Military Review

Russian Nuclear Forces: Mace

34
The tension in political circles, the press and the network of debates about the fate of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles is incredibly high. With reinforced concrete arguments and a sense of self-righteousness, the sides defend who is the Bulava, who is the Blue, who are liquid rockets, who are solid propellants. In this article, without going into the debates of the parties, we will try to decompose the whole bundle of problems into more or less understandable components.


The debate, of course, is about the future of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, in which many are not without reason inclined to see the main guarantee of the state sovereignty of our country. The main problem that exists today is the gradual elimination of old Soviet ICBMs that could carry several warheads at once. This applies to missiles R-20 (ten warheads) and UR-100H (six warheads). They are being replaced by the solid-fuel “Topol-M” mine and mobile-based (one warhead per missile) and the RS-24 “Yars” (three warheads). If we take into account that new missiles come into service rather slowly (there are only six Yars adopted), the future is not very bright: in the Strategic Missile Forces in expanded form there will be less and less carriers and especially warheads. The current START-3 treaty gives Russia the right to have up to 700 deployed and 100 non-deployed carriers and up to 1550 deployed warheads, but in the current state of affairs there are big doubts that after writing off all the old missile technology, such indicators for our country will be achievable even taking into account the sea and aviation components of the nuclear triad. Where to get so many new missiles?

Russian Nuclear Forces: Mace

The PC-20 rocket, also known as the P-36M and Satan, became the apotheosis of the Soviet school of developing heavy ICBMs. The rocket was created in the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhnoye design bureau, where all engineering documentation and production facilities related to the rocket remained to this day. The mass drop rate for this two-stage mine-based missile is 7300 kg. Mortar start from the launch container.

Relevance of choice

The topic of comparative advantages and disadvantages of liquid and solid propellant rocket engines is also very debatable, and there are two reasons for this. The first is the future of Russian SLBMs and, in general, the maritime component of the nuclear triad. All the SLBMs currently in service have been developed at the Makeev center (Miass), and all of them are built according to a liquid scheme. In 1986, the Makeevans began work on a solid-fuel Bark SLBM for SSBNs of the Borey 955 project. However, in 1998, after an unsuccessful launch, the project was closed, and the topic of a solid-fuel offshore rocket was transferred to the Moscow Thermal Engineering Institute, as was said, to unify the product with Topol-M. "Topol-M" - the brainchild of MIT, and the experience of creating solid-fuel rockets in this company was. But what MIT did not have was experience in designing an SLBM. The decision to transfer the maritime theme to the land-based design bureau is still puzzling and controversial among the military-industrial complex, and, of course, everything that happens around the Bulava does not leave indifferent representatives of the Makeyev Center of Culture. Makeyevtsy continued successful launches of their “Sinevy” (R-29RMU2), built, of course, at the LRE, and solid-fuel Bulava only this summer conducted the first and successful launch from the standard SSBN of the 955 project. As a result, the situation is approximately as follows: Russia has a reliable liquid-based Sineva SLBM, but no one is going to build submarines of the 667BDRM project under it. On the contrary, for a lighter Bulava, which only barely showed signs of stable work, one Borey RPK (Yuri Dolgoruky) has already been built, and in the next six years seven more submarines of this class will appear. Intrigue added the May launch of a new Makeevsk development - the Liner SLBM, which, according to unofficial information, is a modification of the “Sinevy” with a modified head part and is now capable of holding about ten low-power warheads. “Liner” was launched from the board of the K-84 “Ekaterinburg” SSBN - and this is the boat of the same 667BDRM project on which the “Sineva” is based.


Liquid rocket engine (LRE) - a very complex machine. The presence of a fuel supply system (including moving elements) in it, on the one hand, facilitates the control of a rocket, and on the other, it places high demands on reliability.

