Military Review

Four fights of "Glory", or the effectiveness of mine-artillery positions (the end)

54
Having studied the battles of the battleship “Glory” in Moonsund, we can draw some conclusions about the battle in the mine-artillery position as a way of waging the weakest fleet against the strongest.


There is no doubt that unarmored minefields seriously hamper the actions of the enemy, but cannot stop him on their own. Even very dense minefields, such as those put up in the Irbensky Strait as of 1917, were nevertheless passed by the German minesweepers, although it took several days to do this.

In no case did light forces, such as gunboats, destroyers and submarines, could play any significant role in the defense of mine-artillery positions. Their role was limited to patrols and reconnaissance, but in no case were they able to prevent the trawling.

Here, however, should make a substantial reservation. Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev believed that the mine position in the Irbensky Strait was set up very badly:

In the Irbensky Strait itself, a minefield was already delivered and maintained a long time ago, which by no means could be considered a minefield position:
1) the south coast of the strait belonged to the enemy and was heavily fortified;
2) a large area of ​​the field made it possible for the enemy to carry out sweeping works all the time, and we could not catch the moment when he really intended to force the passage; besides, thanks to this field, we were deprived of the possibility of continuous observation of enemy minesweepers;
3) these enemy works could be carried out completely without the support of their fleet;
4) during the breakthrough of the enemy thanks to the arrangement of our position, all the time was guaranteed from our attacks by destroyers and submarines, as it was protected by our barriers parallel to the shore (this was, in my opinion, a huge mistake);
5) the enemy had the opportunity to make along the coast itself the beaten channel and monitor its good condition;
6) we had no opportunity to expel our destroyers and submarines to the W, at sea and, consequently, unexpectedly for the enemy from the Gulf of Riga.
7) this field made it impossible for us to conduct exploration in the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Riga.


It is possible that if the mine position corresponded to the wishes of M.K. Bakhirev, light forces could be used with greater efficiency. However, there are certain doubts.

Of course, if the minefields were set perpendicular to the coast (across the strait), there would be free mines between them, of which the defenders would know, and the advancing ones would not. In this case, it would be possible to conduct a group of destroyers under the coast, and then undertake an attack, moving outside the minefields. But the German minesweepers worked under the protection of larger ships, such as light cruisers, armadillos and dreadnoughts, which were quite able, by developing intensive fire, to make such an attack impossible. "Glory" twice (3 August 1915 g. And 4 October 1917 g.) Drove the enemy destroyers from the maximum firing distance. There is no doubt that two battleships or a dreadnought, with the support of two light cruisers (namely, such a detachment was usually assigned to directly cover the trawl caravan) would cope with this task much faster and more efficiently.



As for submarines, it would seem that for them the forcing of minefields by the enemy represents almost ideal conditions for an attack. The main problem of the submarine is that it is not able to get close to the enemy warship in the surface position (drown), and under water at the boat is too low speed for this. Therefore, by and large, a submarine can attack a warship if it is by chance within the reach of its torpedo weapons. But the breakthrough of the minefields presents additional possibilities for the boat.

First, a significant part of the enemy detachment is usually located in front of minefields, awaiting the moment when the fairway will be rattled. Accordingly, the submarine has enough time to get close to the enemy and attack him. If the submarine is behind the minefields, then it can choose a suitable position, because the enemy does not know where the minefield ends and whether a new one will not start, why you have to be cautious and move at low speed behind the trawl caravan even where the mine is not.

However, the only successful case of submarine use was the attack of the German Indianola minesweeper base, which resulted in damage and was forced to refuse to participate in the October 4 1917 battle. And this was despite the fact that Moonzund took part in the defense very experienced British crews that used very advanced for the time boats. To a certain extent, such a disappointing result was the result of the fact that the Germans attracted a sufficient number of destroyers to protect their larger ships. But in other cases, the submarines failed. Thus, in 1915, the fleet command sent E-1, E-9, Bars and Gepard to the Irbensky Strait. On the morning of August 10, two armored cruisers (the Roon and Prince Heinrich), accompanied by two light cruisers, approached the Irben Strait. In a short battle, they drove away the Russian destroyers, and proceeded to the shelling of Cape Tserel. In total, German cruisers fired 40 minutes, during which time the E-1 and the Cheetah three times tried to attack the German cruisers. Alas, without success.

It can be assumed that light forces are able to play a certain role in the defense of mine-artillery positions, but they cannot defend them on their own.

As for the coastal artillery, she almost didn’t show herself in Moonzund’s battles: On October 10, the batteries of Moon and Werder were quickly suppressed by the Germans. There is a reasonable assumption that the most powerful battery of 4-mm guns was forced to cease fire due to technical reasons.

The only more or less “bright spot” was the short duel between the battleships “Friedrich der Grosse” and “König Albert” with the “Zerel battery”, which consisted of four modern 305-mm guns. Despite the fact that one gun was fought against two German dreadnoughts (and one more episodically) the Germans could not crush it and were forced to retreat without causing any damage to the Russians.

As the experience of the numerous battles of the “sea with the shore,” teaches, coastal artillery is fully capable of withstanding the naval artillery. A good example of this is the defense of the Dardanelles by the Turks from the attacks of the allied Anglo-French fleet. Despite the fact that the Turkish coastal defense artillery was inferior to the allies both quantitatively and qualitatively, the mine-artillery positions of the Turks justified the expectations placed on them.

Four fights of "Glory", or the effectiveness of mine-artillery positions (the end)

One of the few modern guns of the Turkish coastal defense.


The fact that the Russian batteries almost did not play any role in the defense of Moonsund in 1917, says not about the weakness of coastal artillery, but only about the propaganda of the troops, completely lost their stamina and every desire to fight. In general, it should be considered that the mine-artillery positions defended by modern coastal artillery are capable of stopping the enemy’s many-times superior naval forces. But coastal artillery has two serious flaws that should be taken into account.

The first of these is a very high cost with any lack of mobility, as a result of which the coastal artillery could be used only to cover the most important point objects. At the same time, if the enemy will storm one of them, in all other points this artillery will be useless and will stand idle.

The second is vulnerability from the shore. So, for example, the “Zorel battery”, in the presence of determined commanders and calculations, was almost invulnerable from the sea. But no one could prevent the Germans from landing troops elsewhere on the island of Ezel (which, in fact, they did in 1917 d) and seizing the specified battery from land. But in order to reliably cover up all the dangerous areas, heavy guns were no longer enough. If we return to the operation in the Dardanelles, we will see that despite the very numerous artillery (both stationary coastal defense and field defense), the Turks still could not prevent the landing of the landing forces. True, their very selfless defense did not allow the troops to perform the assigned tasks, and as a result, the latter were evacuated.

