force, the 30 Army was on the offensive, and on the left flank, part of the forces (one rifle regiment) of the 29 Army. A week after the start of the operation, it was planned to launch the 5 and 33 armies into battle with the task of defeating the Gzhat group of the enemy and reach the closest approaches to Vyazma.

The German 9-I Army Colonel-General V. Model confronted the Soviet troops consisted of three army and two tank corps (18 infantry total, 1 airborne, 1 airborne divisions, two battalions of assault guns). The army reserve had two tank, two motorized, one cavalry divisions and a tank battalion. In addition, in the rear of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge there were concentrated three tank divisions from the reserve of the Army Group Center (1, 12-I and 19-I).

Having timely identified the preparation of the Kalinin and Western fronts for the offensive, V. Model in order from 16 in November 1942 demanded, in addition to maintaining constant combat readiness, to create in each corps and infantry division mobile groups intended to be deployed to threatened areas. In addition, a maneuver was planned on them by the army mobile reserves. To solve this problem, as of November 20, there were 302 serviceable tanks of the most varied modifications.

The main strike in the Kalininsky front was struck by the 41 Army Major General GF. Tarasov. It consisted of five rifle divisions, the 1 th mechanized corps, Major General MD. Solomatina, 47-I and 48-I mechanized brigades and 6-th Stalin volunteer infantry corps of Major General S.I. Povetkin (one rifle division and four rifle brigades) - a total of 116 thousand people and 300 tanks. She was ordered to break through the enemy defenses south of Bely, extend the breakthrough in the western and northern directions and join up with the 20 Army of the Western Front. To act in a wooded area with a limited number of roads. It was necessary to force the rivers Cherry, Vienna and Nach.

In the offensive zone, the army was defended by part of the 246 Infantry Division and the 2 Fighting Division, whose combat potential and level of training were significantly inferior to other units. Considering this, the enemy command concentrated in the area of ​​the city of Belyi, a strong reserve — the 1 Tank Division and the combat group consisting of two motorized infantry battalions of the Great Germany motorized division.

On the morning of November 25, rifle formations, after a three-hour artillery preparation, attacked the front edge of the enemy's defenses, immediately broke through and rushed into the valley of the r. Cherry But here they met strong resistance from strongholds located on its steep west bank, and also underwent divisional reserves counterattacks. In an environment where the threat of disrupting the launched offensive was created, Major General GF Tarasov ordered the introduction of the 1 th mechanized corps into battle (224 tank, of which KV - 10 and T-34 - 119).

During November 26, his brigade completed a breakthrough in enemy defenses and began to develop success. By the end of the third day of the offensive, the depth of penetration of the army mobile group was 33 km. In this case, the group acted in isolation from the rest of the troops, with significant gaps in the order of battle and open flanks.

By December 1, all reserves of the 41 Army were put into battle, but there was no decisive change in the course of the operation. The enemy, stubbornly defending himself in the strongholds blocked by Soviet troops, not only attracted and sprayed their forces in a wide swath, but also, having gained time, created the conditions for a counterattack. His strong groups, launching the December 6-7 offensive, soon surrounded the 6 rifle and 1 th mechanized corps. During the week, they repelled the strikes of parts of four German tank divisions and completed a breakthrough from the environment only by the dawn of December 16, losing a large number of people, guns, mortars and almost all the tanks.

The commander of the 22 Army (80 thousand people and 270 tanks) of the front, Major General V.A. Yushkevich decided to break through the defenses of the enemy with 238 and 185 rifle divisions without recruiting direct infantry support tanks, and then introducing the 3 mechanized corps, Major General ME, into battle. Katukov. By the end of the third day, he had, having crossed 20 km, cut the Olenino-Belyy highway, subsequently with part of the forces to conduct an offensive to the north, to meet the 39 army, and part to the south, to White, to join the 41 army. In reserve were one rifle brigade and a separate tank regiment. To act was to be in a narrow corridor, which was limited to the valley of the river. Luchesa. Thick forests surrounded it on both sides, which made it extremely difficult to maneuver by forces and means.

The strike force of the army launched an offensive on November 25 after an hour and a half artillery preparation. During the day of the battle, the infantry divisions, with the support of two brigades of the 3 of the mechanized corps, were able to penetrate into enemy defenses at 1 – 2 km in some sectors. Nevertheless, in the evening of the same day, his command began to push tactical reserves into the threatened areas. Their arrival predetermined the fact that during 26 in November the advance of the Soviet troops did not exceed 1 km.

The next day, all the brigades of the 3 mechanized corps were brought into battle, but they could not overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy. Major General V.A. Yushkevich decided to change the direction of the main attack and during the night to regroup the main forces of the corps from the left flank to the right. However, by that time, part of the forces of the German division "Great Germany" had been advanced here. Not led to a decisive success and the use of military reserves, which, at the cost of heavy losses, only slightly advanced.

November 30 and December 1 fierce battles were fought throughout the army’s offensive zone. By December 3, its advanced units were only 2 – 5 km from the Olenino-Belyy highway. But by that time, more than 200 from 270 tanks had already been lost. Tank and mechanized brigades, acting on disconnected directions, in a wooded area could not make full use of their shock and maneuver capabilities, in a short time to break into the depth of enemy defenses and build on success. All this allowed the German command, as well as in the band of the 41 Army, to gain time and make timely maneuver reserves. All subsequent attempts by the 22 Army to reach the Olenino-Belyy highway, which continued until December 12, were unsuccessful.