Nostalgia for "Satan"

There is one more reason why the “LRE vs. RDTT” theme was in the spotlight. This year, the General Staff and a number of representatives of the military industrial complex made semi-official statements about their intention to create a new ground-based heavy rocket at the LRE by 2018, apparently based on the developments of Makeyev GRTS. The new carrier will become a classmate gradually leaving in history complex PC-20, nicknamed in the West "Satan". A heavy split-head rocket will be able to receive a significant number of warheads, which would help to cope with a possible future shortage of launch vehicles for nuclear weapons. In unison, the General Staff on the pages of the press was made by the honorary general designer of the NPO Mashinostroeniya, Herbert Yefremov. He proposed to restore cooperation with the Dnipropetrovsk Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Ukraine) and “repeat” both stages of the Р-20 (Р-362M) at their production facilities. For this time-tested heavy base, Russian designers would be able to supply new warhead dilution units and a new control system. Thus, both ground and sea Russian ballistic missiles on a solid propellant rocket motor device have a promising liquid fuel alternative, even if it is real in one case and very hypothetical in the other.

RDTT: line of defense

The relative advantages and disadvantages of LRE and RTDT are well known. Liquid engine is more difficult to manufacture, it includes moving parts (pumps, turbines), but it is easy to control the flow of fuel, easier control and maneuvering. A solid-fuel rocket is structurally much simpler (in fact, the fuel checker burns in it), but it is much more difficult to control this burning. The required thrust parameters are achieved by varying the chemical composition of the fuel and the geometry of the combustion chamber. In addition, the manufacture of the fuel charge requires special control: air bubbles and foreign inclusions should not penetrate into the charge, otherwise the combustion will become uneven, which will affect the load. However, for both schemes, nothing is impossible, and no shortcomings of solid propellant solid propellant engines did not prevent the Americans from making all their strategic missiles using a solid-fuel scheme. In our country, the question is posed somewhat differently: are our technologies for creating solid-fuel missiles sufficiently advanced to solve the military-political tasks facing the country, or is it better to turn to the old proven fuel-oil schemes behind which we have a decades-long tradition?


Modern solid rocket fuel usually consists of aluminum or magnesium powder (it plays the role of fuel), ammonium perchlorate as an oxidizing agent and a binder (like synthetic rubber). Binder also acts as a fuel, and at the same time a source of gases that act as a working medium. The mixture is poured into the mold, inserted into the engine and polymerized. Then the form is deleted.

Supporters of heavier liquid-propellant rockets consider the low mass to be cast as the main drawback of domestic solid-fuel projects. The Bulava also claims in range, the parameters of which are approximately at the level of Trident I, that is, the American SLBM of the previous generation. To this guide, MIT responds that the lightness and compactness of the Bulava have their advantages. In particular, the rocket is more resistant to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion and to the effects of a laser weapons, has an advantage over a heavy missile in the event of a breakthrough of a missile defense system of a potential enemy. The decrease in the mass being thrown can be compensated by more accurate aiming at the target. As for the range, then to reach the main centers of any likely opponents it is enough, even if you shoot from the pier. Of course, if a target is too far, the SSBN can approach it. Defenders of solid-propellant rockets make a special emphasis on a lower trajectory of their flight and on a better dynamics, which makes it possible to reduce the active portion of the trajectory several times in comparison with the rockets on the LRE. The reduction of the active segment, that is, that part of the trajectory along which the ballistic missile flies with the main engines enabled, is considered important from the point of view of achieving greater stealth for the missile defense system. If, however, we allow the emergence of space-based strike weapons, which is currently prohibited by international treaties, but one day can become a reality, then, of course, the higher the ballistic missile goes up with the blazing torch, the more vulnerable it will be. Another argument of supporters of solid propellant rocket propellers is, of course, the use of a “sweet couple” - asymmetric dimethyl hydrazine as a fuel and diazoto tetraoxide as an oxidizer (heptyl-amyl). And although solid fuel incidents also happen: for example, at the Votkinsk plant, where Russian rockets are made on solid propellants, the engine exploded in 2004, the consequences of a highly toxic heptyl spill, say, on a submarine can be disastrous for the entire crew.