Of course, you can build a whole system of coastal batteries and cover them with bastions from land, creating a first-class fortress, capable of defending against sea and land opponents with equal effectiveness. But the cost of such structures is extremely high. For example, the cost of the Revel-Porkalaud position covering the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and part of the Peter the Great Fortress was estimated at 55 million rubles. Almost the full price of two Sevastopol battleships! It should be borne in mind that:

1) the above-mentioned 55 million included only coastal installations, without creating defensive positions against the land enemy;

2) in itself, the Revel-Porkalaud position did not guarantee the protection of the Gulf of Finland against invasion and could only protect it in conjunction with a strong Baltic fleet.

In general, mine-artillery barriers protected by coastal artillery can be considered a very effective defense against a superior fleet, but such defense is not self-sufficient and cannot guarantee protection of the coast as a whole. Coastal artillery can cover only some of its most important points and needs other means of naval warfare to supplement it.


One of the surviving positions of the fortress of Peter the Great


Consider now the heavy artillery ships. As Moonshund’s experience has shown, the mine-artillery position offers significant advantages to the ships defending it and makes it possible to withstand a much stronger enemy. Of course, it can be argued that in both cases, conducting operations in 1915 and in 1917, the Germans achieved their goals, and the naval forces of the Gulf of Riga could not prevent a rush into the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917 they lost the battle of the Great Zund.

But ... If “Glory” alone on the open sea would have fought with 4-th squadron Hohzeeflott, which included seven battleships like “Alsace” and “Braunschweig”, then the Russian battleship could hardly hold out even for an hour. But defending the mine-artillery position, "Glory" not only did not die, but also forced the Germans to interrupt the operation and retreat. Gunmen Nassau and Posen at sea would have shot Glory in half an hour, but at the mine-artillery position Slava held them back for a day, and only on the second day of the operation did the German dreadnoughts manage to break into the Gulf of Riga. Even the "Koenig" and the "Kaiser" could not destroy the ships of M.K. Bakhirev from the first attempt, though, happen to "Glory" and "Citizen" to fight the battleships Benke in the open sea ...

The battle of heavy artillery ships in a mine-artillery position was characterized by the following features:

No matter how superior the enemy was, he used only a small part of them to cover the mine caravan. So, the Germans in no case attracted more than two heavy ships: 26 July 1915, it was the Alsace and Braunschweig, 3-4 of August of that year - Nassau and Posen, and in October 1917. - “Koenig” and “Kronprinz”. Usually, in addition to the battleships, the enemy also included two light cruisers into the squadron of the sweeping caravan.

According to the author of this article, "Glory" was a more sophisticated ship than the battleship of the type "Brunswick". It is likely that the Germans thought otherwise, believing that the ships of these types are equal in their fighting qualities. But on July 26, they put two ships against the same "Glory" and did not succeed. It would seem that something too simple: add another one or two battleships, providing an advantage of one to four, but this was not done. Instead, Nassau and Posen were sent into battle.

But the German plan of the operation was being built in the hope of luring four battleships of the “Sevastopol” type from the Gulf of Finland to help them in order to destroy them in a general battle. Of course, the Russian dreadnoughts were sitting too deep to pass the Moonsund Strait into the Gulf of Riga. In order to throw "Sevastopoli" into battle, it was necessary to lead them through the throat of the Gulf of Finland to the open sea. And 4 Squadron Hohzeeflotte looked like an ideal bait for this: even if numerous, the old ships gave a strong temptation to the Russian command to crush the forces storming the Irben Strait with one blow. Another question is that on the road to the Irbens, eight dreadnoughts and three battlecruisers of Hochseeflott were waiting for the four Russian battleships, but it was assumed that the Russians did not know about it.

The Russians, having received the ciphers of the German fleet from the wrecked cruiser “Magdeburg”, knew about this intention of the Germans, but the German commander, of course, could not presume such. Accordingly, he should have concealed the presence of his dreadnoughts in the Baltic, presenting the case as if the Germans did not have more seriousness for Moonund than the old battleships. And yet, to continue the operation, he sends Irben “Nassau” and “Pozen” to break through. Why?

We can assume the following.

First, it is likely that the sweeping caravan had a restriction on the trawling width. This, in general, is understandable: the longer the fairway, the easier it is to trawl, the less chance the minesweeper will explode on the mine, and if the minesweepers are in abundance, it is probably better to be safe, letting them go in several echelons in order to eliminate the missing ones mines. Despite attracting significant trawling forces (39 of 26 minesweepers in July 1915), only two battleships were assigned to cover the sweeping caravan. In the second phase of the 4 battle of October, the German dreadnoughts followed the 19 minesweepers, however the Kronprinz did follow Koenig, although somewhat to the left of its course, i.e., probably, their width was smaller than if they were marched in parallel wake columns.

Secondly, the speed of the trawling caravan is very limited. Of course, in the descriptions of the performance of German minesweepers of that period, we can see the speed of movement with the trawl even 15 nodes, but it is obvious that in practice nothing like this happened. In order to pass the Irbensky Strait one should trample no more 45 miles, but on July 26 the German minesweepers, having started their work, were extremely far from its completion even at 03.50 in 13.00.

It is obvious that heavy ships, breaking through the mine-artillery position, are severely limited in maneuver and speed. Unlike the attackers, the defenders have no such restrictions, as “Glory” demonstrated in 1915 battles. The ship moved along the edge of the minefield, first from north to south, and then in the opposite direction, and when it came under fire from enemy battleships, it always had the opportunity to retreat to the east, go beyond the range of the German heavy artillery, and then start all over again.

At the same time, the main target for the artillery of the defenders are not escort warships, but minesweepers, whose disruption prevents the breakthrough. And the covering forces follow the trawl caravan and at a certain distance from the latter - at least in order to have time to stop if the minesweeper in front of them is blown up by a mine. From this it follows that the distance between the defending battleship and the minesweepers will always be less than the distance separating the defending battleship from the heavy covering ships.

Nothing prevents defenders from firing at minesweepers from a distance close to the maximum firing range. In this case, with a sufficient density of fire and with a high-quality fire control system, it is quite possible to provide covers for minesweepers. In Moonund “Glory” it was possible, although the battleship could not provide the first and did not have the second. As the practice of fighting has shown, regular coverings of the caravan are quite enough to force him to stop working and retreat, even in the absence of direct hits from the minesweepers.

It is extremely difficult for the forces of covering a trawling caravan to resist such tactics. With an equal range of firing from the ships going after the minesweepers, it may not be possible at all to fire at the enemy, or there will be much less time, because the defenders will only occasionally be within the range of the artillery of the attackers. But even in the latter case, the battleships protecting the mine-artillery position will be located on the sharp nasal corners of the bursting out, which will not allow all the heavy artillery of the attackers to be used in battle. At the same time, the defenders are able to fight all overboard. In addition, minesweepers slowly crawling forward are a much easier target for shooting than a battleship that maneuvers on 14 nodes.

