Military Review

Bloody Mars

100
At the same time as Operation Uranus near Stalingrad, Operation Mars was unfolding in the Moscow direction. The idea of ​​the Soviet operation was to defeat the 9th German army, which formed the basis of Army Group Center, in the region of Rzhev, Sychevka.


General situation

January 8 - April 20 of the year 1942 was carried out by the Rzhev-Vyazma operation - an offensive by the forces of the Kalinin Front under the command of Colonel-General I. S. Konev and the Western Fronts under the command of Army General GK Zhukov, conducted with the assistance of the North-Western and Bryansk Fronts . It was a continuation of the strategic battle for Moscow. Soviet troops threw the enemy to the west on 80 - 250 km, completed the liberation of the Moscow and Tula regions, liberated many areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions. The result of the operation was the formation of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge.

The Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge had up to 160 km in depth and to 200 km along the front (at the base). The German command considered this ledge as a strategic springboard for an attack on Moscow. Here was the shortest direction to Moscow - from the front line to Moscow in a straight line about 150 km. In the winter of 1942 - 1943 of the year, around 2⁄3 troops of the Army Group Center were concentrated in this area. It is clear that the Soviet command was trying with all its might to destroy the edge, aimed at the capital of the USSR. The main forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts acted against the bridgehead. The Soviet command carried out successively several operations with the aim of eliminating it, which would crush and throw away the troops of the Army Group "Center" further from Moscow.

July 30 - October 1 1942, the first Rzhev-Sychevskaya operation took place (or the second battle for Rzhev). Our troops attacked with the aim of defeating the German 9 Army under the command of General V. Model, defending on the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, and eliminating the enemy bridgehead. In the course of the operation, Soviet troops advanced to the west by 40 - 45 kilometers, but they did not reach their goals.

Bloody Mars

Soviet Tanks T-60 and KV-1 are fighting in the region of Rzhev

It is worth noting that by heat, rage and losses in the Rzhev direction, eyewitnesses on both sides were compared with the battles in Stalingrad. According to the memoirs of the Soviet military correspondent I. G. Ehrenburg: “I did not manage to visit Stalingrad ... But I will not forget Rzhev. Maybe there were offensives that cost more human lives, but there seemed to be no other, so sad - for weeks there were battles for five or six broken trees, for the wall of a broken house and a tiny knoll ... ”.

German military journalist J. Schuddekopf in October 1942 of the year in the article “Zazov Rzhev” wrote: “The German offensive in the East reached the Volga in two places: near the walls of Stalingrad and Rzhev ... What is happening on the smaller scale at Rzhev is almost year. Almost a day a day a year ago, the German troops reached the Volga for the first time ... Since then, three major battles have turned over a piece of land in the upper Volga — and the fourth, the most fierce, has been going on for more than two months. ”

The fighting near Rzhev became one of the bloodiest episodes of the Great Patriotic War. According to a study by historian A. V. Isaev, conducted on the basis of the archives of the Ministry of Defense, the losses in operations on an arc encircling Rzhev, 200 length - 250 kilometers, from January 1942 to March 1943, were: irrevocable - 392 554 people; sanitary - 768 233 person.



Party plans

The plan of the Soviet operation "Mars" appeared at the end of September 1942, as a continuation of the First Rzhev-Sychevskaya operation. October 10 Soviet troops received a directive to continue the Rzhev-Sychevka operation, which was again to be carried out by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts with the aim of: encircling and destroying the 9 of the German army in the area of ​​the Rzhevsky protrusion. The beginning of the offensive was scheduled for October 23. Then the dates were shifted by a month. The general management of the operation was carried out by Army General G. K. Zhukov.

Of the eleven armies of the Western Front, under the command of General Konev, the 20, 31, and 29 were to take part in the offensive. The main blow was struck by the 20 Army under the command of Major-General N. I. Kiryukhin, consisting of six rifle divisions and four tank brigades. After breaking through the enemy defenses in its lane, it was planned to introduce into the battle a mobile group under the general command of Major General V. V. Kryukov as part of the 6 tank and 2 guards cavalry corps and the 1 scooter and motorcycle brigade.

From the Kalinin Front, Colonel-General M. A. Purkayev, the 3 armies were also distinguished. The 41 Army under the command of Major-General F. G. Tarasov and the 22 Army of Major-General V. A. Yushkevich delivered a blow to the east, against parts of the Western Front, and the 39-I army of Major-General A. I. Zygin should have been advancing south, in the direction of Olenino. In the strip of the 41 Army for the development of success it was planned to introduce into the battle 1 of the mechanized corps of General M. D. Solomatin. The Solomatin corps numbered more than 15 thousand soldiers and 224 tank, of which 10 KV, 119 T-34 and 95 T-70. In addition, the 41-I and 47-I tank brigades (another hundred tanks) were in reserve of the 48 Army. In the zone of the 22 Army, in addition to the 185 Division, the 238 Division Infantry Division, the 3 Mechanic Corps under the command of Major General M.Ye. Katukov - three mechanized and one tank brigade, 13,5 thousand people, 175 tanks. In reserve, the commander had a 114-I infantry brigade and 39-th tank regiment.

Thus, the German army was going to defeat by several simultaneous breakthroughs on those sectors of the front where no major attacks had been carried out before: between the Osuga and Gzhat rivers - by the 20 army, in the Young Tuda region - by the 39 army, in the valley of the river Luchesa - by the forces of the 22 army, south of the city of Bely - by the forces of the 41 army. In the last three areas, the density of the German defense was 20 - 40 km per infantry division, which was supposed to facilitate its breakthrough. At the site of the 20 Army, the defense was much denser — the 2 division (including the 1 tank division) at the front in 15 km. In case of success of the first stage, the 5-i and 33-i army (they were opposed by the 3-I German tank army) were to be connected in the direction of Gzhatsk, Vyazma. Subsequently, after the failure of the first stage, the Bid with a directive from 8 December 1942 gave a new indication: after regrouping the troops of the Kalininsky and Western fronts, by the end of January, crush the enemy grouping and reach our old defensive line. That is, it was supposed to reach the line on which in September 1943, in the rear of the Western Front, stood the armies of the Reserve Front.

At the same time, another operation was being prepared on the right wing of the Kalinin Front — the attack of the 3 shock army of Major General KN Galitsky on Velikie Luki and Nevel in order to cut the Leningrad-Vitebsk railway in the Novosokolniki area. In the future, the Soviet command calculated, having liquidated the Great Bridge of the enemy, to open the way to the Baltic States. The 2 th mechanized corps under the command of General I. P. Korchagin was in the reserve of the army. The main blow south of Velikie Luk, bypassing the city from the northwest, was struck by the 5 th rifle corps of Major General A. P. Beloborodov. In the breakthrough zone of the main forces of the 5 Infantry Corps, the 2 Mechanic Corps was introduced. Towards Beloborodov from the region north of Velikiy Luki, the 381-Infantry Division of Colonel B.S. Maslov was advancing. From the front, the city covered the 257 Rifle Division of Colonel A. A. Dyakonov. To the south of the guardsmen of Beloborodov, the 21-I Guards and 28-rifle divisions of the 3-th shock army and the right-flank 360-th division of the 4-th army attacked.

The Germans did not have enough troops here, so they concentrated their efforts on protecting the most important sectors. The Great Bow District was defended by units of the 83 Infantry Division and one guard battalion. However, the city itself was turned into a powerful, prepared for a circular defense center of resistance, saturated with fire weapons. Many buildings turned into long-term firing points, interacting with each other and blocking streets and intersections with fire. The front edge of the defense was 5 km from the city outskirts. To the south, in the Martyanovo area, the site was covered by two separate battalions. Between these two garrisons and north of the Great Onions, there were only small garrisons in separate settlements.

The 3-I Mountain Division and the 55 th regiment of 6-barreled mortars were located in the area of ​​Novosokolnikov. The Germans also pulled up reserves: the 20-i motodivision was concentrated north-east of Nevel; the 291-I infantry division was pulled up to the area of ​​Tumor against the southern flank of General Galitsky; northeast of the Great Bows, the 8-I tank division was deployed from the Kholm region. The headquarters of the 59 Army Corps, which arrived at Novosokolniki from Vitebsk, was supposed to unite all these units. Later, with the purpose of releasing the surrounded garrison of the Great Onions, other German formations also entered the battle.


Soviet soldiers inspect German tanks abandoned in the Great Bow area

The forces of the parties

In the Moscow strategic direction, the main grouping of Soviet troops was still concentrated in the area from Holm to Bolkhov. In sum, the forces of the two fronts and the Moscow defense zone with reserves The stakes consisted of 1890 thousand people, more than 24 thousand guns and mortars, 3375 tanks and 1100 aircraft. They were confronted by almost all troops of Army Group Center (except for five divisions on its extreme right flank), and 2 divisions of Army Group North — the entire 72 division (except for 9 security and field training in the rear), of which 10 tank and 6 motorized. Army Group "Center" along with the reserves had about 1680 thousand people, up to 3500 tanks.

A total of 545 thousand people and 1200 tanks were allocated for operations "Mars". Two Soviet fronts engaged seven of the seventeen armies in the offensive: 41, 22, 39, 30, 31, 20, and 29. At the second stage (in early December), the 5 and 33 armies were to join the offensive. The intended offensive of these two armies did not take place only because of the failure of the first stage of the operation.

Colonel-General V. Model's 9 Army, which took the brunt of the Soviet troops, consisted of: 6 Army Corps (2 Airfield, 7 Airborne and 197 Infantry Divisions); 41 Tank Corps (330-I and 205-I Infantry Divisions, regiment 328-th Infantry Division); The 23 Army Corps (246, 86, 110, 253, and 206 Infantry Divisions, 87 Infantry Division and 10 Motorized Division); The 27 Army Corps (95, 72, 256, 129, 6, and 251 Infantry Divisions, two regiments of 87 Infantry Division); 39 Tank Corps (337-I, 102-I and 78-I infantry, 5-I tank division). The 9 Army Headquarters subordinated to two motorized divisions (14 and Great Germany), 1 and 9-tank divisions, 11-tank division of battalions (37 tanks) and 1-cavalry division. In addition, reserves of Army Group Center — 12, 19, and 20 — tank divisions were located at the base of the projection, which in a critical situation could be quickly transferred to a dangerous direction.

