Military Review

Bloody Mars. H. 2

48
The offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts in November — December 1942 of the year failed. Our troops suffered heavy losses. However, a fierce battle swallowed up all the reserves of the German Army Group Center, which could have been sent to release the surrounded Paulus 6 Army in the area of ​​Stalingrad.


German counterstrikes. The environment of the Soviet troops

The mobile group of the Western Front November 28, 1942 with the approach of the lagging units resumed the offensive. Together with the 6th tank the corps was advancing by the 1st scooter-motorcycle brigade. The cavalry corps of Kryukov also struck. By the end of the day, Soviet troops advanced another 20 kilometers. The headquarters of three units from the 9th Army were defeated, 2 artillery regiments of the enemy were destroyed, and rear warehouses were captured. By the end of the day, the 22nd and 200th tank brigades, together with part of the forces of the 6th motorized rifle brigade, cut the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. Further advancement of our troops was stopped by German reserves.

Mobile units could do better if supported by infantry. However, the Soviet infantry units, concentrated on the bridgehead, did not enter the breakthrough. In addition, it was not possible to transfer a sufficient amount of artillery to the bridgehead. At this time, the German 9-I tank division launched a counterattack to the north along the Rzhevsky highway, threatening to cut off the Soviet forces that had broken through. However, the Soviet command still did not notice the threat. G. K. Zhukov on the night of November 29 ordered rifle divisions on the bridgehead to expand the breakthrough, and mobile units to continue the advance to the west. Combined with the troops of the Kalinin Front, they had to complete the encirclement and defeat the enemy.

Meanwhile, on the night German troops struck from two sides on the flanks and in the rear of the Soviet group that had broken through. From the north, they attacked parts of the 27 Army Corps, and from the south, attacked the 39 Armored Corps. They closed the gap in the defense at the site of the spoon, Nikishevo. As a result, parts of the 2 Guards Cavalry Corps, 22 and 200 tank brigades, battalion of the 6 motorized rifle brigade, the remnants of the scooter-motorcycle brigade fell in the area, which were weakened in battles to the west of the Rzhev-Sychevka railway, were weakened in battle.

Food supplies, ammunition and fuel coming to an end. Attempt to organize the supply by air failed. It was necessary to break through to her. At dawn 30 November on the orders of the front command of the part of the 6-th tank corps went on a breakthrough in the area of ​​Maloe Kropotovo. At the same time, the troops of General Kiryukhin's 20 Army delivered a counter blow from the east. But only tankers managed to get through to the village, the Soviet infantry advancing from the east could not break through to their own. The Germans, meanwhile, were pulling up reserves and strengthening their defenses in this area. Then the command of the 6 tank corps decided to make its way to its north, through the Big Koropoto. On the night of November 30, tankers struck an unexpected blow to the northeast. At the same time, the 100 I tank brigade, supported by infantry, attacked them. In this battle, the commanders of the 200 tank and 6 motorized rifle brigades died, but by the morning of December 1 the surrounded units had made their way through the enemy barriers. Tank brigades lost most of their combat equipment, so the 6 tank corps was deployed to the rear for retrofitting. The 20 Cavalry Division could not make its way eastward and therefore went west. The Soviet cavalry, in spite of the negative myth created, was very useful in the “war of engines”, especially during the breakthroughs, raids on the enemy’s rear, and fast offensive operations. So, after more than a month-long raid on the German rears, about a thousand cavalrymen and partisans who joined them moved into the 22 Army's location.

In the offensive zone of the Kalinin Front, the situation was also tense. Reinforcements approached the 41 of the German corps — the 9 and 12 tank divisions. December 1 mechanized corps Solomatina was forced to stop the attacks and go on the defensive. After analyzing the situation, the commander of the Soviet corps realized that a real threat of encirclement hung over his units. He brought motor transport to the rear, leaving only tanks, tractors with guns and vehicles with ammunition in combat formations. Measures of front command to strengthen the flanks at the base of the wedge were late. By December 6, German troops regained control of the Bely - Vladimirskoye road. Bypassing White from the northeast, the 47-I tank brigade of Colonel Dremov was cut off. Tankers had to fight their way out of the encirclement. December 7 from the south went on the offensive from the reserve 30 German tank corps - 19-I and 20-I tank divisions, as well as 1-I tank division and parts of the 41-corps. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to reach the rear of the Kalinin Front mobile group, surrounding southeast of the settlements of Shiparevo, Tsytsyno, Dubrovka part of the 1 mechanized corps and two brigades of the 6 infantry corps.

Zhukov ordered the surrounded troops to remain in place. General Solomatin was subordinated to all the troops that turned out to be in the “boiler”. They organized an "air bridge" for the delivery of ammunition and food. To break through the outer ring of the environment reserves. The Soviet command hoped to keep the bridgehead, captured by the mobile front group, to soon resume the offensive.

