Military Review

Kukhar forest

After the bloody battles on the 15 - 21 July 1916 river, the command of the Guards Troops (Special Army) had an idea to break through the enemy front on the sector where he least expected it.

On the night of 23 July, the 1-I and 2-I guards divisions, having made an 35-km night march along the front, concentrated in the region of vil. Yanovka - Manure. The Life Guards Izmailovsky Regiment changed its position to the secondary 282 Infantry Regiment of Alexandria. The commander of the regiment, Major General N. N. Schilling, ordered the preparation of the bridgehead from which the regiment was to attack the enemy.

Kukhar forest
1. N.N. Schilling

The position was in its infancy - no fortification work was carried out. For three nights, the Izmailovs put the position in order, and the excavation work was still not finished when an assault on enemy positions was assigned to 26 July. The 1 and 2 lines could be prepared, but the message lines leading to them (along which the reserves should have been pulled up) were only ready for knee depth.

By the morning of July 26, the first line was the 3, the second line of the 4 battalions, and behind them, the 2 and 1 battalions stood along the Janovka-Belits highway. On the right flank of the Izmailov was the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment, on the left flank of the Life Guards, the Moscow Regiment and in reserve, the Life Guards Egersky Regiment.

The enemy's position stretched along the edge of the forest, having two lines of trenches protected by wire barriers (at the most important defense points - up to 6 steps wide).

In 6 hours 26 July began artillery preparation attacks Guardsmen. In the 11 hours of 30 minutes, the fire of the Russian howitzer and field artillery focused on the enemy's trenches - and under the cover of fire the 3 th battalion rushed to the attack. But almost immediately rolled back - the artillery did not break through the passages in the German wire. The 4-th battalion moved behind the 3-m and quickly became involved in the passage of the message leading to the first line - in them and lay down. Since the posts were dug up only to the knee depth, the battalion had to spend three hard hours under continuous fire from the enemy's heavy and field artillery - suffering losses.

After the first unsuccessful attack, the artillery repeated the artillery preparation and in 16 hours the 3 th battalion again rushed to the attack and was forced to lie down in front of the wire - it again turned out to be whole. And the 11-I company lost its only officer - Ensign Vitkovsky. The valor of the 3 Battalion was amazing: the soldiers tore the wire with their butts and hands, and in a few minutes the barbed wire was littered with the bodies of Izmailovsky heroes.

The impulse that prevailed in the battalion makes it possible to judge the letter found by the fallen non-commissioned officer of the 9 Company. The letter contained the following words: “Dear sister. Tomorrow attack. Before us is a formidable enemy, all covered with wire, but we will destroy him. I feel that I will be killed tomorrow. Do not cry, I will die for Faith, Tsar and Fatherland. ”

The advancing left of the 11 Company 9 Company under the command of Captain A. V. Esimontovsky 2 also performed miracles of heroism. Despite the contusion of the company commander and the loss of both junior officers (Lieutenant Baron Shtakelberg and Warrant Officer Sadovsky) and many lower ranks, the company overcame the wire fence and knocked the Germans out of the first line of trenches.

As soon as the 3-th battalion moved into the attack, the 13-th, 14-th and 16-th company, having jumped out of the message moves, began a rapid movement for the 9-th company.

The 3 and 4 battalions that moved to support the 2 and 1 battalions were stopped by enemy fire due to an underdeveloped bridgehead and, above all, due to the lack of communications.

Thus, only four regimental companies entered the Kukhar forest (9-I, 13-I, 14-I and 16-I). The 9 Company was moving ahead, taking the direction to the right of the breakthrough location - in order to ensure the right flank of the offensive.

The general command of the 4 battalion of the battalion in Kukharsky Forest was assumed by the lieutenant Obruchev - despite the concussion received at the beginning of the battle. Having ordered the 16 th company to move to support the 9 th, 13 th and 14 th company, he took the lead personally.

