Two operational strategic strikes - two outcomes
Among the variety of events and facts stories Japanese attack fleet Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, occupies a special place at the main US naval base. Pearl Harbor almost from the very beginning became a household name, applied whenever it is necessary to emphasize the crushing defeat.The theme of this military catastrophe was unusually widely "exploited" by the Americans in order to be introduced to the world military history and even to the multitude of victims of unprovoked aggression: after all, it was somehow morally "laundered" for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not without scale intrigue: the Americans until December 7 1941 were in a state of such peace and self-isolation that the US president had nothing left to do but hide his awareness of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. However, samurai-piloted diving planes and the sight of smoking inverted American battleships in the water area of Oahu Bay awakened a benignly sleeping country, which began its ascent to the glory of the winner and the position of a superpower.
Today, after 70 years, it is appropriate to turn to this turning point in world history thoughtfully and without bias in order to learn the necessary lessons. After all, history, as is known, has a habit of repeating itself and punishing for inattention to itself, incorrectly interpreted facts and incorrect conclusions.
Formally, the attack on Pearl Harbor was indeed a brilliant operation, courageously planned, punctually prepared and clearly carried out by the Japanese imperial fleet. She was called upon, according to the plan of her developers, in combination with the simultaneous crushing defeat of the Anglo-American forces in the western Pacific Ocean, to put the enemy in front of the need to sign a fast and advantageous world for Japan. To the authors of the "Eastern Blitzkrieg", he seemed even more transient and no less ambitious and deafening than the Barbarossa plan.
It is noteworthy that the custom of interpreting them with deep conviction that the outcome was almost 100% logical was a feature of the modern historical approach to the events and facts in question.
However, a serious and responsible historical approach, involving the productive use of history, makes us avoid a biased, superficial, hasty attitude to events and facts, and relies only on objective analysis. This fully applies to the events around the Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941 of the year. After all, they are extremely instructive.
However, the operation itself is no more than an analogue of the attack of the English fleet on Taranto and the Italian fleet in it a year before Pearl Harbor. True, this is a much less well-known story, which, however, gives reason to suspect the Japanese of plagiarism.
THE DEVIL IS HIDDEN IN THE DETAILS
If a similarity of operations is established, one cannot escape from comparing them. Although at first glance what is there to compare: at Pearl Harbor and the US Pacific Fleet based in it, the enemy’s air fleet crashed in two waves - more than three hundred aircraft, the most advanced at that time, with the most trained crews at that time. In the raid on Taranto participated in 18 times less cars, and what! Slow-moving, primitive biplanes with non-retractable Suordfish type chassis could not even compete with Japanese Keits, Valas and Zero in the first approximation. Meanwhile, the objects of attack and the damage inflicted on the enemy are just commensurate.
At Pearl Harbor, the US Pacific Fleet was based with eight battleships (LC) and three aircraft carriers (AB) in the core, all in all - 93 warships and auxiliary ships.
In Taranto, the supermarine concentrated on the night before the attack also practically its entire fleet (near 70 surface ships and auxiliary ships) with six LCs in the core, two of which were generally the newest ships, while all Americans-LC were veterans built during World War I. wars with speed not exceeding the 20 – 22 node. Despite the fact that there were no American aircraft carriers on the day of the attack, the parameters of operations and especially the losses in them were commensurate. One LK was destroyed (in any case, the Cavour was not put into operation before the end of hostilities), six and three LK, respectively, were damaged. In both cases, according to the operational standards of the time, the combat capability of the American and Italian fleets was radically undermined. In both cases, according to the most modest operational and strategic estimates, it corresponded no less than the conquest of dominance in the theater of operations.
The Japanese needed it for freedom of action in the main direction: the unimpeded capture of the resource-rich regions of Southeast Asia and the construction of an external strategic perimeter in the Pacific Ocean. It was believed that Pearl Harbor as a strategic position "hung" over the left flank of the vector of strategic advancement of Japan.
In England, as a result of the operation against Taranto in November 1940, it was vital to “ensure free hand” in Greece and North Africa. There is hardly any need to further indicate the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean Sea in general, despite the fact that by the autumn of the 1940, the Italian fleet had unprecedentedly increased in it and began to really influence the plans of the war as a whole.
Indeed, these are brilliant examples of operations both in their conception, thoughtfulness and thoroughness of preparation, and in a masterly implementation. As for the preparation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese found an absolutely similar bay in the South Kuril Islands, in a completely deserted and inaccessible area, where, having placed the mockups of large ships, as in Pearl Harbor, they gradually trained in torpedo and bombing, bringing the skills crews almost to automatism.