If all of the above is true, then it turns out that neither three nor even four battleships of the Wittelsbach and Braunschweig type were enough to ensure absolute superiority over a single Slava while she defended a mine-artillery position. That is what made the German commander of the operation unmask the presence of dreadnoughts and send into battle "Nassau" and "Pozen." And they eventually completed their task, but the Germans managed to break through only after they had entered into battle two dreadnought against one squadron battleship! In fact, we are talking about the confrontation of ships that differ by two generations: between the “dotsusimsky” battleships and the dreadnoughts were the so-called “predreadnoughts”, which far exceeded the battleships of the preceding types in firepower.

In the Russian imperial fleet these ships were the “Andrey Pervozvanny” and the “Emperor Paul I”, and I must say that if 3 and 4 August 1915 were protected by the Irbensky Strait, not one of these ships it is not known what the matter would turn out to be. The main problem of "Glory" in the battle of 3 in August is the short range of the main caliber, which the commander and crew had to fill with artificial lurch and tactical maneuvering, but which, of course, could not be fully compensated by either one or the other. But “Andrew the First-Called”, having 305-mm tower installations with an elevation angle of 35 degrees, could shoot twelve-inch projectiles at 110 kb, and 203-mm - at 95 kbt. That is, being at the limit of the range of German 280-mm guns, which from such a distance could hardly inflict fatal damage on our battleship, he could simultaneously fire at one of the dreadnoughts with 305-mm guns, and 203-mm cannons it is not known how the Germans would have liked it. In addition, it should be borne in mind that on the “Andrew the First-Called” and “Emperor Paul I” a fire control system was developed by Heusler, model 1910, and they may have had a better SLA than it was in “Glory”.



The author will also risk claiming that if the Irbensky Strait in 1915 was defended not by “Glory”, but by one of the battleships of the “Sevastopol” project, then the Germans would have had to go off without a bit of it. Because the Russian Dreadnought, with its nearly twenty-foot rangefinders (not 9-feet, as on Slava), a dozen rapid-fire guns of the main caliber, the range of 470,9 cable shells, which is two miles greater than the capabilities of guns battleships of the Nassau type, as well as armor almost invulnerable at such distances, would present a completely unsolvable problem for the Germans.

Unfortunately, the Russian command did not risk losing at least one dreadnought and did not send a ship of the Sevastopol type to Moonzund. The reason is clear: in the 1915 year, in general, no battleship could pass the Moonsund channel directly from Riga to the Gulf of Finland, so that the ship of this class, which went to Moonzund, had to win or die. So they sent the least valuable combat unit (they chose between “Glory” and “Tsesarevich”). As for 1917, despite the dredging in the Strait of Moonsund, neither the First-Called and Sevastopoli could pass through it. So, the opportunity to retreat in case of failure of Moonsund’s defense was only in the “Tsesarevich” with the “Glory”, and, again, the most experienced and “sniffed with gunpowder” crew was just on the “Glory”.

In this regard, one can only regret that when choosing the main base of the imperial Baltic fleet, we stopped at Revel (present-day Tallinn). As an alternative, it was proposed to equip such a base in Moonsund, and for this to deepen the Moonzund Canal so that they could pass ships of all classes of the domestic fleet. If the variant with the base of the fleet in Moonsund was accepted, then there is no doubt that in 1915, an attempt to break into the Gulf of Riga would run into the horizon of the twelve-inch guns of the newest Russian dreadnoughts - with a very sad result for Kaiserlmarine.



The main reason why the Germans succeeded in breaking through to the Gulf of Riga in 1915 and the success of Operation Albion in 1917 was not at all the perversity of the idea of ​​a mine-artillery position as such, but in the overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of the German material. The Germans surpassed the “Glory” decisively in everything: the number of artillery barrels of the main caliber, firing range, rangefinders, SLA, etc. and this superiority eventually nullified the advantages of the Russian position. In 1917, the problem of hydrography was added to this excellence. Battleships M.K. Bakhirev was extremely constrained by the fairway of the Great Sound, and almost could not maneuver, becoming a floating battery.

From the above, we can draw the following conclusion: mine artillery position as a form of coastal defense in the first world war fully confirmed its worth as a means of allowing the weakest fleet to defend against the strongest attacks. But only when one of its most important features is taken into account: mine and artillery position compensated only for quantitative, but not qualitative weakness of the defending forces.

In other words, in order to successfully defend a mine and artillery position from attacks by squadron battleships, equivalent squadron battleships were required, albeit in smaller numbers. In order to resist the dreadnoughts attack, dreadnoughts were needed. It was impossible to protect the mine-artillery position by weaker types (and even more so - classes) of ships.

According to the results of the moonsund fights, it can be assumed that the four Russian “Sevastopol” with the support of coastal artillery of the Revel-Pkalaud position could indeed repel an attack of at least a dozen dreadnoughts of Hochseeflotte (at least until the appearance of the kayzerlmarmar margins are supernaturals. Baden "with their 380-mm main caliber) and do not miss the German ships into the Gulf of Finland. But neither four, nor eight, nor twelve battleships of the “Glory” type, no number of monitors, coastal defense battleships and so on could have done this.

It is known that the tsar’s dreadnought construction program in the Baltic is now periodically criticized. At the same time, its main thesis is that, since we still could not achieve equality with the German High Sea Fleet, it did not make sense to begin, that our dreadnoughts were still doomed to defend themselves in the bases when the war began, which means there was no need spend large funds on their creation.

But in fact, only the presence of dreadnoughts as part of the imperial Baltic fleet guaranteed the inviolability of the Gulf of Finland, and if the command had ventured to send a ship of this class to Moonsund, then perhaps Riga.

Concluding the series of articles about the battles of "Glory" and the defense of the Moonsund Archipelago, I would like to note the following. In the eyes of modern researchers, the reputation of Admiral MK Bakhirev was heavily tarnished by the results of the battle he had failed in Gotland, in which, despite the general superiority in forces, the Russian fleet achieved more than modest successes. As a result, the characteristic of an indecisive and non-independent naval commander stuck to the admiral.

But under the conditions of 1917 of the year, after the February Revolution and the March slaughter of naval officers that followed, which began when the sailors lifted the watch of the watch lieutenant V.G. Bubnova, who refused to change the flag of St. Andrew to the revolutionary red (the battleship “Andrey Pervozvanny”), Mikhail Koronatovich showed himself desperately brave and skillful commander.

The very fact that he remained at his post when confusion, vacillation and unwillingness to fight were spread in the army and navy, when insubordination to officers became the norm, and not the exception to the rule, when the activity of commanders was put under the control of ship committees, when officers they could not know what should be feared more: the superior forces of the German fleet, or the treacherous bullet in the back from unwilling to carry out the combat order of the “comrades”, says a lot.

