Military Review

God of war of the Russian Imperial Army of the First World War. Some features of the combat use of Russian artillery. Part of 2

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At the very beginning of World War, the infantry regiments did not have their own artillery. The division also had 48 field 76-mm guns, and there were no howitzers. Light field howitzers were available (in limited quantities - 12 122-mm guns) only in the army corps. At the beginning of the war, heavy artillery had no Russian divisions and corps.


Despite this, the Russian artillerymen fought effectively — even while fighting a counter-battery battle with a superior enemy, defending their infantrymen. An artillery officer recalled how, during the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation 1914, the 4's heavy cannon guns of the Germans fired at the Russian trenches, and suddenly was suddenly covered with a Russian field battery. The German battery ceased to exist, and the Russian battalion commander, having visited the place of her death, took for memory an officer’s helmet removed from a German grave, torn from the head of an enemy artilleryman with a fragment of a scalp and several letters and postcards [Ververn B.V. 6-I battery. T. 1. C. 57].


10. Lunch at the carriage

And in the battle of Balumutivka-Rusty 1915, the 6-I and 7-I Don Cossack 26 batteries of April entered into a competition with four Austrian batteries (including heavy ones) and silenced them. The artillery of the enemy issued its location with dust columns between the village of Balamutivka and Dezus-Snouch - and the Don team opened fire. Moreover, a huge cloud of dust and smoke was observed on the enemy's heavy battery - the charging box was blown up and the searchlight was damaged, and the battery did not shoot anymore during the battle.

As long as enemy artillery could organize a fire curtain in front of the defense of its infantry, the attacks of the Russian infantry were of little success. Accordingly, the Russian artillery faced the task of not only destroying the enemy’s machine guns, but also suppressing the fire of enemy batteries. Thus, at the final stage of the Battle of Galicia, the Russian 27 th Infantry Regiment of the Vitebsk Infantry Division of the 7 Infantry Division, which was in the vanguard, attacked the Austrians, who were well entrenched overnight in positions covering the approaches to Tomashov. The Austrians behind the center of their defensive position positioned an artillery battery, which impeded the advance of the Russian infantry. Then the commander of the Russian infantry regiment ordered the mortar battery supporting him to crush the Austrian artillery - which was successfully completed. After that, the 27 Infantry Regiment knocked out the Austrians from their position and, pursuing them, first broke into Tomashov.

The gunners had an impact on the outcome of entire military operations. Thus, the work of the 2 of the Finnish rifle artillery battalion in the 27 battle of August 1914 led to the fact that the advancing German division with stronger artillery was not only stopped by the accurate 3's Russian batteries (2 field and one mountain), but also made the enemy believe in the presence of large Russian forces. The German field artillery could not even open fire for a whole day — the battalion batteries operated so brilliantly and tactically. This resulted in insignificant losses of the Russian riflemen, the withdrawal of the German division from the town of Lyk and the possibility of a quick detachment from the enemy of our rifle brigade and the rest of the 22 Army Corps following behind it. This battle eased the pressure of the Germans on the left flank of the 1 Army and enabled the units of the 22 Corps to concentrate on further combat missions.

Russian artillerymen acted well under tactically difficult conditions. Thus, the ability of even heavy field artillery to move quickly in mountainous conditions was tested in February and March 1915 in the Carpathians (Vyshkov Pass, Volosyans, Lihobori) - when the heavy battery of the 3 Siberian rifle artillery brigade passed at night through Vyshkov Pass , passed through the most terrible mountain roads (only in places hastily tampered with wooden flooring) and went out into the valley of the r. Sviki.



11., 12 Front in Galicia

The Russian artillerymen tried to compensate for the shortage in the number of barrels with the quality of firing, the introduction of tactically progressive methods of using guns and the rate of fire. For example, the battery of Captain Sokolov from the 1 heavy (!) Artillery brigade in the battles near Angerg gave - a gun to 9 shots, and a howitzer - to 4 shots per minute.


13. Battery artillery observatory

In the Russian army, earlier than in any other army participating in the First World Divisional Artillery (according to 1-2 batteries) they began to subordinate infantry regiments, which made it possible to support the attack of each battalion with 2-4-guns. Infantry interaction with artillery improved. Artillery became the conductor of the infantry. The artillery preparation of the infantry attack began to be carried out systematically, becoming an important key to a successful offensive.

Russian gunners have made a lot of new in the question of the methodology of using artillery. Various schemes of artillery fire (fire raid, fire curtain, fire breakthrough), types of artillery preparation and forms of infantry fire support (fire shaft) were developed. For the firing shaft, the artillery had to create a line of fire moving in front of the infantry in short jumps, applying to the speed of its movement. The infantry should be pressed against the firing shaft as close as possible - so that enemy machine guns that escaped artillery fire or survived in their shelters could not use the gap between the firing shaft and infantry to resume their fire. But in conditions of a small number of barrels and a limited amount of ammunition, it was necessary to use the available funds as economically as possible. Russian artillery was divided into groups, each of which solved its tasks. Of great importance was the centralization of artillery - the formation of a fire fist.

Thus, during the artillery preparation period during the offensive of the South-Western Front 1916, the artillery was used centrally in three groups: the 1) group for breaking through passages in wire barriers, the 2) group for destroying fortifications and suppressing the fire defense system and the 3) group for fighting with enemy artillery. Artillery attack was divided into 2 stage. In the first of these, the task of the artillery was to destroy the enemy’s wire obstacles. Then the artillery, including the heavy one, was to destroy the fortifications of the enemy’s 1 and 2 lines; The main attention was paid to the elimination of machine-gun nests. Moreover, instead of the previously practiced 1-2-hour hurricane fire, when shooting for a second time, the 15-20-minute fire was ordered according to the prior shotgun. Such a fire gave much better results than with a hurricane fire. As soon as the infantry moved to assault enemy positions, the howitzer and heavy artillery had to transfer fire to the reserves, flank reinforcements (in relation to the attacked sector) and the enemy’s 3 line of defense. Heavy (primarily 107-mm) guns were supposed to start a counter-battery fight - in case of inaccessibility of enemy guns for light artillery. Heavy artillery was placed no further than 3 - 4 km from enemy advanced positions.

