Military Review

About shooting accuracy in the battle of Jutland (part of 2)

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Flagship Hochseeflotte - "Friedrich der Grosse"



Having considered the accuracy of firing of the linear cruisers of both opponents, we proceed to the battleships. Unfortunately, the information in the sources about the dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet and Hochzeeflotte is much less detailed and does not allow for an analysis in the context of each ship. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be obtained from the available data.

After examining the descriptions of hits in every single ship of the British, we get the following (the table shows the names of British ships and hits in them from German battleships and battle cruisers)

About shooting accuracy in the battle of Jutland (part of 2)


According to the data presented in it, the number of hits on British ships is slightly higher than the generally accepted (according to Puzyrevsky) values. This is due to the fact that, according to Muzhenikov’s detailed descriptions, Malaya, Lyon, Tiger and Princess Royal fell on one projectile more than indicated by Puzyrevsky, and besides, the latter did not take into account “ New Zealand ”with“ Fon der Tanna ”. In accordance with the above, the British ships did not hit 121, but 126 large-caliber projectiles, including 69 from the battlecruisers (assuming that there were 15 hits in Queen Mary) and 57 from the ships of the line.

Given that the German dreadnoughts in the battle of Jutland spent 1 904 projectile, 57 hits give 2,99% of the total number of projectiles, but you should consider one very important nuance. The fact is that from the 57 15 hits recorded accounted for the armored cruiser "Black Prince", and that's what happened to him история.

With the onset of darkness, the armored cruiser seems to have lost its way and, going separately from the rest fleet, stumbled upon a dreadnought column of the High Seas Fleet. Probably, the cruiser thought they saw their ships, otherwise there is no way to explain why the Black Prince, discovered by Thuringen and Ostfriesland, at a distance of less than a mile (only 8 kb) continued to draw closer to the Germans. Several German ships hit him on a saz. It was not possible to establish the exact number of battleships firing on Black Prince, since the sources contradict each other, but all agree on one thing: the armored cruiser was shot from some 5,5 cable ones, i.e. just over a kilometer. At such a distance, the heavy guns of the dreadnoughts of the Hochzeflotte could fall on direct fire.


"Black Prince" was killed with the whole crew


"Black Prince", in fact, was substituted by a blow, allowing the Germans to "increase the score" with a minimum expenditure of shells. The fire on the doomed armored cruiser, most likely, turned out to be extremely effective, because it was carried out almost at close range. Of course, such shooting cannot serve as confirmation of the high professionalism of the German artillerymen, and for comparison with the achievements of their British colleagues, the execution of the Black Prince should be excluded.

The only problem is that we do not know the number of shells spent on the British armored cruiser. It is likely that the target hit every second or third round, and maybe the Germans fired even better. But even if we assume that only every tenth projectile hit (that is, when shooting at Black Prince, the percentage of hits was only 10%), then in this case the 15 hits accounted for 150 hits. Accordingly, in all other episodes of the battle, the German dreadnoughts spent 1 754 projectile and achieved 42 hits, which gives a very moderate 2,39%, but in fact, most likely, this percentage is even lower.

Thus, the accuracy of the shooting of the German linear fleet is absolutely not amazing. Dreadnoughts shot out at 1,75 times worse than Rear-Admiral Hipper's battlecruisers (according to them, the accuracy of 4,19% seems to be the most likely). Perhaps this is due to much worse conditions in which the battleships had to fight. With the exception of shooting at the 5 squadron of Evan-Thomas battleships, in all other cases the British had an advantage in appearance and on the German dreadnoughts they very poorly distinguished the enemy. Both the first and the second fights of the German and British dreadnoughts were characterized by the fact that not even British ships saw the German ships, but flashes of their shots.

As for the British battleships, a slightly more detailed analyst is possible for them solely due to the large difference in the caliber of the guns. Despite the fact that the German 305-mm projectile was about a quarter heavier than the 280-mm, yet it is not so easy to distinguish between their hits. Another thing - the British 305-mm, 343-mm and 381-mm projectiles, which hit "diagnosed" much better. Accordingly, we have the opportunity to determine the accuracy of firing of the superhigh-winds in the context of their calibers, i.e. on ships carrying 381-mm, 343-mm and 305-mm separately.



As in the case of the German results of shooting, the analysis according to Muzhenikov gives a slightly better picture than Puzyrevsky shows, but the discrepancies are even greater. According to Puzyrevsky, “Helgoland” and “Nassau” got one hit each, the Husbands confirming none. The author of this article in this case holds the position of Muzhenikov. In the case of Helgoland, simply because the Muzhenikov monographs are more detailed and detailed and therefore look more trustworthy. In the case of the Nassau, it can be assumed that Puzyrevsky mistakenly counted the damage to the German dreadnought, which he received as a result of a collision with the British destroyer Spitfire, as damage from hitting an English heavy projectile.

Here is how Mujen described the aftermath of a collision between Nassau and Spitfire:

“At the same time, Nassau suffered significant damage to the nasal tip. Strange as it may seem, the destroyer’s strike made a hole in the battleship’s side - the board lining was broken in a section of length 3,5 m, the beams under the deck bent, and the deck of the tank itself was pushed in places, swelling in places, which reduced its travel speed to 15 knots. ”


And this is how the Husband's damage is described:

“During the day battle, Nassau received one hit with a large-caliber projectile (from which caliber it has not been established). There was a hole 152 m wide in its bow in the 3,5-mm reservation over the waterline. Before it was sealed, the ship could only go 15-node passage. ”


Since the fact of a collision between Nassau and Spitfire is indisputable, and given the fact that Puzyrevsky does not mention a collision when describing damage to Nassau, we can assume that in this case, it is Muzheniki who is right.