Directly on the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in front of the front of the 20 and 31 of the Soviet armies, the 39 tank corps was defensive. Behind him were reserves — the 9-I tank and 95-I infantry divisions. The German 22 tank corps was located on the western flank of the protruding 41 and 41 armies, behind which were also military reserves - the 1 tank division and the Great Germany SS moto-division. To the north, the 23 Army Corps occupied the defense.

The German command took into account the mistakes of the previous campaign and prepared for winter (during the 1941 campaign of the year, Hitler planned to win before the onset of winter, so the troops were not ready with the harsh Russian winter). All personnel were provided with warm uniforms. German defense was continuously improved in engineering. Minefields were set up in all directions of the enemy's probable strikes, powerful strongholds were created, a system of wooden-earth firing points, etc.


Colonel-General Walter Model speaks to the crew of an assault gun StuG III

Beginning of the offensive

The operations of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began on November 25 in three directions at once. Two armies of the Western Front attacked the eastern front of the Rzhevsky bulge north of Zubtsov, on the 40-kilometer stretch along the Vazuz and Osuga rivers. At the same time, the 22-I and 41-I armies of the Kalinin Front struck a counter blow from the western flank of the ledge.

The 3 Shock Army launched an offensive against the north wing of the Army Group Center, trying on both sides to embrace Great Luke. November 24 in 11 hours after 30-minute artillery preparation, the advanced regiments of three divisions of the 5 Guards Rifle Corps launched an attack. Having advanced deep into 2-3 km, by the end of the day our troops reached the main enemy defense zone. In 9 hour. 30 min. November 25 began an hour and a half artillery preparation, after which the main forces of the army launched an offensive. During the day of the fighting, the army of Galitsky advanced to a depth from 2 to 12 km, with the 381 Infantry Division advancing from the north achieving the greatest success. Over the next two days, army troops with stubborn battles, beating off fierce counterattacks of the enemy, slowly moved forward.

By the end of November 27, Army intelligence found that the enemy was pulling up reserves in the battle area: the 8-th tank division from the north, the 291-th infantry and the 20-th motorized from the south. The command of the 3 shock army strengthened the flanks of the advancing group, which allowed it to counter enemy attacks. In the evening of November 28, near the Ostrian station, the 381-th and 9-th Guards Divisions met, closing the ring around the German garrison of the Great Onions. In addition, part of the forces of the German 83 Infantry Division was surrounded south-west of the city, in the area of ​​Shiripino settlement. The offensive of the Soviet troops in order to seize the Novosokolniki met with strong enemy defenses. The 18-I and 34-I mechanized brigades and the 381-I infantry division could not overcome the resistance of the 3-I mountain enemy division and capture the city. However, by the end of 3 December, the enemy group was completely destroyed, surrounded by Shiripino. After that, the troops of the 3 shock army went over to the defensive, reflecting attempts by the German forces to break through to the Great Onions.



On Rzhevskiy ledge offensive developed worse. The night before the onset, the weather in the 20 and 31 armies changed dramatically, snow fell, a snowstorm began. The gunners fired on the squares, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of the artillery preparation, and although it lasted an hour and a half, its results were insignificant. When the Soviet infantry went on the attack, the enemy’s non-suppressed gun emplacements had a strong opposition. The 31 Army Major General V. S. Polenov failed to break through the enemy defenses. Her rifle divisions, supported by 332 and 145, by tank brigades, at the cost of great losses, achieved only insignificant successes. South of the 20-I army Kiryukhin reached a little more - 247-I Infantry Division, with the support of 80-th and 140-th tank brigades, forced the river. Vazuzu and captured a bridgehead on its western shore. The commander immediately threw into battle his reserve — the 331 th rifle division of colonel P. Ye. Berestov. Under heavy enemy fire, units of the 20 Army were slowly making their way forward, expanding the bridgehead. However, here it was not possible to break through the German defense.

Then Zhukov and Konev decided to throw forward the reserves and the mobile group, without waiting for the infantry to crack the enemy defenses. At the dawn of November 26, units of the second echelon - the 8th Guards Rifle, 6th Tank and 2th Guards Cavalry Corps began their advance to the bridgehead. However, a quick massive blow did not work. Two hundred tanks, thousands of riflemen and cavalrymen in long columns stretched along two narrow, snow-covered roads leading through the river to the west bank. As a result, the mobile units suffered losses from German artillery fire, not yet entering the battle. Only in the middle of the day the 6th Panzer Corps, which, due to General Getman’s disease, was commanded by Colonel P.M. Arman, crossed over to the bridgehead. Cavalry divisions were forced to linger on the east bank of the river until the next day.

Tankers rushed forward and achieved some success, freed several settlements. However, the success was bought at a high price: the brigades lost up to half of the personnel and tanks, there were many wounded requiring evacuation, and it was necessary to replenish stocks of fuel and ammunition. The tank corps went on the defensive. At this time, the German command was transferring part of the 27 Army Corps from the Rzhev area and the 9 Tank Division from the Sychevka area to the breakout area.


Soviet tank landing dismounts from the KV-1 tank on the Kalininsky front

The Kalinin Front attacked at once with both its wings and achieved more noticeable successes. The 41 Army under the command of G. F. Tarasov, aimed at the left flank of the Rzhev group, launched an offensive against the city of Bely, northward along the river Luches, was struck by V. Yushkevich’s 22 Army. In the morning of November 25, the 41 th Army Strike Group - the 6 th Siberian Voluntary Rifle Corps of General S.I. Povetkin and the 1 th Mechanized Corps, despite the blizzard and unsuitable terrain for attack, broke through the enemy defenses and began to bypass Bely, trying to cut the highway on Dukhovshchina. By the evening of November 27, advanced units of the 65 and 219 of the tank crews of the Solomatin mechkorpus reached Bely - Vladimirskoye road, interrupting one of the two most important communications of the German 41 tank corps.

Thus, a breakthrough 20 km wide and 30 km deep formed in the German defense. However, the Soviet infantry and artillery in off-road conditions were far behind the tankers, weakening the strike power of mobile units, which allowed the enemy to transfer reserves to dangerous areas. The mistakes of the Soviet command played a major role in this: the command and interaction of the troops were unsatisfactory, and there was no reliable connection with the units.

In addition, instead of following the tanks and completing a deep reach, General Tarasov threw the 150 Infantry Division north to the storming of Bely. However, our troops could not break the resistance of the enemy's 146 Infantry Division. In the morning of November 26, the German reserves approached - the 113-th motorized regiment of the 1-th tank division and the fusilier regiment of the Great Germany SS moto-division. The rest of the 1 Tank Division was thrown to the north - against two Solomatin tank brigades that mounted the Bely-Vladimirskoye highway. November 27 Tarasov threw in reserve - 47 and 48 tank brigades. However, Tarasov didn’t even send them into a breakthrough - the commander conceived a new roundabout maneuver. The 47 Brigade of Colonel I.F. Dremov was sent northeast of Bely to try to close the encirclement around the city. On November 29, Dremov managed to bypass the city and get on the Bely-Vladimirskoye highway, but he could not go further.

North of the 22-I army on the first day of the attack Yushkevich broke through the German defenses at the junction of the 86-th Infantry Division of the 41-Tank Corps and 110-th Infantry Division of the 23-Army Corps. The Germans did not have a solid defense here, the main obstacle for the advancing Soviet troops was at first deep snow and numerous minefields. On the next 2 of the day, General Yushkevich brought the Katukov Mechanized Corps into battle. Enemy troops dislodged from the valley of the river Luchesy. Further, the offensive stalled, as the Model transferred the last regiment from the Great Germany division to the 23-th Army Corps strip. The command of the Soviet army threw into battle its last reserves — the 114 th infantry brigade and the 39 th tank regiment. However, this did not help, the Soviet units could not advance further and go onto the Olenino-Belyy highway.

From the north, the 23 Army of Zygin, which had three rifle divisions, four rifle divisions and two tank brigades, advanced on the position of the German 39 Army Corps of the Germans. Since the army delivered an auxiliary strike, it had no reserves. As a result, it was impossible to break through the enemy defenses and enter the Olenino-Rzhev 39 highway. Its parts advanced only a few kilometers, and then were thrown back to their original positions.



To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
1942 Campaign

The Third Reich again goes on the offensive.
"The whole Russian front was falling apart ..." Wehrmacht breakthrough in the southern strategic direction
Stalingrad Fortress
1942 year. "The operation in the south develops without stopping"
How the German army broke through to Stalingrad
Expectations to take Stalingrad a sudden blow failed
Breakthrough of the 6 of the German army to the northern outskirts of Stalingrad
Defeat of the Crimean Front
"The spirit of optimism ... vital at the command post of the front." Kharkov disaster of the Red Army
Khrushchev dumped all the blame for the Kharkov catastrophe on Stalin
How the Wehrmacht stormed the Caucasus
Battle for the Caucasus: no invasions from land
The battle for the "black gold" of the Caucasus
How failed operation "Edelweiss"
"Soviet troops fought for every inch of land ..."
"Verdun of World War II ..."
"It truly was hell." How to reflect the first blow to Stalingrad
"We will storm Stalingrad and take it ...". Second storming of the stronghold on the Volga
The second assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
The third assault on Stalingrad
"Tanks drive through people like wood." The third assault on Stalingrad. H. 2
“We are fighting as if we are possessed, but we cannot make our way to the river ...”
Battle of Stalingrad changed the course of the “Big Game”
The German command is focused on "extremely active" defense and "a sense of superiority of the German soldier over the Russians"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus"
"Stalin's holiday": Operation "Uranus". H. 2
Stalingrad "boiler"
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  1. 210ox
    210ox 24 November 2017 06: 56 New
    +7
    Yes, the battles of 1942 and the beginning of the 43 years were hard for us. Even experience and strength were not enough, and the enemy was strong. But this was our VICTORY! By the way, not Sychev, but Sychevka.
  2. avva2012
    avva2012 24 November 2017 07: 11 New
    14
    Army General M.A. GAREEV, Doctor of Historical Sciences: "In order to properly understand the features of the Mars operation, it is advisable to pay attention to the following circumstances. First, it is a misconception and does not correspond to reality the opinion that the operation is on the south (Stalingrad, Uranus) and the western ("Mars") directions, these are two independent strategic operations. After failures in the summer-autumn campaigns of 1941 and 1942, the country, the State Defense Committee (GKO) made great efforts to provide reserves, weapons, ammunition by forces, other material and technical means, troops intended for a counter-offensive near Stalingrad ...... The idea of ​​the Supreme Command Headquarters was to "first defeat the enemy group in the interfluve of the Volga and Don, and then strike in the North Caucasus, the Upper Don and near Leningrad. In order to shackle the enemy and deprive him of the ability to maneuver forces, it was also envisaged to conduct offensive operations in the areas of Velikiye Luk, Rzhev and Vyazma. "The main objective of the operation in the region of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge was, therefore, to prevent the transfer of reserves from the group Army Center to the south, and if possible to attract additional enemy forces and thereby ensure the success of the Stalingrad operation. According to the Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, after discussion in At the same time, the plan and dates of the Stalingrad operation were finally approved by Supreme Commander-in-Chief IV Stalin, and GK Zhukov was subsequently tasked with preparing a distracting operation on the Kalinin and Western fronts ..... In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the note , which the famous Russian military historian and theorist A. A. Svechin introduced to the People's Commissar of Defense KE Voroshilov in March 1930, in which, in particular, he noted that the right to attack still needs to be earned. Only the successful operation of hundreds of divisions on all fronts will allow four dozen divisions to deliver a lightning strike in a chosen direction and achieve an unconditional victory. In the light of this remarkable thought of an outstanding military scientist, it can rightly be said that the subsequent victorious offensive operations in the western direction were "earned" precisely on the Rzhev-Vyazma land. Without these difficult, debilitating battles, there would be no decisive turning point in the war, nor its victorious end. And no modern "Martians", no matter how hard they try, will be able to portray victory by defeat ".http: //nethistory.su/blog/4369833153
    8 / Operatsiya-Mars
    1. andrewkor
      andrewkor 24 November 2017 07: 54 New
      10
      An exhaustive answer to "Martian strategists! Remember the film" Red Square "? They threw a regiment to death to ensure the success of the Front! The strategy is generally a cynical and ruthless science." I need several thousand dead soldiers to sit down at the negotiating table "(on the surrender of France ). Benito Mussolini.
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 24 November 2017 08: 14 New
        11
        Strategy is generally a cynical and ruthless science.