Light artillery had to shoot at the attacked positions to the maximum distance. When the attacking infantry bursts into enemy positions, part of the light guns creates (from the flanks and the front) a fire curtain - to help the infantrymen to gain a foothold on the captured position and repel the counterattack of the enemy, and the other part leads the counter-battery. As soon as the infantry captures the first and second lines of enemy positions, part of the howitzer and heavy artillery had to move forward - in order to begin preparations for the capture of deeper enemy defenses.

Actually for the first time in stories artillery method was developed to cover the attacking infantry mobile artillery fire shaft.

In addition, after the artillery preparation was completed, part of the light batteries were reassigned to the commanders of the infantry regiments and followed the infantry to support it in the depths of the enemy defense. It was a new word in the use of artillery in breaking through the enemy’s positional defense and provided the Russian infantry with a higher attack rate than in foreign armies. These batteries were to be located no further than 2 km from the enemy’s positions, and the artillery observers were to be present at the commanders of the advanced infantry battalions. It was about the support of their infantry artillery when conducting combat in the depths of the enemy’s tactical defense. On the French front, this issue was not resolved and led to the vicious method of "methodical gnawing" of small-depth sections of the enemy's defense.

The most difficult issue in the preparation of a breakthrough of the South-Western Front in 1916 was the problem of massing artillery in the attack areas - due to a quantitative lack of artillery. Although the Russian command succeeded in achieving artillery superiority in enemy artillery against the enemy, the artillery densities were extremely low and, on average, did not exceed 20 - 23 guns (including 6 heavy ones) on 1 km of the front. At the same time, on the French front, where the artillery had to completely destroy all enemy defenses before the offensive, a huge amount of artillery (up to 100 guns on 1 km of the front) was sent to a narrow section of the front. For many days this artillery conducted artillery preparation at the intended breakthrough site - and thus revealed it to the enemy. In preparing the South-Western Front’s breakthrough, Russian artillerymen developed their own, more efficient and economical method. They refused to completely destroy the enemy defenses, which caused a huge expenditure of shells and required a long time. Instead, the objects on which the stability of the enemy’s defenses depended: fire points, observation posts, artillery and artificial obstacles depended on a point. For this purpose, special artillery groups were created, in each of which targets were distributed among the batteries.

New methods in the use of artillery for the preparation of a breakthrough made it possible to drastically reduce the duration of artillery preparation - from several days to several hours.


14. Disguised battery

To organize a breakthrough of deep and solid defense of the enemy during the period of positional warfare, new technical means of struggle and new organizational forms of their use were required. The armament of the Russian artillery at the divisional and corps level (light field 76-mm rapid-fire guns, light field 122-mm howitzers and 107-mm heavy guns) during this period was not sufficient to suppress the fire resistance of the enemy’s increased defense. There was a need for a sharp increase in the number of howitzer and heavy artillery and in the creation of lighter artillery means capable of quickly maneuvering on the battlefield along with the combat orders of the advancing infantry.

It was during this period that trench artillery was further developed. It consisted of mortars, bomb bombs and "escort" guns and the closest support of infantry in combat (37-mm, 47-mm and 55-mm guns). The “escort” weapons differed in comparatively low weight, and therefore they could advance with the infantry and support it at all stages of the battle. Mortars and bombed bombs possessed a great firepower, mounted trajectory and the ability to destroy the fortifications of the enemy. The infantry battalions began to give commands from six mortars or bomb bomb.

The increased growth of howitzer artillery with a mounted trajectory of firing was mainly due to the fact that the defense began to use more and more durable structures with a strong upper tree-earth or concrete ceiling, against which a cannon-gun fire with a flat trajectory was ineffective. Equally important was the increase in the number and range of heavy artillery. The Russian army was the first to carry out the organizational design of breakthrough artillery as a separate unit, starting the formation of heavy special-purpose artillery (TAON). The TAON building was created in 1916 and included artillery brigades, a detachment of balloons and a number of other parts into the 6. By the spring of next year, there were 338 guns in the hull - from 120- to 305-mm caliber. TAON brilliantly proved itself in the 1917 Summer Offensive.

Thus, on the issue of creating a breakthrough artillery, as well as on a number of other major issues of artillery application, Russia occupied a leading place among other participants in the world war. Russian artillery was the first to master the method of shooting using calculated data, and already 16 in December 1916 brilliantly applied it - on the Northern front near the town of Dvinsk. Hidden behind the firing positions, the heavy batteries of the 19 Army Corps suddenly for the enemy (i.e., without adjustment, correction and observation) dealt a powerful fire strike against a group of objects in the area of ​​art. Elovka. Objects scattered across the front and in depth at a distance of 11 - 13 km from the advanced Russian positions were crushed. Were badly damaged or destroyed: ammunition depot, airfield, power plant, railway station, railway tracks and a bridge.

The new method of shooting was of great practical importance. Shooting at the calculated data provided a surprise artillery action and saved it from enemy fire. The gunners of other countries began to master this method only from the end of 1917.

Russian artillery has developed both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Anti-aircraft guns, trench artillery appeared, the number of howitzers and heavy artillery increased, the range of the main types of guns increased on average by 15 - 30%. By the end of the war, as noted, the TAON Corps was created - a powerful firing resource in the hands of Stakes. Artillery tactics were improved.

The role of artillery in offensive and defensive combat has increased significantly, and this caused an increase in the proportion of artillery in the armed forces by more than 1,5 times.
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 15 November 2017 07: 39 New
    +3
    At the beginning of the heavy artillery war, Russian divisions and corps did not have.
    .. I would like to know why ..?
    1. XII Legion
      XII Legion 15 November 2017 09: 15 New
      21
      Before the war, the Russian army had 5 siege artillery divisions (heavy 107 mm guns and 152 mm howitzers).
      At the beginning of the war, both Russian and French did not have heavy artillery in divisions and corps (they went to war with 240 and 308 heavy guns, respectively).
      The French receive corps heavy artillery in the winter of 1914, and the Russian army by 1916 - field heavy artillery divisions appear (3 batteries each) - the latter are fully or partially attached to the corps.
      Also in Russia by the end of 1916, in addition to heavy artillery brigades, a special-purpose heavy artillery corps (TAON) appeared - in whole or in part it was given to the shock armies at the disposal of the Headquarters. He distinguished himself in the summer campaign of 1917.
      The development of Russian heavy artillery is an extremely interesting topic - maybe the author will consider it in detail and in the future? hi
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 15 November 2017 11: 49 New
        0
        At the beginning of the war, both Russian and French did not have heavy artillery in divisions and corps
        .... This is probably a coincidence ....
    2. Dzmicer
      Dzmicer 15 November 2017 09: 33 New
      15
      Perhaps because Russia stood on the threshold of industrialization, did not pass it and did not prepare for a war for living space for thirty years, like Germany, because it could not afford it, was it not?
    3. Gopnik
      Gopnik 15 November 2017 14: 16 New
      15
      Quote: parusnik
      . I would like to know why ..?


