Foreign tanks are not afraid of our missile systems
Test conditions weapons do not meet the estimates of the protection of foreign armored vehiclesAnti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are an effective means of combating tanks, have a large firing range and have small dimensions and masses. ATGM in conjunction with the launcher and special equipment received the name of anti-tank missile system (ATGM). The anti-tank missile system is one of the most technically sophisticated and knowledge-intensive types of weapons.
Adoption of the new model depends on the results of state tests (GI), which are used to verify that its combat characteristics comply with the requirements of the tactical and technical requirements (TTZ). These tests are organized by the customer responsible for their conduct. The inadequate assessments of the level of protection of foreign armored vehicles and the combat characteristics of domestic ATGMs during the formation of the TTZ, as well as deficiencies in programs and methods of the GI, led to the adoption of anti-tank systems with ineffective tandem combat units (TBCs).
With regard to the conditions of the sixth generation of wars abroad, work is underway to create a new generation tank with high firepower and security, which is able to counteract all types of modern and promising anti-tank weapons.
This should take into account the multi-level principle of protection of foreign armored vehicles, which ensures the detection and destruction of Russian ATGM in various attack zones. For this reason, it is necessary to create highly effective anti-tank systems for the defeat of modern and promising armored vehicles. In this case, the level of methods and programs of the GI should ensure the verification of the combat characteristics of the new high-performance universal anti-tank systems, developed in the framework of the LG-2020.
To the disadvantages of the ATGM equipped with the TBCh, the NVO newspaper has repeatedly appealed over the past 12 years (NVO No. 31, 1999; No. 13, 2008; No. 45, 2011, etc.). The articles noted that the adopted simulators for testing tandem warheads are not analogous to the designs of dynamic protection (DZ) installed on foreign tanks. In other words, for testing tandem warheads, a DM was installed, mounted on Soviet tanks, which is inferior in performance to foreign models. As a result, a number of armed ATGMs with ineffective PBC were received. But this is only one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory effectiveness of ATGM with TB. The second reason is the fuzzy GI rules, which allow the use of anti-tank systems on the basis of false test results with the participation of GRAU. But let's look at everything in order.
MENTALITY - ABOVE
The IWO publications focus on the technical shortcomings of the ATGM with a TBP. But behind the scenes were the moral and ethical relations between high-ranking officials, their honesty, intransigence to injustice in making decisions in the process of creating anti-tank systems.
The command of the test site (military unit 21374) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, having extensive experience in evaluating the characteristics of anti-tank systems adopted by weapons, allowed me, together with the officers of the test site, to conduct additional tests of the armor penetration of XHNXX9 (Zenit), 128X9M (“Invar”) missiles under conditions use of DZ blocks with a length of 119 – 400 mm installed on foreign tanks M500А48, М3А60. Recall that the 1М9 and 128М9М missiles were put into service with the help of domestic DZ (BDZ-119) units with a length of 1 mm, which were not always overcome by tandem warheads and, in the event of a negative result, were considered uncountable experiments that did not affect the decisions made commission gi. So fraud was formed test results.
One of the conditions for testing using DZ blocks with a length of 500 mm was the prohibition to compile any reporting materials. The command of the 21374 military unit in the event of a negative test result feared a harsh reaction by the GRAU - up to the punishment of employees involved in organizing the assessment of the combat properties of the recently adopted Zenit and Invar anti-aircraft systems. Hidden from the eyes of the GRAU tests were held in stationary conditions: TBCh installed at an angle of 60 degrees from the normal to the upper surface of the DZ. The length of the containers was 500 mm, in which the eight elements of dynamic protection (EHR) 4 – 22 fit into so that all elements were undermined. The total mass of explosives of eight EHL 4С22 was 2 kg. The contact point of the TBP was in the upper half of the container (“NVO” No. 4, 2011). Versions of mounted DZ (thickness of the steel plate 3 mm) and built-in DZ (plate thickness - 15 mm) were tested. After the explosions, the TBH received stunning results. The armor penetration of the TBCh of the 9М128 (“Zenith”) and 9М119М (“Invar”) missiles decreased by 70% after the interaction with the integrated remote sensing system and by 50% from the mounted remote warning. These tests confirmed the high efficiency of foreign DZ, due to its large length in the plane of interaction. At the same time, a problem arose - how to bring the obtained “underground” results to the leadership of the Main Institution and to achieve the official conduct of such tests. It should be noted that any attempt to conduct such tests would have been blocked by the GRAU, which was confirmed later. But it was necessary to take any steps.