The goal of the 39 Army (more than 92 thousand people, 227 tanks) of the front was to attract enemy reserves and prevent them from being transferred to other directions. It was accomplished by accomplishing two successive tasks: first mastering the Bolshaya Young Tud - Rzhev on the Urdom, Zaitsevo sector and then in cooperation with the 22 Army and the strike group of the Western Front - Olenino settlement.

Army Commander Major-General A.I. Zygin planned to strike the center of the line with the forces of 158, 135 and 373 infantry divisions with the support of the 28 and 81 tank brigades. In the second echelon, the 348-I Rifle Division stood out, and in reserve - the 101-I Rifle and 46-I mechanized brigades. Other strikes were inflicted: on the right flank - the 100-I Rifle Brigade and the regiment of the 186 Rifle Division, on the left - the 136-I Rifle Brigade, two regiments of the 178-th Rifle Division and three tank regiments.

The German 42 and part of the forces of the 206 and 251 infantry divisions occupied the zone of the impending offensive of an army 253 km wide. They focused their efforts on keeping individual strongholds, the gaps between which reached several kilometers. However, this deficiency was compensated for by the presence in the rear of strong mobile reserves — two motorized divisions (14 and Great Germany).

As in other unions of the Kalinin Front, the offensive in the 39 Army's band began on November 25 with an artillery preparation of the duration of 1 an hour. Since the density of guns and mortars was low (50 units per 1 km), it was not possible to crush the enemy at the leading edge, and especially in tactical depth. Forced from the course of the river. Young Tud rifle companies, supported by the 28 and 81 tanks, came under heavy fire from mortars and machine guns and retreated to their original positions.

But success was achieved in the directions of other strikes: on the right flank the advance of the Soviet troops was 5, and on the left - 4 km. Major General A.I. Zygin planned to develop the offensive, reinforcing the flank groups at the expense of the forces and means deployed in the center of the line. However, the commander of the front forces demanded that the original plan of the operation be followed and that the maximum forces of the enemy should be shackled here, in order to make it easier for the 41 and 22 armies to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

During November 26, the main forces of the 39 Army again forced the r. Young Tud and in the evening advanced with the battles on 2 km. The next day, the regiments of the second echelons of three rifle divisions were entered into the battle, but this did not change the course of the fighting. At the same time, the flank groups, without receiving additional reinforcement, could not develop the initially achieved success and were drawn into heavy battles with the enemy. Soon, they underwent a strong counterattack, some of their forces were surrounded, and the other was thrown back to its original position.

Ignoring the situation on the flanks, the army commander decided to continue the offensive in the center, in the direction of the Urdom settlement. The ensuing battles continued for two days without a break. In their course, infantry compounds lost up to 50% of people, and tank brigades lost more than half of their armored vehicles. In the end, Urd managed to free, but the main shock group of the army lost almost all the tanks remaining by that time. After that, she completely lost her offensive capabilities.

In such an environment G.K. Zhukov ordered to shift the breakthrough area to the left flank of the army, closer to Rzhev. The second stage of its offensive began on December 7. Initially, it developed successfully: the infantry units broke through the enemy defenses and created the conditions for entering into battle the new tanks 28 and 81 tank brigades received. But the latter, rushing ahead, were surrounded by the enemy’s approached reserves. Heavy fighting continued until December 17, and then began to subside as the combat effectiveness of the troops decreased. Soon the army received an order to go to the defense.

The most powerful grouping of forces and means in Operation Mars was created in the offensive zones of the 31 and 20 armies of the Western Front. Here, 14 rifle divisions focused on one breakthrough sector. At the same time, the density of forces and means was: guns and mortars - up to 100, and tanks - up to 20 units per 1 km. The main role in the offensive was assigned to the 20 Army, Major-General N.I. Kiryukhina, which included seven rifle divisions, the 1 Guards Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, the 8 Guards Rifle Corps (one rifle division and two rifle brigades), eight tank brigades, 53 artillery regiment - only 114 thousand people, 1310, only 151, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand people, XNUMX, XNUMX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand men, XNUMX, NNXX man, XNUMX, XNUMX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand people, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, XNUMX, NNXX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand people, XNUMX, XNUMX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand people, XNUMX, NNXX, XNUMX, XNUMX artillery regiment - only XNUMX thousand. The XNUMX tank. The army had the task of breaking through the defenses of the German troops, cutting the Sychevka-Osuga railway, seizing Sychevka and connecting with the advance units of the Kalininsky front.

Four rifle divisions and five tank brigades were allocated to the first echelon, the 8 th Guards Rifle Corps in the second echelon, the 1-I Guards Motorized Rifle Division was in reserve. The mobile group consisted of three tank brigades. It was intended for the development of the offensive in the south-east, in the direction of Sychevka. In addition, in the army band it was planned to launch a front horse-mechanized group (KMG) under the command of Major General V.V. Kryukov. It includes 2-Guards Cavalry Corps, 1-Guards Motorized Brigade and 6-Panzer Corps (166 tanks, including HF - 18, T-34 - 85, T-70 - 30, T-60 - 33) . KMG was to move to the northeast in order to surround the Rzhev group of the enemy.