Dry lines report M.K. Bakhirev on Moonsund’s September 29 Defense - October 7 1917 cannot convey the tragedy of the situation in which Russian naval officers found themselves, who risked remaining on duty and fulfilling their duty:

“The team, under the influence of agitation, did not trust the officers; with constant proximity to the enemy, the result was an excessive nervousness, turning into perplexity at dangerous moments, and turning even into panic into difficult ones. ”


“It was possible to say that there was no discipline, and the teams had a consciousness of complete irresponsibility and confidence that they could do everything with their superiors.”


"The orders of the chiefs were discussed by the committees, and even by the general meetings of the team, and often were not executed."


"Commander of" Glory "captain 1-rank Antonov, shortly before the battle, told me that he was not sure in his team at all and that during any operation it was possible that the team would decide not to go to the appointed place and in case of non-fulfillment of its desire will tie him up and officers. "


In light of the above, it is not so easy to blame Rear Admirals Sveshnikov and Vladislavlev (commandant of the Moonsund fortified area and the head of the submarine division) of cowardice when they arbitrarily abandoned their posts. But Mikhail Koronatovich tried to find some bright sides in the current situation:

"Despite all this, I was sure and now it seems to me that I was right then that good half ship crews who had been in the Gulf of Riga since early spring, sincerely wanted to repel the enemy and defend the bay from mastering the enemy. ”


WHOLE half!

M.K. Bakhirev correctly saw the danger of the assault on Dago and Ezel and demanded the deployment of additional artillery to protect them. But the fleet headquarters did not believe in this possibility and did not find any tools for the admiral.

The Germans began the invasion and the admiral's suspicions were “brilliantly” confirmed. Strong pressure is put on the forces entrusted to his command: the enemy has attacked both the islands and the Irben Strait and Soelozund. Everything is crumbling around like a house of cards: the garrisons are not fighting, the minelayer cannot be persuaded to throw mines, the base of the Irben defense, the “Tserel battery” has treacherously capitulated ... And in this situation M.K. Bakhirev manages to bring the ships entrusted to him to battle with the enemy many times superior to his forces. The admiral gave a battle at the Bolshoi Zunda with the expectation of a meager chance to hold the position and save the defense of the Moonsund archipelago. In battle, he acted flawlessly, not allowing any tactical error, but the obviously superior German forces, given the presence of Russian minefield maps, did not leave Mikhail Koronatovich with a single chance.

Actions M.K. Bakhirev in Moonsund should be recognized as skillful and heroic, and taking into account which teams were on his ships - doubly heroic. Of course, the "grateful" country "in full" rewarded him for his valor on the battlefield.

Already on January 2, 1918, the admiral was dismissed without the right to receive a pension, and in August of that year he was arrested and released only in March 1919. But he did not flee the country, but became an employee of the operational department of the Marine historical Commission (Moriskoma). In November 1919, Mikhail Koronatovich was arrested again, on charges of promoting the rebellion of Yudenich. On January 16, 1920, the admiral, so bravely fighting the superior forces of the German fleet, was shot.


M.K. Bakhirev (second from left on the bridge of the battleship "Sevastopol")


List of used literature:

1. Bakhirev M.K. Report on the actions of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga 29 September - 7 October 1917
2. Vinogradov S.E. Battleship "Glory". The undefeated hero Morezund.
3. Kosinsky A.M. Moonzund operation of the Baltic Fleet 1917
4. Melnikov R.M. Armored cruisers of the type "Admiral Makarov" (1906-1925).
5. Melnikov R.M. Tsesarevich.
6. Muzhenikov V.B. Battleships of the Kaiser and Koenig types (1909-1918).
7. Muzhenikov V.B. German battleships Part 1: Nassau, Westfalen, Rhineland, Pozen.
8. Taras A.E. First World War at sea.
9. Timirev S.N. Memories of a naval officer. Baltic Fleet during the time of war and revolution (1914 — 1918).
Author:
Articles from this series:
Four "Glory" battles or the effectiveness of mine and artillery positions (part of 5)
Four "Glory" battles or the effectiveness of mine and artillery positions (part of 4)
Four "Glory" battles or the effectiveness of mine and artillery positions (part of 3)
Four "Glory" battles or the effectiveness of mine and artillery positions (part of 2)
Four "Glory" battles or the effectiveness of mine and artillery positions (part of 1)
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  1. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 22 December 2017 06: 58 New
    +3
    Greetings, Andrei Nikolaevich hi
    Bravo! good
    Rest in the evening drinks
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 09: 24 New
      +4
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Greetings, Andrei Nikolaevich

      Good day to you too! hi
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Bravo!

      Thank you!
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Rest in the evening

      Let's wait :))
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 22 December 2017 22: 54 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let's wait :))

        And there’s nothing to wait for ... yes
        The conclusions are the same - the defense under the accompanying conditions is stronger than the attack, if the place of the attack is known in advance. The land notorious 1: 3 is quite effective at sea, if again the dogmatic conditions for the classes of ships (their weapons) are observed
        Conclusion - the conditions would be ideal when the Gulf of Riga would be part of the defensive system with the Gulf of Finland, i.e. the conditions for the distribution of ships for the defense of the entire area would be equal. Then the appearance of dreadnoughts in the Gulf of Riga through a hypothetically deepened Moonsund canal would make the defense of the entire mine artillery position as a whole more varied (if we take the defense of St. Petersburg.)
        But these are all assumptions. You described reality better than me! For which respect! hi drinks
        All I can say is Bravo!
        Reading was interesting and informative drinks
  2. kvs207
    kvs207 22 December 2017 07: 49 New
    +4
    Brilliantly.
    And “Glory”, justified its name 100 percent.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 09: 24 New
      +3
      Thank you!
      Quote: kvs207
      And “Glory”, justified its name 100 percent.

      Absolutely agree
      1. Lebedev Sergey
        Lebedev Sergey 23 December 2017 21: 49 New
        +2
        Moments are distributed: to whom is a shame
        To - infamy, and to whom - immortality.


        The battleship "Glory" not only glorified himself in the defense of Moonzund, but also departed, despite his death.
  3. Amurets
    Amurets 22 December 2017 07: 56 New
    +4
    The second is vulnerability from the shore. So, for example, the “Tserel battery” in the presence of decisive commanders and calculations was almost invulnerable from the sea. But no one could stop the Germans from landing in another place on the island of Ezel (which, in fact, they did in 1917) and capture the indicated battery from land.