While maintaining business relations with the 3 staff of the Central Research Institute of the Defense Ministry (42261 military unit) responsible for the combat effectiveness of the Zenit and Invar ATGMs used in service, I briefly informed them of the test results. The situation was extremely difficult: on the one hand, the 42261 military unit participated in the development of tactical and technical requirements (TTT) and TTZ for the creation of these samples, and on the other, it turned out that serious errors were made in these documents, which were the cause of the unsatisfactory effectiveness of the defeat. tanks M1, M1A1. In spite of the fact that the management of the military unit promised to report to the Main Investigation Commission about the defects in justifying the parameters of the foreign DZ simulator, it took the position of delays and promises.
In the end, my friend Colonel Lev Savkin led me to the Deputy Commander of the Missile Forces and the Artillery of the Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Yuri Shumilikhin. He listened carefully to my message and called Major General Gennady Ludanniy, Chief of the Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Main Investigative Committee, who was in charge of the ATGM. Yuri Shumilikhin said that he has reason to doubt the effectiveness of the recently adopted Zenit and Invar anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out additional tests in the conditions of remote sensing, installed on tanks М60А1, М48А3. Gennady Ludann promised to sort it out and give a response in a week.
A week has passed. And here I am again in the office at Shumilikhin. The phone is on speakerphone. Ludann responds very evasively that there is currently no ATGM with a TBT at the test site and such tests are not appropriate. It can be assumed that, before this telephone conversation, Ludanny had discussed the situation with the 42261 military unit personnel and had given an answer rejecting additional tests of the ATGM with tandem warheads. The ordering office of Ludannoye enjoyed priority when ordering ATGWs. In this situation, the management style of work was that the customer tried to smooth out and hide the mistakes made in the design and conduct of state tests. Therefore, at present, the mass of underdeveloped ATGMs is in service: 9М128, 9М113М, 9М131, 9М119М, 9М133, 9М123, 9М117М and others.
Unfortunately, the activity of the head of the ordering department, who concealed serious mistakes in creating the ATGM and considered it his main task to preserve his own mentality, caused the failure to create highly efficient ATGMs.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, which began at the beginning of 90, played a role for the commanders who tried to hide the shortcomings of the Soviet ATGM with TBC in the ability to overcome DZ installed on foreign tanks (“NVO” No. 45, 2011).
MORNING INSTEAD OF SCIENTIFIC SUBSTANTIATIONS
Last year, the military-theoretical journal Military Thought (No. 7) published an article by Lieutenant Colonel Rafail Davliev, an employee of the GRAU test site, “Improving the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Tandem Cumulative Military Units”, in which an attempt was made to improve outdated guidance documents containing serious methodological errors. Davliev, as an employee of the test site, was constrained in the choice of definitions and assessments in the formation of final conclusions. In general, the article by Rafail Davliev is devoted to the issues of reducing the armor penetration rate of a TBT after interaction with dynamic protection. There were no questions in the article. How were the negative results of GI on overcoming DZ missiles with TBN 9М128, 9М119М, 9М113М, 9М117М hidden when they were taken into service? Why does the vicious practice of testing TBCH continue with the help of the Soviet DZ, which does not reflect the essence of the construction of foreign dynamic protection?
Testing the armor penetration capability of the ATGM TOR in the course of the GI is carried out by firing and in stationary conditions in accordance with the “Method of experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of overcoming the dynamic protection, armor penetration and parameters of the armored action of the ATG combat units at the preliminary and state tests” developed by the 1986 military unit in 42261 TsNIIHM, Scientific Research Institute of Steel, Central Research Institute Tochmash, military unit 21374.
