New radar "Caste 2-2" entered the Central Military District

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The new mobile radar "Caste 2-2", capable of detecting "stealth" objects, was received by the state defense order in the Central Military District, told the "Military Review" in the press service of the district

New radar "Caste 2-2" entered the Central Military District




The station strengthened the combat capabilities to control the airspace of the subdivisions of radio-technical troops of the Central Military District deployed in the Orenburg Region.
- added to the press service

Radar "Caste 2-2" - a mobile radar station with a circular view of the standby mode. It is intended to control the airspace, determine the range, azimuth, flight height level, and route characteristics of airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles, including those flying at low and extremely low altitudes.

The press service noted that the station detects targets made using Stealth technology, as well as moving objects on the sea surface.
  • Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
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  1. Don
    +3
    19 December 2017 12: 27
    A whole radar? belay Well, everything, Americans can safely write off all their stealth aircraft wink But seriously, for our open spaces it is not even a drop in the bucket. The survivability of traditional radars is also very doubtful in our time.
    1. +1
      19 December 2017 13: 05
      Quote: Donskoy
      A whole radar?

      Chet, I, too, did not get to the hidden meaning of this article request
    2. +2
      19 December 2017 14: 08
      What survivability of the STANDARD radar are you talking about?
      This is not a radar of illumination and guidance, and not a low-altitude detector ...
      It is used as a radar for air traffic control and airspace control in aerodrome zones.
      The altitude of the target is estimated by echelons based on the detection of the target in the lower beam, in the upper beam, or both; the accuracy of estimating the flight altitude of a fighter type target is 900 m (i.e., bast up or bast down).
      It does not require fierce combat stability. Designed to block holes in the radar field in peacetime.
  2. 0
    19 December 2017 12: 30
    The press service noted that the station detects targets made using Stealth technology, as well as moving objects on the sea surface.

    At what distance, and most importantly, are air defense systems capable of shooting down the F-22 and F-35 after finding a stealth target? what
    1. +2
      19 December 2017 13: 20
      Of course not, this is a surveillance radar, it can’t direct missiles, but it will be able to direct aircraft, and this is not bad
    2. 0
      19 December 2017 13: 27
      Performance characteristics

      Target detection range with EPR 2m2, km:
      when working on a standard antenna:
      target height 100 m - 41 km
      target height 1000 m - 95 km

      Target detection range with EPR 0,3 m2 flying at altitude
      60 m, km:
      when working on a standard antenna -
      when working with the antenna on a light mast
      50 m high - 30 km
      1. The comment was deleted.
    3. +2
      19 December 2017 14: 27
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      At what distance, and most importantly, are air defense systems capable of shooting down the F-22 and F-35 after finding a stealth target?

      But this is precisely the main problem of air defense with inconspicuous targets: the radio technical battalion can see the invisible target with its radar of detection as long as it wants. But until it is taken to escort the radar of the anti-aircraft missile division or the interceptor radar, this target will fly with impunity. And in the last two radars, the range is different and the range of work on an inconspicuous target is much smaller.
      To shoot at the radar detection data, hoping that the ARLGSN on target will capture the target (or the PARLGSN / radio fuse “learns” the radiation reflected from the target) - this should be a great optimist. smile Because the same Caste 2-2 gives a height accuracy of about a kilometer.
      1. +2
        19 December 2017 15: 09
        In fact, ordinary CDs can easily be attributed to unobtrusive goals. Just because the horizon is highly dependent on the height of the radar antenna. With a flight altitude of 60 m, you will not be able to detect low-flying targets at a distance of more than 50 km .... For this, they create aircraft like A-50, A-100 and our "partners" E-3C Avax .... And so radar task to detect the target and transmit data to air defense control points. And there they’ll figure it out.
        1. +3
          19 December 2017 17: 50
          Quote: Topotun
          In fact, ordinary CDs can easily be attributed to unobtrusive goals. Just because the horizon is highly dependent on the height of the radar antenna.

          Heh heh heh ... just recently there was a big shit on this subject ... a long dialogue on the capabilities of naval air defense systems. In which it was explained that the S-300F radio horizon for the RCC type target is 40-45 km. And the radio horizon of the shipboard radar OVTS for the same anti-ship missiles is about 55 km. And all the tablets with a range of 90-120-165 km can be forgotten, because no one now goes at medium altitudes to a target covered by air defense systems. smile
          Quote: Topotun
          With a flight altitude of 60 m, you will not be able to detect low-flying targets at a distance of more than 50 km ....

          There are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take! ©

          Even in Soviet times, at a pioneering age, the pomnitsa experienced a considerable shock when, on the way from Roshchino to Simaginskoe Lake (the Karelian Isthmus), in the gap between the pines, he saw cyclopic latticed legs holding a radar platform (top under the Reshetnikovo) above the tree tops. Martians Wells tripods are resting. smile
          By the way, these platforms are still standing - only now they are equipped with "three hundred" radars, and not "seventy-five".
          The amendment is already four hundred. For 1488 regiment (yes, yes, such a number) a year ago, the first in the North-West received the S-400.
          Quote: Topotun
          And so the radar’s task is to detect the target and transmit data to air defense control points. And there they’ll figure it out.

