This topic deserves a whole study. My book “Who are you mr. Gorbachev?History mistakes and betrayals ”(Veche, 2016) In this article I will focus only on landmark events, which, in my opinion, led Gorbachev to make a decision about restructuring and catastrophic. I'll start with his biography.
From assistant to combiner to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Mikhail Gorbachev was born in 1931. In 1942 for half a year he was in the territory occupied by the Nazis. According to the testimony of his mother, Maria Panteleevna, Misha was a very hard-working boy. In the occupation, he diligently plucked geese for the Germans and wore them water for a bath.
Misha's father, sapper Sergey Andreevich Gorbachev returned from the front with two orders of the Red Star and the Medal "For Courage" and continued to work as a machine-combine operator mechanic. Mikhail from 15 years worked as his seasonal assistant on a combine. In 1948, Sergey Andreevich was awarded the Order of Lenin for his father 8900 centners of grain, and his son was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Having received the order, Michael, a schoolboy, he entered the 19 years as a candidate for the position. CPSU. So he got into the elite of the Soviet youth.
Admittedly, Michael was smart, had a great memory. He took science from a raid, therefore, apparently, did not receive the skills of thoughtful work with serious materials. Early fame and successes developed self-admiration in Michael. Valery Boldin, an assistant to Gorbachev, and later the head of the office of the President of the USSR believed that: “Gorbachev was mentally wise, habits, in the spirit of a provincial, who had an early glory that turned his head ... thanks to the order, he got into Moscow State University and for hardware work” (“Kommersant “Power”, 15.05.2001).
Upon graduation, Mikhail, a silver medalist, was accepted to the law faculty of Moscow State University named after M.V. without exams. Lomonosov. There he was elected secretary of the Komsomol organization of the faculty and a member of the party committee of Moscow State University. At university, Mikhail married a student at the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University Raisa Titarenko. After completing his studies, Gorbachev was sure that he would be sent to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. But "above" they decided that it was risky to determine young lawyers who did not have life and professional experience to work in the highest echelon of prosecutorial supervision.
As a result, the young couple Gorbachev went to Stavropol. In the regional prosecutor's office, Mikhail was offered to go to the unregulated area. But Gorbachev, who dreamed of a career, decided to break through to the komsomol committee. Then the staff who had a higher education in the office of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the Komsomol, there were only six people.
The former first secretary of the regional committee, Viktor Mironenko, in December 2008 told me that before the visit to him, Mikhail had enlisted support in the regional committee of the CPSU in the person of the deputy head of the organizational department, Nikolai Porotov. A young lawyer was attracted by the fact that he not only had a higher education, but was an order bearer and a member of the CPSU. Well, then Mikhail, with the support of Raisa, "charmed" the first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU, Fedor Kulakov, then the chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov and even the "incorruptible and dry" Mikhail Suslov, not to mention Andrei Gromyko, who was known in the west, as "Mr. No" ...
M. Gorbachev made the main means of moving up the career ladder the ability to enter into confidence in his older comrades, give them time to argue, convincingly talk about current topics, without forgetting about self-promotion.
Soon, Gorbachev in the Stavropol region had the reputation of a tribune propagandist. In the period of Khrushchev, and then of Brezhnev, this quality was highly valued by the Komsomol and party leaders.
