Military Review

Barguzin goes on a siding

30
Barguzin goes on a sidingAt one time, the creation of a combat railway missile system (BZHRK) 15P961 "Well done" with a three-stage solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) RT-23UTTX (according to the NATO classification - SS-24 SSSRREl Center 3) with a split head with 10, with the XNUMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-XXUMX) landmark event in stories Russian strategic nuclear forces and allowed to significantly increase the combat potential of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). But since then, the situation has changed dramatically.


INVISIBLE "GOOD WAY"

The development of a railway-based missile system based on RTB-23UTTH type ICBMs was specified in accordance with the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers on 9 August 1983 of the year. And at the same time, the creation of stationary (mine) and mobile ground-based complexes based on this rocket was also asked. The latter was never created, but the presence of a mine-based option subsequently played a cruel joke with the BZHRK: by and large, its liquidation did not occur because the missile train itself had to be destroyed, but because the missile standing on it had to be eliminated.

The head designer of the BZHRK was the Dnepropetrovsk Design Bureau (KB) Yuzhnoye, and the Utkin brothers became its chief designers: Vladimir Fedorovich from Yuzhnoye Design Bureau was responsible for creating the rocket, and Aleksey Fedorovich, who worked at the Leningrad Design Bureau of Special Engineering (KBSM) responsible for the design of the launch complex and cars for the rocket train.

In November, 1982, the draft design of the RT-23UTTH and BZHRK rocket was developed with advanced railway launchers. The complex provided the ability to perform rocket firing from any point of the route, including electrified railways, for which it had a high-precision navigation system, and its launchers were equipped with special shorting and retraction devices for the contact network. At the same time, as indicated in the national literature on the history of BZHRK, Alexey Utkin managed to find a unique solution to the “problem of transferring large mass loads to the railway bed during the operation of BZHRK complexes”.

The Molodets combat railway missile system was put into service on November 28 1989 of the year, and the first complex started combat duty even earlier - October 20 on the 1987 of the year. The production of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the RT-23UTTH type was carried out at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash). During the 1987 – 1991 period, 12 complexes were built, and the number of missiles launched was about 100.

Rocket trains were deployed in three regions of the country, and, interestingly, due to the huge mass of cars - launchers of special trains - within 1500 radius of km from the bases of the latter, the embankments of the railway had to be reinforced with more dense gravel stone, lay heavier rails, and replaced wooden sleepers on concrete, etc.

It can be said that the creation of BZHRK to a certain extent had a positive effect on the development of the country's railway network. However, the size of the cost of creating a missile system and ensuring its operation was simply enormous. But the situation of that time - the Cold War - demanded it.

In light of the warming of relations between the USSR and the West, since the 1991, rocket trains began to take combat duty at points of permanent dislocation — the patrols took place on a strictly limited route, without going to the country’s railway network. Then, according to the START-2 agreement, the country agreed to eliminate all RT-23UTTH missiles. What was done. Trains were disposed of during the 2003 – 2007 period (the last BZHRK was removed from combat duty in the 2005 year).

LIVING IDEA

Rocket trains are not a new topic. Moreover, the pioneers here, as well as a number of other classes of weapons, have become the US military. For the first time, they attempted to acquire a combat railway complex at their disposal as early as the 1960s, during the implementation of the ambitious program to create a new solid-fuel ICBM “Minuteman”.

In the summer of 1960, as part of the theoretical study of this issue, the US Department of Defense carried out Operation Big Star, during which prototypes of future rocket trains secretly moved along American railways. The experience was considered successful, and next year they prepared a draft, as well as a prototype "BZHRK in American style" with five ICBMs. It was planned to put the first such train on duty in 1962 year, and the entire Air Force intended to launch 30 trains with 150 missiles in the country. But in the summer of 1961, the project was closed due to its high cost - mine “minutemen” turned out to be cheaper, simpler, and more reliable (see the article “Good for you” in American style - unsuccessful debut ”in this issue of HBO).

In 1986, the idea of ​​a rocket train again took possession of the Pentagon, but already as part of the creation of a new heavy ICBR "Piper", also known as the MX. The train, called Peacekeeper Rail Garrison (“Railway Garrison with Peacekeeper” missiles), was supposed to carry two missiles, each with a divided warhead with 10 warheads of individual guidance. From 1992, it was planned to put 25 of such trains on combat duty. The prototype was tested in 1990 year, but a year later the main enemy was not - the Soviet Union, and therefore, to receive "peacetime dividends", the United States launched a program under the knife (it was possible to save 2,16 billion dollars in this way only by purchasing the first seven trains).

