Military Review

Four "Glory" battles, or the effectiveness of mine-artillery positions (part of 2)

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So, the August 3 battle was a failure for the Germans - they could not break through to Irben. It can be assumed that our opponents appreciated the actions of the only Russian battleship who dared to block the path of the Kaiser dreadnoughts. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the dispatch of two newest destroyers to the Gulf of Riga on the night of August to search for and destroy Glory. Fortunately, V-4 and V-99 were unable to detect the "Glory", although they were moving in the right way - passing the Irbens, they turned to Ahrensburg Bay. But in the Irbensk Strait, the Germans had short-term contact with the Russian destroyers Okhotnik and General Kondratenko, and at the entrance to the bay - with Ukraine and Troops, and the German ships received several hits. This convinced the German commanders of the futility of further searches, and they tried to retreat, but were intercepted by Novik. In a short artillery battle, the Russian destroyer scored a convincing victory over them, and V-100, trying to escape, hit a mine, jumped out of the Mikhailovsky lighthouse where it was blown up by its own crew.

And then morning came.

The third battle (4 August 1915 g)

In 05.03, "Glory" moved into position. The battleship was accompanied by the 8 th battalion of the destroyers. However, this time the main opponent of "Glory" was not the German ships, but ... the weather. Yesterday the Russian battleship perfectly saw the enemy dreadnoughts even on 120 KBT, but on August 4 the visibility deteriorated to such an extent that it did not exceed the 40-50 cables to the west of Glory.

The worst thing for Russian sailors was that the thick fog that limited visibility was thickening to the west. Accordingly, the Kaiser ships could observe the "Glory", remaining invisible to its signalmen. In addition, the Germans guessed to adjust the fire from the Mikhailovsky Lighthouse, located on the southern bank of the Irbensky Strait, and thus gained an additional advantage.

In 07.20, when the German guns thundered, only flashes of shots were seen on the Glory, but not the firing ships. Enemy shells fell near the destroyers accompanying the Russian battleship. In response, Slava raised flag flags, turned south, moving perpendicular to the German course, and prepared for battle. Apparently, the commander of the "Glory", Sergey Sergeevich Vyazemsky, considered that the Germans, moving from west to east, are about to appear, and will be within reach of the guns of the Russian battleship, because at least to the east, visibility was better than West, but it’s unlikely that the Germans would be able to see the “Glory” at a distance of more than 8 miles.

However, these calculations were not justified - on 07.45, the enemy gave 5 volleys to "Glory", while he himself was still invisible. This forced the battleship to retreat to the east.

Unfortunately, the sources do not give a detailed change in the weather condition, but it is known that in 08.40 Slava discovered the enemy minesweepers and destroyers at the 85-90 cable distance south of the Mikhailovsky lighthouse, but still could not open fire on them. Then the battleship met the enemy and, after some five minutes, came under heavy German Dreadnought fire. It is not known exactly whether Nassau and Posen were observed from Glory, but in any case, because of limited visibility or because of long distances, the Russian battleship could not respond to them with fire. In 08.50, almost immediately after the dreadnoughts fired at the Glory, she stopped coming closer and lay down again on a course perpendicular to the German one — the battleship turned north.

And at that moment, three 280-mm projectiles hit the Glory almost simultaneously.

The battleship received moderate severity damage - one projectile didn’t damage anything serious, flying over the upper deck, broke through the semi-marque and bed nets on the starboard and flew off without a break. But two other hits caused fires, moreover, with the threat of detonation of the powder cellars of the 152-mm tower, and also damaged the steering. Nevertheless, the battleship, still unable to respond to the enemy with fire, did not turn off the combat course, but instead began to repair the damage, which was quickly localized by the competent actions of the crew. In 08.58, “Glory”, continuing to go north, went beyond the limits of visibility or the firing range of the German Dreadnoughts and they stopped firing.

It is unlikely that someone would reproach the commander of the "Glory", Sergey Sergeyevich Vyazemsky, if he retreated at that moment. Not only did the Germans have an overwhelming numerical advantage, not only did they also have a decisive superiority in the range of fire, so now they also turned out to be invisible! But instead of retreating "Glory" turned to the west and moved towards the enemy.


"Posen". One of the opponents of "Glory" in the battle of August 4


It is difficult to say how all this would end, but the actions of the Russian battleship were observed “from above”. As soon as the damaged ship moved towards the enemy, the battleship received a signal (searchlight) from the commander of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga: “Go to Kuivast!”. Ss Vyazemsky tried to act in the best traditions of Nelson, who in a similar situation attached a telescope to the absent eye, and with good reason stated: “I don’t see an order!”. The commander of "Glory" preferred not to notice the order given to him and continued to go towards rapprochement with the Kaiser ships, but then he was repeatedly sent an order from the escort destroyer, and it became impossible to "ignore". Glory did not leave Arensburg’s raid, and its participation in the defense of the Irben position of August 4 ended there.

For all the time of the battle, "Glory" did not expend a single projectile - the enemy was either not visible or was too far away for shooting.

After the failure of 4 August, the battleship seemed doomed to death. The Germans completed the trawling of the Irbensky watering on August 4, and the next day they entered their heavy ships into the Gulf of Riga. “Glory” did not have a single chance to go to the Gulf of Finland (too much draft) to break through the Strait of Irbena due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy’s forces. She could only die with honor. Therefore, on August 6, the minelayer Amur set up a minefield between Moonzund and the Gulf of Riga, and Slava prepared to take her last battle at this mine-artillery position, maneuvering between Kuyvast and Werder Island.

In fact, on August 5 and 6, the “Glory” was only helped by the fact that the Germans prepared badly for the operation, had not previously scouted the Russian basing system fleet in Moonsund, they simply did not know where to look for the Russian battleship now. But the German plan involved blocking the passage from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Riga and, having embarked on this plan, the Germans would inevitably encounter Glory. It would seem that a tragic denouement is inevitable, but then the inevitable accidents at sea and ... the British intervened.

The fact is that foggy Albion transferred to the aid of the Russian imperial Baltic fleet several submarines operating in the Baltic with a truly murderous effectiveness many times greater than the achievements of Russian submarines. And it turned out that while the Germans invaded the Gulf of Riga, their battle cruisers, still cruising the Gotska Sanden-Ezel line, awaiting the release of the Russian Dreadnoughts, were attacked by the submarine of His Majesty E-1, which managed to torpedo " Moltke. In the evening of the same day, the S-31 destroyer exploded and sank, and the next day in the Gulf of Riga, German observers found the submarine Minoga

All this created an extremely nervous situation in the German headquarters. The fact is that, contrary to the original idea of ​​joint actions of the German army and the Kaiserlhmarin, the Germans never launched an offensive on land, and without this, the operation to break through into the Gulf of Riga was largely meaningless. Now, being in a small and shallow bay, among mines and submarines (of which the Russians had only three, and those were outdated, but the eyes were large with fear), the German command was extremely irritating, with the result that Erhard Schmidt ordered the interruption of the operation and the German fleet retreated .

What conclusions can be drawn from the battle 4 August 1915 g? They are few. At this time, the weather conditions also added to the unfavorable balance of forces and the quality of the materiel - in the circumstances, the continuation of the battle with “Glory” could only lead to the senseless death of the battleship. There was no way for Slava to defend the Irben position, but it wasn’t any sense to go “on the last and decisive” exactly on August 4. Ss Vyazemsky, the commander of "Glory", acted bravely, leading his battleship towards many times superior enemy, but the head of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga acted wisely, withdrawing him. Since the Germans were destined to break into the Gulf of Riga, the "Glory" with dozens of correct actions of the enemy was doomed. And if so, then you should choose the best time and place for the last fight. The Irbensky Strait 4 of August was neither the one nor the other: retreating and fighting in the new mine-artillery position at Moonzund, Slava received much better chances of inflicting at least some damage to the enemy, even if at the cost of their death.