Fig. 1. Placement of hinged DZ (BDZ-1) blocks on armor plates and organization of ATGM launches with TBC at maximum ranges along vertically mounted obstacles: a) placing BDZ-1 on armor plates; b) the organization of the shooting.Davliev misses an important point in the conditions for conducting GI 9М128, 9М119М missiles when firing at obstacles equipped with remote sensing equipment. For these missiles, firing was carried out on armored obstacles, in which six BDZ-1s were installed (three blocks in two rows). At the same time, the distance between the missiles and obstacles with remote sensing was 100 m. It is important to note that these missiles were not tested by such an important parameter as overcoming remote sensing during firing at the maximum range. Under the GI program for assessing the armor penetration capability of the TBT, the 25 9М128 and 9М119М missiles were allocated. In this case, the TBC of the 9М128 missiles did not penetrate obstacles with remote sensing five times. What did the commission who led the IG do? In the act according to the results of the GI, these experiments are classified as uncountable. Thus, using the method of attributing these experiments with a negative result to uncountable, the 9М128 Zenit rocket withstood the GI and was put into service. In this case, the GI Commission did not use its right to terminate tests according to GOST B 15.210-78 in order to identify the reasons for non-compliance with the TTZ requirements to overcome the DZ when firing. The termination of tests should be drawn up by an act, which is signed by the members of the commission and sent to the GRAU and to the KB.
History with the adoption of the missile 9М128 was contagious, as a result of each deception followed by the next deception. With the help of such a fraudulent reception, not only the 9М128 rocket was adopted, but also others - the 9М119М, 9М113М, 9М117М. One can guess that the KI Commission could not make such decisions without the knowledge of the GRAU.
In 1993, the customer finally comes to the insight that the conditions for verifying the effect of a TBT on obstacles with remote sensing when shooting at a range of 100 m do not reveal many features of the reduction in armor penetration. For this reason, when conducting GI, the 9M117М was already fired at the maximum range of 5 km.
The organization of firing at the maximum range is shown in Fig. 1, where the hinged DZ is placed on the armor plate, which corresponds to the installation of BDZ-1 units (“NVO” No. 45, 2011) on the T-72 tank. Recall that on the frontal parts of the body (LBK) T-72 placed 28 units BDZ-1 (seven blocks in four rows). But for reliable ATGM hits at 4 – 5 km distances, an 56 BDZ-1 units were installed on an armored obstacle. At LBK, foreign tanks housed seven blocks of the DZ of greater length in two rows. And here there is an obsolete Russian DZ, which has never imitated the parameters of a foreign DZ.
When firing at maximum range revealed a great folly, which is that, in accordance with the TTZ, tandem warheads must pierce armored obstacles equipped with remote sensing when shooting at maximum ranges with 0,9 frequency and in stationary tests - also 0,9. In other words, when launching ten missiles on obstacles with remote sensing, there should be nine penetrations. The same applies to inpatient testing, when a TBT is placed relative to an armored obstacle with a DZ at the point “A” (Fig. 2) and is undermined. But due to the scattering of the missiles during firing, it turned out that the TTZ on the penetration of armored obstacles with remote sensing tandem warheads are not performed. The authors of the aforementioned methodology and the compilers of the TTZ did not take into account the fact that the guided weapon has dispersion and the missiles with TBC when fired hit various points along the entire surface of the RS blocks. Based on the analysis of the Act of GI anti-tank guided projectile 9М117М, part of 3, Vol. 1, military unit 21374, 1993 year ”Rafail Davliev set, for example, for the 9М117М rocket when firing at a range of 5 km, the frequency of penetration of an armored obstacle equipped with a DZ was 0,56, not 0,9.
What is attractive point "A" when conducting inpatient tests? At this point, there are favorable conditions for overcoming the DZ tandem warhead. The lead charge (5), located inside the head compartment of the rocket, during an explosion completely destroys it and part of the instrument compartment following it. In this position, the EDS (1, 2) and BDZ-1 (1) fragments scattering from the explosion do not affect the OZ (8) and the channel for the passage of the cumulative jet (7), which ensures the normal functioning of the main cumulative charge on the “bare” armor.
The positive evaluation of the article by Rafail Davliev is deserved by the results of experimental studies carried out by him on the initiating ability of leading charges with armor penetration 110 – 150 mm in the areas of dynamic protection AB, BC, CD (see fig. 2). In this case, LZ explosions were carried out, which were established taking into account the focal lengths in the above-mentioned areas. At section AB, the cumulative jet LZ (5) passes through two DZ elements (1, 2). In this case, OZ is removed from the explosive effect of the DZ and the decrease in armor penetration is minimal. In the area between points “B” and “C”, the cumulative LZ jet excites detonation in the upper EDS (1), which is transmitted by the EDS (2). In this position, the RS acts on the main charge (8) through the main engine (6) located in front, which reduces the armor penetration of the OZ.