      Because the need to have heavy howitzer artillery in the infantry was realized at the beginning. century and based on the results of the REV. After the end of which and the end of the first revolution, they adopted samples of heavy guns for arming, then, within the framework of the "Big Program", they decided to lower 122 mm howitzers in the division, and give 107 guns and 152 mm howitzers to the hulls. But the Germans attacked earlier.
      Those. the answer - they did not have time because of a lack of funds, because of war and revolution. But we even had 122 howitzers in the corps, but the French, who had not experienced war and revolution, did not have this.
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 15 November 2017 07: 42 New
    18
    Russian gunners have contributed a lot to the issue of the methodology of using artillery. Various schemes of artillery fire (fire raids, fire curtains, fire breakthroughs), types of artillery preparation, and infantry fire support forms were developed (fire shaft). For a shaft of fire, artillery had to create a line of fire moving in front of the infantry in short jumps, applying to the speed of its movement.

    It was these achievements of the Russian gunners that led to the successful offensive in the Second World War ..
    In addition, Russian gunners, unlike the Germans, immediately showed themselves to be masters of firing from closed positions.

    Excellent article, as always! The only remark: talking about the magnificent artillery attack in the Lutsk breakthrough, one could mention Major General KHANZHIN, the artillery genius-organizer of this attack, as well as mention his associates.
    We must know and remember our Heroes.
    1. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 29 New
      +3
      Quote: Olgovich
      It was these achievements of the Russian gunners that led to the successful offensive in the Second World War ..


      And even during the Second World War, the equipping of 122-155 mm guns left much to be desired.
      For comparison:
      at the beginning of the war, the German infantry division was superior to the infantry division of the Red Army in artillery.

      The British division had 72 howitzer guns (87.6 mm)
      RKKA small arms division According to the state of 1939 M-30 howitzers - 28 pcs +
      In June 1940, there were 32 of them.
      In 1941-1942, the number of 122 mm howitzers was 122 mm from 8 to 12, and the number of 76 mm divisional guns was up to 20.
      Since December 1944, the guards rifle divisions had 20 122-mm howitzers and 20 divisional 76 mm - that is, even towards the end of the war, the artillery equipment of the Soviet rifle and even the guard divisions was almost twice as inferior to the British. Those. not every battalion of the division was provided with howitzer and divisional artillery in defense, and even in the offensive.
      It’s another matter that many divisions having 50% of the staff — less than half of them are combat, the rest are of type security, often from 9 battalions they were brought into one consolidated battalion, which fought and then all the remaining artillery “worked” for this combined battalion.

      The main losses of the infantry are due to weak artillery support, which is a consequence of the weak artillery equipment of the Red Army.
      1. chenia
        chenia 15 November 2017 10: 52 New
        +3
        Quote: DimerVladimer
        The main losses of the infantry are due to weak artillery support, which is a consequence of the weak artillery equipment of the Red Army.


        Initially, it was a matter, but already in 1942, and since 1943 we always surpassed the Germans in terms of massing artillery. Most of the artillery was in the RGK (artillery division and even artillery corps).

        I already answered you in the first part.

        We didn’t destroy targets in the first position as Germans,
        We carried it out with all the saints (where the main thing that could have detained our soldier was barbed wire).
        The Germans, as a rule, often wound up at night right up to the borders of the first position (leaving the military guard), and returned after 9 (usually we did fire training before, then there was an instruction to change the time of the artillery attack, so that they would not be repeated.)
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 11: 10 New
          +3
          Quote: chenia
          Initially, it was a matter, but already in 1942, and since 1943 we always surpassed the Germans in terms of massing artillery. Most of the artillery was in the RGK (artillery division and even artillery corps).
          I already answered you in the first part.


          In places of the main blows - yes.
          And there are very few such places on the front of the offensive, where the fire is massaged.
          In the remaining cases - at best, the battalion in the offensive was supported by a howitzer battery - and a lot depended on its spotter whether the offensive would be for the infantry - a successful or a bloodbath.

          Here is how Mikhin describes such episodes in the book "Gunners. Stalin gave the order."
          So this time we are running with the telephone operator next to the battalion commander in a chain of advancing infantry. We are running after the retreating Germans, moving from one straw omelet to the next. The matter takes place in the last days of August, everything is clean, sunny and warm in the field, no matter where you look - even stubble is shining with pure gold, and tall and omelettes of fragrant straw that have not yet settled down and solidified are randomly scattered here and there. The infantry runs around the omelets, and we and the battalion commander Abaev jump on each one so that we can see everything better from above. We look, the German infantry jumped into the forest belt. Hardly our soldiers, and there were about fifty of them left in the battalion, approached this strip two hundred meters, when suddenly a thick black chain of fascists fell out to meet them - two hundred people! The enemy counterattacks with fresh forces! Our fighters were dumbfounded, lay down. And the Germans, shooting on the move, are struggling to meet us, and enemy machine guns open fire from the flanks of the attackers.
          Our infantrymen were frightened of such a force, and one by one they begin to crawl back, then everyone got up and ran to retreat. I hit with my shells on the German chain - the Nazis lay down. Abaev jumped off an omelet and with a gun raised above his head he ran to stop the escaping soldiers - he backs away on the move, shoots up, swears, but cannot stop his retreating battalion. And at this critical moment of the battle, I suddenly lost contact with the battery! ...

          http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mihin_pa/09.h
          tml full episode text.

          And this is an indicative battle - 95% of battles and offensives took place in this way - with the support of the rifle division’s own artillery divisions.
          1. chenia
            chenia 15 November 2017 19: 01 New
            +2
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            In other cases - at best, an offensive battalion


            In other cases. this is either a demonstration offensive (pooling reserves and preventing regrouping), or an attack on the retreating enemy.
            Even the offensive to occupy an advantageous position (for the subsequent offensive such as a bridgehead, an important area) artillery attack is serious.
            Naturally, when the offensive arrives, the moment comes when you attack a well-prepared defense on a wide front, but an attempt to get around will fail, and there is no strength. All. Pause.
            Quote: DimerVladimer
            We are running after the retreating Germans, moving from one straw omelet to the next.