        What could be more valuable than the life of one person? The life of two people. During epidemics, quarantine is established around infected areas. Attempts to leave it are thwarted by all possible means. For some reason, in this form, "cruelty" does not cause rejection of office hamsters.
        1. Hantengri
          Hantengri 25 November 2017 00: 01 New
          +2
          Quote: avva2012
          For some reason, in this form, "cruelty" does not cause rejection of office hamsters.

          Well yes. But only as long as the hamster, by his meager stupidity, does not suspect that he, himself, his beloved, could be in the quarantine zone! As soon as you guess - the universal howl about the bloody gebnya (crossed out) by the doctors - the killers will be provided to you.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 25 November 2017 03: 24 New
            +2
            Assassins in white coats! We know, passed.
            The fact that the lost Battle of Stalingrad could lead to the implementation of the “General Plan Ost” in the end, the hamster’s brain is not able to digest such an “abstraction”, as well as the fact that, although officially in the USSR, abortion was not prohibited, but was not encouraged in every way , up to posters in antenatal clinics, "Mom, I could live." Perhaps there would be a different policy in the "vile scoop", then ....
            1. Hantengri
              Hantengri 25 November 2017 17: 53 New
              +2
              Quote: avva2012
              The fact that the lost Battle of Stalingrad could lead to the implementation of the “General Plan Ost” in the end, the hamster’s brain is not able to digest such an “abstraction”

              Are you sure they heard about him? Vague doubts torment me ...
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 25 November 2017 18: 16 New
                +4
                Well, yes, history buffs, I forgot. The main thing for them is to know for sure that Stalin personally drank the blood of 100 millions, and Beria raped the same amount. Well, those who remained behind the scenes, German bunkers flunked them with corpses. Here, just who 2 Milena is German, got upset, I even get lost in conjecture.
                1. Hantengri
                  Hantengri 25 November 2017 22: 06 New
                  +4
                  Quote: avva2012
                  Well, yes, history buffs, I forgot. The main thing for them is to know for sure that Stalin personally drank the blood of 100 million, and Beria raped the same amount.

                  Stone crusher, in a terrible basement on the Lubyanka, swallowed them all ... !!!
                  Quote: avva2012
                  That’s only, who is 2 milenas of Germans, got upset, I’m even lost in conjecture.

                  Well, so it is known who !!!
                  Quote: avva2012
                  100 million, and Beria raped the same amount.

                  2 million (business!), Well, this is a week of “work”! And if you attract subordinates, you can manage in two days. The choice is small - either, you, a German woman is juicy, or a stone crusher is dishonorable! The combination of the pleasant, with the useful for life, so inspires ... laughing
                  1. avva2012
                    avva2012 26 November 2017 03: 54 New
                    +3
                    I agree with you. As you look around, as you reflect on our black past in crimson tones, so terribly covers your knees. Nightmares torment, pester obsessive thoughts, the voices of the innocently killed Wrangel and Krasnov. One joy and support is our heavenly protector, Nicholas and other white saints who fell during the great turmoil (though, you, as a Gentile, wassat judging by the flag, it seems that it does not concern 30 percent, but already in the Russian Federation), but who cares.
                    ps and the German woman is juicy, it's buzzing. It is a pity that he was born late. laughing
    2. avt
      avt 24 November 2017 10: 44 New
      10
      Quote: avva2012
      The main objective of the operation in the area of ​​the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge was, therefore, to prevent the transfer of reserves from Army Group Center to the south, and, if possible, to attract additional enemy forces and thereby ensure the success of the Stalingrad operation . As Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. writes Vasilevsky, after discussing a number of issues at the Headquarters, the plan and terms of the Stalingrad operation were finally approved by the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin, and G.K. After that, Zhukov received the task of preparing a distracting operation on the Kalinin and Western fronts ....

      Absolutely! Moreover! This direction was highlighted through ,, Monastery ”as the main direction of the strike! Well, only Mlechin can broadcast about the fact that Abwehr and other services did not know ANYTHING about the impending counter-strike. It is impossible to hide the movement of such an amount of forces and means. But to hide the direction of the main strike - That was brilliantly played already in the operation Bagration
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 24 November 2017 10: 48 New
        +7
        Yes. For me personally, the opinion of Sudoplatov and Gareev is expert.
      2. BAI
        BAI 24 November 2017 11: 15 New
        +7
        was lit through ,, Monastery "

        I also wanted to write about it, but not a word about it on the official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service (http://svr.gov.ru/history/operation4.htm)
        Although in the memoirs of Sudoplatov:
        Disinformation was sometimes of strategic importance. So, on November 4, 1942, Heine-Max announced that the Red Army would strike the Germans on November 15, not near Stalingrad, but in the North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were waiting for a blow near Rzhev and repelled it. But the environment of the Paulus group near Stalingrad came as a complete surprise to them.

        Zhukov, unaware of this radio game, paid a dear price - thousands and thousands of our soldiers under his command were killed in the offensive near Rzhev. In his memoirs, he admits that the outcome of this offensive operation was unsatisfactory. But he never found out that the Germans were warned of our advance in the Rzhev direction, so he threw so many troops there.
        1. avt
          avt 24 November 2017 12: 42 New
          12
          Quote: BAI
          but on the official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service not a word about this

          bully Amazing right? bully Moreover, prose writers "even manage to declare that the removal of Zhukov from ,, Uranus" and the appointment to ,, Mars ", is such a vicious revenge of the envious glory of Zhukov Stalin! bully But the appointment is also part of the game to hide the direction of the main blow! Well, suppose that the Germans do not track personnel movements of this level, and even draw conclusions in comparison with other data of all types of intelligence ... request this is the destiny of analytes of type
          Quote: Fox
          all the "talent" of the stickman Zhukov in color.
          with their operetnoy wringing hands in exaltation of the image of their own suffering.
          Quote: Monster_Fat
          "Rzhevskaya meat grinder" .... Pointless and ruthless ...

          request
          Quote: Monster_Fat
          ruthless ...

          This is yes. But
          Quote: Monster_Fat
          Meaningless

          This is for those who do not consider the entire totality of events and realities of TOGO time, and even who know the final result in 1945.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 04 New
            +5
            Quote: avt Well, assume that the Germans do not track personnel movements of this level

            Not just not tracked, but they knew for sure that Zhukov would be at Rzhev.
            Nothing is new under the moon. Caught on the old truth, "first, you work for a reputation, and then a reputation works for you." She worked. The main threat at that time was destroyed, that is, the capture of Stalingrad, a breakthrough to the Volga, the loss of the Caucasus, oil, the entry of Turkey into the war, etc., etc. And ,, prose writers "either do not know about logic or deliberately cast a shadow on the wattle fence.
          2. alstr
            alstr 24 November 2017 13: 39 New
            +2
            By the way, the Anglo-Saxons used a similar trick when landing in Normandy. They then formed a fictitious army under the command of Patton. and the Germans also bought it.
            1. avt
              avt 24 November 2017 13: 44 New
              10
              Quote: alstr
              They then formed a fictitious army under the command of Patton. and the Germans also bought it.