The approach of the 13, 14 and 16 mouth to the leading battle of the 9 company and the divisions of the Moscow Guards regiment gave impetus to the attack, allowing the enemy to be brought down again. Another tension - and our parts would take possession of the western edge of the forest.

At this time, a movement began in the ranks of the retreating enemy — some troupes of soldiers began to stop and fire back. Clearly felt the change in the situation. Indeed, among the trees appeared a slender advancing chain of a fresh German battalion, which kept the direction of impact on the exposed right flank of the Izmailovites.

Russian chains under the onslaught of the enemy counterattack began to pull back and reached a broad clearing that ran through the whole forest. Izmaylovtsy occupied the eastern edge of the glade, and the enemy western.

But, seeing that it was impossible to resist without support, the lieutenant Obruchev ordered to retreat - and was killed. A few minutes before his death, the commander of the 14 company, Lieutenant Kvashnin, was seriously wounded, and the commander of the 16 company, Second Lieutenant Sokolov, 2, was killed.

Waste through the forest was very heavy. An unforeseen difficulty was that during the attack, due to lack of time, the occupied trenches and enemy shelters were not cleaned - and enemy soldiers who had not managed to escape lurked in them. When they left Izmailov, they fired and threw Russian chains at them with hand grenades. Largely because of this, the bodies of Lieutenant Obruchev and Second Lieutenant Sokolov could not be brought out, nor was the evacuation of the wounded to the head and foot of Second Lieutenant von Richter.

Coming out of the forest, the chain Izmaylovtsy lay down.
In 19 hours, they counterattacked, but due to the lack of reserves, they were able to advance only half a kilometer deep into the forest, where they entrenched themselves. At this point, the enemy again received fresh reinforcements, and the Russian chains began to pull back.

The chains held the first line of enemy trenches, but after 20 hours, an order was received to take the starting position.

From the 1000 of the lower ranks, the officers of four companies participating in the forest battle remained in the 9, with only one officer remaining in the 300 ranks. In total, the regiment lost 11 officers that day and about 1000 lower ranks.

The battle was so fierce that there were almost no healthy prisoners.

What are the reasons for the failure of the guards?

They lie in the field of tactics - above all, inadequate preparation of an infantry attack.

The artillery preparation of the attack was insufficient. Organization of fire, observation conditions, absence aviation played a role. But the artillery could not only prepare the attack, but also with its fire stop the coverage of the parts that had captured the forest - and the forest would remain for the guards.

The offensive plan was developed poorly.
So, at the breakthrough front, apart from the regiments that occupied the front lines and conventional reserves, there was no reinforcement troops. The available reserves (for example, the Life Guards Egersky Regiment) were to enter the front line fairly quickly, and there was nothing to feed the offensive. That is, there was no strike fist and level of development success. There was not a single cavalryman in the whole area, but the cavalry could have developed the success of the breakthrough. The fact is that the attack of the Kukharsky Forest was to be local in nature (straighten the front line on the north bank of the Stokhod River) and this task was assigned to the 1 Guards Corps. It was believed that the forces of the latter were sufficient, and the headquarters of the Guard troops believed that his intervention in the organization of the attack should be minimal. In fact, the preparation of the attack was carried out by the Chief of Staff of the 1 Guards Corps, Major General KI Rylsky, and Corps Artillery Inspector Lieutenant General E. K. Smyslovsky. KI Rylsky, a self-confident and very stubborn person, at a meeting in the headquarters of the 1 Guards Corps did not allow anyone to make significant adjustments to his plan. The obvious shortcomings of the latter were actions at the junction of the divisions (1 and 2 of the Guards) in the forest and such a direction of attack, which could lead (and led) to the through passage of some parts through the others. The front of the two divisions was at right angles - and attention was paid to this possible future difficulty (crossing) and even in forest conditions. But KI Rylsky, who did not want to lose the reputation of a “solid” commander, rejected all the arguments.

2. K. I. Rylsky.

EK Smyslovsky could not properly prepare the artillery preparation. He believed that in his position of “inspector” he gives only general instructions and sets goals - without supervising their implementation.