    Very accurate remark. The same problems were on the islands during the Second World War. Almost all coastal batteries were either taken by land attacks or destroyed by their personnel. And also on the construction and equipping of the coastal defense of the Bothnian, Finnish and Riga Gulfs there is a good book by L. Amirkhanov "The Sea Fortress of Emperor Peter the Great."
    "The Sea Fortress of Emperor Peter the Great (official name) is a unique fortified area in the world, created on the territory from the Moonsund archipellagus to Petrograd in 1913-1917.
    Creation, construction. Participation in hostilities. Photos, drawings. "
    https://eknigi.org/voennaja_istorija/59640-morska
    ya-krepost-imperatora-petra-velikogo.html
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 09: 27 New
      +3
      Quote: Amurets
      Very accurate remark. The same problems were on the islands during World War II.

      And there is no objection to this :)))) Of course, this is so. Coastal artillery is an important and useful thing, but not a panacea.
      Quote: Amurets
      there is a good book by L. Amirkhanov "The Sea Fortress of Emperor Peter the Great."

      Of course :))) In general, Amirkhanov is perhaps the best of all domestic historians who write on coastal art
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 22 December 2017 11: 06 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Of course :))) In general, Amirkhanov is perhaps the best of all domestic historians who write on coastal art

        There is also Chernov: “The war extinguished the lighthouses” and Y. Melkonov: “The cannons of the Courland coast.” Moonsund’s batteries, "but this is already the time of the Second World War and the post-war history of the coastal defense of this region. Sorry that I did not thank in the first comment, it is very interesting and detailed.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          22 December 2017 12: 22 New
          +3
          Quote: Amurets
          There is also Chernov: “The war extinguished the lighthouses” and Y. Melkonov: “The cannons of the Courland coast.” Moonsund’s Batteries, "

          By the way, I somehow missed this, it will be necessary to read at my leisure
          Quote: Amurets
          Sorry for not thanking in the first comment, very interesting and detailed.

          Thank you for your kind words, why am I apologizing for that? :)
    2. Alex_59
      Alex_59 22 December 2017 11: 59 New
      +4
      Quote: Amurets
      The same problems were on the islands during the Second World War. Almost all coastal batteries were either taken by land attacks or destroyed by their personnel.

      Yes, in general, it happened exactly the same at the Black Sea Fleet. The Germans were good. And when, at a critical moment, ours finally realized that they were not attacking us from the sea, namely from land, they elegantly did the opposite and crossed the North Bay from the sea, putting an end to the defense of Sevastopol (which even with the captured northern side could hold on for a long time like Stalingrad for example). Brilliant welcome.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        22 December 2017 12: 15 New
        +4
        Quote: Alex_59
        . And when, at a critical moment, ours finally realized that they were not hitting us from the sea, namely from land, they elegantly did the opposite

        Well ... Manstein is not in vain considered the best general staffer of the Reich.
  4. Moore
    Moore 22 December 2017 09: 56 New
    +6
    Ballad of Nails
    Calm down the pipe to the end,
    He smiled calmly from his face.
    "Team, to the front! Officers, go!"
    The commander walks dryly.
    And the words are equal in full height:
    "Anchoring at eight.
    At whom the wife, the brother -
    Write, we will not come back.
    But there will be a noble bowling alley. "
    And the eldest in response: "Yes, captain!"
    And the most daring and young
    I looked at the sun over the water.
    “Does it matter,” he said, “where?
    It's even easier to lie in the water. "
    Admiral's ears caught the dawn:
    "The order is executed, there are no rescued".
    Nails would be made from these people:
    Harder would not have been in the world of nails.
    Nikolai Tikhonov - under the impression of Moonsund.
  5. avt
    avt 22 December 2017 10: 12 New
    +4
    All is well good However, a couple of points in the conclusions
    In the Russian imperial fleet, such ships were the “Andrew the First-Called” and “Emperor Paul I”, and I must say that if on 3 and 4 August 1915 the Irbensky Strait would have defended not “Glory”, but one of these ships, then it is not known what the matter would turn out to be.
    wassat Yes, it would end the same way as with “Glory,” which the author had previously described in detail. Well, in terms of how the demoralized personnel simply surrendered this very artillery component to the position of the Germans. Now, if yes, they would have fitted it to Tsushima “Andrew the First-Called” and “Emperor Paul I” .... but Oleg is already needed here - I have been waiting for fantasy on this subject for a long time.
    But only when one of its most important features is taken into account: the mine-artillery position compensated only for the quantitative, but not qualitative weakness of the defending forces.
    Yes? The fragment, and far from high-quality, which the Finns inherited, completely resisted the untouched Red Army fleet in the Finnish company, as indicated in the memoirs of Kabanov.
    From the foregoing, the following conclusion can be drawn: the mine-artillery position as a form of coastal defense in the First World War fully confirmed its viability as a means of allowing the weakest fleet to defend itself against the attacks of the strongest.
    really so, but
    But only when one of its most important features is taken into account:
    another and the author also previously indicated
    this is shore vulnerability
    that the Germans repeated to the Patriotic War in the same place.
    Of course, you can build a whole system of coastal batteries and cover them with bastions from land, creating a first-class fortress that can with equal effectiveness defend against sea and land opponents. But the cost of such structures is extremely high.
    Absolutely right! BUT so cover the base, not the position. The position .... well, if you like - it’s covered by the course of the company as a whole, like the defensive lines on land. Well, in general, of course good Now, once again, we fully read bully
    1. Serg65
      Serg65 22 December 2017 10: 31 New
      +6
      hi Greetings to the Great White Shark!
      Quote: avt
      The position .... well, if you like - it is covered by the course of the company as a whole, like defensive lines on land.

      Which was demonstrated by Sevastopol and Oranienbaum bridgehead!
      1. avt
        avt 22 December 2017 10: 48 New
        +2
        Quote: Serg65
        Which was demonstrated by Sevastopol and Oranienbaum bridgehead!

        hi Fisherman.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 10: 34 New
      +2
      Quote: avt
      All is well

      Taki glad I liked it :)
      Quote: avt
      and it would end in the same way as with “Glory,” which the author had previously described in detail. Well, in terms of how the demoralized personnel simply surrendered this very artillery component of the position to the Germans.

      Eeee, so this is 1917, and I’m writing about the “thrusting” of the First-Called in 1915, the first assault on Riga. Then there was no demoralization
      Quote: avt
      Now, if yes, “Andrew the First-Called” and “Emperor Paul I” would have been brought to Tsushima .... but Oleg is already needed here - I have long been waiting for fantasy on this subject.