The resumption of the Soviet offensive

Zhukov was still hoping to achieve victory in the Rzhev salient area. The Directive of the Headquarters, signed by him on December 8 1942, demanded that the troops of the Kalininsky and Western fronts crush enemy forces in the area of ​​Rzhev, Sychevka, Olenino, Bely by 1 in January of 1943. For the new offensive, new troops were sent to the 20 Army: the fresh 5 tank corps of Major General KA Semenchenko and several units from the 31 Army. 6-th tank corps, without completing the replenishment, again thrown into battle. Mobile units were assigned the task of breaking through together with the rifle units the enemy defenses in the area of ​​Bolshaya and Maloye Kropotovo. In the future, in cooperation with the 2-th Guards Corps, continue the offensive and turn to the north-west.

“The offensive,” commented the commander of the tank corps, A. Getman, “was conducted in the same direction as at the end of November. However, this time it was not successful, as it was carried out by smaller forces, while the enemy continued to pull up reserves ... ”. It is clear that the Germans were already waiting for the strike and managed to prepare for it.

10 December 1942, the Soviet tank corps went on the attack. Tankers managed to reach the village of Maloye Kropotovo, but again without infantry lagging behind. The Germans counterattacked and our troops were forced to retreat to their original positions. The fighting continued until the end of the month, until the troops of the Western Front exhausted themselves completely. The troops of the 39, 22 of the Kalinin Front also attacked the enemy in the general direction of Olenino, and the forces of the 41 Army in the area of ​​the city of Bely. However, the front did not receive new armored formations, and its army could not break through the enemy front.

In the meantime, Solomatina’s surrounded group fought for a week in surroundings, repelling all the attacks of the German divisions clutching the ring. Supplying them through the air was extremely difficult for non-flying weather, it happened that the planes dropped vital cargo in the enemy's position. The units ran out of fuel, ammunition and food were running out. Finally Zhukov ordered to break out of the encirclement. On the night of 15 on December 16, General Solomatin led the remnants of his troops to a breakthrough. Before that, he destroyed the remaining equipment (there was no fuel for it) and heavy weapons, gathered his troops into a fist and struck at the western direction. At the same time he took with him the sick and wounded. From the outside of the front, with the support of the entire army artillery of the enemy, attacked the 154-I tank brigade of Colonel F. D. Artamonov. Soldiers Solomatina able to escape from the "boiler". The losses of the 1 th mechanized corps, according to the report of General Solomatin, amounted to 8 thousand killed and wounded and 150 tanks.

Bloody Mars. H. 2

German machine-skier takes aim from MG-34 sitting in a crater in the Rzhev area

German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun at a position in the Rzhev region

Velikoluksky direction

The troops of the Kalininsky front could not break through the enemy defense also because they fought hard in the Great Lenin direction. December 11 Germans struck a powerful blow here, and all the reserves of the front had to be thrown there. After an unsuccessful attempt to unblock the besieged garrison from the northwest, the Germans transferred their main efforts to the Leshakovo and Konyushka regions. From here, in the shortest direction to the Great Ones on the 6-kilometer front, the 291-I Infantry Division tried to break through. The Germans managed to press off parts of our 9 Guards Division. December 14 in this direction, the enemy managed to capture Gromovo.

Both sides were building up forces in this direction. The commander of the 3 shock army, KN Galitsky, received from the reserve of the front the 8 th Estonian infantry corps. The 19-I Guards Rifle Division of the 8-Estonian corps was urgently advanced to the threatened area, which restored the situation. By regrouping the forces and pulling up the 20 th motorized division and the 1 th SS brigade, on December 19 the enemy struck a new blow, this time on the flank of the 19 th guards division. Over the 2 day of the battle, they advanced to Alekseykovo. General Galitsky (Zhukov was also at the command post of the army these days), successively threw the newly arrived 249 Infantry Division and 100 Infantry Brigade into the threatened area. December 24 44-I and 45-I ski teams, as well as 360-I division, were introduced into the battle. The army received more 10 artillery regiments. The fighting was stubborn, the village Alekseykovo repeatedly passed from hand to hand.

The fighting continued until December 25th. The heavy losses suffered during the offensive forced the German command to take an operational pause to pull up fresh forces and prepare a new strike. On January 4, 1943, after artillery training, German troops resumed their attack on Velikiye Luki from the south-west in the direction of Alekseykovo. In addition to the 20th Motorized and 6th Airfield Divisions operating here, the 205th Infantry Division, deployed from Velizh, participated. On January 7, the German strike force was reinforced by the 331rd Infantry Division, which had arrived from France. A day later, the Germans crossed the Velikiye Luki-Novosokolniki railway and continued to move forward. The advanced units of the Germans were already 4-5 km from the city. At the same time, the 8th Panzer Division again went on the offensive from the northwest. German troops attacked with the support of large forces aviation and artillery.

The real threat of an enemy breakthrough to the surrounded garrison forced the Soviet command to withdraw some of the forces from the battle in Velikiye Luki and aim them at defense. Two regiments of the 357 th rifle division were deployed front to the south-west, and the 47-I mechanized brigade was withdrawn to the north-west of the city with the task of countering the enemy if necessary. Also, the 100-I and 36-I tank and 57-I engineering brigades took up the defense from the Great Bows. January 9 on the German wedge struck flank attacks 33-I and 184-I tank brigades and arrived from the front reserve of the 32-th rifle division. By January 12, having advanced a month of bloody battles on 15 km, both German groups finally exhausted and stopped, they failed to break through to the surrounded ones. Then they were thrown back to their original positions by counterattacks of the troops of the 3 th shock army. By January 21 front stabilized.