3. E. K. Smyslovsky.

The lines of the trenches were not straight - and on leaving the trenches, the attacking companies took to the left. As a result, the right flank was weakened and opened to the blow of the enemy. In the forest, it was also not possible to withstand the right direction, and the departure to the starting position under these adverse conditions naturally caused unnecessary losses.

In general, speaking of the actions of the Troops of the Guard in the battles of the campaign 1916, the following circumstances should be noted. Firstly, this is a disadvantageous attitude of the higher headquarters towards the Guard for the Guard - it was especially strong during the Stokhod fighting. Adjutant General V. M. Bezobrazov put a spoke in the wheel, and then blamed the failure of the operation only on him and his headquarters. The latter acted too “Guards”, pledging to carry out the obviously unrealizable without reasoning. The successor to V. M. Bezobrazov, V. I. Gurko, behaved in a completely different way: he, as they say, “cursed” with the front headquarters and with Headquarters, invariably scoring them with his argument - which, alas, was not enough for V. M. Bezobrazovu.

As a result, V.I. Gurko “crushed” the senior staffs under him and became a complete “master” in his army. He was not denied reserves, which he invariably did in respect of the Guard Forces in the summer of 1916. And, in the end, V. I. Gurko received so many reserves that the Special Army grew to the size of the Great Army of Napoleon 1812 of the year (13 corps). Despite this, V.I. Gurko forced the Stavka to abandon the idea of ​​a “decisive” offensive against Vladimir-Volynsky.

It was necessary to teach the Guard and the specifics of forest combat - especially the nuances of orientation and maneuvering in these conditions. Izmaylovtsam was destined to have the experience of another forest battle - under Svinyuhi.

After the end of the Kukhar battle, the Izmailovsky officers wrote a letter to the Germans asking them to clarify the fate of their officers - Obruchev, von Richter and Sokolov. The letter was transmitted during the cleaning of corpses in front of enemy trenches. The next day, the Germans, in a very kind reply, notified the Russians that Obruchev and Sokolov were killed and buried behind their positions, and von Richter was wounded and held captive. The letter contained the phrase that they were surprised at the cruelty of the Russian Guardsmen, who overpowered the Germans who had surrendered to captivity. Indeed, when the Izmaylovoists broke into the German trenches, then somewhere in the shelter, the Germans who had surrendered began to shoot back. This caused the bitterness of our soldiers, and they perekololi all - not taking a single prisoner. Despite this episode, the valor of the Izmailovs was emphasized in a later-captured German newspaper.

The tactical experience of the Kukhar battle was not in vain, and the Izmailov showed outstanding heroism and military courage.

4. The company of His Majesty of the Life Guards Izmailovsky Regiment. Photo 1915 of the year.
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  1. Olgovich
    Olgovich 16 November 2017 06: 52
    The prowess of the 3rd battalion was amazing: the soldiers tore the wire with their butts and hands, and in a few minutes the wire fence was littered with the bodies of Izmailovo heroes.
    The letter found at the fallen non-commissioned officer of the 9th company allows us to judge the impulse that reigned in the battalion. The letter contained the following words: “Dear sister. Tomorrow's attack. Before us is a formidable enemy, all covered with wire, but we will destroy it. I feel that I will be killed tomorrow. Do not cry, I will die for Faith, Tsar and Fatherland ”

    Stunning heroism, real Russian soldiers who saved the Fatherland from German invaders in the Second World War.
  2. XII Legion
    XII Legion 16 November 2017 07: 51
    Illustration of the heroism of Russian soldiers and officers
    And the huge fighting spirit and motivation of the Russian guard and the army, who knew what they were fighting for
    Forest Combat Example
    And an example of how important is thorough preparation, both artillery and tactical
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 16 November 2017 09: 56
      After the first unsuccessful attack, the artillery repeated the artillery preparation and at 16 o’clock the 3rd battalion again launched an attack and was forced to lie down in front of the wire - it was again intact.
      Is ITT always to blame?
      "the guard died and was able to defend the throne in February 17" - they told us
      Or were they framed under bullets without passes in wire barriers?
      + they didn’t do everything themselves (advancing with errors)
      the fate of the monarchy depended on several divisions?
      1. Lieutenant Teterin
        Lieutenant Teterin 16 November 2017 11: 15
        Quote: antivirus
        Is IVS always to blame?

