A very sad geostrategic picture is seen for us in the turbulent front-Asian region. The capture of the control and liberation of the igilovskogo fortified area of El-Kuriy - Abu-Kemal on the west bank of the Euphrates is still very, very far away (this enclave now receives considerable technical support through the narrow riverbed from the east bank, which is retained by the second remaining IG grouping (forbidden in the Russian Federation), Kurds and Americans). For the same reason, the CAA cannot effectively storm all approaches to the partially besieged Abu-Kemal. And in such a controversial situation on our side, one after one is followed by mistakes of a strategic scale, which strike at Russia's defenses and due control of the far-reaching geostrategic poles of the world. Take, for example, the concluded conclusion of a contract for the supply of Turkey to the Triumph C-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. In particular, according to the statement of the representative of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), Ankara is currently expected to pay the full amount of funds provided for by the contract, after which deliveries of the four-hundredths will begin.
But what is the real benefit of this contract? That's right: absolutely no, besides, of course, the next "drain" of promising technologies to a potential adversary of tomorrow. And the assumption that the Turks will not provide American specialists from Raytheon and the Air Force for such elements of the S-400 systems as the 92H6E multi-function radar and 55K6E combat control station is extremely erroneous. Even if some “critical” tactical information exchange modules responsible for integration into the network-centric network with ACS “Polyana-D400M4”, AWACS A-1U, as well as tactical fighter are removed from the hardware element base of the Turkish Armed Forces S-50 aviation Russian videoconferencing system, the algorithms for computing devices of the PBU and the operating modes of the 92H6E radar will not undergo absolutely no changes.
Multipurpose radar station (sector radar, illumination and targeting radar) 92Н6Е of the anti-aircraft missile system 98Ж6Е (С-400) after the delivery of the armed forces of Turkey will be the most interesting element for the Western intelligence services of Triumph, because this product is responsible for all stages of interception of enemy air targets . In contrast, the length and breadth studied RPN 30N6E2 Greek C 300PMU-2, and 92N6E earlier (before 2012 years), an updated radar 92N6E has such advantages as increased with 6 to 10 simultaneously fired VTS channels, increased energy potential (range target acquisition reaches 300 - 350 km) and significantly increased noise immunity
This means only that the specialists of the Raytheon itself, as well as the research laboratories of the naval and air forces of the USA, can get a unique opportunity to familiarize themselves with the operating principles of the complex’s “firing stuffing” and program the operating modes of their airborne electronic warfare complexes accordingly: LR-700 / IDECOM Block 3 (F / A-18G "Growler"), AN / ASQ-239 "Barracuda" (F-35A / B / C "Lightning II"), AN / ALR-944 (F-22A "Raptor") etc. And then we will express deep surprise in connection with another unpunished attack by the OVVS coalition or Hel Haavir on the infrastructure of the Syrian Arab Army. Only such a result can be achieved by the implementation of such contracts with a NATO member state. And no billions of dollars in profits for several ZRDN C-400s ever compensate for the fall of critical technologies into the hands of the enemy.
These schemes demonstrate the fundamental differences in the integrated airborne electronic intelligence complexes and electronic warfare tactical fighters of the 5 generation F-35A and F-22A. Thus, the F-35A - AN / ASQ-239 "Barracuda" airborne defense complex is represented in total by 8 SPO / DER receiving antennas operating in the S / X bands at the toe, on the side edges of the wing and on the edges of the elevators, with two emitting antennas of decimeter S- range (to wear at the root of the wing), as well as radiating groups of MRP X-band, located on the canvas AFAR AN / APG-81. This complex in 3-4 is more primitive than the AN / ALR-94 F-22A fighter; the latter is not represented by 10, but more than 30 receiving antennas of the L / S / X-bands
We are attacking this rake for the third time. The first took place during the signing of a similar contract with India, the second - with Turkey and the third - with Saudi Arabia on November 15. Yes, it was with the country that had recently been convicted of supporting the terrorist enclave in Dzhebhat al-Nusra and providing the green corridor to ISIL militants during the retreat from the central regions of the Syrian Arab Republic. The initial stage of negotiations on the future contract was held back in May 2017, and the final one followed immediately after the visit of King Salaman Ben Abdel Aziz al-Saud to Russia. As part of the 2 billionth deal, Riyadh gets the 4 of the C-400 division, which will be used far from in favor of Russian interests in Asia Minor. In principle, the same factor as the contract with Turkey, but in addition to losing critical technologies, we also face the threat of a complete reformatting of the Persian region under the dominance of the pro-American regional superpower, which is Saudi Arabia. There is simply an absurd situation where for 2 a meager billion dollars (compared to the 110 billion defense contract with US corporations concluded during Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia), we help our potential adversary to gain overall domination over our reliable Asian front ally - Islamic Republic , against which ballistic missiles the "400th" are bought.