But the idea in America, as well as in Russia, turned out to be surprisingly tenacious. Thus, in the framework of the “Analysis of Alternatives” on the further development of the ground grouping of national strategic nuclear forces, completed in 2014, the American specialists considered, among others, the so-called “mobile option”, which included the development of a new ICBM as part of a mobile missile strategic ground or rail missile complex home base. Moreover, the “tunnel version” was also considered - the creation of a strategic missile complex based underground in specially constructed tunnels and moving along them. However, the cost of creating such complexes in the end was recognized too expensive, even for the huge military budget of the United States.

NEW TRAIN- "GHOST"

The Russian military-political leadership also did not remain indifferent to the idea of ​​a rocket train. To discuss the issue of the need to create a replacement for the Molodtsu that was disposed of and sent to the museums became almost from the day the last BZhRK was removed from combat duty.

The development of the new complex, known as “Barguzin”, was launched in Russia in 2012, although as early as June 2010, a patent issued by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Central Design Bureau“ Titan ”for the invention, designated as the“ Launcher for launching and launching ” placed in a railway carriage or on a transport and launch container platform. " The Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering, the creator of Topol, Yars and the Bulava, became the lead performer of the BZHRK.

In December of 2015, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakaev, said that "preliminary design has been completed, working design documentation for the units and systems of the complex is being developed." “Of course, with the revival of BZhRK, all the latest developments in the field of combat missile topics will be taken into account,” emphasized Sergey Karakaev. “The Barguzin complex will significantly exceed its predecessor in terms of accuracy, missile range and other characteristics, which will allow this complex to be part of the Strategic Missile Forces for many years, at least until 2040,”

“Thus, in the Strategic Missile Forces, a group will be recreated on the basis of three types of home-based missile systems: mine, mobile soil and railway, which proved to be highly effective in the Soviet years,” the Interfax news agency commander commanded the Strategic Missile Forces.

In November of the next, 2016, the first ICBM launch tests for a promising rocket train were successfully passed. “The first throwing tests took place at the Plesetsk cosmodrome two weeks ago. They are recognized as fully successful, which opens the way for the start of flight design tests, ”the Interfax news agency quoted the interlocutor as saying. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation were very optimistic, they reported that a report was scheduled for 2017 to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the prospects for deploying the Barguzin complex and the start of flight tests of the missile designed for it.

And suddenly - the unexpected news that the "topic is closed" at least for the near future. What is even more remarkable: in the case of official confirmation of this decision, this will be the first case of stopping - temporarily or permanently - work in the field of strategic nuclear weapons, which, we recall, are considered by the Russian military-political leadership as the main guarantor of the country's security against aggression of any adversary, due to than for their development resources are allocated in priority order.

So what's the deal? Just in a banal shortage of funds in the current difficult economic situation, or has the approach to the development of Russia's strategic nuclear forces changed? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the main features of the BZHRK.

THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED

The main goal of creating the Molodets BZHRK was the striving of the Soviet military-political leadership to increase the power and effectiveness of the grouping of a retaliatory / retaliatory missile strike in conditions of tough confrontation with the countries-members of the NATO military-political bloc, and first of all the United States. To solve this problem was possible due to the high secrecy of the actions of BZHRK, which was ensured by the following circumstances:

- The factual closeness of the country to foreigners, which significantly limited the ability to organize continuous monitoring of areas of possible deployment and patrols of rocket trains (and Soviet citizens were also largely limited to visiting several districts and cities of the country);

- the lack of the ability for the armed forces and special services of a potential enemy to conduct air (aviation) reconnaissance of the territory of their interest in the depths of the Soviet Union, which was due to the high efficiency of the air defense system created by that time;

- significant restrictions on the conduct of round-the-clock space reconnaissance of objects on the territory of the USSR, which, in turn, was due to the poor development of radar ground observation devices placed on board spacecraft (satellites) of the appropriate purpose and only capable of providing all-weather and twenty-four-hour monitoring of areas of interest for intelligence probable adversary (the most common optical and infrared surveillance tools are Coy possible not given);

- the underdevelopment of high-precision air attack weapons, primarily such as relatively small-sized unobtrusive cruise missiles of various types of basing, intended for strikes against ground targets located deep in the territory of the enemy, and capable of flying in a rounding mode of terrain (not to mention corrected and guided long-range bombs and, even more, hypersonic aircraft);

- the absence of such international treaties in the field of control over strategic offensive arms, which in one way or another limited the operation of such missile systems.