        Excuse me, what does the temporary detention facility have to do with it? An article on historical subjects, but why do you bring the term police.
        Quote: antivirus
        the fate of the monarchy depended on several divisions ??

        In fact, several disciplined, loyal divisions could suppress the rebellion in the capital and restore order, because the rebels did not have normal commanders. However, in the situation of February 1917, it was not the divisions first of all that were needed, personally the lord of the Stavka guards, personally loyal to the Sovereign, who could arrest Ruzsky and his accomplices, and also ensure the restoration of control over the communications and movement of the Imperial train.
        1. Monarchist
          Monarchist 16 November 2017 18: 32
          Lieutenant, you are absolutely right: in February 1917, even 450-500 people would have been enough to restore order with the VOLLEY commander. After all, even Leiba Brnstein said that “the heroes of the February revolution are drunk reservists. And reservists could equally well have revolutionaries with bayonets.
          The SMERSH front-line soldier told me: 1942 reservists were not detained in the rear, but sent to the front line and were always “disassembled” in parts, and only the sentries in the rear had rifles with cartridges (they did not believe in the lack of rifles).
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 16 November 2017 18: 47
            GDP - Putin
            Is the lieutenant commander of the sofa?
            1. Lieutenant Teterin
              Lieutenant Teterin 16 November 2017 19: 50
              Mr. Antivirus, the article is dedicated to the battles of the Russian Guard and the Izmailovsky regiment in particular in 1916. The logical question is: how does Joseph Dzhugashvili relate to the topic of the article?
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 16 November 2017 20: 37
                as, then, a “corrector” and a revenge-seeker for failure in the WWII. Winner in WWII. And the heir of the enemies and the enemy of the monarchy itself.

