Military Review

Army boost. Part of 1

We previously wrote about the strategic Warsaw-Ivangorod operation 15. 09. - 26. 10. 1914 (Strategic victory ; Strategic castling). Now we want to talk about a very interesting and illustrative episode of this operation, which was of great importance for its result - the actions of the troops of the Russian 4-th army, complicated by forcing the river. Wisla.

The middle of September is near 1914.
The Galician operation of the South-Western Front approached the end and the First August Operation of the 1 and 10 Army of the North-Western Front began on the left and right flanks of the Russian Front, respectively. The 2 Army, which had not yet fully recovered from the “Samson” catastrophe, stood passively on the r. Narev.

Polish theater of operations was gradually saturated with troops - its strategic importance was steadily increasing. Warsaw was occupied by a detachment of a general from P. D. Olkhovsky’s infantry (see Who defended Warsaw), who advanced his cavalry to the front of Wloclavsk-Novoradomsk.

The command of the North-Western Front was inclined to leave Warsaw, pulling the left flank of the front under Velsk. The command of the Southwestern Front revolted against this plan. And the headquarters consistently held two meetings - dedicated to solving key strategic issues and held on 9 and 13 in September in the Hill. They decided to regroup to the Middle Vistula. The 2 Army was deployed to Warsaw from the North-Western Front, and the 4-I, and then the 9-I and 5-I armies moved from Ivangorod from the Lower San. In front of the right flank of the South-Western Front in the area of ​​Pinchov - Nov. Korchin - Stopnitsa was nominated by A. V. Novikov’s newly formed equestrian corps.

Even before receiving intelligence data from left-bank groups of cavalry on both fronts, the Headquarters assumed that the Germans could develop an offensive operation on the left bank of the Vistula - in the directions of Warsaw and Ivangorod. This foresight, supported by intelligence data, and then confirmed by reports from the cavalry of both fronts, was fully justified.

After the end of the East Prussian operation, which ended with the encirclement of a part of the forces of the 2 and displacing the 1 of the North-Western Front from East Prussia (see The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. On the balance of power ; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. The only victory - Gumbinnen? H. 1 ; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. The only victory - Gumbinnen? H. 2 ; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. About the transfer of buildings from the West ; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. About losses. CH 1. North-Western Front; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. About losses. CH 2. 8 Army; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. The main reasons for the operational defeat of Russian troops ; The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. Let's sum up), P. von Hindenburg transferred the bulk of his corps to Silesia - launching an offensive towards the Middle Vistula. Purpose - threatening the right flank and rear of the South-Western Front, to assist the Austrians who were defeated in the Battle of Galicia. To the south, from Krakow, the Austrian 1 Army went on the offensive.

09. 09. 1914 The commander-in-chief of the front issued an order to the 4 Army General of Infantry A.E. Evert (as part of the Grenadier, 3 Caucasian and 16 Army Corps and Ural Cossack Division) from September 11 to start movement from San near Ivangorod - and two corps were to be sent to Lublin, and from there they were transported by rail to Ivangorod. At the same time, an order was made to transfer all heavy artillery and pontoon battalions from the 4 to the 5 army — which indicated a clear underestimation by the front command of the upcoming 4 army combat operation on such a serious water barrier as the Visla River. The necessity of the movement of the Ural Cossack Division along the left bank of the Vistula was also indicated.

1. A. E. Evert. Niva. 1914. No. 40. From the author's library

September 10 Commander in Chief Directive No. 1404 set the 4 Army the following tasks: 1) to ensure the right flank and rear of the Southwestern Front in the event of the Germans coming from the r. Narev; 2) to assist the Warsaw Detachment; 3) in the event of the advance of the Germans from the west to attack them on the left bank of the Vistula; 4) “if direct assistance to the armies of the North-Western Front is required, then this is done only upon receipt of the special order of the Supreme Commander”. The directive also stated that if the movement of the German troops to the Vistula in the Ivangorod-Sandomir sector was found during the movement of the army to Ivangorod, the 4 army should work closely with the 9 army, providing the right flank and rear communications of the latter. The fortress of Ivangorod was subordinate to A.E. Evert.

Initially, A.E. Evert planned to locate his corps in the Sedlec area, Garwolin, and Lukov - with the front to the north. Only one of the avant-gardes was planned to push to the left bank of the Vistula - to Magnushev, to ensure the crossing.