However, today the situation in this area has changed in the most radical way, significantly reducing or even completely leveling many of the advantages of rocket trains, and first of all - their secrecy.

First, the country has become open and free to move practically throughout its entire territory both for its citizens and foreign guests (provided, of course, that the latter freely entered Russia).

Secondly, modern means of space reconnaissance include spacecraft equipped with highly efficient radar detection devices that are able to conduct all-weather round-the-clock monitoring of the BZhRK deployment areas known from the exchange of relevant information under various international treaties or revealed as a result of various reconnaissance activities (and when determining the classification features of a rocket train and knowing its location, monitoring it can to install just hard).

Thirdly, a high-quality leap was made by precision-guided aerospace attacks, which, with appropriate target designation and targeting, could easily destroy an object such as a BZHRK. He doesn’t even need to be destroyed, the main thing is to prevent him from performing rocket shooting.

And in the study of the American corporation RAND from 2014, it is indicated that the rocket train also has the following significant drawbacks: more complex maintenance; the possibility of natural (snow, landslides) and artificial (sabotage, accidents) blocking of the railway track; limited set of routes for movement; lower survivability compared to mine complexes (when detected by the enemy, BZHRK can be considered destroyed).

Moreover, according to the set of treaties in the field of limiting strategic armaments to which Russia is a party, the operation of the BZhRK is literally trapped in the grip of numerous restrictions that do not allow the full realization of their entire unique combat potential. And most importantly - it does not allow to achieve stealth patrols. If a rocket train has to travel only along a certain route or routes in its area of ​​deployment, and even regularly demonstrate itself to airborne and space-based surveillance equipment of foreign “controllers,” what kind of secrecy can we talk about? And this is perhaps the most important advantage of the BZhRK, without which the very concept of a rocket train loses its meaning (although, we emphasize this, there is no prohibition on the creation of such rocket complexes).

Of course, all these “controllers” can be removed with one stroke of the pen - to withdraw from these treaties, thereby removing any restrictions from themselves, but two superpowers did not allow themselves such even in the hottest periods of the Cold War. Not to mention the fact that there is also an undercover intelligence of our potential "friends", and the spy satellites are not going anywhere. Is it possible to disguise them? This is a big question.

Finally, we must not forget that the invisibility of the rocket train and the inability to distinguish it from ordinary freight trains is a myth. Do not believe? In confirmation, let us cite the words of the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergey Karakaev, told to journalists in December 2013. According to him, the first generation BZHRK car was quite different from the refrigerator car, under which it was masked. “It was longer, heavier, the number of wheelsets was greater. No matter how he was hid, if BZhRK was parked, any expert could determine that this was not a national economy train, ”the RIA Novosti news agency quoted the general as saying. The carriage of the train, according to Sergey Karakaev, can be disguised more successfully, although experts on railway rolling stock have questioned this thesis as well. Moreover, even if it succeeds, then where to put such a unmasking attribute, like several locomotives in the head of a short “special train,” is unclear.

As a result, it seems that the creation of a BZHRK as a means of retaliatory or reciprocal counter-strikes becomes a very dubious undertaking. In this regard, it is noteworthy that back in February 2011, in an interview with the weekly MIC Yuri Solomonov, chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, said: “In fact, the survivability of the mobile soil and railway complexes is almost the same. Most recently, we just won a competition on this topic, but I was a supporter of the decision to not deploy full-scale work on BZHRK. First, here we are talking not so much about missiles, but about the type of basing, which is associated with the necessary costs for the reconstruction of the military infrastructure, which is now completely destroyed. This is a lot of money, and they will potentially add nothing to the combat effectiveness of our SNF. Moreover, BZHRK has a fundamental flaw in modern conditions: low anti-terrorism resistance. This is a vulnerable point of the railway complex, and it significantly reduces its combat capabilities. "