At the same time, starting from December 13, four Soviet rifle divisions, one tank division, one mechanized brigade, and the 13 th Guards Tank Regiment with flamethrower tanks, were continuously storming the Great Luke. The total number of the surrounded German garrison was 8-9 thousands of people, 100-120 artillery guns, 10-15 tanks and assault guns. The main, continuous line of defense passed through suburban settlements, each of which was adapted to all-round defense. All the stone buildings of the city were turned into resistance units adapted to long-term defense. The Velikoluksky fortress and the railway junction area were a particularly powerful base. Encouraged by promises about the imminent breakthrough of the ring of encirclement from the outside, the Germans offered desperate resistance and refused to surrender. In addition, the German garrison was actively supported by aviation. Only 16 January 1943 was able to completely suppress the resistance of the enemy garrison and liberate the city.


Red Army soldiers flee down K. Liebknecht Street during battles for the liberation of the Great Onions

German soldiers captured in the Great Bow District

Results

The offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts on the Rzhev direction failed. Territorial acquisitions were very small (breakthroughs in the Luchёsy valley and north-west of Rzhev). However, of great strategic importance was the constraint of forces of the 9 of the German army and the reserves of Army Group Center. The second Rzhev-Sychev battle swallowed up all the reserves of the German army in the central direction, which could be used to unlock the surrounded 6 army in the area of ​​Stalingrad.

Thus, the military historian, General M. A. Gareev notes that since operations “Mars” and “Uranus” were carried out within the framework of a single plan, the main strategic task in operation “Mars” was to divert the forces of the enemy to ensure the success of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, "There is no compelling reason to consider the operation" Mars "a failure or" the largest defeat of Marshal Zhukov, "as D. Glentz and other authors write about this." Moreover, there is an opinion that Moscow did not conceal the preparation of an offensive in the Rzhev area (in the central strategic direction) in order to divert the enemy’s attention from the main thrusts of the attacks. Pavel Sudoplatov claimed that the Germans had been specifically warned about the offensive in the Rzhev area as part of the radio game Monastery and were waiting for the offensive.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the Second Rzhev-Sychev operation amounted to more than 215 thousand people. German losses - 53,5 thousand people.

The troops of the 3 shock army bound the enemy's 10 divisions, preventing their use in other directions, and liberated the ancient Russian city of Velikie Luki. The total losses of our troops in this area amounted to 104 thousand people. The Germans lost more than 60 thousand people.


Soviet tank landing dismounts from the KV-1 tank on the Kalininsky front
Author:
Articles from this series:
1942 Campaign

The Third Reich again goes on the offensive.
"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction
Stalingrad Fortress
1942 year. "The operation in the south develops without stopping"
How the German army broke through to Stalingrad
Expectations to take Stalingrad a sudden blow failed
Breakthrough of the 6 of the German army to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad
Defeat of the Crimean Front
"The spirit of optimism ... vital at the command post of the front." Kharkov disaster of the Red Army
Khrushchev dumped all the blame for the Kharkov catastrophe on Stalin
How the Wehrmacht stormed the Caucasus
Battle for the Caucasus: no invasions from land
The battle for the "black gold" of the Caucasus
How failed operation "Edelweiss"
"Soviet troops fought for every inch of land ..."
"Verdun of World War II ..."
"It truly was hell." How to reflect the first blow to Stalingrad
"We will storm Stalingrad and take it ...". Second storming of the stronghold on the Volga
The second assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
The third assault on Stalingrad
"Tanks drive through people like wood." The third assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
“We are fighting as if we are possessed, but we cannot make our way to the river ...”
Battle of Stalingrad changed the course of the “Big Game”
The German command is focused on "extremely active" defense and "a sense of superiority of the German soldier over the Russians"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus". H. 2
Stalingrad "boiler"
Bloody Mars
48 comments
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  1. hohol95
    hohol95 29 November 2017 15: 05 New
    +6
    Corps of General Shubnikov
    1. Andy
      Andy 29 November 2017 21: 54 New
      0
      I also remembered about this movie ...
  2. creak
    creak 29 November 2017 15: 32 New
    +5
    Our losses in the second operation amounted to 215 thousand people, and the German - 53 thousand. Well, who fettered whom? If such a loss ratio is our success, then what is considered failure.
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 29 November 2017 16: 15 New
      +3
      The central direction was completely absent, Romanians, Italians and Hungarians, or do you think that the success of Mars was possible against a solid German front?
      1. gafarovsafar
        gafarovsafar 4 December 2017 10: 37 New
        0
        Well, yes, the defense to Berlin was entirely made up of Hungarians Romanians and pasta. In your opinion, Berlin came to this place just because of this. And if only a German purebred, there would still be a war
    2. dzvero
      dzvero 29 November 2017 16: 57 New
      10
      Typical positional battles with an attack on the prepared long-term enemy defense. Moreover, the enemy knows almost everything about the plans of the operation.
      By the way, this operation can be considered as a mirror analogue of the Battle of Kursk. The Germans could not break through the defenses and enter the operational space. Moreover, under the same conditions, they could not stop the counter-offensive of the Red Army, despite formally sufficient forces and means.
      So, in general, the Rzhev operation cannot be called a failure. Unsuccessful - in a sense, yes. But! In conjunction with Uranus, she completed her minimum program. And the maximum program ... the Germans simply did not make a second strategic mistake with the transfer of reserves near Stalingrad. If they had done it, it is not known how the events of Rzhev would have turned. Indeed, at some point, the balance could swing in the other direction.
    3. Roman 11
      Roman 11 29 November 2017 17: 54 New
      +2
      Quote: ranger
      what then is considered a failure.