It is known that the theses of speeches to Michael were prepared by the wife of the philosopher Raisa. Since then, her advice for Michael has become the unquestioned guide to life. He believed in his lucky star, and that he was meant for great things. This confidence, or rather self-confidence and narcissism, was fueled by family stories about how he was born on straw in the passage, like Jesus used to be, and his first name Victor (the winner) changed his grandfather at baptism to Michael (equal to God). This is from the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich. Raisa supported this faith. And, apparently, for good reason. In March 1985, Mr. Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
Her Majesty's Mania
In the life of Mikhail Gorbachev, there were many fateful meetings. But the main thing, in my opinion, should be considered a meeting with Raisa Titarenko in the dormitory of Moscow State University. For the provincial Stavropol young men she became decisive. Valery Boldin, a longstanding assistant of Gorbachev, in the book “The Pedestal Crash ...” wrote about the role of Raisa:
“It’s hard to say what his fate would have been if he hadn’t married Raisa. The attitude to the outside world and the character of his wife played a decisive role in his fate, and, I am sure, significantly affected the fate of the party and the whole country. ”
But back to the future lawyer Michael. He had to spend 1,5 of the year for Raisa Titarenko to pay attention to him. The fact is that before meeting with Michael, she experienced a love drama. The mother of beloved Raisa, the wife of a Soviet high-ranking economic worker, forced her son to abandon her. For Raisa, single-minded and proud of nature, it was both drama and humiliation.
Apparently, for this reason, by agreeing to marry Mikhail, she set herself the task of making him a successful person who would occupy a higher position in society than the people who rejected her. Again I refer to Boldin, who noticed one feature of Gorbachev. It consisted in the fact that: “Raisa Maksimovna, day after day, persistently and unswervingly could repeat the same idea that had mastered her and, ultimately, sought her spouse from her.”
There is no doubt that the desire to prove that she married a successful man became almost manic for Raisa and she made every effort to implement her. It was she who created Gorbachev as a politician and, as Mikhail himself recalled, all the time she was pushing him to advance along the career ladder.
This is how the tragedy of one person provoked the tragedy of a huge country. It is known that a small pebble that fell from the top of a mountain, at its foot, sometimes turns into a huge avalanche, sweeping away everything in its path ...
Gorbachev idolized his wife, which he did not hide. Raisa’s attitude towards him can be judged by some episodes of their lives. So, in an interview with the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda (23.03.2016). Gorbachev recalled that in their debates Raisa used to say: “You shut up. You only have a silver medal! ” The Orthodox Gazette "Russian Herald" (06.06.2003) provides a selection of evidence about the Gorbachev couple. Valery Boldin, Dmitry Yazov, Maya Plisetskaya and others are among the witnesses.
The celebrated ballerina recalled how Gorbachev was interviewed in Germany. So, Raisa Maksimovna answered all the questions addressed to Mikhail Sergeevich. The journalist could not resist and noticed that he was asking questions to the president. In response, Gorbachev smiled and said: "We always excel women." I note that Plisetskaya incidentally gave a description of Gorbachev, noting that she "behaved like a queen."
The evidence collection was completed by the information that Gorbachev had never taken final decisions on important state issues in the afternoon. He wrote them down and went to the cottage in Novogarevo.
In the evening, during a two-hour walk through the park with Raisa, Mikhail explained to her questions of national importance, after which he took decisions on these issues, taking into account her opinion. I learned about this situation back in 1990, when I began to communicate with the staff of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They have become accustomed to the fact that Gorbachev seems to give his consent in the afternoon, and in the evening or in the morning everything changes.
Alexander Korzhakov, the former security chief of Boris Yeltsin, told the newspaper “Gordon Boulevard” (No. 49 / 137, 04.12.2007) about the role that Gorbachevs played in the marriage of the Gorbachevs: “Once, when Gorbachev came home drunk, Raisa began to whip him under protection on the cheeks. Yeltsin would not allow this ... ". Again I refer to Boldin: “For you to imagine the scale of her (Raisa) influence, I will say only one thing. Yakovlev, when he wanted to tell me something about her, took me out of the room and spoke in a whisper in my ear. ” (Kommersant-Vlast, 15.05.2001).
Vladimir Medvedev, the chief of Gorbachev’s personal guard, believed that Mikhail Sergeyevich was sick of the delusions of her greatness (“The Man Behind His Back”, Russlit, 1994). It is no coincidence that 21 February 2013 in Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared an article entitled “The country was not led by Mikhail Sergeevich, but by Raisa Maksimovna”.
To this I add that Mikhail's mother, Maria Panteleevna, could not accept the daughter-in-law. Apparently, the mother's heart felt something unkind about the character of Raisa. I note, the above is not for red word. This information is of direct importance for clarifying the question of when and why Gorbachev had the idea of a restructuring-disaster.