In the direction of the attack of the strike force of the Western Front, they occupied the defenses of part of the 102 th infantry and 5 th tank divisions of the enemy. Just a few days before the Soviet troops went on the offensive, the 78-I infantry division also arrived here, which was to replace the 5-tank division on the front line. The strongest fortifications were created on a narrow four-kilometer stretch between the Osuga and Vazuza rivers. German units were located in a number of strongholds in the vicinity of large villages. Between them were placed wooden-earth firing points (bunker) with a density of 10-15 per square meter. km At a distance of 4-5 km from the front edge was the second defensive line. It was based on battalion areas in the settlements of Maloye Petrakovo, Bolshoye and Maloe Kropotovo, Podosinovka and Zherebtsovo. Approaches to them were covered with obstacle stripes, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields.

The offensive of the 31st and 20th armies began on November 25 at 7 hours and 50 minutes with artillery preparation. However, even before dawn, a strong wind blew and snow began, which completely eliminated the adjustment of the fire. He ceased to be aimed and was conducted through the squares. Aviation and was completely inactive due to non-flying weather. As noted in the front’s operational summary: “The snowstorm on the first day of the offensive reduced the artillery preparation to almost nothing, since visibility was from 100 to 200 meters. In view of this, the enemy’s fire system was not violated to the necessary extent ... ”

After an hour and a half in the 31-th army band (Major General VS Polenov), on the plain between the Osuga and Vazuza rivers, enemy positions attacked 88, 239, 336-I divisions, 32-I and 145-I tank brigades. They were met by strong fire from non-repressive strongholds and by noon they lost 50% of people and almost all tanks. Subsequent attempts to break through the front line of the 102 Infantry Division’s defense proved futile, and the army stopped playing an active role in the operation on the very first day.

The right-flank formations of the 20 army did not achieve any tangible results. And only the actions of one 247 th rifle division, which, with the support of the 240 th tank brigade, led the offensive in the center of the army belt, were effective. On the move, she forced Vazuzu across the ice and seized a small bridgehead on her west bank. In an effort to build on success, Major General N.I. On the night of November 26, Kiryukhin began to nominate a second echelon, a reserve and a mobile group - 8 of the Guards Rifle Corps, 1 of the Guards Motorized Rifle Division and three tank brigades, respectively.

But the failure on the right flank of the 20 Army threatened to disrupt the entire plan of the operation, as the loss of time allowed the German command to transfer reserves from the depths. Therefore, the commander of the front, Colonel-General I.S. Konev decided to use a bridgehead (3 km width and 1,5 km depth) taken by the 247 division to enter the breakthrough of a horse-mechanized group of bridgeheads. However, such a number of troops could not be quickly brought into battle. In addition, only two roads led to it, under the constant influence of artillery and enemy aircraft.

In the second half of November 26, the brigade of the 6 tank corps launched an offensive from a foothold in completely unfamiliar terrain, without reconnaissance and artillery support. By the end of the day, they had lost from the enemy’s anti-tank artillery fire to 60% of tanks, and for the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad only one tank battalion had managed to break through. For three days he seized a number of settlements, but soon he was left with almost no fuel. The attempt to introduce the 2 th Guards Cavalry Corps into the breakthrough in order to build up the force of the strike ended, in fact, with the defeat of its main forces. Operating at night in unfamiliar terrain, cavalry units got into fire bags prepared by the enemy and most of them were destroyed by artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. Could not break through the railroad and the specially created tank group that accompanied the transport vehicles with fuel and ammunition.

Rifle units, separate cavalry and tank units continued the fruitless attacks of German strongholds up to December 5. Then the remnants of the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps were withdrawn from the battle, as well as all the individual tank brigades that provided direct support to the infantry. They have almost no combat tanks left. So, in the 25 Tank Brigade, after its withdrawal to the rear, there were one KB and three T-60.

8 December The Western Front received the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters to continue the offensive. This time he was given the task “to break through enemy defenses in the Bolshaya Kropotovo, Yarygino and not later than December 10 to take Sychevka, December 11 in the Andreevskoye area at least two rifle divisions to organize the closure together with the 15 Army Kalinin front surrounded by the enemy.

In accordance with the decision of the commander of the Western Front, the 20 Army, as before, instead of Major-General N.I. Kiryukhina was entered by Lieutenant-General MS Khozin. It was strengthened by six rifle divisions, units and subunits of various types of troops. In addition, now the right-flank formations of the 29 Army were involved in the offensive.

The 6 and 5 tank and 2 guards cavalry corps entered the mobile front group. The 6 tank corps, which was led by Colonel I.I. Yuschuk, managed to get a 101 tank, of which KV - 7 and T-34 - 67. It was planned to enter into battle for a joint defense with the rifle divisions and subsequent penetration into its depth between the Big and Small Kropotovoes. Following him, the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps, weakened in previous battles, was to be advanced. The 5 tank corps of Major General K.A. Semenchenko (160 tanks, including KV - 21, T-34 - 46) was to develop an attack on the Sychevka.

Having drawn conclusions from the unsuccessful experience of breaking through enemy defenses in the first phase of the operation, the command of the Western Front reduced the range of advance of infantry divisions to 1-1,5 km and brought the density of guns and mortars to 130 units per 1 km of the breakthrough segment. Prior to the commencement of artillery preparation, reconnaissance was carried out in combat by the forces of assault groups and detachments in order to destroy the enemy firing points. However, she did not justify the hopes placed on her, as did the subsequent artillery raids. Their effectiveness against well-supported strongholds was low.

