Then in Belovezhskaya Viskulyakh, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and Chairman of the Supreme Council of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich, ignoring the opinion of millions of Soviet people who spoke in March 1991 for preserving the Soviet power, declared that “the Union of SSR, as a subject of international political law and geopolitical reality, ceased to exist ”and signed the Agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
During the 26 years past after this event, a lot of memories of its participants appeared in the press, as well as the judgments of various witnesses, historians, and experts. Nevertheless, a number of fairly important circumstances of the Belovezhskaya collusion remain in the shadows. This concerns, first of all, the events that made the fateful meeting in Viskuli inevitable.
The chain of events that caused the movement of the Union to Viskuli began in distant May 1983, when the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, suddenly wished to visit Canada to learn how Canadians are engaged in agriculture. There he was expected to meet with Alexander Yakovlev, the former ideologist of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then the Soviet ambassador to Canada and the American “agent of influence” in combination.
In the evenings on the shady lawns of Ottawa, far from curious ears, the former Soviet ideologist suggested to Gorbachev that "the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is so unhygienic that any creative and even classical thoughts are dying in it." In his book, which had the symbolic name Omut of Memory, Yakovlev recalled: "... it was in conversations with me back in Canada when I was ambassador that the idea of restructuring was first born."
Then March 1985 came, when Gorbachev, who was talkative and firmly believing in his exclusive mission, was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. So for the USSR began the six-year road to Bialowieza.
Former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov noted that “Gorbachev was corrupted by world fame, by foreigners. He sincerely believed that being the Messiah saves the world. He was dizzy ... ".
For this reason, the narcissist Gorbachev started perestroika, which turned into a “catastrophic” for the USSR.
Let me remind you that the failure of the Gorbachev "catastrophic" became clear to 1989. And in 1990, this failure began to manifest itself in the form of statements of independence of the Union republics. 11 March 1990 was the last to declare Lithuania’s withdrawal from the USSR. By the way, for Gorbachev this was not a surprise. After all, at a meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik (October 1986), he agreed with the proposal to withdraw the Baltic republics from the USSR. Gorbachev gave final consent to the withdrawal of the Balts from the Union during a meeting with another US President G. Bush in Malta (December 2 – 3 1989). Baltic separatists knew this.
It does not interfere to remind you that in 2009, in an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, Andrei Baranov (15.06.2009), Gorbachev said that, starting perestroika, he knew: "The Baltic republics will seek independence." In 1990, due to the crisis situation in the economy of the Union, caused by Gorbachev’s ill-conceived reforms, other Soviet republics began to declare their withdrawal from the USSR.
12 June 1990 Russia declared state sovereignty. June 20 The Declaration of Independence was adopted by Uzbekistan, June 23 - Moldova, July 16 - Ukraine, July 27 - Belarus. Then began a cascade of proclamation of sovereignties within the RSFSR. It came to the point that 26 October 1990 g. Declared its sovereignty Irkutsk region.
At the same time, Gorbachev pretended that nothing special was happening. The first alarming “bell” sounded for him at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (17 – 27 December 1990). Before the work of the Congress began, MP Sozhi Umalatova suggested that the first thing on the agenda would be to raise the issue of non-confidence in the USSR president, saying: “it’s not the course that needs to be changed, but the course and the head of state”.
I remember this speech by Umalatova (I attended the convention as a guest). Most of the deputies in the hall listened to Umalatov with some kind of fear. After all, everything that was true, but what was preferred to be silent, suddenly sounded from the stands of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The situation was saved by Anatoly Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Gorbachev’s loyal associate. He did not allow anyone to speak on the proposal Umalatova, and put it on a roll call vote.
426 was in favor, 1288 was against, 183 deputy abstained. It was natural, since by that time only Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Kryuchkov had information about Gorbachev’s treacherous policy. But he chose not to support Umalatova’s proposal, although he knew that the 23 February 1990 was a meeting of representatives of the USSR KGB headquarters sent Gorbachev a letter stating that the delay in taking urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the USSR was in danger of a catastrophe. Therefore, Kryuchkov, as head of the KGB, was simply obliged to ask the president why he ignored the letter of the Chekists.