      Kiev boiler, near Bryansk and Vyazma in the 41st, near Minsk - there were a lot of these failures ..... and this is a “combat draw”.

      We really treated the soldiers as "cannon fodder", most importantly forward, but it doesn’t matter there.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 29 November 2017 18: 04 New
      10
      Quote: ranger
      Our losses in the second operation amounted to 215 thousand people, and the German - 53 thousand. Well, who fettered whom? If such a loss ratio is our success, then what is considered failure.

      For example, the Kharkov operation of 1942. When Tymoshenko and Khrushchev, despite all the warnings of Shaposhnikov, managed during the offensive to drive the best forces of the South Specialized Detachment into the Bardenkovskaya trap of Fridericus, from which no more than 10% escaped. And then the Blau attack hit our weakened troops.
      270 of our total losses (officially) versus about 000 German and 30 Romanian.
      1. The comment was deleted.
    5. hohol95
      hohol95 30 November 2017 00: 28 New
      +1
      And let's compare Operation MARS with a small "walk" of the Japanese army in Malaya - the "walk" lasted 54 days and cost the Japanese 4600 people!
      British defending troops (with highly educated, initiative, not afraid of difficulties officers) this Japanese "WALK" cost 25 thousand people (mostly prisoners) and a large amount of equipment.
      For those who like to compare losses: five to one!

      But they saved the soldier! FOR CAPTURE! Only the Japanese prisoners did not respect ...
      AT ALL ...
  3. Cartalon
    Cartalon 29 November 2017 15: 44 New
    +1
    Probably everything that could have been done within reasonable limits was possible, an offensive by all means was possible and could lead to a breakdown of German resistance, but not the fact that the troops that did not take part in the offensive were capable of offensive operations, all this cannot be considered Zhukov's personal failure.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 29 November 2017 15: 59 New
      +5
      “all this cannot be considered Zhukov’s personal failure.” ///

      But what about? After all, individual soldiers survived and were not captured. And this is success.
      Even the triumph of Zhukov. Compared to 1941, when this was not the case.
      When, with confident command hand, he drove everyone into the cauldrons of the Germans, without exception.
      Then he got on a plane with headquarters and flew to Moscow to report: "oops, it didn’t work out again ... where to fly to command?" sad
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 29 November 2017 16: 11 New
        +4
        If there had been no offensive, the German reserves would have gone to the Don, it would be possible and possible to conduct an operation better with insufficient forces without the effect of surprise, but for this it is necessary to have troops superior to the enemy in fighting efficiency.
        1. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 29 November 2017 18: 56 New
          +4
          "German reserves would go to the Don" ///

          Understand: the Germans did not have any reserves.
          They held all forces on the fronts, in the rear was the “zero” divisions.
          Hitler was furious at the very word "reserves."
          When necessary, troops were quickly transferred to an active offensive site
          front with passive defensive.
          At the time when the broad offensive in the south began, all the main forces
          and were in the south, not on the Rzhev ledge.
          There was SOMEONE to distract. Therefore, Zhukov decided to hammer there because the Germans were
          few. But it turned out to be enough to grind the Red Army attackers in the forehead while sitting in the bunkers.
          1. avt
            avt 29 November 2017 19: 49 New
            +8
            Quote: voyaka uh
            Understand: the Germans did not have any reserves.

            Azochenway! Is it really? It turns out that Manshtein was actually scraped off from the other sections for a breakthrough to the deblockade, and .... yes, yes, Mars fulfilled the task.
            Quote: polpot
            You will agree that this genius of military thought has done a lot of harm to the army in which he served and deserves to be called the champion on the attack on the rake, otherwise Rzhev’s battles cannot be called,

            Another strategus, knowing the result over the years, full of burping hands. Operations of the past. I have to agree that these geniuses, who win victories in virtual wars in the aftermath, are indestructible.bullyGlory to the winner of all levels of different strategies! Where are Zhukov and others, well, not virtual Generals Winners
            Quote: ranger
            Our losses in the second operation amounted to 215 thousand people, and the German - 53 thousand. Well, who fettered whom? If such a loss ratio is our success, then what is considered failure.