The second phase of the attack on Vazuz began on December 11. But the lack of surprise of a second strike in conditions when the combat capability of the troops was weakened due to the failure of the first offensive did not allow for success. Rifle and tank formations and units were involved in battles for fortified settlements, and acted in dispersed directions, solving individual tactical tasks. All this led to great losses in people and technology. Already on the third day of the offensive, the command of the Western Front was forced to combine the remaining tanks of the 5 and 6 of the tank corps into two consolidated brigades. But by December 20 and they were left without military vehicles.

Operation Mars

Obelisk in honor of the liberation of Rzhev from the Nazi invaders. Mound of Glory, the city of Rzhev, Tver region. Architects A. Usachev and T. Shulgina, sculptors V. Mukhin, V. Fedchenko and I. Chumak. Opened 1 August 1963

Having liberated territory in 11 km in width and 6 km in depth, the 20 Army never completed the task. Moreover, her losses were 57 524 people, of which 13 929 killed and 1596 missing. The 2 Guards Cavalry Corps lost 6617 people (killed, wounded and missing), the 6 Tank Corps - two regular tank squadrons, the 5 Tank Corps - almost all combat equipment in just three days of fighting. And, in general, the losses of the Kalininsky and Western fronts in the "Mars" operation amounted to more than 215 thousand people, including 70 400 - irrevocably, as well as the 1363 tank. The positive results of the operation can only be attributed to the fact that the Soviet troops involved in it attracted considerable enemy forces, depriving the German command of the freedom of maneuver with reserves that were necessary for him to strengthen his grouping, which caused an unblocking attack on the Stalingrad direction in December.
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53 comments
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  1. 210ox
    210ox 31 December 2017 06: 08
    13
    The operation, of course, failed .. But this was one of the components of our victory .. After three months the Germans left Rzhev and Vyazma .. We bow to our fighters and commanders!
    1. Finches
      Finches 31 December 2017 10: 41
      +5
      Always here, when I read about this operation, I remember that in the second year of the military school it was for “Mars” that I received three balls, or rather, I was disassembling another operation “Uranus” on the main issue, but I could not answer an additional question, which made to study me in more detail and deeper!
      1. Andrey Yuryevich
        Andrey Yuryevich 1 January 2018 15: 25
        +4
        The positive results of the operation can only be attributed to the fact that the Soviet troops participating in it attracted significant enemy forces, deprived the German command of the freedom of maneuver by the reserves that were necessary for him to strengthen his group, which dealt in December 1942 a debilitating strike on the Stalingrad direction.
        what a pity that such "strategic geniuses" were born late ... maybe the IVS, would use your advice ... or shoot (also right).
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 31 December 2017 07: 13
    +7
    On communal graves do not put crosses,
    And the widows do not cry at them,
    To them, someone brings bouquets of flowers,
    And the eternal flame ignites.

    Here the earth stood on its hind legs,
    And now - granite slabs.
    There is not a single personal destiny -
    All fates are united into one.

    And in the Eternal Flame you see a tank flare up,
    Burning Russian huts,
    Burning Smolensk and burning Reichstag,
    The burning heart of a soldier

    Mass graves don't have tearful widows
    People go stronger here.
    On communal graves do not put crosses,
    But is this easier?
    On communal graves do not put crosses,
    But is this easier?
    1. Andrey Yuryevich
      Andrey Yuryevich 1 January 2018 15: 27
      +1
      Quote: parusnik
      But is this easier?

  3. Vard
    Vard 31 December 2017 08: 14
    +4
    There, to Moscow ... if I’m not mistaken, 200 km ... So the Germans had the opportunity to make an attempt to break through ... Ours prevented this ... At a very heavy price ...
    1. avt
      avt 31 December 2017 11: 03
      +2
      Quote: Vard
      . So the Germans had the opportunity to attempt a breakthrough ... Ours prevented this ... At a very heavy price ...

      AFTER your registration on the site, there was an article about ,, Mars "in the comments completely disassembled in detail. But the campaign here we have another regiment leader drew up with an alternative strategy, the essence of which was described by Fonvizin - ,, I do not want to study, but I want to get married." And even then - why suffer in the knowledge of facts and their subsequent awareness? Everything from Astral has already been received from the Mitrofanushki, now only in advance, well, for the virtual pursuit!
      1. polpot
        polpot 31 December 2017 13: 43
        +1
        You are apparently Pravdin from that play
    2. polpot
      polpot 31 December 2017 11: 08
      0
      Sorry about this, the Germans wanted to break through to Moscow in the winter of 42-43, I wonder how.
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 31 December 2017 12: 05
        +5
        GERMANS WAS CHAMPIONS ON JUMPING TO THE SIDE.
        THE SAME CRAZY IN SITUATION - WOULD THE "ALIGN THE FRONT" BE IMMEDIATELY ???
        the greed of the modern world for oil (and in Baku in 42g) - does not contradict the desire to capture Moscow then
  4. polpot
    polpot 31 December 2017 11: 05
    +4
    Eternal memory to the Russian soldier, and shame on the generals who arranged this massacre, no solution to the task was found, the operations on the ground are poorly prepared, not a maneuver of thought, pity people.
    1. avt
      avt 31 December 2017 11: 50
      +5
      Quote: polpot
      no solution to the task was found, the operations on the site are poorly prepared, no maneuvers are not thoughts, people feel sorry.