Kryuchkov also knew that in January 1990, US Secretary of State J. Baker stated: “The circumstances are such that Gorbachev will not survive ... The danger for him is not that he will be thrown out with a palace coup, but that this will be the street. ” But Kryuchkov preferred to remain silent ...
The next “bell” for Gorbachev sounded at the April 1991 city plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at which I, as a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, attended. After the presentation of the new Pre-Council of the USSR Valentina Pavlova, the speakers began to harshly criticize Gorbachev. He could not resist and announced his resignation. However, Gorbachev, announcing a break, organized a collection of signatures in support of the Secretary General. After the break, the Plenum voted to disregard Gorbachev’s statement. So political Pinocchio remained in power.
Let me remind you that in March 1991, at the request of US President George W. Bush, ex-US President Richard Nixon arrived in the USSR for an inspection purpose. His conclusion to the White House sounded disappointing: “The Soviet Union was tired of Gorbachev”.
It was an accurate diagnosis. Gorbachev knew about this diagnosis and began feverishly preparing for retirement.
About this 15 of May 2001, the former head of the office of the President of the USSR Valery Boldin told in an interview with the newspaper Kommersant-Vlast. He said that Gorbachev was already in 1990, Mr .: “I felt out of the game ... He was crushed. I tried to make a good face on a bad game. I realized this after I, the head of the presidential staff, began to receive incredible bills for the products delivered for him ... mostly delicacies and alcohol - sometimes boxes. Harvested for the future. For a rainy day. Then he called me and asked me to arrange his personal affairs ... ".
Well, by August 1991, the chair near Gorbachev turned into a hot frying pan. He learned that in September, 1991 planned to convene a CPSU Congress, which was to remove Gorbachev from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, and then at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to deprive him of his presidency and bring him to criminal responsibility for the totality of his crimes.
Gorbachev could not accept this. It was impossible to prevent the conventions and, above all, the Communist Party. There was no official reason to outlaw the party. A large-scale provocation was needed that would put an end to the CPSU, the KGB and the people's deputies of the USSR. It was for this purpose that Gorbachev, with the support of Kryuchkov, organized the so-called August 1991 coup. At that time, many in the Soviet Union were waiting for something like that.
11 February 1991 The Moscow Chekists invited me to a meeting. They were extremely interested in the bloody provocation at the Vilnius TV tower, which on the night of 13 in January 1991 was organized by the President of the USSR Gorbachev and the head of the separatist Supreme Council of Lithuania Landsbergis. This provocation, which resulted in the death of 14 people, allowed Lithuania to eliminate the remnants of the Kremlin’s control and prepare the appropriate structures to seize power.
At that time I was a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, the 2 secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party / CPSU and a deputy of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. Therefore, I knew something of the secret intrigues of Gorbachev and Landsbergis. To the question of the security officers: “What should be expected in the future?” I replied: “Provocations of a union scale that will hit the authority of the CPSU, the KGB and the army!”
My assumptions about the provocations being prepared by Gorbachev with the State Emergency Committee were subsequently confirmed by Mikhail Poltoranin. In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda (18.08.2011), he stated that the State Emergency Committee was the greatest provocation of the President of the USSR.
In this interview, Poltoranin also said that Yeltsin and Kryuchkov actively assisted Gorbachev in the situation with the organization of the so-called August putsch. In addition, Poltoranin noted that on the eve of the “putsch” Yeltsin often communicated with Gorbachev.
The preliminary conspiracy of our “heroes” is indicated by their behavior after the “putsch”. It is no coincidence that Gorbachev then resignedly allowed Yeltsin to issue a series of decrees that went beyond the constitutional powers of the President of the RSFSR and aimed at misappropriating the federal authority.
