Preface to the book by V.V. Shevchenko "Unrecognized. The Caribbean Crisis in Memories and Documents" (Rostov-on-Don: Altair, 2017. 500 p.).
Modern public consciousness is characterized by a real “memory boom”, a kind of “memorial revolution”. Attention is naturally increasing to those events that directly defined the ideas of society about the past . Entering into resonance with actual reality, they are the key condition for the preservation of social identity. In post-Soviet Russia, along with the memory of the Great Patriotic War, information about what is connected with the events of the Cold War, the “second edition” of which today is obvious, is preserved with particular tenacity. The efforts of the enemy are aimed at developing destructive inferiority complexes and guilt, inflicting the most powerful damage to the collective consciousness. To oppose aggressive ideological expansion can only influence the public consciousness through the mechanisms of memory. It is this approach, based on the nature of its evolutionary mechanisms, that is able to successfully resist the hostile ideological influence. In this connection, the first-person narrative, which prepares consciousness for a certain form of self-identification, determines the perception patterns of the actual informational context and, ultimately, manifested in specific social actions, becomes crucial. It should be recognized that история as a scientific and educational discipline is not directly intended for these purposes - it is the responsibility of historical memory .
One of the central events of the Cold War is the famous Caribbean crisis of the 1962 of the year (or, as it is called abroad, the Cuban missile crisis), directly connected with the strategic operation Anadyr, whose 55 anniversary is celebrated in October of the 2017. The Caribbean crisis became the most dangerous in the history of the Cold War: two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, turned out to be as close as possible to a full-scale war with the use of a nuclear war. weapons . In the public mind, the historical memory of these events still plays an exceptional role. The Soviet Union then dared to challenge the United States and, speaking in a "chess" language popular with geopolitics, tried, having abandoned a long positional struggle, to decide the outcome of the party with the help of a dizzying, bordering on adventurism, operation, reminiscent of something dashing tank attack of times of the Great Patriotic War . It is still striking how filigree the Soviet military and political leadership managed to get “on the edge” separating the cold war from the hot one. Although modern scholars, as a rule, emphasize the compromise nature of the outcome of the Caribbean crisis, it remained in historical memory as a special period. “We were advancing in all directions,” and this offensive impulse, completely shared by the revolutionary-minded people of the “Liberty Island”, was ensured by faith in the rightness of our cause, the combat experience of the Soviet command, the amazing fighting qualities of the Soviet troops, the determination of the legendary Fidel Castro and his military associates.
Considering in a brief retrospective of events related to the Caribbean crisis, we note that in January 1959 in Cuba, young radical left-wing reformers led by Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-American dictatorial regime Batista. The American leadership began preparing forcible overthrow of the new government. In response to US help from counterrevolutionaries, F. Castro began to seek support from the Soviet Union. The Cuban leadership announced the country's entry into the "socialist camp." Under these conditions, Havana became increasingly close to Moscow. By the beginning of 1962, the US-Cuban conflict had outgrown the regional framework and moved to the global level, and the general US-USSR systemic confrontation began to superimpose on it.
It is well known that by the beginning of the 1960's. The United States created a huge network of various military bases around the borders of the Soviet Union, from which nuclear strikes could be inflicted on our country. Of particular concern were American missiles in Turkey, which, according to USSR Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovsky, "could have reached Moscow in 10 minutes." The Soviet Union did not have such opportunities. For this, a decision was needed to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba, adopted by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU 10 June 1962. The global confrontation system was almost complete by that time. At the strategic level, the highest echelon of threats and counter-threat was distinguished by a large asymmetry in the number of warheads and in the delivery systems: one Soviet warhead on the American 17. At the same time, the deployment of a part of the Soviet nuclear missile potential in Cuba significantly changed the situation in the strategic confrontation in favor of the USSR.