      Another ,, mitrofanushka "hatched from a computer strategy. Great Lavrov with his - ,, DB."
      1. polpot
        polpot 31 December 2017 13: 10
        +6
        Sorry, I studied computer strategy in 87-88 on my own skin in Afghanistan
        1. avt
          avt 31 December 2017 14: 41
          +3
          Quote: polpot
          Sorry

          I do not ring, I am stating a fact. Who strive to confirm with each new post
          Quote: polpot
          Near Stalingrad was a very well-organized operation, the Sychev battles are a masterpiece of the activities of the genius Zhukov with all the ensuing consequences

          Even despite the attempts
          Quote: antivirus
          antivirus

          At least somehow to refute two folk wisdom - ,, Foolishness gets richer with his dummy "and ,, Fools to teach - only to spoil"
          1. polpot
            polpot 31 December 2017 15: 17
            +4
            How do you self-critical about yourself, bravo, and folk wisdom
            1. avt
              avt 31 December 2017 15: 22
              +4
              Quote: polpot
              folk customs

              bully The fighter with Zionism, or non-uniform? bully Take advice - do not fiddle about this topic with me. I will answer in the same weight category as the regular website visitors from Israel. In the best case, the moderators will close, as correspondence is not related to the topic. In the worst case, you will suffer from mental trauma. Better try the search engine to work on a topic in pursuance of the slogan - Learn, study and once again - study.
              1. polpot
                polpot 31 December 2017 15: 37
                +3
                You suffer from mental injuries, and do not frighten the frightened one request, do not consider your point of view as the only true one, this may turn out to be a mistake, goodbye.
                1. avt
                  avt 31 December 2017 16: 30
                  +1
                  Quote: polpot,
                  Farewell.

                  bully Goodbye Here is the desire to leave the last, at least some kind of word behind you bully
                  1. polpot
                    polpot 31 December 2017 16: 33
                    +2
                    And I forgive you too
      2. Train
        Train 8 January 2018 01: 54
        0
        But he was right — everything was prepared badly, in haste — and after all it should be clear to our commanders with 41 that such frictions against well-entrenched Germans (and the Wehrmacht in general) do not end with anything good
    2. 210ox
      210ox 31 December 2017 12: 01
      +3
      Did you notice or not when this operation took place? And what was near Stalingrad?
      Quote: polpot
      Eternal memory to the Russian soldier, and shame on the generals who arranged this massacre, no solution to the task was found, the operations on the ground are poorly prepared, not a maneuver of thought, pity people.
      1. polpot
        polpot 31 December 2017 13: 14
        +4
        Near Stalingrad was a very well-organized operation, the Sychev battles are a masterpiece of the activities of the genius Zhukov with all the ensuing consequences
        1. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 1 January 2018 15: 20
          +4
          After Rzhev, he was removed from planning operations until the end of the war.
          And finally they wiped out the General Staff.
          Only Berlin Zhukov begged Stalin to hold that he did not find himself in the shadows
          Rokossovsky at the finish line. And in Berlin, too, did not flash.
      2. Town Hall
        Town Hall 1 January 2018 13: 49
        +2
        Quote: 210ox
        Did you notice or not when this operation took place? And what was near Stalingrad?




        Interesting logic. In the failed cover operation, more forces are involved than in the "main" one. Maybe it became unreasonable because of the failure precisely?


        And yet. Even if it was for “cover”, it is necessary to carry it out so stupidly, driving hundreds of thousands of people to slaughter? ... what prevented Brilliant from carrying out this operation successfully?
    3. antivirus
      antivirus 31 December 2017 12: 12
      +4
      for experienced young people --- about 10 years ago, I see in detail on the Star about the operas "Monastery".
      was it too early for you to think about abstract from sausage?
      in the Monastery there was a game about the direction of hl strike.
      took away from Stalingrad and leaked about the strike on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge.
      perhaps it was the interest of the West-- not to give Hitler oil. IVS helped them get rid of the phobia "oil seizure"
      and Germany then fought 2 g on synthetic fuel - from peat.
      The military in 53 g very happily recouped in Beria (and its people) for such a "setup" at the cost of 1.5 million people.

      and the IVS was over the battle and won the Second World War. the price is known.
      1. polpot
        polpot 31 December 2017 13: 32
        +3
        Generalisimus and the Marshal drove 1,5 million for slaughter, to confirm the desa, it is a very interesting idea to recognize Zhukov and Konev’s mistakes more difficult.
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 31 December 2017 18: 05
          +1
          there is opportunity everywhere; win, win for a clear advantage. and so on, but there are fatal errors.
          No one has had an advantage in the winter of 42-43.
          on NTV Parfyonov (ca. 5 years ago) praised Model in detail for the art of defense and proper retreat.
          BEER AND NOW IN GERMANY THE BEST.
          And UNDERSTANDING DEATH - VICTORY - Shame is even worse comprehensible and CONCLUSION ONE-- do not go against Vankov and Jebrail, they will bite.