So, maybe, it is more expedient to allocate additional funds for mobile ground-based missile systems or for a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile Sarmat?
Author:
Originator:
http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2017-12-08/1_976_barguzin.html
30 comments
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  1. andr327
    andr327 10 December 2017 15: 22
    +4
    Old song about new. How much can you drive one and the same news.
    Need to bring to mind and Yars. and Sarmatu. And if the missiles fly well, the military infrastructure is very far behind. And for BZHRK oh how much it takes to build. If before the train was state-owned, now Russian Railways put it right on such an account that ... everything was covered with a copper basin.
    Although all the other arguments against are true.
    1. Golovan Jack
      Golovan Jack 10 December 2017 18: 26
      +8
      Quote: andr327
      If before the railway was state, now Russian Railways

      The sole shareholder of Russian Railways is the Russian Federation. On behalf of the Russian Federation, the powers of the shareholder are exercised by the Government of the Russian Federation. The charter capital of Russian Railways was formed by the founder by depositing property and property complexes of organizations of the federal railway transport
      1. Kasym
        Kasym 10 December 2017 20: 40
        +2
        Against the backdrop of the new Sarmat, Bulava, Yars, and X-102, Caliber missile launchers, the American Tomahawks, Tridents, and Minutemans are outdated.
        Maybe that's why the Kremlin believes that Barguzin will be too much for the “partners”? Or maybe they let dust in his eyes to make everything secret? Announcing the creation and adoption of the BZHRK is unreasonable in view of security. It is possible to cram such a BZHRK in the expanses of 6 (7) parts of the land and without any mileage along the railway. And pull out the joker only at the right time. hi
        1. NordOst16
          NordOst16 11 December 2017 08: 01
          0
          Well, the Minetmen, but the Tridenians are so old, and the axes are constantly being modernized (as, however, are the Minetmen with the Tridents). And what's the difference how old they are if they can complete their task? It’s better we don’t spend a lot of money on all kinds of Sarmatians, but on the submarine fleet because it’s more reliable
    2. max702
      max702 12 December 2017 23: 06
      0
      then where to put such a unmasking sign as several locomotives in the head of a short “special train” is not clear.
      I didn’t understand this ... But why do you need THREE locomotives there? Even with the old missile, it was understandable, though not completely, but they promised to fit the foreign one into the dimensions of ANY car! By the way, we didn’t see the postal luggage trains in which the truck leaves and you can load a sufficiently large one in such a car .. if we pack a rocket I repeat in any car (and there are dozens of them) then what kind of poor disguise are we talking about? And to deceive with accurate radar portraits to rivet is not a problem, and in the type if they found then consider destroyed I do not believe! How to do it in a very limited time? So the point is either in the dough or the ULTIMATE requirements of the partners the second is more accurate ..
      1. michell
        michell 13 December 2017 13: 22
        +1
        Quote: max702
        I didn’t understand this ... But why do you need THREE locomotives there?

        I was also puzzled by this question - three missiles in a train, nine wagons (three missile and six support), even two hundred tons per missile car and one hundred on a support car - 3 x 200 + 6 x 100 = 1 tons; for freight trains - 200 tons - this is nothing, up to 3 tons are formed, with one locomotive. And only recently I read that “Molodets” was not a single indivisible system, but three autonomous subsystems, each of which included a rocket car, a control car and a support car; if necessary, the train was divided into three autonomous units, each of which went on its own route, for which three locomotives were needed.

        So the point is either in the dough or the ULTIMATE requirements of the partners the second is more accurate ..


        The case may be, quoting one author (American, by the way), whose article was recently posted at the VO, in the All-Russian Museum of Contemporary Art (the Great Russian Smoke Screen). There was no OFFICIAL termination announcement. I strongly suspect that the development of the complex has been discontinued due to the END of such. Well, about everything else you wrote wink .
  2. Korolev
    Korolev 10 December 2017 15: 31
    +6
    The Iskanders laughed, but Barguzin was not lucky.
    That is, in order to understand all its uselessness and futility, it was necessary to pump money into 5 years of development?
    But if the money in the budget didn’t run out, I wonder if these same authors would prove how these trains are efficient and needed?
    1. 210ox
      210ox 10 December 2017 16: 23
      0
      As I understand it, there is a "cost optimization". Maybe you should not start from this? Do not cut back the amount of money, but consider and look at what and how they are spent?
      1. Golovan Jack
        Golovan Jack 10 December 2017 18: 37
        +7
        Quote: 210ox
        and consider and look at what and how they are spent?

