Military Review

About planned costs for HPV 2018-2027. Is the chain mail a bit small?

32
News About the HPV program 2018-2027 leave a very ambivalent impression. On the one hand, there is a feeling that the state armaments program for the next 10 years has become much more realistic than the HPN 2011-2020. On the other hand, significantly less funds were allocated for it than was planned to spend on the state armaments program in the 2011-2020 year, and this is certainly very disappointing.


So, in the article “The new state armament program gives an idea of ​​Russia's military priorities” (rsnews.ru):

“At first it was planned that this program would be valid until the 2025 year. However, it was quite unexpectedly extended to 2027 of the year, highlighting 19 trillions of rubles for its implementation. (This is roughly 244 billion pounds). Adjusted for inflation, this figure is close to the amounts that are allocated under the current program, calculated on 2012-2020 years. "


The following statement is surprising in this statement: there is not a word of lies in it, but at the same time it forms the reader a wrong impression about the financing of the new state armaments program. One gets the feeling that we have smoothly transferred one program to another and, without reducing the size of financing, we are heading towards a bright and well-protected future. But is it?

In fact, the numbers 20 trillion. rub. HPV 2011-2020 and 19 trillion rub. completely incomparable to each other. This is due to inflation - every year it depreciates money, because the same product due to rising prices begins to cost more. Accordingly, 20 trillion rubles, which were planned to spend in 2011-2020, cost much more than 19 trillion. rubles planned for 2018-2027

In order to deal with what is happening with the financing of our military programs, let us try to find out first how much money we have already spent on implementing the LG 2011-2020 and spend it before the start of 2018. Unfortunately, in open sources it is not so easy to detect the amount of actual financing for the HPN 2011-2020 during the 2011-2017 years. It was possible to find data from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, which indicated the planned figures for procurement expenditures and R & D in 2011-2015. They look like this:

2011 g. - 585 billion. Rub.
2012 g. - 727 billion. Rub.
2013 g. - 1 166 billion. Rub.
2014 g. - 1 400 billion. Rub.
2015 g. - 1 650 billion. Rub.

And all in the period 2011-2015 g were going to spend 5 528 billion rubles. The remaining 14,5 trillion rub. planned to spend in 2016-2020.

Strictly speaking, such a distribution of funding was one of the reasons for the criticism of the LG 2011-2020: it was reproached for its impracticability precisely because it was planned to spend the bulk of the funds at the end of the program. And indeed, if we assume that in the future, in 2016-2020, it was planned to retain approximately the same proportion of cost increases, then in 2016-2017. 2,5 should have already been sent to perform HPW by bln. rub. annually, but even in this case, almost half of all planned expenses (about 9,5 trillion rubles) accounted for the last three years, 2018-2020. In order for the state to afford it, it was necessary either to increase the budget revenues (which was already overly optimistic), or to cut some other expenses.

Were the spending plans for the state armaments program fulfilled during the 2011-2016 period? Rather not, than yes, and the reason is not at all in the lack of money, but in the fact that the domestic defense industry after two decades of collapse (1991-2010) could not demonstrate the expected rates. Of course, the reasons for the failure of the HPV 2011-2020. many: here is the disruption of Polymen-Reduta’s readiness deadlines, which is largely related to the decisions of the company's management, and the conflict with Ukraine, as a result of which the Russian Federation stopped receiving power plants for its frigates, and sanctions, which resulted in slowed down build small warships. But in any case, to ensure the release of military products in the volumes that were expected during the development of the LG-2011-2020. we failed.

It should be understood that even what our industry was able to give the armed forces, breathed new life into them. From the outside, this was especially noticeable in the example of our Air Force, which by 2010 had come close to the “point of no return”. With virtually no new machines, the pilots were forced to be content with old, un-modernized aircraft, with running out of resources, outdated equipment and weapons. The average annual raid was very low, and could not be compared with what "sworn friends" provided for their pilots. Today's videoconferencing and marine Aviation not even tens, but hundreds of modern combat aircraft were replenished, and the level of combat training became completely different, although, of course, we still have room to develop.



But how much was spent on HPV 2011-2020? Probably the lowest possible level of costs for its implementation is contained in the data that the Russian Federation reports to the UN.