Maneuverability and invulnerability

What do liquid fuel traditions say in response to this? The most characteristic objection belongs to Herbert Efremov in his correspondence debate with the leadership of MIT. From his point of view, the difference in the active area between missiles with liquid propellant rocket engines and solid propellant rocket motors is not so great and not so important when passing a missile defense system compared with much higher maneuverability. With an advanced missile defense system, it will be necessary to significantly speed up the distribution of warheads on targets with the help of the so-called bus, a special breeding stage, which, changing its direction each time, sets the direction for the next warhead. Opponents from MIT tend to abandon the “bus”, believing that heads should be able to maneuver and be aimed at the target on their own.

Critics of the idea of ​​the revival of heavy liquid-fuel rockets point to the fact that the likely successor of Satan will certainly be a silo-based rocket. The coordinates of the mines are known to the probable enemy, and in the case of an attempt to deliver a so-called disarming strike to the missile deployment site, they will undoubtedly be among the priority targets. However, it is not so easy to get into the mine, and it is even more difficult to destroy it, despite the fact that, for example, Topol-M mobile complexes, which are slow-moving and moving across open areas in a strictly defined area, are much more vulnerable.


Mine-based missile replacement. Technique is not eternal, especially this one, on which too much depends. Strategic nuclear forces have to be updated. Nowadays, light single-piece solid fuel "Topol-M" is installed in the mines instead of the monsters of the era of the "cold war" who used 6 − 10 warheads. One rocket - one warhead. Now about five dozen Topol-M are deployed in the mine version. Constructive development of Topol-M - the Y-rocket R-24, although it can hold three warheads, exists only in a mobile version and in unit quantities.

The problem of poisonous heptyl is now being solved by ampulling rocket tanks. However, heptyl, for all its fantastic toxicity, is unique in its energy density fuel. In addition, it is very cheap, because it turns out as a by-product in chemical production, which makes the “liquid” project more attractive from an economic point of view (as already mentioned, solid fuels are very demanding to the process, and therefore very expensive). Despite some demonization of UDMH (heptyl), which in public consciousness is associated exclusively with military projects and possible environmental disasters, this fuel is used for quite peaceful purposes during the launch of heavy Proton and Dnepr rockets, and it has long been completely safe to work with it, how it works with many other industrial substances. Only the recent accident with the progress of cargo Progress over Altai, carrying cargo of heptyl and amyl on the ISS, once again slightly damaged the reputation of asymmetric dimethyl hydrazine.

On the other hand, it is unlikely that the price of fuel is of fundamental importance in the operation of an ICBM; after all, ballistic missiles fly extremely rarely. Another question is how much it will cost to create a heavy carrier, despite the fact that the Bulava has already swallowed up many billions. Obviously, cooperation with Ukraine is the last thing that our authorities and the military-industrial complex will do, because no one will abandon such a serious matter to the will of a volatile political course.

The question of the future components of Russian strategic nuclear forces is too close to politics to remain a purely technical matter. Behind the comparison of concepts and schemes, the controversy in power and in society, of course, is not only a comparison of rational considerations, but also conflicts of interests and ambitions. Of course, everyone has their own truth, but I would like the public interest to prevail. And how it will be provided technically, let the experts decide.
Author:
Originator:
https://www.popmech.ru/weapon/12014-tyazhela-li-nasha-bulava-rakety/
34 comments
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  1. Romario_Argo
    Romario_Argo 6 November 2017 17: 12
    12
    the feeling that the article was reprinted from another resource and not checked for relevance of information
    1. Pan_hrabio
      Pan_hrabio 6 November 2017 17: 55
      +5
      The way it is. The source is listed under the article, and there:

      The article "Is our" Mace "heavy?" published in the journal Popular Mechanics (No. 10, October 2011)
      1. Romario_Argo
        Romario_Argo 6 November 2017 20: 24
        +6
        Well, why do we need the source of 10 years ago ????
        where is the author’s personal work ???
        moderators delete this article
        1. Krabik
          Krabik 11 November 2017 03: 09
          0
          And I like to become - it is much better than printing about any other Ukraine or other rubbish.