      With those shells that we had - there, at least push the "Sevastopol" there, there was no sense. And if someone gave Rozhdestvensky a thread from the master’s shoulder, shells of the model 1907 (of the same weight, but from normal steel + TNT), I would also see for whom Tsushima would become Tsushima laughing
      Quote: avt
      Yes? The splinter and far from high-quality, inherited by the Finns, completely resisted the untouched Red Army fleet in the Finnish company

      I didn’t understand this a bit :) Did we break through some kind of MAP? :)))))
      1. avt
        avt 22 December 2017 10: 56 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I didn’t understand this a bit :) Did we break through some kind of MAP? :))))

        They tried to shell old coastal batteries from the sea, all by the cash register.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And if someone gave Rozhdestvensky a thread from the master’s shoulder, shells of the model 1907 (of the same weight, but from normal steel + TNT), I would also see for whom Tsushima would become Tsushima

        But no! You understand! Fantasy is Oleg’s theme! bully
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        First-Called in 1915, the first assault on Riga. Then there was no demoralization

        So in the 15th, the result was different! ,, Glory "also shook the coast with the Germans, though they snapped and fell into it, but the work ,, Glory" continued. Ah ,, Tsesarevich "in the photo is good! good Right in the frame and on the wall asks. bully
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          22 December 2017 11: 23 New
          +3
          Quote: avt
          They tried to shell old coastal batteries from the sea, all by the cash register.

          AND! Well, this is still a little different, there was no one swinging the MAP for forcing, they did it for show
          Quote: avt
          But no! You understand! Fantasy is Oleg’s theme!

          Is it you who tell me the regular history? laughing However, altistory is one thing, and fantasy is another laughing
          Quote: avt
          So in the 15th, the result was different! ,

          Yes, but the Germans nevertheless climbed into Riga. But with the First-Called ... they might not have climbed.
          Quote: avt
          Ah ,, Tsesarevich "in the photo is good!

          There are no words. Handsome man
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 22 December 2017 12: 17 New
          +4
          Quote: avt
          They tried to shell old coastal batteries from the sea, all by the cash register.

          Because you need to work on the point targets of the "gun in the yard" type with reconnaissance and adjustment. Aerial photography, determining possible positions, suppressing air defense, CDF or ICBMs over an island, targeted work on positions. To facilitate the work of ships, you can attract aviation - bombing outbreaks of shots at a unmasking position (a BO gun must either stop shooting for the duration of the raid, or wait for the bomb in the courtyard).
          But the RKKF decided to act by statistical methods, filling up the forest with shells and hoping that some of them would still hit.
          There’s nothing to say about fleet reconnaissance - the Finnish BO system was for our dark forest. The fleet even managed to oversleep the construction of a two-gun 12 "battery at Cape Ristiniemi near Vyborg. They opened the Finnish BO during the UFV, and the favorite method was the demonstrative passage of ships and shelling of possible positions (which almost lost the Kirov KRL - the Finnish battery frightened him for a few minutes before entering the Finnish minefield).

          And most importantly - there was no sense in shelling the same Björk group of batteries. They would make sense if the Red Army broke through the coast through UR Ink. Then the BF after the suppression of the BO could support the infantry with naval artillery. But the main direction of the breakthrough was chosen sector Sum at the railway to Vyborg and Helsinki, inaccessible to ships. So the fleet was just serving the number, shelling the batteries for the sake of the shelling report.
        3. Amurets
          Amurets 22 December 2017 13: 03 New
          +1
          Quote: avt
          They tried to shell old coastal batteries from the sea, all by the cash register.

          There is a portal "Northern Fortress". http://www.nortfort.ru/
          You can find a lot of interesting things on it. Here's an example photo of getting into one of the batteries from the island of Björke.
          “A way out of one of the battery casemates. Something large-caliber and very heavy got here. The walls - traces of fragments, an armored door jamb - are twisted and bent. I would not want to be here in December 1939 ..."
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 22 December 2017 18: 15 New
            +2
            We were sadly convinced that our artillery fire did not achieve what we wanted. The battleships “October Revolution” and “Marat” of 305 mm guns fired three times at this battery. On December 10, from 10 hours 57 minutes to 12 hours 11 minutes, the October Revolution fired 60 HE shells, but after the war it turned out that the place where the battery was fired was fired, and the barrel of the sixth gun was damaged with only one fragment. The battery did not respond to shelling. On December 18, the same ship fired 209 HE shells on the Saarenpä battery, the battery continued to fire at the battleship, but only with one gun. The next day, "Marat" in 33 minutes fired 136 high-explosive shells on the battery, but did not suppress it. 405 large-caliber shells dug up the entire area around the battery with giant funnels, especially beyond its southern front, tumbled down and killed the drill pine forest. The picture of the battle as a gunner was clear to me and required a direct conclusion: it is a battery of high survivability, it was built correctly, although its systems were outdated and its anti-ship fire was not effective.

            The ICH is not some kind of revisionist historian, but General Kabanov, who personally examined the positions of the Finnish BO in 1940 and described what he saw in his memoirs issued in 1971.
            1. Amurets
              Amurets 22 December 2017 23: 09 New
              +1
              Quote: Alexey RA
              The ICH is not some kind of revisionist historian, but General Kabanov, who personally examined the positions of the Finnish BO in 1940 and described what he saw in his memoirs issued in 1971.

              Kabanov’s memoirs I read. I agree with you that most Finnish coastal batteries destroyed themselves, but this does not mean that there were no hits.
              On the portal "Northern Fortress," in the "Coastal Artillery" section, there are two photos of hits on the structures of coastal batteries on the island of Björke.

              And the caption under the photo: "Traces of Soviet bombing and shelling from the times of the Winter War. There are a lot of funnels around, but there are very few hits."
              And yet, this is the memoirs of P. Melnikov, also a famous coastal artilleryman: “The war ended in March of the fortieth year. A peace treaty was signed with Finland. Then we found out where our 228th battery of the 22nd separate artillery would be located Division: on the southern tip of the island of Björke {1}. We are located in a military town where Finnish artillerymen used to live. There was a three-story stone barracks building, a sailor’s dining room, a headquarters building with a wardroom and three residential buildings for the command staff. There were two shores nearby e battery derived Finns down during the retreat from the island. "
      2. unknown
        unknown 23 December 2017 14: 49 New
        0
        The ships of Nebogatov had normal shells. In addition, part of the 2 Pacific shells was of German production.
        But this, all the same, would not help. Russia had to lose this literary war in any way. So wanted the customers of this literary version of the story.
  6. Serg65
    Serg65 22 December 2017 10: 13 New
    +7
    hi Welcome Andrew !!!
    I read all parts of the article with pleasure good . Despite the fact that I myself am interested in the history of "Glory", I learned a lot of new and interesting winked . I only wanted to add, this is my personal opinion, the pogrom on the "Krechet" helped the Germans to determine the places and boundaries of minefields and contributed to the planning of a breakthrough!
    Thanks for the pleasure drinks
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 10: 35 New
      +3
      Quote: Serg65
      Welcome Andrew !!!

      Good day to you too!
      Quote: Serg65
      Despite the fact that I myself am interested in the history of "Glory", I learned a lot of new and interesting

      I, while writing - also :)))))
      Quote: Serg65
      solely wanted to add, this is my personal opinion, the pogrom on the "Krechet" helped the Germans determine the places and boundaries of minefields and contributed to the planning of a breakthrough!