              There was EVEN cooler - the Wehrmacht general openly drove the misinformation directly to Hitler, even after when it was already simply impossible to hide the scale of the landing in Normandy, the chief of staff had frankly slowed down the transfer of tank units. Actually, Rommel paid for it with suicide, bargaining for a guarantee that the family would not go to a concentration camp.
              1. Bashibuzuk
                Bashibuzuk 24 November 2017 14: 13 New
                +4
                Gentlemen, gentlemen, comrades, white sharks, karharodon .... stand a minute.
                What authority of Zhukov is comrade avva2012 talking about in 1942? What authority did he have at that time?
                Well. Khalkhin-Gol ... was, yes. So this Halkin-Gol is notable primarily for its brilliant transport operation, as they say now - a logistic one. Where are our MTS bases, where you need to drive the dead one and a half truck, what is the leverage of transportation ... yes, all this is urgent, fast, in secret. Here, it seems to me, first of all. merit of the headquarters, and specifically NS Bogdanov. And the operation itself .... well, not impressive, you know. Forehead. Turk-Turk .... Looks like the Germans have seen enough of such a "head-on" strategy. Yes, and rushed "gardens" to Warsaw, but Paris, all on the flanks, but the flanks. And in the mind they made a mark - Zhukov pounding in the forehead.
                Then he is a whole NGSH of the Red Army - a figure, needless to say.
                And what do we see? Ineptly spent summer and autumn months, in an attempt again to stop the Germans in the forehead. Or is it generally unknown what ....
                Then Zhukov valiantly commands the Reserve Front .... and the German group calmly turns itself to the South and Southeast.
                Yes, they wanted to spit on this Zhukov. Which, incidentally, was immediately transferred to the Leningrad Front.
                But Moscow was defended - we must not hide, the nonsense of the German General Staffists, coupled with libertine and God on our side, and the Siberian-Far Eastern divisions. Which fell completely, but Moscow defended. Zhukov at that time was sharing bread in Leningrad.
                And then - they throw the former NGS from place to place, then they will fight, it will be noted here.
                What kind of front commander is this (former NGS), to whom no one, well, not a single dog has brought — they say, Georgi Konstantinich, you’ve saved the soldiers ... it’s enough to scare the Germans with your name alone. But this operation is like that, to divert the eyes of the Germans, you are with us, G.K. - You stand two solid armored fists.
                It turned out - not enough. It was necessary to lay 400 thousand, send 700 thousand to the rear, ditch the mass of equipment, create authority Simonov for "Rzhev" ...... ah .. well and so on.
                Apparently, such an authoritative comrade was that only in the regime of Baba Yaga he could serve .... by raids and take into fright. Its parts.
                No, I don’t see any authority here.
                This speech was about the Second Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya ..... and how many of them were all, by numbers, eh? And the rest was carried out by the "most authoritative" Zhukov? Strengthened, so to speak, authority, yes?
                For me, he ..... well, a little more than .... I will not.
                1. avva2012
                  avva2012 24 November 2017 14: 40 New
                  +7
                  And Moscow defended - we will not hide

                  Sami, as usual, maybe, etc., ... I won’t, otherwise they will ban me for the mat. Zhukov nothing to do with it? And, if at that, then for one such operation, the Germans had to correct their pince-nez and take a closer look, xy from xy.
                  I will not argue about General Morzzzz and other Siberian divisional stamps. he himself is not a strategist and did not finish academies. But.
                  There are things that can and should be, if you do not have the entirety of the information, download by indirect. And, indirectly, we have steel. I.e., straight steel, in the form of comrade I.V. Stalin, who G.K. Zhukov, chest hung awards that 6 body armor protection class. From Moscow to Berlin, he put this man on the most important operations. Was he stupid or kindhearted? Maybe he didn’t understand people, comrade Joseph Vissarionovich? Yes, no, like, on key posts, he always had professionals with a capital "F". Lavrenty Pavlovich, take one.
                  So, Rezun’s song in a new way is not very good. Although, I understand, perhaps this is your personal opinion, reinforced, unlike me, by a deep knowledge of tactics and strategy. I, more and more in everyday psychology and A. Isaev, trust, which, as you know, is not a schoolgirl ruddy, but George Konstantinovich, appreciates only in excellent epithets. Maybe he read some archives?
                  1. Bashibuzuk
                    Bashibuzuk 24 November 2017 15: 04 New
                    +2
                    Well, avva2012, Alexander Vasilievich, I guess, right? About Moscow in 1941 - Zhukov, I think, nothing to do with it, really. He has nothing to do with it. Commander of Leningrad - September 14 - October 10. A lot of things can be ordered in a month? Zapadny_Reservny Front - Commander from July 29 to September 11, the result - the first offensive operation of the Red Army. Came .... to Moscow itself. No, what?
                    Then from October 08 to 1943 - everything commands and commands. Western front. And the front, as it got stuck in the swamps of the Moscow Region, so - until the Germans themselves left it, led by Model, it got stuck. At the same time, it was provided not weakly. To everyone. Ah yes the commander, where is Rodimtsev, let’s say.
                    As for promotion to key posts, and in general, career growth, especially in the army, there is really nothing to argue. Any sensible commander will try to keep the “ogloved with crystal-clear eyes” away from himself and in the shortest possible time - including by way of promotion to a higher position! Unfortunately. I think you, as a medical practitioner, are also well aware of this.
                    So, neither the number of awards, nor the number of posts, nor the other "achievements and merits" make any impression on me.
                    You are right - this is a personal opinion. My. And my uncle, who started with Chuikov near Stalingrad.
                    And I’ll add from myself that not a single military leader has, say, the ninth edition of his memoirs. Moreover, starting from the third, all memoirs are posthumous.
                    For some reason, I’m very afraid of this.
                    .
                    As for the frost - I'm not saying that the frost won. Although he came in handy.
                    And to the fact that the entire NGSH of the Red Army is to blame - to admit the enemy to the capital!
                    1. alstr
                      alstr 24 November 2017 15: 32 New
                      +4
                      Again a song about the fact that everything was done contrary to the authorities.
                      This is a bit wrong.
                      If in fact, then one of Zhukov’s first orders in Leningrad was the refusal to mine and explode the Baltic Fleet. As well as stupid orders such as forging checkers and spades, we will fight with them.
                      And so that they would not say (in particular, that the Germans themselves had withdrawn their troops, etc.), but Zhukov played his part in the defense of Leningrad and the city as a result was not surrendered.

                      And as for the guilt of only the highest military leadership - this is not entirely correct. Yes, a considerable part of the blame lies with them for the defeats of 41-42, but a considerable part also lies with the lower command staff of the army (with all due respect to their heroism), because a significant part did not follow the instructions given from above.

                      For example, only Zhukov wrote several orders on the topic of circumventing fortification points in the offensive. Or the need to have a mobile anti-tank reserve. Almost every month he wrote, but they didn’t do it. And the Headquarters Representatives also did not appear from a good life, but from the fact that they did not provide reliable information to the top.
                    2. avva2012
                      avva2012 24 November 2017 15: 37 New
                      +5
                      Not Alexander Vasilyevich and not even Maslyakov. Humor, I understand, is not ice, but like humor for personal pleasure.
                      And in medicine, it happens differently, as elsewhere. Even in our industry, an “Ogloved with crystal-clear eyes” is not always assigned to leading posts. The previous minister, a practitioner himself, an excellent surgeon and organizer. It’s just that the times are gone, not by night will be remembered, have come.
                      I’m sorry that your relative started with Chuikov, but this is the opinion of your relative and no more, with all due respect to the war veteran. Authority I.V. Stalin, nevertheless, will be more serious. And to choose, he, as the Supreme Commander, was from whom. For some reason, hosted the Victory Parade, yet G.K. Zhukov. For me, that says a lot. And about the fact that "allowed the enemy to the capital," so some democracies fell in 42 day. And there are colonies that slightly increase the territory, both the economy and the General Staff from the “blue blood” and traditions, not like ours from the plow.
                      1. Bashibuzuk
                        Bashibuzuk 24 November 2017 15: 54 New
                        +1
                        ",, But there is interest,
                        how do women go there ... "
                        Let be. Let Zhukov be super.
                        Why didn’t they send him to the war with Japan?
                        That's where the Japs and authority would not have to be scared - they would have done the seppuk without knowing what was going.
                        Yes, and accept the surrender from Japan - is this not an enchanting finish?
                        But no .....
                    3. avva2012
                      avva2012 24 November 2017 16: 25 New
                      +3
                      That's where the Japs and authority would not have to be scared - they would have done the seppuk without knowing what was going.

                      A good boss, if you have someone to work with, will give you the opportunity to distinguish yourself not only to your "most beloved employee", but that there will be no offense in the team, he will entrust the obviously beneficial business to the other (them). Yes, and you can tear yourself, and so the Berlin operation has just passed. How much work there was and responsibility, where is Stakhanov. And there are a lot of things.
                2. horhe48
                  horhe48 28 November 2017 09: 01 New
                  0
                  Your reasoning seems unconvincing. Try to justify and prove that if the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation had not been carried out, the Germans would not have transferred reserves to the Stalingrad direction. Surely they would have transferred. And since they didn’t abandon their plans to attack Moscow in 1942, maintaining the platzdarm in the Moscow direction was of paramount importance to them. As a result, the reserves were “tied” by heavy fighting, suffered losses and it was not possible to take them away from there for these reasons It may be that both the Stalingrad and Rzhev-Vyazem operations were not conceived as a whole (Stalin probably demanded that the Moscow direction be secured, but they could certainly succeed both here and there), but their coincidence in time did not allow the Germans to maneuver their forces and and at the decisive moment of the Battle of Stalingrad they did not have enough reserves to support Paulus. As for G.V. Zhukov, then the Germans knew that he had been sent to the most difficult sectors before. Maybe this was not the main argument, but the fact that Zhukov was sent to this or that sector of the front strengthened the confidence of German strategists that the NSU would be where it is.
                3. horhe48
                  horhe48 28 November 2017 09: 02 New
                  0
                  Your reasoning seems unconvincing. Try to justify and prove that if the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation had not been carried out, the Germans would not have transferred reserves to the Stalingrad direction. Surely they would have transferred. And since they didn’t abandon their plans to attack Moscow in 1942, maintaining the platzdarm in the Moscow direction was of paramount importance to them. As a result, the reserves were “tied” by heavy fighting, suffered losses and it was not possible to take them away from there for these reasons It may be that both the Stalingrad and Rzhev-Vyazem operations were not conceived as a whole (Stalin probably demanded that the Moscow direction be secured, but they could certainly succeed both here and there), but their coincidence in time did not allow the Germans to maneuver their forces and and at the decisive moment of the Battle of Stalingrad they did not have enough reserves to support Paulus. As for G.V. Zhukov, then the Germans knew that he had been sent to the most difficult sectors before. Maybe this was not the main argument, but the fact that Zhukov was sent to this or that sector of the front strengthened the confidence of German strategists that the NSU would be where it is.
              2. chenia
                chenia 24 November 2017 18: 13 New
                +4
                Quote: avt
                There was EVEN cooler - the Wehrmacht generals frankly drove disu directly to Hitler