As is known, at the moment, the tactical fleet of the Iranian Air Force is mainly represented by 3-th and 4-th generation machines, which not only exhausted the operational life of gliders and power plants, but also did not receive a single update package of on-board radio-electronic equipment , Radar and pilot information field).
The airborne avionics of most vehicles allow you to perform only highly specialized combat missions: for 30 — 35 F-14A and a similar number of MiG-29А / У / УБ, these are air-to-air operations to intercept air targets and achieve air superiority (but only through outdated and low maneuverability) URVB type MIM-23B and P-27Р / T, noise immunity and flight reliability of homing heads is at an extremely low level); for the F-5B / E / F, F-4D / E, Dassault Mirage F1 and Su-24M are various little-known air-to-surface tactical missiles, the Noor anti-ship missiles, and (not confirmed) Russian anti-radar / multipurpose missiles of the X-25MPU family in several modifications. With these weapons, the Iranian Air Force is not only unable to cover the country's long-range air borders from numerically and technically superior airborne troops of the Arabian Coalition and the Israeli Air Force, but also have no opportunity to seriously damage the strategically important military infrastructure of the Arabian Coalition (El-Udeid airbase, Al-Dafra, Al-Salem, Ahmed Al Jaber, King Abdulazis, plus the storage bases of medium-range ballistic missiles DF-3 purchased from the PRC) on the ground.
The DF-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (Dongfeng-3), which are in service with the Royal Saudi Strategic Rocket Forces, have a range of up to 2000 - 3100 km, depending on the modification. The missiles were purchased from Beijing in the period from 87 to 88, the reason for which was a huge increase in tensions between Riyadh and Tehran after bloody clashes between Iranian pilgrims and the Arabian police, which led to the death of 375 Iranians. Already then a regional conflict was brewing. Saudi Arabia has acquired more DF-40 3 missiles. Later it became known about the deliveries of CAs of more high-speed MRFM DF-21С, whose combat stages accelerate to 5500 - 11000 km / h (these parameters cause the interception using Iranian C-300PMU-2)
The fact is that all the states of the Arabian Peninsula cover the air borders of the Persian Gulf with dozens of batteries of the modern Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile systems, and will soon be reinforced with several THAAD batteries capable of shooting down dozens of outdated tactical and anti-radar missiles of various types. type Moreover, the tactical fighters of the Iranian Air Force do not have modern broadband and multi-range electronic countermeasures in both integrated and suspended versions to counteract the anti-interference, Patriot-based IRRLS AN / MPQ-53 / 65, built on the basis of PPAR. Such circumstances will not allow a single tactical missile of the Iranian Air Force to overcome the echeloned Arabian, Qatari, Emirates or Kuwaiti missile defense system. It is for this reason that, in order to launch a decapitating strike against the above air bases and other targets of the “Arab coalition”, which also deployed American early-warning radars, as well as tactical fighters with reconnaissance Rivet Joints of the United States Air Force, Tehran staked on the most developed military sector. -industrial complex of the country - rocket science.
Today, the number of operational tactical ballistic missiles "Tondar", "Hatf-2 / 3" "Fateh-110", "Hormoz-1 / 2", "Zolfaghar", as well as the medium-range ballistic missiles "Sajil" and "Qadr" rolls far for 1 thousand units. All missiles, if necessary, reached both the western coast of the Persian Gulf and the depth of the territory of the Arabian Peninsula or Israel. The maximum that the deployed “Patriots” and “THAAD” are capable of is to stop the fourth / third parts (250 - 400 units) of the launched Iranian BRs, and even then only with the help of the planned Aegis Ashore antimissile systems.
In other words, military parity reigns in the region, where Riyadh with its “Arab coalition” defends its interests with the help of a huge tactical fleet, represented more than 500 by X-Generation Fighter + X ++ (“Typhoon”, F-4C / D / SA / QA, Tornado ADV / IDS, Mirage-15-2000, Rafale and F / A-9E / F Super Hornet), and the Islamic Republic of Iran defends its ambitions for a regional presence through thousands of ballistic missiles short and medium range. Doesn't this state of affairs suit us? Naturally, great! But, as we see, the views of the Ministry of Defense and Rosoboronexport are completely different. By selling the C-18 divisions to the Saudis, Moscow simply participates in parrying the combat potential of the Iranian missile forces, which in turn may well make it impossible for Iran to inflict a sufficient asymmetrical attack on the Arabian coalition: most of the air attack assets of the air force and Iran’s missile units will be destroyed The Patriot PAC-400 and the more efficient Triumph C-3.
Nevertheless, this is still not the whole theater of the absurd, which can be observed in terms of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and the far from partner countries of the Arabian Peninsula. 24 August 2017, the agency Interfax, referring to the official representative of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Maria Vorobyov, announced plans to supply the United Arab Emirates of two squadrons (24 machines) super-maneuverable Su-35 multi-role fighters, while the memorandum Abu Dhabi’s interest in these fighters of the transitional generation was signed between the Minister of Defense and Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zeyid Al Nahyan and the head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade Ros ii Denis Manturovym in February this year. Now, after the Dubai Airshow-2017 air show, the date of the contract has become closer, but what will this contract bring to Russia in operational and strategic terms?