                Enemy of the monarch and the winner of the enemies of the monarch.
                strange squiggle stories
      2. horhe48
        horhe48 17 November 2017 09: 00
        Exactly so. Before the war (in 1914), only in St. Petersburg there were about 70 thousand guards devoted to the tsar. The emperor, empress, children of the monarch, and grand dukes were the chiefs of the guard regiments. They attended regimental festivals, were engaged in charity work, and rendered all possible things to the sponsored regiments. help and assistance. There were 37 corps in the army before the war, and only one of them was the Guards. And so, the limp Nikolai -2nd, following the army command, essentially laid down all his devoted allies in local battles, mainly in Galicia After that, the guards regiments became such only by name, with officers from raznoshchintsy and hastily trained recruits from among the peasants recruited during mobilization, i.e. practically did not differ from other units. If he had preserved the backbone of the guard, then the events of 1917 would have developed in a different scenario. And even the convoy refused to defend him. For comparison: 1812. Borodino. Marshals beg Napoleon-Syr, give us the guard and we will break through the defense of ussky. He replied: maybe you will break, maybe not. And I stay here for thousands of leagues with you, but without my guard, madness. How he turned out to be right! His guard did not allow the Cossacks to capture Napoleon, allowed him to take his legs away from Russia. During the restoration, he first went over to his side and stood behind him until the end.
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 17 November 2017 09: 03
          limp Nikolai -2nd, following the army command, essentially laid down all his devoted allies in local battles, mainly in Galicia
          1. horhe48
            horhe48 18 November 2017 11: 02
            You, Mr. antivirus, take the time to write to look at the map before writing. From the Carpathians to the Bosphorus it is not very close. Yes, and in general my comment was that Nick the 2nd did not value his guard and allowed his not-so-outstanding generals to ruin it without any need. And he did not have another guard it could not (for its creation, considerable time and remarkable efforts are required). As a result, when the hard time came, he had no supporters or loyal troops capable of turning the tide in his favor.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 18 November 2017 14: 47
              I agree with you, but in my --- not only the Guard (“dies, but does not give up”), AND THE WHOLE RI MONARCHIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KILLED IN AUTUMN 16G (AND IN 15 DETERMINED THE POSITION OF THE MOST POPULATION- “YES, SUCH HOCKEY US DO NOT NEED ") - see mine above and to other articles
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 16 November 2017 08: 06
    N. N. Schilling- Since December 1918, in the Volunteer Army, distinguished himself in battles with the Red Army and Petlyura's troops. In 1920, he failed to organize evacuation from Odessa. For this, by order of Wrangel, he was put on trial on June 4, 1920, by the verdict of a military court in Sevastopol, he was sentenced to executed, but this sentence was canceled. In November 1920 he emigrated to Czechoslovakia. After the liberation of Prague by Soviet troops, in May 1945, was arrested SMERSH, but released due to health and old age. He died in Prague in early 1946. He was buried in the crypt of Uspenskaya churches in the Olshansky cemetery.K.I. Rylsky - In 1918, voluntarily joined the Red Army. He was an assistant chief of the All-Russian General Staff of the RVSR. In March 1920 he was appointed head of the information department of the Operational Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the RVSR. In the same year, the Cheka was arrested. From February to September 1921 he headed the Office for the Training and Training of Troops of the Headquarters of the Red Army.E. K. Smyslovsky-In November 1918, voluntarily, enlisted in the Red Army as an artillery inspector of the Higher Military Inspectorate. As the head of the 11th Department of the Artillery Committee, the GAU is engaged in the design and improvement of various carriages, wagons and accessories related to equipping artillery. In addition, he was in 1924 at the Military Academy of the Red Army - the main leader in artillery, part-time - a teacher of the Military Academy of the artillery supply cycle, etc. In 1927, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR he was awarded the title of teacher of higher military educational institutions Red Army tactics. November 26, 1930 was arrested in the case of "Spring". On July 18, 1931, he was sentenced to death with 10 years' imprisonment in prison, but already on November 4, 1932 he was released on health grounds. On November 4, 1933, Yevgeny Konstantinovich died of a stroke in Moscow.
  4. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 16 November 2017 08: 06
    Wonderful and informative article! In modern Russian historiography, there is very little material about the latest battles of the Russian Imperial Guard. Meanwhile, these battles became an expression of the unmatched heroism and stamina of the Guard troops. Based on what I read, the battles on Stokhod and subsequent battles bore the mark of, if not direct betrayal, then criminal negligence for sure. After the battles of 1915, the Guard was assigned to replenish, numerous wounded returned to the ranks of the regiments after the cure, but the tactical training remained at the pre-war level - without taking into account the realities of positional warfare and the need to break through much strengthened positions. One of the guards officers recalled that they sent new tactical instructions to the unit for ... 3 days before the offensive! What it was: negligence or malice to this day remains a mystery.
    The author - my heartfelt gratitude for the work done and the return of memory of Russian heroes!
    1. Curious
      Curious 16 November 2017 13: 13
      "What was it: negligence or malice to this day remains a mystery."
      If you analyze the situation, then it was a sober calculation.
      As you write correctly, starting in October 1915, all the guard units are assigned to the strategic reserve.
      This was the result of the efforts of the commander of the Guards detachment consisting of two guards infantry corps and the guards cavalry corps, General V.M. Bezobrazova. Bezobrazov achieved this and achieved, recalling that the guard is not only a “shock” army, but also a stronghold of the throne.
      June 2, 1916 Bezobrazov becomes Commander of the Guard.
      On June 26, 1916, the Guards detachment was transferred to the South-Western Front of General A. A. Brusilov.
      And on July 6, a series of unsuccessful offensive operations begins: Stohod, Kukharsky Forest, Kovel, Vitonezh.
      As a result of these offensive operations, on August 14, 1916, Bezobrazov was removed from command.
      Obviously, the commander of the Guard troops loyal to the throne was not happy with someone and it was required to prove his "unsuitability", which was successfully undertaken.
      As the colonel of the Russian Imperial Guard, the stalmeister of the Supreme Court F.V., writes in his memoirs Vinberg: “A little sovereign had those who, with all their hearts and souls, loved him, selflessly devoted to him, subjects. That’s why Bezobrazov removed, in advance of the revolution, his connection with the guard.”
      Confirmation of this can be found in the memoirs of the commander of the Izmaylovsky regiment, and since July 1916, the quartermaster general of the guard forces, a direct participant in the events, Major General B. Gerua.
      Quoting here would take up a lot of space, so I suggest reading "Gerua BV Memoirs of my life in two volumes." With regard to the issue - T.2, chapter "Quartermaster General at the headquarters of a special army."
      Obviously the fate of Nicholas II was decided already then. Well, for the sake of high intentions, the soldiers did not consider it necessary.
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 16 November 2017 18: 52
        I did not expect such a foresight from myself.
        I agree with you (at the top), here is a comment about the other side of the dissatisfied (lower classes)