          The battle was short.
          And then
          jammed the ice cold vodka,
          and picked out with a knife
          from under the nails I blood
          someone else's.
  5. Ural resident
    Ural resident 1 January 2018 13: 09
    +6
    Well, the most brilliant commander Zhukov
    His manner of waging war is to throw fresh units into the defense without preparation. Only give new divisions.
    Everything rested on the heroism of the soldier and the ingenuity of the junior officers. Whoever said anything, but somehow of all the military leaders like Zhukov, the most illiterate was. I read a lot about him - did he have real victories ?, not those where he failed, but prepared, thought out.
    As soon as you read - art preparation failed, I had to go to unsuppressed firing points — 50 percent personnel loss in the first hours — I had to retreat. Then, after thinking and applying ingenuity, the firing points are destroyed and we complete the operation with small forces. The question is, why not do it right away and for what first thousands of recruits should be put in, which were collected bit by bit across the country ?. And more than once - this is systematic. Only at the end of the war they tried to act more literate, and even then our losses were higher than German, even with an overwhelming advantage.
    1. alstr
      alstr 1 January 2018 21: 28
      +4
      You're not right. Zhukov’s relative losses were often less than others. There are completely layouts in the internet.
      All this comes from the fact that he was a very tough person. Often the person is not fully understood to blame or not. Chopped off the shoulder. He squeezed many corns - and they started such a rumor.

      And about corpses heaped, so there is a simple example. When attacking a minefield, the best solution is to go ahead despite the losses from the mines.
      And there is a logical explanation for this - if there is a lie, then the defenders will cause artillery fire. And to retreat is to lose pace and give time to regroup.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 2 January 2018 12: 19
        +4
        "In an attack when hitting a minefield, the best solution is to go forward despite the losses from the mines." ////

        And about making passages? have you heard of mine trawls?
        The best decision negative ... until he was sent to the minefield, to clear his carcass.
        Any idiots and generalism are ready to justify negative .
        1. alstr
          alstr 2 January 2018 15: 23
          +1
          To make the passes you need: time, sappers (they still need to be found). Trawl also still ado find.
          In this case, sappers will make passages under fire. Narrow passages are not rational, since they allow you to shoot them at the enemy (i.e., in the crowd). Plus, the loss of pace, which allows the enemy to throw reserves for a breakthrough.
          Moreover, this is not only the calculations of Soviet generals, but also American (Patton), and German, too.
          There are some exceptions. When a deeply layered barrage system is created, which is covered by troops. But usually mines cover up weak spots, i.e. behind mines there is usually no serious amount of enemy.
          In addition, if a soldier is trained in standard mining schemes, then losses can be reduced (since by knowing the mining schemes and seeing the first blasts, the rest of the blasts can be avoided).
          As for the best solution, everything in the world is relative. From the point of view of a particular soldier - yes - this is bad. And from the point of view of the whole unit - a loss of 10% in a minefield is better than a loss of 20-30 percent under machine guns and shelling. Moreover, it is not a fact that in the second case the unit’s task will be completed.

          You just need to understand that the commander (anyone starting with the squad leader) sends his subordinates to death so that most of those remaining survive.
          Hence the cover of the withdrawal (actually suicide bombers), from here distracting attacks and reconnaissance in battle, etc.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 2 January 2018 17: 38
            +2
            “To do the passes you need: time, sappers (they still need to be found). Trawls are also still ado to find” ///

            This is called: PLANNING operations. But when the brave general has one crinkle under his cap (from a cap), he prefers to send hundreds of thousands of infantry for slaughter, instead of knowing in advance: where to clear it, than
            to clear mine where the firing points of the enemy, than to suppress them ... sad
            1. mat-vey
              mat-vey 2 January 2018 17: 58
              +1
              Quote: voyaka uh
              he prefers to send hundreds of thousands of pehturs for slaughter

              And what exactly did he regularly send? ...
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 3 January 2018 10: 01
                +3
                Zhukov? With enviable regularity. From June 22.06 to the end of 1942.
                When the Soviet General Staff was headed by Vasilevsky, the ugliness of Zhukov
                have stopped. We began to seriously plan and think over military operations.
                1. mat-vey
                  mat-vey 3 January 2018 10: 11
                  +1
                  DIRECTIVE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT

                  30 March 1942 city
                  Top secret

                  № 3750
                  To all commanders, commissars of divisions and brigades
                  The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the Front receive numerous letters from the Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers, testifying to the criminally negligent attitude of command of all degrees towards saving the lives of the Red Army infantry.
                  In letters and stories, hundreds of examples are cited when the commanders of units and formations destroy hundreds and thousands of people in attacks on the enemy’s undefeated defenses and machine guns that have not been destroyed, on unsuppressed strongholds, and in a poorly prepared offensive.
                  These complaints are certainly fair and reflect only part of the existing frivolous attitude towards saving replenishment <...>.
                  I demand:
                  1. Every abnormal loss of people in 24 hours, thoroughly investigate and immediately make a decision, according to the results of the investigation, reporting to the higher headquarters. Commanders who have criminally thrown parts at an unsuppressed enemy fire system should be brought to the strictest responsibility and assigned to a lower position.
                  2. Before an infantry attack, the enemy’s fire system must be suppressed and neutralized, for which each commander organizing the attack must have a carefully developed plan for destroying the enemy with fire and attack. Such a plan must necessarily be approved by the senior commander, which at the same time should serve as control for the senior commander.
                  3. A personal explanation of the nature of the loss should be attached to the loss reports, who is responsible for the abnormal losses, what measures have been taken by the perpetrators and to prevent them [losses] in the future.