          Although it would be possible to update the article a little, nevertheless there were not a few Bulava launches and submarines were being built.

          You can insert a Nemesis comment at the end of the article so that it is clear that everything is not so bad;)
      2. Left shot
        Left shot 11 November 2017 14: 45
        0
        Popmehanika - famous yellowness
  2. Nemesis
    Nemesis 6 November 2017 18: 34
    20
    To date, according to information from open sources, the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation have 96 RS-24 ,, YRS '' missiles which carry 384 nuclear warheads. One RS-24 missile can carry 3-4 warheads of 300-500 ct each, or 6 warheads of 150 ct each. According to open data in the Russian Federation, on each RS-24 there are 4 nuclear warheads of 300 ct each ..... In addition, the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation have 78 RT-2PM2 ,, Topol-M '' missiles, each of which has 1 nuclear warhead with a capacity of in 1mt. The number of Liner missiles is not exactly known, but it can be assumed that they re-equipped the K-84 nuclear submarine Yekaterinburg, which underwent a major overhaul and modernization. As a result, we have at least 16 Liner missiles, each of which has 4 500 kt warheads (a total of 64 warheads). In addition, there are 48 R-30 ,, Bulava '' missiles (they have 288 nuclear warheads), 6 of which have 150 kW each. Bottom line: Today, Russia has at least 238 new strategic ballistic missiles, which carry 814 nuclear warheads with capacities from 150 kt to 1 mt ... Is this a lot or a little ?! Given the expansion of the US missile defense system, in my personal opinion, the Russian Federation needs to withdraw from the Strategic Missile Forces limitation treaty and increase the number of missile carriers in the Strategic Missile Forces by placing warheads of at least 100 kt each on them. As for the author’s question - Where to get the money ?! Turn the embezzlers inside out. If you do not really begin to fight corruption, Russia will never have enough money. It's time to end with Putin's amnesties for thieves and terrorists.
    1. Krabik
      Krabik 11 November 2017 03: 21
      +2
      Let me explain why they make an amnesty for stolen money.

      So you stole a billion rubles from the construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome and took them abroad.

      If you just start the persecution, then this money will be lost because all offshore companies are controlled by the USA and England, and theft in the Russian Federation is beneficial for them.

      In order to somehow return at least part of the money, an amnesty is made and the stolen money comes partially back to the country in the form of investments.

      Now take the embezzlers and the fight against them.
      Well, how do you imagine this fight when, during Putin’s message to the country, embezzlers are sitting in front of him and he’s talking to them all about them so that they don’t steal ?!

      Even the word theft was replaced by corruption.

      It looks ridiculous ...
      1. Nemesis
        Nemesis 11 November 2017 03: 53
        +1
        Living people need money, not the dead, and the best way to fight corruption is the hangman ... Yeltsin’s era drove Russia into the swamp and Putin is clearly not able to get Russia out of it. Russia needs a new president who will bury the Yeltsin era and its policies. Until Yeltsin is buried, Russia cannot develop.
        1. Krabik
          Krabik 11 November 2017 06: 50
          +2
          There will be no power to hang itself - this is simple logic!

          It's not about Putin.

          Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the nomenclature that now rules the country was nurtured.
          Just replacing Putin with Lenin will not give anything from the word at all.
          He will either be killed or removed quite quickly.

          Here is a striking example from modern life - Trump.

          He came all in white to the throne, and they began to haul him in the face on the floor and part of the team was removed.
          Now it has come to the point that he is afraid of meeting with Putin for fear of persecution at home.
          1. Nemesis
            Nemesis 11 November 2017 08: 20
            +1
            Here I agree with you, but there are good examples. For example, the displacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev ... Someone is FOR, but there are always those who are against.
            1. Krabik
              Krabik 11 November 2017 08: 35
              +1
              However, the example is not correct.