A considerable influence on the worldview of the young Gorbachev was made by Czech Zdenek Mlynarzh, with whom Mikhail shared a room in the MSU hostel. This is confirmed by Gorbachev himself. Mlynarzh already at the age of 16 (1946) became a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Having become a communist by conviction, Zdenek was well acquainted with Marxist ideas and was a supporter of democratic socialism. Once in 1950 in the USSR, he was somewhat disappointed with the implementation of these ideas in practice. Indeed, according to the Manifesto of the Communist Party by K. Marx and F. Engels, as a result of the construction of communism, a society should be created, representing: "an association of free producers in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all."
But in the USSR socialism was built, as it is now often said, of the barracks type. I do not know whether Mlynarzh understood that the perversions of Soviet socialism were due to the fact that the first socialist revolution occurred in agrarian Russia, and not in all industrialized countries (England, Germany, France and the USA), as Marx and Engels assumed.
As a result, the hostile capitalist environment has led to the peculiarities of building socialism in Soviet Russia. The country had not only to build socialism, but to fight and prepare to repel an enemy attack. Therefore, Joseph Stalin turned the Bolshevik Party, the main driving force behind the building of socialism, into a party built on the model of the medieval Order of the Sword, centralized and with the strictest discipline. For the first time about such a party, Stalin said in 1921, in the article "Outline of the plan brochure."
The Stalinist Party in the shortest possible time provided a solution to the problem of industrialization of the country, a victory in the Great Patriotic War against the whole capitalist Europe, led by Nazi Germany, and then for a few years ensured the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war.
Unfortunately, the transformation of the party into a certain order led to the rebirth of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the leader and party apparatus. It was this dictatorship that allowed General Secretary Gorbachev in the 1985-1991 years. to experiment with the CPSU and the country with impunity.
However, believing that Mlynarzh inspired Gorbachev to think about the collapse of the USSR as an unsuccessful model for building communism is groundless. Yes, Mlynarzh became secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and was one of the main ideologues and organizers of the Prague Spring 1968. He, as stated, defended the idea of democratic socialism or socialism with a human face.
Mlynarzh in his memoirs "Frost struck from the Kremlin" (1978) claimed that in 1968, the Czechoslovak communists only tried to create "a new system of economic management ... gradually eliminating bureaucratic centralization and releasing the independent economic activity of state enterprises ...". It reminded me that in 1978, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Belarusian Communist Party, Petr Masherov, suggested developing socialist enterprise and initiative at the enterprises of the republic at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus.
But in Czechoslovakia 1968, there were not so many supporters of Mlynář. More were those who proposed to abandon socialism and withdraw from the Soviet bloc. Most likely, they would have won then, which was confirmed by 1989’s “Velvet Revolution”. But for the USSR, their victory in 1968 meant that NATO would have direct access to the USSR’s borders. That is, the situation would be repeated 1939-1941. Therefore, the Prague Spring was terminated by the introduction of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries.
After the defeat of the Prague Spring, Mlynarzh emigrated to Austria. He returned to Czechoslovakia after 1989's Velvet Revolution, when the Communist Party was removed from power. Mlynarzh became honorary chairman of the “Left Bloc” - a coalition of communists with socialists. But right-wing liberals who seized power in Czechoslovakia did not even want to hear about democratic socialism. As a result, Mlynarzh chose to return to Austria. In this regard, there is no reason to believe that he managed to set Gorbachev antisocialist.
For Gorbachev, when he was the 2 secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU, the meeting with Yuri Andropov, a member of the Politburo and the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, was fateful. It is known that although Andropov was from the Central Committee of the CPSU, they did not like him there. Especially in the Politburo. Understood Andropov and the fact that the elders from the Politburo will "leave" only on the gun carriages and they will lay down their bones, but will not allow him to become General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Thus began the secret war of the head of the KGB for the post of general secretary.