            Honestly, a professional cuts a rumor, too rollicking.
            Moving irregularly. Once shooting with a PDO (and the battery is howitzer. Most likely it should be so). you need a binding (here you can without it, but for the eye you need a shot-loss of time) and instrument orientation. Sighting in battle is a difficult thing; there are many breaks - you need to take your own. And when the source is almost at random, where to catch your shell is still a pleasure.

            Yes, and cover the trenches with a battery (prepared defense) and the enemy ran?

            I’ll say that, according to (GP), a division of 18 trunks hits, 2 carriages of shells fly away, the target is suppressed (30% defeat), and then they can run, and not always.
        2. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 11: 35 New
          +2
          Quote: chenia
          We carried it out with all the saints (where the main thing that could have detained our soldier was barbed wire).


          The same Mikhin has in the book "Gunners. Stalin gave the order"
          how they used a captured German 105 mm gun’s battery for quite some time - since there were more German trophy shells already advancing than the supply of domestic cannons could.

          Crossing the hill, we see in the distance a new German trench. It was thought how many more there will be, these trenches, while we reach Berlin! The Germans noticed us and immediately doused, as if for warm-up, a machine-gun burst. Explosions of shells joined the machine guns - the howitzer battery that was visible behind the infantry fired. Our battalion lay down. Shtansky has already connected the telephone to the cable, and I open artillery fire on German howitzers. They are not entrenched - it is evident that they just hastily took up a firing position. This is in our favor. The explosions of powerful shells covered the entire battery. She stopped right there, calculations lay down near her guns. I give, for the sake of fidelity, one more round of shells on the battery and transfer the fire to the newly identified trench. My shells are torn along the entire length of the trench, the German infantry can not stand it, jump out and again flee. I give them the opportunity to run away so that they don’t decide to return to the trench, and cover the retreating shells with explosions.
          Then again I transfer the fire of my guns to the German battery so that it does not resume firing. The fleeing German infantry caught up with their guns, the surviving artillerymen joined the fleeing. Abaev immediately raises his battalion, and we all rush after the retreating Germans. On the run I cast a glance to the left, at the battery left by the Germans - the guns are intact, we must try to shoot from them!
          When the battalion was laid down for the last time, and Abaev and I realized that today our offensive was over, and the infantrymen began to dig in hastily, I contacted my battery and ordered the senior battery officer, Lieutenant Oshchepkov:
          - Leave the two howitzers in place, with the rest drive forward, put them next to the battery thrown by the Germans. When ready to fire, pull up the remaining [243] two guns. And urgently get acquainted with German howitzers - is it possible to use them, in what condition sights, panoramas. If you can shoot from them, turn everything a hundred and eighty degrees.
          It was already getting dark. Oshchepkov divided the gun crews in half, putting the most intelligent guys to the German howitzers. The German guns were in good condition, moreover, four tractors stood on the firing position and about a thousand shells lay. But there were no shooting tables, the price of the division of the sight was unknown and the panorama was divided not into 60 divisions, but into 64. And also: you increase the angle meter, and the barrel goes to the left - it is confused “to the right” and “to the left” in comparison with our guns. I give the command:
          - Shoot German howitzers. Bussol sixteen, the scope is seven-zero, the first - one shell, fire!
          We are looking forward to breaking the German shell with Abaev. And then he cracked fifty meters ahead of us. I quickly put my shell near and compare the sights. It turned out that the German sight 70 corresponds to our 44, that is, 2 kilometers two hundred meters. Then, using firing from German and our guns, we establish the correspondence of sights at 3, 4, 5 and 6 kilometers.
          All! Tomorrow morning we will give heat to the Germans from their own guns!
          And so it happened. Approaching the Dniester, I shot at the Nazis only from their guns. Shells - heaps! Entire trains are at Vesely Kut and Dolinskaya stations, and nobody needs them, that is, you do not have any limits, permissions, reports. And I immediately got two howitzer batteries - our 122-mm and trophy 105-mm. Of course, my batteries got more trouble, I had to service not four, but eight howitzers. But shoot yourself plenty at the Nazis! [244]
          These captured weapons have served us greatly. With their help, we unexpectedly for the Germans broke out to the Dniester and won the bridgehead on the other side. With my howitzers, I would not risk going to the rear to go to the Germans, but I went with the German: it’s not a pity to abandon them, if something happens.

          http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mihin_pa/11.h
          tml
          Mikhin very well described the "typical work" of artillerymen in the Second World War.
  3. XII Legion
    XII Legion 15 November 2017 09: 00 New
    23
    Tactics of Russian artillery considered
    Illustrative examples of its combat use are given.
    And the short stories that Russian gunners managed to achieve during the war
    Thank you!
  4. Dzmicer
    Dzmicer 15 November 2017 09: 36 New
    18
    Many thanks for the informative article, it is very interesting and informative, especially against the background of all the dirt that the red propagandists poured and continue to pour on historical Russia and its true heroes.
    1. OAV09081974
      15 November 2017 09: 54 New
      23
      Thank you very much - Dzmicer and others. Colleagues for their appreciation.
      XII Legion
      The development of Russian heavy artillery is an extremely interesting topic - maybe the author will consider it in detail and in the future?

      As they say - I understood the order, I hope I will fulfill it in the near future.
      Olgovich
      The only remark: talking about the magnificent artillery offensive in the Lutsk breakthrough, it was possible to mention Major-General Khanzhin, the artillery genius-organizer of this offensive, as well as mention his comrades.

      I agree, during this period a galaxy of talented Russian artillery commanders appeared. The article is mostly devoted to artillery tactics, but you should also talk about personnel in the future. Khanzhin - the star of Russian artillery. But besides the artillery inspector of the 8 Army Khanzhin, his colleagues in the other armies of the South-Western Front distinguished themselves. About one of them, by the way, at the end of the week a personal article will be published.
      Best regards
      hi
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 15 November 2017 10: 48 New
        17
        Quote: OAV09081974
        Khanzhin is a star of Russian artillery. But in addition to the artillery inspector of the 8th Army, Khanzhin, his colleagues in other armies of the South-Western Front distinguished themselves. About one of them by the way at the end of the week will be a personal article.