To accomplish the third task, A.E. Evert demanded quick guidance on the Vistula of a reliable bridge and asked the superior command of the 1 - 2 pontoon battalion. Moreover, it was relevant in close cooperation with the 9-th army. But to these considerations, the commander in chief replied with a proposal to locate the 4 Army in the Kazimierz, Opole, and Motych areas — without interrupting two railway lines.

Then A.Ye. Evert turned the corps: the Grenadier to Vonvolnitsa and further to the Kazimierz district, the 16-th army in Opole and the 3-th Caucasian Army - to the Motych region.

Despite the petition for the addition of pontoon battalions to his army, A.Ye. Evert asked for the allocation of transfer capacities of commandant Ivangorod.

2. Acting commandant of the Ivangorod fortress, Colonel A.V. Schwartz (in the first row, first right). Niva. 1914. No. 48. From the author's library

The latter replied that the 15 barges, the boats and the steamer had already taken the 9 Army, but there are no pontoon battalions yet. From the headquarters of the 16 front of September, A.E. Evert received a message that bridges would be built by the care of A.V. Schwarz — in Novo-Alexandria and near Golomb; Also, Novo-Alexandria will have 6 steamers and one steam steam with a total carrying capacity of 3000 people.

3. Pontoon bridge over the Vistula. The great war in the images and paintings. Issue 5. From the author's library

4. Steamship pier and bridge on the river. Wisla from Novo-Alexandria. Niva. 1915. No. 9. From the author's library

On September 17, the commander-in-chief proposed to land the troops in Ivangorod and then push them forward, depending on the situation. But on September 19 he ordered the 4 Army to be concentrated on the right bank of the r. Vistula - from the mouth of the river. Vilga to the mouth of the river. Ilzhanka, having firmly secured the crossings at Novo-Alexandria and Kazimierz. During the offensive, the 4 th army should be deployed on the Kozienice, Zvolen, estuary line. Ilzhanka - with direction to the front Opoczno, Skarzysko. From the south along the right bank of the Vistula, units of the 9 Army were pulled up.

The 4 army corps gradually castled along the Vistula to the north, initially turning around for passive defense.
A.E. Evert decided to occupy the following initial position on the left bank: the 3-m Caucasian Corps - in the Kozienice region, Ivangorod; Grenadier and 16 cases - to gain a foothold on the line south of the line of Ivangorod forts, in 8 - 10 km from the crossings. This reliably provided them with enemy artillery fire. On September 18, the commander informed the commander of the Grenadier Corps that his unit would be shipped from Novo-Alexandria. It was ordered to choose, in addition to the bridgehead (bridgehead) ahead of the crossing, the position for the advanced units on the 1 - 2 brigade and instruct the chief of staff and the corps engineer to conduct a reconnaissance of the position, as well as to strengthen the strong points.

On September 20, A.E. Evert recommended that the Grenadier Corps commander speed up the crossing. But after three hours, he was forced, on the instructions of the commander-in-chief, to wire the commcorus: "... to detain the uncrossed whole units on the right bank."

Army boost. Part of 1
5. The commander of the Grenadier Corps, General of Artillery I. I. Mrozovsky.

The commander ordered the bridge position to be strengthened and stubbornly defended. On September 21, A.E. Evert ordered I.I. Mrozovsky to take over all the ferries from Novo-Alexandria, and use the sappers to build bridgeheads.

September 18 The 16 Army Corps received orders to prepare for crossing from Kazimierz. From September 20, the arriving one after the other three (9, 8 and 3) pontoon battalions were supposed to bridge. But then it was decided to remove the bridge near Kazimierz (by organizing passive defenses on the right bank of the Vistula), and to continue building the bridgehead for the future bridge. The 16-th corps had to prepare, in addition to Kazimierz, other points for the guidance of the pontoon bridge.

The commander of the 16 Corps considered it possible, in the presence of three pontoon battalions, to bring two bridges within 12 hours - one pontoon and the other - mixed.

6. The commander of the 16 Army Corps, General of Infantry, P. A. Geisman.

Because the commander-in-chief expressed to the 4 commander-in-chief fear of engaging his corps in private battles, A.Ye. Evert did not make the final decision on preparing bridgeheads on the left bank - refusing the most correct solution in the given situation and limiting himself to making bridge bridge

Major-General S. P. Lebedev, engineer, was in charge of organizing the crossing of the Vistula and the bridgehead fortifications, at the disposal of which the army provided its sapper battalions. And before that, the commander ordered to start collecting boats, logs and boards. The commandant of the Ivangorod fortress was ordered to build two ship bridges at Novo-Alexandria and organize a ferry of 6 steamboats. It was ordered to prepare one bridge near Golomb. But instead of the last A.V. Schwartz built 4 marinas: 1) for the 1 ferry to 50 people or 16 approach; 2) for the ferry to 250 people; 3) for 1 bollards for 250 people and 4) for 3 steamboats for 400 people - just one flight from Golomb could transport 1400 people for 45 minutes.