The operation itself, which received the code name "Anadyr", was prepared under the guise of a strategic exercise with the redeployment of troops and military equipment by sea to various regions of the Soviet Union. Within two months, 42 thousand people were secretly transported to the island. personnel with weapons, equipment, ammunition, food and building materials. October 4 1962. Nuclear weapons for strategic missiles were also delivered here. American intelligence, possessing ample capabilities and means, was not able to reveal the composition of the grouping of Soviet troops in Cuba. She discovered the deployment of strategic missiles using aerial photography only on October 14. After that, the situation began to worsen every day. The crisis threatened to develop into a world nuclear missile catastrophe. In this highly heated situation between the leaders of the USSR and the USA - N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy began intensive negotiations. As a result, the US president gave a guarantee not to invade Cuba if the USSR removes offensive weapons from there. The Soviet side, agreeing with this, also insisted on the elimination of the American missile base in Turkey. Thus, the armed conflict was prevented. A positive aspect of the Caribbean crisis was an agreement to establish and maintain constant contacts between the leaders of the USSR and the USA via direct telephone communications. In addition, a definite military-strategic victory of the USSR was that the already existing missile bases in Turkey were eliminated, and the inviolability of the territory of Cuba  was guaranteed.
1962 was devoted to the dramatic events of the new work of the famous historian of the Cold War Vitaly Shevchenko, whose scientific and social activities should be emphasized. Military General, Honorary Worker of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, combatant, veteran of numerous military conflicts, V.V. Shevchenko is widely known not only as the founder and permanent chairman of the Rostov organization of soldiers-internationalists - participants of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia "Danube-68", but also as the author of the books "Navstech dawn"  and "Remind" , dedicated to conducting military operations in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. His ascetic activity revived the veteran movement in the Rostov region and became known far beyond its borders . Efforts V.V. Shevchenko was supported by the famous Russian military leader, the Hero of Russia, Colonel-General V.V. Bulgakov, coincided with the scientific interests of the Department of Sociology, History, Political Science of the Institute of Management in the environmental, economic and social systems of the Southern Federal University and the Military Training Center at SFU. The result of fruitful cooperation was a series of high-profile events that took the form of manifestations of the historical memory of the central events of the Cold War .
A characteristic feature of books V.V. Shevchenko - exceptional attention to personal materials, primarily to the memories of the direct participants in the events. Of course, their role as sources is great in academic history. But it seems that this emphasis is directly related to the main task of the author, aimed at the formation of a stable active citizenship for the younger generation. The primary embodiment of consciousness in image and sensuality, and not in idea or concept, is fully recognized. It is this primary material that is the most effective object of influence on the consciousness, and only then do concepts, judgments, and conclusions come out. Therefore, the most objectively presented story (if it is possible at all) loses the history of memory. Memory is selective, it thinks not by statistical figures of participants, victories and defeats, but by the highest emotional markers of participants of events, highlighting the prevailing spirit in past events, focusing on the individual existential priorities of contemporaries. Moreover, individual consciousness, personal memory is introduced into social memory through personal initiations and memoirs, thanks to sensuality and image. The living word of a non-engaged participant and a witness is able to influence social identification constants more strongly than endless volumes of objective statistics and mountains of grand memorials.
It is reasonable for a convinced pessimist to say that the author of the memories could bring something from himself, not know or subjectively interpret all the circumstances that had taken place. Could But, it is precisely in the vitality and problematic nature of the solution of the questions that a huge educational potential is laid. Historians, in pursuit of objectivity, express a conjunction of two mutually exclusive thoughts: “the historian should avoid expressing moral judgments about the past” and, in doing so, “history should serve the moral education of the youth”. How can you bring up, without expressing moral judgments, historians have not explained. And they do not do what the old veteran easily does, setting the reader the most real analytical task: what was to be done under the prevailing conditions. This approach allows you to tell the truth about the war without glorifying the war itself. Memories of the participants themselves ask questions themselves show the basis by which the narrator was guided. Thus, the narrator puts the listener in a situation in which each person can find himself without having a “moral decree”.