In this war, Andropov needed a loyal assistant. But not just an assistant, but a person who is able to gain confidence in people, if necessary, create a support group to defend the patron, split the camp of opponents, be his eyes and ears - and at the same time give the impression of a self-thinking politician.
Gorbachev Andropov, against the background of other regional party leaders, seemed to be just such a figure.
At the same time, as Valery Legostaev, former assistant secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yegor Ligachev, the head of the KGB, was well aware of the negative personality traits of Gorbachev: pathologically ambitious, mentally shallow, boastful, arrogant, a rare hypocrite and liar. I met people of this type in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (Soviet). And, as a rule, they always “turned” among high-ranking party leaders. In a word, “necessary and comfortable” people.
Yuri Vladimirovich also made a bet on the "convenient" Stavropol. He needed an effective and controlled backup in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It can be argued that Andropov’s confidence that only he is able to steer the USSR along the right path, and therefore should lead the party and the state, was the spring that threw Mikhail Sergeyevich to the very top of the power pyramid of the USSR.
Under the supervision of the CIA
Well, what about the foreign intelligence services, about which so much has been written and which Gorbachev allegedly recruited? I am sure that he got into the card file of the Western special services when he was still a high-ranking Komsomol activist. At that time, even they were in the attention zone of Western intelligence services. This is evidenced by my experience of foreign travel when I was a Komsomol functionary of a fairly high rank.
Gorbachev, who became 1958 (in 27 years) the first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the Komsomol, was a very suitable candidate for the development of Western intelligence agencies. Well, when he became the first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU in 1970 (in 39 years), who gave two members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU - M. Suslova and F. Kulakov, then certainly the American CIA and the British MI 6.
For foreign intelligence agencies, the contacts of the first secretaries of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU with members of the Politburo were not a secret.
In 1994 in Minsk, former deputy head of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Vladimir Sevruk, in a conversation with me, claimed that the Gorbachev couple came to the attention of CIA experts who worked on the Harvard project program and the associated Liotte influence training plan in September 1971 in Italy.
Then Gorbachev, already the first secretary of the Stavropol regional committee of the CPSU, arrived with Raisa in Palermo (Sicily) for a symposium of young leftist politicians. According to Sevruk, the CIA was attracted not so much by the suggestible, talkative and selfish Mikhail as by Raisa with her tough character, unbridled ambition, desire for power and unlimited influence on her husband. The "Raisa & Mikhail" tandem was considered by Western experts to be the most promising for pushing "upward". They weren't wrong.
The moment of truth of the final shaping of the Gorbachevs' worldview was their journey through France in 1977. The Communist Party of France Central Committee provided them with a car with a driver and translator, and, as Gorbachev recalls in his memoirs Life and Reforms. They “drove 21 cars thousands of kilometers in 5 day. It was a great trip that tied me tightly to this great country and its cheerful people ... ”.
Gorbachevs in France visited a dozen cities. Probably, not once did they meet on the way married couples who are decently speaking in Russian and who are able to arrange for a spiritual conversation. Mikhail Sergeyevich only needed this. He threw on the audience a lot of information, which, of course, listened attentively and fixed. Then, in Western special laboratories, psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and other specialists in human souls, on the basis of this information, tried to recognize the nature of Gorbachevs and their vulnerabilities.
It was then, I believe, that Gorbachev revealed the Buratino complex, which was most clearly formulated by the fox Alice: “You don't need a knife for a fool, you lie to him with three boxes and do what you want with him!”
Of course, you cannot call Gorbachev a fool, but he clearly suffered from the Buratino complex. As it turned out later, Western leaders — Thatcher, Reagan, Bush — were trained by high-class Western psychologists for meetings with Gorbachev, who knew Mikhail Sergeyevich’s weak points.