7. On the banks of the Vistula. Niva. 1915. No. 9. From the author's library

Already 20 September 1 bridge at Novo-Alexandria was completed, and 2 th lay - pedestrian.

By September 23, there was already the 3 bridge (including the railway bridge) in Ivangorod, the 4 aforementioned marinas near Golomb, and the ship and foot bridges near Novo-Alexandria. There were also a ferry at Novo-Alexandria and a pontoon bridge at Kazimierz.

On September 25, the front headquarters ordered the 3 pontoon battalion to be sent to Gura-Kalwaria to the 5 Army.

When 26 of September decided to cross at Pavlovice, a steamer with a ferry was sent there from the fortress and the construction of the bridge was started - the last one was completed on the night of September 29.

They were actively preparing for the crossing of the 4 Army Corps. So, at the request of the command of the 3 Caucasian Corps, September 19, from Kiev, Ivyangorod sent Polyansky floats to 200 - per each engineer company.

8. The commander of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps is General of Artillery V. A. Irmanov, hero of the Kozenitsky battles. Figure Acad. M. Rundaltsev. Chronicle of the 1914 War No. 15. From the author's library.

The officers of the General Staff of the 3 Caucasian Corps began reconnaissance of both banks of the Vistula, and then, together with the corps engineer, and the river bed.

The best places for crossings were: Sverzhe Gurne, at Holendra, at Pavlovice and at Rychivol. All ferries on the river were taken by the Ivangorod fortress, there were few boats (the rest were hidden on the shore), there were no fords. But 5 barges were discovered and used.

Intelligence of the Vistula from Kazimierz to Zakrzheva was organized by the headquarters of the Grenadier Corps. She revealed an insignificant number of available boats and materials for the construction of bridges. The 3 barges discovered by September 17 were shipped to Novo-Alexandria. By September 19, the day of the avant-garde crossing, the grenadier on the left bank, the right bridge near Novo-Alexandria, was only halfway up the river - and the avant-garde regiment was transported by a steam ferry.

And E. Evert insisted on enhancing intelligence. And the 3 Caucasian Corps acted in Kozienice 3 with hundreds of Khoper Cossack regiments. Pedestrian intelligence also operated, and on the left bank there were guard outposts with machine guns.

A reduced German aircraft was captured in the fortress - it was also used for reconnaissance.

Grenadier Corps scooped information about the enemy from expelled to the village. Zhabyanka 4 of hundreds of 14-th Orenburg Cossack regiment, from 14-th cavalry division (cavalry corps of A.V. Novikov) and from 75-th infantry division (from Radom). Parts of the latter reported the appearance of German armored vehicles.

The 16 Corps sent foot reconnaissance with machine guns to the left bank.
The Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade and the Ural Cossack Division were actively engaged in reconnaissance.

September 22 discovered the approach of three German corps - north, west and south of Radom. The brigade of the 75 Division, which occupied Radom, was ordered, without being carried away by the battle, to retreat to Kozienitsa or Ivangorod, depending on the situation.

On September 24, German patrols approached Ivangorod - a group of M. von Halwitz approached the city as part of the 20 Army and Guards reserve corps. To the north, a group of A. von Mackensen attacked Warsaw, and to the south - a corps of R. von Voirsch and the Austrian 1-i army, supported by the German 11-i army corps.

By September 25 the approach to the front of the 4 Army on the Vistula of three German corps was clearly indicated. Undercover information, military intelligence and a survey of prisoners made it possible to install on the front of the army troops of the 17 and 20 of the army and Guards reserve corps.

From 18 hours 27 September, German artillery began shelling advanced positions and left-bank forts of the fortress. At about 15 hours on the highway to Pakhna Volya, the movement of the enemy's advanced units and infantry columns with artillery was noticed. Around 18 hours, 4 armored vehicles, infantry and cavalry (20 km south-west of Kazimierz) appeared.

By the evening of September 28, the Germans occupied Breznitz, Mozelice-Nizhny and Stashov. Of the last villages, they were soon driven out. The attack on the fortress from the southwest was also repelled. Since September 25, German airplanes bombed Ivangorod daily.