The Americans, who theoretically allowed the possibility of such an attack on their main base (taking into account the experience of Taranto), still did not fully believe in its reality. Too bold and even adventurous should have looked like a plan, it is enough to estimate the geographical distance of the Hawaiian Islands.
The possibility of deploying a large fleet operational connection to such a depth, moreover, with the preservation of secrecy and full combat capability in the most turbulent time of the year when passing through areas difficult for weather (bunkering alone — beyond the available limits) did not fit the imagination of American flagships, operators and scouts.
But the main thing that the American command "lulled" was the shallow depths in the bay of Oahu, which, according to the existing standards, did not allow air torpedoing, as well as information about the absence of the Japanese bombs of the necessary power to destroy such well-armored targets like LC.
The hidden deployment, backed up by skilfully organized false radio communications in the original deployment area, has finally confused the American command. The bold improvisation of the Japanese with the modernization of torpedoes for shallow water and the adaptation of armor-piercing shells instead of bombs left the Americans no chance.
Of course, this operation is rightfully recognized as the swan song of the Japanese fleet, immortalizing the names of its authors and performers: admirals Isoroku Yamamoto, Tuichi Nagumo, captain of 2 rank Mitsuo Futida, who directly trained the crews and headed the first strike group of aircraft in the Pearl Harbor raid.
By the way the Japanese used their “honestly earned chance”, we will return, but for now let's turn to “Taranto” and those otkazkam in the preparation of the operation, which were required by the British, operating under the flag of Vice Admiral Allan Cunningham and the immediate commander of aircraft carriers Rear Admiral Arthur Lister.
First, they were the first and they had nothing to rely on in the sense of another's experience. Deck aircraft while remained weapons too new to rely on it as the main strike weapon, to be completely confident in the success of this daring enterprise, and even at night. Talk about achieving a complete surprise attack on the main base of the Italian fleet is not necessary.
A long-term detailed aerial survey of the Italian base, supplemented by the latest aerial photography data from the Maryland high-altitude, showed that the base was well prepared for the attack: there were anti-torpedo nets around the battleships. The grouping of anti-aircraft artillery, which numbered 200 anti-aircraft artillery barrels and anti-aircraft large-caliber machine guns, was also impressive. Some of the batteries were floating, which fairly complemented the fire system, bringing it to a degree of almost complete fire interaction. If you add dozens of anti-aircraft searchlights, as well as anti-aircraft equipment of numerous Italian LC, KR, EM and other warships, an irresistible air defense picture is created.
It is necessary to pay tribute to the courage and skill of the British pilots and their superiors, who preferred the night raid with its transcendental balancing act of maneuvering between balloons and batteries, while in the dark it was necessary to find targets - battleships and go to them from the water area to use torpedoes . To overcome the anti-torpedo networks, which were fenced all LC, from the metropolis specially delivered torpedoes with the latest magnetic fuses, allowing, increasing the depth of the torpedoes, pass under the nets and carry out non-contact blasting of torpedoes under the keel of the ship.
At the very last moment, due to the accident, the second Eagle aircraft carrier dropped out of service, and its air group had to be transferred to the Illastries that remained alone.
Good luck accompanies the stubborn, skillful and courageous: 20 torpedo bombers and bombers, two waves rising from the deck AB in the calculated point, remained known only to the British and which as a result of numerous fleet maneuvers during the previous day managed to hide from enemy reconnaissance, as well as the plan of the operation , brilliantly solve the problem.
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPERATION
On the operational and tactical level, the actions of the attackers in both cases were almost flawless. If someone, comparing these two operations, wants to give preference to the British, leaning toward the fact that they were much more efficient, if only because they solved the same task with a much smaller force outfit, let us say that it is much more difficult to manage a much larger force outfit. Warlords and naval commanders, both in planning, training, and in directing the conduct of hostilities, are forced to reckon with a lack and an excessive outfit of dedicated forces, sometimes almost equally.
At the same time, it should be noted that the British with their raid, in fact, achieved a strategic result: the Italian fleet, in addition to incurring significant losses, also had to leave this advantageous base, very close to the main communications and operational lines of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the result of the raid was a persistent "fear of the Italian flagships, which served them together with the badly organized interaction of the fleet with aviation bad service. In fact, with his bold raid, Cunningham not only halved the main enemy forces, but also deprived the supermarine of a uniquely advantageous strategic position.