Absolutely contradictory data on hits in the "Kaiser". As we said before, foreign sources contradict each other, but Campbell and Brayer still claim that there were two hits, and Campbell attributed them to the 4 phase of the battle, when Commander Hohzeeflotte Scheer framed his battle lines under the blow of the British line a second time. Campbell even points out the caliber of the shells that hit the Kaiser battleship - 305-mm. But Hildebrand testifies that the Kaiser in the battle of Jutland did not receive any damage. Puzyrevsky finally confuses the affair, claiming that the Kaiser received one hit of an 343-mm projectile from Marlboro battleships, while the second projectile of the same caliber did not hit the ship, but exploded nearby and caused only fragmentary damage.


This mysterious "Kaiser"


Since most of the sources are inclined to two hits, and Campbell is probably still more reliable than Puzyrevsky, we will read the English two hits to the Kaiser in 305-mm caliber.

Puzyrevsky indicates a hit into the Schleswig-Holstein dodrednaught, the Husbands — into Pommern, but, by and large, if this hit really happened, then for our calculations it is not too important which particular battleship hit the shell.

In the information about the British hits in the battlecruisers of the Germans, there are also large and unexplained discrepancies. The most simple situation with “Derflinger” - Puzyrevsky reports 17 hits with a large caliber, but Muzhenik gives detailed descriptions of 21 hits, and therefore we accept the Muzhenikov data.

Puzyrevsky notes 4 falling into the “Fon der Tann”, while the Mujenics writes about five, noting, however, that one of them is unidentified (that is, the projectile was heavy, but of unclear caliber). As we have previously suggested, it could be a shell from New Zealand. We put 5 hits.

According to "Seidlitsu" the situation is very controversial, because again there are discrepancies in foreign sources - either 22 or 24 hits, but since, quoting Hildebrand and Brayer, Husband mentions only 22 hits, we’ll dwell on the 22 digit.

The situation with the “Moltke” is also difficult, because the same projectile (343-mm from “Tiger”) in one case is treated as a hit, in the other - as a close gap. The author of this article counted him as a hit. But it should be understood that this is an author's arbitrariness in its pure form, since the decision was made for reasons of the following nature: “Since 2 has already removed all possible hits to Seidlits, then let’s take that one hit into Moltke”. Alas, for a reliable picture it is necessary to work well with the original sources in the British and German archives, and the author, unfortunately, is deprived of this opportunity.

Questions remain on hitting the German cruisers Pillau and Wiesbaden, and since the latter died, no archive will provide reliable information on it. The descriptions of the Battle of Jutland speak of several hits of heavy shells in these cruisers, and most likely this is exactly what happened, but still 4 read hits (three in Wiesbaden and one in Pillau) again is copyright arbitrariness. However, this assumption will in no way affect the assessment of the accuracy of the shooting of the British dreadnoughts, because the 3-I squadron of battle cruisers fired at these German ships

In view of the above, it can be assumed that the total number of hits in German ships is also slightly higher than the generally accepted one - 107 hits, not 101, while the British battlecruisers achieved 38 hits, battleships - 69. British battleships spent 2 578 shells, respectively, the average percentage of hits was 2,68%. Thus, it can be argued that, in general, the British battleships in Jutland fired better than the German ones.

At the same time, the best results were shown by superdreadnoughts carrying 343-mm guns. Interestingly, only Marlboro (162 projectile) and Iron Duke (90 projectiles) Orion, Monarch and Conqueror fired for some lengthy firing and spent 51, 53 and 57 projectiles, Benbow respectively and Tanderer - 40 and 37 shells, and the rest barely had time to open fire: Centurion, King George V, and Ajax fired 19, 9 and 6 shells, respectively. Total battleships spent 524 projectile and achieved while 18 hits, the percentage of which reached 3,44%

Dreadnoughts with 381-mm guns are in second place. In total, the British spent 1 179 shells of this caliber, and the Germans recited 37 hits with these shells, which gives the percentage of hits 3,14% As you know, four such ships (Barham, Malaya, Worspite and Valiant) were The 5 squadron of battleships operating jointly with the Beatty battlecruisers while the other two (Rivendge and Royal Oak) fought alongside Jellico's battleships. Mujenikov writes that "Rivendzh" achieved three hits in "Derflinger", and "Royal Oak" - two in "Derflinger" and one in "Seidlits", while most likely there were no hits to other battlecruisers from these battleships, be hit by dreadnoughts hohzeeflott. Therefore, to assess the accuracy of shooting 5-th battleship squadron, unfortunately, is not possible.

In the very tail, the 305-mm battleships of the British fleet “trail”. Having spent the 833 projectile, they achieved all 14 hits, which is 1,68%.

Well, time to take stock.

In total, the Germans used up 3 549 shells in the Battle of Jutland and achieved 126 hits, the percentage of which was 3,55%. But with the exclusion of the results of "Black Prince", we get approximately 3 399 shells, 111 hits and 3,27%. The British spent 4 420 shells, achieving 107 hits, which gives the percentage of hits equal to 2,42%.

Thus, it can be stated that the ratio of shooting accuracy (2,42% -3,27%) is slightly better for the British than the generally accepted figures (2,2% -3,4%), although, of course, the percentage of German hits is higher. As for the rating of connections and individual ships, it should be understood that it is sufficiently conditional, if only because of possible errors in determining the ships that achieved hits.

You should also understand that such a rating only indirectly characterizes the skills of gunners, because a high percentage of hits of one compound can be achieved in conditions of good visibility and at short distances, while a different compound that showed the worst result led the battle in much more difficult conditions. .

When reviewing the performance of individual groups of ships, the author often operated with several values ​​of hit percentages, due to the misinterpretation of projectile consumption in sources or due to an undetectable number of hits (to dead ships), but for the rating, the author accepts single values ​​- those that seem most likely to him.