                Absolutely, then the German generals were already thinking about whom to give up, and therefore they were incredibly stupid. After 1,5 months Hitler tried to finish. And while he exhausted sedition, in the Ardennes it was too late to rock the boat.
                And so, if they wanted, they broke the Allies to the fullest in June 1944.
                True, it would not cost us cheaply, but we would take Paris.
      3. Monarchist
        Monarchist 24 November 2017 17: 22 New
        +2
        True, I read about it somewhere, and it said that Zhukov was not dedicated to all the details.
        In general, the battles for the Elninsky ledge and the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation in our historiography were not very favored. I remember even with the Union in the framework of the program “Serving the Soviet Union” and there was a cycle: “This day in the war”, the presenter seems to say there said, “Our historians still have no time to work on this topic”
    3. antivirus
      antivirus 24 November 2017 16: 43 New
      0
      northeast of Rzhev - 15 km Polunino. beyond it is another 25 km d Maximovo:
      for a speaker under the Reichstag dome:
      antivirus 3 November 20, 2016 12:36
      antivirus Today, 11: 59 ↑
      Sergei Gavrilovich Semenov, 1931, d. Maksimovo, Staritsky district of the Kalinin region: "We were under the German for a month and a half, but nearby, under Rzhev 1,5 g, They did not consider us to be people." At 10 years old, the child understood instinctively, everyday communication, glances and were beaten, expelled from the hut.
      + the elder brother died at the front, and 2 more were blown up on the remaining supplies in the ground (which ones? I dismantled out of curiosity, but I don’t know)
      Reply Quote Complaint More ...
      ++ even earlier, he said-- "the first doctor to go was a military doctor, oh gut ... gave a harmonica and a chocolate bar"
      NEXT WAS - SEE THE FIRST PART
  3. Olgovich
    Olgovich 24 November 2017 07: 14 New
    +2
    Awful bloody operation ....
    What was going on there and how the Russian soldiers fought is well described in Mikhin’s memoirs “Gunners, Stalin gave the order” and Shumilin “Vanka Rotny”
  4. Monster_Fat
    Monster_Fat 24 November 2017 07: 21 New
    +2
    "Rzhevskaya meat grinder" .... Pointless and ruthless ...
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 24 November 2017 07: 23 New
    +7
    I am killed under Rzhev,
    In an unchanged swamp,
    In the fifth company, on the left,
    With a cruel raid.
    I did not hear the rupture,
    I did not see that flash, -
    Like a precipice from a cliff -
    And neither the bottom nor the tires.
    And in all this world,
    Until the end of his days,
    Neither loops, nor crochets
    From my tunic.
    I am where the roots are blind
    They look for food in the darkness;
    I am where with a cloud of dust
    Rye walks on a hill;
    I am where the cock crow
    At dawn the dew;
    I am where your cars are
    The air is torn on the highway;
    Where a blade of grass to a blade of grass
    The grass river spins, -
    There, where at the wake
    Even the mother will not come.

    Count, live,
    How long ago
    Was at the front for the first time
    Named suddenly Stalingrad.
    The front burned, not abating,
    As on the body of the scar.
    I'm dead and I do not know,
    Is our Rzhev finally?
    Did our
    There, on the Middle Don? ..
    This month was terrible,
    It was all at stake.
    Is it possible until autumn?
    There was already Don
    And at least wheels
    Did he escape to the Volga?
    No it is not true. Tasks
    That did not win the enemy!
    No, no! Otherwise
    Even to the dead - how?
    And the dead, mute,
    There is only one joy:
    We fell for our country,
    But she is saved.
    Our eyes faded,
    The flame of the heart went out,
    On Earth in Verification
    Do not call us.
    We have our own fighting
    Do not wear the Order.
    You - all this, alive.
    We are pleased with one thing:
    What was not in vain struggled
    We are for motherland.
    May our voice not be heard
    You must know him.
    You should have been, brothers,
    Stand, like a wall,
    For the curse of the dead -
    This penalty is terrible.
    This is a formidable right
    It’s forever given to us, -
    And after us it is -
    This is a bitter right.
    In the summer, in the forty-second,
    I'm buried without a grave.
    Everything that happened afterwards,
    Death deprived me.
    To all that, perhaps, long ago
    You are accustomed and clear,
    But yes it will be
    With our faith according to.

    Brothers, maybe you
    And Don did not lose,
    And in the rear of Moscow
    For her, they died.
    And in the Volga region
    Hastily digging trenches,
    And with the fighting came
    To the limit of Europe.
    We need to know
    What was, of course,
    That last span
    On the road military.
    That last span,
    What if you leave,
    That stepped backwards
    The leg has nowhere to put.
    That feature of depth,
    Behind which rose
    Because of your back
    The flames of forges of the Urals.
    And the enemy turned
    You are to the west, back.
    Maybe twinned,
    And Smolensk already taken?
    And the enemy you smash
    On another line,
    Maybe you are to the border
    Approached already!
    Maybe ... Yes, come true
    The word of the holy oath! -
    Berlin, if you remember,
    He was named after Moscow.
    Brothers now spoiled
    The fortress of the enemy land,
    If dead, fallen
    If only we could cry!
    If volleys victorious
    Us, the dumb and the deaf,
    We are eternally devoted,
    Resurrected for a moment, -
    Oh, true comrades,
    Only then b on the warrior
    Your happiness is immense
    You comprehended completely.
    In him, that happiness, the indisputable
    Our blood part,
    Our, torn by death,
    Faith, hatred, passion.
    Our everything! Do not be sullied
    We are in a severe struggle,
    All having given, they did not leave
    Nothing to myself.

    All of you are listed
    Forever, not for a period.
    And alive not in reproach
    This voice is your imaginable.
    Brothers, in this war
    We did not know the differences:
    Those that are alive, that have fallen -
    We were on a par with.
    And no one before us
    Of the living not in debt,
    Who is the hand of our banner
    Picked up on the run,
    To the sacred thing,
    For the Soviet government
    Also, maybe, accurately
    A step further to fall.
    I am killed under Rzhev,
    He is still near Moscow.
    Somewhere, warriors, where you are,
    Who stayed alive?
    In cities of millions,
    In the villages, at home in the family?
    In combat garrisons
    Not on our land?
    Ah, its own. alien,
    All in the flowers of il in the snow ...
    I will bequeath your life, -
    What more can I do?
    Bequeathed to that life
    You are happy to be
    And my homeland homeland
    With honor to continue to serve.
    To grieve proudly
    Do not bend your head,
    Rejoicing - Not Boasting
    In the hour of victory itself.
    And take care of her holy
    Brothers, your happiness -
    In memory of a warrior-brother,
    What died for her.
    A. Twardowski
  6. Fox
    Fox 24 November 2017 07: 40 New
    +4
    all the "talent" of the stickman Zhukov in color.
    1. avva2012
      avva2012 24 November 2017 07: 43 New
      11
      "stickman Zhukov", and you are an expert at 80 level?
      1. avt
        avt 24 November 2017 10: 47 New
        10
        Quote: Fox
        all the "talent" of the stickman Zhukov in color.

        Quote: avva2012
        "stickman Zhukov", and you are an expert at 80 level?

        Don’t bother - a typical whooper sofa.
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 24 November 2017 10: 54 New
          11
          Quote: avt Yes, do not bother - a typical couch whooper.

          M.A. Gareev writes, “But then no one asked this representative why not all, even no less important events of the Second World War are reflected in American or English history, in textbooks? There is, for example, such a fact. In February 1942, the 60 thousandth the British garrison, led by General A. Percival, defended the fortress of Singapore, but as soon as the Japanese approached the city, the British troops, who had large quantities of ammunition and food supplies, capitulated almost without resistance.W. Churchill called this act the most shameful root page of British history ".
          So, this is the opinion of the next Kolya from N. Urengoy, so I have to answer.
          1. avt
            avt 24 November 2017 11: 30 New
            +5
            Quote: avva2012
            W. Churchill called this act the most shameful page in British history. "

            An interesting fact in the piggy bank for thought in the spirit of “conspiracy theories.” When they surrendered, there was a communication cable there, so the Angles did not touch it until the next return of Singapore! And when you decide to return, they sent the submarine and cut it.
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 24 November 2017 11: 40 New
              +2
              Quote: avt An interesting fact in the piggy bank for thought in the spirit of ,, conspiracy theories ”

              Could, you, not develop the idea a lot, I personally am not aware of these ups and downs.
              1. avt
                avt 24 November 2017 12: 30 New
                +4
                Quote: avva2012
                Could you, develop a thought a little,

                Walter Lord’s, "An incredible victory," the Americans on the underwater cable, teased the American obscenities "Japanese in Japan, and those ... answered them," incomprehensible "gibberish bully Surprisingly, cable transoceanic communications during the war .... persisted! On the fingers count the cases of destruction. Here, in the First, it’s possible that Zmden on the Cocos Islands cut down a relay station and immediately elusive paid for it - Sydney came up. And the case I’m talking about - the Angles did not touch the cables Saigon-Singapore and Saigon-Hong Kong before 1945, and cut with a guarantee in several places.
                1. avva2012
                  avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 09 New
                  +2
                  Thank. I will not say that it has become much clearer. Apparently, the flaws of education. What to read do not tell me?
                  1. avt
                    avt 24 November 2017 13: 40 New
                    +4
                    Quote: avva2012
                    What to read do not tell me?

                    request Who direct transcripts of conversations then publish a separate book then? bully Well, if it’s popular and for the most part in the technical aspect - Arthur Clark ,, Voice across the ocean "publishing house ,, Communication" 1964
                    1. avva2012
                      avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 44 New
                      +3
                      bully Well then, thanks!
          2. antivirus
            antivirus 24 November 2017 20: 41 New
            +1
            So, this is the opinion of the next Kolya from N. Urengoy, so I have to answer

            -a finish MGIMO and will represent the Russian Federation in Brussels whether Singapore.
            stages of a long journey have begun
    2. dzvero
      dzvero 24 November 2017 09: 16 New
      +8
      And what is wrong with Zhukov? He tied large German forces in battle, not allowing the transfer of troops near Stalingrad. Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs that the Germans were "leaked" to the offensive plans near Rzhev, convincing them that the main blow would be delivered there, and Stalingrad was a distraction.
      1. avva2012
        avva2012 24 November 2017 09: 25 New
        11
        This is not with Zhukov, something is wrong, but with one of the saved descendants.
        1. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 25 November 2017 20: 36 New
          +4
          Quote: avva2012
          but with one of the saved descendants.

          With Kolyan from Urengoy ...
      2. creak
        creak 24 November 2017 10: 23 New
        +1
        Quote: dzvero
        Bound large German forces in battle, not allowing the transfer of troops near Stalingrad

        So after all, our troops, bogged down in battles, also could not be deployed, at least under the same Stalingrad .. They would not be out of place there ...
        When they say that the enemy’s grouping was connected as a result of the operation, they often forget to mention that for this they had to divert their own forces ... Not everything is so simple ...
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 24 November 2017 10: 27 New
          +5
          And how would they be thrown over if the 1,5 millionth enemy group hung over them? (which, there on the map, is not 150 km to Moscow).
          1. creak
            creak 24 November 2017 10: 40 New
            0
            Quote: avva2012
            But how would they be thrown over if a 1,5 million enemy group hung over them?