            It’s a failure to consider the lack of the ability to perceive the facts presented in the article when the head is a bone adapted to eat. Since it’s not even possible to understand, the Soviet troops practically fought in the encirclement, without the possibility of a full evacuation of the wounded, respectively, sanitary losses in the winter became irrevocable. The soldiers died. Actually, even the majority of the completely uninjured, but starving Germans from Stalingrad actually bent in the camps from the diseases of an exhausted organism. And nobody at the same time starved them and didn’t feed them with half-baked rutabaga, as in the Nazi concentration camps.
          2. hohol95
            hohol95 29 November 2017 20: 12 New
            +3
            Or maybe you should disperse all the "home-grown" commanders and military commanders and invite, for example, the British "geniuses of North Africa", headed by Archibald Percival Wavell? AND? What do you think? Maybe there would have been less losses and the war would have been "finished" faster (not known only with what result)? But would finish ...
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 29 November 2017 16: 12 New
        +2
        Then rose and barking,
        And only the old Parrot
        Shouted loudly from the branches:
        - The big giraffe - he knows better!
      3. polpot
        polpot 29 November 2017 17: 14 New
        +2
        I have to agree with you that this genius of military thought has done a lot of harm to the army in which he served and deserves to be called the champion on the attack on the rake, otherwise there was no name for the Rzhev battles, it was necessary to look for a solution to the task and not drive the soldiers into frontal attacks, but Zhukov and the care of the soldier these are different things, the eternal memory of soldiers and officers who died in these battles
      4. antivirus
        antivirus 29 November 2017 17: 24 New
        +2
        BABY-- IT WAS 2 YEARS ELSE TO WAIT WHILE ALL JEWS IN ASHES AND IN FIELDS
        THERE WASN'T AND NOW AN EXACT RECIPE OF VICTORY.
        count "32 soldiers will die in the attack on Gaza and get 112 corpses, when you reach the goal," is that how you get it?
        moreover, about 7-10 years ago they mentioned the op “Monastery” on Zvezda-desa TV from Beria and Merkulov.
        read the sickly congratulation of gdp to the Palestinian people
      5. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 29 November 2017 18: 24 New
        +7
        Quote: voyaka uh
        But what about? After all, individual soldiers survived and were not captured. And this is success.
        Even the triumph of Zhukov. Compared to 1941, when this was not the case.

        You better compare with 1942 - with the same Kharkov operation. Or, butting on the northern front of Stalingrad, when the three armies, having the strictest order to break through the corridor to the city, could not break through the defenses of a pair of German divisions. On that site, the number of our tanks discovered by captured teams following the results of the Battle of Stalingrad exceeded the German number by an order of magnitude (because the territory remained with the Germans each time).
        Quote: voyaka uh
        When, with confident command hand, he drove everyone into the cauldrons of the Germans, without exception.

        And an example can these boilers? A concrete example, when Zhukov’s orders led to pitting - and not their creative execution by the command of the fronts and armies.
        And do not refer to subordination and discipline - about them in the Red Army at the beginning of the war they had an extremely vague concept. When the front commander immediately after leaving the NGS cancels his order with his will and starts chasing the non-existent German tanks by mechanized corps, spinning up the kilometer of marches - what discipline can we talk about?
        Quote: voyaka uh
        Then he got on a plane with headquarters and flew to Moscow to report: "oops, it didn’t work out again ... where to fly to command?"

        In fact, it was usually quite the opposite - at first the GKZh was called to Moscow, and upon his departure they began to weird on the ground, creatively interpreting the orders given until their cancellation.
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 29 November 2017 18: 40 New
          +5
          When the front commander immediately after leaving the NGS cancels his order with his will and starts chasing the non-existent German tanks by mechanized corps, spinning up the kilometer of marches - what discipline can we talk about?

          Are you talking about Kirponos? It remains to mention Vashugin - there the initiative generally came from a member of the military council.
          Warriors have their own attitude towards Zhukov. laughing
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 29 November 2017 18: 52 New
            +4
            Quote: Mikado
            Are you talking about Kirponos?

            But yak is a clinical case. The NHS clearly and unequivocally ordered the mechanized corps to be taken from the armies and attacked in convergent directions, cutting off the most probable direction of the German mobile formations strike behind the backs of the past German tank fist. So what organ of the confrontation instead made a carousel with the reassignment of the same 8 MK, changed the direction of the strike, and then returned to the original only when it was too late - the German infantry with anti-aircraft missile defense pulled in the direction of the strikes?
            However, the story from 1 TD 1 MK is also indicative: the NGS orders to withdraw the division from the battle and transfer it to the main forces of 1 MK, which are preparing to repel 4 TGr tanks rushing through the Baltic. The commander of the army, which was assigned 1 TD, puts the M120x200 on this order - and gives the division only after a second order, after a few weeks, and even robbing it of a couple of tank battalions.
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 29 November 2017 19: 00 New
              +2
              The NHS clearly and unequivocally ordered the mechanized corps to be taken from the armies and attacked in convergent directions, cutting off the most probable direction of the German mobile units from behind the past German tank fist.

              EMNIP, yes, Zhukov called for precisely this at the beginning of the war. Well, what can I say .. 8 MK, it seems, he managed to wind more than 500 km before the battle with all the marches back and forth?
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 29 November 2017 19: 08 New
                +5
                Quote: Mikado
                8 MK, it seems, he managed to wind more than 500 km before the battle with all the marches back and forth?