              You offered to change the era of Yeltsin, but Khrushchev’s change to Brezhnev’s era did not change, and the nomenclature apparatus remained the same.

              But I will give you an example where the era has really changed - this is the October Revolution of 1917!

              Are you ready to arrange a massacre in the country for the sake of another bright future, or will we live like that?
              1. Nemesis
                Nemesis 11 November 2017 10: 49
                +1
                Yes, how can I say. Khrushchev and Brezhnev are far from the same thing. 1917 is an undesirable thing.
  3. andr327
    andr327 6 November 2017 19: 10
    +6
    With all my love for strategic missiles,. What the moderators wanted to say by posting this article on the VO is a big question. No news, no polemics. - Some outdated data and hackneyed truths.
  4. Eurodav
    Eurodav 6 November 2017 19: 42
    0
    Hey, with a nut on the flag and a black hat on the bastard, why don’t you discuss the topic? Zionists !!! Let’s, boldly, Professor, Voyakaukh, etc. Feel the bend of history? After the mattresses, come off you! I emphasize-the Zionists !!! Jews are different ..
    1. andr327
      andr327 6 November 2017 19: 54
      +4
      What is this about? Eurodav got into the wrong place
      Sorry cons removed
  5. Dzafdet
    Dzafdet 6 November 2017 20: 04
    0
    The saddest thing is that the Mace still flies through time. And MIT is already giving birth to a new Mace. This again billions to the wind ...
    1. bk316
      bk316 6 November 2017 23: 18
      +5
      still flies through time.

      Yah? Of the last 16 launches, 15 successful ones - is this through time?
      It doesn’t matter what, the main thing is to blur something?
  6. mvg
    mvg 6 November 2017 22: 22
    +3
    It is for such affectors that the "minus signs" must be returned
  7. bk316
    bk316 6 November 2017 23: 13
    +5
    He began to read and went nuts: where did all the ICBMs produced in the last five years go?
    Then I realized that this is a reprint of 11 years. Well, why?
    The only point is to show how we stepped forward
  8. Old26
    Old26 6 November 2017 23: 48
    +2
    Quote: andr327
    With all my love for strategic missiles,. What the moderators wanted to say by posting this article on the VO is a big question. No news, no polemics. - Some outdated data and hackneyed truths.

    And besides a bunch of mistakes. You don’t even have to list everything (and there are blunders in terms of both quantity and weight cast) - you can touch only one blunder from the author - the R-20 rocket
  9. Old26
    Old26 6 November 2017 23: 49
    +2
    Quote: bk316
    He began to read and went nuts: where did all the ICBMs produced in the last five years go?
    Then I realized that this is a reprint of 11 years. Well, why?
    The only point is to show how we stepped forward

    So loy this would have to compare what has been done over these 6 years.
    1. bk316
      bk316 7 November 2017 13: 27
      +2
      it would be necessary to compare what has been done over these 6 years

      Yes, it would be very interesting and that the specialist would write, and not stupidly compile the sources.
      Maybe write? bully
  10. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 7 November 2017 02: 20
    0
    Yes, an outdated article. And something I did not see about the difference in reliability when navigating on a submarine with liquid and solid-fuel missiles - I believe that this was the reason for replacing liquid ... with solid ... with submarines. And not a word ...
  11. cost 75
    cost 75 7 November 2017 06: 31
    +1
    What year is the article?
  12. Xscorpion
    Xscorpion 7 November 2017 11: 05
    +3
    Quote: kos 75
    What year is the article?