As it is known, public consciousness is always not free from political influence and even from political mythology. Over the years that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War as a whole and its main events, including the Caribbean Crisis and Anadyr, have been rethought many times. At present, when a kind of unprecedented national discussion is unfolding in society, focusing on the question: should geopolitical activity be curtailed, the Crimea returned, the Donbass to be merged and unhappy Syria to be torn to pieces by the partners in exchange for withdrawal Western sanctions and the preservation of the liberal political course, especially important is the collective memory of veterans of the not so distant past. Books V.V. Shevchenko essentially contains a generalized answer to this central question. Understanding the Cold War by the absolute majority of its participants as a response to the aggressive aspirations of the West challenges liberal historiography and brings back to life the traditional perception of memory as a confrontation to values alien to most Russians. This confrontation can be traced throughout almost the entire national history and the Cold War is only a stage of centuries-old reality. In this regard, the author’s conviction, shared by almost all participants in Operation Anadyr, that there was essentially no choice, deserves special attention, just as Russia's territorial expansion was a response to the aggressive and unreasonable behavior of its neighbors in order to secure its existence, and the desire to deploy missiles in Cuba, in close proximity to the United States, was a retaliatory threat to the strengthening of NATO along the borders of the Soviet Union.
It is characteristic that after more than half a century, after all doubts about the political expediency of the participation of Soviet soldiers in various conflicts and wars of the Cold War, after the liberal "demythologization" of Soviet history (in fact, which turned into artificial propaganda of liberal dogmas and stereotypes), the vast majority of veterans are proud its combat past. "To us, who have fulfilled our sacred military duty with dignity, is not ashamed of the past, we worthily pass the baton of goodness, patriotism and love for the Motherland to the younger generation, unite in social organizations and groups, striving to strengthen the veteran fraternity, we cherish the memory of our comrades, who left behind their lives, fulfilling the order of the Fatherland! " - stresses in this regard, V.V. Shevchenko . The thoughts of another participant of the Cold War, General AG, are quite consonant with this statement. Isengulov (of the Republic of Kazakhstan), who today believes that our deeds and actions related to participation in the events of the Cold War were right, that "we were then small cogs of a huge military machine, but it was these cogs that forged a great victory ..." . This fully applies to the participants of the military-strategic operation "Anadyr". Naturally, pride cannot be altered even by the offense of insult - Motherland (as opposed to fraternal Cuba) has never been able to appreciate the merits of veterans only formally recognized as participants in the hostilities. The heroes of 1962, who did not allow a third world war, were explained that they did not fight, they were not allowed any privileges . I would like to believe that, albeit with a huge delay, government agencies will correct historical injustice, especially since the current generation of military personnel well remembers those recent times when "Russia did not complain about its defenders with fame or ruble." However, the existing experience of fighting for the legal rights of veterans of Operation Danube leaves no hope for a positive resolution of this issue in the near future ... And the participants in Operation Anadyr are becoming less and less every year ...
1. In modern research literature, “historical memory” continues to remain a strictly non-formalizable basic scientific concept, which has its own specific content for various authors. On our understanding of this concept, see pod .: Bogdanov V.V., Fomenko O.A., Baylov A.V. Social memory. Maikop: JSC "Polygraph-YUG", 2015.
2. This, in particular, is evidenced by the experience of research work that has been underway for almost four decades, a huge interdisciplinary international team of participants in the “places of memory” project by P. Nora and their followers who identify themselves with the “history of memory” research direction. See other: Nora P. World celebration of memory // Immediate reserve. 2005. N2. C.202-208.
3. See, for example: Operation “Anadyr” // Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Defense of Russia) [electronic resource], URL: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/[email protected]&_print = true / (reference date: 6.07.2017), etc.
4. It was not by chance that, probably, the command of the Soviet grouping in Cuba was entrusted to a recognized “master of swift raids”, capable of captivating subordinates by personal example, the legendary I.A. Plievu. See, for example. Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev // Heroes of the country. [electronic resource]. URL: http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=343 / (appeal date: 6.07.2017).
5. On the Caribbean crisis and the operation "Anadyr", see also: The website of the GVASC veterans [Electronic resource]. http://www.gsvsk.ru/ (appeal date: 6.07.2017); Operation Anadyr: Facts. Memories. Documents (Caribbean Crisis, Year 1962 ...). M., 1997; Esin V.I. 1962 Caribbean Crisis of the Year: Open-ended Questions and the Most Instructive Lessons // FACULTY OF WORLD POLICY MSU. Mv LOMONOSOV [Electronic resource]. URL: fmp.msu.ru/attachments/article/252/ESIN_1_2013.PDF / (access date: 6.07.2017); Svilas S. Historiography and sources on the history of the Caribbean crisis // DEVELOPMENT. International Public Association for Research and Informational and Educational Programs [electronic resource]. URL: evolutio.info/content/view/526/53/ (access date: 6.07.2017), etc.