To be continued
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  1. XII Legion
    XII Legion 28 November 2017 07: 00
    The operation associated with forcing a water barrier is considered one of the most complex. Moreover - such a barrier as the Vistula.
    School for the troops, an exam for the command staff.
    Thank you!
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 28 November 2017 07: 54
    I. I. MrozovskyDuring the February Revolution, on March 1, 1917, he was put under house arrest, and on March 10, 1917 he was fired from sick service with a uniform and pension. After the October Revolution he emigrated to France.P. A. Geisman-After the October Revolution, he remained in Petrograd, taught at the University of St. Petersburg, a private assistant professor at Petrograd University, also worked in the Unified State Archival Fund. He died on January 27, 1919 in Petrograd. A Russian military historian.V. A. Irmanov-In 1918, he joined the Volunteer Army. He left Russia in November 1920. He lived in Yugoslavia. Despite his old age, Vladimir Irmanov did not stay away from politics in exile: he headed the Novosad department of the Union of Legitimist Monarchists and led the publication of the newspaper Faith and Faithfulness " In 1924, at the behest of Kirill Vladimirovich, he also headed the Corps of Officers of the Imperial Russian Army and Navy. He died on September 27, 1931 from an apoplexy strike and was buried in the Russian section of the local cemetery.
  3. Blue cop
    Blue cop 28 November 2017 09: 22
    Interesting text and excellent illustrations - photos of the war years.
    And Ivangorod is the second example when the fortress successfully operated during the year, playing an important strategic role.
    1. Blue cop
      Blue cop 28 November 2017 09: 22
      After Osovts
      1. Mikado
        Mikado 28 November 2017 20: 41
        From the former cop to the esteemed Blue Cop drinks Osovets is generally a separate topic, overgrown with legends. Unfortunately, I did not participate in the discussion yesterday. The author showed the theme of “the attack of the dead” at a high level, removing all unnecessary and “putting it on the shelves”. good Good PMV cycle. soldier
        To the author: Alexey Vladimirovich, the First World War often passes in our minds as something ephemeral, distant, resembling, although this is an important part of our history. I bow to you for the expansion of historical knowledge! hi
        1. OAV09081974
          28 November 2017 22: 31
          Thank you!
          And in my turn, it is pleasant and important to know - that the materials are read by such competent experts as you, Curious, Poruchik Teterin, and others. Colleagues who make valuable comments and additions - on the merits
          Best regards
  4. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 28 November 2017 10: 57
    A wonderful and very informative article! About the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation, as well as about the battles of September 1914, domestic historiography pays little attention to the criminal. I will wait with interest to continue. To the author — my deepest appreciation for the work done! hi
  5. Curious
    Curious 28 November 2017 13: 30
    I will allow myself a few technical details.
    By the beginning of the First World War, the Russian Army practically didn’t have personnel military ferry facilities that could be used to force water barriers with companies, battalions, and regiments.
    To organize the crossing of large masses of troops through large water barriers, the Tomilovsky Pontoon Park was in service. Despite the fact that it was adopted into service in 1872, it fully met its requirements, providing guidance for the bridge assembled from the pontoon park kit - 224,193 meters (105 compression 6,5 dm). The carrying capacity of the bridge is up to 20 tons. However, the number of pontoon parks was limited.
    The first border battles, especially in East Prussia, showed that units of infantry and artillery needed to have their own light crossing facilities to overcome a large number of small rivers and lakes. Only for the day of the offensive battle, the regiment has to overcome at least 2 water barriers up to 10 meters wide and 1 obstacle from 10 to 50 meters wide. The use of the pontoon park in such conditions is impractical and impossible.
    The calculation on the use by the troops of existing bridges, boats and improvised means was not justified. The enemy, departing, carefully destroying bridges, taking away or rendered unusable ferries and boats, sought to deprive offensive and improvised means (logs, boards), burning coastal wooden structures.
    In 1915, Officer Polyansky proposed a universal tool that could be used both for sailing solo fighters and for assembling rafts, ferries, and even light floating bridges for crossing infantry, cavalry, and even light guns. This tool was a rectangular bag made of oiled or impregnated with a rubber compound tarpaulin. Across the bag was intercepted by a leather belt with metal rings. Two belts with rings were also sewn to the upper plane of the bag. In one of the corners of the bag there was a rubber tube closed by a stopper. The size of the float is 70x36x35 cm. Weight is only 2 kg. Payload up to 56 kg. The float was inflated by a soldier in 7-8 minutes.

    Using the rings on the belts, it was possible to attach straps, ropes, etc. to the float, connect any number of floats to each other.