The British 3 squadron of battlecruisers - 4,56% demonstrated the best accuracy indicators in the battle of Yutland.

In second place is the battle cruiser 1 of the admiral Hipper's reconnaissance group - 4,19%.

The third place is occupied by the British "343-mm" superdreadnoughts - 3,44%.

The fourth place in the “381-mm” super-dreadnoughts of the British is 3,14%.

The fifth place is received by the battleships of Germany - 2,39%.

The sixth place in the British 1-nd squadron of battle cruisers (343-mm) - 1,78%.

Seventh place was taken by the British "305-mm" battleships - 1,68%.

And, finally, the British 2 Squadron of the battle cruisers (305-mm) - 0,91% turns out to be the first from the end.

As for the "individual offset", then it wins ... British ships.

The first place by a large margin is taken by Royal Oak. According to the descriptions, he achieved two hits in “Derflinger” and one - in “Seidlits”, despite the fact that during the whole battle he spent only 38 shells, which gives a completely enchanting percentage of hits - 7,89%!


"Royal Oak" in all its glory


The second place, apparently, belongs to the “305-mm” British dreadnought “Kolosus”. Having spent the 93 projectile, the battleship achieved five hits in “Derflinger”, which is 5,38%

In third place is the flagship Hipper "Lutzov" - 380 spent shells and 19 hits, 5%.

However, there is another ship that has the opportunity to qualify for inclusion in the top three, this is the Derflinger. It is believed that this battlecruiser spent 385 shells, having achieved 16 hits. But only 3 hits at Queen Mary are “recorded” on it, which is extremely doubtful, and if in fact he achieved 6-7 hits on this British ship, then the percentage of hits of the Derflinger will increase to 4,94-5,19%.

Nevertheless, I would like to once again note the extreme conventionality of this rating and recall that other ships that were not included in the rating showed even better accuracy in certain moments of the battle. For example, “Fon der Tann” achieved five hits in “Indefatigeble” and destroyed it, having spent only 52 of the projectile, that is, in this period of the battle its percentage of hits was 9,62%! But later the ship had to go zigzagging in an attempt to avoid being hit by fifteen-inch British shells that were deadly for him. In addition, combat damage led to the inability to shoot from part of the main-caliber towers (there was a period when all eight 280-mm guns did not work) and all this could not affect the further accuracy of the Fon der Tanna.

Generally speaking, the shooting accuracy is influenced by many reasons, of which, besides the artillery training level, the following can be distinguished: the presence of centralized fire control, the quantity and quality of rangefinders, the quality of fire control systems, the quality of projectiles and guns, the distances being fired, lighting and visibility. The damage inflicted on the shooting ship is very important: high-quality shooting is achieved with the participation of at least four barrels in the salvo, and the highest speed of shooting is in the presence of eight, ten or twelve barrels. For example, Derflinger fired four-gun half-salts, while the four guns fired a volley, the rest reloaded. Accordingly, it is in no way possible to demand the same accuracy from “Derflinger” at the beginning of the battle, when he was fully operational and near the end, when two of his four towers were silenced.

Or, for example, range finders. It is known that the optical range finder is a very difficult to handle device that requires the operator, in addition to work skills, to have perfect vision in both eyes. There were seven range finders on the “Derflinger”, and they worked with them like this: they made measurements to the enemy, all seven, and then chose the average value, discarding the extreme options. However, during the battle rangefinders failed, and the measurement accuracy, of course, fell.

Or, for example, such a seemingly “smallness” as ... mud. The Germans, apparently, very carefully studied the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, including the massive death of the commanding staff of the Russians due to the poor design of armored military logging: large viewing slots, unsuccessful roof construction ... In Germany, the question was solved radically - in battle special “armored artillery shutters” were raised, which turned the conning tower into a hermetically sealed room. Observation at the same time was carried out by means of devices similar in construction to the periscope and stereo tube. This was, without any doubt, a reasonable and ingenious decision, however, as the senior gunner of the Derflinger, Georg Haase, writes:

“Now it was more difficult to manage the fire. The lens of my periscope was constantly polluted with powder gases and smoke from pipes. At such times, I was entirely left to the observations of the officer on the fore-Mars. He directed his pipe to the enemy; the arrow at my periscope pointed out to me the position of his pipe, and the non-commissioned officer at the central tip combined his arrow with this arrow, and so we sent all our guns to the enemy without seeing him. But such a situation was only a temporary exit, and the lens glass was immediately cleaned from the post by specially prepared chopsticks, and sometimes I sent my orderly galvaner to the roof of the conning tower for wiping optical glasses with a heavy heart. ”


Thus, the shooting accuracy is influenced by many different factors and almost never happens so that both sides in battle have equal conditions for shooting at their opponent. But it would be extremely difficult to analyze them in all their diversity, so that we confine ourselves to a brief description of the conditions in which the German and British gunners fought.

It is well known that in the first phase of the battle (from the moment it began in 15.48 until the turn of the Evan-Thomas battleships from dreadnoughts Hohzeeflott in 16.54) the lighting was not on the British side. Their ships were on the background of the bright part of the horizon, the Germans - against the background of darkness, and this, of course, could not but affect the results of the fire fight. However, according to Campbell in this period, 44 shells hit British ships, while German ones received just 17, and this ratio can hardly be explained solely by the difference in illumination. Usually, the superiority of German rangefinders over British ones is also indicated, and this is certainly true. But here it is necessary to take into account this. The range finder is a very important, but far from the only component of the fire control system. In those years, analog computers (AVMs) were used for this purpose, which made it possible, on the basis of the data on the course, speed, range, and other data of the own ship and the target ship, to calculate the magnitude of the change in distance and target pickup angles. But if something is known about the British AVMs, there is very little data about the German SLAs, while there is sufficiently authoritative evidence (the British historian Wilson, who in turn refers to the story of the senior artilleryman "Luttsov" Paschen, published in the journal "Marin Rundschau" ), that the FCS of Germany still lost as a British one.