It seems likely that it was during the trip to France that the Gorbachev couple were “recruited”, but not by the special services, but, as they said, “decaying” capitalism. France, with cozy towns and colorful villages in which people seemed to enjoy life, struck the Gorbachevs. This is very different from Russia. As Viktor Kaznacheyev, the former second secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU, told me, Raisa constantly repeated after France: we have to live like the French. Once again I remind Boldin, who claimed that Raisa knew how to achieve what she wanted.
It is also known that Raisa’s attitude toward the Soviet power was clouded by unpleasant memories. Her paternal grandfather, a railroad worker, spent four years in prison on a false denunciation in the 1930 years. The maternal grandfather was shot as a Trotskyite, and the grandmother died of starvation during the period of collectivization. Gorbachev's ancestors also suffered from the Soviet power. Michael's grandfathers, father and mother, were repressed in the same 1930 years. And only the orders of their son, the front-line soldier Sergei, covered their grandson Michael, and then, as he said, he himself received the order.
Meetings, meetings, meetings ...
Another defining foreign trip for Gorbachev was his flight to Canada in May 1983. I wrote about this in the previous article, but an addition should be made. V. Sevruk, mentioned by me, speaking of the Gorbachevs, especially stressed that Raisa allegedly was a channel of communication between Western “patrons” with Mikhail Sergeyevich. I did not agree. Although really - how in Gorbachev did 1983 find out that they were waiting for him in Canada? And Raisa spoke excellent English and, being the wife of the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on Agriculture, enjoyed relative freedom when traveling to the city, as well as when meeting with a wide circle of people. But…
There could be another option. Let me remind the statement of the KGB General Yuri Drozdov in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta (No. 4454, 31.08.2007).
He cited the revelation of an American intelligence officer who signed up during a friendly dinner at a Moscow restaurant: “You guys are good guys! .. But the time will come and you will gasp when you find out (if this is declassified) what kind of CIA and State Department agencies in your country the very top.
In this connection, let me remind you once again that by the beginning of perestroika, there were 2200 agents of Western influence in the leading echelons of the USSR. In short, Gorbachev was with whom to communicate and from whom to receive important messages.
It should be borne in mind that Gorbachev in Canada was awaited not only by the agent of influence of the West and the Soviet Ambassador Alexander Yakovlev, but also by the Prime Minister of Canada Elliot Trudeau. Otherwise, how to understand that Trudeau met with Gorbachev three times, although according to diplomatic regulations one meeting was enough. Moreover, as I was told in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, every time there were new people at the meetings. In fact, they were Gorbachev bride.
A. Yakovlev, a former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Gorbachev’s adviser on restructuring, in an interview with the Kommersant-Vlast weekly (14.03.2000) said: “The first Western politician who treated Gorbachev with sympathy was not Thatcher, but Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. Mikhail Sergeyevich came to Canada when I was the ambassador there. His free behavior, he struck the Canadian leaders. Instead of one scheduled meeting with Trudeau, there were three. ”
Some researchers believe that Gorbachev was recruited by Western intelligence agencies in Canada. However, given that he was very willing to make contact with Western politicians, there was no need for direct recruitment. Americans, and especially the British, besides recruitment, are proficient in direct and indirect influence on a person, in addition to his consent.
Gorbachev made a good impression on Trudeau, and the Canadian Prime Minister immediately reported this to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. She became interested in Gorbachev and in February 1984, having flown to Moscow for the funeral of the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yury Andropov, tried to get acquainted with Mikhail Sergeyevich.
After the visit to Canada, the then US Vice President George Bush Sr showed interest in Gorbachev. He, as the head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Viktor Israelian, recalled during his stay in Geneva in April 1984 g, said that he would like to meet with M. Gorbachev. But failed. However, Bush, one-on-one in a conversation with Israel, said: “Gorbachev will be your next leader!” (Failure of the meeting. AIF, №25, 1991). Strange confidence! ..
In the autumn of 1984, a proposal came from London to Moscow initiated by Thatcher. Allegedly, in order to strengthen interstate British-Soviet relations, it is advisable to send a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet to England, but only headed by M. Gorbachev. 15 December 1984 Gorbachev, accompanied by Raisa, A. Yakovlev and a delegation of the USSR Armed Forces, arrived in London on an official six-day visit.