                Yeah ... in addition, during these marches and subordination-subordinations, Muzychenko robbed him (who, for the advance of the front, allocated only one division from his 4 MK - instead of the entire corps) ..
                In general, the PMSM, the practice of subordinating the best mechanized corps directly to the border covering armies was as vicious as the practice of subordinating the air forces to the same armies. As a result, at a critical moment, the front turned out to be without a fist — for by this time the army MKs were mired in battles of local importance and were pulled apart battalionly and even porotno to reinforce the infantry of the army.
                1. Mikado
                  Mikado 29 November 2017 20: 45 New
                  +2
                  In general, the PMSM, the practice of subordinating the best mechanized corps directly to the border covering armies was as vicious as the practice of subordinating the air forces to the same armies.

                  I think you are right. Did the German TGr act separately from the armies? Yes, by the principle of "fist, not fingers!" (G. Guderian).
                  in addition, during these marches and subordination-subordinations, Muzychenko robbed him

                  Zhukov warmly wrote about Muzychenko according to the results of some pre-war maneuvers. But a competent regiment does not mean that there is enough experience in leading the army in the most difficult conditions, and he had a quick career growth according to the results of the Finnish war. Well, what can I say .. then often "grew" quickly, the country did not have other personnel! what
          2. BAI
            BAI 30 November 2017 11: 18 New
            +1
            Vashugina mention

            In fact, Vashugin, realizing what he had done, honestly shot himself.
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 30 November 2017 15: 01 New
              +1
              unconditionally. Yes, honestly. soldier
        2. Rt-xnumx
          Rt-xnumx 30 November 2017 11: 12 New
          0
          And an example can these boilers? A concrete example when the orders of Zhukov led to pitting

          And 33 Efremov’s army?
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 30 November 2017 17: 00 New
            +2
            Quote: Rt-12
            And 33 Efremov’s army?

            And there it is a dark matter. Efremov was ordered feet the whole army in collaboration with Belov hurriedly take Vyazma. And he tried to cover the rear, spending the forces of the shock group for this. As a result, he failed to fulfill the main task, and did not hold the place for breaking through the front.
    2. Roman 11
      Roman 11 29 November 2017 18: 00 New
      +1
      Quote: Cartalon
      all this cannot be considered Zhukov's personal failure.

      It is necessary to prepare troops, to prepare operations, if there are no results along their course and losses are growing - it is necessary to stop.

      I do not understand - why did the Nazis warned about his offensive ?? To have a lot of losses? Here they are really above the roof ..... how to fight like that? Absurd. request
      1. alstr
        alstr 30 November 2017 10: 37 New
        0
        There are several explanations:
        1. Ensure the surprise of another operation
        2. To interrupt the transfer of units from one place to another.
        3. It is possible that the enemy will additionally transfer troops to the spotlighted place, and not to the place of the main strike.
  4. Operator
    Operator 29 November 2017 16: 55 New
    +3
    What, damn it, the offensive operation "Mars", when the forces of the parties (advancing and defending) were equal to each other?

    “Mars” is a typical distracting operation that fettered enemy forces in the central sector of the front during the period when the offensive operation took place in the southern sector of the front near Stalingrad.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 29 November 2017 18: 32 New
      +3
      Quote: Operator
      “Mars” is a typical distracting operation that fettered enemy forces in the central sector of the front during the period when the offensive operation took place in the southern sector of the front near Stalingrad.

      There is one subtle point - the forces involved in the distraction operation exceeded the forces of the main operation.
      PMSM, at the planning stage, both operations could be basic. And which of the two would have ended in victory - it depended on the Germans. If they decided that Stalingrad was more important and would transfer the reserves of GA Center to the south, then a breakthrough to Paulus could end in success. But at the same time we would have a victorious “Mars”. And the Germans - a march along the bare snowy steppes.

      By the way, as Helmut Welz wrote in his memoirs “The Soldiers Who Betrayed”, the main blow to the rear and reserves of the 6th Army was dealt precisely in the process of preparing a strike towards the releasing forces and the subsequent withdrawal from Stalingrad. It was then that all stocks that could not be taken with them were destroyed - and the volume of stocks raised was calculated based on the availability of fully operational equipment. Waelz wrote that he saw how they burned even the winter form. And when the destruction of stocks came to an end - a stop order came.
      1. avt
        avt 29 November 2017 20: 00 New
        +3
        Quote: Alexey RA
        By the way, as Helmut Welz wrote in his memoirs “The Soldiers Who Betrayed”, the main blow to the rear and reserves of the 6th Army was dealt precisely in the process of preparing a strike towards the releasing forces and the subsequent withdrawal from Stalingrad. It was then that all stocks that could not be taken with them were destroyed - and the volume of stocks raised was calculated based on the availability of fully operational equipment. Waelz wrote that he saw how they burned even the winter form. And when the destruction of stocks came to an end - a stop order came.