        Does the term "GOZ special accounts" say anything to you? And what about the Department of Financial Monitoring of the State Defense Order?
        Take an interest, informative yes
    2. andr327
      andr327 10 December 2017 16: 31
      0
      and to understand whether it is necessary or not to invest money. at least a preliminary design is necessary. 60-70 percent of developments go to the basket, but without them there is no development.
  3. Fedorovich
    Fedorovich 10 December 2017 17: 51
    +1
    But what, the option that development has been stopped exclusively in the media is not considered? ..
  4. gray
    gray 10 December 2017 17: 52
    +2
    Hello. What incredible nonsense. How many spy satellites are needed (our space observation forces don’t follow the enemy, everything is left to chance.) And how many spies (because they will not shoot with bullets on the BZHRK) you have to drop them onto the territory in order to follow. All from the series if By. Such a feeling (from the article) that they now do not know where our strategic nuclear forces are concentrated. Follow.
  5. andrej-shironov
    andrej-shironov 10 December 2017 18: 14
    +2
    Well, the author made a compelling argument.
    1. Golovan Jack
      Golovan Jack 10 December 2017 18: 39
      +8
      Quote: andrej-shironov
      Well, the author made a compelling argument.

      Congratulations on another stupid thing you said. love
      1. andrej-shironov
        andrej-shironov 11 December 2017 07: 16
        0
        smile So not all the same you talk nonsense.
    2. KERMET
      KERMET 10 December 2017 18: 53
      0
      Here is here http://omchanin.livejournal.com/888895.html
      the author answers some of these arguments, I would like to hear an opinion
  6. TOR2
    TOR2 10 December 2017 18: 55
    0
    Need BZHRK, or not needed, you can discuss of course for a long time. At first we got excited, then everything was canceled. In general, people work.
    modern space reconnaissance equipment includes spacecraft equipped with highly efficient radar detection tools that are capable of all-day round-the-clock monitoring of the BZHRK deployment areas.
    ... high-precision means of aerospace attack have also made a quantum leap

    Here the question arises - did the means of counteracting all this remain at the level of the 80s?
  7. Victor_B
    Victor_B 10 December 2017 19: 01
    +2
    1.
    The wagon of the new train, according to Sergei Karakaev, can be masked more successfully, although specialists in railway rolling stock have questioned this thesis. Moreover, even if this succeeds, then where to put such a unmasking sign as several locomotives in the head of a short “special train” is not clear.
    Well, rightly said. Tea is a professional.
    I’m sure that he’s not supposed to talk nonsense, but it’s not difficult for me to “couch” the strategist to attach a couple of dozen empty wagons to the train or, conversely, start a hundred short trains with several rusty locomotives from under the fence, and then arrange and disguise them ( not very carefully).
    1. Victor_B
      Victor_B 10 December 2017 19: 15
      +2
      Quote from me. Beloved!
      Quote: krops777
      "
      It’s extremely expensive to keep a group of 10-12 satellites to track one BZHRK, and it’s not a fact that even with so many satellites they can keep track of them if they let the BZHRK ride around the country.


      [quote] Well, what is it to keep?
      Nails to heaven to nail?
      They fly in the right place. Sometimes. Scheduled, accurate to seconds.
      The schedule will hang in a frame. In the vestibule of the train. Near each toilet. [/ Quote]
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 10 December 2017 19: 26
      +2
      These trains have places of deployment, and patrol routes will be tracked from them - the topic of the BZHRK is closed. We have problems in the fleet - with the ICBM Bulava, we need to create a new one in the same dimensions - since the MIT has managed.
      1. Victor_B
        Victor_B 10 December 2017 19: 31
        +2
        These trains have places of deployment, and patrol routes will be tracked from them - the topic of the BZHRK is closed. We have problems in the fleet - with the ICBM Bulava, we need to create a new one in the same dimensions - since the MIT has managed.
        The submarines also have places of permanent deployment and, as I understand it, today they are there and are ready to fire a salvo right from the pier. If you have time.
        BZHRK can shoot from any point of the route. This, like, a submarine can shoot only from predefined points.
      2. alstr
        alstr 11 December 2017 10: 27
        +2
        Once again I ask: And that we have canceled the false trains?
        If TWO identical trains with the same behavior leave at the same time, how will we follow? This time.
        Secondly, it is necessary to change the satellite trajectory much more time than to overtake a train 200-300 km to the south. And there, look for the winds in the field.
    3. Dima812
      Dima812 11 December 2017 17: 30
      0
      I don’t know, but did anyone see the BZHRK alive? But you can watch it in St. Petersburg and even touch it! Personally, I saw wagons under loading at YuMZ in the 80s and I could distinguish them from ordinary ones by strode, but I'm not a railwayman! Or is the rocket now longer and heavier? In my opinion, Americans once spent millions of dollars finding them, so no special camouflage is required! Then full-scale tests of BZHRK to resistance to a nuclear explosion were carried out!
  8. fa2998
    fa2998 10 December 2017 20: 37
    +1
    Quote: 210ox
    As I understand it, there is a "cost optimization". Maybe you should not start from this? Do not cut back the amount of money, but consider and look at what and how they are spent?