Of course, it is completely meaningless to talk about the accuracy of the gunners of "Glory" in the battle of 4 in August - the battleship failed to make a single shot that day.

Preparing for future battles

The next battle of battleships at the mine-artillery position took place two years and two months after the previous invasion of the Kaiserlmarine ships in the Gulf of Riga.

Of course, during this time the experience of the confrontation of "Glory" to the German ships was carefully studied and certain conclusions were made. The range of the battleship's guns was categorically inadequate, and measures were taken to increase it, as a result of which "Glory" was able to fire at a distance of 115 kb. But what were these measures, and when were they taken?
If it were possible to increase the elevation angles to 35-40 degrees and thereby obtain the above range increase, then this would be fine. Alas - although the vertical angles of orientation “Slava” were corrected, but far from as much as we would like. The author came across various data on what angle the battleships could have climbed to the horizon — 20 hail, 22,5 hail or 25 hail (the latter is most likely), but one thing is sure - Slava remained very, very far from the Black Sea battleships. But then how did you manage to increase the range to 115 KB?

The fact is that the firing range depends not only on the angle of elevation, but also on the length of the projectile. Both the Baltic and Black Sea battleships fired 331,7 lightweight caliber 3,2 g. With a lightweight 1907 kg. In addition to this type of projectiles, a new, heavier and longer 470,9 kg 1911 grit projectile of the newest dreadnoughts was made in the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, its use on the battleships was completely impossible, because the design of the feed mechanisms and the chargers did not involve working with such massive projectiles, and their alteration was too complicated and expensive. Here, however, they usually recall the famous shelling of "Chesma" from "John Chrysostom" - the Black Sea battleship then fired with "heavy" shells arr. 305 d. But you need to understand that the firing rate of such firing did not matter, so there was no need to use regular means of lifting projectiles from under-battalions, etc. Those. the shells could simply “roll” into the towers, and the loading should be carried out with the help of some temporarily installed hoists.

On the other hand, to load the domestic industry, which could not cope with the release of shells for the front, the production of a new type of heavy projectile was meaningless.

They found the way out in special ballistic tips made of brass and screwed onto the projectile (before this, of course, it was necessary to cut the thread on the body of the projectile). With such a tip, the mass of the projectile increased to 355 kg, and its length almost to the 4 caliber. But due to the fact that neither the storages nor the feeding devices of the battleships were intended for the "turning" of such long projectiles, these tips should be screwed on immediately before loading, which reduced the rate of fire three times. Nevertheless, they were all the same ready to go in order not to be completely unarmed in front of the German Dreadnoughts.

And here, apparently, it worked, "I do not understand well, but here I will understand it, since it comes to a loop." The fact is that the sailors of "Glory" in the period of 26 July - 4 of August 1915 g had the "pleasure" on themselves to feel all the sensations of an unarmed person, who was shot from a safe distance by large calibers. This brings to mind the remarkable impromptu of one of the officers of the port-arthur squadron, told by him when the Japanese battleships got into the habitat with impunity to bombard the water area where Russian ships stood with throw-over fire:

“Isn't it boring?
Sit and wait
When they start throwing you,
From afar heavy objects


But the battleship, obviously, also understood that such a sharp (threefold!) Drop in the rate of fire reduces the benefit of increasing the range to almost zero. Therefore, on the "Glory", the ship's means (!) Managed not only to equip 200 storage spaces for projectiles with screwed caps, but also to alter the feed so that the "new" projectiles could be delivered to the guns and charged without any problems.


Loading torpedoes on the battleship "Glory" (the photo was taken during the 1 World War I)


This raises two questions. The first one is rhetorical: how did it happen that the crew of a warship managed to do what specially trained gentlemen ship engineers considered impossible? The second is more interesting - if Slava was able to provide storage and supply of such ammunition, then maybe for the newest shells of the 1911 model, everything was not so hopeless? Of course, high-explosive shells arr. 1911 g were longer (5 gauges) but armor-piercing - just 3,9 gauges, i.e. In terms of geometry, they corresponded to the “new” projectile arr. 1907 g with a ballistic tip. Of course, the armor-piercing shell was heavier (470,9 kg versus 355 kg), but was it an insurmountable obstacle? Alas, we can only guess about this now. But if “Glory” had similar projectiles in its last battle ... But let's not get ahead of ourselves.

Thus, we can say that the crew of the battleship did everything in its power (and even a little more than that) to meet the enemy fully armed in the next battle. Alas, this was not enough.

The fact is that the new “miracle-projectiles” with ballistic tips had one fatal flaw: their dispersion significantly exceeded that of conventional 305-mm projectiles. In essence, ballistic projectiles represented a specific ammunition for firing at squares. As wrote in 1916 year LM Galler (at that time - the flagship artillery 2-th brigade of battleships):

“Ships ..., being supplied with a long-range projectile, have the opportunity, without being subjected to the fire of the main forces of the enemy, to shoot the minesweepers with impunity: the destruction of the minesweepers under such conditions makes any attempt to break through the obstacles very risky ...”


That is, it was assumed that, shooting at an areal target, which is a dense system of minesweepers, high-explosive shells exploding from the impact when in contact with water, you can achieve heavy damage or even the destruction of minesweepers, without achieving direct hits, but only due to high-explosive and fragmentation action shells. In this case, as noted LM. Galler ballistic projectiles were considered necessary:

“Only from the point of view of firing a specific item, but not shooting in a squadron battle”


In other words, despite the above events, “Glory” never received weapons, allowing you to hit the enemy's warships at a distance over 90-95 KBT reliably.

We described two measures to increase the range of the battleship, but it should be borne in mind that they were carried out in reverse order. Slava received ballistic-tipped shells by the end of 1915, but the command considered the presence of a battleship in the Gulf of Riga to be so necessary that it did not even venture to take it away with the onset of cold weather. “Glory” got up for the wintering of 1915-1916 at the entrance to the Strait of Moonsund, opposite the Werder Beacon and entered the 1916 campaign of the year without returning to Helsingfors. As a result, the ship's factory repair, replacement and increase of the elevation angles of the 305-mm guns was possible only at the end of the 1916 year. "Glory" left the Gulf of Riga 22 in October, passing through the in-depth Moonsund Strait, through which the oldest, but at the same time, the smallest Russian battleships, the Tsarevich and Slava, could now pass.

One can only rejoice at the fact that the Germans did not dare to invade large forces in the Gulf of Riga in 1916. In this case, Slava would have had to fight in about the same conditions as before - with the ability to shoot conventional shells at 76-78 KBT (guns They were also shot, so the achievement of even 78 kbt was probably questioned) and long-range projectiles for firing at squares - kbt 91-93. Or, with artificial roll in 3 degrees - respectively 84-86 KBT and 101-103 KBT, which the Germans would not be enough to counter the dreadnoughts of the Germans.

Yet the remnants of 1915 g and 1916 year passed for the battleship relatively calmly. "Glory" fought, supporting with fire the coastal flank of the army and achieved considerable success in this. So, for example, Vinogradov indicates that the German offensive, launched by them on October 17, initially led to success, and that it was thanks to the heavy cannons of Glory that our troops managed to restore the situation. The Germans tried to counteract the battleship using field artillery, hydroplanes and zeppelins. They could not seriously damage the heavily armored ship, but still achieved some success. So, September 12 German 150-mm shell hit the edge of the reflective visor of the conning tower, killing almost everyone in it, including the commander of the "Glory", Sergey Sergeyevich Vyazemsky.