There is no doubt that Gorbachev in this period has already set himself the task of pushing the USSR towards disintegration, which would ensure a safe future for him. And by December 1991, according to Gorbachev, it was time to put the finishing point in stories THE USSR. Here I will stop and proceed to the analysis of another chain of events, which also led the USSR to the Belovezhskaya agreement.
Yeltsin. For the sake of power ...
This chain of events is connected with Boris Yeltsin. To begin with, I’ll give a description that his former closest ally Mikhail Poltoranin gave him in an interview with the newspaper Fontanka.ru (08.12.2011). When asked what role Yeltsin played in the preparation of the Bialowieza Agreement, Poltoranin answered:
“Yeltsin played a decisive role. He was nothing sorry.
He didn’t care: whether to lead a democratic state, a fascist one, of whatever kind, just to be in power. Just to be controlled by no one. He met with Gorbachev, who also, in general, did not care, and they only “painted” the struggle between themselves.
But in actual fact there was no struggle! They literally agreed on nights. ”
And then Poltoranin said: “Yeltsin spent almost an hour of 4 spending time with Gorbachev before going to Belarus. And Gaidar, Shahray, Burbulis were waiting for him. The team has gathered, and Yeltsin still receives the last instructions from Gorbachev in front of Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Then he jumps out: “I have to go, meet Kravchuk!”. Mikhail Sergeevich said: “You talk to him there”. ”
17 March 1992 Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk in an interview with Moscow journalist K. Volina reported that Yeltsin flew to Viskuly with the consent and on behalf of Gorbachev, who was interested in Kravchuk's answers to three questions. I will quote these questions as they are stated in the book. Kravchuk “Our goal - a free Ukraine: speeches, interviews, press-conferences, briefings” (“Our goal is a free Ukraine: speeches, interviews, press conferences, briefings”). Kravchuk, LM Kiev: Globus Publishers, 1993.
Yeltsin told Kravchuk: “I want you to know that these three questions are not mine, they are Gorbachev, I spoke with him yesterday, and ask them on his behalf. First: Do you agree with the draft agreement? Second, should it be changed or corrected? Third: can you sign it? After I said no to all three questions, he asked me: “What is the solution?”. According to Kravchuk, Yeltsin replied that in that case he would also not sign the new union treaty.
So, Kravchuk, who was a member of the Bandera’s hundreds of “brave youths” in 1950, then implanted into the Komsomol and Party organs of the Ukrainian SSR, delivered a mortal blow to the USSR.
To confirm this episode of Kravchuk’s biography, I propose that readers turn to the book by Yuri Taraskin “War after the War. Memoirs of the counterintelligence officer ”(Moscow: ed.“ Kuchkovo Pole ”, 2006). He was an employee of SMERSH, who had been operating under cover for several years in the leadership of the OUN-UPA (banned in the Russian Federation).
But back to B. Yeltsin. In Sverdlovsk, the construction engineer Yeltsin, “by conviction” who joined the CPSU, was known for being ready “to break into a cake, but to fulfill any task of the party”. Becoming the first secretary of the regional committee, Yeltsin immediately executed the long-standing decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to demolish the Ipatievs house (the place of execution of the royal family in 1918 year). Yeltsin’s predecessors didn’t do this in the regional committee.
In June, 1985 Yeltsin, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Party Committee, became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Gorbachev and Ligachev liked his toughness and decisiveness, then the “second” to the CPSU, and Yeltsin was “sent” to Moscow to “restore order” after conservative Grishin.
Yeltsin, without hesitation, dismissed the 22-x first secretaries of the Moscow regional committee of the CPSU, others brought to suicide, some to a heart attack. Apparently, it was for that, but Yeltsin carried out the replacement of many secretaries who had been dismissed on the principle of “awl on soap”. The conceit of Boris Nikolayevich, no less than that of Mikhail Sergeevich, soon let him down. At the October 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin allowed himself to criticize the activities of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. He also expressed concern about the inordinate "praise of some members of the Politburo against the Secretary General."