        antivirus 3 November 14, 2017 21:07 | How Kerensky and Krasnov tried to recapture Petrograd
        The Bolsheviks, meanwhile, ordered the railway workers to stop the movement of troops in the capital. The order was executed. October 27 (November 9) The Military Revolutionary Committee ordered the combat readiness of the Petrograd garrison, put forward revolutionary regiments, detachments of the Red Guards and sailors to Tsarskoye Selo and Pulkov. On the night of October 27 to 28 (November 9 to 10), the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the Soviet government created a commission led by V. Lenin to lead the suppression of the rebellion. Squads of sailors were summoned from Helsingfors and Kronstadt to Petrograd. In case of a breakthrough to Petrograd, Lenin ordered the Baltic Fleet ships to enter the Neva. On October 29 (November 11), Lenin and Trotsky visited the Putilov factory, where they examined guns and an armored train prepared to fight the Kerensky-Krasnov troops. At the call of the Bolsheviks, thousands of Red Guards from Putilovsky, Pipe and other plants came out in defense of the revolution. Trotsky then departed for Pulkovo Heights, where he directed the construction of fortifications. About 12 thousand fighters had to defend them. The Reds were divided into two units:
        it all comes down to one
        - you need to look how they lived in the "war without cards" 120 million. When they decided to "pretty ride us"
        !!!!!! without ??? signs, it is clear that in about 15
        and at 16 everything was finally formed and poured by 17 g into the TIPS - LOCAL AUTHORITIES (past nobles and other serving bureaucrats) !!!!!!! it was clear to all observers (and all military identities) by the tilt of the head of a woman who was walking through the water with empty buckets and with full backs.
      2. Lieutenant Teterin
        Lieutenant Teterin 16 November 2017 20: 05
        Quote: Curious
        If you analyze the situation, then it was a sober calculation.

        Apparently, yes. The emperor and his loyal commanders calmly expected to deprive reliable parts. Just imagine the situation when in February 1917 the guards were equipped with front-line soldiers who went through the crucible of the battles of 1914-1916. In this case, it would be enough for the corps commander sent to rebellious Petrograd to issue an order in the style: "Brothers, while we are shedding blood at the front, every trash in the rear has raised a rebellion for the joy of the German!" And that’s it. Guardsmen on their way to the capital without any words will raise to bayonets any agitator, "revolutionary commissar" or any person trying to stop them. The conspirators understood this perfectly and calmly condemned thousands of people to death. However, all dishonest people who strive for power in this way relate to the lives of other people.
        Quote: Curious
        Obviously the fate of Nicholas II was decided already then.