And then came the February Revolution

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  1. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 27 November 2017 16: 17 New
    +3
    . Of course, the armor-piercing projectile was heavier (470,9 kg versus 355 kg), but was this an insurmountable obstacle? Alas, we can only guess about this now. But be at the "Glory" like shells in her last battle ...

    I think that the then artillerymen had no particular need to guess, the experience of using "super-heavy" shells in 12 "installations (455kg shell for 12" / 35 guns) was clearly not forgotten - a moderate ballistic or a meager barrel resource when again "cloudless" ballistics. For the effective use of heavy shells, it was necessary to design new guns which became 12 "/ 52
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 16: 30 New
      +7
      Quote: BORMAN82
      the experience of using "super-heavy" shells in 12 "installations (455kg. shell for 12" / 35 guns) was clearly not forgotten

      It wasn’t, but that’s not the question. Our 305 mm / 40 projectile could shoot 470,9 kg, without question, the question is in the feed mechanisms
      1. Bormanxnumx
        Bormanxnumx 27 November 2017 20: 49 New
        +1
        It wasn’t, but that’s not the question. Our 305 mm / 40 projectile could shoot 470,9 kg, without question, the question is in the feed mechanisms

        But if the “Glory” had such shells in its last battle ...]

        The question is that “Glory” could not have thrown it to the enemy. Yes, and with the “knee-jerked” impromptu touching the magic ballistic tip, most likely the primary question was to compile the correct shooting tables, and then there are no miracles in the world)))
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 November 2017 21: 29 New
          +5
          Quote: BORMAN82
          The question is that “Glory” could not have thrown it to the enemy.

          I propose to return to this issue in the discussion of the next article. hi
          Quote: BORMAN82
          And with an “impromptu” impromptu touching the magic ballistic tip, most likely the primary question was to compile the correct shooting tables, and then dispersion

          I thought about it, but - very unlikely. The first - I believe that Haller, as an artilleryman, would definitely mention this, and the second - brass is a soft metal with a very low melting point - 880-950 degrees. That is, in my unenlightened view, deformations during a shot are not just likely, but almost inevitable. With such initial conditions, good accuracy cannot be in principle.
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 29 November 2017 14: 01 New
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I thought about it, but - very unlikely. The first - I believe that Haller, as an artilleryman, would definitely mention this, and the second - brass is a soft metal with a very low melting point - 880-950 degrees. That is, in my unenlightened view, deformations during a shot are not just likely, but almost inevitable. With such initial conditions, good accuracy cannot be in principle.


            I do not agree.
            The durability of the ballistic tip is enough to avoid deformation during firing - the spread is more likely due to the fact that the drilling of shells for the ballistic tip occurred either in the arsenal or in the workshops, which implies less precision in manufacturing and the inability to calibrate the tip after screwing on the projectile.
  2. 27091965
    27091965 27 November 2017 16: 19 New
    +9
    It is not known exactly whether Nassau and Posen were observed from Glory, but in any case, due to limited visibility or because of great distances, the Russian battleship could not answer them with fire.


    This moment of the battle is described in the book "On" Glory "in the Gulf of Riga" published in 1949.
    " For the entire battle only once and only one lieutenant A.P. Waxmouth, standing at the rangefinder, noticed when approaching the masts of a German dreadnought appearing in the fog for a short period of time, shooting at us. He asks to open fire in the direction indicated by him. Alas, the commandants, not seeing the target, do not know where to aim the guns. "

    Indeed, the situation is being fired at, but you cannot answer. It is necessary to have steel nerves that act in such an environment.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 16: 29 New
      10
      Thank you!
      But I wondered where Vinogradov’s replica was saying that “it was impossible to shoot, because they didn’t see the target in the towers”. But with the fragment quoted by you - everything is clear. To notice the masts, this is fine, but not enough to open fire - you can’t determine the distance / course / speed from them ...
      Quote: 27091965i
      Indeed, the situation is being fired at, but you cannot answer. It is necessary to have steel nerves that act in such an environment.

      Absolutely agree
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 27 November 2017 16: 59 New
    +2
    So I waited for the continuation! Thank you so much!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 17: 40 New
      +3
      And thank you :))) The third article is now in work :)
  5. soldier
    soldier 27 November 2017 17: 05 New
    23
    Without exaggeration, I enjoy reading these materials.
    The author is well done
    Such articles make review Military
    1. not main
      not main 28 November 2017 00: 12 New
      +3
      Quote: soldier

      6
      CSKA Today, 17:05 New
      Without exaggeration, I enjoy reading these materials.
      The author is well done
      Such articles make review Military

      I totally agree! In everything! Thanks to the author! I look forward to continuing!
  6. bionik
    bionik 27 November 2017 17: 07 New
    +4
    Squadron battleship Glory on completion in Kronstadt, 1905The battleship "Glory".
  7. belost79
    belost79 27 November 2017 17: 15 New
    +2
    Some kind of curse is fun over the conning tower of the Tsarevich series. In 1904, in a battle in the Yellow Sea, fragments of a Japanese shell shred everyone at the Cesarevich’s cabin, the ship was deprived of control. In Tsushima, the fragments hit exactly the light head of Rozhdestvensky. Some miserable 11 years pass by, and the shell of a land-based gun of super-giant caliber again crumbles all living things into logging. Really the technology of that time did not allow to protect the ship’s brain “question mark”
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 27 November 2017 17: 34 New
      +1
      In the battle in the Yellow Sea in 1904, the command of the squadron, led by Wittgeft, was OUT of the conning tower yes
      1. belost79
        belost79 27 November 2017 18: 27 New
        +1
        If I’m not mistaken, there were two bad shells - one killed Vitgeft, but the ship remained in service (or rather even led the squadron), and the second crumbled all living things in the wheelhouse and deprived the ship of control
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 27 November 2017 18: 49 New
          +3
          Precisely, the second shell, presumably with a ricochet from the water in an ascending trajectory, fell into the conning tower from the right along the ship, exploding from a blow to the upper part of the deckhouse. This is already at the end of the second battle.
          Here is the location of this projectile in the center of the picture

          And here is the place where the first shell hit the base of the mast behind the conning tower that killed Witgeft
    2. Bormanxnumx
      Bormanxnumx 27 November 2017 21: 29 New
      0
      Quote: belost79
      Some kind of curse is fun over the conning tower of the Tsarevich series.

      The curse did not hang over the conning tower, but over the tactics of seeing the battle - the Japanese “overtaking” the Russian squadron fired from forehead angles and were often hit in the conning tower
      predictable. And with regard to security, good protection and ensuring a normal view from the cabin was apparently not feasible then.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 November 2017 21: 40 New
        +3
        Quote: BORMAN82
        The curse did not hang over the conning tower, but over the tactics of seeing the battle - the Japanese “overtaking” the Russian squadron fired from fore-course angles

        Well, in ZhM they just caught up with the Russian squadron, passing along its line :)
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 November 2017 22: 43 New
        +1
        Quote: BORMAN82
        The curse did not hang over the conning tower, but over the tactics of seeing the battle - the Japanese “overtaking” the Russian squadron fired from forehead angles and were often hit in the conning tower

        Damage scheme "Tsesarevich" after the battle 28.07/XNUMX

        As you can see, almost the entire ship suffers. Since the flagship receives the most, the likelihood that the shell will fall into the "right" place is quite high ...
        No. 11 the shell that killed Vitgeft, No. 12 - the shell that wounded everyone in the conning tower and brought the armadillo into circulation
    3. burigaz2010
      burigaz2010 27 November 2017 23: 48 New
      0
      Actually, Wittgeft came out on the bridge, but he commanded the battle absolutely correctly! If not for his death, how would the Russian-Japanese war turn?
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 November 2017 23: 53 New
        +4
        Quote: burigaz2010
        If not for his death, how would the Russian-Japanese war turn?