And finally, the CD segment proved to be insurmountable for LZ 9М128, 9М119М, 9М113М, 9М117М missiles. At the same time, the main reason for the lack of solution of the DZ is laid in the design of the TBC. It is known that in rockets due to the mass-dimensional limitations of the LZ has armor penetration 110 – 150 mm. But not all areas of the cumulative LZ jet are capable of causing explosive detonation in the EHD. Only the leading part of this jet with a length of the order of 30 mm causes detonation. After the interaction of the cumulative jet with the top and side of the container (I) and EDS (1), as well as with the side of the next container (II), its leading part is completely spent on overcoming all the listed obstacles. The remaining less high-speed part of the cumulative LZ jet is no longer capable of initiating explosive detonation in EDS (3, 4). Under these conditions, the cumulative jet OZ, having ensured detonation in EDS (3, 4), loses up to 70% armor penetration.
It should be noted that in the experiments LZ ATGM 9М133 “Kornet” with armor penetration 200 mm were used, which in all experiments ensured the initiation of all EDS blocks (I, II).
INFORMATION TO THOUGHT
The title of the article by Rafail Davliev “Improving the evaluation of the effectiveness of tandem cumulative warheads” does not correspond to the content of the materials presented in it. Essentially, the article is devoted to the issues of assessing the armor penetration rate of a TBT when interacting with barriers equipped with remote sensing devices. At present, there is a “Methodology for the comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the AF-CU effectiveness, taking into account the overcoming of dynamic protection”, created by the staff of TsNIITM, TsNIIHM, 42261 military unit in 1984 year. Of course, this technique needs improvement.
Rafail Davliev conducted a study on the vicious practice of testing the TBH on obsolete guidelines of the last century. There were two reasons for the decline in the quality of the article. The first reason is that the editorial staff of the Military Thought journal, having reduced the volume of the material, made the discrepancy of the illustrative material with the text of the article. For example, the names of 1 and 3 figures do not correspond to their content, etc. The second reason is that Davliev did not use a number of papers on the issues raised in the article, which did not allow him to draw deeper conclusions. So, the works published in the journals were ignored: “Ammunition”, No. 4, 1991; No. 8, 1992; No. 1 and No. 2, 1996; "Bulletin of armored vehicles" № 5, 1990; No. 1, 1991; No. 11, 1991; Defense Engineering Issues, Series V, 3 Edition (147), 1991; 3 (152), 1992, and others.
Summarizing the results of overcoming the DZ by tandem warheads of ATGM based on the materials of Rafail Davliev and others, the following can be noted:
- testing and testing of TBCh ATGM is still ongoing in the Russian BDZ-1, BDZ-2 units, which are not analogous to foreign DZ (NVO No. 31, 1999; No. 29, 2001; No. 8, 2003; No. 13, 2008 ; No. 45, 2011);
- ATGM 9М128 (“Zenit”), 9М119М (“ower”), 9М113М (“Competition-M”), 9М117М (“Arkan”) when firing at the maximum range overcome hinged DZ with a probability of no more than 99% over an -99-% -99-mm-99.92 outdated foreign tanks М0,56, М1А1, equipped with remote sensing ("NVO" number 1, 24);
- Domestic TBCH ATGM 9М123 (“Chrysanthemum”), 9МXNUMHem (“Cornet”), 133A9K (“Vortex-M”), 4172M9D (“Attack”), and others. “NVO” No. 120, 400), but, despite the high armor penetration of the main charge, modern foreign tanks will hit when they fire at their frontal zones with a probability of no more than 500 – 0,5;
- all adopted by domestic ATGM with TB, do not overcome the tandem DZ of foreign tanks;
- armor packages of complex obstacles, imitating frontal fragments of protection, currently do not reflect the development of protection of foreign tanks that have undergone modernization.
Fig. 2. Sites reduce the initiating ability of the leading charges TBCh ATGM: I, II - blocks mounted DZ (BDZ-1); 1, 2, 3, 4 - DZ (E) elements; Point A - determines the conditions for conducting in-patient tests of TBH; areas AB, BC, CD - where there was a decrease in the initiating ability of LZ; 5 - leading charge; 6 - marching engine; 7 - channel for the passage of a cumulative jet of the main charge; 8 - the main charge; 9 - armored plate. Note: in contact with point “A”, the 9М119М rocket is shown in case of a stationary detonation.The experimental studies that were carried out allowed me (“NVO” No. 31, 1999) to establish that with the length of foreign DZ 400 – 500 mm blocks, domestic TBPs would not overcome them if they hit the upper half of the DZ container, since the main the charge will be destroyed even before the start of operation. To which the chief and chief designer of KBM Nikolai Gushchin responded (“NVO” No. 44, 1999): “Mikhail Rastopshin builds all his reasoning, considering only extreme conditions:
- if getting into a tank, then only in the forehead;
- if hit in the DZ, then only in the zone unfavorable to the work of the warhead.