The first meeting of M. Gorbachev with M. Thatcher was held in the special residence of the prime minister at Checkers in Buckinghamshire, where only the first persons of other states were received.
There, Gorbachev struck Thatcher by deploying a top-secret card of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense in front of her with the direction of nuclear strikes in England and declared that "this must end." This fact was described by A. Yakovlev in “The Plosh of Memory”. He was also honored to be at the Checkers meeting! ..
MI-6 (English Intelligence) clearly explained Thatcher that the Gorbachev map could not be genuine (it could only be given to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), but the prime minister understood that Gorbachev could go to great lengths in his desire to hit the western partners and said that "you can deal with him." This conclusion she told US President Ronald Reagan. Thatcher's message to Reagan was declassified in December 2014.
I note in particular that December 18. Gorbachev made a speech in the British Parliament, the essence of which was “Europe is our common home”. There is no doubt that Thatcher threw the idea of a common European house to Gorbachev. Meanwhile, Mikhail Sergeyevich had no authority from the Politburo to announce such a statement. But Chernenko, apparently extremely ill, did not respond to such a serious misconduct by the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Ustinov, the Minister of Defense and the de facto head of the Politburo under Chernenko, 1984. December 20 died for an unknown reason. Well, the then KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov chose to remain silent.
As a result, March 11 1985 Gorbachev took the post of Secretary General of the CPSU Central Committee. On the same day in New York, Gorbachev’s very impressive biography was published in large volumes as a separate brochure. This was not honored by any General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. But it's not only that.
It is known that the time difference between Moscow and New York is 8 hours. The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which elected Gorbachev General Secretary, ended approximately at 17 hour. 30 mines 11 March 1985 g. In New York it was the beginning of the day, 9 hour. 30 min. In order for a brochure with a biography of Gorbachev in sufficient quantity to appear on the shelves on the same day, it was necessary to begin printing several days before the Plenum of the CPSU. That is, American publishers had to be absolutely sure that Gorbachev would be elected!
The question whether perestroika has a plan takes many researchers. Some believe that Gorbachev, out of habit, without a plan, “got involved in a fight”, hoping then to deal with the situation. Others, primarily from Gorbachev’s entourage, argue that there was a certain amount of ideas about restructuring, but not a concrete plan of action. Gorbachev himself in an interview with the newspaper "Free Word" in 1996, said that the concept of restructuring was, but there was no specific plan, such as train schedules.
However, 14 in December 1997, in an interview with the American newspaper Minneapolis Star-Tribune, M. Gorbachev, stated that “the general meaning of restructuring was: eliminating the monopoly of state property, freeing economic initiative and recognizing private property, abandoning the communist monopoly on power and ideology , pluralism of thought and parties, real political freedoms and the creation of the foundations of parliamentarism ”. These were the true goals of Gorbachev's perestroika, since they ensured the transfer of the USSR to capitalist rails. Gorbachev's statements about reforming the USSR, the CPSU, and the socialist economy were empty verbiage.
There is no doubt that Gorbachev pushed M. Thatcher to such a restructuring. This clever and insidious woman made the most of the Gorbachev complex Buratino and in December 1984 gave Gorbachev the idea of “let's live together”.
By this time, Gorbachev was psychologically ready to abandon socialist values. A trip to France, a flight to Canada, resentment against the Soviet regime and the influence of the wife played a role here. As a result, Gorbachev "pecked" at Thatcher's proposal.
Undoubtedly, the prime minister told Gorbachev that the question of joining the Soviet Union to the European common house would be put on a practical plane only if the USSR became free from Marxist ideology and socialist approaches in the economy. The idea is interesting, as the characters of the famous “USSR Zucchini 13 chairs” said in the USSR. She was a guide for Gorbachev in the period of perstroyka.