It should also be taken into account that, if the Beatty battlecruisers were equipped with “9-foot” rangefinders, which were really inferior to the German ones, the Barharmus, “Valiant”, Worspite and Malaya superdreadnoughts had much more advanced “16-feet” range finders (the so-called “base” is measured in feet, the bigger it is, the more accurate the range finder) and it is unlikely that they lost so much on German optics. Presumably, the material part of the “381-mm” super dreadnoughts was not inferior to that of the German battle cruisers, which means, all other things being equal, one would expect equivalent results of shooting.

But the conditions were not equal - firstly, the lighting "played" against the British, and secondly, the commanders of the terminal German cruisers ("Moltke" and "Fon der Tann"), knowing full well what their long-term shelling of fifteen-inch shells threatened their ships from zigzag, knocking the tip of the British gunners. Of course, in this case, the accuracy of the fire of these battlecruisers should have decreased, but this is exactly what we observe - Moltke shot out almost worse than all other Hipper ships, and the accuracy of Fon der Tanna after the sinking of Indefatigeble dropped sharply. But, again, it cannot be argued that the only reason for this was their “zigzags”.

It is interesting to evaluate the results of the shooting of the leaders of our rating, the ships 3-she squadron of battlecruisers. The fact is that the bulk of their hits was made from a distance of 50 KB and lower. So, “Wiesbaden” and “Pillau” were fired with 49 KBT, the battle with Hipper battlecruisers also began around 50 KBT, after which the distance was reduced. This is significantly less than the distances at which the Hipper and Beatty battlecruis fought, but does this indicate that the 3-I squadron of the battlecruisers fought in certain "greenhouse" conditions compared to the latter?

It should be taken into account that in order to correct artillery fire it is extremely important to correctly determine the target parameters (course / speed / distance) and, subsequently, to observe the fall of your own shells. Of course, it is easier to do this in the vicinity than in the distance, but not only distance, but visibility, is important here. In other words, if, say, the visibility is ten miles, then the ship is shot at a target seven miles from it, better than a target located five miles with a visibility of five miles. Because in the first case, the gunners will shoot at a perfectly visible target, while in the second they will hardly distinguish it, although it is closer. As the commander of the battle cruiser Lion, Chetfield, later admiral said:

"In 90 cases from 100, the combat distance is determined by the state of the weather."


So, 3-I squadron of battle cruisers just fought in conditions where visibility ranged from 4 to 7 miles, depending on the specific location and direction. And the shelling of the German light cruisers, and the beginning of the battle with the ships of the Hipper took place at the moment of the enemy's discovery, that is, at the range limit. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that Horace Hud’s ships would have shot worse than German battlecruisers at long distances - well, unless it’s because of 9-foot rangefinders inferior to German optics and ... perhaps because of poor-quality 305 hardware -mm guns, but we'll talk about this a little later.

As for the relatively poor-quality shooting of the German dreadnoughts, there is a very simple explanation for this, and this is due to the fact that the Germans almost did not see the enemy in both cases of the collisions of the Scheer and Dreadnoughts battleships. If we analyze the statistics of hits, we will see that Sheer's dreadnoughts fell into the super-middotes of the 5 squadron, in Princess Royal, when it was within reach, but not in Jellico's battleships. In fact, only one single hit into the Hercules was noted, while the rest of the German dreadnoughts fell into the armored cruisers Warrior and Defense.

Scheer twice converged with Jellico, and of course, the German battleships tried to somehow fight back, but shooting at the enemy, which is not visible (and the Germans really well distinguished only flashes of British guns) could not be much effective. Probably, this is what reduced the percentage of hits of the battle ships of Scheer. And besides, in the last, fourth phase of the battle, in order to withdraw the main forces from the impact of the British, Scheer was forced to launch the battle cruisers on Jellico. At the same time, the latter were shot almost with impunity - they could not fight back, but they saw them from the British battleships quite well. All this gave the British gunners significantly better conditions than those in which their colleagues from Hohzeeflott were.

As for the frankly weak shooting of the British “305-mm” dreadnoughts, here we can say the following: where the ships with 343-mm guns confidently hit the enemy (we read 13 hits of 343-mm “battleships” of shells in König, Grosser Elector "and" Markgraf "), battleships with 305-mm guns could not get anywhere at all. Yes, the "305-mm" battleships gave 14 hits, but to whom ?!

Eleven of them had to be in Seidlits and Derflinger, that is, in ships forced by Scheer’s order to get close to the enemy at short distances. Another 2 hit read in the "Kaiser", but, as we said above, they are very doubtful: these hits could not be at all, or they were, but of a different caliber. More or less reliably, a single 305-mm projectile from Jellico's battleships (in the Margrave) hit the Scheer dreadnoughts! Interestingly, the “New Sealand” also “smeared” from large distances - its three hits into the “Seydlitz” the battle cruiser made from a distance of less than 50 KB.


"New Seeland"

It turns out a very interesting picture. At some great distances, the accuracy of British ships with 305-mm guns tends to zero, but as soon as the distance becomes relatively small (5-6 miles), they suddenly became excellent arrows! The excellent results of the 3 Squadron of the battlecruisers, the excellent result of the Colossus who fired 5 shells into the Derflinger, the unexpectedly decent shooting of the New Ziland ...

In the absence of other examples, one would assume that the British did not attach significant importance to firefighting at great distances, but we know that this is not so. And, in the end, their battleships with 343-mm and 381-m guns showed quite decent results. It only remains to assume that the British 305-mm guns, due to some technical reasons, proved to be ineffective at a distance over 60 KBT.