      I do not even know. At the Thunder, the Germans received maps of minefields, did Krechet add anything to this - no idea hi
  7. Alex_59
    Alex_59 22 December 2017 12: 03 New
    +2
    I join the expression of gratitude)))
    Andrei, and in the photo “One of the preserved positions of the Peter the Great Fortress” - down in the center, what is this tank lurking about? Tank firing point? T-54?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 12: 13 New
      +2
      Quote: Alex_59
      I join the expression of gratitude)))

      And thank you!
      Quote: Alex_59
      Andrei, and in the photo “One of the preserved positions of the Peter the Great Fortress” - down the center, what kind of tank was hiding?

      And without a clue. I understand that now something like a museum has been organized there, so that anything can stand, from the Roman trireme to the Tiger laughing hi
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 22 December 2017 12: 22 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I understand that now something like a museum has been organized there,

        And then another question - where exactly is the picture taken? I would go there. If not Moonsund of course.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          22 December 2017 12: 32 New
          +2
          As I understand it, this is Kuivasaari Island in the Helsinki Archipelago. https://bobbie-hamilton.livejournal.com/8408.html
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 22 December 2017 12: 48 New
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            this is Kuivasaari island in the Helsinki archipelago

            Bummer. ((((
            Capstrana ...
        2. Serg65
          Serg65 22 December 2017 13: 42 New
          +5
          Quote: Alex_59
          I would go there

          Next year, it’s like the Kronstadt batteries are opened for tourists and I would also love to visit the islands near Vyborg - there is something to see! good
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 22 December 2017 15: 47 New
            +2
            Quote: Serg65
            Next year, it’s like the Kronstadt batteries are opened for tourists and I would also love to visit the islands near Vyborg - there is something to see!

            Exactly! Climbing Chersonese, Fiolent, Balaclava, I turned my eyes to the shores of the cold Baltic, and although I have never been there, I saw a lot of interesting things about Wikimapia. One thing only - it’s probably expensive, because everything is there on the islands. You need to hire a boat. And the bastions there are very tempting.
            We here in Perm also have everything. Catacombs. Only a few of a different origin. 52-I Guards Missile Division. All too clambered. Poterns, secure vaults. They’re dismantling the base of the BZHRK and I’m probably one of the last to visit it before the final demolition - the villainous method, of course, all were surrounded by tellers. It would be necessary to prepare material for all this, but time is in short supply.
            We must also drive them to the Baltic. Can we arrange a joint expedition, huh? ))))
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 22 December 2017 18: 20 New
      +4
      Quote: Alex_59
      Andrei, and in the photo “One of the preserved positions of the Peter the Great Fortress” - down in the center, what is this tank lurking about? Tank firing point? T-54?

      This is most likely the Finnish 100-mm tower coastal artillery mount 100 56 TK.

      The 100 mm coastal tower artillery mount 100 56 TK (100 millimetrin 56 kaliiperin tornikanuuna - Finnish turret installation with a 100 mm cannon 56 meters long) is a tower of the Soviet T-55 tank used in coastal defense with a standard 100 mm gun D -10T. 58 of these towers were purchased by Finland in the USSR specifically for the needs of coastal defense in 1967, and used to build 14 four-gun coastal batteries commissioned in 1969-1972. To reduce the cost of the tower purchased without gun stabilizers. On the shore installations, the towers were mounted with an extensive underground armored-concrete turret, and on top were covered with asbestos-cork “coating” for masking. The towers themselves were equipped with sighting equipment for firing from closed positions. The calculation of one tower installation was 9 people. On a number of batteries, mock towers were additionally constructed, outwardly similar to 100 56 TC, as false targets. In the 1980s, installations of 100 56 shopping malls underwent modernization with the installation of electric drives, laser rangefinders, ballistic computers and night vision devices, as well as with the installation of a more sophisticated "stone-like" camouflage towers. Plans for the further modernization of 100 56 TKs, including the planned purchase in China of modern 100-mm ammunition, were canceled after 1991.
      © bmpd
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 22 December 2017 23: 09 New
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        This is most likely the Finnish 100-mm tower coastal artillery mount 100 56 TK.

        Wow! That's what!
  8. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 22 December 2017 12: 49 New
    +4
    Andrew welcome !!! The work is just wonderful! You can defend a dissertation or a book. Do not mind if I insert my "five cents".
    I also do not understand the reason for not sending battleships such as "Andrew the First-Called". Moreover, the last draft was only 5 cm more than that of the "Glory". Probably the reason is still in unreliable crews.
    The effectiveness of the mine-artillery position can also be estimated by the losses that the enemy suffered during the operation. And if losses from artillery are minimal, then they are more serious on mines. By the way, on losses. The data is different. Soviet sources talked about the deaths of more than 10 destroyers only. My attempt to calculate the German losses of 100% of the result did not work, but I will voice them. There may be people who supplement or correct.
    29.09/12.10.17 (according to the new and old style) the battleships “Bayern” and “Grosser Elector” were injured by being blown up by mines.
    29.09/12.10.17 Corsica transport was blown up by a mine and sank under the shore.
    1.10/14.10.17 In the Gulf of Finland near Tagalakhti, they were blown up by mines and sank two aux. minesweeper "Altair" (1916, 231 armored vehicles, +10 died) and "Dolphin" (+22)
    2.10/15.10.17 The destroyer V-98 (1915, 1374/1843 tons, 40000 hp, 36 knots, ec - 114 people, 4x1-105/45 mm, 2x2 and 2x1-500 mm TA). An explosion tore off his nose for 13 meters, (+14/7)
    3.10/16.10.17 The minesweeper “T-56” (1890, 132/153 tons, 44,3 × 5,05 × 1,49 m, 1200 hp, 20,5 knots), damaged by artillery, washed ashore and was destroyed.
    3.10/16.10.17 The floating base KTSh "Indianola" (1912 p., 4603 brt, 118,87x16x7,8 m, 10,5 knots) was damaged by the torpedo of the English submarine S-27
    5.10/18.10.17 Destroyer "S-64" (1917 p., 802/971 t, 82,2 x 8,3 x 3,7 m, 24900 35 hp, 83 knots, eco-3 people, 1x105 - 45/2 mm, 2x2 and 1x500-6 mm TA) died after being blown up by a mine (+5/XNUMX)
    5.10/18.10.17 Minesweeper "T-66" (1893 p., 147/177 tons, 48,7x5,4x1,64 m, 2140 hp, 22,7 knots, eco-22 people, 1x1-50/40 mm) died in a mine explosion (+17)
    5.10/18.10.17 Destroyer "B-111" (1915 p., 1374/1843 t, 40000 hp, 36 hp, ec. - 114 people, 4x1-105/45 mm, 2x2 and 2x1-500 mm TA) is damaged by a mine explosion (+5/16)
    That's all for now. Although German ships received other injuries in numerous artillery skirmishes. But their results are not known to me. You can try to add on the dead on mines in the same place, but later the German KTSC F-3 "(24.10.17), TSC" T-65 "(26.10.17) and TSC" M-68 "(29.10.17), but rather total, these losses will be "indirect" and not related to the operation "Albion"
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 19 New
      +3
      I do not presume to fix it; I did not seriously deal with this issue. But I note that when the "S-64" killed another two destroyers, the S-61s and V-74s were injured (without exploding on mines) while trying to save him (the first appeared to leak, the second bent the screw) both failed and needed repair .
  9. Conductor
    Conductor 22 December 2017 13: 09 New
    +2
    Thank you Andrew for the review, as always excellent! And it is necessary in the land Chelyab and such people !!!!)))
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 14 New
      +2
      Quote: Conductor
      Thanks to Andrew for the review.