        It will be very interesting to read, because the available information is extremely scarce. Thank! hi
        As far as I know, you have a lot of articles, spread them ALL, we will read it with pleasure!
  5. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 05 New
    +5
    The role of artillery in offensive and defensive combat has increased significantly, and this caused an increase in the proportion of artillery in the armed forces by more than 1,5 times.


    What we see from other sources: http://militera.lib.ru/tw/kirillov-gubetsky/01.ht
    ml
    While in Germany the number of heavy guns reached 33% of the number of light guns, in Russia it was barely 3,5%, and in other countries, although it was more than in Russia, it did not even reach 10% anywhere.
    In these numbers, two prevailing views at that time on the use of heavy artillery were reflected. In pure form, these were the views of the French and German armies.

    In Germany, in connection with the lessons of the last wars, and especially the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 - 1905, heavy artillery was given great importance. It was believed that its role would be very great not only in the fight against fortresses, but also in a field battle, in which trenches, field defenses, wire fences and other targets appeared, against which the field gun grenade could prove completely powerless.
    Therefore, a lot of effort was made to spend a lot of money, not only in order to have quantitatively superior heavy artillery with a high power of a single shot, but also in order to provide this artillery with the means of possible rapid movement for timely delivery to the desired section of the front.

    The underestimation of the role of heavy artillery, noted above for France and for Russia, affected very quickly. Both of these states, like Germany, in all their pre-war charters preached the offensive, trained their troops in this spirit and, it would seem, prepared for offensive actions.

    But Germany alone made all the necessary conclusions from its offensive doctrine and tried to create materially its desire to advance with the creation of heavy artillery. The remaining states were convinced of this only after they had to carry out an equally rapid retreat instead of a swift offensive. Already during the war they had to feverishly create heavy artillery for themselves, without a well-thought-out plan, without a clear system, first of all using old, immobile until that time, serf and coastal guns, and then by creating new systems. At the same time, France was in conditions much more profitable than Russia. France had its own well-developed heavy industry, heavy systems for Russia were being prepared at its plants, and therefore, it was provided with everything necessary for the rapid production of these tools.
    Therefore, we see that the number of heavy guns increased by the end of the war in France by 24 times, and in Russia - by 6 times, and this was largely due to the guns brought [34] from the allies (French and Japanese). In the French and German armies, the number of heavy guns was more than 50% of the total number of active guns. In Russia, this ratio was less, but not because of the underestimation of the role of heavy artillery, but because of the above economic lack of independence and helplessness.
    1. Gopnik
      Gopnik 15 November 2017 14: 19 New
      13
      Quote: DimerVladimer
      Therefore, we see that the number of heavy guns increased by the end of the war in France by 24 times, and in Russia - by 6 times, and this was largely due to the guns brought [34] from the allies (French and Japanese). In the French and German armies, the number of heavy guns was more than 50% of the total number of active guns.


      And, as usual, under the "end of the war" for France and Germany, the end of 1918 is taken, and for Russia, at best, the end of 1917.
  6. kalibr
    kalibr 15 November 2017 10: 12 New
    16
    And the article is very interesting, and the photos are selected excellent ...
  7. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 15 November 2017 10: 15 New
    17
    Wonderful and informative article! Russian gunners during the Second World War showed a remarkable level of both combat training and tactical thinking. Anton Kersnovsky once wrote that the German artillerymen could compete with Russian artillery on equal terms only in the ratio of 1 to 3. To the author - my sincere gratitude for the work done!
    1. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 48 New
      +2
      Quote: Lieutenant Teterin
      A wonderful and informative article! Russian gunners during the Second World War showed a remarkable level of both combat training and tactical thinking. Anton Kersnovsky once wrote that the German artillerymen could compete with Russian artillery on equal terms only in the ratio of 1 to 3. To the author - my sincere gratitude for the work done!


      Indeed, the gunners proved themselves to be quite worthy and professional.
      But their supply - just shamefully failed!
      Let us recall the shell hunger of 1914, when they did not have time to submit a mobilization stock of shells to the army.
      August 29 / September 12, 1914 (the 43rd day of mobilization), the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, General Ivanov, sends an extremely alarming telegram directly to the Minister of War (No. 1014):

      “When releasing the last light and field cartridges of local parks, I urge you to send urgently at least one hundred and fifty thousand light cannon and twenty-five thousand field howitzer cartridges, otherwise you will have to stop operations due to a lack of artillery ammunition. The other day I present considerations of the immediate local need. ”

      On the same day (August 29 / September 12), the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief confirms the critical position of the armies of the South-Western Front by telegram No. 652:

      “The position of supply of cannon cartridges is positively critical. The whole burden of modern fighting is on artillery. She alone sweeps away the deadly enemy machine guns and destroys his artillery. The infantry will not boast of artillery, but the latter achieves this by excessive consumption of ammunition. Continuous sixteen-day or more battles violate theoretical calculations. The South-Western Front is already fed by the Northern and Odessa districts. Immediate help is needed. Without cartridges there is no success. To clarify the situation on this issue and the enormous demands of the troops, generals Kondzerovsky and Ronzhin were personally sent to the front. Both, having all the digital materials, through personal negotiations with the rear authorities were convinced of the validity of the alarming symptoms that could be a catastrophe, perhaps at the last minute of the enemy’s defeat. The quickest help in this matter is unconditionally and urgently needed. I am personally convinced that this is the key to final success over the Austrians. ”


      September 8/21, 1914 (the 53rd day of mobilization), the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich considered it necessary to contact the Sovereign directly (telegram No. 4141):

      “For about two weeks now, there has been a shortage of artillery cartridges, which I announced with a request to expedite delivery. Now Adjutant General Ivanov reports that he must suspend operations on Przemysl and on the entire front, until the cartridges in the local parks are brought to at least a hundred per gun. Now there are only twenty-five. This forces me to ask Your Majesty to command to expedite the delivery of cartridges. ”
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 52 New
        +1
        on the issue of production of artillery shells, the military industry of the Russian Empire was chronically unprepared for the First World War. On this occasion, General Golovin writes:

        “The development of this industry required a long time, during which our stocks of cannon cartridges (meaning shells - approx.) Were doomed to a catastrophic fall. It is enough to say that during December 1914 and the first months of 1915, we could expect no more than 12 parks (360 thousand units - approx.) Per month for replenishment in cannon cartridges for light guns per month, which was less than 25% needs for them. In an even worse situation was the issue of replenishing heavy artillery with firearms. And if this issue did not take on as acute a form as the issue of providing light artillery with military supplies, it was only because the number of field heavy batteries in our army was completely insignificant and the use of them was an exception for our troops. There was no heavy artillery at all. Thus, on the part of our War Ministry, a manifestation of super energy was required. Just this was not.
        The leaders of our War Ministry, headed by Sukhomlinov, did not want to reckon with the demands of life. The first thing they did was to look for the guilty, and those were again the troops. In this regard, various reports of persons involved in the work at the Ministry of War and sent to the troops to investigate the famine are extremely characteristic. The conclusion that could be drawn from these reports is that the troops are shooting too much (!). Now that we know the experience of our enemies and allies, this conclusion is striking in its complete misunderstanding of modern combat. ”
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 57 New
          +1
          About the real state of affairs in providing the Russian army with shells, the previously mentioned British military agent in Petrograd, Lt. Col. Knox (who later became a general), wrote in early 1915:

          “The secrecy of the Russian official circles and, at the same time, the stubborn desire to present the current state of affairs as completely prosperous make it extremely difficult for the representatives of the allies to timely and correctly inform their governments about the needs of Russia.

          Here is an example: on September 25, General Joffre telegrams asked the British and Russian governments whether the existing firearms allow the war to continue for a long time with the same tension as before, and if not, how is the supply planned.

          The French ambassador posed this question to the Russian government in an official letter. On September 28, the Russian Minister of War replied that the military supply did not inspire concern, and the ministry took all measures to get everything it needed.
          At the same time, a French military agent learned from unofficial sources that the monthly production of artillery shells was only 35. Unfortunately, he was not able to prove that by that time the needs of the front had reached 000 shells per day ...!
          1. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 59 New
            +1
            ... after the crisis in 1914 in providing the Russian army with shells related to the not timely delivery of shells to the front line, by the spring of 1915 a crisis ensued, which was associated with the expenditure of the mobilization reserve of shells by the army and their extremely inadequate supply from military industry enterprises.

            In this regard, General Golovin writes:

            “Since the spring of 1915, a tragedy has come for the Russian army in the full sense of the word. Just this campaign was marked by the transfer from Germany of its main blow from the French theater to Russian. "

            Here are a few quotes in this regard:

            “The spring of 1915 will remain in my memory forever. The great tragedy of the Russian army - the retreat from Galicia. No ammo, no shells. Bloody battles every day, heavy transitions every day, endless fatigue - physical and moral; then timid hopes, then hopeless horror ... I remember the battle of Przemysl in mid-May. Eleven days of fierce battle of the 4th Infantry Division ...

            Eleven days of terrible hum of German heavy artillery, literally tearing down whole rows of trenches along with their defenders. We almost did not answer - there is nothing. The regiments, exhausted to the last degree, fought off one attack after another - with bayonets or point-blank shooting; blood was pouring, rows were thinning, grave hills grew ... Two regiments were almost destroyed - with one fire ...

            Lord French and English! You, having reached incredible heights of technology, will not be interested to hear such an absurd fact from Russian reality: When, after a three-day silence of our only six-inch battery, fifty shells were brought to her, it was reported by telephone to all regiments, all companies, and all the arrows sighed with joy and relief ... ”(Anton Denikin).
      2. Lieutenant Teterin
        Lieutenant Teterin 15 November 2017 11: 14 New
        16
        It was a deal. All the warring countries miscalculated with the supply; the Germans had this problem by the beginning of 1915. Somewhere I met a quote from Ludendorff's correspondence, in which he complains about the lack of shells. I don’t remember where I saw it, but if you are interested, I will look for this quote today.
        But it was still difficult for Russia to meet the increased needs of the troops due to our vast territory. The main defense plants were far from the rear, and Russia's budget simply did not allow to quickly build the same dense railway network, as, for example, in Germany. Yes, and, I believe, no one's budget would have pulled such expenses. But, to the honor of the tsarist government, railways were actively built in 1915-1916 to solve this problem in the framework of the theater of war.
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 11: 43 New
          0
          Quote: Lieutenant Teterin
          It was a deal. All the warring countries miscalculated with the supply; the Germans had this problem by the beginning of 1915. Somewhere I met a quote from Ludendorff's correspondence, in which he complains about the lack of shells. I don’t remember where I saw it, but if you are interested, I will look for this quote today.


          Yes, it would be interesting to get acquainted with the translated material.
          If not difficult.
          1. Lieutenant Teterin
            Lieutenant Teterin 15 November 2017 13: 05 New
            16
            Of course it will not. True, my memory let me down a little - I found information in the memoirs not of Ludendorff, but of Falkenhayn:

            As the last period of the war created in the concept of each soldier completely new concepts of human endurance and performance, in the same way he created a new measure of the requirements for combat supply and the size of its expenditure. Only one who held a responsible position in the German Headquarters during the winter of 1914–1915 can determine the size of the difficulties that had to be overcome: after all, during this winter, almost every shot on the Western Front was counted, every train delay with shells, rail breaks or some other stupid accident threatened to paralyze entire sections of the front. The preference [101] in covering needs was always given to the Eastern Front, taking into account its composition from compounds with a smaller internal commissure.

            https://m.fictionbook.ru/author/yerih_fon_falkeng
            ayin / verhovnoe_komandovanie_1914_1916_godov_v / rea
            d_online.html? page = 5
            The book is generally interesting, it allows you to understand how the course of the war was perceived by the German high command.
            1. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 14: 18 New
              +1
              Thank you so much.
              The link did not open.
              But found on http://militera.lib.ru/h/falkenhayn_e01/index.htm
              l
  8. Serge72
    Serge72 15 November 2017 10: 19 New
    19
    The role of artillery in offensive and defensive combat has increased significantly, and this caused an increase in the proportion of artillery in the armed forces by more than 1,5 times.