However later the events would unfold, sometimes quite tragically for the royal fleet, the Italian fleet, which soon regained its combat capability and even strengthened by the introduction of the third modern LC, Rome, was no longer active, citing its “operational lethargy” as a fuel deficit.
Noteworthy is the indirect assessment of the operational and strategic consequences of Taranto by the injured party itself. All the most serious losses, subsequently inflicted on the English fleet by German and Italian forces and means, were called nothing less than “revenge for Taranto”, which means that it was worth it, it was great.
In general, the strategic price of "Taranto" and its consequences are much higher. The Italian fleet, which had lost its operational activity, but it objectively represented an impressive force, not only showed its inability to “strangle” the most important English communications in the Mediterranean, but also “brought down” and “failed” its own most important communication with North Africa. This allowed the British to first stop and then defeat the German-Italian forces here, creating the prerequisites for the landing of the Allies, which soon spread to Sicily and then to the mainland.
Meanwhile, get a capable and enterprising Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in a timely manner all that he was assigned to supply and promised replenishment - the consequences could be easily predictable: the seizure of the Suez Canal, the entry of the Berlin-Rome axis countries in the most vulnerable for allied locations. But this did not happen in many respects due to the fault of the Italian fleet, which failed to cope with the tasks assigned to it.
The situation was different in the Pacific. The Japanese side was not ready to take advantage of the victory at Pearl Harbor. Formally, the brilliant results of the operation, supported by successes in the Philippines and actions to destroy the English fleet from Singapore, successes in the seas of the Australian-Asian archipelago and in the Indian Ocean did not lead to the achievement of strategic objectives by Japan. Japan did not have time, and then failed to build its outer defensive perimeter. All military historians agree that Japan underestimated the time factor. Outwardly, this looks like the Japanese underestimating the possible reaction of the allegedly dormant United States.
The matter is aggravated by the fact that the underestimation was admitted by the most advanced party in the field of aviation. The "uninhabited" American aircraft carriers began with a moral impact action (raid on Tokyo - operation Shangri-La). Following this, but much faster than they had to expect, they switched to force at the operational-tactical and even operational levels (battles in the Coral Sea, the battle at Midway Island). This happened just a few months after the start of the war unsuccessful for them.
The defeat of the Italian fleet in Taranto 11 November 1940 of the year. Photos from the official website of the Italian Navy
LOST VICTORY
Why did the Japanese side not take advantage of the victory at Pearl Harbor? The cause of the underperforming operational-strategic effect can hardly be explained by the fact that the victory itself was just a manifestation of the adventurism of the imperial command, which is what so many historians and researchers like to limit themselves to. In fact, the causes are much deeper.
It is difficult not to link the famous outcome of the war for Japan with the absence of aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor that day. At the same time, it is difficult to explain why, with such thoroughness in the preparation of the operation, the possibility of the absence of aircraft carriers in the base at the time of the attack was not taken into account, either because of a fatal surprise, or because of the lack of an adequate course of action in this situation.
Without a doubt, the search and destruction of aircraft carriers dispersed from Pearl Harbor were fully capable of brilliantly coping with the morning combat task of the strike operational link Nagumo. Moreover, the highly advanced naval imagination of Admiral Yoroku Yamamoto could not help him to say that “these lost aircraft carriers” of the enemy after only a few months, not waiting for the readiness of the restored and new LCs, would start delivering completely inadequate problems to the Japanese side.
The point is, as you might guess, in the combat properties of the aircraft carriers themselves and in the peculiarities of the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, with its countless atolls and islands scattered in the ocean. In addition, the very idea of a fleet's mode of action could not help the Americans to be told by the recent winners with their successful and audacious raid across the ocean.
And so it happened, literally a few months later the American fleet bombed Tokyo, deployed active hostilities in the Coral Sea, conducted a fatal operation for Japan on the Midway Atoll. And what is remarkable - by the forces of practically the same aircraft carriers.
It is also difficult to explain the logic of the Japanese command. Why, while developing and during the operation against Pearl Harbor, they did not attack the ship repair shops and strategic fuel reserves in the oil storage facilities of Pearl Harbor. This allowed the Americans soon to raise and repair damaged and drowned LCs for independent transition, and also to provide the US Navy with fuel for at least the next two years of war. Although, however, neither Nagumo nor his younger flagships sought to develop the success of the operation, believing that a swift departure was more appropriate. Unlike the Japanese, British pilots in a similar situation sought to finish off the Italian fleet in Taranto.