Yeltsin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was chaotic and not impressive. But, according to Gorbachev, he “threw a shadow on the activities of the Politburo and the Secretariat and on the situation in them,” and the CPSU was punished for this. I felt it on my own experience, when in 1981, for the most streamlined criticism of the Lithuanian Civil Code and the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party to ensure productivity growth, I was immediately sent to the 2-year study at the Vilnius HPS for "increasing the Marxist-Leninist level." Moreover, he was sent to a group of instructors of rural district committee of the party, although he had a higher technical education and was secretary of the RK in economic management in the large Leninsky RK of the Lithuanian Communist Party of Vilnius.
Boris Nikolayevich was removed from his post as first secretary of the Moscow State Committee of the CPSU and was appointed first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee. However, Soviet citizens, as always, chose not to report, for which Yeltsin was dismissed.
The secrecy of the speech of the First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee at the October Plenum was used by his supporter, the editor of the Moskovskaya Pravda newspaper, Mikhail Poltoranin. He prepared a version of the speech of Yeltsin, who had nothing to do with the fact that he spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
In this speech, a talented journalist put everything he would like to say at this Plenum.
This was the revelation that the Soviet people had been waiting for a long time, during the so-called stagnation period. Yeltsin's speech, spread out by Poltoranin on a Xerox, was distributed throughout the Union at the speed of a forest fire. Soon in the eyes of the Soviet people, Boris Nikolayevich became a public defender, unjustly punished by the Kremlin party members. It is not surprising that in March 1989 Yeltsin was elected people's deputy of the USSR. At the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May-June 1989), he, thanks to deputy A. Kazannik, who gave up his mandate, became a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, as chairman of one of the committees of the Supreme Soviet, became a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
During this period, American Sovietologists became interested in Yeltsin. In the Soviet “historical closet” they sought out the old tricky idea and decided to reanimate it with the help of a disgraced Russian politician. In the USSR, the absence of the Communist Party of Russia was simply explained. In the monolithic Union it was impossible to create a second equivalent political center. This threatened to split both the CPSU and the Union. With the advent of the charismatic figure of Yeltsin, the Americans had the opportunity to realize plans to create such a center in the USSR.
In September, 1989, a certain organization that seems to be dealing with AIDS, invited Yeltsin, USSR people's deputy, to lecture in the United States. More than strange: a former builder of Yeltsin and AIDS ... But neither Gorbachev nor the State Security Committee alerted this. In the US, Yeltsin spent nine days, during which he allegedly gave several lectures, receiving for each 25 thousands of dollars.
It is hard to say what these lectures were like, since the Soviet guest was constantly, to put it mildly, “tired” all the days of the visit. But he remembered well the recommendations that he was inspired by American experts. They were simple and very attractive - to declare the sovereignty of Russia, to introduce the institution of the presidency there and become president.
This was all told by the same M. Poltoranin in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda (09.06.2011) entitled “Who brought Yeltsin to power?”. He stated: “The idea of the presidency Yeltsin brought from America back in 1989 year. In the US, a lot of work was done with our politicians. But Yeltsin was very influential. ”
I note in particular that the CIA, which closely watched over Yeltsin during his visit to the United States, reported to the new American President George Bush that Yeltsin would give the States more, faster and more reliable than Gorbachev.
That is why Bush initially made a bet on Boris Nikolayevich, and not on Mikhail Sergeyevich.
In May, 1990 Yeltsin began to implement the American recommendations. Moreover, it seemed that Gorbachev did everything to facilitate Yeltsin’s return to power. 29 of May 1990 in the absence of real opposition from the Gorbachev team to Yeltsin’s team, Boris Nikolayevich was elected Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev, the day of the election of the head of the Russian parliament and his future political gravedigger, met on a plane over the Atlantic, heading once again to the USA.