            Just like German troops at dzvero - I just noted that both sides were deprived of the opportunity to withdraw troops from this operational area, and not just the Germans ....
            This, incidentally, applies not only to this battle ....
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 24 November 2017 10: 45 New
              +4
              Why the Germans, being in well-trained positions, could not remove the units for transportation to the south, I do not understand. If ours had not begun the offensive, then nothing would have prevented them from transferring part of their forces.
              1. creak
                creak 24 November 2017 10: 55 New
                +1
                Quote: avva2012
                Why the Germans, being in well-trained positions, could not remove the units for transportation to the south, I do not understand

                I will answer the old parable: Ivan, I caught a bear. So drag him here ... But he will not let me ....
                1. avva2012
                  avva2012 24 November 2017 11: 06 New
                  +1
                  If so, then you have to admit that it’s right, here it is: D. Glentza, who wrote a book about this operation, calling it "the largest defeat of Marshal Zhukov." I personally trust our opinion.
        2. dzvero
          dzvero 24 November 2017 11: 47 New
          +6
          At the end of the 42nd Red Army was already able to forge a large (!) Enemy grouping and at the same time conduct an offensive operation in another sector of the front. And the Wehrmacht was no longer able to maneuver troops on such a scale. In the summer, the difference is from the 41st, when the German command calmly removed troops from near Leningrad to storm Moscow or when it redirected a large group from the Moscow direction to Kiev. Then the Germans were not afraid of "otvetki" from the Red Army.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 14 New
            +3
            “Slightly, a little” was not enough for what we lost in 41, but still did not work at full power in 42. Therefore, I personally have a very negative attitude to the expression that "42 year, this is a school year." There were no economic opportunities, i.e. shells, tanks, airplanes, and a military genius, he either is or is not. Proved by Napoleon, Suvorov, Frederick the Great. hi
            1. dzvero
              dzvero 24 November 2017 13: 44 New
              +8
              Genius - piece goods. But a brilliant commander without trained troops can do little. In the 42nd, the Red Army was just limping combat coordination, command and control of the combat arms at the regiment-division-army level. There was still a practice of "tanks separately, infantry separately, and aviation on its own." Only in the 43rd flaws and omissions identified in the first period of the war were overcome. Only then, together with the establishment of a production base, did the Red Army become a debugged and honed tool of geopolitics for the leadership of the USSR. Indeed, until the beginning of the 50s the power of the "conventional" RKKA "model of 1945" was the only (and convincing) counterweight to nuclear weapons of the United States.
              So, in my opinion, the term "educational" essentially reflects the transition of the Red Army (and the USSR at the same time) to a qualitatively new level of development.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 48 New
                +3
                Well, well, convincingly. Although the word training, you correctly quoted. Somehow, otherwise, it becomes bad from such an image.
                the power of the 'conventional' Red Army of the 1945 year model was the only (and convincing) counterweight to the US nuclear weapons.

                Yeah, and they also say ten million Chinese who are ready to go where the “Helmsman” will order, though through the Berengov Strait. laughing
      3. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 24 November 2017 14: 57 New
        +3
        "What is wrong with Zhukov?" ///

        Nothing special - in his repertoire. He laid another million soldiers in the ground. After this operation, he, fortunately, was forever removed from strategic planning and forever expelled from the General Staff. Stalin realized that women give birth more slowly than Zhukov sends cannon fodder to machine guns.
        1. polpot
          polpot 24 November 2017 18: 28 New
          +2
          I agree with you, the further this genius was from the front line, the better the soldiers were, Zhukov’s fear and respect for Rokosovsky are two different things.
          1. Doliva63
            Doliva63 27 November 2017 01: 39 New
            +5
            Quote: polpot
            Zhukov's fear

            Are you from personal memories? laughing
            So the chukh is full. Firsthand - father fought in the Second World War, Zhukov spoke warmly. I believe him more than what they write on the fence.
        2. Cartalon
          Cartalon 24 November 2017 19: 58 New
          +4
          Wow Zhukov suspended from planning, a million to the ground, the first time I see stupidity from you
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 25 November 2017 22: 10 New
            +1
            After the failed Rzhev, Zhukov did not plan any strategic operations other than Berlin (he urged Stalin not to remain in the shadow of Rokossovsky and others at the end of the war). The General Staff was headed by Vasilevsky and Antonov, and things went smoothly. They didn’t let Zhukov go there. He became the "representative of Stalin on the fronts." He also interfered fairly, but at least could not start some kind of lethal attack.
            1. stalkerwalker
              stalkerwalker 25 November 2017 22: 17 New
              +4
              ... I have nothing against an impartial analysis conducted under the direction of G.K. Zhukov. The rejection causes the depressing incompetence of critics of the marshal in a number of journalistic works of recent years. V. Suvorov, V. Beshanov, V. Safir demonstrate a lack of understanding of the basic principles of operations and ignorance of factual material. Therefore, instead of constructive criticism, we get tubs of slop, and instead of an integral picture of a battle, a picture of margarine in the style of “horses, people mixed in a bunch”. The main problem is that they already have an answer in advance to any questions: “The Stalin regime is to blame!” (Pronounced with a fierce gleam of noble madness in the eyes). A thorough analysis of documents, facts and decisions made is not required. It is enough to grab a few details from the surface, and you can amaze the public with the conclusions that the author had prepared even before studying certain events. It comes to the point of absurdity - Zhukov is accused of conducting exercises at the Totsky training ground in 1954 with the use of an atomic bomb, while in the 1950's this was common practice. In 1955, in Nevada, the exercise "Desert Rock VI" was held, in which about 8 thousand US troops participated. There are tons of photographs of American soldiers looking curiously at a nuclear explosion mushroom. The tasks of the American exercises read in plain text: "To familiarize troops with the capabilities of new weapons and the conduct of hostilities in a nuclear war." The consequences of nuclear explosions have not yet been fully studied, and the situation required the preparation of troops for action in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons. Suffice it to say that the headquarters of the exercises and its guests at the time of the nuclear explosion were in an open area only 11 km from the epicenter of the explosion. Humanity in those years was still playing with a dangerous toy that fell into his hands, not realizing the danger of the effects of nuclear weapons invisible to the eye. But to create a negative image of Zhukov, intelligence analysts put him in a concrete bunker away from the explosion, as if the case is happening these days ...

              A. Isaev. "Georgy Zhukov. Last argument ..."
        3. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 25 November 2017 20: 43 New
          +4
          Quote: voyaka uh
          After this operation, he, fortunately, was forever removed from strategic planning and forever expelled from the General Staff.

          And what happened in November 44?
          And how is this “disgraced” G.L. Zhukov, I.V. Stalin, appointed to command the 1-m Belorussky?
          Lyosha .. It seems like a smart man ... And broadcast Goebbels propaganda ....
          New, young cadres “Antonov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky” “grew” in the General Staff. Both Vatutin and Vasilevsky went through school with confrontations ...
          Good luck, Lesha, in the matter of propaganda .... Far from you to Y. Kedmi. Oh, how far.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 25 November 2017 22: 13 New
            +1
            "appointed to command the 1st Belorussian?" ////

            This is not planning an operation, but commanding according to a plan developed not by him, but
            General Staff, in which he was no longer.

            He was not disgraced. Just Stalin, finally, seduced that a person is not pulling the post. And that the human mobilization resources of the USSR are not rubber. Everyone knew that Zhukov was not able to plan operations. And Stalin appreciated Zhukov's personal devotion to himself.
            1. stalkerwalker
              stalkerwalker 25 November 2017 22: 20 New
              +4
              We read above ....
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 26 November 2017 04: 38 New
                +3
                Just J. Kedmi, this is a living example of the fact that you can be a communist. Not to be at the same time, not to be anti-Soviet.
  7. igordok
    igordok 24 November 2017 08: 39 New
    12
    In preparation for the defense in the Great Bow region, the Germans committed another crime. The population of several villages prepared for defense were driven into a barn in the village of Andryukovo, Velikoluksky district. Where they were burned. More than 360 people, women, children, old people died. And this was not done by the SS, but by the Wehrmacht.

    After Koliizurengoy’s speech, shouts began to rise in his defense that the Wehrmacht, unlike the SS, was not recognized as a criminal organization, and it could be “pitied”. In vain.
    These creatures, "regret"?
    1. avva2012
      avva2012 24 November 2017 09: 09 New
      +8
      The humanism of the USSR, from our point of view, simply knew no limits, but, nevertheless, we look at that situation after 70 years. I think that He knew better, although purely human, the number of superhuman, in the end, had to be significantly reduced.
      1. Proxima
        Proxima 24 November 2017 09: 35 New
        +7
        Quote: avva2012
        The humanism of the USSR, from our point of view, simply knew no limits ....

        I agree, this is how we "recouped" on German prisoners of war ..
        1. Proxima
          Proxima 24 November 2017 09: 40 New
          +4
          "Revenge" for all their atrocities in full. New Year celebration in Soviet captivity.
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 24 November 2017 10: 22 New
            +4
            If I’m not mistaken, there was a plot in the Soviet film “Wounded”, where the boy tried to throw a bunch of grenades into such “heroes” in the camp, but as a result he blew himself up. Apparently, the boy saw firsthand the art of these .....
            1. Proxima
              Proxima 24 November 2017 12: 48 New
              +4
              Quote: avva2012
              If I’m not mistaken, there was a plot in the Soviet film “Wounded”, where the boy tried to throw a bunch of grenades into such “heroes” in the camp, but as a result he blew himself up. Apparently, the boy saw firsthand the art of these .....

              I remember myself as a teenager, I remember this film (a sunbathing teacher on the roof in topless), for a worried young man, you must agree this is more important than the ideological component of the film (discussed by the whole class).