    Yes, this trend was emphasized by Soviet historical science.
    The increase in the specific gravity of artillery in general and the growth of heavy artillery are different processes. And maybe growth in Russia is 1,5 times and was not as active as in other countries - but also significant. And the heavy artillery was really underestimated by everyone except the Germans and Austrians.
    But on the other hand, I saw how many new gunners and bonuses the Russian artillerymen had: the ability to act from closed positions at the beginning of the war, increased rate of fire, jewelry shooting at close sections, various new artillery preparation methods, the appearance of infantry escort artillery, centralization of artillery (corps and army inspectors) shooting on calculated data.
    Interesting article
  9. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 10: 42 New
    +1
    Russian artillery was the first to master the method of shooting according to calculated data and already on December 16, 1916, it brilliantly applied it - on the Northern Front near Dvinsk. Moving stealthily to firing positions, the heavy batteries of the 19th Army Corps were suddenly for the enemy (i.e., without shooting, adjusting and observing)


    But many consider this method of firing at closed targets "in areas" - ineffective.
    At one time, these new methods, the so-called accurate shooting in all armies, were very keen on and thought that it was possible to completely refuse shooting. But pretty soon everyone had to admit that the new methods still could not replace the sighting completely, but only facilitate it and allow it to be completed in a shorter time with less bullet consumption. Precision shooting methods (according to modern terminology - with full preparation of the initial data) cannot completely exclude sighting because no one has yet mastered the issues of topographic, ballistic and meteorological shooting training so that they accurately and accurately perform all measurements and calculations. Therefore, if it is possible to observe the result of the fire, an error in the preparation of the data should be corrected by shooting. When shooting at unobservable targets, where observation of the results of the fire is impossible, these methods are allowed, but due to possible errors in the calculations, a rather large consumption of shells is required.

    http://militera.lib.ru/tw/kirillov-gubetsky/02.ht
    ml

    The entire Second World War in the ranks of the advancing was the artillery spotter, who provided art support at the request of the infantry
    1. Serge72
      Serge72 15 November 2017 11: 23 New
      19
      But many consider this method of firing at closed targets "in areas" - ineffective.

      Why by area? The method was called according to the calculated data - based on accurate calculations.
      The method of shooting according to the calculated data was used, of course, only under CERTAIN conditions (in ordinary everything remained as usual).
      And if it weren’t effective, a year after the Russians, the allies would not have practiced it.
      The author writes about the case at Elovka.
      Contrary to the established patterns of positional warfare, the infantry general R.D. Radko-Dmitriev, commander of the 12th Army of the Northern Front, laid the principle of surprise in the basis of the Mitau offensive operation. Accordingly, the Russian artillery was able to overcome the doctrine of "I don’t see - I don’t shoot", having successfully fired without shooting - according to the calculated data.
      In anticipation of the offensive, a group of heavy batteries of the 19th Army Corps secretly advanced to firing positions to the front line of Russian defense. The group’s goal was the Elovka station, where the enemy’s artillery, engineering and quartermaster’s warehouses were located, opposing the 19th Army Corps.
      The Russian command carefully prepared for the fire attack. All targets were photographed from the air, carefully plotted on a map, their sizes were precisely set, target deviations were determined, corrections for magnetic declination were made. All targets were numbered and distributed between the group's batteries. When calculating gun installations, sights and goniometers, the dispersion of the guns, their different types and sizes of each target were taken into account. The data for each weapon were tabulated, and the tables were distributed to platoon and gun commanders.
      In fact, the shooting was reduced to full automation. All the batteries of the group were connected by radio communication with each other, with the infantry, with the counter-battery combat group, with the artillery and combined arms high command. Special camouflage measures were taken, and anti-aircraft machine-gun platoons were placed at the batteries to repel a possible enemy air raid.
      Such careful preparation brought the desired success. In particular, when on the eve and during the operation the enemy made an attempt to detect the batteries of the fire group and destroy them with the help of howitzer and cannon batteries, the counter-battery group suppressed the German artillery.
      In the conditions of complete absence of ground and air surveillance, without preliminary sighting, observation and adjustment, from just before the occupied positions, the fire group carried out a successful fire raid on 7-8 sites in the Yelovka station district. 8 heavy guns (2 - 305 mm and 6 - 152 mm) opened fire without sighting - immediately to defeat. Objects scattered along the front and in depth at a distance of 11 - 13 km from the advanced Russian positions were defeated. As a result, they were destroyed or badly damaged: the ammunition depot at Lassen Manor, an airfield, a railway station, a power station, a bridge and railway tracks. 40 German troops were killed and wounded. The enemy was forced to remove and send to the rear airfield, warehouses and other objects, which tactically worsened the situation of German troops in the area.
      The development of a new method of shooting - according to the calculated data - ensured the surprise action of artillery and saved it from enemy fire. Artillerymen of other countries began to master this method only a year later - from the end of 1917.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 15: 08 New
        +3
        Quote: Serge72
        8 heavy guns (2 - 305 mm and 6 - 152 mm) opened fire without sighting - immediately to defeat. Objects scattered along the front and in depth at a distance of 11 - 13 km from the advanced Russian positions were defeated. As a result, they were destroyed or badly damaged: the ammunition depot at Lassen Manor, an airfield, a railway station, a power station, a bridge and railway tracks. 40 German troops were killed and wounded. The enemy was forced to remove and send to the rear airfield, warehouses and other objects, which tactically worsened the situation of German troops in the area.


        Let's analyze the situation?
        Sorry, but common phrases such as “objects are crushed”, “worsened the situation of the German troops”, “destroyed or badly damaged” - are very often used when evaluating artillery actions, when the results cannot be verified.
        I don’t know the number of shells fired, but the artillery strike of 8 heavy guns and 40 killed and wounded does not look like a particularly outstanding achievement (according to human losses, how many of 40 were killed? 2 or 22?) And who reported the number of wounded / killed to the gunners? The parliamentarian came and complained, for 40 victims, asked not to do this anymore ...? It's ridiculous.
        The score looks taken from the ceiling.

        I understand that you are guided by some kind of historical source, but it happens that they are composed of people who are interested in the results, and therefore not quite objective.

        Let's analyze the goals:

        - Destroy the airfield - something from the realm of fantasy, the airfield in those years represented ordinary ground-grassy areas: did the artillery damage / destroy the field?
        Of course, after this the airfield was taken out of range of heavy guns - now not 11 km, but 15 km - which "greatly worsened the situation of the troops."

        - I can believe in a blown up warehouse - this will be visible and audible for 11 km - for a week the Germans were left without shells.

        - Railway station (area target) - buildings have no strategic value. The paths are yes - but they are recoverable. Restore rail tracks at the station - does not take much time.

        - The bridge was destroyed (point target) - maybe - it could well be confirmed by reconnaissance from a balloon or aerial reconnaissance. Recover? It depends on which bridge, the larger the longer the repair period. High strategic value - if the ford or the nearest bridge is not closer than 10 km. A detour of more than 20 km will definitely worsen the situation of troops.