The famous Falkland battle indirectly confirms this: the British battlecruisers achieved quite a decent percentage of hits there, but only when the distance to the enemy was reduced to less than 60 KBT. In the first phase of the battle, when Sturdy tried to fight at long distances, the fire of his ships was incredibly inaccurate. So, “Inflexible”, having spent 150 shells on “Gneisenau”, achieved only two hits and one close gap.

Concluding the present cycle of articles, the author makes the following assumptions: in his opinion, the quality of training of gunners from the British and German dreadnoughts was quite comparable, and, being in similar conditions, they could give a similar percentage of hits. But "305-mm" British battleships due to the imperfections of their guns could not lead an effective firefight at distances over 60 KBT. The best arrows of the Germans turned out to be Hipper's battlecruisers, but 3-I squadron of Hud battlecruisers in preparation did not yield to anything, although it lost in the material part (range finders and guns). As for the 343-mm "cats of Admiral Fisher," then, probably, their gunners were poorly trained, worse than the crews of the British and German dreadnoughts.

The end.

List of used literature:

1. Muzhenikov V.B. The battleships Helgoland, Ostflesland, Oldenburg and Thuringen. 1907-1921
2. Muzhenikov V.B. Battleships of the Kaiser and Koenig types (1909-1918).
3. Muzhenikov V.B. The battlecruisers of England. H.1-2.
4. Muzhenikov V.B. Battlecruisers Germany.
5. Muzhenikov V.B. Battlecruisers Germany. H.1.
6. Muzhenikov V.B. The armored cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Blucher (1905-1914).
7. Puzyrevsky K.P. Combat damage and death of ships in the battle of Jutland.
8. Wilson H. Battleships in battle. 1914-1918
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About shooting accuracy in the battle of Jutland (part of 1)
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  1. Kibb
    Kibb 29 November 2017 10: 10 New
    +5
    Andrey, thanks, I read it with pleasure
    But the “305 mm” British battleships, due to the imperfection of their guns, could not conduct effective fire combat at distances of over 60 kb

    IMHO Everything is simpler, I think it would be nice to make a selection on the SLA models (exactly at the time of the battle) standing on 305 mm LK and LKr and on the others, and the picture will develop. Indeed, under your assumption, the Colosus that has really problematic (at least generally accepted) guns is knocked out and the overall picture of 305 mm Brit ships. The Germans relied on optics.
    With the 3rd squadron of LKR it’s still easier, they just took a training course in shooting therapy
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 10: 20 New
      +2
      Quote: Kibb
      Andrey, thanks, I read it with pleasure

      And thank you!
      Quote: Kibb
      IMHO Everything is simpler, I think it would be nice to make a selection on the SLA models (exactly at the time of the battle) standing on 305 mm LK and LKr and on the others, and the picture will develop.

      I don’t think :) The fact is that our armadillos at the World Cup shot quite well, having Geisler arr 1910, and he, as I understand it, roughly corresponded to what was on the 305-mm dreadnought. But you can try to check.
      Quote: Kibb
      The Germans relied on optics.

      Well, without optics, there’s no way for anyone, it’s an element of the OMS
      1. Kibb
        Kibb 29 November 2017 10: 48 New
        +1
        Geisler is based on Pollen, but he was just standing on very few GF ships.
        You mentioned the Foklands, there, emnip, not only the Dreer tables were standing and whether anything more advanced to Jutland appeared was a question. Once there was a Dreadnought bourgeois site, there was information on the MSA models of British ships and the installation time. Now I can’t find it - I remember that you seem to have referred to it in the work on the Geysler MSA - if there is a link, help.

        It is clear that optics are an important element, and the Germans had it better - I mean, the Germans relied less on an electro-mechanical computer.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          29 November 2017 11: 05 New
          +3
          Quote: Kibb
          At the heart of Geisler - Pollen

          No, these are completely different devices. A Geisler is not even so much a fire control system as a fire control, i.e. it provided centralized fire under the guidance of the mine. However, Geisler still considered the vertical aiming angle, but at the same time he demanded to enter the VIR (magnitude of the distance change) manually. And Pollen, as he considered this same VIR. Those. Pollen is not an analog, but a device that complements the Geisler of 1910. That is how it was used in Sevastopol
          Quote: Kibb
          You mentioned the Foklands, there, emnip, or iblah, there were only Dreer's tables and whether anything more advanced to Jutland appeared - this is a question

          Well what are you, Dreyer’s table is a very advanced thing, more than enough to provide fire
          Once there was a Dreadnought bourgeois site, there was information on the MSA models of British ships and the installation time.

          I once put together everything that I know from the LMS http://alternathistory.com/sistemy-upravleniya-ko
          rabelnoi-artilleriei-v-nachale-pmv-ili-voprosov-b
          olshe-chem-otvetov
          It turned out that I know a little: (((((((
          Quote: Kibb
          I mean that the Germans relied less on an electro-mechanical computer.

          Nevertheless, he had them
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. Kibb
            Kibb 29 November 2017 13: 54 New
            +2
            For some reason, they deleted the comment.
            Well, and it is in this article that you have an excellent link on British SLAs
            http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/D
            reyer_Fire_Control_Table
            I was not talking about individual devices, but about the system precisely as a system, and it was precisely Pollan’s system that was installed on very few ships, and in my opinion it was exactly on the Oak (I could be wrong)
            And yes, there was a Dumarex calculator in LKR in the Falklands, and not Dreer - I write from memory, I need to get to the computer.
  2. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 29 November 2017 10: 28 New
    +1
    Thank you so much! I read it with pleasure!
    I will look forward to the next cycle on this "armored" theme))))

    and yes ... when will you publish the books? do not forget to inform!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 10: 33 New
      +2
      Quote: Trapper7
      Thank you so much! I read it with pleasure!