        Yes, the same way. By that time, of all the battleships, only “Victory” could have reached Vladivostok, the rest either had coal or health. If they had interned, then yes, they would have saved more ships, but this would not have affected the result of the RPE
        1. burigaz2010
          burigaz2010 28 November 2017 00: 02 New
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Quote: burigaz2010
          If not for his death, how would the Russian-Japanese war turn?

          Yes, the same way. By that time, of all the battleships, only “Victory” could have reached Vladivostok, the rest either had coal or health. If they had interned, then yes, they would have saved more ships, but this would not have affected the result of the RPE

          Hello Andrei, Togo was already thinking of retreating, but the death of Wittgeft and, accordingly, the loss of control of the squadron did their job! Makarov, who replaced him, unfortunately did not have time!
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            28 November 2017 07: 48 New
            +3
            Quote: burigaz2010
            Hello hello, Togo was already thinking of retreating

            I didn’t think :)))) Apparently - this is a duck from a French magazine, based on nothing. At least neither Japanese historiography nor British observers mention anything like this. And why should he retreat? With a practically intact squadron?
            1. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 29 November 2017 15: 15 New
              +2
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              I didn’t think :)))) Apparently - this is a duck from a French magazine, based on nothing. At least neither Japanese historiography nor British observers mention anything like this. And why should he retreat? With a practically intact squadron?


              At that time, there were several large-caliber hits on Mikas and half of the GK did not work.
              The load of responsibility on Togo was very high - to do what he could to lose the flagship battleship and a half of a failed GK or to leave the battle.
              I don’t believe in fairy tales about the Russian shells getting into the trunks of the main ships of the Japanese ships, but the version with the bursts of thin-walled Japanese shells in the trunks of Japanese guns is a very plausible version.


              recall damage "Mikasy"
              - At 12.41, at the time of turning “all of a sudden” to the right, a 305mm projectile that hit from the aft course angles broke through the main mast and exploded in Spardeck, killing 12 and injuring 5 people. This shell destroyed the mainmast by about two-thirds of the circumference.
              - A 305 mm shell hit the starboard side, in the area of ​​the bow barbette, and pierced the 178 mm armor belt, breaking a piece of about 1 m in size from an irregular shape.
              Shortly after the start of the second phase of the battle, between 16.30-17.00 a severe explosion occurred in the stern of the Japanese ship. A 305mm shell hit the stern barbette. The fragments of this shell killed 1 and wounded 18 people.

              The right gun in the barbet exploded, and the entire installation turned out to be damaged (horizontal aiming failed).
              - At the same time, a 305mm shell pierced the left side, destroyed the laying of the anti-torpedo net and made two holes of the order of 1 m. The explosion of the shell destroyed a significant area on two decks and caused great losses to personnel.
              - Around 18.20, an armor-piercing 305mm shell hit the Mikasa’s main armor belt at the level of the waterline under the foremast, breaking armor at the junction of 152mm and 178mm plates, broke through the bevel of the armored deck and, breaking the bulkhead between the coal pit and the engine room, exploded in the engine room . Fragments of a shell seriously damaged the left car and killed the Mikasy steam line, the engine room was filled with steam. As a result, the entire compartment and a number of adjacent coal pits were completely flooded. Over the next 3-4 minutes, the ship received 3 more hits,
              - but the heaviest was a 254mm high-explosive shell that exploded on the bridge of the Japanese flagship, with 7 killed and 16 wounded, including the ship's commander and two staff officers who were killed and wounded, although Admiral Togo accidentally survived, but received a heavy shell shock and temporarily out of order.
              Nothing is known about the time of other hits. A 254-mm shell pierced 178 mm port side armor, in both pipes there were holes - large in the rear and smaller in the front, probably from a large (305 mm or 254 mm) and medium (152 mm) caliber shell. In addition, on the starboard side, right above the armored belt, a square piece of skin was torn out - possibly the head of the shell that hit at 16.30-17.00. Finally, several shells exploded on the armor without causing damage. In total, the ship received more than 25 hits of caliber 152-305mm. Crew losses were the most severe among all Japanese ships in this battle. According to official figures, 36 people were killed and 94 injured.


              I can repeat my opinion: having no data on damage to other ships of the fleet, taking damage on the flagship from the entire Russian column, with half of the non-operational CC, more than two dozen hits received, especially to the logging site - Togo, who received the shell shock, could overestimate the damage not only to Mikasy , but the entire squadron.

              He still had minuscule forces and the expectation of a night attack and a whole daylight chasing to Vladivostok, he could calmly break the distance, determine the damage and decide whether to continue the pursuit or leave the battle "without losing face." We must give him his due - the admiral’s courage did not yield to his determination.
            2. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 29 November 2017 15: 39 New
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              With a practically intact squadron?


              How to say:
              The Asahi EDB - just like the rest of the battleships of the Japanese squadron with the exception of the Mikas - suffered relatively little from Russian fire. At about 13.45, a 305-mm shell exploded close to the ship, bombarding the upper deck with fragments. Another shell exploded in the armored belt of the port side in the stern. The armor was not pierced, however, shell fragments caused damage to lightweight structures. In addition, at about 17.05/XNUMX, the Asahi stern barbet ceased fire (according to some reports from projectile hits, for others - for technical reasons). Those. half of the GC is not functional.
              Around 17.00-18.20, the battleship received 9 hits with medium-caliber shells and a heavy shell that pierced the side and exploded in the bow. Loss of crew 5 killed and 17 wounded.

              The Sikishima EDB received only 7 hits with medium-caliber shells that did not cause serious damage, one main-caliber gun in the nose barbette failed as a result of the accident. 254mm shell exploded in the rear. 1 person was killed and 7 injured.

              During the battle, the Kassuga BRKR received 9 hits of medium-caliber shells, 19 people were injured.

              DBKR "Nissin", the flagship of Vice Admiral Kataoka closed the line of Japanese main forces in the first phase of the battle, and for some time after the turns, "everything suddenly" became the lead one. Between 12.20 and 14.20 he received 2 hits with heavy shells, which killed 3 and injured 13 people. Another 5 shells hit the Nissin near the end of the battle, with 11 people dead and 2 injured. In total, the ship received 7 hits of 76-305mm caliber shells. Thus, according to official figures, Nissin had 22 killed and 27 wounded.

              DBKR "Yakumo". At the end of the first phase of the battle, Rear Admiral Virgo decided to support his main forces and attacked the tail of the Russian column. At the same time, a 305mm shell from the battleship Poltava hit his flagship. At the end of the battle, the Yakumo trailing end received twelve hits, including a supposedly 254mm shell from the Oslyaby, which got into the nose and caused extensive flooding, some of the hits were allegedly received from Askold, who fired at the Japanese cruiser during this period. The crew of the ship lost 27 people killed and 10 wounded.

              DBKR "Asama". Toward the end of the battle received 7 hits with medium-caliber shells. There was a fire on the ship. The number of victims is unknown.