    I think that with such an economy and finances in the near future, many new developments will be susceptible to “optimization.” Not publicly, but they will quietly test the SU 57, T 14 for many years, they will build small ships and purchase upgraded aircraft units. I certainly want to Yes, the pocket is empty. It is certainly not completely empty, but you still need to keep numerous officials, and throw a piece of the budget for cuts to those close to you. And the rest will wait! angry hi
  9. Russian whale
    Russian whale 10 December 2017 22: 45
    +2
    Quote: KERMET
    Here is here http://omchanin.livejournal.com/888895.html
    the author answers some of these arguments, I would like to hear an opinion

    Excellent two materials from the user !!! But there is an answer to the most important question - what to do? The entire infrastructure of the basing districts, etc., has been destroyed; to recreate all this - how much money is needed? There will probably be enough for 10 Crimean bridges and Olympiads :) That's the whole answer - as long as the situation in the economy is as it is now - even sober-minded people will not even think about the BZHRK. But for a drink ...
  10. Nemesis
    Nemesis 11 December 2017 09: 27
    +1
    A very dubious and short-sighted undertaking is the refusal of the Russian leadership to abandon the BZHRK, and taking into account the abundance of people with a very dubious reputation in the Russian government, it is possible that this is a deliberate sabotage
  11. Antianglosax
    Antianglosax 11 December 2017 10: 16
    +2
    BZHRK for matrastan and Nata is a terrible nightmare, and, apparently, it has become the subject of some bargaining. But what? What can the Anglo-Zionist geeks offer us in return? Bagel hole, as usual? Now they will rub on our blue eyes that the BZHRK is not profitable, dangerous to themselves and other snowstorms. Another stroke for the upcoming drain ...
  12. Dima812
    Dima812 11 December 2017 17: 05
    0
    I do not know what stopped the continuation of work on the BZHRK! There may be a lack of funding or competitive brawls between developers, but I think that the repetition of the complex should be continued, maybe later, maybe sooner! And the disputes between the developers have been known for a long time, remember at least the suspension of development of the Sinev rocket, developed by the oldest design bureau for the design of missiles for submarines, and the Scientific Research Institute of TP! How much time it took to finalize the latter and still Sineva returned, albeit in parallel, to the fleet! It seems that now we are seeing a similar picture! But who knows the true reason? We are unlikely to be called and right!
  13. Arikkhab
    Arikkhab 12 December 2017 12: 02
    0
    Or maybe the news that the "topic is closed" at least in the near future is simply misinformation for the "partners"?
  14. KLUTSALS
    KLUTSALS 14 December 2017 11: 39
    +2
    The article "Barguzin" goes to a siding "on a very important topic, especially in modern realities. However, it is difficult to agree with some provisions and assumptions in the article.
    • Work on the creation of a railway missile complex by the cooperation of enterprises began much earlier than the issuance of the decree in 1983. There were several stages in which the rocket and elements of the complex changed.
    • Kuzhniy Kuzhnoye Yuzhnoye was responsible not only for the missile, but also for the entire ideology of the complex. He was the head in every way
    • The presence of stationary complexes with a rocket of the same family, the RT-23UTTX (15P961), did not play a cruel joke with the RT-23UTTX (15P060) BZHRK. They had different fates with the collapse of the USSR. All stationary missiles were deployed in Ukraine and were eliminated in accordance with its "nuclear-free" status. Missiles for a mobile complex located in Russia had a different fate. After a relatively short period of full-time combat duty, the BZHRKs were joked by the treacherous decision of the then leadership of our country to please our opponents. This was tantamount to barring missile submarines from leaving their base. Time passed, the warranty period for the operation of solid fuel rockets BZHRK expired, it is less than that of liquid rockets. It was necessary either to change missiles or to carry out an engine replacement operation. And the missiles were assembled in Ukraine, the BZHRK itself was equipped and surrendered there. Repeating such operations was no longer possible. Russian-Ukrainian relations rapidly deteriorated and state authorities in both countries were degassed. The operation of the BZHRK with the expired warranty period for the operation of the missiles became impossible, and they were disposed of. So that a cruel joke was played by the leadership of the USSR.