Total for 2011-2016. It turns out 3 216 billion rubles, including for the first five years 2 918,4 billion rubles. or 52,8% of planned. However, the above figures raise huge doubts, and here's why.

Somehow, it turns out that the data on military expenditures that Russia submits to the United Nations is almost always where there is little, and where it is very much lower than the expenditures under the budget item “National Defense”. In this regard, 2016 has become a phenomenal year: reports to the United Nations on military expenditures of 2,06 billion rubles. while the item “National Defense” was listed almost twice the amount - 3,78 billion rubles. And even if you subtract 975 billion rubles. one-time payments for early repayment of loans by defense enterprises, still remains 2,8 billion rubles. but not 2,06 billion rubles.

In general, the first option is to check the data submitted by the Russian Federation to the UN, then the total expenditure on the implementation of HPV 2011-2020 for the first seven years in 2017 g inclusive is approximately from 3 700 to 4 400 billion rubles. and this is probably the bottom bracket of spending. And you can just by analogy with the plan assume that the Russian Federation spent in 2011-2017 approximately 50% of its military expenditures, and in this case, the total costs of carrying out HPW for this period will be 8 368 billion rubles.

It is possible that the truth, as often happens with it, is somewhere in the middle.

On the one hand, it seems that even 8,37 trillion. rub. in seven years, significantly less than 19 trillion. rub for ten, but only if we forget about inflation. After all, the ruble in 2011 g had a completely different purchasing power than it will have in 2018 g, when funding for a new state armaments program begins. If we recalculate the amount of funds spent over 7 years for carrying out HPW (according to official inflation data and taking inflation at 2017 at 4%) into 2018 prices, we will see the 10 940 billion figure, or 1 562 billion rubles. in year. At the same time, it should be understood that 19 billion of the new state program will not be issued all at once in 2018 g, but will be issued throughout the entire program execution line. And here we are again confronted with the influence of inflation, because even with an annual price increase of only one level at 4%, one trillion in 2027 is equal to 702 billion in 2018. If we assume that all 10 years of new WUF funds will be spent evenly ( taking into account inflation) then the new HPV will cost about 15 825 billion rubles. in 2018 g prices (i.e. annual 1 costs 582,5 billion per year in 2018 prices).

Is not it true, 1 562 billion rubles. The average annual expenditure of the previous program is very reminiscent of 1 582,5 billion rubles. average annual expenditure of the new program? Apparently, this is exactly what was meant when it was said that “With inflation adjusted, this figure is close to the amounts allocated in the framework of the current program for the 2012-2020 years”. But then why then talk about reducing the financing of the LG?

Yes, because of the old HPV 2011-2020 during the period 2018-2020. it was supposed to spend about 9,5 trillion. rub. then the new - no more 4,5-4,9 trillion. rub., but rather, and even less.

Thus, we come to the fact that HPV 2011-2020's. It turned out failed. We planned an annual increase in arms procurement costs, but around the turn of 2015-2016, we realized that there was no money for a further increase in expenditures in the budget, and (there is such a hunch) even if they were, it’s not a fact that the industry will make military orders in such volumes. And now we are reducing the cost of acquiring new weapons and R & D from what was planned. Although not from what we actually allocated for rearmament in recent years.

Will the funds incorporated in the new program, enough to re-equip our armed forces? On the one hand, the 2011-2017 period can be called a breakthrough in the newest stories Russia in terms of financing the state arms program, but on the other hand, along with obvious successes, such as the massive supply of modern combat aircraft, Ratnik equipment, Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, qualitative growth in combat training, and much, much more, there are obvious gaps, such as the disruption of the Navy's rearmament program, the refusal to supply modern tanks in favor of upgrading the T-72, etc.

From the above, one thing follows: realizing that we are in fairly cramped financial circumstances, the country's leadership should devote to planning the LG of 2018-2027. the closest attention. In order to ensure high combat effectiveness of the domestic armed forces, we must be guided by the criteria of "cost-effectiveness" and exclude inefficient and duplicative development and armaments.

However, the few information that leaks into the open press regarding HPV 2018-2027, causes reasonable doubts about the validity of a number of planned programs.