6. The first edition of the book was published in 2011. See: V. Shevchenko. Towards dawn. Rostov-on-Don: Altair, 2011. In 2013, the book was substantially revised, supplemented and republished. See: V. Shevchenko. Towards dawn. Part of 1. 1968 events of the year in facts and documents. Rostov-on-Don: Altair, 2013; Shevchenko V.V. Towards dawn. Part of 2. 1968 events of the year in the memories of the participants. Rostov-on-Don: Altair, 2013.
7. Shevchenko V.V. Reminder. The actions of the Soviet troops in order to preserve the socialist system in Hungary 1956 Rostov-on-Don: Altair, 2016.
8. The first public performance of V.V. Shevchenko took place in 2011. See: Shevchenko V. “If we had not had time, the third world war would have started and there would have been much more victims” // 161.RU [electronic resource]. URL: http://161.ru/text/person/363652.html / (the date of the appeal 6.07.2017).
In the same year, the site of the Rostov organization Danube-68 began to operate: Dawn 21 | About Operation Danube 21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia [electronic resource]. URL: http://rassvet21-go.ru / (appeal date: 6.07.2017).
9. See Podr .: On 161.ru the presentation of the book "Towards Dawn" was held [Electronic resource]. URL: http://m.161.ru/text/newsline/459899.html / (appeal date: 6.07.2017); The seminar "45 years of the military strategic operation" Danube "was held in SFedU // Southern Federal University [electronic resource]. URL: http://sfedu.ru/www/stat_pages22.show?p=PR/news1/D¶ms=(p_nws_id =% 3E46009) / (appeal date: 6.07.2017); A seminar on the Cold War was held at SFUU // Southern Federal University [electronic resource]. URL: http://sfedu.ru/www/stat_pages22.show?p=PR/ news1 / D & params = (p_nws_id =% 3E51568) / (appeal date: 6.07.2017); In Taganrog, General Shevchenko presented the book "NaPominanie" to students // 1Rnd.ru. Rostov-on-Don website [electronic resource]. URL: https: //www.1rnd.ru/news/1614318 / (appeal date: 6.07.2017), etc. There were joint articles that caused a wide social resonance. See: Bulgakov VV, Shevchenko VV, Bailov AV “Prague Spring” or military-strategic operation “Danube”? // Southern Russian Lawyer, 2015, N 3, p.44-45; Bulgakov VV, Shevchenko VV, Bailov AV Once again on the Prague Spring, Operation Danube and the threat of a big war in Europe in 1968 // Tam same, 2015, N 3, s. 46-49; Bulgakov V.V., Shevchenko V.V., Baylov A.V. On the 60 anniversary of the 1956 events in Hungary // Ibid., 2016, N 3, p. 36-37 et al.
10. Shevchenko V.V. 25 February 2016, the Cuban ambassador presented awards to our countrymen who participated in the operation "Anadyr" in 1962 / / DAWN 21-GO | About operation "DANAY" 21 August 1968g. in Czechoslovakia [electronic resource]. URL: http://rassvet21-go.ru/index.php/component/content/article/18-obrashcheniya-pozdravleniya/243-kubinskie-nagrady-nashli-geroev?tmpl=component&print=1&page= / (access date: ).
11. Letter of Aitkali Isengulov // DAWN 21-GO | About operation "DANAY" 21 August 1968g. in Czechoslovakia [electronic resource]. URL: http://www.rassvet21-go.ru/index.php/12-rostovskoe-regionalnoe-dvizhenie-voinov-internatsionalistov-operatsii-qdunajq/10-pismo-ajtkali-isengulov / (access date: 6.07.2017)
12. Warriors-second-class internationalists // DAWN 21-GO | About operation "DANAY" 21 August 1968g. in Czechoslovakia [electronic resource]. URL: http://rassvet21-go.ru/index.php/stranichka-istorika/knigi-stati-publitsistika/247-voiny-internatsionalisty-vtorogo-sorta?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page= / (date::): address: </ i> / </ i> and print = xNUMX <p> </ p> ).