    BC along the way. Topol is just different from the Topol RGCh, and they already started to put them in the late 90s. I’m generally silent about the vulnerability of the PGRK to mine complexes. According to the author, the Americans have one rocket hundreds of sq. Km of taiga that covers where one PGRK division is located.
  13. Old26
    Old26 7 November 2017 15: 31
    0
    Quote: Xscorpion
    about our era along the way. Topol-m is just different from Poplar RGCh, and they began to put them in the late 90's

    "Poplar-M" does not differ from "Poplar" by the presence of RGCh. Both the one and the other have monoblocks. Although later “Topol-M” became the multi-headed “Yars”
  14. Xscorpion
    Xscorpion 7 November 2017 17: 30
    +1
    Quote: Old26
    Quote: Xscorpion
    about our era along the way. Topol-m is just different from Poplar RGCh, and they began to put them in the late 90's

    "Poplar-M" does not differ from "Poplar" by the presence of RGCh. Both the one and the other have monoblocks. Although later “Topol-M” became the multi-headed “Yars”


    It was created in one-piece, but with the prospect of RGCh, many regiments got up on the database already with RGCh. Then they decided to refuse in favor of the RS-24, which, as you correctly noticed, was made on the basis of Topol-M with the RGCh. The only thing that I’m a little wrong indicated that in the 90s there were only monoblock, RGCh went only in the 2000s
  15. Dzafdet
    Dzafdet 7 November 2017 19: 08
    0
    - September 2013, 06 - from the White Sea with the Alexander Nevsky SSBN, within the framework of the State Test Program for SSBNs, the Bulava SLBM was launched at the Kura training ground in Kamchatka. The initial phase of the flight was normal, but in the second minute of the flight there was a malfunction in the onboard missile systems (source). Consequently, a failure occurred during the operation of the second stage of the rocket (it works from the 50th to the 90th second of flight, see above). Later in the media it was reported that the command to turn off the rocket engines was issued by the rocket control system, it is also reported that since the launch was carried out as part of the SSBN test program, the rocket was not equipped with a telemetric system (source). Presumably, the launch was not test, but combat training and should have been carried out on command of a new automated control system for launching SLBMs (source). As a result, on September 7, 2013, the Minister of Defense of Russia Sergey Shoigu decided to conduct an additional 5 launches of the Bulava SLBM (source).

    - September 2013, 14 - Kommersant weekly reports, citing a source in the military-industrial complex about the reasons for the emergency start on September 06.09.2013, 90 - “There is XNUMX% confidence that the reason lies in the problems with the second-stage retractable nozzle nozzle. Most likely, it came out only partially, as a result of which the engine could not reach the rated thrust. "

    - October 2013, 04 - the source reports that the State Commission on Emergency Launch of Bulava SLBMs completed its work on September 06.09.2013, XNUMX. The cause of the accident is established. The missiles that need to be returned to the factory are few, all of them are installed. The problem is not design. The whole series will not respond.

    - November 2013, 13 - Media reports - The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, said that in 2013 no Bulava missile launches were planned. All launches under the test program will be carried out in 2014.

    - November 2013, 15 - The media report that the reasons for the unsuccessful launch on September 6 became known - an unopened nozzle of the second stage of the rocket. The reason is a manufacturing defect in a batch of 4 rockets - a defect in the material of the nozzle.

    - November 2013, 26 - media report plans to re-equip the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant in the period 2014-2017, which will double the production of missiles. Earlier, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised to double the production of Bulava, Yars, and Iskander-M missiles since 2013 during a visit to the Votkinsk plant on March 21, 2011.

    - 2013, end of November - the construction of the 1st and 2nd storage facilities for Bulava missiles in Okolnaya Bay was launched by the forces of the Spetsstroy of Russia. construction of storage facilities No. 3 and No. 4 is scheduled to begin in October 2014. The storage facilities are designed for 200 Bulava missiles.

    - May 2014, 23 - Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Yuri Borisov announced that Bulava missile launches will resume in autumn 2014 (source)
    Quote: bk316
    still flies through time.

    Yah? Of the last 16 launches, 15 successful ones - is this through time?
    It doesn’t matter what, the main thing is to blur something?

    2012 August 10 - the media reported that during the tests all the ammunition of the Bulava missiles was used up and to complete the tests in 2012, missiles from the standard Yuriy Dolgoruky SSBN ammunition will probably be consumed. Earlier it was also reported that the completion of tests of the armament complex of the SSBN Yuri Dolgoruky would be carried out without launching a rocket.