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  1. NEXUS
    NEXUS 7 December 2017 16: 20 New
    13
    From all of the above, one thing follows: realizing that we are in a fairly constrained financial situation

    When they say that we are constrained in financial matters, I involuntarily recall the phrase iPhone-No Money, but you hold on.
    At the same time, billions of rubles and dollars of corruption come up from somewhere, accounts in the overseas of the Russian aligarhat, at home, at the cost of several billion, and so on ... and the question suggests itself, guys, do we live in Russia alone?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 December 2017 16: 29 New
      +9
      Let’s be realistic - you understand that no one will squeeze out financing for the chips, Rosnans and other World Cups in football. How much was allocated to the GPV, how much was allocated, will not be added anymore, alas
      1. NEXUS
        NEXUS 7 December 2017 16: 40 New
        +6
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let's be realistic

        I just as realistically look at this issue. There is a question of the country's defense capability, but there is a question of enriching some at the expense of others. Say the question of the “Golden Colonel" ... how many frigates and corvettes could be built with that money?
        Let’s be realists, not storytellers, and clearly say that the figures given in the new rearmament program are a filkin letter designed for the “Russian fool”.
        A simple example: an Arctic force grouping. How fast are icebreakers being built with cruising tonnage? And you don’t have any disruptions in the supply of components, nor disruptions to your financing and moving the deadlines to the right ... but why? Because the Arctic for Gazprom and Rosneft is Klondike. And let's be clean ... even this filinky money would be normal if it weren’t for one unofficially legalized expense-bribe item and theft.
        And how much will actually be allocated and spent, you don’t know, not you, not I, not the Lord God. So I think that the amounts will be much more than those indicated by you.
        1. Lexus
          Lexus 7 December 2017 22: 45 New
          +5
          Moreover, even of these "crumbs" on the GPV, the part is "shoved into pockets". Some friends serve, because I had the opportunity to get acquainted with a form sewn in one line, which spreads from the effort. Others work in enterprises overgrown with intermediaries in private ownership, because of which financing does not actually reach the executors of state defense orders. There is a story in my city about the demolition of the building of the famous design bureau for the equipment of the helipad for receiving the Bell-407 with Monsieur Taburetkin (officially solely for the purpose of "optimizing assets"). Yes, here, on the resource, there are a lot of articles about how prices for products are “adjusted” in the process of development and production, and always upwards.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            7 December 2017 22: 53 New
            +1
            Quote: lexus
            Others work in enterprises overgrown with intermediaries in private ownership, because of which financing does not actually reach the executors of public defense contracts.

            Now this is almost gone. In principle, Taburetkin did one useful thing - I'm talking about the 20 + 1 rule, the field of which the intermediaries lost their meaning
            1. Lexus
              Lexus 7 December 2017 23: 01 New
              +2
              I'm afraid you don’t know much ...
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                7 December 2017 23: 07 New
                +1
                Well, I worked at two enterprises performing GOZ, I know a number of people from other enterprises
                1. Lexus
                  Lexus 7 December 2017 23: 27 New
                  +2
                  If you want, I’ll write in a personal message, "how it works." It turns out that the leading manufacturers of BT themselves went bankrupt, apparently from old age).
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    8 December 2017 09: 36 New
                    +1
                    Let's :) And I will unsubscribe also in response
              2. The comment was deleted.
      2. 210ox
        210ox 7 December 2017 16: 49 New
        +2
        Yes, alas .. But if you steal less (dreams! Yes, and I don’t say at all), they will squeeze the appetites for giving fishing hunting corporate parties .. Maybe enough ... sad
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let’s be realistic - you understand that no one will squeeze out financing for the chips, Rosnans and other World Cups in football. How much was allocated to the GPV, how much was allocated, will not be added anymore, alas
      3. Town Hall
        Town Hall 7 December 2017 17: 06 New
        +4
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Let's be realistic -




        I have such a question for you. Why did this new GPV arise ten-year-old 2018-2027 right now? Why did not wait for the end of the previous one in 2020. We calculated, reported and launched the new 2021-2030. What is the point of putting one program on another. broke now in what is really done and spent.