It should be recalled that, in accordance with the TTZ, state tests are necessarily carried out by shooting at frontal tank defense simulators equipped with a DZ. It is appropriate to note that the TBCh ATGM “Chrysanthemum” has a low probability of overcoming the real construction of a foreign DZ. The TBC of this missile is well overcome by the DZ of only Soviet tanks.
At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the field of research covered in the article by Rafail Davliev. As a rule, very old and ineffective anti-tank systems and their unpromising carriers are considered. An example is the 9MX. "); 117-mm rifled gun D10-T10 tank T-1 (KUV "Bastion"); 10-mm rifled gun 2А10 BMP-3; 100-mm smooth-bore gun U12TS tank T-100 (KUV "Sheksna").
A very old 9М128 rocket was used when firing 125-mm cannons of T-64B, T-80B tanks and was intended to destroy MXXUMX tanks. And finally, a ZUBK1 shot with an ineffective ATGM 20М9М, which, when fired from 119-mm cannon tanks T-125, T-72U, T-80C, was supposed to hit tanks M90, M1X1. But as a result of modernization, these tanks are practically absent in the troops. The probability of these modern missiles M1А1 being hit by firing at the frontal most protected zones is 2.
GRAU and 3CNII MO is time to pay attention to new and upgraded foreign tanks, for the defeat of which requires new missiles and the appropriate methods of their tests.
In reference books and textbooks for ATGM with TBC, it is stated that all of them either provide for overcoming of DZ or defeat of modern and promising tanks equipped with DZ (see Russia's Arms. - M., Military Parade Publishing House, 2000). But the experimental data presented suggest otherwise. The question is, whom are we deceiving? Our military, who are considered equipped with modern weapons.
The creation of anti-tank systems was accompanied by a set of guidance documents that are now hopelessly outdated. Thus, the Methodology for the integrated assessment of the effectiveness of the AF missile shield with overcoming dynamic protection created in 1984 did not take into account the development of combat characteristics of foreign armored vehicles, and the criteria for their defeat for the sixth generation of wars. Nonconventional methods of defeating tanks were not considered at all (“NVO” No.6, 2000). The issues of over-action of various ammunition are not finalized.
The guideline “The Composition of Complicated Barriers to Assessing Armor-Piercing Action of Anti-tank Ammunition (RD 401.1.6-454-85)”, created in 1985 by the Scientific and Research Institute of Steel, lost its practical significance. In this document, the presented obstacles do not reflect the structure of protection of foreign tanks. Instead of DZ imitators of foreign tanks, less effective DZ units mounted on Soviet armored vehicles were proposed.
The system of initial data on the vulnerability characteristics of typical elementary ground armored targets and anti-tank ammunition, created in 1983, requires immediate processing. Since the creation of this system, much has changed in foreign tank building, which is adapted to operate in the conditions of the sixth generation of wars. When creating a source data system for the sixth generation of wars, a more thorough study of the characteristics of the vulnerability of armored vehicles is required. If the pathologist examines the cause of death of a person or an animal, then a vulnerability specialist examines the “body” of the armored vehicle in order to find directions for its most effective damage.
Thus, the existing and currently used guidance documents do not provide an adequate level of organization and testing of new samples of ATGM with a TBP.
Military Thought magazine, in which an article by Rafail Davliev was published, published congratulations to the testing ground (military unit 21374) in connection with its 70 anniversary. The congratulation was signed by Major-General Alexander Romanovsky, head of the Main Directorate. I do not want to believe that the signature of Romanovsky extends to the further use of the outdated and unsuitable for practical application test methodology of ATGM with TBC, discussed in Davliev’s article. The organization by the editorial board of the Military Thought journal of serious opposition, combined with the expert opinion of experienced specialists, would undoubtedly improve the quality of the article by Rafail Davliev on the current problem of testing modern anti-tank systems.
Information