      And thank you for your kind words!
      Quote: Trapper7
      I will look forward to the next cycle on this "armored" theme))))

      What would I write about? :) Will there be any wishes? :)
      Quote: Trapper7
      and yes ... when will you publish the books? do not forget to inform!

      Never. I can’t imagine myself as a publisher laughing But if someone undertakes to publish my notes - I will only laughing
      1. Trapperxnumx
        Trapperxnumx 29 November 2017 10: 37 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        What would I write about? :) Will there be any wishes? :)


        Want to make out the 1898 Spanish-American War? ;-)
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          29 November 2017 10: 55 New
          +3
          Let's think :))) But there it’s still boring somehow, in the sense that the Spaniard’s fleet left very much to be desired.
          1. Cartalon
            Cartalon 29 November 2017 13: 30 New
            0
            If anything and it is Guadalcanal, it’s interesting there, I don’t know if your topic is the only one.
      2. Alexey Gusev_2
        Alexey Gusev_2 10 December 2017 15: 03 New
        0
        About Japanese battleships
  3. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 29 November 2017 10: 42 New
    +1
    By the way, I don’t know how true it is as much as not, but I had to come across such an opinion (perhaps even expressed earlier by the most respected Author of this article) that one of the reasons for the transition of Grand Fleet to a larger caliber and the creation of super dreadnought is that they could not create xnumx mm. a tool similar to what the Germans and Russians did. Maybe this is one of the reasons for the poor firing of guns at long distances - just a mate. part really did not meet the increased requirements.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 10: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Trapper7
      One of the reasons Grandfleet’s transition to a larger caliber and the creation of super dreadnought is that they could not create 305 mm. a tool similar to what the Germans and Russians did

      This is certainly true.
      Quote: Trapper7
      Maybe this is one of the reasons for the poor firing of guns at long distances

      I thought about it, but here's the thing - the British had 305 mm / 40 Mark 9 on their old battleships, then they did a little better for the Nelsons - 305 mm / 45 Mark 10, and they armed the first dreadnoughts and battlecruisers with it. And then they tried to make a powerful 50-caliber artillery system and now they didn’t go with it
      1. Kibb
        Kibb 29 November 2017 11: 11 New
        +1
        But the “305 mm” British battleships, due to the imperfection of their guns, could not conduct effective fire combat at distances of over 60 kb

        Yes, but it was on Colosus that the 305/50 Mark 11 stood
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          29 November 2017 11: 21 New
          +2
          Quote: Kibb
          Yes, but it was on Colosus that the 305/50 Mark 11 stood

          And who is arguing? But all his hits - in Derflinger, there, perhaps, less than 60 kb were
          1. Kibb
            Kibb 29 November 2017 11: 28 New
            +1
            But the guns are clearly worse than an ellipse than 305/45
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              29 November 2017 11: 32 New
              +2
              Quote: Kibb
              But the guns are clearly worse than an ellipse than 305/45

              Of course, although the persistence is higher, and this at such distances is essential
              1. Kibb
                Kibb 29 November 2017 14: 03 New
                0
                The trajectory is a trajectory, but their spread should be greater both in the direction and in the horizontal, and here the LMS comes into play.
    2. Kibb
      Kibb 29 November 2017 11: 08 New
      +4
      The problem was in technology - with the British, the guns were fastened with multilayer hot winding wire on the barrel pipe. For long trunks of 50 calibers, it did not fit - the 12/50 guns on two Colosus (the last 12 "British LCs) failed, it was necessary to reduce the length and increase the caliber.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        29 November 2017 11: 20 New
        +3
        Quote: Kibb
        The problem was in technology - with the British, the guns were fastened with multilayer hot winding wire on the barrel pipe.

        Exactly drinks
  4. Konstantin Yu
    Konstantin Yu 29 November 2017 10: 47 New
    +1
    Thank you for your work, very interesting. Coincidence ... yesterday I just looked at Puchkov Zhukov about the Battle of Jutland, on June 21. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCFtoZMgpzM and here is your continuation on the topic. Good luck
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 10: 54 New
      +2
      And thank you!
  5. Konstantin Yu
    Konstantin Yu 29 November 2017 11: 20 New
    +1
    I think that not only the numerical value of hitting such monsters matters, but also where, what part of this ship. Or at such distances, is it already impossible to cure? Is there an analysis of damage from the British and from the Germans? The result of the doctrine of the structure of mastodons?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 11: 29 New
      +3
      Quote: Konstantin Yu.
      I think that not only the numerical value of hitting such monsters matters, but also where, what part of this ship

      The fact is that when shooting at such distances it is completely impossible to aim at any part of the ship. There, dispersion is such that with a correct sight of 4-5 shells in a salvo, it is good if one hit the ship. Therefore, the term cover is highlighted - this is when the scope is taken correctly. But this does not mean that every cover gives a hit.
      Quote: Konstantin Yu.
      Or at such distances, is it already impossible to cure?

      Maybe it is possible, but not with my capabilities, and it is not really necessary - I wrote about visibility. Distance alone doesn’t mean anything.
      Quote: Konstantin Yu.
      Is there an analysis of damage from the British and from the Germans?

      No. But all this is not bad in the sources described - the same Puzyrevsky, etc. (although he has many errors)
      Quote: Konstantin Yu.
      The result of the doctrine of the structure of mastodons?

      For this, a separate series of articles is needed.
      1. Konstantin Yu
        Konstantin Yu 29 November 2017 11: 54 New
        +1
        Thanks for the answer. . We are waiting for new reviews ....
  6. BAI
    BAI 29 November 2017 11: 23 New
    +1
    that the British 305-mm guns for some technical reasons were ineffective at a distance of over 60 kbt.