He decided that he had the opportunity to become the head of the Eurasian community, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. After all, who in Europe could politically, economically, and militarily fight with the USSR? Moscow would become the center of a huge Eurasian community. But this idea was only a bait for Gorbachev to eliminate such a powerful competitor from the world political and economic arena from the world political and economic arena.
Western partners made for Gorbachev the rejection of socialism and its replacement by capitalist ideals with a kind of “carrot”. It is known that a stubborn donkey runs well for a hanging carrot, which still remains inaccessible to him. This "carrot" and caused Mikhail Sergeyevich unilateral delivery of the main positions of the USSR in the world.
Gorbachev was sure that he had a great future. Therefore, he began perestroika, whose main tasks were to remove the CPSU from the political arena, as the main clamp of the USSR, and prove the ineffectiveness of the socialist economy.
Everything else, as was said, the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, the reorganization of the management system, the democratization of the CPSU, etc., were only distracting elements.
Meanwhile, J. Kennan, US ambassador to the USSR in 1950 and author of the famous doctrine of world containment of communism, characterized the role of the CPSU for the USSR: “If anyone succeeds in disrupting the unity and strength of the Communist Party as a political tool, Soviet Russia can be quickly transformed from one of the strongest into one of the weakest and most insignificant national communities. ”
There is no doubt that the events that took place then in Europe reinforced Gorbachev’s determination to start perestroika-catastroika for the USSR. It is known that in March 1985, the European Council took the first step towards creating a European Union with a single economic and political space. In February, 1986 signed the Single European Act, which envisaged the gradual creation of a “single space” from 1 in January 1987, in which the internal borders between European countries were to be eliminated and free movement of capital, goods and individuals was ensured.
Europe is our common home
Gorbachev began the implementation of his restructuring plan with a meeting with Friedrich Wilhelm Christians, chairman of the Westminster Bank, one of the world's largest banks. It took place in the Kremlin 18 on April 1985 and is still a secret record of their conversation. But from the interview of F. Christians it can be understood that the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU introduced his foreign interlocutor with some ideas regarding the "restructuring of the Soviet economy." That is, literally a month after the “accession to the throne”, the informal head of the Soviet state began discussing the concept of restructuring-catastroika with a representative of a foreign bank.
5-6 October 1985 Gorbachev was in Paris, where he met with President François Mitterrand. The meeting was held under the motto "Europe - our common home." Mitterrand listened with interest to Gorbachev's considerations about the entry of the USSR into the "common European home", although he was somewhat puzzled by the intentions of the USSR head to critically reconsider the main political and economic mechanisms of the Soviet system.
Therefore, Mitterrand told Gorbachev: “If you manage to accomplish what you have in mind, it will have worldwide consequences.” And in his entourage, the French president said: “This person has exciting plans, but is he aware of the unpredictable consequences that an attempt to implement them may cause?”
Returning from France, Gorbachev decided to throw a "trial ball." October 13 1985 appeared on the pages of Pravda an editorial called Europe is our common home. But she did not cause any special reaction in the USSR, since the majority in the country did not understand what changes were behind it.
The first results of the restructuring of Gorbachev and his Western patrons summed up in the Kremlin at a meeting with representatives of the Tripartite Commission (one of the economic and political instruments of the so-called "world government"). 18 January 1989 The Commission in the Kremlin was represented by its chairman, David Rockefeller, as well as Henry Kissinger, Joseph Bertouan, Valerie Giscard d'Estaing and Yasuhiro Nakasone. Mikhail Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgy Arbatov, Yevgeny Primakov, Vadim Medvedev and others attended from the Soviet side. All Gorbachev's army.
Summing up the meeting, Gorbachev said that the integration of the USSR into the capitalist world economy can be considered fundamentally resolved. (M. Sturua. Izvestia, 19.01.1989). I believe that the foregoing is enough to understand what plans Gorbachev was carrying, declaring a restructuring-catastroika.