    In the simplest case, the float was worn on the back of a soldier like a duffel bag, or the soldier swam, holding on to the float. It was possible to connect the two floats and then the fighter could swim, sitting on the ropes between the two floats. 4-6 interconnected floats were used to transport poorly floating or tired horses, a machine gun (with immersion in water). Wagons could be transported, ensuring their buoyancy, tying the necessary number of floats to them.

    It was possible to assemble rafts (pontoons) of various sizes and carrying capacities from floats using improvised means (ropes, ropes, poles, etc.), thus creating floating bridges and transport ferries for infantry, cavalry and field artillery. The figure shows a pontoon of 12 floats. Pontoon capacity 600 kg. Its length is 1.3m, width 1.6m. Weight 40 kg. From such pontoons, using the flooring from the boards, it is possible to assemble an assault floating bridge for infantry and cavalry or transport ferries.
    There are a lot of options for using the Polyansky float. There are cases when ferries were collected from them for crossing heavy 6-dm. guns.

    The float turned out to be a universal remedy. Thanks to him, the Russian Army was less dependent on the presence of bridges and pontoon parks. Maneuverability of troops increased significantly. The float was in service with the Russian Army throughout the First World War, it was almost the only official cross-ship means of the Red Army during the Civil War, the main military cross-ship means in the twenties. Its sunset began after 1931, when a set of TZI was adopted as a service ferry for sapper companies of infantry and cavalry regiments. However, even then Polyansky's floats were not withdrawn from service. they were only transferred to the category of reserve engineering property and production was discontinued. They were actively used until the middle of World War II, until the last stocks of floats had melted.

    Pedestrian bridge on floats Polyansky.
  6. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 28 November 2017 18: 25
    Irmanov is a brilliant front-line general.
    He showed himself in all campaigns.
    For Kozienice - George 4th degree.
    Fine good
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 28 November 2017 20: 46
      For Kozienice - George 4th degree.

      pre-revolutionary orders have a separate theme - the wearing of each degree. You probably watched the movie "Admiral"? Well, of course, everything is sheer discrepancies and lies, but, the most interesting thing, he began to consider with the hero of the Khabensky Order during a fictional battle at the beginning of the film. what He, yes, got them! but .. in the next year, 1915! and here they lied ... request
      1. Curious
        Curious 28 November 2017 20: 49
        Why should he change clothes before every take? Dressed once - and for the whole film. Author's reading of the topic.
        1. Mikado
          Mikado 28 November 2017 21: 01
          idiotic, excuse me, reading the topic from the very first frame. Although, yes, it looks beautiful. hi Especially finished off “Drozdovtsy” in his headquarters. And presenting him by phone: "Commander cruisers “Glory” to Admiral Kolchak. Apparently, we had such an oversupply of admirals that even a minesweeper had two landings — a commander and a political officer. And to “glory” from the battleships is just a thing! am Viktor Nikolayevich, now I read briefly about the director of the film. It turns out that he shot the many times spat upon “Viking”! Well, what can I say .. about him, about Barin, about the bald Fed (whom own dad He wants to strangle in heaven, come on) ... figures from art! Because if you are shooting "films with ambitions" on historical topics, do not spare money on military and historical consultants! Shame on you .... hi
          1. Curious
            Curious 28 November 2017 21: 18
            Well, as you do not understand! After all, the main creative plan is the embodiment of the master’s worldview, in which the boundaries between authenticity and fiction are arbitrary. The higher the talent, the more foggy the border. A cruiser, battleship, what's the difference. This is the surroundings, frame. Could even go on a canoe. The main thing is what a lyuboff!
            1. Mikado
              Mikado 28 November 2017 22: 42
              The main thing is what a lyuboff!

              for lyuboff - plus. For ignorance of elementary things - to shoot. Or at least deny access to cinema.
              1. Curious
                Curious 28 November 2017 23: 12
                Shoot from the main caliber of the battleship "Glory". As an exception, it is allowed to replace the 305-mm gun of the Obukhov factory of 1895 with a 305-mm gun of the Obukhov factory of 1907.
                1. Mikado
                  Mikado 28 November 2017 23: 20
                  Schaub faster, in our opinion, in North Korean? wink great you, however, a humanist, Viktor Nikolaevich! hi laughing damn ... you have to turn to your Japanese comrades, they have Mikas afloat, we only have Aurora! request
                  EMNIP, our only armadillo "demoted" into an armored cruiser, was the "Relight" with its 254 mm, bought from lovers of sushi, miso and Mikado personally? what