              But seriously, as it seemed to me that the young men had avenged the Germans, not for anything specific, but for their FOREGED CHILDHOOD (war, death, disasters, hunger), but the captured Germans just personified all of the above misfortunes.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 24 November 2017 13: 24 New
                +5
                That, that was real movie, that's for sure. And in a serious work, there are always several semantic loads. You are right, this thought, about childhood deprived, is basic, it is universal for the whole country. And not only deprived of childhood. The war itself was, as a result, the tragedy that gradually led to the 1991 year. But against this background of the General, the film shows private tragedies. The boy's tears, not fear, when he tried to put out the Bickford cord. The loneliness of the protagonist, who, behold, found a family, but the "young wife" did not want to share her happiness with someone else's boy. And against this background, a tanning teacher, topless, looks like Light in the whole nightmare of broken fates. ps Of course, my present reflections are very different from those then laughing laughing laughing
          2. BAI
            BAI 24 November 2017 11: 31 New
            0
            Exactly the same photos were on the other hand. For example, about the Finnish captivity (1939):

            1. BAI
              BAI 24 November 2017 11: 40 New
              0
              It was with the Germans (Volkhov Front):
            2. Proxima
              Proxima 24 November 2017 18: 58 New
              +5
              Quote: BAI
              Exactly the same photos were on the other hand.

              Maybe these? And this I do not lay out real death camps for prisoners of war! The most scanty thing is that the Natsiks did not even want to show off. A lot of honor, they did not consider us people. Window dressing was when a prisoner of war was taken from the Western Front. You can find many such pictures. There really is more or less decent content. True, with rare exceptions, they did not capture blacks. In the representations of the German soldiers washed by propaganda, these are not people at all, but something like smart monkeys.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 24 November 2017 19: 17 New
                +4
                There was a description of the content of Soviet prisoners of war at the place where the Salaspils Children's Camp will be. A clean field, dug holes with his hands and some of the people who had stumbled into the group, suddenly piled on top, the earth crumbled and the person there was suffocating. Then they ate. Several thousand soldiers passed (the exact number is not known), no one was alive.
            3. Serg koma
              Serg koma 25 November 2017 18: 20 New
              0
              Quote: BAI
              The exact same pictures were on the other hand.

              The difference in agitation is that some "pass" is captured others, both military and post-war years.
              Prisoners of war were sent to enterprises of the national economy. Received a salary from them. From the salary was deducted the maintenance and nutrition of prisoners. They received the rest to the personal account, from where they could withdraw money. Provision of housing, utilities and food - at the expense of the enterprise where the prisoners work.

              In addition to the salary on hand received from the USSR:
              Private and non-commissioned officers - 7 rubles per month.
              The average staff is 10 rubles.
              Senior officers - 15 rubles.
              Generality - 30 rubles per month.

              Additionally (in addition to salary):
              On standardized works:
              40-50% of the plan - 10 rubles
              51-80% of the plan - 15 rubles
              81-100% - 25 rubles
              Over 100% - 50 rubles.
              Foremen and Foremen:
              up to 60% of the plan - 30 rubles
              up to 80% - 50 rubles
              up to 99% - 70 rubles.
              100 and above - 100 rubles.
              Unregulated work - 20 rubles per month.
              Doctors - 40 rubles.
              Paramedic - 20 rubles.
              Household services - 10 rubles.

              1945 year
              for non-working prisoners the daily allowance rate


              Rye bread - 600 grams.
              Wheat flour - 10 grams.
              Different cereals - 90 grams.
              Macaroni - 10 grams.
              Meat - 30 grams.
              Fish - 100 grams.
              Fat - 15 grams.
              Vegetable oil - 15 g.
              Tomato puree - 10 grams.
              Sugar - 17 grams.
              Tea - 2 grams.
              Salt - 30 grams
              Bay leaf - 0,2 grams
              Pepper - 0,3 grams
              Vinegar - 2 grams
              Potato - 600 grams.
              Cabbage - 170 grams.
              Carrot - 45 gram
              Beets - 40 grams.
              Onion - 35 g.
              Greens - 10 grams.
              Soap - 300 grams per month.
              [/ quote] [quote]
          3. antivirus
            antivirus 24 November 2017 20: 02 New
            +2
            in 42 g, my father went to first grade - “a month of writing in a notebook, then they wrote and studied between the lines of newspapers in a warehouse at the railway station” (they took it down 5-10 years ago). ”in 43 g the Germans were also driven away to school ( the hospital moved closer to the front) the prisoners were settled, the people began to boil (I don’t remember the exact word of my father) "like children in a warehouse, and these are warm and in the light !!!"
            1. Proxima
              Proxima 24 November 2017 20: 15 New
              +2
              Quote: antivirus
              ... the prisoners were settled, the people began to boil (I do not remember the exact word of my father) "like children in a warehouse, and these are warm and in the light !!!"

              Here we have such hypertrophied humanism ... The mysterious Russian soul ...
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 24 November 2017 21: 06 New
                0
                THIS IS A TRANSFER FROM THE BALANCE OF MO TO THE MIN.
                ARMENIAN USED WHAT IS. without a broad government view of the country's problems.
        2. faiver
          faiver 24 November 2017 18: 24 New
          +1
          Sorry, but ostentatious photos ...
  8. avva2012
    avva2012 24 November 2017 09: 04 New
    +5
    There is a video of A. Isaev, but the analysis of the operation by B. Yulin, in my opinion, is not bad either.
  9. nivander
    nivander 24 November 2017 09: 36 New
    +3
    this article is a base translation of Groysman’s book, The Rzhev-Cornerstone of the East Front. Yes, the Germans resisted only due to mobile battle groups pulled from all units. In all cases, the German defense was hacked, and in some places only a microscopic effort was not enough to a complete disaster. Katukov only 1,5 kilometers did not reach the Oleninsky highway, which immediately the whole northwestern part of the ledge collapsed - the 6th Stalinist Corps surrounded the White Outpost and it was not enough for him just a few hours before it was captured (at the last moment, the Germans came to the rescue 8 and 12 tank divisions), the capture of the Small and Big Kr Optionally, the troops of the 20th army meant a full-fledged breakthrough. The problem was that in each of these cases there were not enough reserves, sometimes one regiment or even a battalion. By the way, the Brusilov concept of a multitude of crushing blows was not so bad and the Rzhev experience only supplemented it. Look on the map of the operation of Bagration in 1944 --- everything is like under Rzhev 1942-- a lot of crushing blows spaced in distance and in time .... only very strong.
    In the Red Army, the 332th Tank Brigade as the 1st Scooter and Motorcycle Brigade never existed. The Fritzes near Rzhev had neither the 1st Cavalry Division nor the 146th Infantry Division
  10. Cartalon
    Cartalon 24 November 2017 09: 44 New
    +1
    It does not look like a strategic mood, too little energy has been allocated, perhaps the version that the plan of the operation was merged to the Germans has a right to exist.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 24 November 2017 10: 31 New
      +5
      Quote: Cartalon
      It does not look like a strategic mood, too little energy has been allocated, perhaps the version that the plan of the operation was merged to the Germans has a right to exist.

      There is one subtle point with the “Mars” level - they tried not to mention this operation in Soviet times. And they pulled it into the light of God only during the revision of the history of the Second World War. And the majority of revisionist historians, having summed up nothing, recorded in the Soviet forces in this operation the general forces of two fronts, and even the MLO.
      The combined strength of the two fronts and the Moscow defense zone with Headquarters reserves totaled 1890 thousand people, more than 24 thousand guns and mortars, 3375 tanks and 1100 aircraft. They were opposed by almost all the troops of Army Group Center (with the exception of five divisions on its extreme right flank), and 2 divisions of Army Group North — a total of 72 divisions (except for 9 security and training fields in the rear), of which 10 were tank and 6 motorized. Army Group Center, together with reserves, had about 1680 thousand people, up to 3500 tanks.

      As a result, it turned out that according to the level of attracted forces, Mars winged Uranus like a bull and was almost the main strategic operation of the end of 1942. In this case, even the fact that the forces of the Moscow defense zone for the most part were training and spare parts, as well as UR and air defense was not taken into account. As of November 1, 1942, only 6 units, 7 units and 8 units were registered in the MLO.
      However, the full outfit of Mars forces really exceeded that of Uranus.
      If we summarize the number of army troops along the perimeter of the Rzhevsky ledge, we will get the following data: 5th (71 people, 249 tanks), 73th (20 people, 95 tanks), 602nd (301 people, 22 tanks ), 70th (275 people, 272 tanks), 29th (54 people, 073 tanks), 93st (30 people, 50 tanks), 199rd (63 people, 31 tanks), The 74th (158 people, 90 tanks) and 33st (78 people, 490 tanks) armies of the two fronts united more than seven hundred thousand soldiers and commanders and more than a thousand seven hundred tanks, namely 196 people and 39 tanks. Of the above armies, the 92th and 135rd armies did not carry out offensive operations in late November and December 227, but on November 41, a week before the start of the offensive of the two fronts, they received directive No. 116 of the headquarters of the Western Front on the destruction of the Gzhat group the enemy. In the early morning of November 743, the 300th and 702rd armies were assigned the date of the transition to the offensive - December 924. The planned offensive of these two armies did not take place solely due to the failure of the first stage of the operation. Therefore, the exclusion of the forces of the "Mars" of the 1718th and 5rd armies is unlawful.
      The South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts that took part in Operation Uranus near Stalingrad numbered 33 1948, 192 193 and 258 317 people respectively. It can be seen with the naked eye that the total number of troops of the three fronts of Uranus is significantly inferior to the number of two fronts that conducted the Mars. These statistics can be detailed by considering the number of armies involved in the counterattack near Stalingrad. If we summarize the number of troops of the 1st Guards Army (142 people, 869 tanks), the 163st Army (21 people, 92 tanks) and the 056th Tank Army (199 people, 5 tanks) of the Southwestern Front, 90 the 600th (359 people, 24 tanks), the 56th (409 people, 48 tanks) and the 65th (63 people, 187 tanks) armies of the Don Front, the 49nd Army (66 people, 39 tanks) , The 457th Army (5 people, 62 tanks), the 41st Army (667 people, 23 tanks) and the 64th Army (40 people, 490 tanks) of the Stalingrad Front, we get 40 people and 51 tanks . That is, strict calculations indicate lesser forces deployed near Stalingrad, in comparison with the offensive undertaken against the Rzhevsky ledge.
      © Isaev
      PMSM, two simultaneous strategic offensives were carried out by the Headquarters in the expectation that at least one of them would be successful in the end - the German trishkin caftan of the end of 1942 could no longer be pulled into two directions. And the second, even being unsuccessful, will not allow the Germans to cast out forces to repulse the first offensive. In principle, this happened - instead of quickly transferring resources from the GA Center band to Paulus, to release 6 A, the division had to be transported from France.
      1. Cartalon
        Cartalon 24 November 2017 11: 16 New
        +1
        If the troops do not participate in the offensive, then all the same, they should not be counted, and if we compare the number and quality of the enemy troops in the regions of Mars and Uranus, then it is clear that the involvement of all the forces of the fronts would hardly lead to strategic success.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 24 November 2017 11: 19 New
          +4
          Quote: Cartalon
          If the troops do not participate in the offensive, then all the same, they should not be considered