    - 2012 August 17 - the media reported that the only launch of the Bulava SLBM in 2012 will take place in November as part of the trials of the Alexander Nevsky SSBN. After this launch, SSBNs will probably be admitted to the Navy.

    - September 2012, 21 - with reference to the statement of the Minister of Defense of Russia Anatoly Serdyukov, the media report problems with the software of the Bulava automatic ballistic missile control system, which prevent it from continuing to test it (source).

    - April 2013, 12 - the general director of FSUE NPO Avtomatiki Leonid Shalimov told the media that during 2013 two launches of the Bulava SLBM with “confirmation of the consignment of missiles” are planned. Shalimov noted that the Bulava complex was handed over to the Navy for trial operation, therefore, all emergency situations that may arise during the launch of the Bulava are associated with manufacturing defects, and not with design developments. A source in the Russian defense industry reports that in late June and early July, the first nuclear-powered nuclear submarine Alexander Nevsky of project 955 (code Borey) will go to sea to continue state testing. for the first time it should be carried out on a command transferred from Moscow through a new automated combat control system for launching these missiles. "

    - June 2013, 18 - media report that in the 3rd and 4th quarters of 2013 it is planned to launch the Bulava SLBM. One launch is planned with SSBN Alexander Nevsky, the second with Vladimir Monomakh. One of the two launches will be two-rocket.

    - August 2013, 28 - a source citing ITAR-TASS reports that in the fall of 2013 it is planned to make a single launch of the Bulava SLBM with the experimental Dmitry Donskoy SSBN pr.941UM.

    - September 2013, 06 - from the White Sea with the Alexander Nevsky SSBN, within the framework of the State Test Program for SSBNs, the Bulava SLBM was launched at the Kura training ground in Kamchatka. The initial phase of the flight was normal, but in the second minute of the flight there was a malfunction in the onboard missile systems (source). Consequently, a failure occurred during the operation of the second stage of the rocket (it works from the 50th to the 90th second of flight, see above). Later in the media it was reported that the command to turn off the rocket engines was issued by the rocket control system, it is also reported that since the launch was carried out as part of the SSBN test program, the rocket was not equipped with a telemetric system (source). Presumably, the launch was not test, but combat training and should have been carried out on command of a new automated control system for launching SLBMs (source). As a result, on September 7, 2013, the Minister of Defense of Russia Sergey Shoigu decided to conduct an additional 5 launches of the Bulava SLBM (source).

    - September 2013, 14 - Kommersant weekly reports, citing a source in the military-industrial complex about the reasons for the emergency start on September 06.09.2013, 90 - “There is XNUMX% confidence that the reason lies in the problems with the second-stage retractable nozzle nozzle. Most likely, it came out only partially, as a result of which the engine could not reach the rated thrust. "

    - October 2013, 04 - the source reports that the State Commission on Emergency Launch of Bulava SLBMs completed its work on September 06.09.2013, XNUMX. The cause of the accident is established. The missiles that need to be returned to the factory are few, all of them are installed. The problem is not design. The whole series will not respond.

    - November 2013, 13 - Media reports - The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, said that in 2013 no Bulava missile launches were planned. All launches under the test program will be carried out in 2014.

    - November 2013, 15 - The media report that the reasons for the unsuccessful launch on September 6 became known - an unopened nozzle of the second stage of the rocket. The reason is a manufacturing defect in a batch of 4 rockets - a defect in the material of the nozzle.

    - November 2013, 26 - media report plans to re-equip the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant in the period 2014-2017, which will double the production of missiles. Earlier, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin promised to double the production of Bulava, Yars, and Iskander-M missiles since 2013 during a visit to the Votkinsk plant on March 21, 2011.

    - 2013, end of November - the construction of the 1st and 2nd storage facilities for Bulava missiles in Okolnaya Bay was launched by the forces of the Spetsstroy of Russia. construction of storage facilities No. 3 and No. 4 is scheduled to begin in October 2014. The storage facilities are designed for 200 Bulava missiles.