        Your opinion?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          7 December 2017 17: 21 New
          +2
          In my opinion the answer is very simple. The first GPV turned out to be fantastic both in terms of production capabilities and in terms of the possibility of financing it. Around 2015-16, it became clear (that the industry could not cope and that further buildup of funding for GPV was impossible) and began to develop a more realistic program with reduced funding and a review of various weapons development and production programs. Something was reduced, something was postponed to a later date.
          In this sense, GPV should not be a dogma at all, everything changes, and if the plans are unrealistic, then they need to be changed, I say it as an economist :) There was no point in, say, financing further work on the BARZHK Barguzin if it became clear what to arrange its production is still nothing. It will be easier and cheaper to add the number of Frontiers and Sarmatians.
          1. Town Hall
            Town Hall 7 December 2017 17: 56 New
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            The first GPV turned out to be fantastic both in terms of production capabilities and in terms of the possibility of financing it. Around 2015-16, it became clear




            "... Kudrin’s resignation after the conflict over the increase in defense spending (recall that the president demanded 20 trillion rubles by 2020 as part of the rearmament of the defense industry complex, and the head of the Ministry of Finance publicly disagreed with this figure) ..."


            This was clear from the very beginning. And the new GPV with plus or minus the same numbers and much weaker revenues than in 2011, sanctions and so on is not the same adventure?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              7 December 2017 18: 00 New
              +2
              Quote: Town Hall
              Kudrin’s resignation after the conflict over an increase in defense spending (recall that the president demanded 20 trillion rubles to be allocated by 2020 as part of the rearmament of the military-industrial complex, and the head of the Ministry of Finance did not publicly agree with this figure).

              And he was wrong, oddly enough.
              Quote: Town Hall
              and the new GPV with plus or minus the same numbers and much weaker revenues than in 2011, sanctions, etc., is not the same adventure?

              I guess not. The numbers are far from the same, in fact, 19 trillion of new GPV - this is approximately the level of financing of the old GPV in 2011-16
              1. Town Hall
                Town Hall 7 December 2017 18: 54 New
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And he was wrong, oddly enough.



                I do not agree ... but I will not argue.

                I think this GPV will suffer the same fate as the previous one. If there is no miracle in the form of $ 120 per barrel. It’s just that both of these GPVs have one common denominator. Both are taken into account when it is customary to distribute the liver. Well, or at least wave them before by the electorate.
      4. Vadim237
        Vadim237 7 December 2017 23: 14 New
        +2
        How much do we now have one 5,45 armor-piercing tracer cartridge?
      5. d ^ Amir
        d ^ Amir 16 March 2018 16: 37 New
        0
        Good afternoon!!!!! the Hague international tribunal will easily make our leadership realistic ... in the sense that if they do not want the fate of Milosevic (peace be upon him), they will develop weapons, because as events show, only nuclear weapons and equipped army are able to maintain the real sovereignty of the country ... so that the money will be found if necessary ....
  2. Glory1974
    Glory1974 7 December 2017 16: 46 New
    +5
    not the fact that the industry to produce military orders in such volumes.

    Most likely this is the case. I am related to industrial production and I know firsthand that many enterprises cannot physically produce products anymore. Despite the fact that there are orders and money.
    Everything rests in the absence of production facilities, which were either sold or rented out earlier, and also in the absence of a machine park, which cannot be updated due to sanctions.
    1. Dart2027
      Dart2027 7 December 2017 19: 33 New
      +1
      Quote: glory1974
      Most likely this is the case.

      This is what it is.
    2. Conductor
      Conductor 10 December 2017 02: 06 New
      0
      A machine park weakly do it yourself?
      1. karabas86
        karabas86 11 December 2017 21: 07 New
        0
        Googling machine tools in the Russian Federation and learn everything.
  3. Recoil
    Recoil 7 December 2017 17: 40 New
    +1
    How can you analyze closed budget items?
    Do you have permission and you disclose?
    or do you draw conclusions on open data, which, according to your admission, vary from case to case by 40-70%?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 December 2017 17: 57 New
      +2
      Quote: Rollback
      How can you analyze closed budget items?

      Elementary :))) You do not find that if there were GPV in them, then it would be there that sequestered it? :)
      Quote: Rollback
      or do you draw conclusions on open data, which, according to your admission, vary from case to case by 40-70%?