        Lies about a counter strike from the boiler, well, about the general training of the entire 6 army. Joachim Wieder - intelligence chief of the 6th Army, memoir - Seydlitz’s corps commander, it seems, the old servant gave the order to prepare the corps entrusted troops for a breakthrough and really - destroyed what they could not take out, for which his corps later paid. But Paulus, according to the recollections of Wieder, received an order to stand still and not break through from the boiler, leaving the occupied part of Stalingrad. He wrote that Adolf personally ordered. Which again confirms that “Mars” completed the task, the Germans did not have enough strength or money, stupidly, although if they had decided to go out they would have made their way. The Red Army could not have done what they had already done with them after. the tankers cut off, going to the airfields and warehouses while the boiler was surrounded and squeezed. Paulus was physically unable to take everything with him to Stalingrad.
      2. Operator
        Operator 29 November 2017 20: 04 New
        +4
        I completely agree with your analysis of the Red Army’s plan for the 1942-43 winter company: the Germans were caught on their own strategy of the 1941-42 model of the “Trishkin Kaftan” - to transfer the same shock units to different sectors of the front, creating a temporary advantage over the enemy there.

        Active counterintelligence activities and a limited number of fresh divisions of the Red Army created the impression that the Soviet strike would be delivered in the center, but in fact it was delivered in the south near Stalingrad.

        Most of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, together with the shock units, was connected by battles near Vyazma, and the smaller part of the Wehrmacht, together with all Italians and Romanians, was ground to zero near Stalingrad.

        This plan of the Red Army was on the verge of genius - with lesser forces to grind lesser enemy forces to create the threat of the collapse of the entire front and lay the foundation for a transition to a strategic offensive (turning point in the war).

        General Staff of the Red Army outright defeated the General Staff of the Wehrmacht and further only increased the lead in the skill of strategic management of military operations.

        Only people with low IQ and Russophobia can vote on the "failure" of the complex operation of the Red Army in the winter company 1942-43.
  5. moskowit
    moskowit 29 November 2017 17: 19 New
    +3
    German soldiers captured in the Great Bow District

    Something the Germans are in an extremely benevolent mood ... Almost everyone is laughing ... Are they glad that they remained alive?
    1. Roman 11
      Roman 11 29 November 2017 18: 03 New
      +2
      Quote: moskowit
      Are you glad that you survived?

      Oh, these propaganda tricks for the war on both sides all the time ..... for that it is war.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 29 November 2017 19: 57 New
        +2
        They were allowed to eat supplies of D9 tablets! good Here they are pleased ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 29 November 2017 18: 57 New
      +4
      Quote: moskowit
      Something the Germans are in an extremely benevolent mood ... Almost everyone is laughing ... Are they glad that they remained alive?

      If you smile, a bird will fly out of the camera. And if not, then something else will fly out of the DP-27 barrel. smile
  6. urman
    urman 29 November 2017 20: 29 New
    +2
    At the same time, the 100th Tank Brigade attacked towards them with the support of the infantry \\\\\\\
    In this brigade, at 45 mother's brother fought.
  7. Ural resident
    Ural resident 29 November 2017 21: 50 New
    +1
    So they say that Zhukov made a victory.
    Zhukov was only a straightforward attacking commander. So many people in vain put.
    It is clear that in the confrontation of millions of armies - 100 is no longer a loss .. But still it was necessary to think more cunningly.
    People in a patriotic upsurge were enlisted in military registration and enlistment offices - for weeks they got to the front to die in the first ill-conceived offensive. How many of our divisions had already lost in the offensive, when the enemy seemed to be shaken precisely because of the lack of proper preparation by the leadership of this offensive.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 30 November 2017 00: 19 New
      +2
      Kindly answer the question!
      Should G.K. Zhukov behave like General Percival?
      Maybe then the ordinary illiterate and technically unprepared soldiers should be replaced by educated British, Australians, Americans?
      Or give an example of the GENERAL ACTIONS of General PATTON!
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 30 November 2017 10: 34 New
      +3
      Quote: Resident of the Urals
      People in a patriotic upsurge were enlisted in military registration and enlistment offices - for weeks they got to the front to die in the first ill-conceived offensive. How many of our divisions had already lost in the offensive, when the enemy seemed to be shaken precisely because of the lack of proper preparation by the leadership of this offensive.

      The problem is that inept leadership was at all levels. But they bring everything down on Zhukov.
      A typical picture of the onset of winter 41-42: in the evening the army of brigade arrives in the division, in the morning to advance - you need to take the village. An offensive plan is being discussed with the commander and headquarters ... and in the morning it turns out that the division headquarters didn’t bring the plan to the executors, the infantry focuses on the other flank, the gunners are in no mood for an attack in this direction, and the commander of the mat demands the tankers themselves attack first, and the division behind them. The result is traditional - the infantry available for tanks on the offensive site does not go, the tanks are burned by the Germans without cover by infantry and artillery. And the worst thing is that the settlement was not taken, and the next day the division again goes on the attack, but without tanks.
    3. alstr
      alstr 30 November 2017 12: 08 New
      +2
      In your opinion, will the front commander set a task for each infantry battalion, given that the front is 300 km long?
      So - this is not really purely physically impossible. There, at best, a division or corps will be indicated in the order.
      Therefore, even the best solution can face incompetent execution.
      In this case, Zhukov can only be blamed for giving the order to make a REPEAT breakthrough in the same place. It was possible to strike a second blow nearby, but again we do not know what considerations he was guided by at that moment and whether this place was.
      1. Roman 11
        Roman 11 30 November 2017 19: 52 New
        0
        Quote: alstr
        In your opinion, will the front commander set a task for each infantry battalion, given that the front is 300 km long?