        For conspirators, yes. But in reality, as I see it, Nicholas II had a chance. As I wrote above, the St. George Battalion, if followed by the Emperor, could well discourage Ruzsky from hunting to fulfill his role in the conspiracy. Under article 99 of the Criminal Code, he certainly did not want to fall. But ... the story went exactly as we know it. Nicholas II, unfortunately, was not paranoid; he, like any normal person, could never have thought that the military, the adjutant general, personally obliged to the Emperor by their position in society, would betray him. However, Caesar, too, could not predict Brutus' dagger.
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 16 November 2017 20: 45
          For conspirators, yes. But in reality, as I see it, Nicholas II had a chance. As I wrote above, the St. George Battalion, if followed by the Emperor, could well discourage Ruzsky from hunting to fulfill his role in the plot.

          -hope dies last
          Nicholas 2 was torn away
          1. for got involved in the war "on his own initiative"
          2. The inner circle of the Grand Dukes intrigued against Nicholas 2 - we will never know this documentarily. memoirs - only a part of "hissing" will be shown (who read?)
          3. many military silent in August 14g was.
          by 16 g they decided on their rejection “WHO IS GUILTY? AND WHAT TO DO?” - they are nobles, not the imperial guard
          4. "commoners" - raznoshintsy in power followed the bourgeoisie, it soon turned out that it was against the emperor.
          5-6-7. and so you can distribute the entire RI on the shelves.
          + outside No., the loss of Poland is the drama and horror of the Romanov dynasty (many countries inside RI were for separating it from RI) - Was the Imperial House psychologically unprepared for imperialism? only "own", without "pump loot" from almost independent chtran
        2. Curious
          Curious 16 November 2017 21: 02
          "Caesar, too, Brutus dagger could not predict."
          A completely unfortunate analogy. Brutus Dagger is a kind of allegory.
          Caesar was killed in front of 800 senators. 60 conspirators rushed at the 56-year-old emperor and stabbed him with short swords. There were 23 wounds left on his body. But Brutus was only one of the conspirators. And Caesar knew about the plot. But to everything else - he was a fatalist.
          And Nicholas II could have had chances only if there had been another person in his place. The personal qualities of Nikolai Alexandrovich did not correspond to the historical moment. Well, he was not the Emperor! Therefore, he lost on the day of the coronation. And he pulled an entire Empire into oblivion.
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 17 November 2017 09: 07
            Well, he was not the Emperor!

            -WAS A EMPIRE
            but not a bulldog that nibbles everyone. Perhaps partly a philosopher.
            1. Reptiloid
              Reptiloid 18 November 2017 10: 10
              It just so happens that I'm not reading all the articles in this series. For me, this topic is fundamentally new and difficult. But now I found out yesterday about the author’s books on 1MB, which I’m reporting to everyone. I’m still more comfortable reading the book. The author also has books on Byzantine history. Perhaps they will supplement Ouspensky’s books that I have. Perhaps I have not yet learned about all the books of the author, I continue to study annotations. POSSIBLE ordering books.
  5. Dzmicer
    Dzmicer 16 November 2017 11: 04
    In the misfortunes of the guards, one feels an evil will directed at their destruction. As if their superiors wanted the destruction of the loyal sovereign guards.
  6. Monarchist
    Monarchist 16 November 2017 18: 54
    Comrades, Curios, Teterin and Wend, correctly noted that the fate of the Empire was already predetermined then ..
    As you like, but to me "Kukharsky Forest" and other operations, on the verge of treason in planning, remind me of a multi-step method to remove Stalin: 1 Vlasik was accused of abuse, 2, not everything is clean with Abakumov’s case ... 3 Tymoshchuk with his vigilance, and then " soup with a cat "... The Central Committee of the CPSU with deep regret (more precisely, with a secret triumph).
    In the light of recent publications: Mukhin, Sokolov, you look differently at the tragedy of 1941 and subsequent events. It seems to me that in the Central Committee of the saddle "radish"
    1. Dzmicer
      Dzmicer 16 November 2017 22: 12
      The Germans would not have attacked if they did not have insider information about the change of leadership, followed by surrender under German conditions.