        - The power plant is an excellent areal target - I fully admit that it is destroyed - how does this change the strategic position? The soldiers were already in the trenches without electricity. A dubious goal from a military point of view, but can be economically justified.

        Total artillery strike really "complicated the situation" of the German troops, but did not lead to any significant tactical, strategic consequences.

        A specific episode demonstrates how difficult it is to evaluate the results of shooting from the calculated data.
        1. Serge72
          Serge72 15 November 2017 15: 28 New
          17
          Dear Dimer Vladimir!
          These data are taken by me from the Soviet military-technical magazine.
          Article written by a professional.
          So there’s nothing to disassemble here.
          Specialists, whom we are not suited to at all, examined in full detail this fire battle.
          I have given only some details here - and that article has all the calculations.
          If interested, I will send a bibliographic description of that article later.
          Interested in?
      2. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 15 November 2017 15: 17 New
        +3
        Quote: Serge72
        Why by area? The method was called according to the calculated data - based on accurate calculations.


        Who can take into account the strength of the wind in the upper part of the trajectory of the projectile and in the descending section of the trajectory?
        The farther the distance - the higher the deviation - the dispersion laws are insurmountable until the appearance of adjustable shells :)
        I had to count the ballistic trajectories for some types of missiles - an error in the third digit after the decimal point - the warhead lies a couple of kilometers from the target ...
  10. 27091965
    27091965 15 November 2017 10: 48 New
    +5
    In preparing the breakthrough of the Southwestern Front, the Russian gunners developed their own, more efficient and economical method. They refused to completely destroy the enemy defenses,


    Very interesting review. But the more "efficient and economical method" unfortunately led to large losses in parts.


    Engineering equipment trench.


    Austrian trenches with a wire fence and a machine gun point.
    1. Serge72
      Serge72 15 November 2017 11: 13 New
      17
      So on the other hand - the attacker no longer lost three times more than the defender. Especially during the BREAKTHROUGH in a positional war.
      During the Offensive of the Southwestern Front, the DEFENDING Austro-German troops suffered total losses of more than a million people (only by prisoners - by November 1, up to 9000 officers and 408000 privates). D. Keegan generally believed that 1 million were lost by the Austrians and 350 thousand Germans.
      The advancing Russian troops for the operation also lost a million (Kuznetsov B.I. Campaign of 1916 on the fronts of the First World Imperial War. M., 1941. P. 72).
      1. Serge72
        Serge72 15 November 2017 11: 13 New
        17
        Hence
        more "efficient and economical method"
        acted
      2. 27091965
        27091965 15 November 2017 12: 04 New
        +5
        Quote: Serge72
        So on the other hand - the attacker no longer lost three times more than the defender. Especially during the BREAKTHROUGH in a positional war.


        Do you think such obstacles are easy to pass, with point strikes, without suffering significant losses?


        or such.
        1. Serge72
          Serge72 15 November 2017 12: 27 New
          17
          Of course it's hard to get through.
          But the new method minimized losses.
          I have already talked about their relationship
          1. Serge72
            Serge72 15 November 2017 12: 33 New
            18
            The barriers were demolished during the artillery preparation - especially of high quality.
            By the way - these figures are May 22 - October 31: i.e. and heavy fighting on Stokhod, etc.
            Losses in the actual breakthrough on May 22-29 (in different armies) due to technology, interaction and other factors of the qualitative use of artillery were minimal.
            1. 27091965
              27091965 15 November 2017 12: 50 New
              +7
              Quote: Serge72
              The barriers were demolished during the artillery preparation - especially of high quality.


              " But in conditions of a small number of barrels and a limited amount of ammunition, the available means should have been used as economically as possible"
              1. Serge72
                Serge72 15 November 2017 12: 56 New
                18
                Certainly
                You're right
                Moreover, by the beginning of the Brusilovsky breakthrough, there was no general superiority in the artillery of the SWF, and in the heavy artillery the enemy generally had superiority.
                This operation is unique. Well, and the proof of the quality of our gunners - corrected the issue of quantity.
      3. Lieutenant Teterin
        Lieutenant Teterin 15 November 2017 13: 18 New
        15
        Let me complement you. There are other estimates of the losses of the Austrians and Russians:
        The Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat. Its losses amounted to about 1,5 million dead and wounded and were already irreparable. 9 thousand officers and 450 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner. The Russians lost 500 thousand people in this operation. (Verzhkhovsky D.V. First World War 1914-1918. M., 1954. S. 74.)

        http://www.hrono.ru/sobyt/1900sob/1916brusil.php
        1. Serge72
          Serge72 15 November 2017 14: 32 New
          18
          You are absolutely right Mr. Porucik good
          The strategic essay gives Russian losses of almost half a million by July 1 - i.e. May 22 - June 30.
          July, August, September and October it turns out that they gave the same amount. Which is not surprising, given what heavy fighting went on - especially in July and August. Kovel, Stokhod, Romanian front. Of course, the enemy suffered additional heavy losses.
          This ratio of losses is very unusual for the defender and the advancing, and even in a positional war. And a considerable merit in this of our gunners - yes, in the absence of an abundance of ammunition.
  11. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 15 November 2017 18: 18 New
    16
    I love such articles
    Fine good
  12. Yura Yakovlev
    Yura Yakovlev 16 November 2017 10: 39 New
    0
    Quote: DimerVladimer
    German guns were in good condition, moreover, four tractors stood on the firing position and about a thousand shells lay. But there were no shooting tables, the price of the division of the sight was unknown and the panorama was divided not into 60 divisions, but into 64. And yet: you increase the angle meter, and the barrel goes to the left - it is confused "to the right" and "to the left" in comparison with our guns.
    1. Yura Yakovlev
      Yura Yakovlev 16 November 2017 10: 55 New
      0
      A very interesting theoretical moment from the development of the theory of shooting. The Germans divided the circumference of 6400 equal chords, and ours divided 6000, which allowed 6 degrees to be divided into 100 parts. At the same time, we got that the sine of 1-00 = 0,1; sine 2-00 = 0,2; sine 3-00; and so on up to 30 degrees (sine 5-00 = 0,5) In addition, knowing that the values ​​of the sine and the tangent of the angle in the values ​​up to six degrees are approximately equal, and also knowing the reduction formulas, it is possible to perform calculations without using tables of trigonometric functions. This was very important when performing calculations on eye and reduced data preparation. And today, even in everyday practice, knowledge of such elementary things will not hurt anyone.