          It’s worth it - if they are included in the planned forces for the operation. Because these troops were originally intended to participate in this operation, and whether they were used during the battles or not, this is another matter.
          1. Cartalon
            Cartalon 24 November 2017 11: 34 New
            0
            I do not agree when evaluating the plan, we can say that we were going to but did not do it, and when evaluating the battle itself, only the involved forces are taken into account, otherwise the Germans were already counted in the Kerch operation, including the Tatars of the policemen.
      2. BAI
        BAI 24 November 2017 11: 27 New
        +4
        Yes, this did not allow the Germans to do their favorite thing - to expose the quiet sections of the front and throw all their strength into a dangerous section. Otherwise, all planes and tanks would be under Stalingrad.
      3. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 26 November 2017 11: 11 New
        +2
        "With the level of" Mars "there is one subtle point - in Soviet times, they tried not to mention this operation." ////

        And there was a basis for this. The losses were overwhelming.
        The USSR had its own style of falsifying history: the "method of silence."
        What was uncomfortable was simply not mentioned, was excluded from news and books.
        Now the approach has changed radically: the method of "turning inside out."
        There was a defeat - we will make of it a "victory, but with great losses." Or "there was a general contribution to the victory - Berlin was ultimately taken (and the enemy also suffered losses), so the operation cannot be considered a defeat. That means: it is a victory."
        1. Mordvin 3
          Mordvin 3 26 November 2017 11: 31 New
          +4
          In the battle of the Dnieper, there were also big losses and unsuccessful operations (landing, for example), but on the whole the East Wall was taken.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 26 November 2017 13: 31 New
            +3
            In any army and any general there are unsuccessful operations.
            But if unsuccessful - everything, then this is removed from office
            unsuitability. Zhukov frankly did not pull staff work,
            did not see even the simplest enemy traps on the fronts, could not
            read the map. He could not even determine the front line. This incompetence
            disguised as a cry, obscenities, denticles, threats of the tribunal and tribunals.
            Even those who knew how to think were paralyzed by the fear of execution.
            He turned the General Staff into a madhouse. What Vasilevsky quickly corrected,
            heading it.
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 26 November 2017 14: 00 New
              +2
              Even those who knew how to think were paralyzed by the fear of execution.
              Somewhere, I heard it, forgot it. It seems like Rezun, something similar, about paralysis, but I could be wrong.
              To be interested in sources is useless, naturally. They are very authoritative, regular references to memories.
              Especially, the passage, about the fact that the card could not read, poor. This story, walks for ten years, every strategist puts himself in the responsibility, to reproduce it, apparently, so as not to be forgotten.
              psIn the Soviet army, you will not believe it, everyone swearing, and some even speak it. And the higher the rank and position, the more assiduous. I think that G.K. Zhukov was a virtuoso! Simply, the position obliged. Rokossovsky, it is not necessary to cite as an example, he, apparently, was the only one there, therefore, he became a legend.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 27 November 2017 10: 42 New
              0
              Quote: voyaka uh
              Zhukov frankly did not pull staff work,
              did not see even the simplest enemy traps on the fronts, could not
              read the map. He could not even determine the front line.

              I understand that in a dozen years in the descriptions istorgov Zhukov will forget how to read and write at all - and he will only fiercely turn his eyes and shoot in all directions from the faithful Mauser.
              Zhukov’s staffer was bad - yes: doesn't like staff work. But the commander for the Red Army arr. 1941-1945 was pretty good. Because all the moans of subordinates about the rude work style, threats and swearing are blocked by documents about what the same subordinates did and what they turned the execution of simple orders into.
              A simple example: the winter offensive of the NWF at the beginning of 1943 - a blow to the Meadow and further to the Gulf of Finland. In the memoirs of subordinates, Zhukov, who arrived at the front headquarters, appears to be a tyrant, swearing space crew for some minor miscalculations. In fact, Zhukov suddenly discovered that the offensive was about to begin, about which the front reported as fully prepared, in fact it was not prepared at all. Most of the roads and supply routes of the advancing units marked on the map, even in their rear, are snow-covered glades, along which even tanks hardly pass (checked by Katukov). Information about the enemy - many months ago, although the headquarters of the partisan movement NW is sitting in the rear of the front. The headquarters are located at such a distance from the front line that there is no need to talk about any operational management at all. But according to the documents, the front is completely ready for an offensive operation, yes ...
              Quote: voyaka uh
              Even those who knew how to think were paralyzed by the fear of execution.

              Because the commander needs to think only after he learns to at least understand the Charter. The trouble of the Red Army 1941 is that it was too fond of thinking and interpreting orders, absolutely not understanding what they were doing. There is an order: to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battle and transfer it to the front-line operation, which should eliminate the main threat - the breakthrough of the enemy tank group in the rear of the front. The commander, having received this order, begins to think - and as a result of reflection with a creak he sets aside one division of "his" mechanized corps, but at the same time reassigns part of the forces of another mechanized corps passing through the strip of his army. Another example: TD's incomplete tank battalion is trying to recapture the village. One company attacks head-on, shackling the enemy, the other goes around from the flank ... and meets a thinking general there, who orders her to attack head-on instead of going around. The result - the village was not taken, the battalion lost 8 tanks burned.
              And I'm not talking about cases of direct and unequivocal violation of orders - such as attacks by villages in the forehead after the Zhukovsky ban to do this or attacks by "naked" tanks, despite the order to "wait for the infantry."
              In general, almost all the orders of 1941-1943 to eliminate and eradicate in section "remedial measures“they simply repeat the Charter and the corresponding instructions. Apparently, it was not possible to convey the Charter to the commanders in another way.
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 27 November 2017 17: 38 New
                +2
                "The trouble of the Red Army 1941 is that it was too fond of thinking and interpreting orders" ///

                Exactly the opposite. The trouble of the Red Army 1941 is that the absurd orders of the generals
                performed blindly and thoughtlessly. When the offensive had already completely failed, the officers, frightened by the tribunals, continued to drive the soldiers and equipment forward - into the boilers.
                No one dared to report the real state of things upstairs. And Zhukov’s style is to blame for this.
              2. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 28 November 2017 16: 52 New
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                the village. One company attacks head-on, shackling the enemy, the other goes around from the flank ... and meets a thinking general there, who orders her to attack head-on instead of going around. Result - the village is not taken,


                So who is to blame for the fact that 499 top commanders were repressed ?!
                499 top commanders! This is a selection only for commanders in the ranks of the commander, commander, brigade commander, commander! Almost 2/3 of the top cadre command staff.

                Hardly about two dozen were released with the outbreak of war - most were shot by paranoid.

                So who was listed in the generals by 1942-1943 - the former regiment commanders who "learned to fight on personnel" - did not graduate from the academies.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 27 November 2017 10: 14 New
          0
          Quote: voyaka uh
          And there was a basis for this. The losses were overwhelming.

          This is you confusing with the Battle of Rzhev. “Mars” tried not to stick out for another reason - the offensive failed.
          Quote: voyaka uh
          The USSR had its own style of falsifying history: the "method of silence."
          What was uncomfortable was simply not mentioned, was excluded from news and books.

          Yes, yes, yes ... but in the rest of the world, uncomfortable operations have always been highlighted. smile
          Does anyone remember Operation Anakim? Or about the landing at Signapur? I'm not talking about German memoirs about the events of 1944-1945, written in the style of "we defeated the hordes of the Bolsheviks with a bold blow, inflicting huge losses on them, but as a result we were forced to level the front line".
  11. gsev
    gsev 26 November 2017 00: 04 New
    +2
    Quote: voyaka uh
    "What is wrong with Zhukov?" ///

    Nothing special - in his repertoire. He laid another million soldiers in the ground. After this operation, he, fortunately, was forever removed from strategic planning and forever expelled from the General Staff. Stalin realized that women give birth more slowly than Zhukov sends cannon fodder to machine guns.

    I do not understand why you consider the fighting on the Western Front in 1942 unsuccessful against the background of other events of this year. On most other fronts, until November 1942, almost every attack of the Red Army ended with a German counteroffensive in which the attacking troops were encircled and destroyed or captured: Sevastopol, Kerch, Barvenkovo, and the Southern Front. Under Rzhev, the losses of the prisoners were less, there were chances to remove and repair the wrecked equipment. On the other hand, a larger percentage of the wounded. Accordingly, information about the suffering of surviving disabled people came to the rear. Witnesses of failures in Kerch, Sevastopol, when retreating to the Caucasus, could not tell their relatives anything. Therefore, the severity of the fighting near Rzhev remained in the memory of the people as an unhealed scar. But as far as I remember, those who fought in that war could not calmly talk about it. My grandfather could not watch films about the war. But then in 1942 both we and the Germans strove for victory. All German counterattacks were countered, their experienced soldiers and officers knocked out. But a year or two ago, these troops for weeks and months smashed the armies of the great powers, marched east almost to Moscow. It was in these battles that the German car broke down. The Germans captured fewer prisoners, the wounded, and it was easier to evacuate the wrecked equipment, cities with factories were not handed over to the Germans. And Zhukov, wherever he fought, the enemy had less success there. In Ukraine, in 1941, while Zhukov was there, the Germans were advancing more slowly than in Belarus, and the Germans were stopped by Leningrad and Moscow. A staff officer and a commander are different qualities and rarely they are combined in one person. Historians believe that Waterloo Napoleon lost because there was no Beginner next to him. Bertier level headquarters.
  12. Mu Dialer
    Mu Dialer 27 November 2017 05: 29 New
    0
    The fact that the Germans were forced to leave the Rzhevsky ledge in February-March 1943 indicates that they no longer hoped to take Moscow, in fact, their departure from Rzhev is their recognition that they no longer hoped to win the war. Later, the Germans lost the war in May 1943, and then fought for another two years so that Hitler would still live, there’s nothing more, complete stupidity.
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