12 June 1990 At the first Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR, the Yeltsin team was able to include on the agenda the issue “On the sovereignty of the RSFSR, the new union treaty and democracy in the RSFSR”. The congress was invited to adopt the Declaration of Sovereignty of Russia, which provides for the priority of Russian laws over the allies. Gorbachev attended the congress. After reading the draft Declaration, he said that he did not see anything terrible for the Union, so the federal authorities would not react to it. For the President of the USSR, a lawyer by profession and the guarantor of the integrity of the USSR, the Declaration should be assessed as a criminal violation of the USSR Constitution. But…
In August, 1990 Mr. Yeltsin, being in Ufa, offered the Supreme Council and the Government of Bashkiria to take as much power as "they can swallow." This desire largely determined the true parade of sovereignties within the RSFSR. It came to the declaration of sovereignty by the Russian regions.
Well, then everything developed, as if by thumb. After all, if we take for granted the speech of Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, he uttered 17 June 1991 at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, then 2200 enemy agents of influence acted in the country. And it is known that the list of these agents was attached to the text of Kryuchkov’s speech. Judging by the scale of the deficit that these agents managed to create in the country, they acted extremely efficiently.
But Kryuchkov at a meeting of the Supreme Council was limited to general words. Apparently, his position was again determined by the fact that he and his department were themselves involved in creating situations in the country that had caused serious damage to the state security of the USSR.
Viskuli is the ultimate ...
A few words about what happened in Belarusian Viskuly during the preparation and signing of the Belovezhsky Agreement. First of all, about the idea of meeting the three heads of the union republics in Viskuly. There are many versions of this. Let me offer one more. There is no doubt that the main theme of the meeting in the Viskulyy far from Moscow was the desire of republican leaders to discuss the treaty on the establishment of the Union of Sovereign States (SSG) without the intrusive dictate of Gorbachev's talker.
It should be borne in mind that Moscow, as a meeting place, immediately fell away. Not only Kravchuk would not fly there, but apparently Shushkevich too. Yeltsin, who had strained relations with Kravchuk, would have refused to fly to Kiev. Belarus remained. Shushkevich was persuaded to organize a meeting, promising to discuss issues of transporting oil and gas through the territory of the republic, which promised her considerable funds. By the way, Kravchuk was also keenly interested in discussing with Russia the supply and transportation of oil and gas to Ukraine. Moreover, he passionately wanted to hunt in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.
As for Yeltsin, he was flying to Belarus, as was said, with the consent of Gorbachev, and his team consisting of G. Burbulis, E. Gaidar, A. Kozyrev and S. Shakhrai carried with him brides for the preparation of the text of the Bialowieza Agreement, which abolished the USSR.
In this regard, we can assume that Gorbachev and Yeltsin, during their 4-hour meeting on the eve of departure, worked out two options for the outcome of the meeting in Viskuli.
The first. Kravchuk will agree on certain conditions to sign a new union treaty. However, this version was unlikely, since 1 December 1991 in Ukraine held a referendum on the independence of the republic, during which 90,3% of voters supported this independence. And, although the bulletin raised only the question of supporting the Act of Independence of Ukraine, adopted by 24 on August 1991, and did not speak about Ukraine’s independence as part of the USSR or outside, which is extremely important from a legal point of view, Kravchuk and his team presented the results of the referendum as unanimous the desire of Ukrainian citizens to be outside the Union.
Second. This, the most likely option, was that Kravchuk, under any conditions set forth by Yeltsin, would refuse to sign the new union treaty, and then it would be possible to denounce the 1922 treaty on the creation of the USSR. In exchange for the Union, it was proposed to create a new state association - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which Gorbachev could claim a leading role.
However, no one believed the promises of Gorbachev. Therefore, it was decided to hold a meeting in Belarus, in a fairly isolated place, but where it was possible to fly by plane. It is also desirable near the Polish border, so that in the event of hostile actions by Gorbachev, you can go to Poland on foot.
Shushkevich recalled the farm Viskuli in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where 1957 was built by order of Nikita Khrushchev, a hunting government residence was built, in which there were several wooden cottages. To the Polish border here 8 km. To the military airfield in Zasimovichi, capable of receiving jets - about 50 km. The cottage was equipped with government communications. An ideal place to meet high-ranking guests.