                  Western Front Commander
                  Army General ZhUKOV
                  Member of the Military Council of the Western Front
                  HO_HLOV
                  VRIO Chief of Staff of the Western Front
                  Major General GOLUSHKEVICH
                  1. alstr
                    alstr 3 January 2018 11: 03
                    +2
                    I would like to add that the command (including Zhukov) sent such a directive on topics of relevance regularly. About once a month.
                  2. voyaka uh
                    voyaka uh 3 January 2018 12: 52
                    +2
                    These pieces of paper are worthless. He organized, planned and approved the operations, and they failed with huge losses.
                    Rokossovskaya did not send such papers, it was not required. But he has operations
                    succeeded with reasonable losses. Because I thought.
                    1. mat-vey
                      mat-vey 3 January 2018 12: 56
                      +1
                      Quote: voyaka uh
                      He organized, planned and approved the operations, and they failed with huge losses.
                      Rokossovskaya did not send such papers, it was not required. But he has operations
                      managed with reasonable losses

                      I understand that now a comparison with numbers and calculations will follow ... the benefit is that in the internet they are and there would be a desire ..
                2. alstr
                  alstr 3 January 2018 11: 01
                  +2
                  Well, firstly, I finished planning at the General Staff level on 29.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. Further, the General Staff steered Shaposhnikov.
                  And secondly, a simple example. Not about Zhukov. in 41 Propulsion Bryansk front. Commander Eremenko. Eagle. The head of defense reports on September 30 that everything is ready for the defense of the city and no help is needed. However, already on October 3, the Germans occupied the city WITHOUT BATTLE (in fact). The city was not even evacuated. Values ​​were not exported, and managers simply fled.
                  And then, already near Mtsensk, the Germans were detained by heroic efforts of the Katukov brigade with comrades.
                  Now just ask yourself how in this situation you can make the right decisions? IMHO, The question is rhetorical. So they shut up everyone. Including the lives of soldiers.
                  And only at the end of 42 years more or less learned to fight (and starting from the lower level of the battalion company, and not just at the top). Location and success.
                  1. mat-vey
                    mat-vey 3 January 2018 11: 11
                    +2
                    Are you again trying to rely on common sense? Empty - there are other goals and aspirations ...
                  2. voyaka uh
                    voyaka uh 3 January 2018 13: 00
                    +2
                    "And only by the end of 42 more or less learned to fight" ///

                    Because i_di_otov above gradually weeded out. I had to.
                    After Rzhev, Stalin told Zhukov: "women will not be in time with us at such a speed
                    give birth to a soldier, to which you spend them. "
                    And he made him his "representative of the rate on the fronts." If only I didn’t get into cards with a pencil ...
                    1. alstr
                      alstr 3 January 2018 18: 28
                      +1
                      Again. To put it mildly, we didn’t have enough job positions from ordinary to generals (and up to 45 years). It is a fact. Therefore, do not blame everything on Zhukov.

                      As for the common phrase about women give birth. So - ANYWHERE there is no reliable documentary evidence that Zhukov said so. (Here is more extensively https://skaramanga-1972.livejournal.com/229909.ht
                      ml). Moreover, the phrase “historians” ascribe to almost every significant commander since Peter 1.

                      As for the representative of the bet, he didn’t climb with a cardash.
                      Question: why does Rokossovsky complain about Zhukov that he has not authorized the decision on counter-training?
                      Those. it’s not just about providing information, but about making quick decisions on the spot. Coordinating the actions of several fronts and resolving conflicts between commanders.
                      By the way, 44 and 45 Zhukov again commanded the fronts.
                    2. Small Saturn
                      Small Saturn 7 January 2018 00: 56
                      0
                      Quote: voyaka uh
                      "And only by the end of 42 more or less learned to fight" ///

                      Because i_di_otov above gradually weeded out. I had to.
                      After Rzhev, Stalin told Zhukov: "women will not be in time with us at such a speed
                      give birth to a soldier, to which you spend them. "
                      And he made him his "representative of the rate on the fronts." If only I didn’t get into cards with a pencil ...

                      Absolute nonsense, at the level of kitchen tales, you do not buy / do not take more books in soft binding :), cheap does not mean good.
                      "Because the idiots at the top were gradually sifted out. I had to.", Let me know, where did NOT and the people come from in the Red Army after 1942? Sat in an ambush? It was not and suddenly appeared, and led to the Great Victory. It does not happen, it happens and it was rather the opposite.
                      It’s not here to talk about this for a long time, but in short I consider it necessary.
                      As there from the song "... to the foundation we will destroy the old world, we ours, we will build a new world .." seem so, I do not remember exactly. That was the whole point, there was nobody and nothing, and by and large there was nowhere to learn for the Red Army commanders. Remember, in Europe and in Germany, including after the WWII, the entire training system was preserved and then developed in accordance with the new realities, and here before the WWI it was not the best, and then the civilian raged for 3 years ... If you say that starting from scratch will not be far from the truth. That's where it all started.
            2. alstr
              alstr 2 January 2018 18: 51
              +2
              Any planning of an operation (and indeed any planning in general) cannot provide for ABSOLUTELY ALL. Yes, you can allocate reserves and so on and so forth, but when a minefield is discovered here and the counteraction is not very large (and there are no reserves and sappers, because the resources are finite), it makes sense not to leave and wait (by the way also losing people), but to go forward, because In this case, TOTAL losses will be less.
              1. Town Hall
                Town Hall 2 January 2018 18: 57
                +2
                I'd love to see you personally, used as a carcass for mine clearance.
            3. Serg koma
              Serg koma 3 January 2018 14: 30
              +2
              And what are you clearing? The line of attack on the first line of defense, and if the defense is deeply layered - give parachutes to sappers and throw them in the rear, or sit and wait in the trench repelled by the enemy until they carry out engineering reconnaissance and do not let the sappers make passages to the second line of defense.
              So it turns out
              Quote: alstr
              You just need to understand that the commander (anyone starting with the squad leader) sends his subordinates to death so that most of those remaining survive.