Deficit as a tool of disaster
After a visit to France, events in the USSR developed in the direction needed for Gorbachev. In order not to bore the reader with an analysis of the disastrous Gorbachev's reforms, I refer to Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to US President George W. Bush. 5 December 2011. He gave an interview to Radio Liberty, in which he stated that “Gorbachev did our work for us” (Gorbachev Was Doing Our Work For Us). That says it all.
Nevertheless, I would like to touch on the problem of the shortage of food and essential goods in the USSR during the restructuring period. It most clearly showed the treacherous and destructive nature of Gorbachev's reforms.
It was precisely the total deficit that largely caused the growth of separatist sentiments in the Union republics, and in Russia itself. Today it is absolutely clear that the deficit and the sabotage that accompanied it were deliberately planned acts of sabotage, which were to confirm the inferiority of the socialist economy and the rejection of socialism.
Let me remind you that for the USSR the shortage and the queues behind it were common occurrences for the Union republics, except for the Baltic. But at the same time, as is known, the production of food and consumer goods in the Union has constantly increased.
Mikhail Antonov, head. Sector of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, argued that according to FAO (United Nations Food Organization), the USSR in 1985 - 1990 years with a population that made 5,4% of the world, produced 14,5% of food in the world. I note in particular that the USSR provided 21,4% of the world production of butter, but in most stores in Russia it was not there!
According to statistics, in 1987, the volume of food production in the USSR increased by 1980% compared to 130. In the meat industry, the increase in production compared to 1980 was 135%, in butter and butter - 131%, fish - 132%, flour milling - 123%. Over the same period, the population of the country increased by only 6,7%, and the average monthly wage throughout the national economy increased by 19%. Just a word, a situation - do not trust your eyes.
And the fact was that agents of influence, relying on the enriched mafia leaders who took control of key points of Soviet trade and supply, skillfully, as before the February revolution of 1917, in 1988-1991. organized in the USSR total shortage of products and consumer goods. A significant part of the deficit was hidden for realization in the conditions of the free market, and the other part was illegally exported. The then B. Yeltsin entourage actively participated in this.
Nikolai Ryzhkov, former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in the NTV television program “The USSR. The collapse of the empire ”(11.12.2011), told how in the summer of 1990 the deficit of tobacco products was artificially created in the country. It turns out that, at the direction of B. Yeltsin, 26 of Russian tobacco factories from 28 were suddenly closed for repair ...
In the same TV program, Yuri Prokofiev ,. 1, the secretary of the Moscow city committee of the CPSU in 1989-1991, reported that Gavriil Popov, co-chairman of the MDG and chairman of the Moscow Soviet, said that the “Intergovernmental deputy group” of the “democratic” faction of the People’s Deputies food so that the products were given out on coupons. It is necessary to provoke the indignation of the workers and their actions against the Soviet power ... ”. (“True”, 18.05.1994).
The Pravda newspaper 20 in October 1989 published photographs of the Moscow railway freight stations, which were packed with wagons with medicines, condensed milk, sugar, coffee, and other products. O. Voitov, deputy head of the Moscow Railways' container traffic service, reported that 5.792 medium-sized and large-sized containers and around 1.000 cars had accumulated at the sites of Moscow freight stations. But…
I also remind you of the “600 seconds” telecast of the Leningrad television journalist A. Nevzorov, in which scenes with barbaric export of fresh meat products were regularly shown to landfills. Writer Yury Kozenkov in the book “Calvary of Russia. Power Fight ”recalled that:
“In 1989, at the first session of the USSR Armed Forces, writer V. Belov handed a note to the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, V. Kryuchkov, who was speaking from the podium with the question:“ Do sabotage exist in transport, industry, and economic sabotage in the country? ” Kryuchkov didn’t have enough courage to answer the session stands, and during the break he gave Belov a positive answer. ”
Comments are superfluous. Naturally, the Gorbachev perestroika should be called only a catastrophic. It is no coincidence that the Soviet people, after 6,5 years after having seen enough of the outrages perpetrated by Gorbachev and his entourage, December 25 1991 calmly and indifferently accepted his farewell speech and the resignation of the Soviet Union.