First, in the UAE is the well-known Al-Dafra airbase. Frequently at this facility are subtle fighter 5-th generation F-22A "Raptor". Using the base as an aerodrome of jump and service in Asia Minor, the Raptors without any problems conduct passive electronic surveillance over the Syrian theater of operations without revealing their own location using the integrated DER system AN / ALR-94, while over Saudi Arabia or Iraq single refueling in the air. It is not surprising that these same F-22A will face more than once face to face with the Su-35C in service with the UAE Air Force. American pilots will simply have a unique opportunity to conduct dozens of training close-range air battles with “Thirty-fifths”, as well as using the training software of the SLA to determine the required angles of attack, overload and position of their fighters relative to the “Dryers” in a maneuver battle AIM-9X Block II "Sidewinder". To admit it was impossible.
Also, this contract will create many problems for the Iranian Air Force flight crew. Only two squadrons of the UAE Su-35С will be enough to “close the sky” for all of the multi-role fighters available to Iran. In other words, “Drying” will make them even less effective than the 79 of the F-16E / F Block 61 multi-purpose transitional generation fighter aircraft equipped with on-board radar c AFAR AN / APG-80 that are currently used by the UAE Air Force. We note that in the case of delivery of the Su-35C batch to the United Arab Emirates, not only will Abu Dhabi’s defensive capabilities, but also percussion, since the Flanker-E + weapon range provides for several types of air-to-surface tactical missiles X-38MLE / MAE and tactical missiles with a low-altitude flight profile X-59МК / 2 to anti-radar X-58USHK).
This weapon will be a real headache for Iranian air defense. Moreover, each Su-35С is a far from simple heavy multipurpose fighter, but a full-fledged tactical aviation complex with such capabilities that neither the Qatari Rafale nor the Emirates F-16E Block 61 ever dreamed of. Airborne radar stations with passive headlights H035 "Irbis-E" turn each "Drying" into a full-fledged compact long-range radar detection and control aircraft, capable of detecting such complex targets as hiding against the background of mountain terrain UAV, long-range cruise missiles and tactical fighters, ground radio-contrast combat units with an accuracy of 3-5 m. For example, low-flying strategic cruise missiles “Meshkat” with EPR 0,1 m2 can be detected at a distance of 160 km, while AN / APG-80 able to detect a target at a distance of no more than 90 km. Irbis-E radars also have the ability to detect, “escort on the aisle” and “capture” Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles on the ascending branch of the flight path. In this part of the trajectory, the BRs are not able to make anti-aircraft maneuvers, which is why interception can be made even by ordinary RVV-SD or R-27EP missiles. The speed of aerospace objects processed by Irbis reaches 5,18М. If the United Arab Emirates acquires the Su-35C, the effectiveness of the Iranian Army's OTB units launched from the east coast of the Persian Gulf may significantly decrease.
Who in Front Asia really ought to properly update the fighter fleet urgently, as it is to Iran itself. But instead of satisfying Tehran’s July request for the supply of 18 Su-35C and 6 Su-30CM (it is obvious that the “Thirty” Iranian Air Force planned to use as an air command center due to the presence of the second pilot - systems operator), the Russian side rejected it and offered, to put it mildly, a simplified version of them - Su-27СМ3. These machines began to actively enter into service with the Russian Air Force in the middle of 2011, and are a deeply refined version of the Su-27 and Su-27CM. The main distinctive feature of these fighters is the installation of a modernized onboard radar H001VE with a Cassegrain antenna, supplemented by air-to-surface mode, as well as increased energy capabilities by 20% (the 3 m2 ESR radar has increased from 110 to 130 km). Also, “СМ3” received an improved control system for fire SCC-VE, unified with air-to-air missiles RVV-AE (Р-77) and РВВ-СД (“Product 170-1”) with active radar GPS.
At the same time, the above characteristics will not allow the Iranian Su-27СМ3 to win in long-range air combat not only on the more advanced Su-35С, but even on F-16E Block 61 or Rafal, carrying AIM- long-range air combat missiles on the suspensions 120D and MBDA "Meteor", and under the nose fairing - promising radar with AFAR AN / APG-80 and RBE-2. It is quite obvious that the refusal of Russia to the Iranian request for the supply of Su-30CM / 35С followed against the background of the growing "concern" of Tel Aviv, associated with the previous supply of 4-x anti-aircraft missile divisions C-300PMU-2. This, in turn, automatically indicates only our definite dependence on large pro-American "players" in the Middle East in various topical issues. The main stumbling block in this relationship was and remains Israel. Alas, with such a "soft-bodied" vector of influence on the geopolitical situation in the Persian region, Russia risks missing all available levers of influence. It remains only to cherish the hope that the current situation with Abu Kemal taught us something, and Tehran’s next request for the supply of modern weapons will not be ignored again.