        Stalin set tasks for individual regiments! belay Given the length of the entire section of the confrontation with the fascist coalition - this is absurd. But this "strategist" remembered everything in small details. He had difficulties with mastering the essence of objects; in military matters, he was not far off, but his memory was unique. In short, memory in this case did not play any role, so they fought not by skill, like the Nazis, mostly Germans, partly Finns, but by numbers.

        Our skill rarely fought, except with the Turks, but when Suvorov was. I remember there was a good squad with D. Adashev, when under Grozny she brought a dodger in the Crimea, and of course Yermak.

        And, you can still recall the experts to the governor D. Shchen and Skopin Shuisky.

        There were separate fragments from Saltykov against Frederick the Great, like everything. Wars and battles were won mainly by simple warriors, mainly by stamina.
        1. alstr
          alstr 30 November 2017 20: 24 New
          +1
          Forgot Kutuzov. His company of 1811 against the Turks - the ideal of a won war.
          1. Roman 11
            Roman 11 30 November 2017 21: 29 New
            0
            Quote: alstr
            Forgot Kutuzov. His company is 1811

            Exactly, a brilliant strategist .... And with Napoleon, yes, the best troops of Europe, though the first part of the war can be written on Barclay, the last on circumstances, but the grandmaster spent the most difficult moment in history clearly, without overlays. True, Napoleon was not the same after 1809 ..... rather, he lost his taste for victories and was too tired of wars.

            By the way, the warring people are quickly depleted. For example, our Blucher by the mid-30s was hopelessly de-energized and sick man, starting to fight in the WWI, he almost did not stop the war until Hassan. Logically, he needed an honorable resignation as the German PMV generals ......

            This is so by the way, wars, + wounds leave their imprints on any specialists .... mistakes and even very large ones are possible. Here it is important to observe breaks, i.e. not so simple.
  8. Roman 11
    Roman 11 30 November 2017 15: 49 New
    0
    Zhukov is certainly not a genius. But he had a Uborevich school, enshrined in practice at Khalkhin Gol. Japanese generals are perhaps less professional German, they also did not stand on ceremony about their losses .... But Zhukov’s memoirs show here and there a lot of absurdity associated with Stalin’s order - for example, the leadership front, the army was driven into a division, which supposedly lost an important point. The commander, having seen Zhukov and all the generals before the commander, was very surprised and assured that he would take the lost position without the presence of so many generals. But after all, Zhukov could not explain to everyone that this was not his "twisted", but the order of Stalin, who constantly imagined something. So as far as there were Zhukov’s decisions only he knew, Stalin could intervene at any moment and change or change actions, for example, throwing a remark - "Are you there, you are completely arrogant with Zhukov"?

    So yes, we had only a few geniuses and they were all under the most severe control of one, the SUPREME a phenomenon.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 30 November 2017 17: 13 New
      +1
      Quote: Novel 11
      But in Zhukov’s memoirs here and there there is a lot of absurdity associated with Stalin’s order - for example, the leadership of the front, the armies were driven into a division, which supposedly lost an important point. The commander, having seen Zhukov and all the generals before the commander, was very surprised and assured that he would take the lost position without the presence of so many generals. The commander, having seen Zhukov and all the generals before the commander, was very surprised and assured that he would take the lost position without the presence of so many generals.

      Well, yes, yes ... that’s just at the level of the division commander. The problems were higher than the roof.
      Failure to fulfill the tasks of the 49th Army, large losses in personnel are explained by the exclusive personal guilt of the division commanders, who are still grossly violating Comrade Stalin's instructions and the "demand" of the front order on the massing of artillery for a breakthrough, on the tactics and technique of offensive on the defensive in populated areas ... For many days, units of the 49th Army have been criminally conducting frontal attacks on the settlements of Kostino, Ostrozhnoe, Bogdanovo, Potapovo and, suffering huge losses, have no success.
      It should be clear to every elementary military literate person that the above villages represent a very advantageous and warm defensive position. The area in front of the villages is under full shelling, and, despite this, criminally conducted attacks continue at the same place, and as a result of the stupidity and lack of discipline of the unfortunate organizers, people are paid in thousands of lives, without bringing any benefit to the Homeland.
      If you want to be left in your posts, I demand:
      Stop criminal attacks on the forehead of the village;
      Stop forehead attacks at heights with good fire;
      To step only along ravines, forests, and low-fire terrain;
      Break through immediately between the settlements and, not stopping at their final mastery, tomorrow capture Sloboda, Dawn and wedge themselves to Levshin.
      Execution to bring me to 24.00 27.1

      Moreover, the practice of Khalkhin-Gol demanded from Zhukov personally to make sure that the order was executed exactly - before reporting to the top. And it could well turn out to be that the division commander would report on the liberation of the village immediately after the first house was captured.
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