              By the way, explosions of artillery shells in the trunks of Japanese guns continued after the war.
              On July 25, 1909, one of the 305 mm guns burst at Asahi during a practical shooting conducted in Ise Bay. Four people were killed, and two officers and three sailors were injured.
          2. Narak-zempo
            Narak-zempo 28 November 2017 09: 30 New
            +2
            Quote: burigaz2010
            Togo was already thinking of retreating, but the death of Witgeft and, accordingly, the loss of control of the squadron did their job! Makarov, who succeeded him, unfortunately did not have time!


            Wow, but I always thought that by the time of the battle in the Yellow Sea Makarov, along with the "Peter and Paul" was already dead.
        2. Nehist
          Nehist 28 November 2017 02: 21 New
          +1
          Good time Andrew! I do not agree with you. 1 TOE would reach Vladivostok. Just not being there would somewhat doubtfully affect the fighting. Japanese could block Vladivostok with the same ease as Port Arthur
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            28 November 2017 07: 51 New
            +5
            Quote: Nehist
            Good time Andrew!

            Hello to you, too! hi
            Quote: Nehist
            I do not agree with you. 1 TOE would reach Vladivostok.

            So write articles after that :))))) Cesarevich - could not, did not have enough coal. Retvisan - coal, in principle, was enough, but it was necessary to go a hole against the wave, which led to flooding, so that could not. Relight - crippled. Sevastopol is a slow-moving ship, its speed has been severely reduced, there is no coal to Vladivostok. Poltava has no coal.
            And this despite the fact that Togo, generally speaking, could easily retreat to Korea at night and give a second battle there - of his ships only Nissin and Kasuga MAY BE short of coal
            1. Nehist
              Nehist 28 November 2017 12: 17 New
              0
              The same Essen in his testimony of the commission of inquiry that studied the battle on July 28 stated the opposite.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                28 November 2017 16: 47 New
                +4
                Quote: Nehist
                The same Essen in his testimony of the commission of inquiry that studied the battle on July 28 stated the opposite.

                Literally, it sounded like this:
                “I didn’t think about coal, considering that coal would be enough for me anyway to Vladivostok”

                You don’t find that “Enough coal” and “Didn’t think about coal” = are two different things? :) Consider the fact that Essen couldn’t get comfortable in the command of armored ships - after Makarov, the ship hardly went to sea. But Kuteynikov writes
                "I saw at the relight and Sevastopol almost empty coal pits"

                No offense to von Essen, Kuteynikov saw them
            2. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 30 November 2017 10: 24 New
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And this despite the fact that Togo, generally speaking, could easily retreat to Korea at night and give a second battle there - of his ships only Nissin and Kasuga MAY BE short of coal


              On three EDBs of Togo, 5 GK guns are not operational (fodder barbets on Mikasa and Asahi were disabled by hit and explosion of a shell in the barrel, on Sikishima one GK gun in the bow barb for those reasons). Moreover, the damage to the main assembly on Mikasa and Asahi is catastrophic - that is, incorrigible during the day (serious repairs are required in the database). In fact, the advantage of the main caliber of operational weapons in the Russian squadron - the advantage increased. Moreover, Togo clearly knows this - such damages as the main team, cars, steering gears and leaks are immediately reported to the admiral.
              Daylight hours are running out. Of course, the decision begs to stop the battle and "look around in the compartments" - i.e. determine the possibility of repairing damage and the ability to continue the battle the next day.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                30 November 2017 11: 33 New
                +1
                Quote: DimerVladimer
                On three EDB Togo - 5 guns of the Civil Code are not operational

                Yes, out of 17 guns of the GK (counting the 254-mm Kasugi), there are 12. We have at the end of the battle - I don’t remember exactly how it happened, one 305-mm Retvisan tower is seized, Poltava + Peresvet tower is practically disabled.
                Quote: DimerVladimer
                Moreover, the damage to the Civil Code on Mikas and Asahi is catastrophic - that is, incorrigible during the day

                It's right. Therefore, I wrote that ours had to return to Arthur, repair and break through again. But in battle 28, we also suffered damage to the Civil Code, and indeed, not the Civil Code alone ... This is clearly not a reason to leave the battle.
                Quote: DimerVladimer
                Of course, the decision begs to stop the battle and "look around in the compartments" - i.e. determine the possibility of repairing damage and the ability to continue the battle the next day.

                Yes, and here one could, having retreated to Tsushima, call Kamimura for help
        3. belost79
          belost79 28 November 2017 09: 41 New
          0
          And I think that even if everyone had broken through to Vladivostok, it would have been even worse. The Japanese would have withdrawn most of the siege troops from under Port Arthur, and then Kuropatkin did not take his legs off at all. And the Russian fleet of Togo also smashed in parts - first the 2nd squadron in the same Tsushima, then the 1st in Vladivostok guarded. We lost this war even before it began.
    4. Amurets
      Amurets 28 November 2017 01: 27 New
      +2
      Quote: belost79
      Some kind of curse is fun over the conning tower of the Tsarevich series.

      And the whole thing is in the design of the cabin, in which the roof was raised 12 "(305 mm) above the base of the cabin. Here under the" Mushroom-shaped cap "of the roof of the cabin and fragments of shells flew in." The sighting gaps between the roof and the walls of the cabin were incredibly large -305 mm , Г can only be explained by some general eclipse that befell all? a complete loss of a sense of reality or just a carelessness syndrome in front of the danger of defeating people in the wheelhouse. This decision is partly explained (judging by the situation during the construction of the Rossiya cruiser, when his senior officer P. I. Serebrennikov proposed to increase the clearance) by the bulkiness of the mine sight installed in the clearance. "All the troubles with logging come from here and only after the Russian- The Japanese war on the new ships changed the design of the cabin. A page from the first book of R.Melnikov. "Tsesarevich".
    5. Cyril Troekurych
      Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 12 New
      0
      12 inches - the width of the viewing gap in the conning tower and thousands of fragments from shells
  8. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 27 November 2017 17: 18 New
    +2
    And I thought why, in the 17th year, the Tsesarevich, having the same guns as the Glory, the same tower installations, already had "obsolete" guns. Although modernization was mentioned, it is not clear what sense.
    In my opinion, the problem was laid back in 1891, when they began to design a 305mm / 40 gun. The then conclusions on the combat ranges assumed a cut of 20-40 cable, because armor penetration was achieved due to the high initial velocity of the projectile. Therefore, they decided that 331kg lightweight armor-piercing projectile was preferable to heavy 470kg. Consequently, under such shells, mechanisms were developed for feeding and loading turret installations of armadillos, starting with the Three Saints and ending with the Emperors and the Eustathians. Although in the latter, the firing range has already been increased due to an increase in the elevation angle, which was made possible thanks to the trends in the development of the Sukanti Autonomous Okrug and the increased firing ranges ....
    So half measures rather psychologically reassured the team sent to die than actually increased the combat efficiency of the ship. And the “Tsesarevich” was sent to the Gulf of Riga no longer as support, but as a mockery of common sense based on the experience of the “Glory” of the 15th year ...
    And now we are convinced that for a more or less effective (and not "effective") opposition to the breakthrough of any MAP is the presence of weapons that are comparable in characteristics to the weapons of the enemy. "Glory" was not like that smile
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 17: 45 New
      +5
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Although in the latter, the firing range has already been increased due to an increase in the elevation angle, which was made possible thanks to the trends in the development of the Sukanti Autonomous Okrug and the increased firing ranges ....

      Until that moment, you wrote everything absolutely correctly, but here there is a nuance. The SADA has nothing to do with it, just black-and-white EDBs were created to storm the Bosphorus, which was necessary to suppress the forts, and it was better to do this from long distances and not with flat but mounted fire
      Quote: Rurikovich
      So half measures rather psychologically reassured the team sent to die, than actually increased the fighting efficiency of the ship

      Actually, yes.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      And the “Tsesarevich” was sent to the Gulf of Riga no longer as support, but as a mockery of common sense based on the experience of the “Glory” of the 15th year ...