          Yeah ... and here I am sitting in my cabin, I look at the VIKO, on which the target mark crawls, the UV-10 scans the desired search sector, throwing it with impulses - and in response, nothing. RTB sees the goal, but I do not. And even for manual accompaniment you can’t take it - there is no normal reflected impulse. sad
          EMNIP, the same Serbs received the normal reflected signal from the "lame goblin" only at a distance at which it was possible to work already through the optical channel.
          1. +3
            19 December 2017 19: 05
            And which sector?
            Serbs were found at ranges of 20-25 km. Taking to the nuclear power station was not always successful, so the CHP-125 was not sharpened for such purposes.
            Alex, is that you?
            How interesting ... well, well - tell a man who studied on the S-125 about the meter range of the radar. I have, you know, a good memory, and I still remember our frequencies.
            It was perhaps only a meter that was given to radar detection - but to capture and track a target through the radar channel it is practically useless, since these operations go to the EEC by signals from UV-10 - UV-11 (the radar of detection gives a picture on the VIKO and only allows you to deploy the antenna the post and the launcher in the approximate direction of the target, then the search is already conducted by the UNV through the UV-10, it also highlights the target when accompanied by the UV-11). And UV-10 has been working in the centimeter range all my life - otherwise, a line with two would have managed to provide acceptable dimensions of the UNV complex
            1. +1
              19 December 2017 19: 43
              Quote: sivuch
              How interesting ... well, well - tell a man who studied on the S-125 about the meter range of the radar. I have, you know, a good memory, and I still remember our frequencies.

              So I remember these frequencies. And I also know perfectly well that it didn’t smell like a meter range - otherwise we wouldn’t have assembled the UNV with a crane and wouldn’t lift it (about mobility and 45 minutes of emergency coagulation, one and a half hours of normative I'm generally silent). smile

              This is exactly what I’m trying to explain: an unobtrusive target in the EEC can be seen only on the VIKO screen, information about the air situation on which is displayed according to data from the RTB radar.
              33. The remote indicator of the circular review of the SSC is intended;
              - to display the combined air situation from the SRC P-12 and P-15 or separately from one of them;
              - to clarify target designation from the regiment control unit;
              - to determine the azimuth and range of the target when targeting the SNR;
              - to identify the target ...

              RTB with its meter-long radars sees the target, but it cannot direct the SAM itself - this is not his business.
              А own means, just providing the use of missiles, the S-125 division does not see this target (up to a certain range, several times less than the table). Although the UNV is deployed in an approximate sector of finding the target (according to the data from VIKO), and the UV-10 actively scans it. But just under the range of these radars, stealth is imprisoned.
              In the meantime, the UV-10 can’t see the target, of course, it is possible to shoot “somewhere in the target area” (because the RKTU displays the missiles not on the physical target, but on the “cross” - a certain conditional point in space, which ideally needs to be combined with purpose). But getting in is extremely problematic. Especially if you know that the same as for a radio fuse when working on inconspicuous targets, the response range also falls - that is, you need to display the SAM quite accurately.
              In good weather, PMSM, as it were, is not simpler than "Karat" in the sector of the probable location of the target to walk. smile

              PS "Two-Gadyushnik" ©
              Petersburg Polytechnic, military department, 1992-1994 Last stream on S-125.
  3. +2
    19 December 2017 17: 42
    And no one wrote that Casta is a further development of the P-15/19 dm-range for detecting low-flying targets. The maximum detection height is -6 km, whether the target is at least stealth, at least not. And like any ONC radar, it should be simple and cheap, since you need to have a lot of such radars. And the stealth pilot, if he’s not at all, will simply not go down below 6 km.
    1. 0
      19 December 2017 19: 50
      Quote: sivuch
      And the stealth pilot, if he’s not at all, will simply not go down below 6 km.

      Well, from the "Caste" he will thus escape. But there is also the Sky radar with its epic “windmill” (a couple of upgrades and improvements - and you can simply catch planes with the antenna array of “Sky”). smile
      Well, or P-18 - also meter.
  4. 0
    19 December 2017 22: 11
    And due to what, what kind of devices can the “caste” see “Stealth” objects? Then RSP-7T, 10-MN.MN-1 can easily do this! They have the same magnetron in the transmitter. True to the "Caste" digital processing of the reflected signal! But this affects the detuning from interference more! What a misunderstanding!
  5. 0
    20 December 2017 00: 41
    I don’t see the dependence on the shape of the antenna and the detection of stealth ...... far from AFAR!

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