      Generally speaking, all this is in the article
  4. Old26
    Old26 7 December 2017 19: 11 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    There was no point, let’s say, to finance further work on the BARZK Barguzin if it became clear that there was still nothing to organize its production. It will be easier and cheaper to add the number of Frontiers and Sarmatians.

    Moreover. There are doubts that they will add “Frontiers”. The first regiment was to stand on the database at the end of 2016. But for now, silence. Hopefully temporary. And to increase the number of "Sarmatians" is a very expensive pleasure. Cheaper to increase the number of "Yarsev" option PGRK
    1. NEXUS
      NEXUS 7 December 2017 23: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Old26
      Cheaper to increase the number of "Yarsev" option PGRK

      And then what to do with the Voivode? In vain did they extend their service life three times? They will bring Sarmat, I have no doubts about this. I voiced the first reason, but there is the second one, it is Yu-71. And on this issue, I suspect a lot of surprises for us and for the adversary.
  5. Bersaglieri
    Bersaglieri 8 December 2017 01: 57 New
    0
    VKS and SNF-priority. For this is a guarantee of non-aggression. The rest is on the residual principle. Reasonable. Nefig spend money on “troughs” and “carts”. excessively.
  6. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 8 December 2017 02: 02 New
    0
    I did not understand: what is “Other” in the table of costs by type of Armed Forces?
    Missile forces, space?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      8 December 2017 10: 20 New
      +1
      Quote: voyaka uh
      I did not understand: what is “Other” in the table of costs by type of Armed Forces?

      I would like to know myself.
  7. Old26
    Old26 8 December 2017 09: 31 New
    0
    Quote: NEXUS
    And then what to do with the Voivode? In vain did they extend their service life three times? They will bring Sarmat, I have no doubts about this. I voiced the first reason, but there is the second one, it is Yu-71. And on this issue, I suspect a lot of surprises for us and for the adversary.

    Andrew! You are reading inattentively. I wrote about the increase in the number of "Sarmatians" (compared to planned). The number of mines in which the Voivode now stands is limited. Building new ones to add new Sarmatians is a very expensive pleasure. And it's not about the project known as 4202. This perhaps one of the options for military equipment. No one will bet on him exclusively. And it is unlikely that the number of these products will be deployed in large quantities.
    And how to add Sarmatians over a certain norm is easier to add Yars PGRK.
  8. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 8 December 2017 13: 12 New
    +3
    Hi Andrey! Very interesting article. Makes you think. But I want to turn back to GWP 2011-20. In 2011, while serving in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, I held classes on the United Civil Party and provided official information (voiced in newspapers, the Internet, radio, in general, everywhere) for students. And they are as follows: from 2011 to 2020, the next IWT will be produced and delivered to the RF Armed Forces. 2300 tanks (new tanks), 2000 artillery mountings, 10 Iskander brigades, 9 S-300B4 brigades, 56 S-400 divisions, 38 S-500 divisions, 600 combat aircraft, 1000-1100 helicopters, 270-280 Yars ICBMs " I will continue the fleet: 8 APKSN of project 955, 8 MAPLs of project 885, 20 diesel-electric submarines of the Lada type, 6 frigates of the project 11356, 9 frigates of the project 22350, 25 corvettes. Perhaps the time has come to take intermediate results. There are 2020 years left until 3 and it is worth recognizing that in many areas of the GWP 2011-20, it was a failure. There will not be 2300 new tanks (maximum 100 new Armats for military tests), there will be 9 S-300B4 brigades, there will be no S-500 at all (they did not even start the tests, everyone feeds them with “breakfasts”). Of the 8 boats of project 955, at best, 5 will be commissioned, but actually 4. Of the 8 boats of project 885, a maximum of 3 units. If everything is “in chocolate”, then by 2020 6 frigates will be built. It is necessary to understand corvettes (should patrol ships and RTOs be ranked as corvettes). Instead of 20 Lada, they may have time to build 8 projects 636.3 and 2 Lada
  9. Conductor
    Conductor 10 December 2017 02: 12 New
    0
    The machine park was normal, and you and your stranger, if you don’t speak, don’t talk.
  10. Conductor
    Conductor 10 December 2017 02: 13 New
    0
    AOMZ Gidromash. I worked there.