      Well ... not really. Cesarevich could support the coastal flank no worse than Glory, but prevent the invasion ... yes, it couldn’t
      Quote: Rurikovich
      And now we are convinced that for a more or less effective (and not "effective") opposition to the breakthrough of any MAP is the presence of weapons that are comparable in characteristics to the weapons of the enemy. "Glory" was not like that

      good
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 November 2017 17: 59 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        there is a nuance. The SADA has nothing to do with it, just black-and-white EDBs were created to storm the Bosphorus, which was necessary to suppress the forts, and it was better to do this from long distances and not with flat but mounted fire

        I do not argue - I was just too lazy to write about it. Although the “Andryusham” did not need to storm such “Bosporus”, but they also received towers with increased gun pointing angles. All the same, I am inclined to the fact that after the REV came the realization that something needs to be changed. But because the state, in the wake of the post-war syndrome, improved only what was on the stocks. But really outdated the EDB made changes in the organization of the battle. A ship is built to carry weapons. Weapons are created for specific purposes. If a weapon does not meet the conditions for achieving goals, then it is outdated, because the conditions of existence for these weapons have changed. The weapons of Glory in the battle with Posen and Nassau did not meet the range requirements, therefore, it is not effective request
    2. 27091965
      27091965 27 November 2017 18: 38 New
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      In my opinion, the problem was laid back in 1891, when they began to design a 305mm / 40 gun. The then conclusions on the combat ranges assumed a cut of 20-40 cable, because armor penetration was achieved due to the high initial velocity of the projectile. Therefore, they decided that 331kg lightweight armor-piercing projectile was preferable to heavy 470kg.


      In fairness, it must be clarified that the real development of lightweight shells in Russia began after 1895. When Armstrong, following the results of the use of guns in the Sino-Japanese War, announced that he would develop a "universal" projectile, modern semi-armor-piercing. In Russia, this idea was picked up. True Armstrong had in mind 120 and 152 mm guns.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 November 2017 19: 00 New
        +1
        Quote: 27091965i
        In fairness, it must be clarified that the real development of lightweight shells in Russia began after 1895.

        Tower installations for 305/40 guns began to be ordered in 1893, with subsequent delivery for the "Three Saints", "Sisoy the Great" and the Trinity type "Poltava" in 1895-98. Therefore, it is doubtful that the complete assembly would be made not for a specific munition. request Most likely the ammunition for this gun was chosen simultaneously with the design thereof. yes
        1. 27091965
          27091965 27 November 2017 19: 47 New
          +1
          Quote: Rurikovich
          . Therefore, it is doubtful that the complete assembly would be made not for a specific munition.

          Length in calibers. The high-explosive shell was longer in length. The elevator was made under the largest shell.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 27 November 2017 19: 55 New
            +1
            Quote: 27091965i
            The high-explosive shell was longer in length.

            I do not argue

            4,5 shells for the 305/40 cannon of the 1892 model. The picture is clickable. But all the same, shells of samples 1907 and 1911 already implied the alteration of all the feeding mechanisms, cellars and surfers in the towers.
      2. Bormanxnumx
        Bormanxnumx 27 November 2017 21: 14 New
        0
        When Armstrong, following the results of the use of guns in the Sino-Japanese ... In Russia, this idea was picked up. True Armstrong had in mind 120 and 152 mm guns.

        The idea of ​​a light projectile / high speed was “spied” by the French, we take 305 mm / 40 (12 ") Model 1893 projectile weight 349 kg, speed 780 m / s - quite close to the characteristics of Obukhov 12" / 40
        1. 27091965
          27091965 27 November 2017 21: 35 New
          +1
          Quote: BORMAN82
          The idea of ​​a light projectile / high speed "spied" on the French


          Everyone was fond of increasing the speed of the shell, perhaps only the Americans to a lesser extent, relying on heavy shells.
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 November 2017 21: 38 New
          +3
          Quote: BORMAN82
          The idea of ​​a light projectile / high speed was "spied" by the French, we take 305 mm / 40 (12 ") Model 1893 projectile weight 349 kg, speed 780 m / s

          And we recall that 331,7 kg of shells were introduced on the recommendation of Makarov in 1892 :)))
          1. 27091965
            27091965 27 November 2017 22: 09 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And we recall that 331,7 kg of shells were introduced on the recommendation of Makarov in 1892:


            Here we get a very interesting intersection. In 1892, the United States conducted a series of experimental firing with shells of various weights, and came to the conclusion that a heavy shell was preferable. They planned to fight at distances of up to 5000 meters.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 November 2017 22: 41 New
              +3
              Quote: 27091965i
              In 1892, the United States conducted a series of experimental firing with shells of various weights, and came to the conclusion that a heavy shell was preferable.

              Yes, too, how can I say? Of course, a heavy projectile is fine. But what exactly did Americans take into account in such an analysis? After all, if I remember correctly, the resource of the trunks of our 305 mm heavy shells was very small, about 60 shots. But the liners have not yet been invented. And it’s bad not even that it’s expensive to constantly change guns, it’s bad that you can end up with completely shot shells in view of the enemy ...
              I absolutely agree that a heavy projectile is better. But the lung also had certain advantages
              1. 27091965
                27091965 27 November 2017 22: 53 New
                +1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                But what exactly did Americans take into account in such an analysis?


                You can not believe this, but in the first place they put a high-explosive shell with an increased amount of explosive. Heavy armor-piercing shells were supposed to loosen and disrupt the armor plate mount. They long before the Japanese and the British came to the conclusion of "flying mines."
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 November 2017 23: 25 New
                  +3
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  You can not believe this, but in the first place they put a high-explosive shell with an increased amount of explosive.

                  Here comedians :))))
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  They long before the Japanese and the British came to the conclusion of "flying mines."

                  I apologize, but I am completely unaware that the British have come to this. Or do you mean the post-Tsushim triumph of a half-armor-piercing shell in the Royal Navy?
                  1. 27091965
                    27091965 28 November 2017 06: 41 New
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I apologize, but I am completely unaware that the British have come to this.


                    It all started in 1887, when they tried to get the results of experimental firing of shells with melinite, conducted by Admiral Ob. They argued for a long time, discussed, and in 1898-1899 they came to the conclusion that they needed such shells.

                    Here are the comedians


                    Yes, they are not so humorous. The Americans realized that 102 mm of armor would protect the ship from 127 and 152 mm of high-explosive shells, a larger caliber was needed. In 1889, they decided to develop a heavy 203 mm shell and tools for it. The result can be seen in the ships built later. Unlike Russia, they did not save money on these developments.
              2. 27091965
                27091965 27 November 2017 22: 58 New
                0
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                . But the liners have not yet been invented.


                Later I will drop you a book about one Russian plant, I think you will be paid when you find out in which year Russia developed the change of the inside of the trunk.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 November 2017 23: 23 New
                  +3
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  Later I will drop you a book about one Russian plant, I think you will be paid when you find out in which year Russia developed the change of the inside of the trunk.

                  If I am not mistaken, 1874th?
                  1. 27091965
                    27091965 28 November 2017 05: 56 New
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    If I am not mistaken, 1874th?