On Saturday 7 December 1991, distinguished guests and their attendants gathered in Viskuli. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev did not fly to Belarus. He preferred to land in Moscow and wait there for the outcome of the situation. Based on the currently known information, it can be argued that neither Kravchuk nor Shushkevich planned to adopt the Bialowieza Agreement at the meeting.
Kravchuk came to hunt and discuss the issues of oil and gas supplies, so he immediately went to Pushcha to hunt. On, as the dacha staff recalls, his guards scared away the boars and bison. Chirping in the tower, Leonid Makarovich empty-handed, returned to the warm room.
As for Shushkevich, he did not prepare the residence at all for the elaboration and adoption of such a serious document as the Belovezhsk agreement. There were not enough seats for accompanying heads of state of advisers, experts, and guards. In the residence not only there were no rooms for serious work, but there was not even a typewriter or other office equipment. For a fax, the plane was sent to Moscow. Something had to borrow from the administration of the reserve "Belovezhskaya Pushcha", including a typist for printing a document.
But by 16 an hour. 8 December 1991 the document was ready, and under the gun of television and photo cameras Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich put their signatures to the Agreement on the termination of the existence of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yeltsin immediately rushed to call President George Bush Sr. and report that the task he had received in the US in 1989 was successfully completed. This also had to be so humbled by the head of Russia, one of the leading states of the world! Unfortunately, Boris Nikolayevich when he was president of Russia, remained at the errand of the Americans.
Fictitious Bialowieza Agreement.
On the signing of the Bialowieza Agreement and the telephone call to Yeltsin, Bush, Gorbachev was reported immediately. But the train, as they say, has already left. Yeltsin, calling Bush, hinted to Gorbachev that he no longer considers him a partner.
The president of the USSR had the opportunity to bring to justice the participants in the shameful Belovezhskaya conspiracy. For almost 24 hours Soviet special forces were awaiting relegation to Belarus to arrest the conspirators.
Flight to the airbase "Zasimovichi" less than an hour. But there was no order from the president of the USSR, although the laws of the USSR and the results of the March 1991 of the All-Union referendum on preserving the Union, which confirmed the desire of 77,85% of the population to live in a single country, allowed Gorbachev to take the most severe measures against the Belovezhskaya conspirators.
I repeat. The cessation of the existence of the Union was beneficial to Gorbachev, whose ideology in life, as the head of his personal guard, Vladimir Medvedev, aptly noted, was the ideology of survival. As a result, Gorbachev was left to be content with a list of personal material claims against Yeltsin, who became his "apostatized" for his non-conflict departure from the post of President of the USSR. They seemed exorbitant to Yeltsin, but Gorbachev’s patrons from the States recommended that the President of the Russian Federation consider them acceptable.
Over the past years, much has been said about the fictitious nature of the Bialowieza Agreement. I will remind only the main thing. 11 December 1991. The USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee adopted a Statement in which it recognized the Belovezhskaya Agreement, contrary to the USSR Law “On the Procedure for Solving Issues Related to the Release of the Union Republic from the USSR”. The statement emphasized that according to this Law, some republics are not entitled to decide issues relating to the rights and interests of other republics, and the authorities of the USSR can cease to exist only “after deciding the fate of the USSR in the constitutional order”.
To this I will add estimates from the Resolution of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of 15 March 1996 for N 157-II DG "On legal force for the Russian Federation - Russia of the results of the USSR referendum 17 of March 1991 on the issue of the preservation of the USSR". The Resolution stated that “officials of the RSFSR who prepared, signed and ratified the decision to cease the existence of the USSR, grossly violated the will of the peoples of Russia to preserve the USSR, expressed in the USSR referendum 17 in March 1991 of the year, as well as the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ".
It was also emphasized that the “Agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States from December 8 1991 of the year, signed by the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and the State Secretary of the RSFSR, G.E. Burbulis and not approved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR - the highest body of state power of the RSFSR, did not have and has no legal force as it relates to the termination of the existence of the Union of the USSR. ”
This is the official legal assessment of the Bialowieza Agreement and its signatories today. But it will not return the lost country.