    27.11.17/75/90. An article about "Glory" - shot at XNUMX - XNUMX kbt.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 11: 30 New
      +3
      Quote: BAI
      27.11.17/75/90. An article about "Glory" - shot at XNUMX - XNUMX kbt.

      PR and what is the "Glory" here? British guns stood on it? :)))))
  7. gorenina91
    gorenina91 29 November 2017 12: 08 New
    0
    -Reading is very interesting ... but always, when you read and everywhere the distance is indicated "in cable", "in miles" (sea and land); barrel length "in calibers", inches ""; weight "in pounds" ... and so on ...- immediately there is a mess ...
    -Well, it’s clear that it’s so common in “marine affairs” to display everything in such units, but here it would be near (in brackets) and they would write how much this is all in kilometers, centimeters, kilograms, and so on ...
    -That immediately everything is clear how much it is when it is written ... -305 mm caliber equipment ... -Well, all the other units of measure would be transferred to the SI system ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 12: 21 New
      +3
      Quote: gorenina91
      Reading is very interesting ... but always, when you read and everywhere the distance is indicated "in cable", "in miles" (sea and land); barrel length "in calibers", inches ""; weight "in pounds" ... and so on ...- immediately there is a mess ...

      I understand you. But usually, when people are interested in the fleet, they know the terminology, and constant transfers (the battleship moved at a speed of 21 knots or 38,892 km / h) will be cut off. Moreover, in principle, everything is very simple - a mile can only be nautical (1 852 m), cables - 1/10 mile (185,2 m) Speed ​​in knots is the number of nautical miles per hour. Inch - 2,54 cm.
      1. gorenina91
        gorenina91 29 November 2017 12: 34 New
        0
        Yes, of course ..., I myself could "translate all this", but why bother constantly with such a "translation" ...
        -That let me show you the sizes of men's clothing ... there is a continuous designation in the capital letters of the English alphabet ...- xl, s, m, l, xl, xxl, xxxl ...
        (English capital letters do not pass here, because .. are not applicable in the text) ... -And how many more similar "dimensional parameters" ....
        -That go and find out .., instead of immediately imagining ...- what is the "size" and "growth" of clothes ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          29 November 2017 12: 56 New
          +3
          Quote: gorenina91
          but why constantly bother with such a "translation" ...

          For example, I don’t bother :)))) Yes, and many others - too
          Quote: gorenina91
          Here go and find out .., instead of immediately imagining ...- what is the "size" and "growth" of clothes ...

          The analogy is clear, but let me give you another. After all, nobody converts the density of tights, measured in denas, into the C system, and den is an extra-systemic unit. But everyone understands (except men, of course laughing )
          1. gorenina91
            gorenina91 29 November 2017 13: 29 New
            0
            -Well, you understand and ... thank God ...
        2. shkiper83
          shkiper83 3 December 2017 04: 54 New
          0
          I recommend you a YouTube video "Women know your limits"
  8. 27091965
    27091965 29 November 2017 12: 35 New
    +2
    Puzyrevsky notes 4 falling into the “Fon der Tann”, while the Mujenics writes about five, noting, however, that one of them is unidentified (that is, the projectile was heavy, but of unclear caliber). As we have previously suggested, it could be a shell from New Zealand. We put 5 hits.


    Thanks, very interesting analysis. The fifth hit in the Von der Tann, some floating, it appears in different sources, then disappears. I think that all the same there were four. I think it is worth believing the naval attache of Austria-Hungary, who examined several German ships after the battle. Below is a table of hits in the ships examined by him.


    According to the dead, the description is alleged, according to the headquarters.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 12: 52 New
      +3
      Dear 27091965i, let me draw your attention to the fact that the table presented in no way can be a code of the ships examined by the attaché of Austria-Hungary. It contains the "Pommern", which was impossible to inspect - he died in the battle. Accordingly, it can be assumed that some of the information in the table was entered not on the basis of inspection, but on the basis of documents or someone’s words.
      Interestingly, in Moltka - five hits. Maybe they mixed up with von der tann? :)
      But thanks anyway! By the way - one hit in Kaiser, interesting hi
      1. 27091965
        27091965 29 November 2017 13: 01 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It contains the "Pommern", which was impossible to inspect - he died in the battle


        Below table explanation hi
      2. 27091965
        27091965 29 November 2017 13: 05 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Interestingly, in Moltka - five hits. Maybe they mixed up with von dertann ?:


        The attache has a description of the consequences of the hits, not the docking for the second hit specified by V. Muzhenikov.
  9. Taoist
    Taoist 29 November 2017 14: 37 New
    +1
    Too many parameters affect the accuracy of artillery fire at long distances, especially in those times. Those. all ratings here are from the category of “possible” and “allowable”. And taking into account the correction for the “mistakes of later scribes”, in general the reliability of these tends to 0. Given the availability and application of centralized guidance systems, the effectiveness of large artillery fire almost does not depend on the level of training of ordinary gunners (their task is to quickly and accurately execute commands and combine limbs with brands) and even the quality of artillery control personnel becomes secondary - and the adequacy of observing the enemy is primary and the results of his fire. After all, the slightest errors in the heading angle, speed of the target and the distance turn into misses - which, in fact, is demonstrated by all the results of battles and training firing up to the moment of the appearance of fully automatic firing control systems.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      29 November 2017 14: 45 New
      +2
      Quote: Taoist
      And taking into account the correction for the “mistakes of later scribes,” in general, the reliability of these tends to 0

      Yes, I would not say - the data of the same Muzenikov is much more perfect and more accurate than Puzyrevsky
      Quote: Taoist
      Given the availability and use of centralized guidance systems, the effectiveness of large artillery fire almost does not depend on the level of training of ordinary gunners

      Colossally dependent. For example, the same gunner had to compensate for the pitching on his own (the Germans began to roll krenometers after Jutland)
      Quote: Taoist
      and even the quality of the managers of artillery fire becomes secondary - and the primary is the adequacy of observing the enemy and the results of their fire.