                    1874 or 1875, the year does not matter. . The main thing is that with the adoption of the Kane guns, the production of two-pipe guns ceased.
                2. Cyril Troekurych
                  Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 14 New
                  0
                  later
                  probably from izgayil planing texts
          2. Bormanxnumx
            Bormanxnumx 28 November 2017 08: 59 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            And we recall that 331,7 kg of shells were introduced on the recommendation of Makarov in 1892 :)))

            At the same time, forgetting that in 1892 the French had already introduced “lightweight” shells into the 12 "/ 45 armament of model 1887. It turns out that Makarov" whispered "them about light shells earlier than his own?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              28 November 2017 09: 03 New
              +4
              Quote: BORMAN82
              At the same time, forgetting that in 1892 the French had already introduced "light" shells into the 12 "/ 45 armament of model 1887.

              Our lightweight shells are called 305-mm shells arr 1892. They appeared simultaneously with the French, respectively, no one whispered to anyone. Moreover, a shell cannot appear at once, out of nowhere, i.e. the very idea of ​​such a projectile arose before 1892
        3. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 27 November 2017 21: 39 New
          +2
          Most likely, the general trend in the views on the conduct of the battle dictated the appearance of a particular system in different countries request The Germans won at the end of the 19th century on their battleships of the Kaiser Barbarossa and Wittelsbach types limited themselves to 240-mm guns firing almost ordinary steel blanks, because they believed that in the Baltic and the North Sea the rate of fire and fire were more important, and therefore this caliber should be enough to break through the opponent’s armor. The Japanese were armed with Armstrong 305/40 guns of the 1891 model with a projectile weight of 386 kg and a projectile speed of 762 km / h against the Russian 332 and 792 km / h. The results of the RPE are known - everyone draws conclusions for himself. Mine for me is that the concept of a light projectile was erroneous yes
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 November 2017 22: 13 New
            +3
            Quote: Rurikovich
            Mine for me is that the concept of a light projectile was erroneous

            Yes, how to say ... In aggregate, it is certainly erroneous. But at some point there was nothing to myself - the only trouble was that this moment quickly passed and it was outdated. And besides, it’s completely incomprehensible to me why such an indicator as the armored projectile effect was ignored. Although ... yes, everything is clear there. Makarov most likely believed that when using adequate steel, the explosive charge would not suffer much, but who would use this adequate steel in our economical ministry? Ehhhh not a prophet in this case Stepan Osipovich, oh not a prophet ...
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 27 November 2017 22: 30 New
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But at some point there was nothing to myself - the only trouble was that this moment quickly passed and it was outdated.

              Those are 20 years of the end of the 19th-beginning of the 20th century. were generally reactive in the development of naval concepts, inventions, weapons. Ships became obsolete almost on slipways request
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And besides, it’s completely incomprehensible to me why such an indicator as the armored projectile effect was ignored.

              They may have thought that to sink a ship it’s enough just to break through the armor belt in various places - and there the water will do everything itself. But again, good conclusions were needed for such conclusions, and they probably stemmed from the idea of ​​battle distances almost straight aiming what
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But who will use this adequate steel in our economical ministry?

              yes request
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Ehhhh not a prophet in this case Stepan Osipovich, oh not a prophet ...

              There was such a time at that moment repeat
    3. burigaz2010
      burigaz2010 28 November 2017 00: 28 New
      0
      Quote: Rurikovich
      And I thought why, in the 17th year, the Tsesarevich, having the same guns as the Glory, the same tower installations, already had "obsolete" guns. Although modernization was mentioned, it is not clear what sense.
      In my opinion, the problem was laid back in 1891, when they began to design a 305mm / 40 gun. The then conclusions on the combat ranges assumed a cut of 20-40 cable, because armor penetration was achieved due to the high initial velocity of the projectile. Therefore, they decided that 331kg lightweight armor-piercing projectile was preferable to heavy 470kg. Consequently, under such shells, mechanisms were developed for feeding and loading turret installations of armadillos, starting with the Three Saints and ending with the Emperors and the Eustathians. Although in the latter, the firing range has already been increased due to an increase in the elevation angle, which was made possible thanks to the trends in the development of the Sukanti Autonomous Okrug and the increased firing ranges ....
      So half measures rather psychologically reassured the team sent to die than actually increased the combat efficiency of the ship. And the “Tsesarevich” was sent to the Gulf of Riga no longer as support, but as a mockery of common sense based on the experience of the “Glory” of the 15th year ...
      And now we are convinced that for a more or less effective (and not "effective") opposition to the breakthrough of any MAP is the presence of weapons that are comparable in characteristics to the weapons of the enemy. "Glory" was not like that smile

      The problem was not in the shells but in the fuses! You can read the memoirs of officers, our shells were simply full of Japanese ships
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        28 November 2017 08: 16 New
        +4
        Quote: burigaz2010
        The problem was not in the shells but in the fuses!

        In the fuses, too, but with the shells, not everything was in order, because of the small number of explosives they had an insignificant armor action
      2. Cyril Troekurych
        Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 16 New
        0
        shells were equipped with watery pyroxylin
    4. Nehist
      Nehist 28 November 2017 02: 24 New
      +1
      Tsesarevich’s tower installations were structurally better than Borodin’s.
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 28 November 2017 06: 09 New
        +1
        Quote: Nehist
        Tsesarevich’s tower installations were structurally better than Borodin’s.

        In the 12 "towers of Tsesarevich there was an extremely unsuccessful feed system, which required rework, as noted by R. M. Melnikov." Tsesarevich "vol. 1
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 28 November 2017 07: 34 New
          0
          I had in mind the general design and not the individual elements. Well, the epic with the guns of the Civil Code for Tsesarevich is generally a separate song. We decided to shove not shoved. From here, and alterations, which by the way is the conclusion of the same MTK. Russian guns did not want to get into French towers, the charging systems did not match, the machines of the Putilov factory turned out to be weak.
          1. Amurets
            Amurets 28 November 2017 07: 37 New
            0
            Quote: Nehist
            I had in mind the general design and not the individual elements.

            Here I completely agree with your comment.
  9. ICT
    ICT 27 November 2017 17: 59 New
    +5
    intercepted by Novik. In a short artillery battle, the Russian destroyer won a landslide victory over them, and the V-99, trying to escape, was blown up by a mine


  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. Mooh
    Mooh 27 November 2017 22: 36 New
    +3
    Another brilliant work. Bravo. If you will, a little advice: when you write about the Monsund, you need to give a couple of paragraphs to the geography of these wonderful archipelago straits. I tried, in the year 95, when Pikul read, to understand the land map, and correlate it with the map from the book, so there the devil would break his leg. Everything that can be renamed, and even more than once. Up to the point that there are simply no islands mentioned. Accordingly, the modern reader-victim of Google maps does not exactly understand who was breaking where and why ;-)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 23: 26 New
      +4
      Quote: MooH
      Another brilliant work. Bravo. If you will, a little advice: when you write about the Monsund, you need to give a couple of paragraphs to the geography of these wonderful archipelago straits.

      You are absolutely right, I promise to correct in the next article
  12. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 27 November 2017 22: 50 New
    +4
    In principle, we can conclude that the “Glory” actually fulfilled its function - the Germans were difficult to trawl and thwarted the pace of the offensive due to the neutralization of the support of the Hohseeflot fleet of their navies.
    "Glory" fought, supporting the coastal flank of the army with fire, and achieved considerable success in this. So, for example, Vinogradov indicates that the German offensive, which they launched on October 17, initially led to success, and that it was thanks to the heavy guns of Glory that our troops were able to restore the situation. The Germans tried to counteract the battleship using field artillery, hydroplanes and zeppelins. They could not seriously damage a heavily armored ship, but still achieved some success. So, on September 12, a German 150-mm shell hit the edge of the reflective visor of the conning tower, killing almost everyone present in it, including the commander of the Glory, Sergei Sergeyevich Vyazemsky.

    I remember in the memorable cinematic film "Admiral" beat this moment - though firstly they called "Glory" a cruiser, and secondly they drove to Kolchak’s bridge (which, however, didn’t hurt) ....
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 November 2017 23: 27 New
      +4
      Quote: doktorkurgan
      I remember in the memorable cinematic film "Admiral" beat this moment - though firstly they called "Glory" a cruiser, and secondly they drove to Kolchak’s bridge

      In the beginning of the movie? So there’s generally a destroyer :)
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 28 November 2017 07: 39 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In the beginning of the movie? So there’s generally a destroyer :)

        The question is from a person who knows the history of WWI very poorly: did the creators of this creation called Admiral generally take some real episode as the basis for this scene at the beginning of the film, or is it pure fantasy? I don’t remember that ours in WWII would have driven some large German ship into mines in a similar way ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          28 November 2017 08: 20 New
          +4
          Quote: Alex_59
          The question is from a person who knows the history of WWI very poorly: did the creators of this creation called Admiral generally take some real episode as the basis for this scene at the beginning of the film, or is it pure fantasy?

          Pure water fantasy.
          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 28 November 2017 08: 31 New
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Pure water fantasy.

            That's because bastards ... Hmm ...
            1. Kibb
              Kibb 28 November 2017 10: 51 New
              +1
              They are artists, they see so winked - Could at least get the Siberian Shooter as it should, and not sculpt Nevka bloated. In general, people have at least something understanding, interest in the film disappeared after the first episode.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                28 November 2017 11: 51 New
                +3
                Quote: Kibb
                They are artists, they see so

                Oh, I would depict these artists as I see them ... laughing
        2. doktorkurgan
          doktorkurgan 28 November 2017 15: 34 New
          +2
          On 17/11/1914, when approaching Memel, the armored cruiser "Friedrich Karl" was blown up at a Russian mine barrier and sank, killing 7 people. Everything else is the imagination of the filmmakers.
      2. doktorkurgan
        doktorkurgan 28 November 2017 15: 28 New
        +1
        At the 29th minute.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          28 November 2017 15: 34 New
          +2
          So it’s not in the first minute :))) And what was shown here - yes, it was like that, Vyazemsky just ordered us not to leave the fire, well ... well ...
          1. doktorkurgan
            doktorkurgan 28 November 2017 20: 11 New
            +1
            It remains only to clarify what a dull duel to the commander of the BF Mine Division to do on the bridge of the battleship ...
            PS: although the very fact of assisting the land explorers had a place to be - the notorious Wikipedia says:
            In mid-October, when snowfalls began, and Kolchak took the ships to Rogokul harbor on the Moonsund archipelago, a telephone message came to the flagship destroyer “The enemy is cramping - I ask the fleet for help. Melikov. " Navigating ships into the blizzard at night through a narrow canal leading out of Moonsund was an extremely difficult task. In the morning, going to the coast, they learned that at Cape Ragots still kept Russian units cut off by the Germans from their main group. Standing on a barrel, the destroyer Siberian Shooter joined the staff of Melikov. The remaining destroyers Kolchak approached the shore, opened shrapnel fire on the attacking German chains. On this day, Russian troops defended their positions. Melikov told Kolchak that the Germans had suffered such losses that they would not soon risk taking a new offensive. In addition, Melikov asked Kolchak for help already in his counterattack, which was to begin in a few days.

            At the same time, “Glory” was still present there, but, as I understand it, it was attached to the combined detachment under the general leadership of Kolchak.
      3. Cyril Troekurych
        Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 18 New
        0
        kolchak uper from race to fort knox train with gold
        For this, the Javgees pit a monument near Irkutsk and put the kin
  13. Comrade
    Comrade 28 November 2017 05: 26 New
    +3
    V-99, trying to escape, was blown up by a mine, jumped at the Mikhailovsky lighthouse

    This is how it looked (clickable)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 November 2017 08: 31 New
      +4
      Quote: Comrade
      This is how it looked (clickable)

      Aghas :)))) A century would have been admiring :)))
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 29 November 2017 02: 06 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Century would admire :)

        The photo is good, but the description of the death of V-99, which has become canonical, actually has serious differences from reality.
  14. Comrade
    Comrade 28 November 2017 05: 47 New
    0
    The ship lost twenty-one crew members, the coordinates of the place of destruction of the destroyer - 57 ° 37 ′ N, 21 ° 52 ′ O.
  15. Narak-zempo
    Narak-zempo 28 November 2017 09: 39 New
    0
    Quote: Amurets
    the bulkiness of a mine sight mounted in the lumen


    It’s interesting how tactics of that time imagined going out in torpedo attacks on heavy ships? The torpedoes were far from “long lances,” which can be fanned out in the direction of the enemy before the start of an artillery battle, as the Japanese cruisers in WWII did.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 November 2017 10: 31 New
      +3
      Quote: Narak-zempo
      It’s interesting how tactics of that time imagined going out in torpedo attacks on heavy ships?

      Why not? If you were supposed to conduct artillery dueling at a distance of 10-15 cables?
      1. Cyril Troekurych
        Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 23 New
        0
        in 1940, he was thin at farewell, he grumbled at Bismarck with a torpedo salvo
        1. Vintovkin
          Vintovkin 3 December 2017 17: 41 New
          0
          Quote: Cyril Troekurych
          thin

          If only I read Wikipedia .. Bismarck torpedo bombers finished off
  16. kapitan281271
    kapitan281271 28 November 2017 13: 41 New
    0
    And then the February Revolution came *********************** In the sense of the scribe, he sneaked up unnoticed, all the February ones would be tied to 305 mm trunks and buckshot
  17. Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 28 November 2017 18: 56 New
    +1
    It’s interesting why this is so - as the WWI events in the Baltic describe, we unanimously cheer for our against the Germans, and how it comes to the North Sea, we immediately begin to cheer for the Germans against seemingly allies ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 November 2017 20: 13 New
      +3
      Quote: Trapper7
      and as it comes to the North Sea, we immediately start to root for the Germans against the seemingly allies

      There are 2 reasons for this:
      1) Hochzeflotte is weaker than the Grand Fleet
      2) In Russia, since grave times, wretched - a special sympathy :))))
      1. Narak-zempo
        Narak-zempo 29 November 2017 10: 20 New
        0
        In WWI, few people are generally sympathetic. Imperialist war from all sides. England fought for the preservation of the colonial empire and the position of a world creditor, that is, for the opportunity to continue to live at the expense of others (but as a result it itself became a debtor to the USA), France - for the same thing, but on a smaller scale, plus push back Alsace and Lorraine and remove the competitor in the face of German industry (in fact, too, remained head over heels in debt + refusal of the Bolsheviks to pay royal loans + demographic pit). Germany - for pushing England away from the position of world hegemon and healing itself at the expense of the rest of the world. Russia fit in with French loans plus the dream of straits to export grain free of duty - "We ourselves are undernourished, but exported." It ended you know what.
    2. Kibb
      Kibb 28 November 2017 22: 08 New
      +1
      As soon as it comes to describing the Gotland battle, I’ll stop rooting for “ours,” and as I describe the battles in the North Sea, I’m always rooting for the British, but who is to blame for the fact that we see this match in the record and all the moves have already been made
      1. Cyril Troekurych
        Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 22 New
        0
        demoted ???
  18. Cyril Troekurych
    Cyril Troekurych 3 December 2017 17: 02 New
    0
    a shot with a 471 kg shell is appropriate 335 will tear out recoil devices
    Amen