    • With all due respect to Alexei Utkin and the entire KBSM development team, the problem of transferring large mass loads was a difficult one, but for this the design bureau was not a unique task. KBSM in the previous period was developing heavy artillery mounts of a railway base, and it had experience in this area.
    Unique was the combination in the design of the launch module of many systems to solve complex problems. In the USA, apparently, they did not even begin to solve such problems.
    • And here the Design Bureau "Titan" is not entirely clear
    • Indeed, the Ministry of Railways was quite a deployment of work on the equipment of patrol routes BZHRK. This gave them the opportunity to significantly upgrade their travel facilities. Due to the gratitude of the Ministry of Railways, some rocketers were even awarded the honorary railroad badge.
    • Yes, BZHRK can, but with great difficulty, be detected by space means on the patrol route. But you can also detect and soil missile systems. But there is a big difference. There are no traces of the train passing on the tracks, and it is problematic to hide the tracks formed from giant soil conveyors.
    • The presence of several locomotives as part of the BZHRK is not a problem. They are needed only so that the BZHRK could be divided into several launch modules, spreading out during the threatened period. And thereby increasing the likelihood of maintaining the complex and striking them back. In addition, at any station you can observe the passage of a variety of economic trains with two, and occasionally with three locomotives.
    • Regarding the observation of “foreign guests”. A truly qualified observer, portraying a tourist or a homeless person, can distinguish a BZHRK from other trains. The information is interesting, but useless. He does not know where the BZHRK went, where he will not know where to stay. And BZHRK has no right to stand at stations and other places, so as not to look at it and pick it with a clove.
    • Regarding the ease of detection of the Barguzin, it should be borne in mind that the Yars family missile is about twice as lighter and significantly shorter than the RT-23UTTX missile. This certainly facilitates the task of eliminating the unmasking signs of the launch car (large length and number of axles)
    • As for the ease of incapacitating the BZHRK, its supposedly low survivability is difficult to agree with. If he really carries combat duty, then his whereabouts can be determined very approximately. Whatever striking means were used to defeat him, they need to know where to fly. And if not a direct hit, then the BZHRK will survive and launch. During the tests, the BZHRK simulated an outburst of large quantities of explosives close to it, equivalent to a serious nuclear warhead. BZHRK survived and after a short time was ready to launch.
    • Relatively low anti-terrorism resistance. It is almost no worse, if not better, than with soil complexes. Strategic Missile Forces successfully solved this problem during the operation of the BZHRK, will be able to solve it in the future
    • At present, our country has no obligations to regularly demonstrate mobile space reconnaissance systems, at least I do not know. And in Soviet times, each BZHRK after leaving the plant stood for some time, showing off to the space reconnaissance of its opponents, to calculate the amount of funds in accordance with strategic offensive arms.
    There were no other obligations for impressions and should not be.
    • It is completely impossible to agree with the conclusion that the BZHRK as a means of retaliatory or retaliatory strike is becoming a very dubious undertaking. On the contrary, it becomes more than an urgent task. Moreover, the railway complex has a unique opportunity to leave, to leave from the "global surprise strike", land and sea missile defense systems. Russia has a unique opportunity to take advantage of a large sovereign territory with an area commensurate with the ocean, where railway missile systems will be much safer than our submarines in the vast ocean.
    • Unfortunately, the financial aspect is very important, perhaps it is key.
    • Delaying dates may provide an opportunity to study the concept of new mobile small-sized missile systems placed in containers indistinguishable from ordinary ones. Missiles of this type were developed at the end of the USSR at MIT and at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. Containers with such missiles can be placed on anything: on railway platforms, caravans, river ships, etc. Missiles of this type will not be as powerful as the RT-23 UTTX, but they will create a real possibility of causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor.