Back in 2014 — 2015, during the final phase of establishing the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the Crimea, a full-fledged mixed grouping of troops was quickly deployed to the peninsula, the “bones” of which were: airborne divisions, fighter squadrons, combined into the 38 th fighter regiment, represented by such Machines like Su-27P, Su-27СМ3, Su-30М2 and Su-27UB, as well as anti-aircraft missile brigades based on the long-range ZRDN C-300PS and C-300ПМ1 complexes. These weapons provided complete security against the background of a probable missile-air strike of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through surviving Su-24M fighter-bomber, Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as operational tactical missile systems 9K79-1 "Tochka-U" and 9-72 "Elbrus". The risk of using this weapon by the new, illegitimate and inadequate Ukrainian leadership was very high even then. To counter the possible aggression of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the land theater of military operations, an impressive grouping of the Russian Army equipped with self-propelled anti-tank missile systems 9K123 "Chrysanthem-S" was transferred to the northern regions of the Republic of Crimea.
These complexes, regardless of the meteorological situation (in the Crimea, it can be very unfavorable) make it possible to fire at enemy armored vehicles at a distance of 6000 m in rain, fog, and snowfall, which is achieved by using the 9М123 additional anti-tank guided missile -2, equipped with a radio command control module. The armored units of the Ukrainian military formations in this case did not have and have absolutely no chance of a "breakthrough" in the area of Armyansk or Predmostnoy.
Today we will try to consider in more detail the possibilities of air defense / antimissile defense systems that have established over the Republic of Crimea a sufficiently powerful aerospace "dome" limiting and prohibiting access and maneuver A2 / AD for high-precision weapons the adversary. The “hot” summer of 2014 of the year was most replete with various information regarding the C-300PS and C-300ПМ1 anti-aircraft missile battalions to the Crimea. Some sources talked about 5 and more complexes (batteries), others about the 20-30 divisions! Given the large number of air routes that are rocket-dangerous for the Crimea (all but eastern), the latter can be considered more adequate figures. In 2016, the range of air defense and anti-missile defense systems of the Russian Federation in the Crimea began to expand. So, in August 2016 of the year, the 18 of the first C-31 "Triumph" anti-aircraft missile battalion of the very long range entered the 2 anti-aircraft missile regiment of the 400 air defense division (Theodosius). From this moment, the anti-air frontiers of the Crimea turned out to be 250 km from the coast. Why not 400 km? We remind you that the ultra-long interceptor missile 40H6 is currently not included in the Triumph kit, and the upgraded 48H6DM SAM has a range only in 250 km.
The next (unofficial) stage of the renewal of the air defense-defense grouping was the arrival in the Republic of Crimea of a more highly specialized and “survivable” troop anti-aircraft missile system C-300В4. Information about this was published on 29 in November on 2016 of the year, on the Kerch web resource kerch.com.ru. At the attached amateur video you can pay attention to the presence in the transferred equipment column one of the main elements of the modernized Anthea - radar program review 9СXNNXX19 Ginger designed for detecting and tracking complex aerodynamic and ballistic objects with a minimum EPR of the order number 2 on the aisle with minimal ESR and X-NUM and X-objects with a minimum EPR of the NMNIMX order and tracking along the aisle with minimal ESR and ballistic objects with the minimum EPR of the X-NUM and X-NUMX mode. as well as the quad launch launcher 0,02А2 for the “light” SAM of medium-range 9М83М with an integrated X-band target radar located on the IG Petritskaya mast about 9 m high. It is most likely that the C-83V15 battery was transferred from the 300-th separate anti-aircraft missile brigade of the Southern Military District deployed in the city Korenovsk (Krasnodar region). The arrival of “Antey” was not spontaneous, but was directly connected with the firing practice of the Ukrainian C-4PS air defense systems in the Kherson region, because the 77ВХNUMXР anti-aircraft missiles could pose a direct threat to military targets and the population of the Republic of Crimea.
In the video you can see the elements of the C-300B4 AIRS system that arrived in Crimea (according to the Kerch information resource kerch.com.ru for 29 November 2016 of the year)
The deployment of the C-300В4 C-400 battery in the Crimea in addition to the C-300 Triumph and C-1PM9 C-82 under the Theodosia and Sevastopol is one of the most important stages in the formation of a fundamentally more sophisticated echeloned air defense and anti-missile system in the South-Western airforce on the South-West air supply and air defense systems in the South-Western airforces and air defense missile systems in the South-Western airforce in the South-West airforce and air defense systems in the South-Western airforce and air defense missiles in the south-west air zone and South American air defense planes in the south-west land zone plan. to the neighborhood. Only this anti-aircraft missile system, which is in service with the Land and Aerospace Forces of Russia, for the first time received an ultra-long-range high-speed anti-aircraft guided missile 9750МХNUMXМВ, which has a maximum flight speed of 50 km / h, intercept height of about 60 - 350 km, and range within 400 - 48 km and range within 6 km / h in the range within 400 - 9 km and range within 96 X / NXX / km / h in the range within 2 km / h, within 9 - 82 km and range within 9 km / h. that is currently unrealizable through the C-15 "Triumph". Moreover, in contrast to the semi-active radar 2H3DM (the C-300 ammunition was never used by the NNXX4-XNUMXMX with the active radar homing heads), the XNUMXМXNNUMXМВ interceptors received ARGSN, thanks to the possibility of deleting the CQ. beyond the “screen” of the terrain or radio horizon, going beyond the limits of the review of XNUMXСXNUMXМXNUMX “Review-XNUMX”, radar, software “Ginger”, as well as on-load tap-changers, located on C-XNUMXВXNUMX launchers.
This principle of guidance ideally corresponds to the rather complex relief of the Southern coast of Crimea, where a large number of elevations, mountain ranges and massifs are a critical problem for a semi-active radar guidance system currently used in the Triumph C-400 system. Nevertheless, another extremely unpleasant moment is traced here: in view of the large dimensions of the 9М82МВ interceptor missiles, their number on each 2А82 launcher is limited to 2 units. Consequently, the entire 4 and 16 anti-aircraft missiles 9М82МВ respectively are present in one battery and one battalion. Whether this quantity is sufficient or not, it is not for us to decide, but for specialists from the command of the VKS and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. But one can definitely say that to repel a massive missile strike using a couple of hundreds of strategic UGM / RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV, AGM-86 ALCM and AGM-158B tactical missiles will not be enough. And this is just one complete salvo of the Arleigh Burke class URO destroyer and the SSGN attack missile of the Ohio strategic class submarine cruiser, whose 22 mine launchers are adapted to use the 154 Tomahawks instead of the Trident 2D5 SLBMs.
Certainly, a large percentage of the enemy’s low-flying strategic missiles will be intercepted by the C-300 PM-1 / C-400 complexes before the crossing of the Southern Coast of Crimea. But given that the shelling would start only from a distance 38 - 55 km (from the height of a universal tower 40V6MD and height of the full-scale division above sea level), to intercept all the "Axes" three or four divisions "Chetyrohsotki" without missiles 9M96E2 is unrealistic, especially when their entrance RGMov in the mountainous relief of the Crimea. Relying on an excessive share of patriotic patriotism, one can argue as much as possible that this opinion has been sucked from the finger by the sore fantasy of the author. Meanwhile, the real situation with a blow to the air base "Shairat" is an iron confirmation of all of the above. And this is only the 200 "Toporov" as an example, while a full-fledged strike by the NATO Navy may be accompanied by the launch of the 300 and more cruise and anti-radar missiles.
By the way, it will be logical to note here the close connection between measures to increase the defense capability of the grouping of Russian troops in Crimea and the agreement with Cairo on the provision of Egyptian air bases for the deployment of combat aviation Russian Aerospace Forces. During a likely regional conflict between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation, the tactical and anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy and the Navy, based on Egyptian military airfields, will become a powerful air barrier to deter underwater and surface strike assets of the US Navy in the central Mediterranean Sea. From these lines, not a single modification of the Tomahawk strategic cruise missile is capable of reaching strategically important objects of the metallurgical and military-industrial complex of Russia, located in the Urals and in the middle zone of the European part of Russia. In other words, the southern air direction will be deleted from the most missile-hazardous, and this is another “fat” plus in favor of maintaining the combat stability of the anti-aircraft missile regiments and air defense systems of the Ground Forces deployed by the Southern and Western military districts of Russia. As for the territory of Crimea, it continues to fall within the range of the Tomahawks launched from the central part of the Mediterranean, and therefore the only way out is to modernize the anti-aircraft missile regiments deployed in Crimea.
The introduction of the long-range anti-aircraft missile complex C-350 (50Р6А) "Vityaz" will help radically solve the problem. Due to the use of ZUR with ARGSN 9М96Е2 (9М96ДМ) exclusively, the question of quickly disrupting the "capture" of the target at the time of its exit from the MRLS will be finally resolved. Moreover, the “let-forget” mode implemented in rockets, operating on “Tomahawks” within 10 — 15 km, will make it possible to conduct simultaneous interception not of 8 officially declared targets, but up to 16, because X-band 50HXXUMUMX multifunction radar can lead to each of the 6 targets for 8 SAM (after each subsequent destruction of the target, a new target channel will be released, distributed between the 2 airborne 16М9DM using computational tools of the 96K50 PBU).
Several times the large target canal of the Vityaz C-350 complex, with additional support from the Pantsir-С1 and Tor-М1 / 2КM self-propelled complexes, will solve another important problem - the threat from the anti-radar AGM missiles -88 AARGM or, even worse, British “smart” PRLR ALARM, capable of attacking multifunctional radar with a diving angle 90 degrees (from the so-called “dead zone” funnels, where a small elevation radar and semi-active radar self-guidance can lead to the division’s life concerns both Thors and C-300PS). Although the British declared that the ALARM missile was being decommissioned as early as 2014, it is believed to be very difficult, since the joint offspring of the American company Texas Instruments and the British division of Matra BAe Dynamics stand out against the background of other (unfortunately, domestic ) anti-radar missiles of their small size (EPR around 0,05 m 2), as well as a lot of modes of additional search of radio-emitting objects during a three-minute parachute descent over the battlefield. Let's not forget that more multi-channel and productive air defense systems are urgently needed by anti-aircraft missile regiments in the Republic of Crimea due to the threat emanating from the northern air route.
Tens of multiple launch rocket systems 9K51 "Grad", 9K57 "Uragan" and 9K58 "Smerch" do not plan to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the Russian-Ukrainian border in the Kherson region. From day to day, Trump can sign a document on the transfer to Kiev of an 47-million package with a “handout” in the form of lethal weapons, and this will radically change the balance of power in the Donbass theater. What remains unknown is that a new “monster” after the fall of the current Kiev top can crawl out of the lobbies of shadowy nationalist and other structures supervised directly from the Pentagon, or with the help of intermediaries. At a minimum, the next wave of escalation will only flood Donbass theater, and at the maximum, it will affect the Republic of Crimea. Obvious is the fact that not a single unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (from the BM RSO to infantry fighting vehicles and OBT) will not be able to cross the Perekop isthmus and will be destroyed in advance by calculations of self-propelled Khrisanthema-S of the missile systems, calculations of the Kornet-E complexes, and using attack helicopters Ka-52 and front-line fighter-bomber Su-34. Consequently, the Ukrainian Grads, deployed in the south of the Kherson region, can pose a threat only to small settlements located just 10 km from Sivash and the Perekop Bay (Armyansk, Suvorovo, Nadezhdino, Medvedevka, etc.). Evacuating a small population from these areas to the safe central cities of Crimea will not be so difficult.
With the "Hurricanes" the situation will be much more serious. High-explosive and cluster unguided missiles 9М27Ф and 9М27К2 types have a range of 35 km and can reach up to the most densely populated city in the northern part of Crimea - Dzhankoy. The impenetrable antimissile barrier in this case can be provided by a battery of anti-aircraft missile and artillery complexes Pantsir-S1, which demonstrated the possibility of interceptions of the NURS Grada and C-350 Vityaz. And most importantly, a small ammunition 16 220-mm unguided missiles on each machine BM-37 eliminates the possibility of penetration into the "anti-missile umbrella" even single enemy missiles. But there is no Vityaz in the troops today, and therefore only Pantsiri, Torah and Buk-M3 can be used as missile defense systems, since the consumption of expensive ammunition sets of C-300B4 and C-400 Triumph for cheap and numerous unguided rockets is an economically inexpedient action. Also, let's not forget that at the disposal of the junta there is a decent amount of the MLRS Smerch, OTRK Tochka-U and a number of modern Alder complexes covering the entire territory of the Crimea. If on the “Points-U” of all the Crimean URD C-300PM1 / 400 is quite enough, then to protect against Tornadoes, definitely, the grouping should be increased.
I would like to mention another important detail that is the main indicator of the performance and survivability of modern mixed groups of air defense / missile defense, deployed both in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and in other regions of the Russian Federation. This is a network-centric linkage between anti-aircraft guided missiles with active RGSN and third-party targeting devices, which include: A-50U long-range radar patrol and guidance aircraft, tactical fighters equipped with powerful on-board radar with PFAR / AFAR, as well as ground and naval surveillance multifunctional radar systems. At present, there is an almost complete systemic linking between the units of the anti-aircraft missile forces of the Russian Space Forces, the air defense of the Russian Ground Forces, and the aviation component of the air defense system, achieved through the development and implementation of automated control systems for the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade Polyana-D4М1, 73H6ME-Gyyr ", As well as unified battery command points 1C9 / M" Ranzhir / -M. "
The architecture of the information-controlling field of the operator's cabin of the unified battery command post "Ranzhir-M". Due to work with anti-rocket propelled complexes families "Thor M1", "Arrow-10M2 / 3 / 4» and «Gyurza" as well as anti-aircraft missile cannon propelled complexes "Tungussko-M1" tool (program) distance display tactical information is up to 200 km
In particular, during an adversary's likely conduct of a strategic aerospace offensive operation involving several massive missile strikes from underwater, surface and air carriers, Polyana, Baikaly and Razhira are able to optimally and tactically distribute the most priority and dangerous airborne forces. -kosmicheskie objects among individual batteries, divisions and shelves antiaircraft missiles-C family 300P / 400, C-300V / 4, «Buk-M1 / 2 / 3», «Thor M1 / 2», «Pantsir-S1" , "Tungusska-MXNU MX "," Needle / Willow ", which are in service with a mixed group of air defense-missile defense. Synchronization of the above complexes and their versions with the automated control system Polyana or Baikal into a single network-centric network will significantly save their ammunition sets due to the complete elimination of the shelling of one target simultaneously by several anti-aircraft missile divisions.
In other words, thanks to the constant maintenance of the tactical tactical communications via coded radio channels, a complete departure from the so-called “Khutor” principle of building anti-aircraft brigade has been achieved. Even one machine of the Baikal-1МЭ automated control system boasts a huge number of tracked targets (up to 500 units), as well as their distribution simultaneously between 24 anti-aircraft missile systems of the C-300B4 / 400, Buk-M2 / 3 type, in the future, and C-350 "Vityaz". In fact, one “Baikal” is enough for organizing a network-centric air defense on a whole strategic air direction more than 5000 km wide, because the instrumental radius of action of this automated control system is 3200 km. Moreover, the Concern VKO Almaz-Antey initially prepared the computational tools of the system for work on hypersonic aerospace targets acting not only on the endoatmospheric, but also on the exoatmospheric flight segment (maximum height of the processed targets - 1200 km, speed - 18435 km / h) The system fits perfectly into the range of means of countering the aerospace threats of the 21st century, including the “Promoted global strike” advertised by the Americans.
The problem today is observed in the complete absence of a full-fledged two-way communication system between missiles and missiles and air-to-air interceptor missiles equipped with ARGSN and other target designation sources. For example, there is absolutely no information about the over-the-horizon targeting of the P-37, P-77 air combat missiles to the targets, or experienced 9М96Е2 and 9М82МВ anti-aircraft guns using, for example, Aeronaut A-50U aircraft or ground-based radars equipped with relevant types of corresponding types equipped with relevant types of relevant types, or corresponding radar systems equipped with relevant types. During the field tests applied targeting solely on battery radar (RPN 92N6E or LRMS 9S32M in the case of C-400 and C-300V4) or airborne radars "Barrier-AM", "Bars" in the case of MIG-31BM and Su-30SM respectively. Consequently, the possibility of “picking up” a backup two-way data exchange channel with other friendly units with respect to our missiles has not been confirmed.
Consequently, damage to the antenna array or the hardware base on the carrier can lead to the interceptor “into the milk” leaving and the destruction of the enemy. And only in the case of air strikes RVV-AE or RVV-SD (“Product 170-1”), equipped with active-passive radar GOS 9B-1103М-200PS, such an outcome is possible, at which RVV-AE / SD will deliver on any active radar enemy fighter; but not all of our ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles also have passive guidance mode at a radio-emitting object. One more such missile can be considered the P-27P with a passive radar seeker 9Б-1102, but not the fact that the airborne radar of the target will operate in the radiation mode; And the absence of the active mode of the GOS 9B-1102 makes the P-27P less “screwdriver” due to the lack of specified target coordinates (especially if the target uses distracting and other types of interference). Thus, the maximum overload of the destroyed target for P-27P is no more than 5,5 - 6 units.
In the Air Force and the Navy, our overseas "friends", as well as the European NATO member countries in these matters, are more and more thoughtful and captured, despite the more mediocre speed parameters of anti-aircraft guided missiles and air combat missiles. Let us take as an example the perspective long-range missile URVB “Meteor”, developed by the West European corporation MBDA (“Matra BAE Dynamics Alenia”). In addition to a powerful multi-mode integrated rocket-ramjet engine with throttle control through a movable valve in the nozzle of the gas generator, the Meteor rocket is also equipped with an advanced guidance system with ARGSN, INS and receiver of the radio correction channel from several sources at once. Such sources are all ground, surface and air units equipped with a Link-16 tactical network terminals (from AWACS DRLO aircraft to Ticonderox missile cruisers and British Type 45 air defense missiles).
In a simpler view: if F-35B, launched 4 URVB “Meteor” for various targets at a distance of more than 120 km, was shot down, the missiles will not go “into milk”, but will receive targeting from AWACS, naval radar or ground command and control systems of ground-based air defense missile systems, the hunt will continue. Similar capabilities are also possessed by the latest versions of the AMRAAM family of missiles (including AIM-120D), as well as the ultra-long-range ship-based missiles RIM-174 ERAM (SM-6), unified with the universal TLU Mk 41 VLS. Back in the early autumn of 2014, Western sources, citing a press release from Raytheon, reported on the successful network-centric field test of two RIM-174 ERAM SAMs, during which they demonstrated the joint work of combat information and control systems synchronized over the JTIDS radio channel. Aegis ”, placed on the missile cruiser URO CG-62 USS" Chancellorsville "and EM DDG-102 USS" Sampson ". Launched from the first anti-missile SM-6 "adopted" channel radio correction from the destroyer "Sampson"; it was his AN / SPY-1D radar that brought them to low-altitude small targets.
As you can see, to build an ideal and high-performance missile defense system both in the Crimea and in other regions of our state, the VKS need not only the transfer of air defense systems to active radar homing due to the introduction of Triumph’s ammunition 9X96DM missiles, but also modernization all existing and developed interceptor missiles modules for the two-way exchange of information with other pieces of equipment, leading radio and optical reconnaissance in theaters.