Also striking is the neglect of the Japanese command to the enemy and intelligence. It was in this that the beaten Americans, who, according to the general views at that time, lost the classic fleet, outplayed the experienced and hardened Japanese warriors. From battle to battle, from operation to operation, the same thing was repeated: the Americans knew in advance what they should do, where, when.
BETTER WRONG THAN NON-SEQUENTIAL
This phrase in the heading can be fully attributed to the operational control style of the Japanese command. Planning a daring, large-scale operation, the Japanese command simply had to proceed from the possibility of a diverse development of the situation during its implementation, and also to provide the most appropriate options for action. In particular, it is difficult to understand how it is possible, having achieved the complete surprise of an operation and successfully suppressing the enemy’s fleet during the first raid, not to take action to develop success.
It is not only the need, after the end of the second raid on Pearl Harbor, even before noon local time, to proceed to an intensive search for the aircraft carriers missing in the aircraft carrier database with all the forces and means available for this, which would definitely predetermine the fate of the Enterprise Admiral William Halsey.
There were unforgivable flaws in planning, such as the exclusion of ship repair facilities and oil storage facilities from the list of obligatory objects. This deprived a highly effective operation of any signs of operational and strategic completion. (The Japanese also acted inconsistently after the brilliant night battle near the island of Savo 9 August 1942 of the year.)
Moreover, when returning from Pearl Harbor, the route should have been laid through Midway to take possession of it. To do this, from Japan to meet Nagumo's connection to Midway, an amphibious compound was supposed to go out in secret. For possible opponents, note that the Midway “model of December 1941 of the year” in its ability to resist was very different from the Midway of April-May 1942 of the year.
Meanwhile, the list and sequence of problem solving in the name of achieving strategic goals, in particular, building an external defensive perimeter, outlined by Japan in this war as priority actions, could not be different. A blitzkrieg, conducted against such a powerful country, does not have much chance of success, in order to neglect the most important, determining factors and strategic canons: a temporary factor in the sequence of actions (strikes), a factor in the correct choice of the direction of the main attack.
Researchers and biographers of Admiral Yamamoto argue that, being a particularly shrewd Japanese strategist, he was afraid of the time factor. But why acted contrary to their beliefs? We are not even saying that on the return route via Midway, the probability of meeting and destroying the second American aircraft carrier Lexington, which at the time under the banner of Rear Admiral John Newton was sent to Midway coastal aviation, was very high. Then the Americans in the Pacific would really expect a collapse. At the same time, the resources of the Japanese fleet for solving these tasks were sufficient; neither reserves nor a serious regrouping were required.
We are no longer talking about the fact that it would be good for Japan to get involved in a big war, to provide several spare wings for aircraft carriers, which would give their fleet even more mobility, operational stability and combat effectiveness. Further, the fleet of Nagumo could act in the sequence as he actually acted. The strategic results, however, would be different.
Having established the role of "Taranto" as a watershed of war in the Mediterranean, it would be an omission not to point out the untapped potential of Italy in this war, precisely as a product of national naval thinking.
By the autumn of 1940, the Italian fleet, with its unique grouping of high-speed LCs, the Kyrgyz Republic and submarines (more than 100 units), literally became the “queen” of the Berlin-Rome axis coalition. If Hitler and Mussolini had taken advantage of them, they would have been able to transfer the burden of war with Great Britain to the Mediterranean - through the efforts of the Rommel ground group in North Africa, the Italian navy and German aviation to solve the problem of gaining dominance in the Mediterranean and establish control over the Suez Canal. After that, it was possible to transfer the efforts of the Italian fleet, uniting it with the German LC and KR, into the Atlantic, where the fate of the British trade, and therefore of England itself, was decided at that time.
And finally, it is impossible to ignore the benefits of aviation. Despite the primitivism of the main deck-mounted attack aircraft of the royal fleet, they put an end to the Mussolini sea ambitions in Taranto and further in subsequent operations at sea.
This situation was repeated several decades later in the Falkland conflict, when the British decked Sea Harriers decided the fate of the campaign at a great distance from the metropolis, in the middle of a stormy winter ocean, acting against modern combat aircraft. These are instructive lessons and convincing arguments in favor of aviation as one of the fundamental principles for building a fleet.
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