    - May 2014, 23 - Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Yuri Borisov announced that Bulava missile launches will resume in autumn 2014 (source)

    Yes, the language is trending - it's not tossing bags!
    1. Old26
      Old26 7 November 2017 20: 48
      0
      Kamrad! But you, in this very long post, said only about one unsuccessful launch
      In principle, your opponent said the wrong thing, but nonetheless

      1. successful
      2. successful
      3. 07.09.2006. failure
      4. 25.10.2006. failure
      5. 24.12.2006. failure
      6. partially successful
      7. 11.11.2007. failure
      8. partially successful
      9. successful
      10. 23.12.2008. failure
      11. 15.07.2009. failure
      12. 09.12.2009. failure
      13. successful.
      14. successful
      15.June 28.06.2011, XNUMX successful
      16.June 27.08.2011, XNUMX successful
      17. 28.10.2011/XNUMX/XNUMX successful single launch
      18. 23.12.2011/XNUMX/XNUMX, a successful two-rocket salvo
      19. September 06.09.2013, XNUMX, the launch took place, a failure in the second minute of the flight
      20 successful launch
      21. 29.10.2014, a successful launch
      22. 28.11.2014, a successful launch
      23. 14.11.2015/XNUMX/XNUMX, a successful two-rocket salvo
      24-25. 27.09.2016/XNUMX/XNUMX, partially successful two-rocket salvo
      26. 26.06.2017, a successful launch
      1. rudolff
        rudolff 7 November 2017 20: 57
        +1
        Vladimir, by failure do you mean emergency launches?
        1. rudolff
          rudolff 7 November 2017 21: 28
          +1
          In addition to emergency launches and launches with deviations from the inherent flight parameters, there were also failures on the prelaunch. More often associated with the missile itself, and not with the operation of the KBSK. Initially, such failures were reported, then, when they realized that this was spoiling the statistics, they stopped. But there are many failures, and even in recent "successful" years. Indirectly, you can find out about them by transferring launches. Due to weather conditions, difficult ice conditions, etc. Moreover, the boats leave for the launch areas and only then a message about the launch transfer. Moreover, the transfers immediately for several months at least. Just to retest all systems and troubleshoot. If these failures are included in the overall statistics, the picture will not be so rosy at all.
  16. Old26
    Old26 7 November 2017 23: 09
    0
    Quote: rudolff
    Vladimir, by failure do you mean emergency launches?

    Yes, of course, Rudolph. There were situations when out of 3 BBs 2 came to Kura, how to count this launch? How successful, partially successful or unsuccessful?

    Quote: rudolff
    In addition to emergency launches and launches with deviations from the inherent flight parameters, there were also failures on the prelaunch. More often associated with the missile itself, and not with the operation of the KBSK. Initially, such failures were reported, then, when they realized that this was spoiling the statistics, they stopped. But there are many failures, and even in recent "successful" years. Indirectly, you can find out about them by transferring launches. Due to weather conditions, difficult ice conditions, etc. Moreover, the boats leave for the launch areas and only then a message about the launch transfer. Moreover, the transfers immediately for several months at least. Just to retest all systems and troubleshoot. If these failures are included in the overall statistics, the picture will not be so rosy at all.

    It could even be. And I'm not saying that everything is welcome
    1. rudolff
      rudolff 8 November 2017 08: 20
      +1
      By the way, did you notice that the “authorship” of the latest launches of (2 + 1) SLBMs was not immediately voiced? The types of rockets are not even named.
  17. Old26
    Old26 8 November 2017 11: 30
    0
    Quote: rudolff
    By the way, did you notice that the “authorship” of the latest launches of (2 + 1) SLBMs was not immediately voiced? The types of rockets are not even named.

    Drew. And he was somewhat puzzled and surprised. Usually they immediately voiced what kind of product, but here initially it was only that from the north they shot one product at Kura, and from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk with two at the Chizh range.