      Just the opposite. In conditions of incomplete information, the human factor was of great importance.
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 30 November 2017 01: 21 New
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Colossally dependent. For example, the same gunner had to compensate for the pitching on his own (the Germans began to roll krenometers after Jutland)

        Something is hard to believe. Already on Paul 1 and Andrew the First-Called there were mercury contactors, which broke the chain of blocking the shot when the ship arrived at an even keel. On the ships of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, the really senior gunner closed the chain manually, using a roll meter, when the ship came on an even keel. Watch the fire control system of the Geisler system of 1899. http://www.japanrussia.ru/russko-aponskaa-voina-a
        rhivi-istoria-korablestroenia-i-voorugenii-samii-
        nugnii-pribor-8.html
        So I doubt, with that close connection between the Russian and German shipbuilders, that they did not know about this OMS. Some of the RIF ships were built abroad, in particular in Germany.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          30 November 2017 09: 11 New
          +4
          Quote: Amurets
          Hard to believe something

          Do you not believe von Haase? To Starartu Derflinger?
          Quote: Amurets
          Already on Paul 1 and Andrew the First-Called there were mercury contactors, which broke the chain of blocking the shot when the ship arrived at an even keel.

          We even dreadnoughts did not shoot like that.
          Quote: Amurets
          On the ships of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, the really senior gunner closed the chain manually, according to the roll meter, when the ship came on an even keel

          No gunner did not short circuit. Even on the Geisler model of 1910, the mine worked like this - he was informed on the remote control that the guns were ready, he pressed the EMNIP pedal and thereby gave permission to open fire, but the gunner fired
          Quote: Amurets
          http://www.japanrussia.ru/russko-aponskaa-voina-a
          rhivi-istoria-korablestroenia-i-voorugenii-samii-
          nugnii-pribor-8.html

          With all due respect to that discussion, this is

          it will be more exact :)
  10. Potter
    Potter 29 November 2017 21: 35 New
    +3
    The lack of accuracy of the English 50-gauge 12-inch was one of the reasons for the transition to a caliber of 13,5 inches with a barrel length of 45 calibers. With a lower projectile speed and a much greater mass, the advantage of 13,5 inches in muzzle energy was not so significant, but the accuracy of the fire increased significantly.
    s.s Just yesterday, an article about Iron Duke and his sisterships and predecessors caught my eye.
    http://www.redov.ru/voennaja_istorija/linkory_bri
    tanskoi_imperii_chast_vii_yepoha_drednoutov / p2.ph
    p
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 November 2017 13: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Potter
      Just yesterday, an article about Iron Duke and his sisterships and predecessors caught my eye

      Thank you, look through :) I love, you know, such a reading :))))
  11. Potter
    Potter 29 November 2017 21: 39 New
    +3
    A big plus and many thanks for both parts of the article.
  12. Comrade
    Comrade 30 November 2017 02: 52 New
    +1
    Thank you again, dear Andrei, for a very interesting topic. You can talk endlessly, eh, with archival documents of repair crews, you could work. With your permission, a few remarks :-)
    According to Puzyrevsky, “Helgoland” and “Nassau” got one hit, Muzhenikov does not confirm a single one.

    In total, “Nassau” received four hits. Alas, as it often happened, the combatant officers of the ship had problems with identifying the caliber, so some sources talk about one main-caliber shell received, and others say about two medium-caliber shells fired from English battleships and battle cruisers. Obviously, one of them is considered either a main-caliber projectile or a medium-caliber projectile. Two more shells that hit the "Nassau" were fired from destroyers.
    Puzyrevsky finally confuses the matter, claiming that the Kaiser received one hit with an 343-mm projectile from battleships of the Marlboro type, while the second shell of the same caliber did not hit the ship, but exploded nearby and caused only fragmentation damage.

    The same problem, determining the caliber of a projectile. Apparently, Puzyrevsky took data from one report (source), Campbell from another. Obviously, neither one nor the other saw the report of the repairmen, where the exact caliber of the shell was named. Kepmbell indicates the caliber 305 mm and gives the time when the shells hit, presumably with "Agincourt". But, since this dreadnought went in one, 1, squadron along with "Marlborough", "Revenge" and "Hercules", that is, it is likely that the caliber could be 343 mm. Apparently, Puzyrevsky drew information from a source whose author thought so. The second shell really exploded outside Kaiser. The first hit 20: 23, the second three minutes later. Moreover, the first shell fell under casemate No. 7, where it split into pieces without bursting. The resulting small fire was quickly put out, one crew member was injured.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 November 2017 09: 14 New
      +3
      Good day, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      In total, Nassau received four hits.

      Sorry, by default I meant only large-caliber
      Quote: Comrade
      You can talk endlessly, eh, with the archival documents of repair crews, you could work

      That's for sure:)))))
  13. Comrade
    Comrade 30 November 2017 05: 25 New
    +1
    A German shell hit one of the English ships during the Battle of Jutland.

    View of the British battlecruisers, explosions of German shells are visible. Photo taken at about 16: 00. It seems that subsequently retouched.


    Everything is clickable, although, alas, it does not open in full size.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 November 2017 09: 15 New
      +2
      Quote: Comrade
      although, alas, it does not open in full size.

      Anyway - thanks a lot! Rare photo
  14. CTABEP
    CTABEP 30 November 2017 12: 57 New
    +1
    Great analysis, thank you very much. Especially for the reference at the end of the article :)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 November 2017 13: 00 New
      +2
      And thank you with a kind word! By the way - almost the entire list is on the prodigy