              alstr speaks of the development of the offensive in the immediate rear of the enemy, justifying
              In this case, sappers will make passages under fire. Narrow passages are not rational, since they allow you to shoot them at the enemy (i.e., in the crowd). Plus, the loss of pace, which allows the enemy to throw reserves for a breakthrough.

              You are talking about the assault on the first line of defense of the enemy, and if you follow your logic, after occupying the first line you must sit (it is not known how long the enemy will give you) and wait for favorable weather, sappers, artillery, rear, etc. Only during this time the enemy will also not sit idle, and all your victims in the assault on the first line will be repeated during the assault on the prepared defense of the second line.
              Suvorov A.V. - Eye meter! Rapidity! Onslaught!
              1. mat-vey
                mat-vey 3 January 2018 16: 47
                +1
                Well, here you are again essentially ... let the brow first "follow a comparison with numbers and calculations ... the good thing is that they are on the internet and there would be a desire ..", otherwise it’s a fabulous, vicious chatter ...
                dogs - all the more so on Kurskaya our sappers managed to change almost under the tracks of tanks, and the Germans were not sewn with the same bast ...
                1. Serg koma
                  Serg koma 3 January 2018 20: 53
                  +2
                  Quote: mat-vey
                  especially on Kursk our sappers


                  "There were no mountains, no rocks,
                  There were no moats or rivers.
                  Here a Russian man stood,
                  Soviet man. "
                  "Shoulder to shoulder with artillerymen and infantrymen repelled attacks enemy sappers, - wrote K. K. Rokossovsky. - They did a great job in defense work and above all praise acted now, reflecting the advance of the enemy. The guided minefields and landmines exhibited by them in the main tank hazardous areas were now exploding under enemy tanks. In many areas mobile sapper units blocked the way for tanks».

                  Sorry for the highlighted text, but we are considering the offensive operation "Mars", and not the first stage of the Battle of Kursk.
                  Quote: mat-vey
                  the Germans were not the same
                  I completely agree with you - the enemy is strong and skillful and probably used similar actions against the advancing Red Army, especially since the advance of tank groups was "read" by the enemy due to the stiffness of maneuver caused by both the terrain and forests. Rivers, swamps, with a high degree of probability, have not yet been completely frozen by the beginning of December - put forward sappers and mine the tank-dangerous direction in the zone of breakthrough of your defense. And the more often you stop, the more mines and prepared defense on your way - in this I completely agree alstr
                  PS Thank you for the memory of the sappers. Happy New Year!
                  1. mat-vey
                    mat-vey 4 January 2018 06: 28
                    +3
                    Quote: Serg Koma
                    PS Thank you for the memory of the sappers. Happy New Year!

                    Mutually - Happy New Year! .... I have a grandfather since 1942 became a sapper (218 oorasm), after a serious wound before that he was a signalman .... The second grandfather was just in Kursk in the tank and was burning ...
                    1. Serg koma
                      Serg koma 4 January 2018 18: 13
                      +2
                      drinks
                      Thanks to our grandfathers !!!
                      I have one in the infantry - Stalingrad (308 SD (2f), 351SP). The second - Art. the political instructor of the artillery division, he completed the war in Prague with Victory.
                      And you won’t be sure to envy sappers, the most draft work ... That's just medals / orders in my opinion they were not very willing to give them - they considered logistical agents as rear guards.
                      PS 218 oorazm = 218th separate mine clearance unit?
                      1. mat-vey
                        mat-vey 4 January 2018 18: 21
                        +1
                        Quote: Serg Koma
                        Here are just medals / orders in my opinion they were not very willingly given - they considered the rear guards.

                        My Red Star and For Courage, well, For Combat ...
                        Quote: Serg Koma
                        218 oorazm = 218th separate mine clearance unit?

                        He is ...
    2. mat-vey
      mat-vey 2 January 2018 10: 44
      +2
      Quote: Resident of the Urals
      not those where he failed, but prepared, thoughtful.

      I hope for such a strategist as you it will not be difficult to show on real numbers how Zhukov "filled up with corpses" in comparison with other "competent military leaders"?
  6. Serg koma
    Serg koma 4 January 2018 19: 04
    0
    Quote: mat-vey
    My Red Star and For Courage, and for Combat

    For the "signalman", or for the "sapper" received? And mine (senior political instructor / captain), who has been operating since February 1944, before that, since 1941, the 11th reserve artillery regiment - "For Victory over Germany". The second grandfather near Stalingrad in 1942 - did not live up to the awards ...
    PS By the way, the grandfather wrote to his grandfather - senior political instructor of the art division, although the institute of political leadership "ended" in 1942.