      You're welcome!
      Quote: Conductor
      And it is necessary in the land Chelyab

      Nuuuuu, we have Miass. The river is so harsh .... laughing
  10. 27091965
    27091965 22 December 2017 13: 46 New
    +3
    In this regard, one can only regret that when choosing the main base of the imperial Baltic Fleet, they stopped at Reval (present-day Tallinn). As an alternative, it was proposed to equip such a base in Moonsund, and for this to deepen the Moonsund Canal so that they could pass ships of all classes of the Russian fleet.


    Revel and Sveaborg, these ports were really considered, primarily for the access of armadillos to them. But they had a weak repair base. The part of the fleet that was intended to be based at one of these ports was supposed to operate in the area from the Moondzun to the Aland Islands. The port of Riga was not suitable for this, the fleet located in it could not quickly respond to the enemy’s actions beyond the Moondzun archipelago.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 20 New
      +3
      Quote: 27091965i
      The port of Riga was not suitable for this, the fleet located in it could not quickly respond to the enemy’s actions beyond the Moondzun archipelago.

      Maybe so, but they could still dig a channel
      1. 27091965
        27091965 22 December 2017 21: 14 New
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Maybe so, but they could still dig a channel


        « The provisions of the theory of “two fleets” and cruising war, in accordance with which the Baltic was supposed, in fact, passive defense. At the same time, indeed, Moonsund turned out to be a very suitable place for basing destroyers, at least in the warm season. Because of this shortcoming such as shallow water, most of the adherents of the idea of ​​strengthening the archipelago did not even mention it, and the head of the Main Hydrographic Office, vice-admiral R.I. Bazhenov, who wrote about it, suggested deepening the fairways to only 24 feet (7,3 m) ), sufficient for sailing only destroyers, gunboats and light cruisers. "

        Later it turned out that there was not enough money pledged to create the defense of Moonsun and the Gulf of Riga. The idea with Libau cost Russia dearly. Perhaps if they had previously decided on the Revel, then the shipbuilding plant began to be built earlier and there were more ships in the Baltic Fleet.

        The plans were very good, it is a pity that they could not be implemented.
        1. Kibb
          Kibb 22 December 2017 22: 03 New
          +1
          Thank you very much, just a priceless quote! And is there where to look at the costs of Libau? (I know approximate estimates that sound by some authors)
          1. 27091965
            27091965 22 December 2017 22: 28 New
            +1
            Quote: Kibb
            . And is there where to look at the costs of Libau?

            "On the construction of the port of Emperor Alexander 3 in Libau" D. Zharintsov
            "Discussion on the ice-free military port in the Baltic",
            1. unknown
              unknown 23 December 2017 14: 53 New
              0
              In fact, a repeat of the story with Port Arthur and Dalniy. Although, it remains to be clarified what is the original and what is a literary copy.
              1. 27091965
                27091965 23 December 2017 17: 00 New
                +1
                Quote: ignoto
                Although, it remains to be clarified what is the original and what is a literary copy.


                "On the construction of the port of Emperor Alexander 3 in Libau" D. Zharintsov.

                About the Developer
                Zharintsov Dmitry Fedorovich. Engineer, inspector of the offshore construction unit.
  11. volodimer
    volodimer 22 December 2017 15: 04 New
    +1
    Thank you so much for the work done! Great stuff! I agree that only a mine-artillery position allowed the "cheap" to keep the Hochzeflotte. The volume of shortcomings that played against us (both technical and moral) is huge, but it doesn’t smell like defeat! If ... increased the elevation angles of the guns ... or deepened the Moonsund Canal ... All the same, I do not think that the “AP” would greatly change the situation.
    "Glory" with an increased firing range - the armor still makes its way through the enemy (the Germans would not have fumbled initially with armadillos).
    I read your article about Sevastopol LC, an interesting analysis, with more optimistic conclusions for our shipbuilders.
    It would be interesting to get an analysis of the possible damage to the AP, based on getting into the Glory, taking into account its reservation scheme. I understand that this is possible only on the battle of August 4 and with huge tolerances.
    Yours faithfully!!!!!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 21 New
      +2
      Thanks for your kind words!
      Quote: volodimer
      It would be interesting to get an analysis of possible damage to the AP, based on getting into the Glory, taking into account its reservation scheme

      Maybe I'll take care someday, but not here - it's a pure alternative, not a military review :)
  12. Taoist
    Taoist 22 December 2017 16: 47 New
    +2
    I agree with the conclusion !.
    Hence the derivative. The quality of the defending forces is more important than technical (to a certain extent) and quantitative superiority.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 22 New
      +2
      Quote: Taoist
      I agree with the conclusion !.

      drinks
      Quote: Taoist
      Hence the derivative. The quality of the defending forces is more important than technical (to a certain extent) and quantitative superiority.

      The quality of the troops is generally ... what can I say, you yourself understand everything
  13. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 22 December 2017 19: 39 New
    +3
    As always - briefly and to the point, but it is extremely interesting. Respect and respect.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      22 December 2017 20: 27 New
      +2
      Greetings, dear colleague!
      Glad I liked it
  14. CTABEP
    CTABEP 25 December 2017 12: 26 New
    +1
    An excellent series of articles, many thanks!
  15. severok1979
    severok1979 9 March 2018 18: 57 New
    0
    The question of the actual participation of battery No. 43 (4 * 305 mm, Tserel) in hostilities is according to the Military Annals of the Russian Fleet: Chronicle of the most important events in the military history of the Russian fleet from the 1917th century. to 1948 - M.: Military Ministry of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, XNUMX, Tserel was twice under enemy fire:
    On October 14, German minesweepers were driven away under cover of three light cruisers, after which they had a shootout with three German dreadnoughts.
    On October 15, three dreadnought fired on Tserel, but no return fire was fired.

    In this case, the 254-mm battery number 36 on Moone fought and fired no less than the famous Tserelskaya!